Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Jihadist cyber"

The terrorist attack on the 11th of September, 2001, marked the change in the West’s perception of the Middle East and vice versa. Followed by the US military presence in the Middle East, this event contributed to the development of the means of terrorist actions around the world and the popularization of jihad. The hostile attitude of the West thus succeeded in maintaining the state of tension between the two spaces. Over time, jihadist and terrorist groups have been joined by members originating from the West who were convinced by the importance of the “missions” they later undertook. In the present paper, we will focus on the transposition and continuation of hostilities in both geographic and cyber spaces, with reference even to the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In this paper we introduce some relevant research results about the role of social embeddedness and social resources in the sphere of social conflicts and violence. In accordance with the actual state of the investigation process the outcomes presented in this analysis are focusing on the activities of the so called ‘Islamic State’or ISIS – considered to be a rather effective terrorism exporter recently. After briefly outlining the broader – global – context of terrorist organizations, the particular characteristics of the activities of ISIS and some elements of the conceptual frame, the study highlights empirically two potential explaining factors of the success of the terrorist organization. On the one hand the influencing network – primarily linked to the cyber sphere – of the Islamic State is explored, demonstrating a notable focus on the developed countries of Europe. On the other hand the paper summarizes the main conclusions from a case study on the recruitment base of the militants in Brussels of the terrorist organization investigating the relationship between the territorial distribution of the ISIS foreign fighters in city and the extent of segregation of the Islamic population in the different districts, including also certain socio-demographic factors to shed light on the significance of the broader – unfavourable – social context.

We used a web tool to extract Twitter API data on the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. The Twitter hashtag was used for a campaign denouncing the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Nigeria on the 14th of April 2014 by the Jihadist group Boko Haram. The data extracted covered the period spanning from the creation of the campaign (19th of May 2014) to the 16th of May 2019. The data were anonymous because they were provided in aggregate form, covering things such as: the number, content, and chronology of tweets; information on geographical area; the relevance of the users making comments; information on followers; the impact of tweets; ‘likes’; re-tweets; demographic profiles (gender); keyword information. These indications were provided in the form of mass, open data by Twitter’s API. The data was ordered and analysed by the research team during the course of the qualitative study to shed light on the cyber-campaign.

Cybercrime is one of the fastest-growing criminal activities in contemporary age. The first recorded cybercrime happened in France in the year 1820. It was not as sophisticated as cybercrime we know in our world today, but, still, that was a crime. Cybercrime has evolved globally as the online platform is progressing. While progress is made in the battle against cybercrime there still remains a wide gap in the consistency of laws across international borders. The main objectives of this study are to explore the nature of cybercrime in developing countries, find out the cyber threats for terrorist activities and explain cybercrime and threats from criminological aspects. This is a descriptive study which is based on secondary data. This study is based on previous researches & studies. this paper discusses the nature of cybercrime in developing countries. It could allow developed countries to understand better the national and international effects of that cyber threats, to determine the conditions of current regional and international agreements, and to help countries create a sound legal framework. And then we notice the impact of cyber threats all over the world. At last, we discuss cybercrime from criminological point of view. Cybercrime is not limited to two neighboring countries and cross-border conflicts; an attempt could be conducted from another world. It is fearful to see cyber wars as the easiest way to carry out sabotaging rather than wars such as cold war, chemical and biological wars, terrorist wars or jihadist attacks. The international legal framework aims by the International Criminal Court to keep offenders accountable for their actions. The government has by far the biggest burden and obstacle in raising knowledge of cybercrime among the people.

This paper examines hybrid threats to maritime transportation systems and their governance responses; focusing on the congested Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) as an illustrative case study. The methodology combines secondary sources with primary data from 42 expert interviews, a 28 respondent survey, and two maritime security roundtables. Key findings were that ships’ critical systems are increasingly interconnected, yet aging IT infrastructure and minimal cybersecurity awareness among crews heighten risks. Meanwhile, regional terrorist groups have previously targeted shipping and shown considerable skill in exploiting online tools, aligning with broader calls for jihadist violence. Furthermore, opportunistic piracy persists in the SOMS with the potential to disrupt shipping. Experts confirmed that maritime cybersecurity lags behind other critical infrastructure sectors and needs updated governance. Initial International Maritime Organization (IMO) guidelines lack specificity but revisions and updated IMO guidance are in process, while Port state implementation of maritime cybersecurity standards varies. Crucially, information sharing remains inadequate, even as recorded attacks increase. Findings underscore that although major hybrid incidents have not occurred, simulations and threat actors’ capabilities demonstrate potential for catastrophic collisions or cascading disruption in congested waterways. Mitigating factors like redundancy and crew training are deficient currently. Some alignment between SOMS states on maritime security cooperation exists, but not on cyber threats specifically. Key recommendations include an anonymous cyber attack reporting system, reinforced training and shipboard systems, and consolidated regional frameworks. Until these priorities are addressed, the analysis concludes that hybrid vulnerabilities in this vital global chokepoint remain a serious concern.

The article examines the role that mentoring, a critical relational leadership process would have in preventing and countering violent extremism by first examining the contexts of radicalization into violent extremism and past violent extremist attacks. Youths and adolescents in Kenya have been radicalized into violent extremism with resultant acts of terror that have resulted in; mass fatalities, casualties, destruction of facilities, disruption of livelihoods and business, and creation of immense fear within the public. The first major attack that seemed to have opened this cycle of al Qaeda and al Shabaab-led Jihadist attacks was the August, 1998 twin-bombing of the USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Since then, we have had the advent of; al Qaeda, its affiliate al Shabaab, and ISIS attacks rising within the African continent with heavy impacts of death trails, casualties, and destruction. This year, Kenya has suffered a number of attacks targeting both soft and hard targets. Among the soft targets was the attack targeting Dusit Hotel in the upmarket 14 Riverside Complex, which left 21 Kenyans and foreigners dead. By extension there have been a number of IED attacks targeting the security services of Kenya many fatalities and casualties. All these attacks have been executed by violent extremists among who are Kenyan youth who have been recruited and radicalized into violent extremism as an ideology that is leveraged on the Islam religion. This ideology of Jihadism is skewed but uses narratives that easily appeal to those targeted for radicalization. Consequently there is an urgent need to have in place relevant mentoring leadership practice to enhance worldviews and perspectives among youth and adolescents which are in tandem with what a sane world subscribes to. It then becomes imperative to have a faith-based mentoring approach that is devoid of extremism and which gives the pool of those targeted a leadership component. This deliver a countering and preventive relational leadership model enhancing resilience of individuals and communities, while countering narratives and propaganda inherent in the recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism. Following literature review and conceptualization of the variables, this article concludes that preventive and countering violent extremism measures are best deployed first amongst the youth, who form the largest and most vulnerable pool of those targeted for radicalization due to; their crave for an identity, promises of a utopian caliphate on earth and life upon death, poverty, joblessness, presence of ungoverned spaces such as the complex cyber space, and dysfunctional social systems including families.

Abstract Long before the eight-stranded weave of ecocritical plot in Richard Powers's Pulitzer Prize–winning The Overstory (2018) and, since then, the interlace between inset astrobiological bedtime stories and the environmentalist passions of family psychodrama in his Booker-nominated Bewilderment (2021), an important turn-of-the-millennium work by this MacArthur-lauded novelist, Plowing the Dark (2000), remains his most strenuous venture in what this article calls the open-circuit structure of his typical multi-plot narratives. Scenes of secretly funded VR aesthetics in the high-tech America of “research and development” are pitted against the contrasting affect, emphatically detached in space and time, of savage sensory deprivation suffered by an Arab American US citizen as jihadist prisoner in Beirut. Only at the eleventh hour of plot time is this man's plight revealed, by proximate cause, to render him, in retrospect, the indirect victim (spoiler alert) of electronic sophistication in American's “wired wars.” Until then, reading swerves between alternate and seemingly unrelated spaces of cyber-optic volatility and cognitive evacuation, virtual over against vitiated—with an all-too-real network of violence hard-wiring them imperceptibly to each other. Beyond the latent dialectic of these disjunct prose episodes, the novel critiques a world “formed” on quite different principles, whose geopolitical systems it confronts on fiction's own resistant verbal terms. To argue the contrary—that literary and societal forms are different from each other only in degree or scale—is, in an especially leveling sense, to rescind crucial differences between the force of depiction and world of force, which every lucid nuance of Powers's unique narrative style would resist.

Cyberspace has emerged as a significant domain in human life, driven by technological advancements and globalization. This paradigm shift has presented terrorists and violent extremists with a new platform for conducting psychological warfare and promoting their terrorist activities. In their quest to recruit individuals and expand their causes, terrorists have integrated their propaganda narratives into diverse visual tools and games. This shift has prompted Western countries to recognize the risks associated with cyber propaganda as a threat to national security, leading to extensive research on developing effective countermeasures. However, limited attention has been given to studying the cyber propaganda and narratives of terrorist groups that utilize games and visual materials to propagate their ideologies. To bridge this gap, this study focuses on analyzing the cyber propaganda tactics employed by ISIS through visual images and internet games. The research aims to gain insights into the strategies employed and the influence exerted by such propaganda on radicalization processes and terrorist activities. The study presents its findings, including research methodologies, analysis results, and discussions, shedding light on the implications for policy development.

Annotated corpora have stimulated great advances in the language sciences. The time is ripe to bring that same stimulation, and consequent benefits, to computational approaches to narrative. I describe an effort to construct a corpus of semantically annotated stories. I outline the structure of the corpus, a structure which colloquially can be described as a "handful of handfuls." One handful of the corpus has already been constructed, viz., 18k words of Russian folktales. There are two handfuls under construction: legal cases focused on the area of probable cause, and stories from Islamist Extremist Jihadists. Four more handfuls are being planned: folktales from Chinese, English, and a West Asian culture, and stories of international conventional and cyber conflicts. There are numerous additional handfuls under discussion. The main focus of the corpus so far has been on textual materials that are annotated for their surface semantics using conventional annotation tools and techniques; nonetheless, there are numerous novel dimensions along which the corpus might grow and become useful for different communities. In particular I propose for discussion the outlines of a few novel sources, annotation schemes, and collection methodologies that could potentially make the corpus of great use to the interactive narrative or narrative generation communities.

The expansion of terrorism in the Middle East in the context of the Arab Spring has become a factor of unprecedented military-political rapprochement between Iran and Russia. This article studies the anti-terrorist cooperation between the two states. The author argues that the new level of cooperation between Tehran and Moscow is a consequence of structural conditions of the international environment, which has come under pressure of international terrorism. To combat terrorism, Iran and Russia are trying to use instruments of not only “hard” but also “soft” power by creating platforms for intercultural and interreligious dialogue. In this regard, the legal foundations of anti-terrorist cooperation between Iran and Russia, its forms and levels are explored. The paper also assesses the possibilities and prospects of cooperation between the two states in the fight against terrorism. The author predicts functional and geographical expansion of the interaction of the two sides in the context of their anti-terrorist strategy. In this context, Central Asia, a significant channel of trafficking of Afghan opiates, and the radical ideology of jihadists, is identified as an important vector of cooperation. The author notes that if Iran intensifies its participation within SCO and CSTO, the potential of these institutions in the fight against non-traditional threats will increase and possibilities of joint participation of Iran and Russia in the settlement of the Afghan conflict will expand. An increase in cooperation between Tehran and Moscow in the field of cyber terrorism is expected against the background of the signing of an agreement between the two states on ensuring information security. The article concludes that the threat of terrorism to the security of Iran and Russia creates many options for joint fight against this destructive phenomenon, but the use of those opportunities remains limited.

Our analysis allows us to talk about two waves of the echo of the Arab spring in Western Europe. The first wave was observed in 2011 and was expressed in the explosive growth of mainly peaceful protests. Taking into account the data on the direct impact of the events of the Arab Spring on the protest activity in Western Europe, the explosive increase in the number of anti-government demonstrations, riots and general strikes recorded in Western Europe in 2011 can be attributed to the influence of the Arab Spring up to a very considerable extent. In 2012–2014 the protest movement in Western Europe acquired its own logic and continued at a fairly high level, despite the disappearance of the "Arab impulse" – to a large extent under the influence of the second wave of the financial and economic crisis. The second wave of the echo of the Arab spring in Western Europe was observed with a noticeable time lag in 2014–2015. and manifested primarily in the form of rapid growth of terrorist (mainly Islamist) activities. One of the consequences of the Arab Spring was the collapse or sharp weakening of several sufficiently effective Arab authoritarian regimes, which led to a significant improvement in the possibility of the activities of terrorist organizations of various kinds, the rapid growth of their strength, influence and effectiveness of organizational forms – including, which is very important for Western Europe, in cyber space. Terrorist activities penetrated from Arab countries to Western Europe through various channels: refugees, quite effective Internet propaganda of ISIS, jihadists returning to Western Europe, and so on. The second wave was expressed in a certain increase in protest activity, but it radically differed from the protests in 2011, since in the latter case it was a matter of the protests organized mainly by the right-wing forces against the migrant wave, which was generated to a very high degree by the tsunami of the Arab Spring.

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity. Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity. Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

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Terrorism and the term ‘jihadism’ have become a global phenomenon, a product of modernity and globalization which shows no sign of abating. The number of radicalized young people in Western and non-Western countries who are willing to travel overseas in the cause of jihad and violent extremism has increased significantly since 9/11. In the 20 years since the largely driven U.S. counter-terrorism efforts began in response, jihadism in force and numbers has risen at least by fourfold in terms of the numbers of Sunni jihadist fighters in the field from the Middle East to North Africa, Afghanistan and beyond according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2018 (https:// www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat). However we look at it as social scientists, policy makers or interested observers, it represents a failure to some extent of state and society to deal with the global threat of violent extremism at any level, involving any religion, ethnicity or ideological forms which seek to change the political and social order.