Literatura académica sobre el tema "Foreign Government policy Australia"

As initially, Australia supported the integration of Timor Leste into the Republic of Indonesia, many events occurred which caused the relationship between Indonesia and Australia to be slightly disturbed. The changes that have taken place in Australia's relationship with Indonesia illustrate the real effects of Timor-Leste's independence. As a result of Australia's role in the East Timorese independence process, its relationship underwent many changes, especially in the political and military fields. The changes taking place in military relations are evident. First, the Agreement on Mutual Security (AMS) was released. Second, the joint training was cancelled, and the troops that used to work together became enemies. Eventually, Australian arms sales to Indonesia were stopped. Changes in the political and diplomatic sphere, including all political visits, were cancelled, and politicians within Australia and Indonesia publicly denounced others. Furthermore, cooperation within the global framework is limited, and the Ambassador's 'high alert' status is. Overall, Australia's relations with Indonesia became hostile. This study aims to determine how the influence of Australian foreign policy on Indonesia after the independence of Timor Leste. This research shows that the independence of Timor Leste and Australia's role in this process directly influenced government relations between Australia and Indonesia. Most Indonesians view the Australian government's actions and policies as separate from its relationship with Australian citizens. However, the relationship between people must still be considered when making policies about Indonesia because of widespread reactions to Australia's role in the East Timorese independence process.

As initially, Australia supported the integration of Timor Leste into the Republic of Indonesia, many events occurred which caused the relationship between Indonesia and Australia to be slightly disturbed. The changes that have taken place in Australia's relationship with Indonesia illustrate the real effects of Timor-Leste's independence. As a result of Australia's role in the East Timorese independence process, its relationship underwent many changes, especially in the political and military fields. The changes taking place in military relations are evident. The Agreement on Mutual Security (AMS) was released, the joint training was canceled, and the troops that used to work together became enemies. Eventually, Australian arms sales to Indonesia were stopped. Changes in the political and diplomatic sphere, including all political visits, were canceled, and politicians within Australia and Indonesia publicly denounced others. Furthermore, cooperation within the global framework is limited, and the Ambassador's 'high alert' status is. Overall, Australia's relations with Indonesia became hostile. This study aims to determine how the influence of Australian foreign policy on Indonesia after the independence of Timor Leste. This research shows that the independence of Timor Leste and Australia's role in this process directly influenced government relations between Australia and Indonesia. Most Indonesians view the Australian government's actions and policies as separate from its relationship with Australian citizens.

This article examines the use of Radio Australia by the Australian Government. It examines the extent that the Australian Government's foreign policy goals are reflected in the charter and programming of Radio Australia. The paper begins with a brief historical look at Radio Australia followed by description and analysis of the role of an intermediary between the government and the station, which, in this case, is the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), the parent company of Radio Australia; the programme philosophy of, and programming offered by Radio Australia, and criticisms of Radio Australia from within the Pacific.

ABSTRACTThe role of decolonization in the decline of the British empire has received a great deal of attention. In comparison there has been little research or analysis of the process of dedominionization affecting Australia and the other dominions. During the Second World War economic ties were seriously weakened and there were substantial conflicts over economic policy between the British and Australian governments. Australia refused to reduce imports in order to conserve foreign exchange, thus contributing to the United Kingdom's debt burden. The Australian government insisted that the British guarantee Australia's sterling balances and refused to adopt the stringent fiscal policies requested by the Bank of England and the British treasury. Australia also took the opportunity to expand domestic manufacturing industry at the expense of British manufacturers. Economic separation and conflict were complemented by political and strategic differences. In particular, the Australian government realized that British military priorities made it impossible for the United Kingdom to defend Australia. This led the Australians towards a policy of cooperating with the British embargo on Japan, only to the extent that this would be unlikely to provoke Japanese military retaliation. In general, the Australians preferred a policy of compromise in the Far East to one of deterrence preferred by the British.

This article places a particular emphasis on the rise of China and its implications for Australian foreign policy. It qualitatively examines the perceptions of China’s rise, its intentions, and the Australian responses, based on government and international organisation reports, and secondary sources such as books, journals, and media articles. Using realism as a theoretical lens, this article argues that Australia’s foreign policy still reflects an ambiguity, as a result of, on the one hand, the economic opportunities China creates, and on the other hand, uncertainty regarding China’s intentions, whether offensive or defensive, peaceful or aggressive. Facing this condition, this article demonstrates that Australia adopts several important policy strategies. First, it maintains a hedging strategy to balance its economic interests and its security concern. Second, Australia continues to rely on the protection of the US. In the long-term, however, this reliance may be changed. For this reason, Australia needs to increase its own military capability. This article concludes that Australian foreign policy will likely remain ambivalent in its response to the rise of China.KEYWORDSAustralia; China’s Rise; Foreign Policy; Military Capability; Power Shift

The article is related to the establishment of Australian foreign policy tradition and becoming of Australia as a subject of international relations. The significant role of the dominions during First World War Great and their help for Great Britain victory, intensified their struggle for independence. As the result of long-term efforts, dominions reached the proclamation of the Balfour Declaration in 1926 by London, which was later confirmed by the Statute of Westminster (1931), which established the authority for dominions for an independent foreign policy. The development of Australian foreign policy before and during World War II was analyzed. The evolution of the relations of the Australia and Great Britain in the context of the events of the World War II is traced, in particular the peculiarities of the allied relations of the two countries. There is shown the regional dimension of the World War II within the Asia-Pacific region, in the context of Australia and the United States actions against Japanese aggression. There are analyzed the peculiarities of external threats effect on the transformation of the Australian foreign policy strategy, in particular in the national security sphere. The main threat for Australia in that period become Japanise aggressive and expansionist policy in the Asia-Pacific region. A lot of Australian soldiers and military equipment were sent to Great Britain to support traditional allie. But in actual strategic situation in Europe there were great doubts that British troops and the navy would be able to effectively help Australians in case of an attack by Japan. Politics of national security and defense of Australia in the context of its participation in World War II is considered. In the conditions of real threat of Japanese invasion, as well as the lack of sure to receive necessary support from Great Britain, the Australian government start to find a military alliance with the USA. There were identified the key implications of World War II for Australian socio-economic system.

In its early documents related to Asianist orientation, Australia looked at engaging its immediate neighbourhood through institution such as ASEAN. ASEAN which was created to bring about synergies within the region and also engage important stakeholders as dialogue partners. Australia has been involved in Vietnam as part of its alliance obligations with US in 1970s and subsequently also. Australia has looked into ASEAN as a vehicle for cooperation, development and building better relations with Indonesia. The author argues that while Australia has aligned itself with the concept of the ASEAN way, there has not been any tectonic shift in the way Australia conducts its foreign policy. Even though Australia was one of the earliest dialogue partner in ASEAN, it has calibrated its policy depending on the national government priorities and the international interests of the country. The article also outlines the narrative from Australian perspective and situates ASEAN in the larger foreign policy discourse in Australia.

Talking about foreign policy relations of a country, it cannot be explained without adapting to the changes that occur in the growing environment or situation of both countries. Adjustments to the environment and the situation, especially the foreign policy are done in order to maintain the physical, economic, politic and social culture of the country in the midst of the real conditions of the situation occurred, like the history of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia). This is a study of the history of Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia since Whitlam government in 1972 until Hawke. The goal of the study is to explain how the foreign policy of the Australian Prime Ministers during their reigns. Although in reality in the course of its history, Australian and Indonesian diplomatic relations were full of intrigues, turmoil and conflicts, but it did not severe the relation of the two nations. Eventually, the conclusion of this study explicitly states that Australia and Indonesia still need each other in an attempt to establish political stability, economic and security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific peacefully.

This article draws on previously classified Australian and British archival material to reevaluate Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's foreign policy. The article focuses on the Whitlam government's decision in 1973 to withdraw Australian forces from Malaysia and Singapore—a decision that constitutes a neglected but defining episode in the evolution of Australian postwar diplomacy. An analysis of this decision reveals the limits of Whitlam's attempt to redefine the conduct of Australian foreign policy from 1972 to 1975, a policy he saw as too heavily influenced by the Cold War. Focusing on Whitlam's approach to the Five Power Defence Arrangement, this article contends that far from being an adroit and skillful architect of Australian engagement with Asia, Whitlam irritated Australia's regional allies and complicated Australia's relations with its immediate neighbors. Australia's subsequent adjustment to its neighborhood was not the success story implied in the general histories of Australian diplomacy. Whitlam's policy toward Southeast Asia, far from being a “watershed” in foreign relations, as often assumed, left Australia increasingly isolated from its region and more reliant on its chief Cold War ally, the United States.

This Dissertation presents a study of Australia's involvement in the negotiation and early interpretation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an instrument which remains the most important global nuclear arms control measure in international law. Using data from recently released Australian government documents, the study analyses the process by which Australia was transformed from an ambivalent nuclear sceptic within the Western alliance, into a steadfast global campaigner against the spread of nuclear weapons. It concludes that Australia's urgent search during 1967 and 1968 for coherence in its policy on nuclear weapons acquisition, largely played out within sections of the Australian bureaucracy and political leadership, was not only the catalyst for that transformation, but also an important step in Australia's search for "middle power" status in both a regional and wider sense. The study uses an interdisciplinary theoretical model which asserts the complementary nature of international law and international relations theory in explanations of relations between states. That model proposes that each discipline is capable of enhancing the insights of the other, in order to account - more closely in concert than each does individually - for the rule-following behaviour of nation-states. Beginning in Chapter One with a critique of the NPT and the regime of institutions and understandings which surround it, the study moves, in Chapter Two, to a review of the domestic and international context in which Australia's nuclear weapons policy debate was conducted, while introducing the elements of division within the Australian federal bureaucracy which largely prosecuted that debate. Chapters Three and Four analyse the debate in detail, concluding that its inconclusive result induced Australia's refusal to agree to America's request for immediate accession to the NPT. This, in tum, resulted in Australia exercising, through its recalcitrance, disproportionate influence over the US on the interpretation of the terms of the treaty. Chapter Five moves analysis to the international arena, and the forum of the United Nations General Assembly, in which Australia finally found the limit of America's willingness to accommodate the concerns of a small but significant Western ally located in a region of strategic importance. Chapter Six examines the process by which Australia's influence over the US on the interpretation of the terms of the NPT was translated into guidance to other nuclear threshold states through the Western alliance. It also examines the level of influence exerted by Australia through its bilateral discussions with other states over the terms of the treaty. It concludes that Australia, mainly through the former process, could claim a significant role in the formulation of the world's most important multilateral nuclear convention through its insistence on interpretative clarity. Finally, the study draws general conclusions on the significance of Australia's nuclear weapons debate for its aspirations to "middle power" status. It concludes that its indisputable leadership role, after 1972, in global nuclear disarmament efforts of many kinds, is an example of that status. Its most important theoretical conclusion concerns the demonstrated utility of an interdisciplinary model for the study of relations between states.

Unlike liberalism, the realist theory of International Relations leaves very little space for individual leaders or other domestic factors to influence the direction of a state’s foreign policy. It therefore provides an insufficient explanation for the enormous influence former Australian Prime Minister John Howard had on Australian foreign policy-making. When considering potential domestic influences on a state’s foreign policy, such as public opinion, Australia’s political institutions and societal structure, John Howard’s influence far outshone them all. Howard claimed to be a realist and indeed his actions generally confirmed that. Yet the fact that he was able to shape Australian foreign policy in his mould, from the more liberal internationalist bipartisanism of the previous few decades, ironically demonstrates the importance of domestic factors in the making of foreign policy over international ones. While in Australia the Prime Minister has always had far more influence in this field than any other factor, this is a trend which Howard consolidated. Howard’s influence was so great not only because of the centralised nature of the Australian foreign policy-making structure he inherited upon winning office in 1996, but because of conscious decisions made during his prime ministership. These decisions included the establishment of the National Security Committee, the promotion of the Australian Federal Police at the expense of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the increased prominence of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Howard was then able to use his influence in Australian foreign policy-making to shape Australia in his own image. The case studies of the 1999 peace-keeping operation in East Timor and the 2003 invasion of Iraq as part of the United States-led “Coalition of the Willing” demonstrate this argument. Not long after Australian troops entered East Timor – Howard’s first real intervention in foreign affairs – Howard outlined to parliament what quickly became known as the Howard Doctrine. This speech foreshadowed the full expression of Howard’s vision of Australia, a vision that was: … centred upon the Anzac tradition; mateship; military valour; mourning; remembrance; the martial defence of Western values [and] the most intimate association with Australia’s two wartime great and powerful friends, the United Kingdom and the United States (Manne, 2004, 50). The War on Terror, especially Australia’s contribution to the invasion of Iraq, represented the most extreme expression of the Howard Doctrine, and demonstrates most clearly Howard’s dominance of the foreign policy-making arena.

This thesis aims to determine if there is a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism in the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy between 2002 and 2018. Discourse analysis have been used to analyze eight statements, based on a constructivist framework and the theoretical concept of Swedish exceptionalism. Swedish exceptionalism is the idea of Sweden having a self-image of being superior to others, mainly based on the country’s understanding of itself as being a “moral superpower”.   The research question formulated was: Are the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy, between 2002 and 2018, articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism?   To determine if there was a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism in the Statements of Foreign Policy, seven key representations of the concept were established. Those were   Sweden:   1.     being military non-aligned 2.     having an active foreign policy 3.     being pioneering or “leading the way” 4.     bringing security, stability, and peace 5.     being a champion of human rights and democracy 6.     acting as mediator and/or a bridge builder 7.     showing solidarity with “less fortune states” (developing, vulnerable and/or small)   The results of the empirical study were that all key representations were present in all of the statements analyzed, which lead to the conclusion is that the Statements of Foreign Policy between 2002 and 2018 were articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism.

The Hawke Labor government came to power in March 1983 committed to playing a more active role in finding a solution to the Cambodian conflict, improving bilateral relations with Vietnam and restoring Australian aid. This signalled a departure from the Fraser government's minimal involvement in the issue, and reflected a closer identification of Australia's interests with the Asia-Pacific region. As Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, explained: The war in Cambodia, in all its many dimensions, is the greatest unresolved source of tension in Southeast Asia...The future of Australia lies in developing a mature and balanced set of relationships with its neighbours in Southeast Asia. Indochina is part of that neighbourhood.

This thesis focuses on the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund, and its linkage to the Norwegian foreign policy. The Kingdom of Norway is usually presented as a role model of a Nordic welfare state. Nevertheless, nothing of this would be possible without oil discovery on the Norwegian offshore in 1969. This thesis debates about possible oil discovery impacts on Norwegian foreign policy throughout the time and tries to analyse and elaborate on major foreign policy challenges. It tries to define whether the Norwegian foreign policy followed Norwegian investment interests and shifted policy's direction since the establishment of the Government Pension or not. Furthermore, the Government Pension Fund -- Global is not intended to be used as a foreign policy instrument. However, some information indicates the contrary. Thesis attempts to answer the question from a wider perspective.

A high level of a country’s foreign trade is related to the growth of foreign earnings, to the acceleration of investments, to increase employment and contributes significantly to the growth of the country's economy. In this context, SMEs as one of the mile stones of the economy, foreign trade and economic growth are located in the leading roles. Especially SMEs sufficiently developed oppressed against strong opponents abroad, government policies or practices in trade restrictive policies are some of the reasons for this downside. SMEs that exports goods, or the infrastructure needed to produce goods for SMEs who import raw materials as well as the country's foreign trade policies and developments in the world economy is important. SMEs to follow the development, recognizing competitors, new markets, new products is very important in terms of growth both business and the countries. In this study, SMEs engaged in foreign trade in Sivas Province performing an application on in terms of both the business and government policy at the local level status will be examined. Data will be obtained on issues such as ultimately foreign trade potential of existing SMEs while doing foreign trade problems they face, strengths and weaknesses, market policies at national and international levels, the opinions about the state's foreign trade policy. The results obtained from the data on SMEs engaged in foreign trade by making general inferences about the data obtained on a micro scale, will allow making inferences on the macro scale.

The purpose of this study is to identify patterns and processes of adaptation of Russia’s tax policy under the influence of foreign policy factors due to the current geopolitical situation in the international arena. The foreign policy activity of the Russian Federation makes it possible to set its priorities, determine the formats and set the course for the entire foreign policy of the state, which certainly requires proper organizational and legal institutionalization. That is why the adaptation measures of the Russian tax policy are very important based on modern realities, built on the basis of sanctions pressure from unfriendly countries towards Russia. This study examined all the measures of the Government of the Russian Federation aimed at adapting taxation and building the course of the state’s economic policy in the context of market economy implementation. The ongoing tax policy, which takes into account benefits, deferrals and exemptions from part of the taxation, will allow the development of domestic production, bring it to a new level and stop dependence on foreign investment. Based on the study, a reasonable conclusion was made about the need to maintain a balance between the fiscal and regulatory role of taxation in the context of a slowdown in the growth of the domestic economy due to the influence of the international situation because of Russia’s foreign policy activity.

A relatively small number of countries have an explicit “Feminist Foreign Policy” (FFP). Those most often cited are Sweden, Canada, France, Mexico, and Spain. In theory, an FFP moves beyond gender mainstreaming in foreign development assistance to include: (1) a wider range of external actions, including defence, trade and diplomacy (2) a wider range of marginalised people, not just women. Within foreign development assistance, it implies a more coherent and systematically institutionalised approach to gender mainstreaming. In practice, those countries with an explicit FFP implement it in different ways. Canada currently focuses on development assistance, France on development assistance and formal diplomacy, Sweden more comprehensively covers the trade and defence policy arenas. Mexico and Spain are yet to produce detailed implementation plans. There is increasing academic interest in FFP, but most analyses found during the course of this rapid review focus on narrative content of policies rather than impact. Policy advocacy and advice is provided by several high-profile advocacy organisations. National government agencies in Sweden, France and Canada have produced some evaluations of their FFP, but the evidence is weak. There are many international institution evaluations of gender mainstreaming for many different sectors that are context-specific.

Most, if not all advanced economies have suffered gravely from the 2008 global financial crisis. Growth, productivity, real income and consumption have plunged and inequality, and in some cases poverty, spiked. Some countries, like Germany and Australia, were better able to cope with the consequences but austerity has taken its toll even on the strongest economies. The UK is no exception and the more recent period of economic recovery might be halted or even reversed by the political, economic, and policy uncertainty created by the Brexit referendum. This uncertainty related risk to growth could be even greater if the UK leaves the economic and legal framework provided by the EU. This CAGE policy report offers proposals from different perspectives to answer the overarching question: What is the role of a government in a modern economy after the global financial crisis and the Brexit vote? We report on economic and social challenges in the UK and discuss potential policy responses for the government to consider. Foreword by: Lord O’Donnell of Clapham.

The arts do not exist in vacuum and cannot be valued in abstract ways; their value is how they make people feel, what they can empower people to do and how they interact with place to create legacy. This research presents insights across Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand about the value of arts and culture that may be factored into whole of government decision making to enable creative, vibrant, liveable and inclusive communities and nations. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed a great deal about our societies, our collective wellbeing, and how urgent the choices we make now are for our futures. There has been a great deal of discussion – formally and informally – about the value of the arts in our lives at this time. Rightly, it has been pointed out that during this profound disruption entertainment has been a lifeline for many, and this argument serves to re-enforce what the public (and governments) already know about audience behaviours and the economic value of the arts and entertainment sectors. Wesley Enoch stated in The Saturday Paper, “[m]etrics for success are already skewing from qualitative to quantitative. In coming years, this will continue unabated, with impact measured by numbers of eyeballs engaged in transitory exposure or mass distraction rather than deep connection, community development and risk” (2020, 7). This disconnect between the impact of arts and culture on individuals and communities, and what is measured, will continue without leadership from the sector that involves more diverse voices and perspectives. In undertaking this research for Australia Council for the Arts and Manatū Taonga Ministry for Culture & Heritage, New Zealand, the agreed aims of this research are expressed as: 1. Significantly advance the understanding and approaches to design, development and implementation of assessment frameworks to gauge the value and impact of arts engagement with a focus on redefining evaluative practices to determine wellbeing, public value and social inclusion resulting from arts engagement in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand. 2. Develop comprehensive, contemporary, rigorous new language frameworks to account for a multiplicity of understandings related to the value and impact of arts and culture across diverse communities. 3. Conduct sector analysis around understandings of markers of impact and value of arts engagement to identify success factors for broad government, policy, professional practitioner and community engagement. This research develops innovative conceptual understandings that can be used to assess the value and impact of arts and cultural engagement. The discussion shows how interaction with arts and culture creates, supports and extends factors such as public value, wellbeing, and social inclusion. The intersection of previously published research, and interviews with key informants including artists, peak arts organisations, gallery or museum staff, community cultural development organisations, funders and researchers, illuminates the differing perceptions about public value. The report proffers opportunities to develop a new discourse about what the arts contribute, how the contribution can be described, and what opportunities exist to assist the arts sector to communicate outcomes of arts engagement in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand.

This paper explores the political landscape of Belarus in the aftermath of the 2020 presidential elections, with a focus on both domestic and international factors behind the ongoing crisis. Lukashenko’s regime has a long record of sustaining its power by preserving elite unity, controlling elections, and/or using force against opponents. Therefore, massive fraud characterizing the 2020 presidential elections and brutal suppression of peaceful protests in its aftermath came as no surprise. Against this backdrop, the anti-government protests following the presidential elections raised a series of unanswered questions regarding both their domestic and foreign policy implications. The biggest question is whether the Belarusian civil society and opposition will prove powerful enough to overcome state repression and change the status quo in Europe’s “last dictatorship”. Worries remain about the Belarusian opposition’s emphasis on foreign policy continuity, meaning that Belarus is bound to remain in the orbit of the Russian authoritarian influence. The total fiasco of post-Velvet Revolution Armenian government both in terms of domestic and foreign policies, among others, further reveals the excruciating difficulties of a democratic state-building within the Russia-led socio-political order.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

This collection brings together brief overviews of the social assistance landscape in eight fragile and conflict-affected settings in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen. These overviews were prepared as part of Better Assistance in Crises (BASIC) Research, a multi-year programme (2020–24) supported by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) of the UK government. BASIC Research aims to inform policy and programming on effective social assistance in situations of crisis, including for those who are experiencing climate-related shocks and stressors, protracted conflict and forced displacement.

This rapid review focuses on Global Health Diplomacy and defines it as a method of interaction between the different stakeholders of the public health sector in a bid to promote representation, cooperation, promotion of the right to health and improvement of health systems for vulnerable populations on a global scale. It is the link between health and international relations. GHD has various actors including states, intergovernmental organizations, private companies, public-private partnerships and non-governmental organizations. Foreign policies can be integrated into national health in various ways i.e., designing institutions to govern practices regarding health diplomacy (i.e., health and foreign affairs ministries), creating and promoting norms and ideas that support foreign policy integration and promoting policies that deal with specific issues affecting the different actors in the GHD arena to encourage states to integrate them into their national health strategies. GHD is classified into core diplomacy – where there are bilateral and multilateral negotiations which may lead to binding agreements, multistakeholder diplomacy – where there are multilateral and bilateral negotiations which do not lead to binding agreements and informal diplomacy – which are interactions between other actors in the public health sector i.e., NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations. The US National Security Strategy of 2010 highlighted the matters to be considered while drafting a health strategy as: the prevalence of the disease, the potential of the state to treat the disease and the value of affected areas. The UK Government Strategy found the drivers of health strategies to be self-interest (protecting security and economic interests of the state), enhancing the UK’s reputation, and focusing on global health to help others. The report views health diplomacy as a field which requires expertise from different disciplines, especially in the field of foreign policy and public health. The lack of diplomatic expertise and health expertise have been cited as barriers to integrating health into foreign policies. States and other actors should collaborate to promote the right to health globally.

[Extract] In 2019 Playgroup Australia established a National Advisory Group, including representatives from government, not-for-profit, community and research sectors, to support the development of a National Playgroup Statement. The forthcoming statement is intended to provide a unifying voice for playgroup provision in practice, research and policy nationwide. Two core strategies were recommended by the National Advisory Group to support the development of the Playgroup Statement. These were: a) a literature review canvassing the existing evidence base of outcomes and benefits of playgroup participation for children and families; and b) a stakeholder consultation strategy to capture children’s and families’ experiences and perspectives of playgroup participation, and the impact of playgroup participation on their lives. This report details the findings from the stakeholder consultation strategy.

In the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 2021, the UK government set out four strategic objectives for ‘Global Britain’. A year later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the shift to a more divided world have put the vision of the UK as a ‘problem-solving and burden-sharing nation with global perspectives’ to an urgent and severe test. This research paper finds that the UK has made clear contributions to its objectives of upholding the values and security of the liberal democracies. But it has undercut its commitments to support global resilience, and its international economic agenda remains very much a work in progress. The government must now prioritize rebuilding its relationship with the EU; leverage the G7 to avoid being sidelined by closer US–EU cooperation; and give greater strategic purpose to its trade agenda. It also needs to follow through on its commitments to support the resilience of the international community, or it will fail to live up to its goal of launching a truly global Britain.

As a means to reduce discrimination and promote the economic empowerment of women, there is a growing understanding that tax policy, tax administration and tax research need to be gender transformative. Recognising this need, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) is reshaping and building its approach to tax and gender programming. K4D’s Tax and Gender Learning Journey brought together tax and gender teams to identify other tax and gender stakeholders and collaboratively craft a future approach to tax and gender for FCDO and partners. Initial exploration of the early impact from activities that have taken place amongst partner organisations in Pakistan suggests K4D’s inputs have the potential to bolster intended social reforms across the country’s revenue and other government departments.