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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Intentionalism"

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Autor: Grafiati

Publicado: 4 de junio de 2021

Última modificación: 11 de marzo de 2023

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1

van Mazijk, Corijn. "Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47, n.º 4 (2017): 499–517. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1255500.

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AbstractThis paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found inIdeas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl (i) covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is (ii) essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that (iii) the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In the third part, I show that Husserl also (iv) offers resources against intentionalism’s exclusive concern with propositional content.

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2

MITROVIĆ, BRANKO. "INTENTIONALISM, INTENTIONALITY, AND REPORTING BELIEFS". History and Theory 48, n.º 3 (octubre de 2009): 180–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2009.00503.x.

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3

Hulbert, Frederick. "In Defence of Moderate Actual Intentionalism". Aesthetic Investigations 4, n.º 2 (6 de septiembre de 2021): 236–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.58519/aesthinv.v4i2.11917.

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The extent to which the artist’s intentions are a relevant consideration in the interpretation of art has long been the subject of critical debate. Initially, I outline the various interpretive positions which have been established, specifically focusing on the debate between hypothetical intentionalism and moderate actual intentionalism. Then I look at some previous test cases which have, as yet, failed to demonstrate a decisive victory for either side. Finally, I offer two new test cases, one from the field of contemporary visual art and the other from literary theory. I argue that the former serves to debunk hypothetical intentionalism and the latter lends support to the moderate actual intentionalist position.

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4

Iseminger, Gary. "Actual Intentionalism vs. Hypothetical Intentionalism". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54, n.º 4 (1996): 319. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/431914.

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5

ISEMINGER, GARY. "Actual Intentionalism Vs. Hypothetical Intentionalism". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54, n.º 4 (1 de septiembre de 1996): 319–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540_6245.jaac54.4.0319.

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6

Byrne, Alex. "Intentionalism Defended". Philosophical Review 110, n.º 2 (abril de 2001): 199. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2693675.

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7

Byrne, A. "Intentionalism Defended". Philosophical Review 110, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2001): 199–240. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-199.

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8

Michaels, Walter Benn. "Intentionalism, Again". Law & Literature 1, n.º 1 (marzo de 1989): 89–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1535685x.1989.11015644.

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9

Nickel, Bernard. "Against intentionalism". Philosophical Studies 136, n.º 3 (26 de septiembre de 2006): 279–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2013-2.

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10

Michaels, Walter Benn. "Intentionalism, Again". Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 1, n.º 1 (abril de 1989): 89–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/27670193.

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11

Kubala, Robbie. "Literary Intentionalism". Metaphilosophy 50, n.º 4 (julio de 2019): 503–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12369.

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12

Zottoli, Davide. "Intentionality and Inner Awareness". Phenomenology & Mind 22 (2022): 68. http://dx.doi.org/10.17454/pam-2205.

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The contemporary discussion on the subjective character of conscious experience is characterized by a stark contrast between higher-order intentionalism, according to which any state of awareness depends on the instantiation of intentional properties by mental states, and anti-intentionalism, according to which the inner awareness constitutive of subjective experience is fundamentally different from ordinary instances of external or introspective awareness, in that one’s experience is not given to the subject as an ordinary intentional object. The purpose of this paper is to outline the most fundamental dimensions of variation among the different kinds of higher-order theories and to show, by providing a comprehensive analysis of the logical space available, that these seemingly incompatible views can be reconciled within an intentionalist framework.

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13

Brown, Vivienne. "Historical Interpretation, Intentionalism and Philosophy of Mind". Journal of the Philosophy of History 1, n.º 1 (2007): 25–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187226307x176767.

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AbstractHistoriographic debates keep returning to issues of authorial intention in the interpretation of texts. This paper offers a response to these debates by differentiating between two versions of intentionalism, termed 'substantive intentionalism' and 'formal intentionalism', according to two different senses of 'identity' in the thesis that assigned meaning is identified with authorial intention, such that these two versions of intentionalism imply different ontological commitments to what are construed as the relevant authorial intentions. These distinctions and arguments are then related to the 'historical intentionalism' of Quentin Skinner and Mark Bevir. The paper argues that in practice historical intentionalism ends up reproducing the arguments of formal intentionalism, and it concludes by raising questions about the value of intentionalism for historians.

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14

Madarasz, Norman. "Intentionalism Contra Intersubjectivism". International Studies in Philosophy 34, n.º 1 (2002): 113–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil200234158.

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15

Livingston, Paisley. "Intentionalism in Aesthetics." New Literary History 29, n.º 4 (1998): 831–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nlh.1998.0042.

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16

Bain, David. "Intentionalism and Pain". Philosophical Quarterly 53, n.º 213 (octubre de 2003): 502–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00328.

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17

Levinson, J. "Defending Hypothetical Intentionalism". British Journal of Aesthetics 50, n.º 2 (4 de marzo de 2010): 139–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp072.

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18

Brinkmann, Matthias. "Political Anti-Intentionalism". Res Publica 24, n.º 2 (5 de enero de 2017): 159–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9347-9.

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19

Maes, Hans. "Challenging partial intentionalism". Journal of Visual Art Practice 7, n.º 1 (8 de julio de 2008): 85–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/jvap.7.1.85_1.

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20

Speaks, Jeff. "ATTENTION AND INTENTIONALISM". Philosophical Quarterly 60, n.º 239 (abril de 2010): 325–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.617.x.

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21

Mendelovici, Angela. "Intentionalism about Moods". Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2, n.º 2 (junio de 2013): 126–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.81.

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22

Deutsch, Max. "Intentionalism and Intransitivity". Synthese 144, n.º 1 (marzo de 2005): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-1022-1.

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23

Haewan Lee. "Not Moderate, Or Not Intentionalism: A Criticism on Moderate Intentionalism". Journal of Humanities, Seoul National University 74, n.º 3 (agosto de 2017): 329–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.17326/jhsnu.74.3.201708.329.

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24

OH, Sein. "Intentionalism, Identitarianism, and Class". In/Outside: English Studies in Korea 47 (30 de noviembre de 2019): 339–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.46645/inoutsesk.47.13.

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25

Alexander, Irene. "The Error of Intentionalism". National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 17, n.º 3 (2017): 399–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ncbq201717341.

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26

Gibbons, John J. "Intentionalism, History, and Legitimacy". University of Pennsylvania Law Review 140, n.º 2 (diciembre de 1991): 613. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3312352.

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27

Tumulty, Maura. "Pains, Imperatives, and Intentionalism". Journal of Philosophy 106, n.º 3 (2009): 161–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil200910635.

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28

Gates, John B. y Glenn A. Phelps. "Intentionalism in Constitutional Opinions". Political Research Quarterly 49, n.º 2 (junio de 1996): 245. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/448873.

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29

Tan, David. "OBJECTIVE INTENTIONALISM AND DISAGREEMENT". Legal Theory 27, n.º 4 (9 de noviembre de 2021): 316–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325221000197.

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AbstractIntentionalist theories of legal interpretation are often divided between objectivist and subjectivist variants. The former take an interpretation to be correct depending on what the reasonable/rational lawmaker intended or what the reasonable/rational audience thinks they intended. The latter take an interpretation to be correct where the interpretation is what the speaker actually intended. This paper argues that objectivism faces serious problems as it cannot deal with disagreement: reasonable and rational persons can often disagree as to what the interpretation of a text should be. It also defends subjectivism against criticisms by objectivists.

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30

Nathan, D. O. "A Paradox in Intentionalism". British Journal of Aesthetics 45, n.º 1 (1 de enero de 2005): 32–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/ayi003.

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31

Pautz, Adam. "INTENTIONALISM AND PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE". Philosophical Perspectives 21, n.º 1 (6 de diciembre de 2007): 495–541. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00134.x.

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32

CHASID, ALON. "Pictorial Experience and Intentionalism". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72, n.º 4 (septiembre de 2014): 405–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12106.

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33

Le Morvan, Pierre. "Sensory Experience and Intentionalism". Philosophy Compass 3, n.º 4 (julio de 2008): 685–702. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00148.x.

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34

Green, Mitchell. "Extreme Intentionalism Modestly Modified". British Journal of Aesthetics 59, n.º 2 (30 de marzo de 2019): 197–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayy053.

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35

Gates, John B. y Glenn A. Phelps. "Intentionalism in Constitutional Opinions". Political Research Quarterly 49, n.º 2 (junio de 1996): 245–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106591299604900201.

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36

Stoljar, Daniel. "The Consequences Of Intentionalism". Erkenntnis 66, n.º 1-2 (20 de febrero de 2007): 247–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9038-6.

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37

Glüer, Kathrin. "Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification". Philosophical Studies 173, n.º 4 (9 de septiembre de 2015): 1007–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0538-6.

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38

STECKER, ROBERT. "Moderate Actual Intentionalism Defended". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64, n.º 4 (septiembre de 2006): 429–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-594x.2006.00221.x.

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39

Janzen, Greg. "Intentionalism and Change Blindness". Philosophia 36, n.º 3 (8 de enero de 2008): 355–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9115-3.

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40

Kuczynski, John-Michael. "Some arguments against intentionalism". Acta Analytica 19, n.º 32 (marzo de 2004): 107–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-004-1005-8.

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41

Lavender, Larry. "Intentionalism, Anti-Intentionalism, and Aesthetic Inquiry: Implications for the Teaching of Choreography". Dance Research Journal 29, n.º 1 (1997): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1478235.

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42

Chediak, Karla. "Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception". Trans/Form/Ação 39, n.º 2 (junio de 2016): 87–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0101-31732016000200005.

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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experience in order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object of perceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate the disjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncing the common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with the concept of biological function and to review the concept of a perceptual object.

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43

Cooke, Brandon. "When Art Can’t Lie". British Journal of Aesthetics 59, n.º 3 (23 de abril de 2019): 259–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayz006.

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Abstract Pre-philosophically, an artwork can lie in virtue of some (perhaps successfully realized) authorial intention that the audience comes to accept as true something that the author believes to be false. This thought forces a confrontation with the debate about the relation between the interpretation of a work and the intentions of its author. Anti-intentionalist theories of artwork meaning, which divorce work meaning from the actual author’s intentions, cannot license the judgment that an artwork lies. But if artwork lying is a genuine possibility, then anti-intentionalism must be rejected as false.

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44

신현주. "Intentionalism and Anti-Intentionalism: Reformulating the Debate Focusing on the Concept of Intention". Journal of Humanities, Seoul National University 74, n.º 4 (noviembre de 2017): 253–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.17326/jhsnu.74.4.201711.253.

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45

Lauria, Federico y Delphine Preissmann. "WHAT DOES EMOTION TEACH US ABOUT SELF-DECEPTION? AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE IN SUPPORT OF NON-INTENTIONALISM". Dossier: On Self-Deception 13, n.º 2 (7 de mayo de 2019): 70–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1059500ar.

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Intuitively, affect plays an indispensable role in self-deception’s dynamic. Call this view “affectivism.” Investigating affectivism matters, as affectivists argue that this conception favours the non-intentionalist approach to self-deception and offers a unified account of straight and twisted self-deception. However, this line of argument has not been scrutinized in detail, and there are reasons to doubt it. Does affectivism fulfill its promises of non-intentionalism and unity? We argue that it does, as long as affect’s role in self-deception lies in affective filters—that is, in evaluation of information in light of one’s concerns (the affective-filter view). We develop this conception by taking into consideration the underlying mechanisms governing self-deception, particularly the neurobiological mechanisms of somatic markers and dopamine regulation. Shifting the discussion to this level can fulfill the affectivist aspirations, as this approach clearly favours non-intentionalism and offers a unified account of self-deception. We support this claim by criticizing the main alternative affectivist account—namely, the views that self-deception functions to reduce anxiety or is motivated by anxiety. Describing self-deception’s dynamic does not require intention; affect is sufficient if we use the insights of neuroscience and the psychology of affective bias to examine this issue. In this way, affectivism can fulfill its promises

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46

Ogusa, Yasushi. "Intentionalism and Disjunctivism of Perception". Kagaku tetsugaku 42, n.º 1 (2009): 29–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.42.1_29.

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47

Stueber, Karsten. "Intentionalism, Intentional Realism, and Empathy". Journal of the Philosophy of History 3, n.º 3 (2009): 290–307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187226309x461542.

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AbstractContemporary philosophers of history and interpretation theorists very often deny the thesis of intentional realism, because they reject intentionalism or the thesis that an agent's or author's intentions are relevant for the interpretive practice of the human sciences. I will defend intentional realism by showing why it is wrong to whole-heartedly reject intentionalism and by clarifying the logical relation between intentionalism and intentional realism. I will do so by discussing the two central arguments against intentionalism; the argument from the perspective of narrative anti-realism and the epistemic argument focusing on the fact that an agent's or author's intentions are not epistemically accessible in a direct manner. In particular, I will show that the fact that historians write narratives does add a level of complexity as far as the giving of explanations of individual actions are concerned. Yet it does not follow that the explanatory power of a full fledged historical narrative can be understood as being completely independent of our folk psychological account of individual agency. Accordingly, we should also be prepared to accept a methodological distinction between the human and the natural sciences as long as the human sciences use the folk psychological framework for explanatory purposes, since it is only in the former that empathy plays an epistemically central role. I however do not claim that empathy is the only method of the human sciences nor do I claim that all interpretive disputes can be settled merely in light of our empathic capacities.

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48

Hatzimoysis, Anthony. "VI. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52 (marzo de 2003): 105–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100007918.

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Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind.

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49

Brown, Derek H. "Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates". Philosophical Studies 148, n.º 1 (7 de febrero de 2010): 69–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9509-0.

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50

Macpherson, James A. E. "Legislative Intentionalism and Proxy Agency". Law and Philosophy 29, n.º 1 (9 de abril de 2009): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-009-9048-z.

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