Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Irrelevance Coverage Model"

Several strategies such as Vector Space Model (VSM), revised Vector Space Model (rVSM), and integration of additional elements such as stack trace and previously corrected bug report have been utilized to improve the Information Retrieval (IR) based bug localization process. Most of the existing IR-based approaches make use of source code files without filtering, which eventually increases the search space of the technique, thereby slowing down the bug localization process. This study developed an enhanced IR-based bug localization model as a viable solution. Specifically, an enhanced rVSM (e-rVSM) is developed based on the hybridization of code coverage, stack traces, and spectrum information. Combining the stack trace and spectrum information as additional features can enhance the accuracy of the IR-based technique by boosting the bug localization process. Code coverage analysis was conducted to remove irrelevant source files and reduce the search space of the IR technique. Then the filtered source files are preprocessed via tokenization and stemming from selecting relevant features and removing unwanted words. The preprocessed data is further analyzed by finding similarities between the preprocessed bug reports and source code files using the e-rVSM. Finally, scores for each source code and suspected buggy files are ranked in descending order. The performance of the proposed e-rVSM is tested on two open-source projects (Zxing and SWT), and its effectiveness is assessed using TopN rank (where N = 5, 10), Mean Reciprocal Rank (MRR), and Mean Average Precision (MAP). Findings from the experimental results revealed the effectiveness of e-rVSM in bug localization. In particular, e-rVSM recorded a significant Top 5 (80.2%; 65%) and Top 10 (89.1%; 75%) rank values on SWT and Zxing dataset respectively. Also, the proposed e-rVSM had MRR values of 80% and 54% on the SWT dataset and MAP values of 61.22% and 47.23% on the Zxing dataset.

Exposome is a critical dimension in the precision medicine paradigm. Effective representation of exposomics knowledge is instrumental to melding nongenetic factors into data analytics for clinical research. There is still limited work in (1) modeling exposome entities and relations with proper integration to mainstream ontologies and (2) systematically studying their presence in clinical context. Through selected ontological relations, we developed a template-driven approach to identifying exposome concepts from the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS). The derived concepts were evaluated in terms of literature coverage and the ability to assist in annotating clinical text. The generated semantic model represents rich domain knowledge about exposure events (454 pairs of relations between exposure and outcome). Additionally, a list of 5667 disorder concepts with microbial etiology was created for inferred pathogen exposures. The model consistently covered about 90% of PubMed literature on exposure-induced iatrogenic diseases over 10 years (2001–2010). The model contributed to the efficiency of exposome annotation in clinical text by filtering out 78% of irrelevant machine annotations. Analysis into 50 annotated discharge summaries helped advance our understanding of the exposome information in clinical text. This pilot study demonstrated feasibility of semiautomatically developing a useful semantic resource for exposomics.

<span>Ant colony optimization (ACO) was successfully applied to data mining classification task through ant-mining algorithms. Exploration and exploitation are search strategies that guide the learning process of a classification model and generate a list of rules. Exploitation refers to the process of intensifying the search for neighbors in good regions, </span><span>whereas exploration aims towards new promising regions during a search process. </span><span>The existing balance between exploration and exploitation in the rule construction procedure is limited to the roulette wheel selection mechanism, which complicates rule generation. Thus, low-coverage complex rules with irrelevant terms will be generated. This work proposes an enhancement rule pruning procedure for the ACO algorithm that can be used in rule-based classification. This procedure, called the annealing strategy, is an improvement of ant-mining algorithms in the rule construction procedure. Presented as a pre-pruning technique, the annealing strategy deals first with irrelevant terms before creating a complete rule through an annealing schedule. The proposed improvement was tested through benchmarking experiments, and results were compared with those of four of the most related ant-mining algorithms, namely, Ant-Miner, CAnt-Miner, TACO-Miner, and Ant-Miner with hybrid pruner. </span><span>Results display that our proposed technique achieves better performance in terms of classification accuracy, model size, and </span><span>computational time. </span><span>The proposed annealing schedule can be used in other ACO variants for different applications to improve classification accuracy.</span>

We present a new paradigm for planning by learning, where the planner is given a model of the world and a small set of states of interest, but no indication of optimal actions in these states. The additional information can help focus the planner on regions of the state space that are of interest and lead to improved performance. We demonstrate this idea by introducing novel model-checking reduction operations for First Order Decision Diagrams (FODD), a representation that has been used to implement decision-theoretic planning with Relational Markov Decision Processes (RMDP). Intuitively, these reductions modify the construction of the value function by removing any complex specifications that are irrelevant to the set of training examples, thereby focusing on the region of interest. We show that such training examples can be constructed on the fly from a description of the planning problem thus we can bootstrap to get a self-taught planning system. Additionally, we provide a new heuristic to embed universal and conjunctive goals within the framework of RMDP planners, expanding the scope and applicability of such systems. We show that these ideas lead to significant improvements in performance in terms of both speed and coverage of the planner, yielding state of the art planning performance on problems from the International Planning Competition.

Current digital ecosystems are shaped by platformisation, algorithmic recommender systems, and news personalisation. These (algorithmic) infrastructures influence online news dissemination and therefore necessitate a reconceptualisation of how online media control is or may be exercised in states with restricted media freedom. Indeed, the degree of media plurality and journalistic independence becomes irrelevant when reporting is available but difficult to access; for example, if the websites of media outlets are not indexed or recommended by the search engines, news aggregators, or social media platforms that function as algorithmic gatekeepers. Research approaches to media control need to be broadened because authoritarian governments are increasingly adopting policies that govern the internet <em>through</em> its infrastructure; the power they leverage against private infrastructure owners yields more effective—and less easily perceptible—control over online content dissemination. Zooming in on the use of trusted notifier-models to counter online harms in Russia, we examine the Netoscope project (a database of Russian domain names suspected of malware, botnet, or phishing activities) in which federal censor Roskomnadzor cooperates with, e.g., Yandex (that downranks listed domains in search results), Kaspersky, and foreign partners. Based<strong> </strong>on publicly available reports, media coverage, and semi-structured interviews, the article analyses the degree of influence, control, and oversight of Netoscope’s participating partners over the database and its applications. We argue that, in the absence of effective legal safeguards and transparency requirements, the politicised nature of internet infrastructure makes the trusted notifier-model vulnerable to abuse in authoritarian states.

For the segmentation task of stroke lesions, using the attention U-Net model based on the self-attention mechanism can suppress irrelevant regions in an input image while highlighting salient features useful for specific tasks. However, when the lesion is small and the lesion contour is blurred, attention U-Net may generate wrong attention coefficient maps, leading to incorrect segmentation results. To cope with this issue, we propose a dual-path attention compensation U-Net (DPAC-UNet) network, which consists of a primary network and auxiliary path network. Both networks are attention U-Net models and identical in structure. The primary path network is the core network that performs accurate lesion segmentation and outputting of the final segmentation result. The auxiliary path network generates auxiliary attention compensation coefficients and sends them to the primary path network to compensate for and correct possible attention coefficient errors. To realize the compensation mechanism of DPAC-UNet, we propose a weighted binary cross-entropy Tversky (WBCE-Tversky) loss to train the primary path network to achieve accurate segmentation and propose another compound loss function called tolerance loss to train the auxiliary path network to generate auxiliary compensation attention coefficient maps with expanded coverage area to perform compensate operations. We conducted segmentation experiments using the 239 MRI scans of the anatomical tracings of lesions after stroke (ATLAS) dataset to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of our method. The experimental results show that the DSC score of the proposed DPAC-UNet network is 6% higher than the single-path attention U-Net. It is also higher than the existing segmentation methods of the related literature. Therefore, our method demonstrates powerful abilities in the application of stroke lesion segmentation.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the value of enriched customer data for analytical customer relationship management (CRM) in the insurance sector. In this study, online quotes from an insurer’s website are evaluated in terms of serving as a trigger event to predict churn, retention, and cross-selling. Design/methodology/approach For this purpose, the records of online quotes from a Swiss insurer are linked to records of existing customers from 2012 to 2015. Based on the data from automobile and home insurance policyholders, random forest prediction models for classification are fitted. Findings Enhancing traditional customer data with such additional information substantially boosts the accuracy for predicting future purchases. The models identify customers who have a high probability of adjusting their insurance coverage. Research limitations/implications The findings of the study imply that enriching traditional customer data with online quotes yields a valuable approach to predicting purchase behavior. Moreover, the quote data provide supplementary features that contribute to improving prediction performance. Practical implications This study highlights the importance of selecting the relevant data sources to target the right customers at the right time and to thus benefit from analytical CRM practices. Originality/value This paper is one of the first to investigate the potential value of data-rich environments for insurers and their customers. It provides insights on how to identify relevant customers for ensuing marketing activities efficiently and thus avoiding irrelevant offers. Hence, the study creates value for insurers as well as customers.

Abstract Single-cell RNAsequencing (scRNA-seq) technologies have enabled the large-scale whole-transcriptome profiling of each individual single cell in a cell population. A core analysis of the scRNA-seq transcriptome profiles is to cluster the single cells to reveal cell subtypes and infer cell lineages based on the relations among the cells. This article reviews the machine learning and statistical methods for clustering scRNA-seq transcriptomes developed in the past few years. The review focuses on how conventional clustering techniques such as hierarchical clustering, graph-based clustering, mixture models, $k$-means, ensemble learning, neural networks and density-based clustering are modified or customized to tackle the unique challenges in scRNA-seq data analysis, such as the dropout of low-expression genes, low and uneven read coverage of transcripts, highly variable total mRNAs from single cells and ambiguous cell markers in the presence of technical biases and irrelevant confounding biological variations. We review how cell-specific normalization, the imputation of dropouts and dimension reduction methods can be applied with new statistical or optimization strategies to improve the clustering of single cells. We will also introduce those more advanced approaches to cluster scRNA-seq transcriptomes in time series data and multiple cell populations and to detect rare cell types. Several software packages developed to support the cluster analysis of scRNA-seq data are also reviewed and experimentally compared to evaluate their performance and efficiency. Finally, we conclude with useful observations and possible future directions in scRNA-seq data analytics. Availability All the source code and data are available at https://github.com/kuanglab/single-cell-review.

Objectives: Increasing care needs for the elderly are an important concern for different countries, especially those with an aging population. It is important for health policy making to have knowledge of the factors affecting the use of health services in the elderly to identify the potential problems and develop appropriate interventions for improving utilization and increasing access to health services. This study aims to investigate the barriers and facilitators of the outpatient health service use in the elderly Methods & Materials: In this systematic review, studies in English published from 1996 to 2019 were searched in Web of Science, PubMed and Scopus databases using PRISMA guidelines and related keywords. After eliminating duplicate and irrelevant articles, the quality of remaining articles was evaluated by two evaluators independently, based on STROBE checklist. Narrative synthesis method was used to combine the data Results: Forty-four eligible studies were included for the review. The determinants of the health service use were divided into three categories of predisposing factors (e.g. age, gender, marital status, ethnicity), enabling factors (e.g. income, insurance coverage, education level, employment status, social network, social support), and need factors (e.g. having chronic disease, self-assessed health status, severity of disease, number of diseases, comorbid diseases, physical disability, unhealthy lifestyle). Findings showed that age >80 years, ethnic minority, being unemployed and retired, low educational level, small and limited social network, and physical disability were the barriers to using outpatient health services, while being female, married, having insurance, social support, having a companion during a disease, having children, high income level, and shorter distance to the health care centers were the facilitators of using outpatient health services in the elderly Conclusion: A group of factors are associated with the outpatient health service use by the elderly. These factors include predisposing, enabling, and need-related factors according to Andersen’s behavioral model of health service use. Interventions to increase the use of health services by the elderly should be based on these factors, and should be taken into account by the policymakers to reduce the burden of health services caused by diseases.

Abstract Introduction Exome sequencing can detect somatic mutations at an unprecedented scale. However, high false-positive rates due to multiple technical contributors affecting signal-to-noise ratio is an unsolved inherent problem. Furthermore, the current literature does not consistently assess or report the allelic burden of detected and scrutinized mutations, potentially leading to focus on irrelevant mutations. We hypothesized that this issue can be addressed by a structured usage of allele frequencies in combination with detected mutations. Employing improved techniques to assess the molecular signature shortly after diagnosis could also result in improved risk stratification. Here, we present proof-of-principle that identification of relevant mutations, and extent of clonality, can be accomplished by pairing hypothetical allelic burden deduced from sequencing reads to leukemic burden in individual samples. Methods 7 samples were used for whole exome sequencing derived from bone marrow aspirated from two different patients. Of these, 4 were leukemia samples (diagnostic and two relapse samples of one T-cell/myeloid mixed-phenotype leukemia and a diagnostic from AML, M0), reflecting different clinical situations, and 3 samples served as controls (keratinocytes, and fibroblasts in the first, remission in the second) to include different clinical situations. Raw data processing, mutations analysis and downstream analysis of sequencing data was performed as described earlier (Hansen & al., MethodsX 2015, Hansen & al., Br J Haematol. 2015), following GATK Best Practice workflow and MuTect default parameters. Cluster analysis was utilized to mathematically divide somatic SNVs into read frequency clusters on the basis of squared Euclidean distance, thus enabling the retrieval of mean allelic burden and expected allele frequencies juxtaposed with flow cytometry-derived leukemic blast percent. The initial condition of the classification model was default set to accommodate separation of background (cluster 1: noise or low read), heterozygous mutations (cluster 2), and an outlier bin for possible homozygous mutations (cluster 3). Results and discussion In order to reference the leukemic burden of a given sample we employed data from immunophenotyping as a surrogate marker for malignancy. Without filtering of detected mutations by exome sequencing the partly stochastic nature of the signal is evident (fig. 1A). An exponential-like continuum of non-rejected mutations is found when these are sorted according to frequencies (black points), making it difficult to deduce any clonal nature of the malignancy, and to evaluate the validity of possibly relevant mutations found. Using a minimum depth of coverage threshold of 30 the signal-to-noise ratio is increased (fig. 1B), and, subsequently, two clones were resolved at diagnosis (fig. 1C) by cluster analysis. This resolution decreases at lower tumor burden showing expected sensitivity towards lower allelic reads (fig. 1D), although driver mutations of the persistent clone could be detected. At second relapse only one distinct sAML phenotyoe clone and, now homozygous, CDKN2 AR80* could be detected (fig. 1E) with the mutations of secondary clone present at diagnosis (cluster 2) lost due to selective pressure from treatment, i.e. FLT3D835Y. The observations are backed by another diagnostic sample from a patient with AML with NRAS and BCOR mutations (fig. 1F), also with a distinct clone. Here, too much emphasis could easily be given to NRASG12D if the frequency had not been assessed. Conclusion We have addressed the pertinent question regarding false positive observations arising from deep sequencing or emphasizing mutations found in the low allele frequency fractions. From this dataset we have, despite the low number of samples, accomplished to suggest a formalized approach for single sample mutational analysis. As a consequence, we can now show that malignant clones with high tumor burden can be resolved semi-spatially by sequencing, generally applicable to a wide range of clinical settings. We conclude that this approach is amenable in single patient situations. While further studies are needed to ultimately test the applicability of this approach in the clinical settings, the perspectives to this observation become evident as sequencing depth and cost continue to develop in an inversely correlated manner. Disclosures No relevant conflicts of interest to declare.

In the classification task, the presence of irrelevant features can significantly degrade the performance of classification algorithms, in terms of additional processing time, more complex models and the likelihood that the models have poor generalization power due to the over fitting problem. Practical applications of association rule mining often suffer from overwhelming number of rules that are generated, many of which are not interesting or not useful for the application in question. Removing rules comprised of irrelevant features can signifi cantly improve the overall performance. In this paper, we explore and compare the use of a feature selection measure to filter out unnecessary and irrelevant features/attributes prior to association rules generation. The experiments are performed using a number of real-world datasets that represent diverse characteristics of data items. Empirical results confirm that by utilizing feature subset selection prior to association rule generation, a large number of rules with irrelevant features can be eliminated. More importantly, the results reveal that removing rules that hold irrelevant features improve the accuracy rate and capability to retain the rule coverage rate of structural associative association.

AbstractAutomatically synthesizing consistent models is a key prerequisite for many testing scenarios in autonomous driving to ensure a designated coverage of critical corner cases. An inconsistent model is irrelevant as a test case (e.g., false positive); thus, each synthetic model needs to simultaneously satisfy various structural and attribute constraints, which includes complex geometric constraints for traffic scenarios. While different logic solvers or dedicated graph solvers have recently been developed, they fail to handle either structural or attribute constraints in a scalable way. In the current paper, we combine a structural graph solver that uses partial models with an SMT-solver and a quadratic solver to automatically derive models which simultaneously fulfill structural and numeric constraints, while key theoretical properties of model generation like completeness or diversity are still ensured. This necessitates a sophisticated bidirectional interaction between different solvers which carry out consistency checks, decision, unit propagation, concretization steps. Additionally, we introduce custom exploration strategies to speed up model generation. We evaluate the scalability and diversity of our approach, as well as the influence of customizations, in the context of four complex case studies.

Responsibility frames in media coverage describe the mediated attribution of responsibility for causes and remedies (treatments, solutions) for health issues, mostly differentiating between individual and societal responsibility. Field of application/theoretical foundation: Media coverage of health topics, public opinion formation, attribution of responsibility, framing studies, social media on health issues Example studies: Gollust & Lantz (2009); Kim & Willis (2007); O’Hara & Smith (2007); Stefanik-Sidener (2013); Yoo & Kim (2012); Zhang & Jin (2015) Information on Kim & Willis, 2007 Authors: Sei-Hill Kim, Leigh Anne Willis Health topic: Obesity Research questions: How have the media presented the causes and solutions for obesity? Have certain causes and solutions appeared more often than others? How has media coverage of causal and solution responsibility changed over the years? Have mentions of certain causes and solutions increased or decreased? Object of analysis: Newspaper and television news data containing “obesity” or “obese” appearing in the headline, lead paragraphs, or index terms; articles published in The New York Times, The Washington Post, Chicago Sun-Times, The San Francisco Chronicle, The Houston Chronicle, and USA Today; news transcripts on obesity from three television networks (ABC, CBS, NBC); after conducting a systematic sampling, n = 300 articles and n = 200 transcripts were analyzed Time frame of analysis: January 1995 to August 2004 Info about variables Variables: Variables included attributions of causal and treatment responsibility, cause or treatment option was coded as ‘‘not present’’ (0) or ‘‘present’’ (1). Level of analysis: News article respectively tv transcript Causal responsibility Solution responsibility Personal causes (Scott’s pi= .81) Unhealthy diet: Consuming too much food, consuming too much unhealthy food, addictive or emotional eating. Sedentary lifestyle: Lack of exercise, Lack of physical activities. Genetic conditions: Genetic=biological factors that may produce obesity (e.g., imbalance of hunger hormones that may stimulate appetite). Others: E.g., poor adult role models. Personal solutions (Scott’s pi= .74) Healthy diet: Consuming less food, consuming healthy food. Physically activities: More exercise and physical activities. Medical treatments: Medications (e.g., diet pills), surgical treatments of obesity (e.g., gastric bypass, gastric stapling). Others: E.g., working with a support group, talking to a counselor, parents as role models. Societal causes (Scott’s pi= .86) The food industry: Obesity-promoting foods (fast=junk food), super-sizing, large increase in fast=junk food restaurants, other aggressive marketing promotions. Schools & education: Unhealthy foods in school cafeterias, lack of physical activity programs at schools, lack of public education about healthy eating and lifestyle. Socioeconomic factors: Low-income families may not be able to afford healthy food, exercise equipment, or a gym membership. They may be too busy to prepare their own healthy food. Others: E.g., automobile-oriented society (e.g., drive-thru stores and restaurants, big-box stores), unsafe community (crime, traffic, accident), and limited opportunities for outdoor activities. Societal solutions (Scott’s pi= .81) Regulations of the food industry: Regulating obesity-promoting foods, super-sizing, vending machines, and other aggressive marketing promotions, taxing unhealthy food. Changes in schools & education: Healthier food in school cafeteria, more physical activity programs at schools, more public education. Socioeconomic changes: Narrowing income gap, healthy food should be more affordable and available, more affordable exercise. Others: E.g., less automobile-oriented and more walking-oriented society (less drive-thru stores and restaurants, less big-box stores), safer community, and more opportunities for outdoor activities. Information on Stefanik-Sidener, 2013 Author: Kelsey Stefanik-Sidener Health topic: Diabetes Research questions: What was the dominant frame used in news stories about diabetes? What were the most common cause and solution frames used for each type of diabetes? Object of analysis: Diabetes coverage in the New York Times (N = 239) Time frame of analysis: 2000 to 2010 Info about variables Variables: The articles were coded for the presence of three types of frames for both causes of and solutions to diabetes, respectively: behavioral, societal, or medical, frames were not mutually exclusive Level of analysis: News article General cause frame (Krippendorff’s Alpha= .96) General solution frame (Krippendorff’s Alpha= .64) Behavioral causal frame Poor diet, lack of physical activity, or other individual-level issues Personal solutions Improving one’s diet or increasing activity levels Societal cause frames Poor food environments, car-centered culture, poor nutrition in schools, or other broad problems Societal solution frames Improving access to healthy foods, increasing nutrition education, or other public policy/societal-level solutions Medical cause frames Family history, genetics, age Medical solution frames Blood sugar control, medication, or surgery Information on Yoo & Kim, 2012 Authors: Jina H. Yoo, Junghyun Kim Health topic: obesity Research questions: What typifications (i.e., causal claims and solution claims) have been made in videos on YouTube with regard to the obesity issue? How do these typifications vary among different types of media formats on YouTube? Object of analysis: YouTube was searched with the keywords “obesity” and “obese” on 5 March 2010 and owing to capacity limits, the number of available videos was limited to 1,000 per each keyword; after a systematic random sampling and excluding irrelevant videos, total sample of N = 417 YouTube videos was analyzed Time frame of analysis: 2000 to 2010 Info about variables Variables: articles were coded for the presence of causal claims and solution typifications, behavioral, biological, and systematic causal factors on obesity being causal claims and behavioral solution, medical or pharmacological solution and systematic solution Reliability: Intercoder reliability was calculated for each category, and average intercoder reliability coefficient was .89. The Cohen’s kappa coefficient for each variable ranged between .77 and 1.00 Level of analysis: each whole video, including all of the video’s visual, audio, and text presentation Causal claims for obesity Solution typifications for obesity Behavioral causal claim Obesity is due to the individual’s lifestyle choices, including lack of exercise, wrong diet, lack of willpower and self-control, etc. Behavioral solution Improving one’s diet or increasing activity levels Biological causal claim Obesity is due to genetic or hormonal problems Medical or pharmacological solution To use diet pills or have a gastric bypass surgery as a means of treating obesity. Systematic causal claim Obesity is based on environmental influences and policy choices, including detrimental practices of corporations and government, such as the fast food industry’s marketing practices, school cafeterias’ unhealthy foods, inadequate or inaccurate information about food and nutrition, etc. Systematic solution A societal level of obesity treatment, such as implementing obesity-related policies, banning fast food marketing, removing vending machines from school, etc. Information on Zhang & Jin, 2015 Authors: Yuan Zhang, Yan Jin Health topic: Depression Research question: Do cultural values and organizational restraints shape the responsibility frames for health issues? Object of analysis: US (n = 228) and Chinese (n = 224) newspaper coverage on depression, including New York Times and USA Today, Philadelphia Inquirer, Houston Chronicle, Star Tribune and Denver Post; Chinese newspapers were not further specified, except for People’s Daily and Beijing Daily Time frame of analysis: 2000 to 2012 Info about variables Variables: News framing of causal and problem-solving responsibilities was measured at individual and societal levels, with individual-level and society-level causes and solutions. Each cause and solution included four subcategories which were measured nominally as 0 (absent) or 1 (present). Reliability: For the US data, a pretest in which two coders both coded a randomly selected 10% of the sample yielded Pearson’s r of 0.737 (p < 0.001) for individual causes, 0.862 (p < 0.001) for societal causes, 0.790 (p < 0.001) for individual solutions, and 0.907 (p < 0.001) for societal solutions. For the Chinese data, a pretest in which two bilingual coders both coded a randomly selected 10% of the sample yielded Pearson’s r of 0.861 (p < 0.001) for individual causes, 0.893 (p < 0.001) for societal causes, 0.807 (p < 0.001) for individual solutions, and 0.899 (p < 0.001) Level of analysis: Article Variables & operational definitions: In the appendix References Gollust, S. E., & Lantz, P. M. (2009). Communicating population health: Print news media coverage of type 2 diabetes. Social Science & Medicine (1982), 69(7), 1091–1098. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.07.009 Kim, S.?H., & Willis, A. (2007). Talking about obesity: News framing of who is responsible for causing and fixing the problem. Journal of Health Communication, 12(4), 359–376. https://doi.org/10.1080/10810730701326051 O’Hara, S. K., & Smith, K. C. (2007). Presentation of eating disorders in the news media: What are the implications for patient diagnosis and treatment? Patient Education and Counseling, 68(1), 43–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2007.04.006 Stefanik-Sidener, K. (2013). Nature, nurture, or that fast food hamburger: Media framing of diabetes in the New York Times from 2000 to 2010. Health Communication, 28(4), 351–358. https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2012.688187 Yoo, J. H., & Kim, J. (2012). Obesity in the new media: a content analysis of obesity videos on YouTube. Health Communication, 27(1), 86–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2011.569003 Zhang, Y., & Jin, Y. (2015). Who's responsible for depression? The Journal of International Communication, 21(2), 204–225. https://doi.org/10.1080/13216597.2015.1052532 Zhang, Y., & Jin, Y. (2015). Who's responsible for depression? Journal of International Communication, 21(2), 204–225.

Purpose The lack of studies about the response time of emergency medical service during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in a dense city of a developing country has triggered this study to explore the factors contributing to a high response time of ambulance service to reach patients in need. An evaluation of contributing factors to the response time is necessary to guide decision-makers in keeping a high service level of emergency medical service. Design/methodology/approach This research employed an agent-based modeling approach with input parameters from interviews with emergency medical service staff in Bandung city, Indonesia. The agent-based model is established to evaluate the relevant contribution of the factors to response time reduction using several scenarios. Findings According to agent-based simulation, four factors contribute to the response time: the process of preparing crew and ambulance during the pandemic, coverage area, traffic density and crew responsiveness. Among these factors, the preparation process during the pandemic and coverage area significantly contributed to the response time, while the traffic density and crew responsiveness were less significant. The preparation process is closely related to the safety procedure in handling patients during the COVID-19 pandemic and normal time. The recommended coverage area for maintaining a low response time is 5 km, equivalent to six local subdistricts. Research limitations/implications This study has explored the factors contributing to emergency medical response time. The insignificant contribution of the traffic density showed that citizens, in general, have high awareness and compliance to traffic priority regulation, so crew responsiveness in handling ambulances is an irrelevant factor. This study might have different contributing factors for less dense population areas and focuses on public emergency medical services provided by the local government. Practical implications The local government must provide additional funding to cover additional investment for ambulance, crew and administration for the new emergency service deployment point. Exercising an efficient process in ambulance and crew preparation is mandatory for each emergency deployment point. Originality/value This study evaluates the contributing factors of emergency medical response time in the pandemic and normal situation by qualitative analysis and agent-based simulation. The performance comparison in terms of medical response time before and after COVID-19 through agent-based simulation is valuable for decision-makers to reduce the impact of COVID-19.

Abstract Background The concept of personalized therapy has been proven to be a promising approach. A popular technique is to utilize gold nanoparticles (AuNPs) as drug delivery vectors for cytotoxic drugs and small molecule inhibitors to target and eradicate oral cancer cells in vitro and in vivo. Both drug and nanocarrier designs play important roles in the treatment efficacy. In our study, we standardized the nanosystem regarding NPs type, size, surface ligands and coverage percentage leaving only the drugs mode of action as the confounding variable. We propose that similarly constructed nanoparticles (NPs) can selectively leverage different conjugated drugs irrelevant to their original mode of action. If proven, AuNPs may have a secondary role beyond bypassing cancer cell membrane and delivering their loaded drugs. Methods We conjugated 5- fluorouracil (5Fu), camptothecin (CPT), and a fibroblast growth factor receptor1-inhibitor (FGFR1i) to gold nanospheres (AuNSs). We followed their trajectories in Syrian hamsters with chemically induced buccal carcinomas. Results Flow cytometry and cell cycle data shows that 5Fu- and CPT- induced a similar ratio of S-phase cell cycle arrest as nanoconjugates and in their free forms. On the other hand, FGFR1i-AuNSs induced significant sub-G1 cell population compared with its free form. Despite cell cycle dynamics variability, there was no significant difference in tumor cells’ proliferation rate between CPT-, 5Fu- and FGFR1i- AuNSs treated groups. In our in vivo model, FGFR1i-AuNSs induced the highest tumor reduction rates followed by 5Fu- AuNSs. CPT-AuNSs induced significantly lower tumor reduction rates compared with the 5Fu- and FGFR1i- AuNSs despite showing similar proliferative rates in tumor cells. Conclusions Our data indicates that the cellular biological events do not predict the outcome seen in our in vivo model. Furthermore, our results suggest that AuNSs selectively enhance the therapeutic effect of small molecule inhibitors such as FGFR1i than potent anticancer drugs. Future studies are required to better understand the underlying mechanism.

One cannot use the Internet for long without encountering its many dead ends. Despite the adage that everything posted online stays there forever, users quickly discover how fleeting Web content can be. Whether it be the result of missing files, platform moderation, or simply bad code, the Internet constantly displaces its archival contents. Eventual decay is the fate of all digital media, as Wendy Hui Kyong Chun observed in a 2008 article. “Digital media is not always there”, she writes. “We suffer daily frustrations with digital sources that just disappear” (160). When the media content we seek is something trivial like a digitised vacation photo, our inability to retrieve it may merely disappoint us. But what happens when we lose access to Web content about significant cultural events, like viral misinformation about a school shooting? This question takes on great urgency as conspiracy content spreads online at baffling scale and unprecedented speed. Although conspiracy theories have long been a fixture of American culture, the contemporary Internet enables all manner of “information disorder” (Wardle and Derakhshan) to warp media coverage, sway public opinion, and even disrupt the function of government—as seen in the harrowing “Stop the Steal” attack on the U.S. Capitol on 6 January 2021, when rioters attempted to prevent Congress from verifying the results of the 2020 Presidential Election. Scholars across disciplines have sought to understand how conspiracy theories function within our current information ecosystem (Marwick and Lewis; Muirhead and Rosenblum; Phillips and Milner). Much contemporary research focusses on circulation, tracking how conspiracy theories and other types of misinformation travel from fringe Websites to mainstream news outlets such as the New York Times. While undoubtedly valuable, this emphasis on circulation provides an incomplete picture of online conspiracy theories’ lifecycle. How should scholars account for the afterlife of conspiracy content, such as links to conspiracy videos that get taken down for violating YouTube’s Community Guidelines? This and related questions about the dead ends of online conspiracy theorising are underexplored in the existing scholarly literature. This essay contends that the Internet’s tendency to decay ought to factor into our models of digital conspiracy theories. I focus on the phenomenon of malfunctional hyperlinks, one of the most common types of disrepair to which the Internet is prone. The product of so-called “link rot”, broken links would appear to signal an archival failure for online conspiracy theories. Yet recent work from rhetorical theorist Jenny Rice suggests that these broken hyperlinks instead function as a rhetorically potent archive in their own right. To understand this uncanny persuasive work, I draw from rhetorical theory to analyse broken links to conspiracy content on Reddit, the popular social news platform, surrounding the 2018 school shooting in Parkland, Florida, the worst high school shooting in American history. I show that broken links on the subreddit r/conspiracy, by virtue of their dysfunction, persuade conspiracy theorists that they possess “stigmatized knowledge” (Barkun 26) about the shooting that is being suppressed. Ultimately, I argue that link rot functions as a powerful source of evidence within digital conspiracy theories, imbuing broken links with enduring rhetorical force to validate marginalised belief systems. Link Rot—Archival Failure or Archival Possibility? As is suggested by the prefix ‘inter-’, connectivity has always been one of the Internet’s core functionalities. Indeed, the ability to hyperlink two different texts—and now images, videos, and other media—is so fundamental to navigating the Web that we often take these links for granted until they malfunction. In popular parlance, we then say we have clicked on a “broken” or “dead” link, and without proper care to prevent its occurrence, all URLs are susceptible to dying eventually (much like us mortals). This slow process of decay is known as “link rot”. The precise extent of link rot on the Internet is unknown—and likely unknowable, in practice if not principle—but multiple studies have been conducted to assess the degree of link rot in specific archives. One study from 2015 found that nearly 50% of the URLs cited in 406 library and information science journal articles published between 2008-2012 were no longer accessible (Kumar et al. 59). In the context of governmental Webpages, a 2010 study determined that while only 8% of the URLs sampled in 2008 had link rot, that number more than tripled to 28% of URLs with link rot when sampled only two years later (Rhodes 589-90). More recently, scholars from Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society uncovered an alarming amount of link rot in the online archive of the New York Times, perhaps the most prominent newspaper in the United States: “25% of all links were completely inaccessible, with linkrot becoming more common over time – 6% of links from 2018 had rotted, as compared to 43% of links from 2008 and 72% of links from 1998” (Zittrain et al. 4). Taken together, these data indicate that link rot worsens over time, creating a serious obstacle for the study of Web-based phenomena. Link rot is particularly worrisome for researchers who study online misinformation (including digital conspiracy theories), because the associated links are often more vulnerable to removal due to content moderation or threats of legal action. How should scholars understand the function of link rot within digital conspiracy theories? If our academic focus is on how conspiracy theories circulate, these broken links might seem at best a roadblock to scholarly inquiry or at worst as totally insignificant or irrelevant. After all, users cannot access the material in question; they reach a dead end. Yet recent work by rhetoric scholar Jenny Rice suggests these dead ends might have enduring persuasive power. In her book Awful Archives: Conspiracy Rhetoric and Acts of Evidence, Rice argues that evidence is an “act rather than a thing” and that as a result, we ought to recalibrate what we consider an archive (12, original emphasis). For Rice, archives are more than simple aggregates of documents; instead, they are “ordinary and extraordinary experiences in public life that leave lasting, palpable residues, which then become our sources—our resources—for public discourse” (16-17). These “lasting, palpable residues” are deeply embodied, Rice maintains, for the evidence we gather is “always real in its reference, which is to a felt experience of proximities” (118). For conspiracy theorists in particular, an archive might evoke a profound sense of what Rice memorably describes as “Something intense, something real. Something off. Something fucked up. Something anomalous” (12, original emphasis). This is no less true when an archive fails to function as designed. Hence, for the remainder of this essay, I pivot to analysing how link rot functions within digital conspiracy theories about the 2018 school shooting in Parkland, Florida. As we will see, the shooting galvanised meaningful gun control activism via the March for Our Lives movement, but the event also quickly became fodder for proliferating conspiracy content. From Crisis to Crisis Actors: The Parkland Shooting and Its Aftermath On the afternoon of 14 February 2018, Nikolas Cruz entered his former high school, Marjory Stoneman Douglas, and murdered 17 people, including 14 students (Albright). While a horrific event, the Parkland shooting unfortunately marked merely the latest in a long line of similar tragedies in the United States, which has been punctuated by school shootings for decades. But the Parkland shooting stands out among the gruesome lineage of similar tragedies due to the profound resolve of its student-survivors, who agitated for gun policy reform through the March for Our Lives movement. In the weeks following the shooting, a group of Parkland students partnered with Everytown for Gun Safety, a non-profit organisation advocating for gun control, to coordinate a youth-led demonstration against gun violence. Held in the U.S. capitol of Washington, D.C. on 24 March 2018, the March for Our Lives protest was the largest demonstration against gun violence in American history (March for Our Lives). The protest drew around 200,000 participants to Washington; hundreds of thousands of protestors attended an estimated 800 smaller rallies held across the United States (CBS News). Furthermore, likeminded protestors across Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia held allied events to show support for these American students’ cause (Russo). The broader March for Our Lives organisation developed out of the political demonstrations on 24 March 2018; four years later, March for Our Lives continues to be a major force in debates about gun violence in the United States. Although the Parkland shooting inspired meaningful gun control activism, it also quickly provoked a deluge of online conspiracy theories about the tragedy and the people involved, including the student-activists who survived the shooting and spearheaded March for Our Lives. This conspiracy content arrived at breakneck pace: according to an analysis by the Washington Post, the first conspiracy posts appeared on the platform 8chan a mere 47 minutes after the first news reports aired about the shooting (Timberg and Harwell). Later that day, Parkland conspiracy theories migrated from fringe haunts like 8chan to InfoWars, a mainstay of the conspiracy media circuit, where host/founder Alex Jones insinuated that the shooting could be a “false flag” event orchestrated by the Democratic Party (Media Matters Staff). Over the ensuing hours, days, weeks, and months, Parkland conspiracies continued to circulate, receiving mainstream news coverage when conversative activists and politicians publicly espoused conspiracy claims about the shooting (Arkin and Popken). Ultimately, the conspiracist backlash was so persistent and virulent throughout 2018 that PolitiFact, a fact-checking site run by the Poynter Institute, declared the Parkland conspiracy theories their 2018 “Lie of the Year” (Drobnic Holan and Sherman). As with many conspiracy theories, the Parkland conspiracies remixed novel information with longstanding conspiracist tropes. Predominantly, these theories alleged that the Parkland student-activists who founded March for Our Lives were being controlled by outside forces to do their bidding. Although conspiracy theorists diverged in who they named as the shadowy puppet master pulling the strings—was it the Democratic Party? George Soros? Someone else?—all agreed that a secretive agenda was afoot. The most extreme version of this theory held that David Hogg, X González, and other prominent March for Our Lives activists were “crisis actors”. This account envisions Hogg et al. as paid performers playing the part of angry and traumatised students for media coverage about a school shooting that either did not occur as reported or did not occur at all (Yglesias). While unnerving and callous, these crisis actor allegations are not new ideas; rather, they draw from a long history of loosely antisemitic “New World Order” conspiracy theories that see an ulterior motive behind significant historical events (Barkun 39-65). Parkland conspiracy theorists circulated a wide variety of media artifacts—anti-March for Our Lives memes, obscure blog posts, and manipulated video footage of the Parkland students, among other content—to propagate their crisis actor claims. But whether due to platform moderation, threat of legal action, or simply public pressure, much of this conspiracy material is now inaccessible, leaving behind only broken links to conspiracy content that once was. By closely examining these broken links through a rhetorical lens, we can trace the “lasting, palpable residues” (Rice 16) link rot leaves in its wake. “All part of the purge”: Parkland Link Rot on r/conspiracy In this final section, I use the tools of rhetorical analysis to demonstrate how link rot can function as a form of evidence for conspiracy theorists. Rhetorical analysis, when applied to digital infrastructure, requires that we expand our notion of rhetoric beyond intentional human persuasion. As James J. Brown, Jr. argues, digital infrastructure is rhetorical because it determines “what’s possible in a given space”, which may or may not involve human beings (99). Human intentionality still matters in many contexts, of course, but seeing digital infrastructure as a “possibility space” opens up productive new avenues for rhetorical inquiry (Brown, Jr. 72-99). This rhetorical perspective aligns with the method of “affordance analysis” derived from Science and Technology Studies and related fields, which investigates how technologies facilitate certain outcomes for users (Curinga). Much like an affordance analysis, my goal is to illustrate how broken links produce certain rhetorical effects, not to make broader empirical claims about the extent of link rot within Parkland conspiracy theories. The r/conspiracy page on Reddit, the popular social news platform, serves as an ideal site for conducting a rhetorical analysis of broken links. The r/conspiracy subreddit is a preeminent hub for digital conspiracy content, with nearly 1.7 million members as of March 2022 and thousands of active users viewing the site at any given time (r/conspiracy). Beyond its popularity, Reddit’s platform design makes link rot a common feature on r/conspiracy. As a forum-based social media platform, Reddit consists entirely of subreddits dedicated to various topics. In each subreddit, users generate and contribute to threads with relevant content, which often entails posting links to materials hosted elsewhere on the Internet. Importantly, Reddit allows each subreddit to set its own specific community rules for content moderation (so long as these rules themselves abide by Reddit’s general Content Policy), and unlike other profile-based social media platforms, Reddit allows anonymity through the use of pseudonyms. For all of these reasons, one finds a high frequency of link rot on r/conspiracy, as posts linking to external conspiracy media stay up even when the linked content itself disappears from the Web. Consider the following screenshot of an r/conspiracy Parkland post from 23 February 2018, a mere nine days after the Parkland shooting, which demonstrates what conspiracist link rot looks like on Reddit (fig. 1). Titling their thread “A compilation of anomalies from the Parkland shooting that the media won't address. The media wants to control the narrative. Feel free to use this if you find it helpful”, this unknown Redditor frames their post as an intervention against media suppression of suspicious details (“A compilation of anomalies”). Yet the archive this poster hoped to share with likeminded users has all but disintegrated—the poster’s account has been deleted (whether by will or force), and the promised “compilation of anomalies” no longer exists. Instead, the link under the headline sends users to a blank screen with the generic message “If you are looking for an image, it was probably deleted” (fig. 2). Fittingly, the links that the sole commenter assembled to support the original poster are also rife with link rot. Of the five links in the comment, only the first one works as intended; the other four videos have been removed from Google and YouTube, with corresponding error messages informing users that the linked content is inaccessible. Fig. 1: Parkland Link Rot on r/conspiracy. (As a precaution, I have blacked out the commenter’s username.) Fig. 2: Error message received when clicking on the primary link in Figure 1. Returning to Jenny Rice’s theory of “evidentiary acts” (173), how might the broken links in Figure 1 be persuasive despite their inability to transport users to the archive in question? For conspiracy theorists who believe they possess “stigmatized knowledge” (Barkun 26) about the Parkland shooting, link rot paradoxically serves as powerful validation of their beliefs. The unknown user who posted this thread alleges a media blackout of sorts, one in which “the media wants to control the narrative”. This claim, if true, would be difficult to verify. Interested users would have to scour media coverage of Parkland to assess whether the media have ignored the “compilation of anomalies” the poster insists they have uncovered and then evaluate the significance of those oddities. But link rot here produces a powerful evidentiary shortcut: the alleged “compilation of anomalies” cannot be accessed, seemingly confirming the poster’s claims to have secretive information about the Parkland shooting that the media wish to suppress. Indeed, what better proof of media censorship than seeing links to professed evidence deteriorate before your very eyes? In a strange way, then, it is through objective archival failure that broken links function as potent subjective evidence for Parkland conspiracy theories. Comments about Parkland link rot elsewhere on r/conspiracy further showcase how broken links can validate conspiracy theorists’ marginalised belief systems. For example, in a thread titled “Searching for video of Parkland shooting on bitchute”, a Redditor observes, “Once someone gives the link watch it go poof”, implying that links to conspiracy content disappear due to censorship by an unnamed force (“Searching for video”). That nearly everything else on this particular thread suffers from link rot—the original poster, the content of their post, and most of the other comments have since been deleted—seems only to confirm the commentor’s ominous prediction. In another thread about a since-deleted YouTube video supposedly “exposing” Parkland students as crisis actors, a user notes, “You can tell there’s an agenda with how quickly this video was removed by YouTube” (“Video Exposing”). Finally, in a thread dedicated to an alleged “Social Media Purge”, Redditors share strategies for combating link rot, such as downloading conspiracy materials and backing them up on external hard drives. The original poster warns their fellow users that even r/conspiracy is not safe from censorship, for removal of content about Parkland and other conspiracies is “all part of the purge” (“the coming Social Media Purge”). In sum, these comments suggest that link rot on r/conspiracy persuades users that their ideas and their communities are under threat, further entrenching their conspiratorial worldviews. I have argued in this article that link rot has a counterintuitive rhetorical effect: in generating untold numbers of broken links, link rot supplies conspiracy theorists with persuasive evidence for the validity of their beliefs. These and other dead ends on the Internet are significant yet understudied components of digital conspiracy theories that merit greater scholarly attention. Needless to say, I can only gesture here to the sheer scale of dead ends within online conspiracy communities on Reddit and elsewhere. Future research ought to trace other permutations of these dead ends, unearthing how they persuade users from beyond the Internet’s grave. References “A compilation of anomalies from the Parkland shooting that the media won't address. The media wants to control the narrative. Feel free to use this if you find it helpful.” Reddit. <https://www.reddit.com/r/conspiracy/comments/7ztc9l/a_compilation_of_anomalies_from_the_parkland/>. Albright, Aaron. “The 17 Lives Lost at Douglas High.” Miami Herald 21 Feb. 2018.<https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article201139254.html>. Arkin, Daniel, and Ben Popken. “How the Internet’s Conspiracy Theorists Turned Parkland Students into ‘Crisis Actors’.” NBC News 21 Feb. 2018. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-internet-s-conspiracy-theorists-turned-parkland-students-crisis-actors-n849921>. 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"If people don't trust their information, it's not much better than a Marxist-Leninist society." -- Orville Schell Dean, Graduate School of Journalism, UC Berkeley "Most people aren't very discerning. Maybe they need good financial information, but I don't think people know what good information is when you get into culture, society, and politics." -- Steven Brill,Chairman and Editor-in-chief, Brill's Content Once upon a time, not very long ago, advertisements were easy to recognise. They had simple personalities with goals not much more complicated than selling you a bar of soap or a box of cereal. And they possessed the reassuring familiarity of old friends or relatives you've known all your life. They were Pilgrims who smiled at you from Quaker Oats boxes or little tablets named "Speedy" who joyfully danced into a glass of water with the sole purpose of giving up their short life to help lessen your indigestion from overindulgence. Yes, sometimes they could be a little obnoxious but, hey, it was a predictable annoyance. And once, not very long ago, advertisements also knew their place in the landscape of popular culture, their boundaries were the ad space of magazines or the commercial time of television programs. When the ads got too annoying, you could toss the magazine aside or change the TV channel. The ease and quickness of their dispatch had the abruptness of slamming your front door in the face of an old door-to-door salesman. This all began to change around the 1950s when advertisements acquired a more complex and subtle personality and began straying outside of their familiar media neighborhoods. The social observer Vance Packard wrote a best-selling book in the late 50s called The Hidden Persuaders which identified this change in advertising's personality as coming from hanging around Professor Freud's psychoanalysis and learning his hidden, subliminal methods of trickery. Ice cubes in a glass for a liquor ad were no longer seen as simple props to help sell a brand of whiskey but were now subliminal suggestions of female anatomy. The curved fronts of automobiles were more than aesthetic streamlined design features but rather suggestive of a particular feature of the male anatomy. Forgotten by the new subliminal types of ads was the simple salesmanship preached by founders of the ad industry like David Ogilvy and John Caples. The word "sales" became a dirty word and was replaced with modern psychological buzzwords like subliminal persuasion. The Evolution of Subliminal Techniques The book Hidden Persuaders made quite a stir at the time, bringing about congressional hearings and even the introduction of legislation. Prominent motivation researchers Louis Cheskin and Ernest Dichter utilised the new ad methods and were publicly admonished as traitors to their profession. The life of the new subliminal advertising seemed short indeed. Even Vance Packard predicted its coming demise. "Eventually, say by A.D. 2000," he wrote in the preface to the paperback edition of his book, "all this depth manipulation of the psychological variety will seem amusingly old- fashioned". Yet, 40 years later, any half-awake observer of popular culture knows that things haven't exactly worked out the way Packard predicted. In fact what seems old-fashioned today is the belief that ads are those simpletons they once were before the 50s and that products are sold for features and benefits rather than for images. Even Vance Packard expresses an amazement at the evolution of advertising since the 50s, noting that today ads for watches have nothing to do with watches or that ads for shoes scarcely mention shoes. Packard remarks "it used to be the brand identified the product. In today's advertising the brand is the product". Modern advertising, he notes, has an almost total obsession with images and feelings and an almost total lack of any concrete claims about the product and why anyone should buy it. Packard admits puzzlement. "Commercials seem totally unrelated to selling any product at all". Jeff DeJoseph of the J. Walter Thompson firm underlines Packard's comments. "We are just trying to convey a sensory impression of the brand, and we're out of there". Subliminal advertising techniques have today infiltrated the heart of corporate America. As Ruth Shalit notes in her article "The Return of the Hidden Persuaders" from the 27 September 1999 issue of Salon magazine, "far from being consigned to the maverick fringe, the new psycho- persuaders of corporate America have colonized the marketing departments of mainstream conglomerates. At companies like Kraft, Coca-Cola, Proctor & Gamble and Daimler-Chrysler, the most sought-after consultants hail not from McKinsey & Company, but from brand consultancies with names like Archetype Discoveries, PsychoLogics and Semiotic Solutions". Shalit notes a growing number of CEOs have become convinced they cannot sell their brands until they first explore the "Jungian substrata of four- wheel drive; unlock the discourse codes of female power sweating; or deconstruct the sexual politics of bologna". The result, as Shalit observes, is a "charmingly retro school of brand psychoanalysis, which holds that all advertising is simply a variation on the themes of the Oedipus complex, the death instinct, or toilet training, and that the goal of effective communications should be to compensate the consumer for the fact that he was insufficiently nursed as an infant, has taken corporate America by storm". The Growing Ubiquity of Advertising Yet pervasive as the subliminal techniques of advertising have become, the emerging power of modern advertising ultimately centres around "where" it is rather than "what" it is or "how" it works. The power of modern advertising is within this growing ubiquity or "everywhereness" of advertising rather than the technology and methodology of advertising. The ultimate power of advertising will be arrived at when ads cannot be distinguished from their background environment. When this happens, the environment will become a great continuous ad. In the process, ads have wandered away from their well-known hangouts in magazines and TV shows. Like alien-infected pod-people of early science fiction movies, they have stumbled out of these familiar media playgrounds and suddenly sprouted up everywhere. The ubiquity of advertising is not being driven by corporations searching for new ways to sell products but by media searching for new ways to make money. Traditionally, media made money by selling subscriptions and advertising space. But these two key income sources are quickly drying up in the new world of online media. Journalist Mike France wisely takes notice of this change in an important article "Journalism's Online Credibility Gap" from the 11 October 1999 issue of Business Week. France notes that subscription fees have not worked because "Web surfers are used to getting content for free, and they have been reluctant to shell out any money for it". Advertising sales and their Internet incarnation in banner ads have also been a failure so far, France observes, because companies don't like paying a flat fee for online advertising since it's difficult to track the effectiveness of their marketing dollars. Instead, they only want to pay for actual sales leads, which can be easily monitored on the Web as readers' click from site to site. Faced with the above situation, media companies have gone on the prowl for new ways to make money. This search underpins the emerging ubiquity of advertising: the fact that it is increasingly appearing everywhere. In the process, traditional boundaries between advertising and other societal institutions are being overrun by these media forces on the prowl for new "territory" to exploit. That time when advertisements knew their place in the landscape of popular culture and confined themselves to just magazines or TV commercials is a fading memory. And today, as each of us is bombarded by thousands of ads each day, it is impossible to "slam" the door and keep them out of our house as we could once slam the door in the face of the old door-to-door salesmen. Of course you can find them on the matchbook cover of your favorite bar, on t-shirts sold at some roadside tourist trap or on those logo baseball caps you always pick up at trade shows. But now they have got a little more personal and stare at you over urinals in the men's room. They have even wedged themselves onto the narrow little bars at the check-out counter conveyer belts of supermarkets or onto the handles of gasoline pumps at filling stations. The list goes on and on. (No, this article is not an ad.) Advertising and Entertainment In advertising's march to ubiquity, two major boundaries have been crossed. They are crucial boundaries which greatly enhance advertising's search for the invisibility of ubiquity. Yet they are also largely invisible themselves. These are the boundaries separating advertising from entertainment and those separating advertising from journalism. The incursion of advertising into entertainment is a result of the increasing merger of business and entertainment, a phenomenon pointed out in best-selling business books like Michael Wolf's Entertainment Economy and Joseph Pine's The Experience Economy. Wolf, a consultant for Viacom, Newscorp, and other media heavy-weights, argues business is becoming synonymous with entertainment: "we have come to expect that we will be entertained all the time. Products and brands that deliver on this expectation are succeeding. Products that do not will disappear". And, in The Experience Economy, Pine notes the increasing need for businesses to provide entertaining experiences. "Those businesses that relegate themselves to the diminishing world of goods and services will be rendered irrelevant. To avoid this fate, you must learn to stage a rich, compelling experience". Yet entertainment, whether provided by businesses or the traditional entertainment industry, is increasingly weighted down with the "baggage" of advertising. In a large sense, entertainment is a form of new media that carries ads. Increasingly, this seems to be the overriding purpose of entertainment. Once, not long ago, when ads were simple and confined, entertainment was also simple and its purpose was to entertain rather than to sell. There was money enough in packed movie houses or full theme parks to make a healthy profit. But all this has changed with advertising's ubiquity. Like media corporations searching for new revenue streams, the entertainment industry has responded to flat growth by finding new ways to squeeze money out of entertainment content. Films now feature products in paid for scenes and most forms of entertainment use product tie-ins to other areas such as retail stores or fast-food restaurants. Also popular with the entertainment industry is what might be termed the "versioning" of entertainment products into various sub-species where entertainment content is transformed into other media so it can be sold more than once. A film may not make a profit on just the theatrical release but there is a good chance it doesn't matter because it stands to make a profit in video rentals. Advertising and Journalism The merger of advertising and entertainment goes a long way towards a world of ubiquitous advertising. Yet the merger of advertising and journalism is the real "promised land" in the evolution of ubiquitous advertising. This fundamental shift in the way news media make money provides the final frontier to be conquered by advertising, a final "promised land" for advertising. As Mike France observes in Business Week, this merger "could potentially change the way they cover the news. The more the press gets in the business of hawking products, the harder it will be to criticize those goods -- and the companies making them". Of course, there is that persistent myth, perpetuated by news organisations that they attempt to preserve editorial independence by keeping the institutions they cover and their advertisers at arm's length. But this is proving more and more difficult, particularly for online media. Observers like France have pointed out a number of reasons for this. One is the growth of ads in news media that look more like editorial content than ads. While long-standing ethical rules bar magazines and newspapers from printing advertisements that look like editorial copy, these rules become fuzzy for many online publications. Another reason making it difficult to separate advertising from journalism is the growing merger and consolidation of media corporations. Fewer and fewer corporations control more and more entertainment, news and ultimately advertising. It becomes difficult for a journalist to criticise a product when it has a connection to the large media conglomerate the journalist works for. Traditionally, it has been rare for media corporations to make direct investments in the corporations they cover. However, as Mike France notes, CNBC crossed this line when it acquired a stake in Archipelago in September 1999. CNBC, which runs a business-news Website, acquired a 12.4% stake in Archipelago Holdings, an electronic communications network for trading stock. Long-term plans are likely to include allowing visitors to cnbc.com to link directly to Archipelago. That means CNBC could be in the awkward position of both providing coverage of online trading and profiting from it. France adds that other business news outlets, such as Dow Jones (DJ), Reuters, and Bloomberg, already have indirect ties to their own electronic stock-trading networks. And, in news organisations, a popular method of cutting down on the expense of paying journalists for content is the growing practice of accepting advertiser written content or "sponsored edit" stories. The confusion to readers violates the spirit of a long-standing American Society of Magazine Editors (ASME) rule prohibiting advertisements with "an editorial appearance". But as France notes, this practice is thriving online. This change happens in ever so subtle ways. "A bit of puffery inserted here," notes France, "a negative adjective deleted there -- it doesn't take a lot to turn a review or story about, say, smart phones, into something approaching highbrow ad copy". He offers an example in forbes.com whose Microsoft ads could easily be mistaken for staff-written articles. Media critic James Fallows points out that consumers have been swift to discipline sites that are caught acting unethically and using "sponsored edits". He notes that when it was revealed that amazon.com was taking fees of up to $10,000 for books that it labelled as "destined for greatness", its customers were outraged, and the company quickly agreed to disclose future promotional payments. Unfortunately, though, the lesson episodes like these teach online companies like Amazon centres around more effective ways to be less "revealing" rather than abstention from the practice of "sponsored edits". France reminds us that journalism is built on trust. In the age of the Internet, though, trust is quickly becoming an elusive quality. He writes "as magazines, newspapers, radio stations, and television networks rush to colonize the Internet, the Great Wall between content and commerce is beginning to erode". In the end, he ponders whether there is an irrevocable conflict between e-commerce and ethical journalism. When you can't trust journalists to be ethical, just who can you trust? Transaction Fees & Affiliate Programs - Advertising's Final Promised Land? The engine driving the growing ubiquity of advertising, though, is not the increasing merger of advertising with other industries (like entertainment and journalism) but rather a new business model of online commerce and Internet technology called transaction fees. This emerging and potentially dominant Internet e-commerce technology provides for the ability to track transactions electronically on Websites and to garner transaction fees. Through these fees, many media Websites take a percentage of payment through online product sales. In effect, a media site becomes one pervasive direct mail ad for every product mentioned on its site. This of course puts them in a much closer economic partnership with advertisers than is the case with traditional fixed-rate ads where there is little connection between product sales and the advertising media carrying them. Transaction fees are the new online version of direct marketing, the emerging Internet technology for their application is one of the great economic driving forces of the entire Internet commerce apparatus. The promise of transaction fees is that a number of people, besides product manufacturers and advertisers, might gain a percentage of profit from selling products via hypertext links. Once upon a time, the manufacturer of a product was the one that gained (or lost) from marketing it. Now, however, there is the possibility that journalists, news organisations and entertainment companies might also gain from marketing via transaction fees. The spread of transaction fees outside media into the general population provides an even greater boost to the growing ubiquity of advertising. This is done through the handmaiden of media transaction fees: "affiliate programs" for the general populace. Through the growing magic of Internet technology, it becomes possible for all of us to earn money through affiliate program links to products and transaction fee percentages in the sale of these products. Given this scenario, it is not surprising that advertisers are most likely to increasingly pressure media Websites to support themselves with e-commerce transaction fees. Charles Li, Senior Analyst for New Media at Forrester Research, estimates that by the year 2003, media sites will receive $25 billion in revenue from transaction fees, compared with $17 billion from ads and $5 billion from subscriptions. The possibility is great that all media will become like great direct response advertisements taking a transaction fee percentage for anything sold on their sites. And there is the more dangerous possibility that all of us will become the new "promised land" for a ubiquitous advertising. All of us will have some cut in selling somebody else's product. When this happens and there is a direct economic incentive for all of us to say nice things about products, what is the need and importance of subliminal techniques and methods creating advertising based on images which try to trick us into buying things? A Society Without Critics? It is for these reasons that criticism and straight news are becoming an increasingly endangered species. Everyone has to eat but what happens when one can no longer make meal money by criticising current culture? Cultural critics become a dying breed. There is no money in criticism because it is based around disconnection rather than connection to products. No links to products or Websites are involved here. Critics are becoming lonely icebergs floating in the middle of a cyber-sea of transaction fees, watching everyone else (except themselves) make money on transaction fees. The subliminal focus of the current consultancies is little more than a repackaging of an old theme discovered long ago by Vance Packard. But the growing "everywhereness" and "everyoneness" of modern advertising through transaction fees may mark the beginning of a revolutionary new era. Everyone might become their own "brand", a point well made in Tim Peters's article "A Brand Called You". Media critic James Fallows is somewhat optimistic that there still may remain "niche" markets for truthful information and honest cultural criticism. He suggests that surely people looking for mortgages, voting for a politician, or trying to decide what movie to see will continue to need unbiased information to help them make decisions. But one must ask what happens when a number of people have some "affiliate" relationship with suggesting particular movies, politicians or mortgages? Orville Schell, dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley, has summarised this growing ubiquity of advertising in a rather simple and elegant manner saying "at a certain point, people won't be able to differentiate between what's trustworthy and what isn't". Over the long run, this loss of credibility could have a corrosive effect on society in general -- especially given the media's importance as a political, cultural, and economic watchdog. Schell warns, "if people don't trust their information, it's not much better than a Marxist-Leninist society". Yet, will we be able to realise this simple fact when we all become types of Marxists and Leninists? Still, there is the great challenge to America to learn how to utilise transaction fees in a democratic manner. In effect, a combination of the technological promise of the new economy with that old promise, and perhaps even myth, of a democratic America. America stands on the verge of a great threshold and challenge in the growing ubiquity of advertising. In a way, as with most great opportunities or threats, this challenge centres on a peculiar paradox. On the one hand, there is the promise of the emerging Internet business model and its centre around the technology of transaction fees. At the same time, there is the threat posed by transaction fees to America's democratic society in the early years of the new millennium. Yes, once upon a time, not very long ago, advertisements were easy to recognise and also knew their place in the landscape of popular culture. Their greatest, yet silent, evolution (especially in the age of the Internet) has really been in their spread into all areas of culture rather than in methods of trickery and deceit. Now, it is more difficult to slam that front door in the face of that old door-to-door salesman. Or toss that magazine and its ad aside, or switch off commercials on television. We have become that door-to-door salesman, that magazine ad, that television commercial. The current cultural landscape takes on some of the characteristics of the theme of that old science fiction movie The Invasion of the Body Snatchers. A current advertising campaign from RJ Reynolds has a humorous take on the current zeitgeist fad of alien abduction with copy reading "if aliens are smart enough to travel through space then why do they keep abducting the dumbest people on earth?" One might add that when Americans allow advertising to travel through all our space, perhaps we all become the dumbest people on earth, abducted by a new alien culture so far away from a simplistic nostalgia of yesterday. (Please press below for your links to a world of fantastic products which can make a new you.) References Brill, Steven. Quoted by Mike France in "Journalism's Online Credibility Gap." Business Week 11 Oct. 1999. France, Mike. "Journalism's Online Credibility Gap." Business Week 11 Oct. 1999. <http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_41/b3650163.htm>. Packard, Vance. The Hidden Persuaders. Out of Print, 1957. Pine, Joseph, and James Gilmore. The Experience Economy. Harvard Business School P, 1999. Shalit, Ruth. "The Return of the Hidden Persuaders." Salon Magazine 27 Sep. 1999. <http://www.salon.com/media/col/shal/1999/09/27/persuaders/index.php>. Schell, Orville. Quoted by Mike France in "Journalism's Online Credibility Gap." Business Week 11 Oct. 1999. Wolf, Michael. Entertainment Economy. Times Books, 1999. Citation reference for this article MLA style: John Fraim. "Friendly Persuasion: The Growing Ubiquity of Advertising, or What Happens When Everyone Becomes an Ad?." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3.1 (2000). [your date of access] <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/0003/ads.php>. Chicago style: John Fraim, "Friendly Persuasion: The Growing Ubiquity of Advertising, or What Happens When Everyone Becomes an Ad?," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3, no. 1 (2000), <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/0003/ads.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: John Fraim. (2000) Friendly Persuasion: The Growing Ubiquity of Advertising, or What Happens When Everyone Becomes an Ad?. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3(1). <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/0003/ads.php> ([your date of access]).

Depression memes are a widespread phenomenon across all social media platforms. To get your hit of depression memes, you can go to any number of pages on Facebook, the subreddit “2me4meirl”, where the posts that are “too real” for more mainstream subreddits go, but nevertheless counting over one million subscribers or, on Instagram, and find innumerable accounts dedicated to “sad memes”, many with tens to hundreds of thousands of followers. In a recent study, depression memes were found to be responsible for 35 per cent of the content researchers analysed in the “#depressed” hashtag on Instagram (McCosker and Gerrard). As a subculture, it is one that has truly embraced the polyvocality of memes, allowing many voices to speak at once through their lack of fixed meaning (Milner). In depression memes, polyvocality allows the user to identify with any number of anxieties affectively represented by the memes without being authentically tied to them, under the guise of irony. Therefore, depression memes find themselves being used in a myriad of ways that do not refer to a stable structure of meaning. This allows me to problematise their roles as both masks and intimate texts within an ironic meme culture.Drawing on traditional readings of irony such as Wayne C. Booth but also contemporary approaches to authenticity, mask cultures and meme culture (de Zeeuw; Tuters), this article situates depression memes specifically within neoliberal regimes of feeling, manifested both in online practices of authenticity and the subject of value (Skeggs and Yuill) and in discourses of resilience and accountability surrounding mental health (Fullagar et al.; James; McCosker). It argues that an internet depression culture based on the principles of dissimulation serves both the purpose of protection from recuperation by dominant narratives but paradoxically creates an ambiguity that generates that risk. In this way, I speak to current anxieties surrounding memes, including ambiguity, irony, and identity formation.Internet Depression Culture Intrinsic to their nature as memes, depression memes can be found in a variety of spaces, formats and platforms. The ones below (Figure 1) circulate on mainstream social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram through accounts dedicated to “sadposting” or the sharing of mental illness memes. They refer to overwhelming feelings of anxiety, a lack of will to live and a desire to recover. In their recent study on hashtagging depression on Instagram, McCosker and Gerrard found memes to be responsible for a wide range of content in the “depressed” hashtag on the platform. They argue that the use of the hashtag “depressed” is primarily as a “memetic device, often with a sense of irreverence, subversiveness and pathos, but in an effort to use the connective power of the popular tag to gain attention and Likes” (McCosker & Gerrard 9). Intimacy and memes as identity performance are therefore intimately intertwined, espousing the memetic logic that there is “safety in relatability” (Ask and Abidin 844), which is dependent on “connecting to common anxieties in a pleasurable, noncompromising way” (Kanai 228).Figure 1. Depression Memes. Sources, from left to right. Top row: <https://www.instagram.com/p/Bl5p88Tg8Cw/>; <https://www.facebook.com/mentallythrillmemes/>; <https://twitter.com/animatedtext>. Bottom row: <https://lovenotlogic.tumblr.com/post/168640369069>; <https://disasterlesbian.com/post/158174792381>; <https://www.facebook.com/mentallythrillmemes>.Indeed, meme culture depends both on the notion that certain forms of content can be relied on to “gain attention and likes” and increase a user’s social capital, but can also be interpreted as intimate and private forms of expression. The popularity of depression memes is a testament to this principle, but at the heart of this culture is a usage of irony that remains ambiguous and undefined. Whether these texts can be found to reflect genuine feelings of relatability is complex, but ultimately irrelevant. As Burton remarks on the culture of Kek, “sociologically speaking”, the sharing of these memes still constitutes a cultural engagement. Therefore, what I refer to as internet depression culture must be understood not as an attitude of self-presentation, but an inter-affective network that relies on precarious and overwhelmingly ironic objects whose authenticities as intimate texts are dependent on volatile and unstable structures of meaning.Wayne C. Booth’s A Rhetoric of Irony tells us that for an expression to be understood as ironic, their meaning needs to be reconstructed by the reader and intended by the author. The reader must therefore draw from the cultural and historical context of the expression to reconstruct covert meaning that the author intended. The inferential process draws from the context of the expression to give meaning to irony. Online, the cultural context in which depression memes have risen to popularity is precisely that which gives them their reason for being. To understand this, we need to realise that, for the last decade, the symptoms that depression memes cultivate have been lying dormant under the tyranny of happiness era of social media (Freitas). I tie this notion to the doctrine of authenticity behind the identity imperative of social media platforms like Facebook (Van Dijck), and contrast it to the forms of subjectivisation anonymous or pseudonym-based cultures on platforms like 4chan embody. Within this dialectic, memes have arisen as the logic of the Internet, and irony as their social contract (Tuters; Burton). New forms of sociality that manifest within this culture are necessarily ambiguous and risk-filled ones, and need to be explored.From the Happiness Effect to a New Sensibility In The Happiness Effect, Donna Freitas investigated social media usage in young adults by surveying over 800 college students about the relationship between social media and their emotional well-being. Her results allowed her to coin the term “happiness effect”, when: “young people feel so pressured to post happy things on social media”. She writes: “most of what everyone sees on social media from their peers are happy things; as a result, they often feel inferior because they aren’t actually happy all of the time” (14). Feelings of inadequacy result when users interpret what other users post to be authentically felt, despite themselves feeling “pressured” to post a certain type of content, one they do not resonate with but fabricate for the purpose of posting. Indeed, the authenticity imperative behind identity-based social media is what defines our relationship to it.Identity-based platforms like Facebook rely on allowing the user to create an identity on their site, but demand from users that the platform be used for “‘expressing who they are’, implying that users do not “perform” their identity on Facebook; they are the selves they portray on Facebook” (Kant 34). As always, this must be situated within the commercial logic behind the seemingly “free” and “public” service the platform offers. Multiplicity and having “multiple identities” (van Dijck) does not cooperate with Facebook’s platform logic because it does not produce valuable legible data which conforms to “normative, regulatory and commercially viable frameworks” (Kant 35). As Skeggs and Yuill note, the contemporary neo-liberal imperative to perform and authorize one’s value in public is more likely to produce a curated persona rather than the “authentic” self demanded by Facebook (380). The happiness effect manifests this. Despite not being legitimate, an identity must be curated to fit in with the other performed personas on the platforms, which are taken as authentic.To many, the irony that makes depression memes such as those in Figure 1 work is in their subversion of the happiness effect and the authenticity imperative. The meaning to be reconstructed in a depression meme consists in peeling back the layer that demands from us to act as the best, happiest, version of ourselves online. Simply put, it unmasks the actual authentic self behind the curated one. Therefore, the self made visible by partaking, sharing or liking depression memes is not necessarily the best one, but, fundamentally, it is a more authentic one. Indeed, it seemed that, in the early phase of its life, users were enamoured with depression memes because it released them from the burden of identity management. What emerged in this phase of the depression memes movement was the perception of a new sensibility based on a more authentic intimacy than had ever been associated with memes. Press coverage of the topic continued to celebrate the emancipatory potential of depression memes, citing the movement as reflective of a new, more sentimental public made possible by the internet (Roffman).As has been argued before by McCosker, the forms of digital intimacy that render personalised distress visible are ones entrenched in visibility and authenticity, pillars of the face culture of Facebook. Comments on memes or reviews of depression meme pages continuously cited relatability and visibility as their reason for identification with the page. Users felt that these memes allowed them to be seen online, with their mental illness, and feel intimately connected to other viewers; “it feels good to know that other people go through the same thing as me” (Figure 2). Though it is a form of public performance, the intimacy generated here feels inherently private because it relies on unravelling certain structures of meaning. This is a skill that, users imply, can only be attained by having experienced the feelings evoked in the depression memes. In these comments, intimacy is a form of identity performance, and a discourse of accountability underpins one of authenticity. Irony, though present, is quickly reconstructed and explained away into more stable structures of meaning through these discourses.Figure 2. Reviewers of “Mentally thrill memes” on Facebook. Irony and Masked PracticesHowever, the tension produced within the user’s psyche by years of subjectivisation and the “curated self” has taken its toll. The social contract of irony in digital culture has come just in time to recuperate authenticity from the burden of management it was placing on its subjects. I’ve spoken to the use of irony as generative of new forms on intimacy, but here I turn to how irony can simultaneously be adopted for the purposes of evading that stifling regime of the self and doctrine of authenticity. In terms of platform moderation in the case of sensitive or problematic issues, subversion through irony allows an alternative discursive economy to exist by evading censorship. When it rejects models through which the self can be turned into data by turning its back on commensurable ways of displaying public emotion, it is a commentary on the authenticity culture of social media. In this, it reflects practices of dissimulation.Ideologically, anonymity and multiplicity in the “deep vernacular web” stands in antithesis to the doctrine of authenticity. Anonymised imageboard cultures such as those found on 4chan have moulded themselves as the Other to the straightforward intentionality of profile based social media (de Zeeuw, Between). Their truth is in their collectivistic rejection of authenticity, constituting an anti-personal, faceless and authorless mass, infamous for their subversion through trolling. They obey an Internet logic that can be summarised as follows; “the internet is not serious business, and anyone who thinks otherwise should be corrected and is, essentially, undeserving of pity” (Tuters). In this, the logic of dissimulation operates as their reason for being. Dissimulation entails a play with identity, one not interested in stability but more in the constant deferral of meaning and self. This negotiation is based on evading the notion of the self in order to gain further freedom through collective play. For these anonymised and anti-personal cultures, the value of dissimulation is to mediate their relationship to society at large.Indeed, as Daniel de Zeeuw notes, mask cultures’ play with identity is not simply a reactionary movement against the subjectivisation of social media but can be understood as part of a rich carnivalesque tradition which revels in the potential of the mask. In this case, the collective culture gathers around the picture of the mask as a symbol of the “dialectic between the masked mass and the authorial, personal self” (de Zeeuw, Immunity 276). The notion that a more authentic, truer self lies under a series of masks is also one taken up by psychoanalysis and various schools of thought. In this way, irony has often been compared to “peering behind a mask” (Booth 33), leading to its valorisation as an act of dissimulation by these cultures. Taking as gospel that “there is no true Self, only an endless series of interchangeable masks” (Lovink 40), for these cultures the mask “is the work of art that best exemplifies the detachment achieved through irony” (Trilling 120). However, irony “risks disaster more aggressively than any other device” (Booth 41). The potential that mask cultures value irony for also creates risk because it trains readers to expect something but never tells us when to stop interpreting its irony. The emancipatory capacity of irony then, is a tension-filled one.Ironic Depression MemesDepression memes I addressed before peel back the layers of the happiness effect and social media cultures by legitimising themselves through authenticity. I turn now to ironic memes about depression memes and their tie to the principles of dissimulation as influenced by mask cultures. Meme culture’s existence across social media platforms, and structural nature as logic of ironic undermining means that, once depression memes were praised in earnest as the new sensibility of the Internet, the next step for the depression memes movement was to be deeply disingenuous and self-aware about the promise of authenticity they were offering. Memes about depression memes are meta memes that are self-reflective about the depression meme movement, referencing using memes to combat loneliness, sadness or overthinking in an ironic way.Figure 3. Ironic memes referencing the use of depression humour. Sources, from left to right. Top row: <https://www.instagram.com/p/B3aH9cmIr1L>; <https://www.reddit.com/r/MemeEconomy/comments/8wotcn/invest/>; <https://jennyhoelzer-deactivated2016120.tumblr.com/post/153443805168/>. Bottom row: <https://twitter.com/animatedtext>; <https://www.instagram.com/p/B0ZsQAMHiAU>; <https://www.reddit.com/r/2meirl4meirl/comments/8se3l5/2meirl4meirl/>.Ironic depression memes can be found on the same platforms other depression memes circulate in, existing as a parallel discourse to, and meta-commentary on, the celebratory, cathartic engagement in depression memes as seen on Facebook. They acknowledge the use of the mask, drawing attention to the divide between one’s chosen digital self-presentation and offline identity. Through this, they re-edify boundaries that depression memes were praised as obliterating. In the ironic memes above, presenting yourself as depressed online is okay, but actually being depressed is no laughing matter (actual suicide = no), and therefore should not be memed about. Memes are a mask that depressed millennials offer to other depressed millennials, to be used against depression, sadness, and overthinking, but mostly to hide that, though the memes are “ironic”, the depression is still very much “chronic”.Ironic depression memes shed the burden of cultures of authenticity and accountability when they disavow the notion of a fixed self. The use of the meme as a mask evokes a privacy and anonymity found within irony that rejects the contemporary mediation of mental ill health through a set of discourses based in neoliberal personhood (Fullagar et al.; McCosker). The bonds being made here are supposedly private, revelling in the facelessness of collective irony, but both weak and risky. The value of the meme is defined by the acknowledgement of the usage of the mask to hide emotions still too taboo or painful to publicly gesture too. Though depression memes undermine that authenticity and accountability should be the pillars of mental health discourse, their use of irony creates unstable ground for a new structure of feeling to emanate from these memes. Irony is about expecting something to mean something else, therefore valuing one set of meaning over another (Booth 33). If the new set of meaning fundamentally cannot be identified, which is key in dissimulation and mask-cultural practices, then this new culture opens up ambiguity which can be recuperated by dominant narratives. In this way, I argue that dissimulation serves the purposes of protection from the mediation of depression through individualising discourse, but paradoxically creates an opening to do so. Wholesome Memes and Resilience I turn now to how “wholesome memes” provide non-ironic commentary on the irony of memes. I argue that, even in a logic removed from the authenticity imperative of face media, and therefore from a notion of identity and profile based interaction, narratives of accountability still recuperate the subversion of depression memes. In the case of depression memes, discourses of resilience and overcoming are promoted as the “correcting” set of values, preferential to the ambiguous multiplicity of dissimulation. Figure 4. “Fixedyourmeme” wholesome memes making use of editing and re-writing.The “wholesome memes” movement aims to edit and correct depression memes, such as examples from a Tumblr page entitled “fixed your meme”. These memes take on popular meme formats that are either neutral and open to remixing, or are known in popular meme culture to be predetermined. On the right, “My memes are ironic, my depression is [chronic]” is a popular motif whose grammar is predetermined (seen in Figure 3) but also an easily deciphered subtext, even if written over, if one is well-versed in meme culture and the mechanisms through which it replicates itself. The explicit editing and re-writing, crossing out the “toxic” message to make apparent the re-writing of the narrative, is purposeful here. The relation to resilience is built as much inside and outside the text. It serves to exemplify the overcoming of the mental illness and the move towards a radical attitude of self-love and recovery. Wholesomeness, positivity, wellness and self-care are the keywords. In these texts, the wellness industry serves as a counter-narrative, preaching a discourse that dictates: “it is within an individual’s power and even a moral obligation to be happy” (Garde-Hansenand Gorton 104).When I refer to resilience, I refer to a specific kind of discourse as coined by Robin James that follows the logic of acknowledging and overcoming damage in order to be “rewarded with increased human capital, status, and other forms of recognition and recompense” (19). Overcoming brings added human capital because it demonstrates resilience which boosts society’s resilience. When depression memes render embodied suffering visible and publicly intelligible, they perform resilience through a therapeutic narrative. In these types of narratives, we see what Fullagar et al. describe as “affective work and action which is required in efforts to be ‘happy’ and achieve ‘normality’” that “commonly evokes a particular form of introspection and surveillance” (10). In this way, wholesome memes can be thought of as an affective assemblage that recuperates narratives of subversion as embodied by ironic memes and mask cultures, thereby “re-ordering flows through capitalist relations that exploit the connection between desire and lack” (Holland 68). Conclusion Internet depression culture operates at the crux of meme culture and neoliberal subjectivisation by both enacting and overcoming mental health regimes of care through irony. The irony within depression memes to be reconstructed is dependent on two structures of meaning. The first is the one within which the memes are being read and interpreted, namely an online meme culture and its collective irony imperative, which I argue is also a parallel discursive area of the neoliberal subjectivisation of value on social media. The second is a product of years of increasing individualisation of mental health discourse, one that emphasises resilience and overcoming in line with values of authenticity and accountability. In different Internet cultures, the intersection of these two contexts manifests differently. Online, irony and polysemy are both tools of subversion and privacy. However, cultures of play are constantly challenged by social media and places where dominant narratives are ones of authenticity and accountability. Depression memes demonstrate that irony can be mobilised into authentic flows of intimacy in the context of certain dominant discourses.Figure 5. “I thought it was just memes”. Source: <https://thisiselliz.com/post/152882025410>.ReferencesAsk, Kristine, and Crystal Abidin. “My Life Is a Mess: Self-Deprecating Relatability and Collective Identities in the Memification of Student Issues.” Information, Communication & Society 21.6 (2018): 834-850.Booth, Wayne C. A Rhetoric of Irony. 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