Tesis sobre el tema "Information contracts"
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Zeng, Shuo. "Topics of Principal-Agent Contracts: Contract Analysis and Pooling Principals". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/577498.
Texto completoReiche, Sonje. "Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information : on the foundations of incomplete contracts". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2001. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1634/.
Texto completoLevin, Jonathan David 1972. "Relational contracts, incentives and information". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9520.
Texto completoIncludes bibliographical references.
Chapter 1: I study the design and functioning of self-enforcing incentive contracts under imperfect observability, using a model of repeated agency that allows for both common and private performance monitoring. When performance measures are mutually observed, optimal relational agreements always keep the parties on the Pareto frontier. When performance measures are privately observed, self-enforcing agreements involve the possibility of separation on the equilibrium path, but optimal contracts still take a basic "termination" form. Using these results, one can view optimal long-term contracts as the solution to a static optimization problem. I use this static program to describe the shape of optimal contracts and the nature of second-best inefficiencies. Under standard conditions, optimal moral hazard contracts are "one-step" - a fixed discretionary transfer is made to the agent any time performance is above some cut-off. Hidden information contracts are also characterized and it is shown that optimal contracts call for effort distortion by all types. Chapter 2: This chapter considers self-enforcing relational contracts between a firm and many agents. Even when contracting opportunities are technologically independent, firms will benefit from reaching multilateral contracts that link their transactional arrangements. Optimal multilateral contracts equalize the shadow cost of incentive constraints on each relationship, something bilateral contracts will generally fail to do. I derive some novel implications for asset ownership and ex ante investment, and consider ways in which firms might be able to use existing relationships as "leverage" in reaching new agreements. I also investigate conditions under which firms might want to refrain from multilateral contracting and conduct relationships separately - this may be the case if firm is concerned about a breakdown in one relationship acting as a catalyst that brings down others. The results are applied to discuss two-tier workforce arrangements, supplier associations and the prevalence of diversified business groups in developing countries. Chapter 3: A seminal theorem due to Blackwell (1951) shows that every Bayesian decision-maker prefers an informative signal Y to another signal X if and only if Y is statistically sufficient for X. Sufficiency is an unduly strong requirement in most economic!'problems because it does not incorporate any structure the model might impose. This chapter develops a general theory of information that allows a characterization of the information preferences of decision-makers based on how their marginal returns to acting vary with the underlying (unknown) state of the world. The analysis focuses on "monotone decision problems," in which all decision-makers in the relevant class choose higher actions when higher values of the signal are realized. This restriction allows a characterization of information preferences in terms of stochastic dominance orders over distributions of posterior beliefs. Conditions are also given under which one decision-maker has a higher marginal value of information than another decision-maker, and thus will acquire more information. The results are applied to oligopoly models, labor markets with adverse selection, hiring problems, and a coordination game. (This chapter is co-authored with Susan Athey.) Chapter 4: This chapter revisits Akerlof's classic adverse selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Greater asymmetries worsen the "buyer's curse," thus lowering the demand curve, but may shift the supply curve as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on where the information impacts the market. A characterization is given for the case of partition information and then for the general case using a definition of information formulated in the previous chapter.
by Jonathan David Levin.
Ph.D.
Cuthbert, Rachel Catherine. "The information requirements for complex engineering service contracts". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648305.
Texto completoKhalil, Fahad Ahmed. "Essays on information gathering in principal-agent contracts". Diss., Virginia Tech, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37236.
Texto completoPh. D.
Isabar, Diyala y Hansson Björn Aurell. "Preventing Interference in Smart Contracts". Thesis, KTH, Skolan för elektroteknik och datavetenskap (EECS), 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-255159.
Texto completoSmarta kontrakt är en ny form av kontrakt som används för att utfärda ekonomiska transaktioner utan någon mellanman eftersom att transaktionernas integritet säkerställs med hjälp av Blockchain-teknologi. Detta säkerställer dock inte alltid säkra transaktioner eftersom det kan vara svårt att skriva säkra smarta kontrakt. Säkerhetsproblem i smarta kontrakt kan utnyttjas och orsaka stora ekonomiska förluster för kontraktanvändarna. I denna rapport undersöker vi hur störningar kan motverkas i transaktioner som involverar sådana smarta kontrakt. Detta för säkerställa att tillgångar av ekonomiskt värde inte riskerar att försvinna och att informationsflödet mellan smarta kontrakt förblir sanningsenligt. Termen störningdefinieras precist i förhållande till smarta kontrakt. Därefter undersöks två olika lösningar till de olika störningsproblemen, som huvudsakligen involverar att låsa tillgången till vissa funktioner för vissa kontrakt så att ingen modifikation av tillstånd kan ske tills dess att transaktionerna avslutats. Metoderna för att motverka störningar i transaktionerna fungerar men dessa lösningar är anpassade till de specifika prob emen och fungerade inte som en allmän lösning på störningsproblematiken.
Banerjee, Anindya. "Information and contracts : a study of principal-agent relationships". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:62b32d23-b43f-4a1a-a4e0-8185e3104ecd.
Texto completoLitterscheid, Sina [Verfasser]. "Essays on Contracts, Mechanisms and Information Revelation / Sina Litterscheid". Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1077266731/34.
Texto completoOzcan, Fatma Rana. "Category-Based Analysis of Smart Contracts". University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1563872670303612.
Texto completoBergquist, Jonatan. "Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts: Privacy-preserving Tools". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för datalogi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-323826.
Texto completoSyftet med detta examensarbete är att utforska blockkedje teknologi och s.k. smarta kontrakt för att bygga applikationer där känslig information hanteras. Huvudsakligen ligger fokus på att utveckla en struktur baserad på blockkedje teknologi och smarta kontrakt för en medikationsplan. Detta är ett typ-exempel för att visa hur en sådan applikation kan byggas, men resultaten kan överföras till andra områden där känslig data delas mellan parter, eller där ett bevis för korrekthet krävs. Först presenteras problemet, varför medikationsplaner behöver digitaliseras och varför blockkedje teknologi är väl anpassat för att implementera en sådan applikation. Sedan förklaras blockkedje teknologi något djupare i detalj, eftersom det är ett relativt nytt koncept. Därefter föreslås en design för att lösa problemet. Ett system av smarta kontrakt är byggt för att visa hur en medikationsplan kan byggas, och riktlinjer ges för hur ett blockkedje system bör se ut för att stödja systemet av smarta kontrakt. Till slut hålls en kortare diskussion om hur olika blockkedje-designer kan användas för att appliceras på problemet med känslig information.
Presentation held externally at Technical University Munich on the 29-5-2017 10.50.
Koufopoulos, Konstantinos. "Equilibrium and optimal financial and insurance contracts under asymmetric information". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2003. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2888/.
Texto completoBoos, Peter Edward. "Structural contracts and liability concerns associated with building information modeling". Kansas State University, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/6845.
Texto completoDepartment of Architectural Engineering and Construction Science
Kimberly W. Kramer
Building Information Modeling (BIM) is altering the way that the construction industry is developing design documents by involving all members of the design team as well as the general contractor early in the design process. The members are encouraged to offer advice on the design and constructability on the project. However, not only is the design process changing, but the liability and responsibility of each team member is changing as well. The alteration in responsibility can severely impact structural engineers because of the level of responsibility already associated with their role in the design process. This report looks at the concerns industry leaders and legal professionals have with how BIM is altering the liability landscape, such as standard contracts, software interoperability, data misuse, intellectual property, loss of data, the legal status of the model, the standard of care, and design delegation. In addition to the liability concerns, this report examines the steps that industry leaders have taken to prevent any unnecessary additional liability from affecting structural engineers.
Tao, Lijuan. "Decision support for contractor selection incorporating 'consolidated past performance information' /". Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2010. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B43572273.
Texto completoCampioni, Eloisa. "Financial markets and competition on contracts /". Louvain-la-Neuve : Univ. Catholique de Louvain, 2006. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/543417182.pdf.
Texto completoPAVONI, NICOLA. "RECURSIVE METHODS AND DYNAMIC CONTRACTS UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS". Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Trieste, 1999. http://thesis2.sba.units.it/store/handle/item/13016.
Texto completoIl titolo stesso descrive la metodologia e l'ambito di analisi del presente lavoro di tesi. In sintesi, per contratto intendiamo un meccanismo allocativo. La metodologia della teoria dei contratti e' caratterizzata dal fatto che si sostituisce ad un problema di equilibrio, un problema di massimizzazione vincolata (ottimo paretiano). Questa sostituzione avviene anche quando non troviamo solo vincoli tecnologici (e il vincolo di garanzia del livello minimo di utilità dell'altro agente). Nel caso in cui ci siano altri vincoli (ad esempio vincoli informativi) si parla di ricerca del ottimo di second-best. La nostra analisi e' focalizzata sugli aspetti intertemporali di detti meccanismi allocativi ed in particolare si studiano i modi in cui le tecniche ricorsive della programmazione dinamica possono essere adattate per poter caratterizzare contratti multiperiodali di second-best. Il termine informazione completa chiarisce che il lavoro non si occupa di problemi di selezione avversa, ma assume che gli agenti conoscano perfettamente le preferenze dei rivali. Infine, "teoria ed applicazioni" sta ad indicare che la tesi e' suddivisa in due parti: una parte metodologica ed una piu' applicata. In questa parte si delineano i fondamenti metodologici delle tecniche usate. Game Theoretical Foundations: Repeated Games. Il capitolo analizza alcuni aspetti dei giochi ripetuti con informazione completa. E' focalizzato sull'approccio di Abreu (Econometrica 1988) e Abreu, Pierce e Stacchetti (Econometrica 1990) che legano l'analisi degli insiemi dei payoffs di equlibrio a mappe ricorsive. Nella prima parte del capitolo viene presentato l'approccio, applicandolo ai giochi ripetuti con monitoraggio perfetto. Nella seconda parte si mostra come le tecniche possano essere estese al caso con monitoraggio imperfetto. Giochi, questi ultimi, strettamente legati al modello Principale-Agente dinamico. I contributi dell'autore in questo capitolo sono. (i) Alcune semplificazioni delle prove legate al fatto che si impongono assunzioni piu' restrittive al fine di avere una trattazione unitaria. (ii) Vengono dimostrate due nuove proposizioni sulla natura stazionaria degli insiemi dei payoffs degli equilibri nella caso di monitoraggio imperfetto. Contractual Approach: Recursive Contracts. Questo capitolo presenta specificatamente l'approccio metodologico e le tecniche ricorsi ve oggetto della tesi. Il capitolo e', per quanto ne sa l'autore, la prima trattazione formale unitaria di queste tecniche per anni utilizzate da alcuni economisti, senza un rigoroso fondamento matematico. Buona parte delle proposizioni nelle Sezioni 3.1 e 3.2.3 possono essere viste come prove formali di congetture proposte da altri autori. Uno dei classici paradigmi in economia e' il problema assicurativo con agenti avversi al rischio. Simmetricamente al capitolo precedente, la prima parte del presente capitolo assume monitoraggio perfetto e si concentra sull'analisi del problema assicurativo in presenza di vincoli di partecipazione. Questi modelli di default sono la base teorica delle nuove applicazioni di teoria del consumo e dei modelli di credito con possibilità di insolvenza (debito sovrano, credito alle piccole imprese, etc ... ) . La seconda parte del capitolo analizza il classico modello Principale-Agente (o azzardo morale). In questi modelli l'assicurazione e' limitata dal fatto che si devono dare i giusti incentivi all'agente, il quale deve compiere uno sforzo non osservabile (monitor aggio imperfetto). La caratteristica essenziale che permette di scrivere il modello in forma ricorsiva e' chiamata efficienza sequenziale. Il contratto ottimale e' caratterizzato dal fatto che in ogni periodo risolve un problema di second-best in cui la variabile di stato e' il livello di utilità attesa garantita all'agente. Questa seconda parte contiene due originali contributi applicativi dello studente. Inefficiencies in Dynamic Family Decisions: An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Labor Supply. In questo capitolo viene criticata la principale assunzione delle moderne analisi ( teoriche ed empiriche) dell'offerta di lavoro: la Pareto ottimalità dell'allocazione delle risorse all'interno della famiglia. Il lavoro propone un approccio contrattuale all'economia della famiglia e vede il matrimonio come un contratto essenzialmente incompleto (ossia che non specifica dettagliatamente come i coniugi devono comportarsi in tutti i possibili eventi futuri). Viene mostrato come siano possibili inefficienze nelle scelte lavorative solo a causa di questa incompletezza; assumendo quindi informazione perfetta e permettendo ai coniugi di scrivere contratti di lungo periodo. Le inefficienze sono legate al fatto che, quando il divorzio può essere chiesto senza il consenso dell'altra parte, allora, in ogni periodo, ciascun coniuge puo' minacciare il divorzio per ricontrattare la divisione di eventuali (inaspettate) rendite. Come conseguenza vengono scoraggiate le attività che creano queste rendite ed incoraggiate le atti vita' che aumentano il potere contrattuale (come ad esempio l'accumulazione di capitale umano). Il modello ha un'importante implicazione empirica. Riesce a spiegare un'apparente anomalia nella serie temporale dell'offerta di lavoro americana, legandola al cambio di legge sul divorzio avvenuta in USA negli anni '70. Moral Hazard, Career Concerns and the Trade-off Between Incentives, Intertemporal Consumption Smooting and Human Capitai Insurance: Some Preliminary Results. Questo capitolo utilizza ed estende le tecniche ricorsive presentate nel Capitolo 3 per analizzare un'importante variante del modello Principale-Agente; il caso in cui ci siano possibilità di carriera. In letteratura il modello viene presentato come un modello di azzardo morale ripetuto in cui viene inserito un processo di apprendimento sulla produttività del lavoratore e si permette all'agente (e solo ad esso) di rescindere il contratto di lavoro in ogni periodo. L'elevata complessità del modello ha portato la letteratura a specializzare l'analisi al caso in cui la tecnologia produttiva e' lineare ed additivamente separabile in: parametro di produttività, sforzo e shock tecnologico. Inoltre, nelle poche analisi del contratto ottimale esistenti in letteratura si assume che l'agente non abbia preferenze per l'appiattimento intertemporale del consumo. Le tecniche ricorsive oggetto della tesi permettono di trattare un caso più generale ed ottenere nuovi interessanti risultati. In primo luogo, come prevedibile, una delle principali componenti che caratterizzano il contratto ottimale di lungo periodo e' il trade-off tra incentivi, appiattimento intertemporale del consumo ed assicurazione rispetto shocks negativi nella dotazione di capitale umano. In secondo luogo c'è un nuovo effetto, chiamato "effetto informativo". Nel modello proposto si puo' verificare il caso in cui un'azione, in se' molto costosa e poco redditizia, venga implementata. Ciò è dovuto al fatto che - a differenza del modello con tecnologia lineare in cui tutte le azioni sono egualmente informative sul parametro della produttività - detta azione ha un elevato contenuto informativo. Questa nuova informazione permette di ridurre considerevolmente l'incertezza sul parametro produttivo e quindi di abbassare i costi di incentivo nei periodi successivi. Il capitolo presenta risultati preliminari. In particolare - benché alcuni risultati possano essere facilmente generalizzati - allo stato attuale dell'analisi il modello e' stato sviluppato per il caso con agente ad utilità logaritmica. Per questo caso specifico e' stata inoltre ricavata la soluzione in forma chiusa per il modello di azzardo morale ripetuto ad orizzonte infinito.
The title itself describes the methodology and the thesis' field of research. Broadly speaking, for contract we mean an allocation mechanism. The methodology of contracts is characterized by the fact that a constrained maximization (a Pareto optimal ) problem substitute an equilibrium one. This substitution is made also when we do not ha ve only technological constraints ( and the constraint of giving to the other party a minimum expected utility level). When t h ere are other constraints (for example informational constraints) we talk about second-best problems. The analysis is focused on the intertemporal aspects of allocation mechanisms, in particular we study ways of adapting recursive dynamic programming techniques to characterize multiperiod second-best contracts. Complete information in the title emphasizes that we do not analyze adverse selection problems, we assume instead that agents know perfectly other agents payoffs. Finally, "theory and applications" means the thesis is divided in two parts: a methodological part and an applied one. In this part we present the methodological foundations of the techniques object of this thesis. Game Theoretical Foundations: Repeated Games. The chapter analyzes some aspects of repeated games with complete information. The chapter is focused on the Abreu (Econometrica 1988) and Abreu Pierce and Stacchetti (Econometrica 1990) approach that links the analysis of equilibrium payoffs sets to recursive set-valued maps. In the first part of the chapter we present the approach applied to games with perfect monitoring. In the second part we show how those techniques can be extended to the case with imperfect monitoring. Games, these last ones, strictly linked with the classica! Principal-Agent model. The originai contributions in this chapter are: (i) some proof simplification due to the fact that we impose more stringent assumptions in order to keep an unified analysis. (ii)· In the second part of the chapter two new propositions are proved about the stationarity of the equilibrium payoff set with imperfect monitoring. Contractual Approach: Recursive Contracts. This chapter presents more specifically the methodological approach and the recursive techniques object of the thesis. The chapter is, to our knowledge, the first unitary formai analysis of those techniques; techniques used by many economists without giving rigorous foundations. Most of the results in Section 3.1 and 3.2.3 can be seen as formai proofs of existing conjectures. One of the classica! paradigms in economics is the insurance problem with risk adverse agents. Symmetrically t o the previous chapter, the first part of the Chapter assumes perfect monitoring and focuses the analysis on the insurance problem with limited commitment. These models of default are the theoretical basis of the new applications to consumption theory and credit models with default (sovereign debt, small firm financing, etc ... ). The second part of the chapter analyses the classica! Principal-Agent model (or moral hazard). In this model, insurance is limited because the principal has to give the right incentives to the agent who has to supply an unobservable effort (imperfect monitoring). The essential characteristic that allows to write the problem in recursive form is said sequential efficiency. The optimal contract is characterized by the fact that in each period it solves a second-best problem where the state variable in the expected utility level guaranteed to the agent. This second part contains two originai applied contributions. Inefficiencies in Dynamic Family Decisions: An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Labor Supply. In this chapter we criticize the principal assumption used in modern (theoretical and applied) analysis of labor supply: the Pareto optimality of intrahousehold resources allocation. The work proposes a contractual approach to the economie of the family and see the marriage as an essentially incomplete contract (i.e. it does not specifies how the partners should behave in all future contingencies). We show how inefficiencies can arise only because of this contractual incompleteness; thus we assume throughout perfect information and the possibility of writing long-term contracts. The inefficiencies are due to the fact that divorce can be asked without requiring the other party consensus, because of that, in each period, each partner can threaten divorce to recontract the division of unexpected surpluses. As a consequence the activities that generate such surpluses are discouraged and, in contrast, are encouraged those activities that raise the bargaining power (such as the accumulation of human capitai). The model has an important empirica! implication. We can explain an anomaly on the US labor supply time series motivating it with the change in divorce law occurred during 70s. Moral Hazard, Career Concerns and the Trade-off Between Incentives, Intertemporal Consumption Smooting and Human Capital Insurance: Some Preliminary Results. Chapter 5 applies and extends the recursive techniques presented in Chapter 3 to analyze an important variation of the Principal-Agent model: the case with career concerns. The literature presents the model as a repeated moral hazard problem where is introduced a process of learning on the productivity parameter of the worker. Moreover, there is limited commitment: the agent can, in any period walk away from the contract and accept a profitable offer from the market. The complexity of the problem induced economists to restrict the analysis to the case where the production technology is linear and additively separable in: productivity parameter, effort and technological shock. Finaliy, the few contributions about the analysis of the optimal contract assume that the agent do not like intertemporal consumption smoothing. Using recursive techniques we can analyze a more generai case and obtain new interesting results. First, as expected, one of the main components that characterize the optimallong term contract is the trade-off between incentives, intertemporal consumption smoothing and insurance against shocks on human capitai endowment. Secondly, there is a new effect that we cali information effect. In the proposed model is possible that a costly and non remunerative action be implemented. This result is due to the fact that- in contrast to the linear technology model where ali actions are equaliy informative about the productivity parameter - this action has high informational content. This new information aliows to reduce the uncertainty about the productivity parameter, reducing incentive costs in future periods. In this chapter we present only preliminary results. In particular - although some results have more generai applications - the model has been fuliy analyzed only for the case in which agent has log-utility. For this particular case we further find a closed form solution of the infinite horizon optimal wage contract for the repeated case ( without learning).
X Ciclo
1968
Versione digitalizzata della tesi di dottorato cartacea. Nell'originale cartaceo mancano le pagg. 37, 41, 60, 87, 91, 95, 112, 137
Benvenuti, Francesco <1992>. "Asymmetric information in loan contracts: A game-theoretic and statistical approach". Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/9185.
Texto completoRoberts, Stephen Paul y Stephen Paul Roberts. "Effects of Incomplete Information: Partial Buyer Information, Optimal Risk Incentivization, and Use of Non-Monotonic Contracts". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621122.
Texto completoRoberts, David E. Peltonen Jeffry M. Ozeck David J. "Baseline assessment of information technology contracts funded by Commander, Naval Surface Forces". Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/MBAPR/2010/Mar/10Mar%5FRoberts%5FMBA.pdf.
Texto completoAdvisor(s): Cook, Glenn. ; Simon, Cary. "March 2010." "MBA Professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on May 18, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Information Technology, Baseline Assessment, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, CNSF Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-92). Also available in print.
Tao, Lijuan y 陶麗娟. "Decision support for contractor selection: incorporating 'consolidated past performance information'". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B43572273.
Texto completoGalvão, Raphael de Albuquerque. "Optimal regulation of oil fields under asymmetric information". reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/9908.
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This work considers a relationship between a regulator and an oil company. There are many uncertainties inherent in this relationship and we focus on the e ects of asymmetric information. We characterize the optimal regulation under asymmetric information, when the regulator must design a mechanism that induces truthful revelation about the rm's private information. We show that, when the rm cannot commit not to quit the relationship, the regulator may not be able to implement the optimal rst-best regulatory outcome. In this case, the regulator cannot achieve the optimal risk-sharing with the rm. We also provide an example, in which we show that the Spence-Mirrlees condition (SMC) may not hold. As it turs out, this is a natural result in our model rather than an imposition.
Neste trabalho é analisada a relação entre um regulador e uma empresa petrolífera. Há várias incertezas inerentes à essa relação e o trabalho se concentra nos efeitos da assimetria de informação. Fazemos a caracterização da regulação ótima sob informação assimétrica, quando o regulador deve desenhar um mecanismo que induz a firma a revelar corretamente sua informação privada. No caso em que a rma não pode se comprometer a não romper o acordo, mostramos que o regulador pode não implementar o resultado ótimo que é obtido sob informação completa. Nesse caso, o regulador não consegue compartilhar os riscos com a firma de forma ótima. Por fim, é apresentado um exemplo, em que mostramos que a condição de Spence-Mirrlees (SMC) pode não valer. Esse resultado aparece de forma natural no modelo.
Baldwin, Kenneth. "The economics of information and piecewise linear limited liability profit sharing contracts". Thesis, Loughborough University, 2000. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/27586.
Texto completoRoberts, David E., David J. Ozeck y Jeffry M. Peltonen. "Baseline assessment of information technology contracts funded by Commander, Naval Surface Forces". Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10550.
Texto completoThis project developed a baseline assessment for assisting Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) leaders and managers in understanding and improving the following information technology programs: Training and Operational Readiness Information Services (TORIS), Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP), and the CNSF Web. The programs were described, assessed, and evaluated in terms of their backgrounds, mission needs, performance, technical requirements, functionality, and contractual terms. One conclusion was that the contractual statement of work does not measure the performance of the system; rather, it is designed to mandate the requirements for the contractor's performance (e.g., indicators that measure downtime, trouble calls, and software bugs are missing). An overarching recommendation is to integrate all staff information technology functions under one authority, while establishing simple and relevant program performance benchmarks to measure and track actual performance.
Argenton, Cédric. "Quality provision in duopoly /". Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI), 2006. http://www2.hhs.se/EFI/summary/704.htm.
Texto completoGabert, Henny y Henrik Grönlund. "Blockchain and smart contracts in the Swedish construction industry". Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-231596.
Texto completoBlockkedjetekniken med sina distribuerade liggare lockar idag massiv uppmärksamhet och skapar intresse inom många olika branscher. Ett av de mest lovande områdena för implementering av blockkedjetekniken är dess användning för att skapa helt automatiserade och decentraliserade kontraktslösningar, så kallade smarta kontrakt. Blockkedjetekniken spås även kunna utveckla begreppet BIM genom att underlätta skapandet av en gemensam modell. Problemet som adresseras i denna studie är den begränsade mängd forskning som har utförts gällande blockkedjor och smarta kontrakts potentiella användning vid upphandling av tjänster i byggbranschen. Byggbranschen skiljer sig från många andra branscher då den är projektbaserad med föränderliga förhållanden och förutsättningar. Studien visar på att byggbranschen är en bransch kantad av diskussioner och tvister, vars majoritet är kopplad till betalningar och kontraktstolkningar. Två för studien centrala begrepp är därmed moral hazard och opportunistiskt beteende. Opportunistiskt beteende kan påverka normer, viljan till samarbete och i hur hög grad parter litar på varandra. Att utforma kontrakt så att risken för moral hazard och opportunistiskt beteende minskar är därmed en viktig aspekt. Studien har valt att studera både relationer som är hierarkiska till naturen men också peer-to-peer. Syftet med studien har varit att konceptuellt reflektera över uppfattade nya möjligheter och utmaningar som finns med blockkedjor i byggbranschen gällande två identifierade användningsområden, smarta kontrakt och BIM. För att undersöka detta har en kvalitativ intervjustudie genomförts. Studien pekar på att det krävs en mer standardiserad byggnadsprocess som omfattas av en viss grad av upprepning för att få en lyckad använding av ett blockkedje-nätverk och smarta kontrakt. Studien visar också på att det finns en positiv grundinställning från respondenternas sida kring en möjlig utveckling för flera av blockkedjeteknikens potentiella applikationer. Blockkedjetekniken och smarta kontrakt har potentialen att förbättra tillförlitligheten och trovärdigheten hos loggböcker, egenkontroller och utförda arbeten inom ett byggnadsprojekt. Vidare belyser studien vikten av långsiktiga relationer och tillit för att minska opportunistiskt beetende. Baserat på tidigare forskning, empiri och analys bidrar studien till en ökad förståelse kring vilka nivåer inom byggbranschen smarta kontrakt kan vara applicerbara. Studien förevisar att smarta kontrakt inte uppfattas lämpa sig för komplicerade kontrakt där arbetet som ska utföras kan ändras många gånger under kontraktsperioden. Studien indikerar däremot att blockkedje utvecklingen med BIM inte efterfrågas i dagsläget. Slutligen pekar studien på att blockkedjetekniken uppfattas ha potential att göra byggprocessen mer transparent och öppen med minskade maktförhållanden samt mindre centraliserade vilket öppnar upp behov av forskning i den riktningen.
Gao, Jie y 高洁. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B43278656.
Texto completoGao, Jie. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues". Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B43278656.
Texto completoKantur, Habil y Charles Bamuleseyo. "How smart contracts can change the insurance industry : Benefits and challenges of using Blockchain technology". Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Informatik, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-39899.
Texto completoBorg, Therese. "Usability of a Business Software Solution for Financial Follow-up Information of Service Contracts". Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Programvara och system, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-149058.
Texto completoLi, Edward Xuejun. "Real time disclosure through current reports the case of material contracts /". Diss., Connect to online resource - MSU authorized users, 2008.
Buscar texto completoTitle from PDF t.p. (viewed on Apr. 8, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-101). Also issued in print.
Pezeshki, Yahya. "Coordination mechanisms in supply chain by contracts". Thesis, Lyon, INSA, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013ISAL0026.
Texto completoIn decentralized Supply Chains, each member decides based on his own interests. Conflict of interests results in suboptimal decisions and poor performance for entire supply chains, as well seriously harms credibly information sharing across them. In this thesis, coordination of decisions in supply chains in the context of Capacity Procurement problem are studied in different situations in form of three models. In first model, a dyadic supply chain with stochastic demand and exogenous price is investigated by taking various costs into account. PARD and RCRS contracts are designed and proposed in order for coordination of decisions respectively in full and partial information updating situations. It is mathematically shown that coordination is achieved by using each contract in its corresponding situation. In second model, endogenous price is assumed. That is, demand is modeled as sum of a decreasing linear function of price and a stochastic parameter. The model is first examined in a dyadic structure, and RSRP contract is proposed for coordinating of price, production time and production rate decisions. It is proved that coordination is achieved by RSRP contract in the dyadic structure. The application of RSRP contract is then extended to be employed in a divergent supply chain with multiple retailers, and shown that the supply chain performs considerably better than the same supply chain with a wholesale contract. In third model, a divergent supply chain comprising a supplier and multiple retailers is studied where retailers face stochastic and price-dependent demand. Since main decision makers in supply chain interactions are human, paying attention to human decision making process and their biases from theoretical predictions are important in designing coordination mechanisms. One of the non-pecuniary factors which cause deviations in human-decisions is Trust. In this model, the retailers have more accurate demand forecast information due to their proximity to market. In order to secure availability of products during the selling season, the retailers have incentives to inflate their private forecast information. A coordination mechanism is proposed, which consists of an optimization model, a scoring system and a rewarding-punishing system, in order to coordinate the supply chain. Using simulation approach, performance of the mechanism is then compared to those of two other mechanisms, namely Without Trust an Asymmetric mechanism. According to the results, employing the mechanism in situations with any demand variability is advised. More accurately, in situations with high demand variability, the mechanism achieves a proper profit improvement and moderate capability for identifying deceptive agents, while in situations with low demand variability, the mechanism shows insignificant profit improvement and considerable ability in identifying deceptive agents
Maier, Michael Shane DeJong Douglas V. "The role of financial information, social capital and reputation in lender decisions". Iowa City : University of Iowa, 2009. http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/402.
Texto completoWest, Stephanie Anne. "Essays on asymmetric information in government contracting". Diss., Virginia Tech, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40026.
Texto completoROCHA, PEDRO DE GOES CARNAVAL. "A MECHANISM BASED ON LOGS WITH META-INFORMATION FOR THE VERIFICATION OF CONTRACTS IN DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS". PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2014. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=24308@1.
Texto completoCONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
Contratos de software podem ser escritos como expressões lógicas capazes de identificar falhas que ocorrem durante a utilização de um software. É possível implementar a verificação de um contrato em um software através de assertivas executáveis. No entanto, a forma como assertivas convencionais são implementadas não é diretamente aplicável a sistemas distribuídos, uma vez que apresentam dificuldades para avaliar expressões temporais, tampouco as expressões podem envolver propriedades de diferentes processos. Este trabalho propõe um mecanismo baseado em logs com meta-informações para a verificação de contratos em sistemas distribuídos. Uma gramática para redigir contratos possibilita operações temporais, ou seja, permite a especificação de condições entre eventos, em diferentes instantes de tempo, ou mesmo garante uma sequência de eventos, durante um período de tempo. O fluxo de eventos gerado é avaliado assincronamente em relação à utilização do sistema, pela comparação com contratos, previamente escritos de acordo com a gramática, que representam as expectativas sobre o comportamento normal do sistema.
Software contracts can be written as assertions that identify failures observed while using the software. Software contracts can be implemented through executable assertions. However, conventional assertions are not directly applicable in distributed systems, as they present difficulties to evaluate temporal expressions, as well as expressions involving properties of different processes. This work proposes a mechanism based on logs with meta-information to evaluate contracts in distributed systems. A grammar to write contracts enable temporal operations, e.g., allows specifying conditions between events at different timestamps, or even guaranteeing a sequence of events over a period of time. The flow of events is evaluated asynchronously in relation to the system execution, by comparison with contracts, previously written according to the grammar, representing the expectations on the behavior of the system.
Tiger, Anna y Sanna Ekman. "IFRS 15 - Revenue From Contracts With Customers : En kvantitativ undersökning gällande den nya intäktsredovisningen". Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-105985.
Texto completoFernades, Gustavo Levi Tourinho. "Aderência à normatização aplicada à area de tecnologia da informaçãono setor público: análise das contratações em uma un idade técnico-científica da Fiocruz". Universidade Federal da Bahia, 2012. https://www.arca.fiocruz.br/handle/icict/7171.
Texto completoMade available in DSpace on 2013-10-18T15:50:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gustavo1 Levi Tourinho Fernandes Aderencia a normatizacao.pdf: 1524204 bytes, checksum: 757e262fb3888b00d71545fb185f1434 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012
Universidade Federal da Bahia. Escola de Administração. Salvador, BA, Brasil
O objetivo desta pesquisa foi identificar de que forma as contratações de Tecnologia da Informação – TI no âmbito do setor público são influenciadas pelo estabelecimento de instruções normativas, verificando a aderência a essas normas e as razões que levam a esta aderência. As contratações na área de TI no setor público vem sendo alvo de normatizações com o objetivo de aprimorar a qualidade dos serviços prestados e controlar o uso de recursos públicos. A introdução, em 2008, das Instruções Normativas 02/2008 e 04/2008 pela Secretaria de Logística e Tecnologia da Informação – SLTI do Ministério do Planejamento Orçamento e Gestão e suas atualizações, a IN 04/2010 e a IN 02/2012, trouxeram novas regras para essa área, com implicações para os contratos firmados no âmbito da Administração Pública Federal – APF. Esse processo se deu num ambiente institucional de isomorfismo coercitivo e legitimidade em que as organizações procuram se modelar a outras de quem dependem, em busca de um reconhecimento que garanta a sua continuidade. A pesquisa é exploratória, descritiva e explicativa, com abordagem qualitativa e estratégia de estudo de caso único, desenvolvido no Centro de Pesquisas Gonçalo Moniz – CPqGM,unidade técnico-científica da Fundação Oswaldo Cruz – Fiocruz, na Bahia. As implicações da normatização foram analisadas sob a ótica das dimensões gerencial, econômica e organizacional, identificadas a partir do referencial teórico reunido para o embasamento do estudo. Durante a revisão da literatura foi identificado um modelo de contratação de serviços de TI, a partir do qual foram elaborados 14 indicadores, agrupados entre as dimensões identificadas. Os dados foram coletados a partir de 3 contratos de mesmo objeto, firmados em anos distintos e sujeitos a ambientes normativos diferentes, o que permitiu buscar características das normas em vigor em seus conteúdos. Os resultados obtidos mostraram o incremento da aderência aos desígnios normativos com a evolução temporal das contratações. Foi feita uma análise acerca do ambiente institucional em que estão inseridas organizações com as características do CPqGM, buscando entender as razões que levam à aderência às normas, uma vez que não estão claramente definidas as sanções pelo não cumprimento destas. A partir da análise dos resultados da pesquisa inferiu-se a existência de processos de isomorfismo coercitivo, na pressão de órgãos de controle para a adesão a normas, e de busca por legitimidade, na adaptação ao ambiente legal e normativo para garantir a continuidade da organização.
The objective of this research was to identify how Information Technology – IT contracting in the public sector are influenced by the establishment of normative instructions, verifying adherence to those standards and the reasons that lead to this adherence. Contracting in the IT area in the public sector has been the target of norms in order to improve the quality of services and control the use of public resources. The introduction in 2008 of the Normative Instructions 02/2008 and 04/2008 by the Secretariat of Logistics and Information Technology from the Ministry of Planning and Budget and its updates, IN 04/2010 and IN 02/2012, brought new rules for that area, with implications for contracts within the Federal Public Administration. This process took place in an environment of institutional legitimacy and coercive isomorphism in which organizations seek to model themselves like others of whom depends of, in search of a recognition that guarantees its continuity. The research is exploratory, descriptive and explanatory, with qualitative approach and strategy of single case study, developed on Gonçalo Moniz Research Center – CPqGM, a technical-scientific unit of the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation – Fiocruz, from Bahia. The implications of normalization were analyzed from the perspective of managerial, economic and organizational dimensions, identified from the theoretical references for meeting the study. During the literature review it was identified a contracting model of IT services, from which were developed 14 indicators, grouped between the identified dimensions. Data were collected from 3 contracts of the same object, signed in different years and subject to different regulatory environments, allowing the search of features of the norms in force in their content. The results showed increased adherence to the normative designs with the temporal evolution of the contracts. An analysis on the institutional environment in which organizations with the characteristics of CPqGM are embedded, seeking to understand the reasons for adherence to standards, since there are no clearly defined penalties for non-compliance of these. From the analysis of the research results it was inferred the existence of processes of coercive isomorphism, in the pressure of control agencies for adherence to standards, and the search for legitimacy, in adapting the legal and normative environment to ensure the continuity of the organization.
Worden, Kathleen. "BIM and Communication: Implementation of Building Information Modeling into an Integrated Project Delivery contract to encourage project teams to communicate". DigitalCommons@CalPoly, 2016. https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/1619.
Texto completoLee, Daesik. "Essays on coalition formation under asymmetric information". Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/53567.
Texto completoPh. D.
Girot, Clarisse. "User protection in IT contracts a comparative study of the protection of the user against defective performance in information technology /". The Hague ; Boston : Kluwer Law International, 2001. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37743473d.
Texto completoPaul, Sandra. "Das elektronische Vergabeverfahren : am Beispiel der Vergabe von Bauleistungen /". Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2008. http://d-nb.info/989808432/04.
Texto completoPhillips, Andelka M. "Protecting the rights of consumers : clickwrap contracts and direct-to-consumer genetic testing". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a16ae984-10ca-4107-8db8-f8a8d7c45322.
Texto completoDi, Corato Luca. "Essays on information gathering and the use of natural resources". Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3425994.
Texto completoFERREIRA, BERNARDO JOSÉ DE BRITO. "INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORBIDITY AND WORK MARKET: AN INVESTIGATION USING PNAD 2003". PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2008. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=13913@1.
Texto completoConhecer o perfil da população brasileira que possui planos privados de saúde é fundamental para orientar as políticas da Agência Nacional de Saúde (ANS) e a linha de ação das seguradoras e operadoras de saúde. A proposta deste projeto é de fazê-lo sob a ótica do mercado de trabalho, levando em consideração a morbidade auto-referida dos indivíduos, e controlando também pelas variáveis demográficas e sócio-econômicas. Para tanto, primeiramente, realizou-se um estudo exploratório relacionando a posse de planos de saúde com estas variáveis. Depois disso, ajustamos modelos logísticos de regressão para explicar as morbidades auto referidas a partir da situação do indivíduo no mercado de trabalho, controlando pelas variáveis demográficas. A mesma classe de modelos foi utilizada como ferramenta para investigar o fenômeno conhecido como Assimetria de Informação na contratação de planos privados de saúde. Os resultados concentram os casos de assimetria de informação em algumas doenças. Pudemos identificar também grupos de trabalhadores com alta propensão a determinadas doenças em determinadas grandes regiões do país.
Knowing about the profile of the Brazilian population covered by private health plans is very important to guide the National Health Agency policies, the health insurance companies` action strategies in many ways and how the many agents involved should stand toward this process. Our purpose is to do this in the light of the work market situation, taking into account his/her self-reported morbidity, controlling for the demographical and social-economical variables. We start by presenting an exploratory study linking health plan owning with these variables. We then make use of logistic regression models, which have been adjusted to explain de self-reported morbidity according to the individual`s position in the job market, controlling for the demographical variables. The same class of model has also been used as a tool to investigate the existence of Information Asymmetry in this type of contract. Our results show that information asymmetry cases are concentrated in some diseases. We could also find some worker groups very likely to being ill from specific diseases in some specific regions of the country.
Tayem, Ghada. "Three empirical essays on the role of information in the public debt markets". Thesis, University of Manchester, 2012. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/three-empirical-essays-on-the-role-of-information-in-the-public-debt-markets(e69a3ab7-f1dc-4315-a1e9-c8f4e9d88865).html.
Texto completoArditi, Rocha Luis M. "Intelligent retrieval system for conditions of contract documents in construction". FIU Digital Commons, 1992. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1304.
Texto completoMohammed, Nazar A. "Specific challenges of consumer protection in distance selling contracts : a comparison of the laws of England and Iraq on the duty to provide pre-contractual information and the right of cancellation". Thesis, University of Stirling, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/28031.
Texto completoHelmholz, Niels. "Contract formation and the Internet : an analysis of contract formation in English, South African and German law with special regard to the Internet". Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/52746.
Texto completoENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation examines the conclusion of contracts on the Internet in English and South African law on the one hand, and German law on the other. Because these legal systems have not developed specific rules for the formation of contracts by way of this medium of communication, the question is whether the traditional doctrines are adequate to the demands of tecnological innovation. The study accordingly proceeds from a detailed discussion of the traditional rules of offer and acceptance developed in each of the systems. To this end, the leading cases and of English and South African law are considered with an emphasis on the points of difference between the approach of the courts in these systems. Where there is uncertainty or different points of view, regard is had to the critical points of view of English and South African commentators. In respect of the codified German civil law, the authoritative provisions of the general part of the civil code are discussed against the background of the commentary of academic authors. An investigation of the technical structure of the Internet and the various methods of communication afforded by it, provides a foundation for an examination of the application of the general principles of the various legal systems to contract formation on the Internet. It is concluded that despite fundamental differences in the of approach of the systems under consideration, the general principles of each system are capable of application in the context of electronic contracting. The dissertation endeavours to develop proposals regarding adequate solutions to the problems typical of the process of contract formation on the Internet.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis is afgestem op die hantering van kontraksluiting op die Internet in die Engelse en Suid-Afrikaanse Reg aan die een kant, en die Duitse Reg aan die ander kant. Omrede geeneen van hierdie stelsels tot op hede spesifieke maatreëls daargestel het vir kontraksluiting deur middel van hierdie kommunikasiemiddel nie, is die vraag of tradisionele beginsels afdoende is met die oog op eise van die nuwe tegnologie. Die ondersoek gaan derhalwe uit van 'n behandeling van die tradisionele reëls van aanbod en aanname soos wat dit in elkeen van die stelsels ontwikkel het. Met die oog hierop, word sleutelvonnisse van die Engelse en Suid-Afrikaanse reg ontleed, veral dan ook met klem op verskille in die benadering van die howe in hierdie twee stelsels. In geval van onsekerheid en verskille van mening, word verwys na die kritiese standpunte van Engelse en Suid-Afrikaanse kommentatore. Met verwysing na die gekodifiseerde Duitse stelsel word die gesaghebbende bepalings van die Burgerlike Wetboek behandel teen die agtergrond van die kommentaar van Duitse akademiese skrywers. 'n Ontleding van die tegniese struktuur van die Internet en die verskillende kommunikasiemetodes wat dit bied, verskaf die grondslag vir 'n ondersoek na die toepaslikheid van die algemene beginsels aangaande kontraksluiting van die onderskeie regstelsels in die konteks van elektroniese kontraktering. Die gevolgtrekking is dat ten spyte van fundamentele verskille in benadering, die algemene beginsels van die verkillende stelsels wel aanwendbaar is in die nuwe omgewing. Die verhandeling poog om 'n bydrae te lewer tot die ontwikkeling van aanvaarbare oplossings tot die probleme wat tipies is aan kontraksluiting deur middel van die Internet.
De, Barros Cruz Julio Cesar. "Effects of Endogenous Risks in Contract Design : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Optimal Contract Design in the Swedish Construction Industry". Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-298069.
Texto completoByggbranschen står inför utmaningar när det gäller kontraktsdesign och riskhantering. Deoptimala upphandlingsmetoderna har studerats över hela världen inom områden avkontraktsteori som i sin tur studerar hur den optimala incitamentsmekanismen ("kontrakt") kanutformas för att uppmuntra parterna att agera mer effektivt. Parterna består vanligtvis av enprincipal och en agent, där principalen anställer en agent för att leverera varor eller tjänster.Men komplexiteten i kontraktsteori kräver ett mer praktiskt tillvägagångssätt i ett försök attbättre förstå upphandlingsproblemet i byggbranschen samt att öka kunskapsutbytet mellanprojekt. Syftet med denna studie är att föreslå en modell baserad på kontraktsteori som kan användas ipraktiken för att undersöka effekter av endogena risker i tre olika typer avupphandlingskontrakt: fastpris, rörligt pris (time and material) och incitament. Denna studieanvänder därmed kvantitativa metoder i syfte att förklara det aktuella upphandlingsproblemeti den svenska byggbranschen, jämföra teori och praktik, och bidra till utökad kunskap omsambandet mellan endogena risker, optimal riskdelning och kontraktsdesign. Slutsatsen från denna studie är att den nuvarande upphandlingspraxisen i branschen inte är ilinje med den optimala kontraktsdesignen som beskrivs av teorin. Teorin i denna studie visaratt, förutsatt endogena projektrisker, så varierar de optimala incitamenten med agentensriskaversion vilket resulterar i ett icke-monoton förhållande mellan optimal kontraktsdesignoch projektrisk. Dessutom blir ett kontrakt optimalt och effektivt när kostnadsbesparingar ochkvalitetsincitament är i linje med varandra. Men analysen av verkliga projekt visar inget tydligtsamband mellan kontraktsdesign och projektrisk, det vill säga en del projekt med fastpris ellerrörligt pris visade sig ha samma risknivå. Därför föreslår denna studie en metod för beräkningav det optimala incitamentet som kan användas i många fall där de andra två typerna avkontrakt för närvarande används. Teorin säger att det optimala incitamentet kan ge värdefullafördelar för de inblandade parterna eftersom det syftar till att på ett effektivt sätt fördelaprojektrisken mellan dem samtidigt som agenten får rätt incitament att arbeta mer effektivt föratt sänka kostnaderna och leverera högkvalitativa tjänster eller varor.
Fröberg, Emil, Gustav Ingre y Simon Knudsen. "Blockchain and prediction markets : An analysis of three organizations implementing prediction markets using blockchain technology, and the future of blockchain prediction market". Thesis, KTH, Skolan för elektroteknik och datavetenskap (EECS), 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-249988.
Texto completoSedan Bitcoins introduktion 2008 har många spekulerat kring omfattningen av blockkedjeteknologins tillämpningsområden. Prediktionsmarknader (eng. prediction markets), d.v.s. marknader i vilka det går att spekulera i osäkra resultat av framtida händelser, är ett sådant tillämpningsområde; blockkedjeteknologi kan tillhandahålla aspekter som främjar implementationer av prediktionsmarknader. Denna artikel beskriver och jämför plattformarna som tillhandahålls av tre organisationer som använder sig av blockkedjeteknologi for att bygga prediktionsmarknadsplattformar: Augur, Gnosis och Stox. Genom detta tillhandahåller vi en helhetssyn över nuvarande prediktionsmarknadsplattformar som bygger på blockkedjeteknologi. Dessutom genomför vi intervjuer med tre svenska blockkedjeteknologiexperter, detta för att klargöra blockkedjeteknologis styrkor och svagheter i förhållande till prediktionsmarknader. Vi identifierar fem faktorer som är essentiella för prediktionsmarknaders förmåga att framgångsrikt aggregera och reflektera information: att många aktorer deltar, att inga aktorer är förhindrade från att delta, en tillförlitlig funktion för avgörande av utfall, frihet att skapa nya kontrakt, samt transparens. Vi drar slutsatsen att blockkedjeteknologi, med avseende på dessa faktorer, har egenskaper som förenklar implementationen av prediktionsmarknader. Å andra sidan utgör blockkedjors skalbarhetsproblem en signifikant utmaning.
Renck, Henrique Brusius. "Uma avaliação de contratos de crédito sob a ótica da economia da informação". reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/18877.
Texto completoInformational asymmetry is an inherent characteristic of the financial market that presents itself as problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. It is not different in regard to bank loan operations. Aware of this situation, the banking institutions utilise screening and monitoring mechanisms, as well as collateral exigencies, in order to reduce the informational asymmetry. The contract plays a central role within this process. Because the contractual instrument has the purpose of mitigating the deleterious effects of the informational asymmetry, the present work intends to evaluate if the clauses employed in usual credit concession contracts by the Regional Development Bank of the Far South (BRDE) are indeed designed aiming at incentives to information disclosure and prevention of hidden actions.
Mostert, Charl. "The benefits of contractual causes in mitigating project failures using business system projects". Thesis, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11838/1778.
Texto completoThis study evaluates the utilisation and effectiveness of contract clauses in Information Technology (IT) and Information System (IS) projects in South Africa to address and mitigate key risks associated with these types of projects. This study established whether specific clauses were being utilised to address key risks, and where clauses were being utilised, whether these clauses were effective in addressing and mitigating the impact of these key risks. The need for the study arose because the researcher had experienced on several occasions in his workplace that contracts which appeared fail-safe during the negotiation stage did not reach the proposed targets, let alone maturity of the agreement. To establish whether colleagues in similar positions in computer-based organisations experienced similar disruptions a quantitative questionnaire was distributed to organisations in the Johannesburg area to gain an insight into their risk profile. Risk could arise from the contract construction and/or wording. Reference was made to the contracts in the engineering environment where standard contracts have been in place for a number of years. Specifically the New Engineering Contract (NEC) of 2011 and the Professional Services Contract were consulted. The study concentrated on four categories of risk identified in a literature review, namely corporate management risk, project management risk, resource utilisation risk and technology risk, which resulted in 42 sub-factors examined. The population of suitable and relevant IT and IS companies could not be definitely established but the researcher made telephonic contact with known organisations and 24 participants agreed to participate in the exercise; 12 service providers and 12 clients of providers, where 78% of participants experienced one or more of the risk factors, and 53% used NEC standard contracts.