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Okafor, Collins E. y Nacasius U. Ujah. "Executive compensation and corporate social responsibility: does a golden parachute matter?" International Journal of Managerial Finance 16, n.º 5 (2 de abril de 2020): 575–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-12-2018-0379.
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PurposeThis study examines the efficacy of compensation in encouraging corporate executives to promote corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, it closely examines the effect of a golden parachute (GP) on an executive's behavior toward CSR.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses longitudinal data on 1,301 US firms for the period from 1993 to 2013. The data comes from Compustat, MSCI ESG STATS, RiskMetrics and ExecuComp.FindingsWe find an inverse association between current and long-term compensations and GP on firms' CSR. However, a test on the moderating effect discloses that a GP and long-term compensation jointly and positively increase the firms' CSR performance. This increase supports the idea that executives with a GP seek to maximize their long-term wealth by approving CSR projects that add value. The results also show that female executives are more likely to promote CSR than their male counterparts, and older executives are less willing to engage in CSR projects.Practical implicationsAdding a GP contractual clause to the executive compensation package could encourage greater engagement in CSR projects. The CEO with a GP will ensure that the firm engages in only value-enhancing CSR projects; this should align the interest of the society (greater firm engagement in CSR) with the interest of the firm (value maximization).Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature by examining the moderating effect of a GP on the association between CSR and executive compensation.
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Zhang, Xiaohan. "The Impact of Executive Compensation Stickiness on Stock Price Crash Risk". Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 58, n.º 1 (20 de noviembre de 2023): 72–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/58/20230828.
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Executive compensation stickiness is a compensation characteristic that links executive pay to company performance, reflecting a tendency among compensation setters to provide generous rewards to executives and relatively fewer penalties. It can be considered an effective incentive mechanism. This paper empirically examines the impact of executive compensation stickiness on stock price crash risk using data from all A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2021. The empirical results show that executive compensation stickiness significantly mitigates stock price crash risk. Further research reveals that in companies with female CEOs, non-financial backgrounds among top executives, and low information opacity, the inhibitory effect of executive compensation stickiness on stock price crash risk is more pronounced. Mechanism tests suggest that executive compensation stickiness reduces agency costs and, thereby, suppresses stock price crash risk. This study extends the understanding of the economic consequences of executive compensation stickiness and factors influencing stock price crash risk, providing practical insights for designing compensation incentive systems for listed companies and maintaining the stability of capital markets.
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Manulang, Dea Lonita, Gracelin Nonifati Hulu y Iskandar Muda. "Executive compensation as a corporate governance issue and factors determining executive compensation". Brazilian Journal of Development 9, n.º 12 (26 de diciembre de 2023): 31987–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.34117/bjdv9n12-096.
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Executive Compensation refers to the monetary and non-monetary benefits provided to executives as a form of payment or recognition for their completed work. The topic of Executive Compensation is regarded as intricate and contentious, garnering the interest of numerous groups for additional investigation. This research employs a qualitative methodology, specifically utilizing a literature review. The findings of this study indicate that the primary objective of carefully crafted Executive Compensation is to effectively attract, retain, and incentivize top-level management while also addressing issues related to agency conflicts. Nevertheless, these incentives have the opposite effect, leading to the financial collapse of major corporations and giving rise to issues in corporate governance as executives exploit them for their own personal gain.
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Patel, Mohsin Ali. "Impact of Board Structure and Firm Performance on Chief Executive’s Compensation". Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal 14, n.º 2 (31 de agosto de 2019): 185–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.24191/apmaj.v14i2-09.
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The corporate board usually influences all important decisions of a firm including setting of its long-term goals, developing a corporate strategic policy, as well as hiring and setting the compensation of the chief executive. Moreover, the organization of the board may have a significant effect on the monitoring and governance of the company. This paper analyses the impact of structure of the board and firm performance on chief executive compensation, in an emerging economy context specifically, Pakistan. Chief executive compensation is one of the controversial and sought after topics in research nowadays. Interestingly, the exploration into the topic has found that there is a significant and positive impact of the non-executive directors serving on the corporate boards on the compensation of chief executive. Furthermore, the size of the board has also showed to have a significant and positive impact on the chief executive’s compensation which logically means that the companies in which the boards are larger than the mean size will relatively pay higher to their chief executives. Also it was found that the performance of the firm does not have a statistically significant impact on chief executive compensation. These results have policy implications and are important to corporate stakeholders. Keywords: corporate governance, board structure, firm performance, Pakistan
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Zhongwen, Liu, Wang Xiaoshuang y Wang Shukun. "Research on the Status Quo and Influencing Factors of Gender Differences in the Executive Salaries of Listed Companies". International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences 12, n.º 3 (julio de 2021): 36–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijsds.2021070103.
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Gender pay difference has always been a concern of scholars. Especially in recent years, experts have gradually shifted their research horizons to gender pay difference of executive compensation. This paper takes executive compensation of listed companies as the research object, uses fixed effect model to study gender pay difference of executive compensation of listed companies from 2016 to 2020, and finds that the gender gap of executive compensation of listed companies shows a trend of decreasing first and then increasing, and the proportion of female executives has an insignificant reverse effect. Private enterprises have a significant reverse effect on the gender gap of executive compensation. That is, there is a gender difference in executive compensation of listed companies, and the factor affecting the gender gap is the nature of the company, while the proportion of female executives are not regarded as the influencing factor.
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Bolfek, Berislav, Perina Torbarina y Lucija Surać. "Struktura i faktori koji utječu na utvrđivanje kompenzacija izvršnih menadžera". Oeconomica Jadertina 6, n.º 2 (12 de noviembre de 2017): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.15291/oec.1343.
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Executive managers represent a small precentage of one companies workers but they are the most important group of employees. The ideal compensation management policy ensures that the best talent will remain with the organization while attracting new talent and minimizing turnover. Executive compensation normally combines base salary, short-term and long-term incentives, benefits and bonuses. The purpose of this paper is to explore and analyse data about stucture and factors that affect executive compensation determination of top five global brands. The collected data on the hight of executive compensations refer to the period from 2010 to 2015. Selected executives are leaders of the companies that are ranked as the top five global brands on Interbrands 2015 list. CEO pay in the U.S. has grown exponentially since the 1970s. The CEO-to-worker pay ratio trend indicates that the ratio keeps rising over the years, with some CEOs making more than 400 times the median salary of their employees. Some analyst recommend that every company's compensation system should include implementing certain regulatory actions, using different metrics for determining CEO compensation, making board member-CEO relationships transparent to all company stakeholders.
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Yu, Lina y Hua Zhao. "Estimation of bargaining effect in the decision of monetary compensation of executive in investment bank: Evidence from China". PLOS ONE 18, n.º 3 (30 de marzo de 2023): e0283771. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0283771.
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Though numerous empirical and theoretical studies have been conducted on the determinants and effects of executive compensation, empirical evidence regarding the bargaining effect on the monetary compensation decisions of executives, especially in a large emerging economy such as China, remains scarce. In this study, a two-tier stochastic frontier and endogenous correction model was developed to quantitatively estimate the bargaining effect on the monetary compensation decisions of investment bank executives. Our study is the first to provide comprehensive empirical evidence that bargaining between investment banks and executives in China significantly affects the compensation decisions of executives. In the bargaining process, investment banks are more proficient than executives, and the comprehensive bargaining effect tends to lower the negotiated compensation of executives. The bargaining effect exhibited obvious heterogeneity in the characteristics of executives and investment banks. When these characteristics tend to augment the bargaining power of executives, the negotiated compensation exhibits a limited decrease; when these characteristics augment the bargaining power of investment banks, the negotiated compensation decreases substantially. Our results provide deep insight into factors that determine executive compensation and help compensation designers of investment banks better understand and design executive pay packages.
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Shin, Taekjin. "The Gender Gap in Executive Compensation". ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 639, n.º 1 (15 de diciembre de 2011): 258–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716211421119.
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While many studies have explored the issue of women’s representation among top management, little is known about the gender gap in compensation among those who reached the top. Using data on 7,711 executives at 831 U.S. firms, this study investigates social-psychological factors that explain the gender gap in executive compensation. Consistent with theories on social identity and demographic similarity effects, the gender gap in executive pay is smaller when a greater number of women sit on the compensation committee of the board, which is the group responsible for setting executive compensation. However, the presence of a female chief executive officer (CEO) is not associated with the compensation of female non-CEO executives working under the female boss. The findings highlight the need to study women’s representation on corporate boards.
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Winfrey, Frank L. y John E. Logan. "Executive Compensation". Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 2 (1991): 225–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/iabsproc199129.
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Rau, Raghavendra. "Executive Compensation". Foundations and Trends® in Finance 10, n.º 3-4 (2015): 181–362. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0500000046.
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Farris, Paul W., Mark E. Haskins, Luann J. Lynch, Phillip E. Pfeifer y Richard S. Reynolds. "Executive Compensation". Compensation & Benefits Review 46, n.º 5-6 (octubre de 2014): 276–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886368714566149.
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CHAN, MARJORIE. "Executive Compensation". Business and Society Review 113, n.º 1 (marzo de 2008): 129–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8594.2008.00316.x.
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Gamba, Roberta. "Executive Compensation". Journal of Wealth Management 5, n.º 2 (31 de julio de 2002): 23–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jwm.2002.320441.
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Tormey, Douglas. "Executive Compensation". Compensation & Benefits Review 28, n.º 4 (julio de 1996): 21–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/088636879602800404.
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Kline, William, Masaaki Kotabe, Robert D. Hamilton y Steven Balsam. "Executive compensation". Journal of Strategy and Management 10, n.º 2 (15 de mayo de 2017): 187–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jsma-02-2016-0015.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how executive pay schemes influence managerial efficiency, which the authors measure as the risk-adjusted firm performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors utilized hierarchical regression to test the hypotheses. Findings The authors find that as options constitute a higher percentage of total compensation packages, subsequent firm risk-adjusted performance declines. The authors also find an inverse relationship between TMT stock ownership and risk-adjusted performance. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that the firm stakeholders should reconsider the likely influence of option-based incentives and equity holdings on the risk-adjusted performance. Originality/value Most executive compensation research focuses on either the pay-to-performance or pay-to-risk links. However, in this paper, the authors combine both the performance and risk dimensions simultaneously.
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Li, Qianqian y Unyong Pyo. "Impacts of Top Five Executives’ Compensation on Employee Wages". International Journal of Financial Research 12, n.º 1 (2 de enero de 2021): 242. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v12n1p242.
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This paper studies the impacts of incentive compensation to top five executives on employee wages. We employ pay-performance sensitivity to measure executive incentive compensation. Using the sample during 1992 – 2017, we find that executive compensation has negative impacts on employee wages. In addition, we examine the impacts of executive incentive compensation on employee wages in different industries and find that the impacts are more severe in technology firms than in non-technology firms. Finally, we show that the executives with higher incentive compensation are more likely to suppress employee wages in financially safe firms. Our results suggest that while top management teams are compensated as a team on average, they are compensated as isolated individuals on other aspects. Furthermore, firm performance may not always improve in the long run by granting high incentive compensation to top executives.
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Li, Zhichuan (Frank) y Caleb Thibodeau. "CSR-Contingent Executive Compensation Incentive and Earnings Management". Sustainability 11, n.º 12 (21 de junio de 2019): 3421. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11123421.
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This paper empirically studies the connection between earnings management and corporate social performance, conditional on the existence of CSR-contingent executive compensation contracts, an emerging practice to link executive compensation to corporate social performance. We find that executives are more likely to manipulate earnings to achieve their personal compensation goals when CSR rating is low, as well as their CSR-contingent compensation. Because of public pressure on their excessive total compensation, corporate executives see no need to manipulate earnings to increase compensation when their CSR-contingent compensation is already high. Our results suggest that earnings management and CSR-contingent compensation are substitute tools to serve the interests of executives, which is an agency problem that was never previously studied. Additionally, we explore how managerial characteristics affect earnings management, driven by the incentive effects of CSR-linked compensation.
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Ohrn, Eric. "Corporate Tax Breaks and Executive Compensation". American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 15, n.º 3 (1 de agosto de 2023): 215–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210155.
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I analyze the effect of two corporate tax breaks, bonus depreciation and the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), on executive compensation in publicly traded US firms. I find both tax breaks significantly increase executive compensation. For every dollar a firm benefits from the tax breaks, compensation of the firm’s top five highest-paid executives increases by $0.17 to $0.25. The tax breaks increase compensation primarily in firms with weaker governance structures, suggesting the compensation response is driven by executive rent extraction. (JEL D22, G34, H25, M12, M52)
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DuoRu, Duo, Mao Cui Guo y Ze Min Wang. "Executive Compensation Level, Executive Characteristics and Quality of Internal Control". E3S Web of Conferences 292 (2021): 03019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202129203019.
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In the process of transformation of economic momentum, the digital transformation and upgrading of enterprises has become an inevitable trend. As an important human resource of enterprise operation and management, senior executives play an irreplaceable key role in the process of enterprise transformation and upgrading. therefores, A total of 2244 A-share listed companies in China from 2015 to 2019 are selected for panel data analysis to verify the influence of the level of executive compensation, characteristics of senior executives and quality of internal control. The results show that there is a correlation between the level of executive compensation and the quality of internal control, and the characteristics of senior executives have a partial moderating effect between the level of executive compensation and the quality of internal control, but this moderating effect is weak and may be negative.
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Hsieh, Chih-Hung, Huai-Chun Lo, Yu-Ying Lai y Chien-Chung Ho. "Exploring the Nexus between Executive Compensation and Disclosure Transparency: Evidence from Taiwan". Journal of Economics, Finance and Accounting Studies 6, n.º 3 (16 de mayo de 2024): 55–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.32996/jefas.2024.6.3.7.
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This study investigates the relationship between executive compensation and compensation disclosure transparency in Taiwanese firms, particularly in light of recent regulatory changes that mandate increased transparency. Employing a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model, the analysis focuses on the impact of executive salary and bonuses on various measures of compensation disclosure. The findings reveal a significant negative relationship between predicted executive bonuses and the Compensation Committee Quality Score (CCQ), indicating that higher bonus levels are associated with lower transparency in compensation committee disclosures. Conversely, executive salaries do not show a significant impact on compensation disclosure measures, suggesting that salary levels may not be a primary determinant of disclosure transparency in the Taiwanese context. The study contributes to the understanding of the dynamics between executive remuneration and transparency in financial reporting, highlighting the importance of executive bonuses in shaping compensation disclosure practices in Taiwan. The results have implications for policymakers, corporate executives, and shareholders, emphasizing the need to consider the structure of executive compensation packages in promoting transparency and enhancing corporate governance standards.
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Weisbach, Michael S. "Optimal Executive Compensation versus Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation". Journal of Economic Literature 45, n.º 2 (1 de mayo de 2007): 419–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.2.419.
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This essay reviews Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried's Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to maximize the shareholders' welfare. In contrast, Bebchuk and Fried argue that executive compensation is more consistent with executives who control their own boards and who maximize their own compensation subject to an “outrage constraint.” They provide a host of evidence consistent with this alternative viewpoint. The book can be evaluated from both positive and normative perspectives. From a positive perspective, much of the evidence they present, especially about the camouflage and risk-taking aspects of executive compensation systems, is fairly persuasive. However, from a normative perspective, the book conveys the idea that policy changes can dramatically improve executive compensation systems and consequently overall corporate performance. It is unclear to me how effective potential reforms designed to achieve such changes are likely to be in practice.
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Gill, Suveera y Manika Kohli. "Perceptual Determinants of Executive Compensation: Survey-Based Evidence from India". Indian Journal of Corporate Governance 11, n.º 2 (8 de octubre de 2018): 159–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0974686218797760.
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Ensuring effective and fair determination of executive compensation is complex, though equally essential for protecting the interests of shareholders and in creating long-term corporate value. The present study attempts to unravel the perceptions of executives and investors in terms of the determinants on which executive compensation ought to be based in the context of corporate India. The main research instrument is a quantitative questionnaire through which the responses of 74 top executives and 55 investors have been examined. Results highlight statistically significant mean differences in the perception of executives and investors with regards to the determinants of executive compensation. Further, the underlying dimensions representing pay determinants vary for executives and investors with the former regarding corporate governance and human capital as important, while the latter emphasising on the primacy of ownership and leverage. The article offers valuable insight as it proposes a comprehensive set of determinants of executive compensation by integrating multiple theoretical perspectives.
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Maloa, Frans y Mark Bussin. "Determinants of executive compensation in South African state-owned enterprises". African Journal of Employee Relations (Formerly South African Journal of Labour Relations) 40, n.º 1 (18 de febrero de 2019): 8–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.25159/2520-3223/5857.
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This research explores the determinants of executive compensation in South African state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A quantitative research approach wasfollowed and secondary data analysis was carried out. The target population consisted of 222 executives in 21 SOEs. This research has shown that the size of the organisation, type of industry and job function can be considered significant and positive determinants of executive compensation in South African SOEs. The findings of the present research also show that demographic characteristics are not significant determinants of executive compensation and should therefore not be taken into consideration when determining executive compensation in South African SOEs.
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Nzunga, Dennis Joseph. "Executive Reward Structure and Financial Performance of Listed Companies in the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya". Journal of Finance and Accounting 6, n.º 3 (12 de julio de 2022): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.53819/81018102t4057.
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Studies have reported positive and significant relationship,that is, positive relationship between executive fixed pay, cash bonus, stock options and company’s financial performance; others negative and significant relationship, while others no significant relationship. In view of4this, the4 study4 sought4 to4 establish4 the4 relationship4 between4 executive4 reward4 structure4 and4 financial4 performance4 of4 listed4 companies4 at4 the4 Nairobi4 Securities4Exchange, Kenya. The investigation's precise goals were to establish the impact of executive base pay, bonuses, and non-cash incentives, as well as executive7 stock7options, on7 the7 financial7 performance7 of7 firms7listed7 on7the Nairobi Securities7Exchange7in7Kenya.The research also determined if the rate of inflation had a moderating influence on the association between CEO compensation and financial performance of Nairobi securities exchange-listed businesses. Stakeholder theory, agency theory, marginal productivity theory, and managerial power and governance theory were all used in this research. In this study, the positivist philosophy was applied, as well as a causal research design. The target population was all 65 listed businesses on the Nairobi Securities Exchange in Kenya, and a census was conducted. The research employed panel secondary data from annual financial statements of NSE-listed businesses. The study finding indicated that all the study variables except for inflation had a positive correlation with with financial performance of listed firms. However it is basic pay, bonuses and non cash benefits that had a positive and significant effect on the financial performance of listed firms. The effect of executive share options was positive but insignificant at 5% level of significance. Equally the effect of inflation was negative but insignificant. However, inflation has a signinificant effect as a moderator in the relationship7 between7 executive7 rewards7 and7 financial7 performance7 of7 listed7 firms7 at7 the7 Nairobi7 Securities7Exchange.Its is on the basis on of this findings that the study recommends that listed firms need to tailor their executive compensation and reward schemes to performance to encourage the top executives to continuous work hard and achieve their performance targets. Keywords: Executive reward structure, executive basic salary, executive bonuses, executive non-cash benefits, executive stock options, inflation rate, financial performance.
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Boyle, Phelim P., Ranjini Jha, Shannon Kennedy y Weidong Tian. "Stock and Option Proportions in Executive Compensation". Quarterly Journal of Finance 01, n.º 01 (marzo de 2011): 169–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010139211000055.
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There is controversy about the relative merits of stock and options in executive compensation. Some observers contend that stock is a more efficient mechanism, while others reach the opposite conclusion. We focus on the manager's risk-taking incentives and derive an optimal compensation contract by using the concept of a comparable benchmark and imposing a volatility constraint in a principal-agent framework. We demonstrate a joint role for both stock and options in the optimal contract. We show that firms with higher volatility should use more options in compensating their executives and provide empirical evidence supporting this testable implication.
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Kholid, Arif Wahyu Nur y Evi Rahmawati. "Does Executive Compensation Reinforce the Influence of Political Connection and Investment Opportunity Set on Firm Value?" Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi 15, n.º 2 (7 de agosto de 2023): 139–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/jda.v15i1.44081.
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Purpose: Executives may be crucial in managing the political connection and investment opportunity set (IOS). Compensations are given to motivate executives to enhance their performance to manage it. Therefore, this study examined the moderation of executive compensation in the influence of political connections and IOS on the firm value.Method: The study used samples of all listed companies in IDX and applied a quantitative approach from 2015 to 2020. Research data were obtained from www.idx.co.id and OSIRIS. This research employed a purposive sampling method, with a firm year of 1,242 observations. Hypothesis testing was carried out utilizing multivariate regression using panel data. This research used the Fixed Effect Model to process the data and employed the different proxies for measuring IOS to examine the robustness model.Findings: This study discovered that IOS positively affected firm value. Furthermore, using different measurements of IOS, this study consistently found that IOS positively affected firm value. Moreover, when IOS was measured by MVBV, the moderating variable of executive compensation provided significant results because there was a wedge of measurement between the MVBV and Tobin’s Q. However, this study could not find that executive compensation had a moderate effect. It indicated that the executive compensation could not reinforce the interaction between IOS and political connections on firm value. In addition, political connections did not influence the firm’s value. On the other hand, the IOS positively affected firm value. Even though IOS was regressed using another proxy, i.e., MVBV and Net PPE, the result was still reliable that IOS positively affected firm value.Novelty: This study was developed from previous research by considering executive compensation as a moderating variable and examined two proxies to measure the IOS and developed one proxy, i.e., net PPE ratio, to measure IOS. Furthermore, this study used the balance panel method, with an observation period of six years.
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Jin, Jiahui. "Executive Compensation and the Three-Dimensional Reference Framework: Insights from Data Analysis of Chinese Publicly Traded Firms". Journal of Electrical Systems 20, n.º 7s (4 de mayo de 2024): 1763–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.52783/jes.3799.
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This paper examines the impact of different reference points on executive compensation of Chinese listed companies by applying three dimensional reference point theory. Drawing on a panel data of 1,236 non-financial Chinese listed companies over the period of 2008 to 2012, it provides evidence that the three dimensions which are composed of external, internal, and time are all positively and significantly related to the average cash compensation of the top three highest paid executives in China. The research also finds a significantly positive relationship between the joint effect of these dimensions measured by factor and the top three executive pay level. The result suggests that the Chinese listed companies usually refer to the pay level of their peer groups, other executives within firms, and previous period to design the compensation packages for their top executives. It finds that all three dimensions comprising external, internal and time are significantly and positively related to the average cash compensation of the top three highest paid executives. The paper further examines the relationship between the three dimensional reference points and executive compensation, and reveals other determinants other than performance, thus contributing to the discussion on the determinants of executive compensation in the corporate governance literature and important policy implication for Chinese authorities.
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Al-Mughrabi, Yahia M. "The Determinants of CEO Cash Compensation in Non-Financial Listed Firms: Evidence from Jordan". International Journal of Economics and Finance 14, n.º 6 (22 de mayo de 2022): 44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v14n6p44.
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Compensation paid to top executive managers is one of the sensitive areas in modern corporate finance. The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the Chief Executive Officer and/or the Chairman of the board of directors’ cash compensation. It examines mainly the linkage between ownership concentration, role duality, financial performance, among other variables, and executives’ cash compensation for a sample of 81 Jordanian listed firms during the period 2010-2013.
By applying fixed and random effects estimates, I find conclusive evidence that dual CEOs receive higher cash compensation, compared to those who do not hold the position of Chairman. In addition, CEOs in larger firms are more compensated than others in smaller ones. The results provided evidence that a firm’s leverage does not affect its CEO’s cash compensation, however, the firm’s industry identity plays some role in determining its executive pay, but not its Chairman of the board. The analysis fails to link CEO cash compensation to the firm’s financial performance and ownership structure, implying that neither compensation contracts nor concentrated ownership structures can alleviate the agency problem or reduce agency costs in Jordanian firms. These results do not diverge much when the dependent variable is the Chairman of the board of directors’ cash compensation.
Overall, Jordanian CEOs are unjustifiably over-compensated as they fail to prove their worth, in light of such lamentable performance of the Jordanian non-financial listed firms, which raises questions about executives’ compensations determining mechanism, and the process of hiring CEOs in the first place.
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Liu, Yilin. "Factors Influencing Executive Compensation in the Automobile Industry in the US". BCP Business & Management 28 (14 de octubre de 2022): 76–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v28i.2218.
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In modern management, executive compensation can exert a substantial impact on the operation and profitability of an organization. This research explores the factors influencing executive compensation in the automobile industry in the United States. It aims to identify the relationship between a set of specific factors, including revenue, earnings per share and return on net assets (RONA) and compensation of executives. The data were selected based on the fiscal year 2021. With the findings and results, it is revealed that executive compensation is significantly related with revenue and earnings per share of a company without a significant relationship with return on net assets. Based on the results, several recommendations are proposed to better engage executives and improve corporate performance.
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Feng, Mingming, Xiaodan "Abby" Wang y Jagjit S. Saini. "Monetary compensation, workforce-oriented corporate social responsibility, and firm performance". American Journal of Business 30, n.º 3 (3 de agosto de 2015): 196–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ajb-10-2014-0057.
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Purpose – Prior literature has established the theoretical and statistical linkages between monetary compensation and firm performance, yet little is known about how the association between monetary compensation and firm performance is moderated by companies’ engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Further, compared to executive compensation, non-executive compensation remains an underexplored topic. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how workforce-oriented CSR moderates: first, the association between non-executive compensation and firm performance; and second, the association between executive compensation and firm performance. Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of 181 from the largest 3,000 US companies for the years 1991-2011, the authors investigate how workforce-oriented CSR moderates the association between compensation and firm performance. Compensation is examined at two levels – non-executive versus executive compensation. The workforce-oriented CSR score is constructed as total strengths minus total concerns in Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini’s employee relations dimension. Findings – The authors find an improvement in firm performance with increases in both non-executive and executive compensation. Further, workforce-oriented CSR positively moderates the association between non-executive compensation and firm performance, and negatively moderates the association between executive compensation and firm performance. Research limitations/implications – This study adds to the literature of the compensation-performance linkage by including both non-executive and executive compensation as important determinants of firm performance and incorporating workforce-oriented CSR as a moderator on the compensation-performance linkage. It also provides new angles for CSR scholars. Practical implications – This study helps managers understand the importance of fulfilling employees’ social emotional needs and the potential of workforce-oriented CSR in shaping employees’ perceived distributive justice. The findings also help managers make critical decisions regarding the allocation of limited corporate resources and prioritization of investment options. In addition, the findings are also useful to boards of directors and human resources managers who are in charge of hiring executives, building top management teams, and deciding executive compensation. Originality/value – This study helps advance our understanding of the compensation-performance linkage. The results suggest that the relationship between compensation and financial performance is contingent on other organizational factors. In addition, the findings provide practical implications on how CSR engagement moderates the association between non-executive compensation and firm performance differently than the association between executive compensation and firm performance and how to allocate corporate resources and prioritize strategic options effectively.
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Matović, Ivana Marinović. "Comparative Analysis of Executive Compensation in the Republic of Serbia and EU Countries". Economic Themes 57, n.º 2 (1 de junio de 2019): 181–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ethemes-2019-0011.
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AbstractExecutive compensations have a strong motivation role in contemporary business organizations. Adequate models of compensation enable attracting and retaining the high-capacity managers. This way, business organization conquers and maintains the competitive position in the context of globalization. It is necessary to align the executive compensation with the business organization’s strategy, which requires careful process of planning, done by the highest levels of management and ownership. The main objective of the paper is to explore and compare the structure and the level of executive compensation in the Republic of Serbia and EU countries. The paper focuses on executive compensation components, primarily long-term and short-term incentives, as well as sallary and benefits. A comparative analysis of executive compensation models was performed to explain the differences in the observed countries.The study found large and disproportionate differences in the executive compensation levels, conditioned mostly by the economic development of the observed economies.
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Lin, Lin. "REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS". Journal of Law and Commerce 32, n.º 2 (18 de julio de 2014): 207–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jlc.2014.67.
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Executive compensation is an essential element of a corporate governance system and an issue of public concern and academic debate. However, the existing literature on executive compensation has primarily focused on the United States, United Kingdom and continental European jurisdictions. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative study of the law and practices of executive pay in China. It critically examines the processes that produce compensation arrangements, as well as the various legal strategies and market forces that act on these processes in the context of China.Based on extensive empirical evidence, it finds that excessive pay in China is less prevalent than that in the United States. Nevertheless, Chinese executive compensation is not optimal in that there are both excessive executive pay and low levels of equity incentives for executives in Chinese listed companies. Meanwhile, executives of state-owned enterprises are largely compensated by on-duty consumption, grey income and political reward. The article argues that the fundamental problem of executive pay in Chinese listed companies lies in the internal defects of its unique governance institutions, as well as the prevalence of concentrated state ownership in listed companies. It concludes that the primary role of Chinese law in regulating executive compensation should not simply be to curb excessive executive pay, but it should be to improve the regulatory structure for setting executive pay in a fairer and more transparent way. To achieve this, regulatory strategies, especially heightened disclosure and strengthening the independence of the compensation committee, must be taken.
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Ngalandji - Hakweenda, Dr Helena Megameno Nailonga. "Rhetoric Analysis on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Performance of Commercial public enterprises in Namibia." International Journal of Scientific Research and Management 9, n.º 11 (30 de noviembre de 2021): 2624–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.18535/ijsrm/v9i11.em12.
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The purpose of this paper was to investigate the relationship between compensation packages and the performance of executive officers in Commercial Public Enterprises in Namibia. The paper was conducted to achieve the following specific objective: to determine the relationship between compensation packages of executives and the performance of Commercial PEs in Namibia. It was all in the context of mixed research approach for data collection using a questionnaire as a tool. The study found that there is a partial relationship between executive compensation and the performance of some commercial public enterprises, in accordance with their Tier Levels. It is recommended that the Government (shareholder) finds the best fit model of executive compensation packages in order to induce a positive level of performance. It is further recommended that a study be conducted, to investigate the relationship between the role of an independent high-level committee on executive compensation packages, aimed at enhancing performance in Commercial Public Enterprises in Namibia
Keywords: Compensation Package; Performance; Commercial Public Enterprises; Executives
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Park, Won y Chunggyu Byun. "Effect of SME’s Managerial Ability and Executive Compensation on Firm Value". Sustainability 13, n.º 21 (26 de octubre de 2021): 11828. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su132111828.
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This paper analyzes the impact of the managerial ability and level of compensation on firm value in small and medium enterprises. The ability of managers is important for the sustainability and growth of small and medium enterprises because they lack awareness of resources, technology, and reputation compared to large enterprises. The managerial ability is the ability to efficiently utilize resources and choose the investment plan with the highest future net cash flows. Managerial ability is also an indicator of the level of compensation for executives. Therefore, the level of executive compensation can help a firm value or growth if it is based on managerial abilities. In addition, high executive compensation standards can be an opportunity or motivation to work hard for the wealth of companies and shareholders. We analyzed 1872 small and medium-sized companies listed on the Korean stock market to achieve the purpose of the research. We analyzed the accounting period of 6 years from 2012 to 2017. Our results have had a positive impact on firm value with executive compensation. In groups with excellent managerial skills, executive compensation has had a positive (+) impact on firm value. However, executive compensation did not have a significant impact on firm value in groups with poor managerial skills. These results validate that the CEO’s role in small and medium enterprise is important and that the level of compensation for executives is important to motivate. It also suggests that executive compensation cannot affect the firm value in groups with low managerial abilities.
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Cong, Ling Mei, Qinggang Wang y John Evans. "Determinants of excessive executive compensation". Corporate Board role duties and composition 8, n.º 1 (2012): 32–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv8i1art3.
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This study examines determinants of excessive executive compensation in PRC firms using 8,100 firm-year observations from 2003-2009. Employing an industry benchmarked excessive pay proxy, this study finds that CEO duality and ownership dispersion have significant positive associations with the probability of overpaying the executives. The presence of a large outside shareholder is negatively associated with the likelihood of excessive executive compensation. Results from this study have important implications for various stakeholders. For example, the PRC authorities need to further strengthen the corporate governance and constrain the power of management over the pay-setting process. More institutional investors could be encouraged to enter the PRC market to play a bigger role in monitoring managers. This paper makes an original contribution to the PRC executive compensation literature by providing unique insights into drivers of excessive executive compensation.
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Wang, Yanghaoyu. "Influence of Executive Compensation Incentives on Enterprise Performance under Different Natures of Property Rights". BCP Business & Management 23 (4 de agosto de 2022): 1087–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v23i.1502.
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No unified understanding has been formed in the academic circles of the fact that executive compensation incentive is an important means to improve enterprise performance, and executive compensation differs in the effects on enterprise performance for the enterprises with different natures of property rights. In this paper this issue is further analyzed using empirical analysis method, based on the selected data concerning the A-share companies listed in both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets during 2010-2020. Research demonstrates the impact of executive compensation on enterprise performance, and the enhancement role of executive compensation incentive in improving enterprise performance. The role differs under different property right systems. In terms of enterprise performance improvement, executive compensation has a significant positive effect on the non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs), and a significant negative effect on state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Based on the research results, this paper proposes to improve the arrangement of enterprise compensation system, deepen the reform of compensation system in SOEs, enhance the level of marketization of enterprises, eradicate the mechanism barriers, strengthen the internal management of executives, and bring into full play of the executive compensation incentives in promoting enterprise performance.
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Rasoava, Rijamampianina. "Executive compensation and firm performance: a non-linear relationship". Problems and Perspectives in Management 17, n.º 2 (16 de abril de 2019): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.17(2).2019.01.
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In order to ensure profitability for shareholders, optimal contracting recommends the alignment between executive compensation and company performance. Large organizations have therefore adopted executives remuneration systems in order to induce positive market reaction and motivate executives. Complex compensation schemes are designed by Boards of Directors using strong pay-performance incentives that explain high levels of executive pay along with company size, demand for management skills and executive influence. However, the literature remains inconclusive on the pay-performance relationship owing to the various empirical methods used by researchers. Additionally, there has been little effort in the literature to compare methodologies on the pay-performance relationship. Using the dominant agency theory framework, the purpose of this study is to establish and examine the relationship between firm performance and executive pay. In addition, it intends to assess the characteristic of model specifications commonly adopted. To this aim, a quantitative analysis consisting of three complementary methods was performed on panel data from South African listed companies. The results of the main unrestricted first difference model indicate a strong non-linear relationship where the impact of current and previous firm performance on executive pay can be observed over 2 to 4-year period providing support to the optimal contracting theoretical perspective in the South African business context. In addition, CEO pay is more sensitive to firm performance as compared to Director pay. Lastly, although it affects executive pay levels, company size is not found to improve the pay-performance relationship.
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Hwang, Seong-Jun y Chan-Hyu Shin. "Effects of Managers Compensation Structure on ESG Performance". Korean Association Of Computers And Accounting 20, n.º 3 (30 de diciembre de 2022): 153–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.32956/kaoca.2022.20.3.153.
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Recently, ESG, which affects corporate capital raising, has become important. The board of directors will encourage ESG management to increase corporate value from a long-term perspective. One way for boards to direct executive decision-making is to consider adjusting executive compensation. If executives have incentive compensation to induce ESG management, it will be possible to match the ESG performance of the company with the performance of the executive(Bebchuk et al., 2002；Marens, 2002；Zalewski, 2003). Therefore, the purpose of this study is to study the relationship between executive compensation and ESG performance using the ESG evaluation score of the KCGS. Specifically, we will analyze the impact of executive compensation on ESG performance, and verify through empirical analysis how the executive compensation composition affects ESG performance.
The analysis results are as follows. First, it was verified that the higher the executive compensation, the higher the ESG performance of the company. Second, it was verified that the higher the stock compensation ratio of the manager, the higher the ESG performance of the company. These analysis results can be judged that executive compensation is made in connection with ESG performance. In addition, as a method of incentive compensation to enhance ESG performance, it can be judged that the stock compensation ratio among executive compensation components is increased.
The contribution of this study is that by identifying the relationship between ESG performance and the compensation of the manager, which is not the main goal of corporate management, the motivation of the manager to perform ESG management is identified, and the incentive to induce ESG management for corporate sustainability management That is, the reward system was identified.
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Mohammed, Sha'awa, Abbas Umar Ibrahim y Faiza Maitala. "Effect of Executive Compensation on Financial Performance of Listed Non-Financial Firms in Nigeria". International Journal of Professional Business Review 8, n.º 5 (17 de mayo de 2023): e01570. http://dx.doi.org/10.26668/businessreview/2023.v8i5.1570.
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Purpose: Examine the effect of executive compensation on the financial performance of listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. Theoretical framework: The continuous rise in compensation of executives in Nigeria without a corresponding increase in firm performance has continued to generate intense debates and controversial opinions within the corporate environment. Consequently, the need to understand the degree of relationship between executive compensation (measured by salary emolument, bonuses, stock-based compensation and pension) and firm performance (measured by return on equity). Design/methodology/approach: A correlational research design was used based on a filtered census population of 63 firms listed on Nigeria’s stock exchange. Secondary data was obtained from the annual financial reports of these firms and analyzed using the generalized methods moments. Findings: The study found salary emoluments, bonuses and stock-based compensation, as measures of executive compensation, have negative impact on the return on equity of listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. Where executive pension claims a positive impact on the return on equity of listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. Research, Practical & Social implications: Regardless of executive compensation being an incentivizing tool for the executive team, which has a significant impact on company strategy, decision-making, and value creation as well as enhancing executive retention, different components of executive compensation exert different effect on the financial performance of firms as confirmed by this research. Originality/value: The research points out different executive compensation measures have different impacts on performance. Consequently, the need for stakeholders to determine the perfect combination of the compensation measures that best drive performance.
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Vieito, João Paulo. "News insights on executive compensation". Corporate Ownership and Control 7, n.º 3 (2010): 8–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i3p1.
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This paper aims to examine executive compensation structure and determinants on a panel of the socalled “new economy” and “old economy” firms in the USA over the period 1992-2004. The results reveal that executive compensation structure in new versus old economy firms is different and more importantly, it changes over time. Additionally, our results document that the factors explaining executive compensation of new and old economy are different, and also that stock options, despite the problems that have been related with these compensation components in the past, are still the most important ones, both in new and old economy firms. Our results imply that different reward structures exist for different industry sectors at different stages in their development and companies must readjust compensation structures frequently to provide incentive for their top executives.
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Asyari, Mahfud y Firna Hayyu Nindya Maritsa. "Effect of Company Performance on Sharia Commercial Bank Executive Compensation in Indonesia". EkBis: Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis 4, n.º 2 (28 de diciembre de 2020): 483. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ekbis.2020.4.2.1256.
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After the disclosure of data from companies, research on executive compensation began to develop. Several studies on executive compensation in banking found that the determination of compensation is positively related to company performance. This research aims to determine the relationship between company performance and executive compensation of Islamic Commercial Bank’s in Indonesia. Company performance is proxied by Return on Assets (ROA). This study uses a sample of Islamic Commercial Banks because they have very good performance growth and currently only have a market share of 6.18% compared to the national financial market so they still have the potential to experience growth. Furthermore, sample used 14 Islamic commercial banks registered with the OJK during 2014-2019. The research method used panel data regression analysis. The results showed that the performance of Islamic Commercial Bank’s has an effect on executive compensation. Islamic Commercial Bank Executives have an obligation to improve company performance (ROA) because it affects the compensation received by the executive.
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Paletta, Angelo y Genc Alimehmeti. "SOX Disclosure and the Effect of Internal Controls on Executive Compensation". Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 33, n.º 2 (19 de febrero de 2016): 277–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558x16630445.
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We study the organizational impact of internal control systems, by examining 1,593 firms with 15,606 executives over 2002-2010. We find that internal control systems explain a significant amount of executive and, in particular, CFO compensation, after controlling for other governance, executive personal characteristics, firm, and macroeconomic determinants of pay. Moreover, the negative relationship between pay and internal control systems suggests that executives operating in firms with ineffective internal control systems earn greater compensation. The results of the longitudinal analysis suggest that firms with ineffective internal control systems have greater agency problems and, consequently, greater levels of executive compensation. The CEO pay shows a nonsignificant relationship with internal control systems.
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Vieito, João Paulo, Walayet Khan, António Cerqueira y Elísio Brandão. "Executive compensation: NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms". Corporate Ownership and Control 6, n.º 3 (2009): 531–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3sip3.
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In this paper, we examine whether the determinants and forms of executive compensation for NYSE versus NASDAQ listed firms are the same during the period from 1992 to 2004. We also investigate whether the determinants and forms of executive compensation changed after the NASDAQ crash in 2000 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Our results reveal that the factors that explain executive compensation for NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms are generally different. We also find that executives are paid different forms of compensation for NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms and that the forms of compensation change after the NASDAQ crash but essentially after the Sarbanes-Oxley act in 2002.
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Daryaei, Abbas Ali, Yasin Fattahi, Davood Askarany, Saeed Askary y Mahdad Mollazamani. "Accounting Comparability, Conservatism, Executive Compensation-Performance, and Information Quality". Journal of Risk and Financial Management 15, n.º 11 (23 de octubre de 2022): 489. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm15110489.
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This paper investigates the relationship between accounting comparability, executive compensation, conditional and unconditional conservatism, and accounting information quality. The findings suggest that conditional conservatism and accounting comparability have a positive and significant impact on executive compensation. Moreover, accrual earnings management can strengthen the relationship between accounting comparability and executive compensation, whereas this is not the case with actual earnings management. Unconditional conservatism, however, does not significantly influence executive compensation. In the end, determining the correlation between earnings management and conservatism reveals that executives use conditional conservatism to perform opportunistic behaviours and gain more compensation. In light of the current results, it is expected that the assimilation of standardisation processes and their use in conjunction with existing features will enhance information quality, greater reliability of financial reports, and protect public interests.
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Borrenbergs, Job, Rui Vieira y Georgios Georgakopoulos. "Remuneration Committees’ Gender Composition as a Determinant of Executive Board Compensation Structure". International Business Research 10, n.º 2 (18 de enero de 2017): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v10n2p135.
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This paper investigates the relationship between the gender composition of firms’ remuneration committees and the relative weight of variable monetary compensation in these firms’ top executives’ compensation packages. Previous archival research into executive compensation has mainly relied on agency theory, managerial power theory and tournament models to construct its theoretical frameworks. However, both psychological and corporate governance-related research concerning gender differences in, for instance, risk- and inequality-aversion, suggest that the gender variable should be included in the academic debate on executive compensation.Controlling for size, industry, and corporate governance variables, this paper uses simple least squares analysis to regress measures of the relative weight of variable compensation against measures of female presence in remuneration committees, in a sample of 25 806 fiscal year/executive combinations. This regression is repeated in a multilevel model that controls for firm fixed effects in a sample of 9048 fiscal year / executive combinations. The results indicate that a female presence in the remuneration committee is negatively associated with the relative weight of the annual bonus in top executives’ compensation contracts.
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Reitenga, Austin, Steve Buchheit, Qin Jennifer Yin y Terry Baker. "CEO Bonus Pay, Tax Policy, and Earnings Management". Journal of the American Taxation Association 24, s-1 (1 de enero de 2002): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jata.2002.24.s-1.1.
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In 1993, Congress passed Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), which eliminated the tax deductibility of nonperformance-based executive compensation over $1 million. Recent research indicates that, as intended, Code Section 162(m) has strengthened the link between executive pay and firm performance. Although 162(m) apparently has changed executive compensation in a way desired by Congress, we hypothesize that 162(m) has indirectly influenced the financial-reporting process. Specifically, we hypothesize and find evidence to support the following: for numerous reasons associated with “qualifying” a compensation plan per Code Section 162(m), executives in firms that qualify their compensation plans receive relatively low pay when their firm's financial performance is extreme. Because these executives receive relatively low pay for extreme financial performance, an incentive exists to smooth reported earnings over time in order to maximize long-term compensation. The relatively smooth earnings patterns that we observe in qualified firms are related to the use of discretionary accruals. Our results appear robust to alternative sampling and modeling techniques. As such, our evidence suggests that a tax policy designed to curb allegedly excessive executive compensation has indirectly affected the quality of reported earnings.
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Pan, Ailing, Qian Wu y Jingwei Li. "External fairness of executive compensation, institutional investor and M&A premium". Nankai Business Review International 13, n.º 1 (21 de octubre de 2021): 79–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-05-2021-0035.
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Purpose This paper aims to study the impact of external fairness of executive compensation on M&A premium, and examine the moderate role of institutional investors. The high M&A premium is the main factors that induce the huge impairment of listed companies’ goodwill and the plummeting performance. Executives are the decision-makers of M&As, and their decision-making process is inevitably affected by the psychological factors. In recent years, institutional investors have become an important external force that can affect the governance of listed companies. Design/Methodology/Approach The authors use M&A data of listed companies from 2008 to 2018 and use OLS regression to test the relationship between executive compensation fairness and M&A premium. Findings The results show that the lower the external fairness of executive compensation, the greater the M&A premium. Institutional investors can effectively reduce the impact of external compensation unfairness on M&A premiums. The mechanism tests show that executives' psychological perception of fairness induced by external unfairness reduces their motivation to work and prompts them to use high premium to seek alternative compensation incentives. Further examinations of executive characteristics and corporate characteristics show that the role of external unfairness in executive compensation in driving M&A premiums is more pronounced in companies with longer executive tenure, weaker executive reputation incentives and private property. Originality/Value This paper enriches the research on the pre-factors of M&A premiums from the perspective of executives’ psychological perception of fairness, provides evidence that institutional investors play a positive governance role and provides decision-making references for companies to take corresponding measures to reduce M&A premium risks.
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Qotrunnada, Nabila, Tjoa Han Hwa y Dwi Mayasari. "The Effect of Executive Compensation, Executive Characteristics, An Executive Shareholding on Tax Avoidance". Jurnal Ilmiah Manajemen dan Bisnis 9, n.º 1 (1 de abril de 2023): 84. http://dx.doi.org/10.22441/jimb.v9i1.16299.
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This study aims to empirically prove the effect of executive compensation, executive characteristics, and executive share ownership on tax evading. This study was showed in the consumer goods manufacturing corporation listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2016–2020, using a descriptive associative research method and secondary data. The sampling method used purposive. This research used 16 sample corporations, with a five-year research period of 5 years, so 80 samples were obtained for data processing using Microsoft Excel and the e-View Statistical software applications to analyze descriptive statistics, model conformity tests, classical assumption tests, coefficients of determination (R2), linear regression analysis of panel data, statistical test F and statistical test t. Results of statistical test F executive-compensation variables, executive-characteristics, and decision-making-shareholdings affect tax avoidance. The statistical test t of the executive compensation variable partially has a optimistic and significant effect on dividend payments—however, the executive's variable characteristics and the executive shares' ownership harm tax evading.
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Dewally, Michaël, Susan Flaherty y Daniel Singer. "Executive compensation, organizational culture and the glass ceiling". Corporate Ownership and Control 11, n.º 2 (2014): 239–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i2c1p7.
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This study examines the impact of organizational culture on executive compensation systems. Organizational culture is found to have a strong impact on the relationship between CEO equity compensation and organizational effectiveness. Compensation patterns found in traditional organizations are interpreted to reflect a Managerial Power Theory of executive compensation. In contrast, in positive organizations, the exercise of managerial power appears to be constrained by the internal values of that organization and the need for the leader to maintain his or her authenticity. Female executives who have penetrated the glass ceiling in both traditional and positive organizations are found to contribute to a culture in which executive compensation reflects an Optimal Contract approach to principle-agent relationships for CEOs and shareholders.
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Arista, Paula, Amrie Firmansyah, Michelle Michelle y Estralita Trisnawati. "Executive Compensation, Executive Character, Tax Avoidance: Does Independent Commissioner Matter?" Educoretax 4, n.º 5 (10 de mayo de 2024): 558–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.54957/educoretax.v4i5.817.
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This study looks at the impact of executive compensation and character on tax avoidance. This study also looks at the moderating influence of the proportion of independent commissioners in this connection. This study uses secondary data from financial statements from consumer products businesses listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2017 and 2021, retrieved from www.idx.co.id. The overall sample size for this study was 85 observations, as determined via purposive sampling. Multiple linear regression was used to evaluate panel data. This research concludes that executive compensation is positively related to tax avoidance, while executive character does not affect tax avoidance. Furthermore, the proportion of independent commissioners succeeded in reducing the positive influence of executive compensation on tax avoidance, while the role of independent commissioners did not have a role in reducing the positive influence of executive character on tax avoidance. This research is expected to be a means for the Indonesian Tax Authority to create policies for profiling company compensation characteristics for executives as an initial indicator of tax avoidance activities carried out by companies.