Literatura académica sobre el tema "Information contracts"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Information contracts"
Brunjes, Benjamin M. "Reducing risk and leveraging markets: The impact of financial structure on federal contractor performance". Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation 4, n.º 1-2 (marzo de 2018): 6–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2055563619858613.
Texto completoCarmichael, David G. y John P. Karantonis. "Construction contracts with conversion capability: a way forward". Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction 20, n.º 2 (3 de agosto de 2015): 132–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfmpc-10-2014-0022.
Texto completoTauqeer, Amar, Anelia Kurteva, Tek Raj Chhetri, Albin Ahmeti y Anna Fensel. "Automated GDPR Contract Compliance Verification Using Knowledge Graphs". Information 13, n.º 10 (24 de septiembre de 2022): 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info13100447.
Texto completoSigalov, Katharina, Xuling Ye, Markus König, Philipp Hagedorn, Florian Blum, Benedikt Severin, Michael Hettmer, Philipp Hückinghaus, Jens Wölkerling y Dominik Groß. "Automated Payment and Contract Management in the Construction Industry by Integrating Building Information Modeling and Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts". Applied Sciences 11, n.º 16 (20 de agosto de 2021): 7653. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app11167653.
Texto completoXiong, Wei y Yangcheng Hu. "Delegate contract signing mechanism based on smart contract". PLOS ONE 17, n.º 8 (19 de agosto de 2022): e0273424. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0273424.
Texto completoFilatova, Nataliia. "Smart contracts from the contract law perspective: outlining new regulative strategies". International Journal of Law and Information Technology 28, n.º 3 (2020): 217–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eaaa015.
Texto completoCorbett, Charles J., Deming Zhou y Christopher S. Tang. "Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry". Management Science 50, n.º 4 (abril de 2004): 550–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0173.
Texto completoTang, Chunhua, Huiyuan Zhang y Jiamuyan Xie. "Optimal Contract Design in Contract Farming under Asymmetric Effort Information". Sustainability 14, n.º 22 (13 de noviembre de 2022): 15000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su142215000.
Texto completoWu, Yong, Giri Kumar Tayi, Genzhong Feng y Richard Y. K. Fung. "Managing Information Security Outsourcing in a Dynamic Cooperation Environment". Journal of the Association for Information Systems 22, n.º 3 (2021): 827–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00681.
Texto completoBenamraoui, Abdelhafid y Yousef Alwardat. "Asymmetric Information and Islamic Financial Contracts". International Journal of Economics and Finance 11, n.º 1 (15 de diciembre de 2018): 96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v11n1p96.
Texto completoTesis sobre el tema "Information contracts"
Zeng, Shuo. "Topics of Principal-Agent Contracts: Contract Analysis and Pooling Principals". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/577498.
Texto completoReiche, Sonje. "Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information : on the foundations of incomplete contracts". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2001. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1634/.
Texto completoLevin, Jonathan David 1972. "Relational contracts, incentives and information". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9520.
Texto completoIncludes bibliographical references.
Chapter 1: I study the design and functioning of self-enforcing incentive contracts under imperfect observability, using a model of repeated agency that allows for both common and private performance monitoring. When performance measures are mutually observed, optimal relational agreements always keep the parties on the Pareto frontier. When performance measures are privately observed, self-enforcing agreements involve the possibility of separation on the equilibrium path, but optimal contracts still take a basic "termination" form. Using these results, one can view optimal long-term contracts as the solution to a static optimization problem. I use this static program to describe the shape of optimal contracts and the nature of second-best inefficiencies. Under standard conditions, optimal moral hazard contracts are "one-step" - a fixed discretionary transfer is made to the agent any time performance is above some cut-off. Hidden information contracts are also characterized and it is shown that optimal contracts call for effort distortion by all types. Chapter 2: This chapter considers self-enforcing relational contracts between a firm and many agents. Even when contracting opportunities are technologically independent, firms will benefit from reaching multilateral contracts that link their transactional arrangements. Optimal multilateral contracts equalize the shadow cost of incentive constraints on each relationship, something bilateral contracts will generally fail to do. I derive some novel implications for asset ownership and ex ante investment, and consider ways in which firms might be able to use existing relationships as "leverage" in reaching new agreements. I also investigate conditions under which firms might want to refrain from multilateral contracting and conduct relationships separately - this may be the case if firm is concerned about a breakdown in one relationship acting as a catalyst that brings down others. The results are applied to discuss two-tier workforce arrangements, supplier associations and the prevalence of diversified business groups in developing countries. Chapter 3: A seminal theorem due to Blackwell (1951) shows that every Bayesian decision-maker prefers an informative signal Y to another signal X if and only if Y is statistically sufficient for X. Sufficiency is an unduly strong requirement in most economic!'problems because it does not incorporate any structure the model might impose. This chapter develops a general theory of information that allows a characterization of the information preferences of decision-makers based on how their marginal returns to acting vary with the underlying (unknown) state of the world. The analysis focuses on "monotone decision problems," in which all decision-makers in the relevant class choose higher actions when higher values of the signal are realized. This restriction allows a characterization of information preferences in terms of stochastic dominance orders over distributions of posterior beliefs. Conditions are also given under which one decision-maker has a higher marginal value of information than another decision-maker, and thus will acquire more information. The results are applied to oligopoly models, labor markets with adverse selection, hiring problems, and a coordination game. (This chapter is co-authored with Susan Athey.) Chapter 4: This chapter revisits Akerlof's classic adverse selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Greater asymmetries worsen the "buyer's curse," thus lowering the demand curve, but may shift the supply curve as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on where the information impacts the market. A characterization is given for the case of partition information and then for the general case using a definition of information formulated in the previous chapter.
by Jonathan David Levin.
Ph.D.
Cuthbert, Rachel Catherine. "The information requirements for complex engineering service contracts". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648305.
Texto completoKhalil, Fahad Ahmed. "Essays on information gathering in principal-agent contracts". Diss., Virginia Tech, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37236.
Texto completoPh. D.
Isabar, Diyala y Hansson Björn Aurell. "Preventing Interference in Smart Contracts". Thesis, KTH, Skolan för elektroteknik och datavetenskap (EECS), 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-255159.
Texto completoSmarta kontrakt är en ny form av kontrakt som används för att utfärda ekonomiska transaktioner utan någon mellanman eftersom att transaktionernas integritet säkerställs med hjälp av Blockchain-teknologi. Detta säkerställer dock inte alltid säkra transaktioner eftersom det kan vara svårt att skriva säkra smarta kontrakt. Säkerhetsproblem i smarta kontrakt kan utnyttjas och orsaka stora ekonomiska förluster för kontraktanvändarna. I denna rapport undersöker vi hur störningar kan motverkas i transaktioner som involverar sådana smarta kontrakt. Detta för säkerställa att tillgångar av ekonomiskt värde inte riskerar att försvinna och att informationsflödet mellan smarta kontrakt förblir sanningsenligt. Termen störningdefinieras precist i förhållande till smarta kontrakt. Därefter undersöks två olika lösningar till de olika störningsproblemen, som huvudsakligen involverar att låsa tillgången till vissa funktioner för vissa kontrakt så att ingen modifikation av tillstånd kan ske tills dess att transaktionerna avslutats. Metoderna för att motverka störningar i transaktionerna fungerar men dessa lösningar är anpassade till de specifika prob emen och fungerade inte som en allmän lösning på störningsproblematiken.
Banerjee, Anindya. "Information and contracts : a study of principal-agent relationships". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:62b32d23-b43f-4a1a-a4e0-8185e3104ecd.
Texto completoLitterscheid, Sina [Verfasser]. "Essays on Contracts, Mechanisms and Information Revelation / Sina Litterscheid". Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1077266731/34.
Texto completoOzcan, Fatma Rana. "Category-Based Analysis of Smart Contracts". University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1563872670303612.
Texto completoBergquist, Jonatan. "Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts: Privacy-preserving Tools". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för datalogi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-323826.
Texto completoSyftet med detta examensarbete är att utforska blockkedje teknologi och s.k. smarta kontrakt för att bygga applikationer där känslig information hanteras. Huvudsakligen ligger fokus på att utveckla en struktur baserad på blockkedje teknologi och smarta kontrakt för en medikationsplan. Detta är ett typ-exempel för att visa hur en sådan applikation kan byggas, men resultaten kan överföras till andra områden där känslig data delas mellan parter, eller där ett bevis för korrekthet krävs. Först presenteras problemet, varför medikationsplaner behöver digitaliseras och varför blockkedje teknologi är väl anpassat för att implementera en sådan applikation. Sedan förklaras blockkedje teknologi något djupare i detalj, eftersom det är ett relativt nytt koncept. Därefter föreslås en design för att lösa problemet. Ett system av smarta kontrakt är byggt för att visa hur en medikationsplan kan byggas, och riktlinjer ges för hur ett blockkedje system bör se ut för att stödja systemet av smarta kontrakt. Till slut hålls en kortare diskussion om hur olika blockkedje-designer kan användas för att appliceras på problemet med känslig information.
Presentation held externally at Technical University Munich on the 29-5-2017 10.50.
Libros sobre el tema "Information contracts"
Feltham, Gerald A., Amin H. Amershi y William T. Ziemba, eds. Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7.
Texto completoNl̲deke, Georg. Unverifiable information, incomplete contracts, and renegotiation. Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992.
Buscar texto completoSchmitz, Patrick. Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts. Aachen: Shaker, 1999.
Buscar texto completoHalvey, John K. Information technology outsourcing transactions: Process, strategies, and contracts. New York: Wiley, 1996.
Buscar texto completoNational Institutes of Health (U.S.). Division of Research Grants. Grants Inquiries Office. Information from the NIH on grants and contracts. Bethesda, Md.?]: Division of Research Grants ... Grants Inquiries, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services, 1986.
Buscar texto completoPemberton, James. Efficient contracts and incentive compatibility with asymmetric information. Reading: University of Reading.Department of Economics, 1988.
Buscar texto completoHalvey, John K. Information technology outsourcing transaction: Process, strategies, and contracts. 2a ed. Somerset, NJ: J. Wiley, 2006.
Buscar texto completoUnited States. General Accounting Office. Health, Education, and Human Services Division. Information on the Davis-Bacon Act. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1996.
Buscar texto completoUnited States. General Accounting Office. Health, Education, and Human Services Division. Information on the Davis-Bacon Act. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1996.
Buscar texto completoUnited States. General Accounting Office. Health, Education, and Human Services Division. Information on the Davis-Bacon Act. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1996.
Buscar texto completoCapítulos de libros sobre el tema "Information contracts"
Dawson, R. L. "Contracts". En Teacher Information Pack 5: Techniques and Information, 14–21. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09005-1_2.
Texto completoSuurmond, Coen. "Business, Contracts, Information". En Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 3–17. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94214-8_1.
Texto completoAzariadis, Costas. "Implicit Contracts". En Allocation, Information and Markets, 132–40. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_14.
Texto completoLazear, Edward P. "Incentive Contracts". En Allocation, Information and Markets, 152–62. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_16.
Texto completoHart, Oliver. "Incomplete Contracts". En Allocation, Information and Markets, 163–79. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_17.
Texto completoShaik, Khader. "Derivatives and Information Technology". En Managing Derivatives Contracts, 355–68. Berkeley, CA: Apress, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-6275-6_17.
Texto completoBeulen, Erik y Pieter M. Ribbers. "Transitions and contracts". En Managing Information Technology Outsourcing, 110–42. 3a ed. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003223788-7.
Texto completoCorbett, Charles J. y Christopher S. Tang. "Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry". En International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, 269–97. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4949-9_9.
Texto completoCallea, M., L. Campagna, M. G. Fugini y P. Plebani. "Contracts for Defining QoS Levels". En Mobile Information Systems, 1–14. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/0-387-22874-8_1.
Texto completoEschenbruch, Klaus y Jörg L. Bodden. "Integrating BIM in Construction Contracts". En Building Information Modeling, 303–14. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92862-3_17.
Texto completoActas de conferencias sobre el tema "Information contracts"
Athamena, Belkacem, Zina Houhamdi y Ghaleb El Refae. "Retention Contracts under Hidden Information". En 2021 22nd International Arab Conference on Information Technology (ACIT). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acit53391.2021.9677284.
Texto completoMa, Zhonghua. "Trade Credit Contracts under Asymmetric Information". En 2009 International Conference on Wireless Networks and Information Systems (WNIS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wnis.2009.85.
Texto completoLi, Jianing y Houcai Shen. "Procurement Contracts Under Asymmetric Yield Information". En 2018 15th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2018.8465060.
Texto completoKobayashi, Shinji y Shigemi Ohba. "Technology licensing contracts and private information". En Technology. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/picmet.2009.5261801.
Texto completoIizuka, Kayo y Chihiro Suematsu. "Psychological Contracts in Business Process Transformation Effect: Structure of Psychological Contracts". En 23rd International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0010526304290435.
Texto completoXinhui Wang y Xianyu Wang. "Supply chain contracts with endogenous information structure". En 2010 2nd International Conference on Information Science and Engineering (ICISE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icise.2010.5689509.
Texto completoAlon, Tal, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash y Inbal Talgam-Cohen. "Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency". En EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467608.
Texto completoDounas, Theodoros, Wassim Jabi y Davide Lombardi. "Smart Contracts for Decentralised Building Information Modelling". En eCAADe 2020: Anthropologic : Architecture and Fabrication in the cognitive age. eCAADe, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.52842/conf.ecaade.2020.2.565.
Texto completoPapireddygari, Maneesha y Bo Waggoner. "Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules". En EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538261.
Texto completoZhang, Hao, Mahesh Nagarajan y Greys Sošić. "Dynamic supplier contracts under asymmetric inventory information". En the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807446.
Texto completoInformes sobre el tema "Information contracts"
Allen, Julia, Lisa Cunningham, Gary Ford, Barbara Fraser y John Kochmar. Security for Information Technology Service Contracts. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, enero de 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada336329.
Texto completoDoD Office of Inspector General. Summary Report: DoD Information Technology Contracts Awarded Without Competition Were Generally Justified. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, septiembre de 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1001815.
Texto completoFinkelshtain, Israel y Tigran Melkonyan. The economics of contracts in the US and Israel agricultures. United States Department of Agriculture, febrero de 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.32747/2008.7695590.bard.
Texto completoSeverud, K. J. Project management plan for Contract Management Information System (CONTRACT). Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), enero de 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/10118756.
Texto completoShah, Ayesha, Jan Olek y Rebecca S. McDaniel. Real Life Experience with Major Pavement Types. Purdue University, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5703/1288284317371.
Texto completoCrabtree, Donald J. Contract Pricing Handbook PMO Tactical Management Information Systems. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, abril de 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada156174.
Texto completoSchembri, Philip y Jillian O'Neel. MDMi contract discussion and preliminary information for planning. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), octubre de 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1893656.
Texto completoFlandreau, Marc, Stefano Pietrosanti y Carlotta Schuster. Why do Sovereign Borrowers Post Collateral? Evidence from the 19th Century. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, octubre de 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp167.
Texto completoCao, Shoufeng, Uwe Dulleck, Warwick Powell, Charles Turner-Morris, Valeri Natanelov y Marcus Foth. BeefLedger blockchain-credentialed beef exports to China: Early consumer insights. Queensland University of Technology, mayo de 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/rep.eprints.200267.
Texto completoDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC. Military Standard: Contractor Integrated Technical Information Service (CITIS). Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, agosto de 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada289778.
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