Literatura académica sobre el tema "Division Artillery"
Crea una cita precisa en los estilos APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard y otros
Consulte las listas temáticas de artículos, libros, tesis, actas de conferencias y otras fuentes académicas sobre el tema "Division Artillery".
Junto a cada fuente en la lista de referencias hay un botón "Agregar a la bibliografía". Pulsa este botón, y generaremos automáticamente la referencia bibliográfica para la obra elegida en el estilo de cita que necesites: APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.
También puede descargar el texto completo de la publicación académica en formato pdf y leer en línea su resumen siempre que esté disponible en los metadatos.
Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Division Artillery"
1
Harka, Ödön. "Combat Support Armament of the Rapid Forces in the Hungarian Royal Defence Forces". Hadtudományi Szemle 14, n.º 1 (26 de mayo de 2021): 5–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.32563/hsz.2021.1.1.
Texto completoResumen
Besides the combat-arms assets, the rapid troops of the Royal Hungarian Defence Forces also had field artillery (light howitzers), air defence artillery and anti-tank guns. The order of battle of the motorised units required the existence of one (after the autumn of 1941, two) artillery battalion(s) with vehicle-drawn assets for providing combat support. The motorised artillery battalions initially had four batteries with light howitzers, while the armoured divisions had two motorised artillery battalions. There were two artillery battalions with four (six) batteries in the mobilised organisation of the cavalry brigades (division). For ensuring defence against air attacks, vehicle-drawn air defence artillery battalions were introduced in the armoured divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division with one light and one heavy battery. Against tank attacks, there were 4–6 anti-tank guns in service used by each of the anti-tank companies of the infantry and reconnaissance battalions (in the motorised rifle brigades and hussar regiments of the armoured divisions) and the 1st Cavalry Division.
2
Bakalov, V., V. Kuzmenko, V. Nikitchenko y I. Yarysh. "MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF THE SURVIVAL OF THE ARTILLERY DIVISION DURING COMBAT". Наукові праці Державного науково-дослідного інституту випробувань і сертифікації озброєння та військової техніки, n.º 12 (5 de julio de 2022): 4–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.37701/dndivsovt.12.2022.01.
Texto completoResumen
The article deals with the survivability of the artillery unit during the combat operation. The brutality of the artillery unit is regarded as a random process. In our view, this random process is a Markov process that depends on time. Mathematical model of survivability of artillery unit based on non-stationary Markov process described by Kolmogorov equation was developed. The mathematical model allows to change probability of impressions of the artillery unit, time of their presence in combat positions and time of determination of positions of the enemy, which allows to determine vitality of the artillery unit in time during combat operations. The article considers two cases of survivability of an artillery unit during hostilities. In the first case, the entire artillery unit begins to fight on the uncertain positions of the enemy's artillery unit. The latter for some time determines the exact position of the attackers and, despite the fact that they entered the battle later, inflicts significant losses on the former. In the second case, the artillery unit is divided into two parts. The first part also begins the battle on the uncertain positions of the enemy's artillery unit. The second part enters the battle after determining the positions of the enemy artillery unit. In this case, the overall survivability of the first unit will be greater than the enemy's artillery unit. Ways to increase the survivability of the artillery unit during combat operations were shown. In our view, this approach can be used to create an interactive simulation of the artillery unit’s command. Such a complex is applicable in the training of commanders of artillery units.
3
Shuliakov, Sergey y Nikolai Dorofeev. "Ways to improve reconnaissance in the interests of missile forces and artillery". Journal of Scientific Papers "Social development and Security" 9, n.º 5 (10 de octubre de 2019): 15–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.33445/sds.2019.9.5.2.
Texto completoResumen
The article describes the experience of creating automated control systems by foreign countries. Experience in controlling fire weapons and reconnaissance assets. The analysis of their interaction. Considered in detail the automated control system of field artillery of the United States of America Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFTDS).
This is an experience of creating a system of foreign countries. Experience in controlling fire weapons and reconnaissance assets. The analysis of their interaction. Considered in detail is the United States of America Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFTDS). This is a multipurpose tactical information system of field artillery using mobile technology. It provides automated decision making for the functional subsystem, support for the ground forces and marines, as well as integrated operational units and united types of troops. The article describes the entire sector of the capabilities of this automated combat control system.
The article also discusses ADLER (Artillerie Daten Lage and Einsatz Rechnerverbund) Germany’s automated field artillery control system. This automated field artillery control system provides all the field artillery control capabilities from the division to the gun (mortar, MLRS, reconnaissance equipment). The unified information network unites target detection facilities, combat (fire) and fire weapons control centers (points). it makes it possible not only to process the data, but also to control the detection mode and hit targets, including the evaluation of intermediate results. Integrated systems of reconnaissance, surveillance, target definitions and their destruction are considered by military experts of the leading, militarily, countries of the world as a critical element for achieving information superiority over the enemy.
Analysis of the interaction of artillery reconnaissance forces and weapons and armaments of the leading military countries of the world provides an opportunity to study the development of weapons and military equipment to ensure the creation of an intelligence-information subsystem of artillery.
4
Zienkiewicz, Aleksandra, Tomasz Podciborski y Andrii Terebukh. "Alternative uses of former coastal artillery military bases in Koszalin coastland in view of the growing popularity of military tourism". Acta Scientiarum Polonorum Administratio Locorum 22, n.º 1 (31 de marzo de 2023): 113–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/aspal.8473.
Texto completoResumen
Motives: In recent years, the popularity of military tourism has increased considerably in Central and Eastern European countries, especially among tourists who have an interest in military history and technology. Due to the general scarcity of methods and studies examining alternative uses of former military bases, including coastal artillery bases, a reliable method for assessing the value of such sites for military tourism should be developed. The study presents the history of the analysed military bases, and it examines the extent to which the existing facilities could be converted into tourist attractions. An innovative method for evaluating the tourism potential of defunct military bases was proposed and verified, and the required changes for improving the accessibility and applicability of military facilities for educational and tourism purposes were described. Two former military sites in Koszalin coastal region were selected for the study. Aim: The main aim of the study was to propose an original method for assessing alternative uses of former coastal military bases, and to evaluate the educational and tourism potential of former military bases on the Koszalin Coast (a subregion of the South Baltic Coast) on the example of two former military facilities: Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division No. 68 in Łeba and Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division No. 66 in Naćmierz. Results: The results of the study indicate that the evaluated military sites have considerable tourism potential, in particular for tourists who have an interest in military history. An analysis of exogenous as well as endogenous (architectural and historical features) factors revealed that both sites could attract tourists, including visitors who are not strictly interested in military facilities. The assessment conducted using the proposed method demonstrated that the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division No. 68 in Łeba is characterised by high tourist attractiveness, whereas the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division No. 66 in Naćmierz is characterised by moderate tourist attractiveness.
5
Gevorgjan, Roland, Konstantin Svjatokum, Serhii Grygorenko, Kiril Dehtiarenko y Leonid Gordishevskii. "ANALYSIS OF THE STATE AND PROSPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH-PRECISION WEAPON, INCLUDING HIGH-PRECISION MUNITIONS". Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy, n.º 15 (30 de septiembre de 2021): 28–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2021.15.28-34.
Texto completoResumen
This article provides an analysis of modern high-precision armament (artillery), is standing in service with Ukraine and USA. The main specifications of high-precision munitions, the principle of their action and application are given. Modern barrel artillery, with high firepower, rate of fire, maneuverability and the ability to solve a wide range of combat tasks, retains a leading position in the armament system of militarily advanced countries. High fire properties of barrel artillery are provided by constant improvement of all components of its subsystems. In terms of combat potential, the most modern artillery systems 2C19 (Ukraine), CAESAR (France), and PzH2000 (Germany) are 4-5 times higher than the artillery systems developed in the 1960s and 1980s. And yet, despite the obvious improvement in artillery, the number of guns involved, the consumption of shells and the time of the main combat missions still remain significant. Thus, to defeat the enemy’s battery at ranges from 15 to 20 km, you need to involve an artillery division (18 guns), and the cost will be 600-800 shells.The firing time is 6-8 minutes. Widespread introduction of the latest scientific and technical achievements in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has led to the emergence of qualitatively new means of armed strugg. First of all, we are talking about high-precision weapons, the mass use of which allows you to solve problems of operational and sometimes strategic nature. Keywords: high-precision armament, high0precision munitions, artillery systems, specifications, possibilities.
6
Мuray, R., O. Lisovyj y O. Rudenko. "METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING MILITARY-ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY COMBAT KITS OF ADVANCED ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE BEING DEVELOPED (MODERNIZED)". Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy 1, n.º 14 (25 de enero de 2021): 76–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2020.14.1.76-80.
Texto completoResumen
An analysis of military conflicts indicates a sharp increase in maneuvering capabilities, the number of armored targets and anti-weapon capabilities. This makes us look for the possibility of increasing the effectiveness of fire weapons. The existing means of destruction in the Armed Forces of Ukraine require a significant expenditure of ammunition and the use of a large number of fire weapons, for example, to suppress a platoon stronghold, which, as a rule, will include 3-4 infantry fighting vehicles and 1 tank must involve at least artillery division of 152 mm howitzers, with a consumption of 1,440 high-explosive fragmentation shells. In addition, in the course of the gradual transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the standards of NATO member countries, bringing artillery caliber standards to these standards, the development (modernization) of artillery systems, there is a need to revise combat kits, which will be used to equip promising artillery systems (complexes). When substantiating the need for the formation of new combat kits for artillery systems that are being developed (modernized), their military-economic effectiveness is assessed. In connection with the foregoing, there is a need to develop a scientific and methodological apparatus, which will assess the feasibility of making changes to the combat kits of artillery systems. The article discusses a universal methodology for assessing the military-economic effectiveness of combat systems of promising artillery systems that are being developed (modernized). The developed methodology of military-economic evaluation of the effectiveness of combat kits allows you to take into account the economic component in the development (modernization) of artillery systems (complexes). Keywords: combat set, artillery system, military-economic efficiency.
7
Ganin, A. А., M. V. Cherevatenko y E. A. Pitikov. "ISSUES OF CONSTRUCTION OF TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION AND TRANSFER OF DATA OF SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY DIVISION OF AIRBORNE FORCES". Issues of radio electronics, n.º 12 (20 de diciembre de 2018): 6–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.21778/2218-5453-2018-12-6-9.
Texto completoResumen
The paper considers the list of functions to be implemented in the special software of the artillery control automation control system of the self-propelled artillery division of the airborne forces to ensure the reliability of operation. The principles implemented in the control subsystem for the control of the operation of the artillery control automation control system developed by the Rubin research and production enterprise are described. They make it possible to significantly reduce the load on network and computing resources by eliminating parallel streams of requests for duplicate data from simultaneously performed special software tasks. Solutions are proposed for automating the operation of the communication and data transmission subsystem, providing reliable data transmission, automatic selection of the communication channel having the highest throughput, automatic retransmission route construction, providing the maximum capacity with the minimum number of relay nodes during the movement of control machines and self-propelled artillery pieces. The analysis of the transport level protocols is carried out and the choice of the optimal protocol - SCTP is proved. The analysis of routing protocols is made and the choice of the optimal protocol - AODV is justified.
8
Konvisar, M. y Y. Sinilo. "RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARTILLERY SHOOTING TASKS TO HIT HIGHLY MANEFUL TARGETS". Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy 1, n.º 14 (25 de enero de 2021): 194–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2020.14.1.194-201.
Texto completoResumen
Analysis of armed conflicts in recent years shows the widespread use of highly maneuverable firearms, which are characterized by rapid movement during hostilities, frequent changes of position after the fire mission. The effectiveness of defeating a highly maneuverable target and performing a fire task depends on the correct choice and priority in assigning a particular artillery firing task. The main factors influencing the effectiveness of fire damage to highly maneuverable targets are: timeliness, accuracy, suddenness, obtaining complete and accurate data on the position, size and nature of targets, the correct choice of means of hitting the target, the purpose of the fire task and method of firing targets. The primary task of artillery units is to defeat highly maneuverable targets while they are in firing positions. This time is called the effective time to complete the fire task. The timeliness of hitting highly maneuverable targets can be assessed by the ratio of reaction time required to use the artillery unit in combination with additional reconnaissance means allocated for counterbattery combat, to hit the target with the set ammunition consumption and the probable time of target targeting after reconnaissance. The time spent by highly maneuverable targets at the position after their detection by reconnaissance means is random, distributed according to the law of equal probability and depends on the tactical and technical characteristics of weapons, time of fire task, terrain, season, time of day, etc., as well as at what point the target was identified. Fire on the target can be timely only if it is detected and the coordinates are transmitted to the fire units by the time it leaves its positions. When determining the degree of damage to highly maneuverable targets, it is necessary to take into account the probability of timely fire, ie all shells intended to hit the target, spent until the target left the position (out of range). To destroy the battery (platoon) of self-propelled armored guns at the firing position and the platoon of self-propelled armored SAM at the position, the task of firing is to prohibit action, even with the use of two artillery divisions. To defeat the battery (platoon) of MLRS and the battery (platoon) of self-propelled unarmored guns in the firing position, the task of one division is to suppress, and when two divisions are involved in firing on the battery (platoon) of MLRS – destruction. To defeat a platoon of self-propelled armored ATGMs at the deployment line, firing one division, firing task is a ban on action, and if at least two divisions are involved - there may be suppression. Keywords: firing tasks, highly maneuverable targets, effective time, effectiveness of fire damage.
9
Mokrotsky, Muhaylo y Roman Shostak. "Methodical approach to determining goals artillery of the mechanism brigade". Military Technical Collection, n.º 30 (31 de mayo de 2024): 37–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.33577/2312-4458.30.2024.37-44.
Texto completoResumen
The experience of repelling and deterring the armed aggression of the Russian Federation shows the need to carry out a significant amount of fire support tasks for combined military units (units) and points to the growing requirements for the timeliness and quality of target identification for missile troops and artillery at various stages of preparation and conducting an operation (battle). The conducted analysis of the use of artillery units during the repulse of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation indicates that the issues of increasing the level of implementation of their combat capabilities and bringing them into line with the volume of fire tasks that can rely on artillery in the battle of a mechanized brigade are problematic and relevant today. At present, there is an urgent need for modern methods and approaches that would take into account the changes that have occurred in the tactics of artillery units, their quantitative and qualitative composition, spatial and temporal parameters of the conduct of hostilities, and allow more qualitative justification of the goals for the division of units in order to achieve planned fire support effects. Therefore, a methodical approach to determining the goals of the artillery of the mechanized brigade is an important component of determining the scope of target engagement tasks and firing tasks of artillery in the battle of the mechanized brigade. It is known that the scope of the target engagement task and the number of phases of actions related to their implementation depends on: the composition, state and nature of the enemy's actions; tasks of fire support of mechanized units; designation of artillery units as elements of the battle order of the mechanized brigade; combat properties, state and supply of ammunition of artillery units; the capabilities of intelligence tools and the results of processing intelligence information about enemy objects; planned effects of hitting targets, etc. Therefore, there is an urgent task regarding the development of a methodical approach to determining the goals of the artillery of the mechanized brigade, as the number of objects (personnel, structures, etc.) of the enemy's troops (forces), districts and areas of the terrain that are accepted for destruction in the lane of action of the mechanized brigade for to achieve certain physical, operational and psychological effects in accordance with the intentions (design) of the brigade commander.
10
HALIP, Ionel. "THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROMANIAN INFANTRY DEFENCE ACCORDING TO THE LATEST INSTRUCTIONS USED DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR". Romanian Military Thinking 2021, n.º 3 (noviembre de 2021): 38–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2021.3.03.
Texto completoResumen
This article discusses the characteristics of the Romanian infantry defence during the last part of the Second World War according to the instructions received from the General Staff or various Higher Commands. It presents aspects relating to the role of the defence that regained its specific mission to hold its position to the last man or bullet. This article presents the tactical rules of an infantry division in a position of resistance, the arrangement of the battalions, the role of the heavy artillery units and the course of action when the enemy started the attack. At the same time, it also lists the differences between the instructions and directives relating to defence, given under the German influence between 1941- 1943 and the last ones during the war. Furthermore, it also defines the concept of fire plan with all the necessary firings to be delivered against an enemy, with the assessment of the role of the cooperation between the aviation and the artillery once the preparatory firing is started or its use against tanks.
Tesis sobre el tema "Division Artillery"
1
Grotelueschen, Mark E. "Success and failure in the AEF style of warfare, artillery, 2 division, and the search for solutions in 1918". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape17/PQDD_0011/MQ31289.pdf.
Texto completo
2
Лаврик, Володимир Вікторович y Volodymyr Viktorovych Lavryk. "3-тя Залізна дивізія Армії Української Народної Республіки". Master's thesis, 2021. http://repository.sspu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/12021.
Texto completoResumen
3-я Залізна дивізія Армії УНР — військове формування, яке 26-27 червня 1919 року витримало оборону залізничної станції Вапнярка, що забезпечувало наступ головних військ УНР на місто Київ. 14-17 вересня 1920 року інженери дивізії разом із польськими інженерами побудували 330-метровий міст через річку Дністер біля села Городниця сучасної Івано-Франківської області.The 3rd Iron Division of the UPR Army was a military formation that withstood the defense of the Vapnyarka railway station on June 26-27, 1919, that it was ensuring the offensive of the main UPR troops against the city of Kyiv. On September 14-17, 1920, the engineers of the division together with Polish engineers built a 330-meter-long bridge over the Dniester River near the village of Horodnytsia in the modern Ivano-Frankivsk region.
3
Ochman, Marcin. "Polski korpus inżynierów wojskowych w latach 1807-1831". Doctoral thesis, 2017.
Buscar texto completoResumen
W połowie XVIII w. rozpoczął się proces modernizacji wojsk Rzeczpospolitej. Sformowane zostały pierwsze oddziały inżynieryjne i Korpus Inżynierów, a w 1765 r. powstała Szkoła Rycerska – uczelnia wojskowa kształcąca inżynierów wojskowych. Wojska inżynieryjne odrodziły się w okresie napoleońskim, w powstałej wówczas armii Księstwa Warszawskiego. Wojska te były zorganizowane na wzór francuski i cały czas rozbudowywane. Największą liczebność osiągnęły przed kampanią rosyjską w 1812 r. W tym okresie Korpus Inżynierów realizował wiele prac na zlecenie Napoleona, m. in. budował twierdzę w Modlinie i prowadził szczegółowe prace kartograficzne. W 1809 r. powołano Szkołę Aplikacyjnę Artylerii i Inżynierów wzorowaną na paryskiej École polytechnique. Jej uczniami było wielu wybitnych inżynierów jak gen. I. Prądzyński i F. Pancer.W okresie 1815-1830 r. Królestwo Polskie było zależne od Rosji, co spowodowało, że jego armia była wzorowana była na rosyjskiej. Powołanie w tym czasie do życia Kwatermistrzostwa Generalnego sprawiło, że przejęło ono wiele obowiązków i najzdolniejszych oficerów Korpusu Inżynierów.Podczas Powstania (1830-31) wojska inżynieryjne odegrały znaczną rolę, budując wiele mostów polowych i fortyfikacji. Najtrudniejszym zadaniem było w tym czasie ufortyfikowanie Warszawy, niestety nie udało się tego skutecznie wykonać. Po upadku Powstania i likwidacji armii w tym również wojsk inżynieryjnych, wielu żołnierzy i oficerów udało się na emigrację ale większość pozostała w Kraju stanowiąc zaczątek polskiej inteligencji technicznej.In mid-1700s, the armed forces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth entered a process of modernisation. The first engineering units and the Corps of Engineers were organised and the year 1765 marked the establishment of the School of Chivalry - a military university training military engineers. The engineering corps was recreated with the formation of the army of the Duchy of Warsaw during the Napoleonic era. The Corps was organised based on the French model and continually developed, reaching its highest numbers in 1812. During that time, the Corps of Engineers carried out a number of projects commissioned by Napoleon, such as detailed mapping or the construction of the Modlin fortress. The Artillery and Engineering School, established in 1809 and designed after the French École polytechnique in Paris, trained many prominent engineers, such as General Ignacy Prądzyński and Feliks Pancer.During the era of the Russian-dominated Congress Kingdom of Poland (1815-1830), the Polish armed forces followed the organisation of the Russian Army. The General Logistics Department set up during that time, took over many of the responsibilities and most talented officers from the Corps of Engineers.The engineering corps played a key role in the November Uprising of 1830, constructing a number of field bridges and fortifications. Unfortunately, the most difficult task at the time, the fortification of Warsaw, was never completed. After the fall of the Uprising and the disbandment of the army, including the engineering corps, many soldiers and officers went into exile; still most remained in the Country and those who did became the nucleus of the Polish technology intelligentsia.
Libros sobre el tema "Division Artillery"
1
Tyner, Earl L. War diary, 1944-1946, of the 66th Division Artillery. [Ponte Vedra Beach, FL]: E.L. Tyner, 2002.
Buscar texto completo
2
Henning, Frank A. 71st Division Artillery Photo Annual. Wildside Press, LLC, 2012.
Buscar texto completo
3
ARTILLERY AND TRENCH MORTAR MEMORIES - 32ND DIVISION. Naval & Military Press, 2006.
Buscar texto completo
4
Chubb, Robert Walston]. Regimental History, 342nd Field Artillery, 89th Division. Franklin Classics, 2018.
Buscar texto completo
5
Chubb, Robert Walston]. Regimental History, 342nd Field Artillery, 89th Division. Creative Media Partners, LLC, 2018.
Buscar texto completo
6
(Editor), R. Whinyates, ed. Artillery And Trench Mortar Memories - 32nd Division. Naval & Military Press, 2004.
Buscar texto completo
7
Robert Walston] 1894- [From Old Chubb. Regimental History, 342nd Field Artillery, 89th Division. Creative Media Partners, LLC, 2022.
Buscar texto completo
8
Collins, Louis L. History Of The 151st Field Artillery Rainbow Division. Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2007.
Buscar texto completo
9
Arthur Lloyd B. 1881 Fletcher. History of the 113th Field Artillery, 30th Division. Creative Media Partners, LLC, 2021.
Buscar texto completo
10
Kilner, Frederic Richard. Battery E In France: 149Th Field Artillery, Rainbow Division. Alpha Edition, 2021.
Buscar texto completoCapítulos de libros sobre el tema "Division Artillery"
1
Davidson, Phillip B. "Totus Porcus: The Whole Hog 1972". En Vietnam At War, 673–734. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195067927.003.0024.
Texto completoResumen
Abstract On 30 March 1972, Hanoi launched the so-called Easter offensive, a massive invasion by conventional forces in an effort to win the war militarily. The North Vietnamese employed about 125,000 men in four teen divisions and twenty-six separate regiments, supported by hundreds of tanks and artillery pieces. This force amounted to some twenty divisions (more divisions, incidentally, than George Patton ever commanded in World War II). To man this offensive, Giap used every NVA division and separate regiment in both North and South Vietnam, every NVA combat unit in Laos except the 316th NVA Division and four independent infantry regiments.1 In contrast to the Tet offensive, the Viet Cong played almost no role in the Easter offensive.
2
Davidson, Phillip B. "Winter-Spring Campaign, September 1952–May 1953". En Vietnam At War, 137–60. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195067927.003.0007.
Texto completoResumen
Abstract In September 1952 the slackening rains of the Southwest Monsoon signaled the beginning of another campaign season in Indochina. To wage the battles of the “winter-spring” campaign of 1952-1953, the Vietminh had about 110,000 to 125,000 men in their Main Force units. Giap had formed them into six infantry divisions (the 325th Division was formed in Annam in late 1951), four independent infantry regiments, and some five or six independent infantry battalions. By 1952 the Chinese had supplied all of these units with ample numbers of machine guns and mortars. To support this infantry force, Giap formed a seventh division, the 351st Heavy Division, composed of two artillery regiments, an engineer regiment, and some light antiaircraft units.
3
Bettez, David J. "Army Camps". En Kentucky and the Great War. University Press of Kentucky, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813168012.003.0007.
Texto completoResumen
Kentucky had four military camps during the war: Fort Thomas in northern Kentucky, Camp Stanley in Lexington, Camp Taylor in Louisville, and Camp Knox between Louisville and Elizabethtown. Camps Thomas and Stanley dealt primarily with the Kentucky National Guard, while Camps Taylor and Knox became facilities to train draftees. US entry into the war prompted the federal government to establish new cantonments to train millions of men for the military. A rivalry to get one of these camps developed between Louisville and Lexington, exacerbated by newspaper coverage in the Louisville Courier-Journal and Lexington Herald. Louisville received the new cantonment: Camp Zachary Taylor. The camp processed men primarily from Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois, many of whom were formed into the Eighty-Fourth Division, known as the “Lincoln Division.” Other training consisted of a Field Artillery Central Officers Training School (FACOTS) and a school for chaplains. Segregated divisions comprised of African Americans were created and officered by white men. At times, the number of men in the camp reached nearly 60,000. Several organizations provided services, including the YMCA, Red Cross, Knights of Columbus, and Young Men’s Hebrew Association. Libraries and “Moonlight Schools” helped combat soldier illiteracy. Toward the end of the war, Camp Knox was developed to provide better artillery range facilities. The new camps vastly boosted the local economies.
4
Malovany, Pesach, Amatzia Baram, Kevin M. Woods y Ronna Englesberg. "The Training System Corps". En Wars of Modern Babylon. University Press of Kentucky, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813169439.003.0049.
Texto completoResumen
This chapter deals with Iraqi ground forces fighting corps—the Infantry, Special Forces, Armour, Field Artillery, Military Engineering and the Chemical Warfare (defence), that were subordinated to the Training Division of the General Staff. It describes their background and development, especially during the Iran-Iraq war, their organization and structure, weapon systems used by them and their training systems.
5
Hess, Earl J. "The Horror of the Thing Bore Me Down Like an Avalanche". En Storming Vicksburg, 122–30. University of North Carolina Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469660172.003.0008.
Texto completoResumen
John A. McClernand’s Thirteenth Corps advanced at 10 a. m. on May 22 but its left-most division, commanded by Peter J. Osterhaus, did not close in on the Confederate line of earthworks. The primary reason lay in the nature of the terrain, cut up by ravines and steep ridges. The men were relatively safe when going through the former but terribly exposed to fire when they crested the latter. Osterhaus’ two brigades engaged in heavy skirmishing and endured terrible artillery fire but neither of them got close to the foot of the enemy parapet. McClernand had organized his artillery to support the corps advance and it opened with a great deal of noise that morning. Its effect, however, was largely nullified by the strength of Confederate engineer Samuel H. Lockett’s parapets, well sited on commanding ground.
6
Li, Xiaobing. "Control and Campaigns". En Building Ho's Army, 87–107. University Press of Kentucky, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813177946.003.0005.
Texto completoResumen
Between December 1950 and July 1951, the PLA helped the PAVN establish four more divisions by rearming and training them in China, including the 316th, 320th, and 325th Infantry Divisions and 351st Heavy (Artillery/Engineering) Division. By the summer of 1951, the PAVN had 200,000 regular troops. Chapter 4 reveals that the Viet Minh high command did not intend to remain in the remote, less-populated mountainous region with a backward economy after their victory in the Border Campaign. Instead, they were ready to move south from the border region into the Red River Delta, the rice bowl of North Vietnam. Ignoring Chinese warnings, Giap planned a “general counteroffensive” for the final victory in 1950–1951. This chapter examines his three offensive campaigns at Vinh Yen, Mao Khe, and the Day River, from December 1950 through June 1951, and explores the disagreements and miscalculations made by the Chinese advisors.
7
Hess, Earl J. "A Thousand Bayonets Glistened in the Sunlight". En Storming Vicksburg, 148–65. University of North Carolina Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469660172.003.0010.
Texto completoResumen
Two other brigades from Eugene A. Carr’s division and Andrew J. Smith’s division advanced south of the Southern Railroad of Mississippi against Railroad Redoubt. Most men of Michel K. Lawler’s and William J. Landram’s brigades managed to make it to near the work, crowding around its long circumference and some taking shelter in its ditch. McClernand’s heavy artillery had battered a hole in the southeast corner of this irregular work, degrading it enough to allow Sgt. Joseph E. Griffith to lead twelve men of the 22nd Iowa into one compartment of the fort. They were unable to penetrate any farther but the small Confederate garrison was unable to drive them out. Meanwhile, a couple of regimental flags were raised on the exterior slope of the parapet. Then a small Confederate counterattack through the center of the fort was decimated by Union fire, causing demoralization among many Confederates near the work. Both sides settled into an uneasy stalemate at Railroad Redoubt.
8
Pfanz, Harry w. "‘‘Old Jack̓̓ Is Not Here". En The Gettysburg Nobody Knows, 56–74. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195102239.003.0003.
Texto completoResumen
Abstract “Tell Gordon, Hays, Avery, and Smith to double- quick to the front,” shouted Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early to his staff, “and open the lines of infantry for the artillery to pass.” It was one of the dramatic moments of the Civil War. Early’s division had arrived at Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 1 at just the right time to bolster the Confederate attack, and, in response to Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s urging, Early ordered his division into the fight. The Union Eleventh Corps was in its front, and John B. Gordon’s Georgia brigade swept toward the blue line, “moving forward through a field of yellow wheat like a dark gray wave in a sea of gold.” Confederate batteries galloped into position and opened fire, and Early’s Louisiana and North Carolina brigades swept forward along the Harrisburg Road and around the Union flank. Early struck a smashing blow that the poorly posted Eleventh Corps could not long withstand. “The Federal flank had shriveled up as a scroll,” and the men in blue retreated south, past Gettysburg College into the town.
9
Macmaster, Neil. "The regroupements Camps and the Collapse of Pilote 1". En War in the Mountains, 451–71. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198860211.003.0021.
Texto completoResumen
Army commanders in the Chelif, as elsewhere, frustrated by the problems of a hearts and mind approach and the difficulty of winning the support of dispersed populations, fell back on the standard ‘big division’ methods of sweep and search operations, destruction of farmhouses, mass internment, and forced displacement into military camps. By 1960 some 291 camps had been established in the Chelif region, holding a population of a quarter of a million, over 70 per cent of the peasantry. The army also declared zones interdites in which civilians were subject to artillery fire and bombing. Bourdieu and Sayad famously recounted the radical destruction of a traditional peasant order, but peasant communities still exerted, through the djemâa, a degree of collective unity and resistance. For example, through ritual submission to the French (aman) some douars in coming over ‘to the French side’, created protective zones for ALN fighters. Internal to the camps joint families and fractions were able to retain their forms of organization, a basis for self-regulation and resistance.
10
Gerard, Philip. "The Crater". En The Last Battleground, 258–65. University of North Carolina Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469649566.003.0037.
Texto completoResumen
To break the stalemate at Petersburg, a coal-mining engineer in a Pennsylvania regiment conceives a plan to tunnel under the Confederate works and plant a powerful mine that can blow a hole in the line for U.S. troops to exploit. The chosen assault troops are the Fourth Division of U.S. Colored Troops-trained to attack around the resulting bomb crater. But at the last minute, untrained white troops are substituted, and after the mine detonates, obliterating almost an entire Confederate regiment and its artillery, they rush headlong into the twenty-five -foot-deep crater. The result is a slaughter. The USCT rush in to reinforce the attack, and they too are caught in the sloping fire of Confederate troops, who continue shooting and bayoneting black troops even after they surrender. The 28th Regiment of USCT alone loses ninety-one of 224 troops, along with seven of its eleven officers-among 4,000 Union dead. The attack fails, and Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant calls it “the saddest affair I have witnessed in this war.”
Actas de conferencias sobre el tema "Division Artillery"
1
Zimmerman, Eric B. "Numerical Modeling of Cylindrically Shaped Propellant Packages for the U.S. Army". En ASME 2000 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2000-1572.
Texto completoResumen
Abstract The United States Army is in the process of developing the next generation of 155mm self propelled artillery through the Armament Systems Division of United Defense in Minneapolis, Minnesota. This next generation artillery system, called Crusader, is fully automated and can fire up to 10 rounds a minute at distances in excess of 40 km. The weapon system employs a new Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS). MACS consists of a low zone charge, the M231, and a high zone charge, the XM232. Both are rigid combustible cylinders filled with propellant and they are approximately 15 cm in diameter and length. The XM232 is filled with approximately 500 cylindrically shaped propellant grains. The grains are similar in size and shape to that of a typical foam ear plug issued to visitors to high noise areas. A two centimeter thick center core of the cylinder which runs the length of both charges is filled with granular explosive powder which is used to centrally ignite the charges. Between one and six of the 15 cm diameter cylinders are loaded into the gun barrel depending on the distance to the target. It is the goal of this new program to have highly accurate first fire capability for maximum effectiveness on the battlefield. It is imperative to have an accurate prediction of the exit velocity of the artillery projectile at time of firing to achieve this goal. Actual firings of the new gun tube with the XM232 propellant canisters revealed that the exit velocity of the projectile was highly dependent on the temperature of the propellant prior to firing. (The velocity achieved by the M231 is relatively insensitive to temperature.) One avenue under review to provide the propellant temperature prior to firing is to physically measure it. This was easily accomplished in earlier artillery systems as the propellant was granular and stored in cloth sacks. The soldier simply inserted a thermometer through the cloth to obtain a bulk temperature of the propellant inside. The new XM232 does not allow this as the canister walls are impervious and even if a way was found to insert a thermometer into the canister — the obtained temperature would be questionable considering the jumbled nature of the small propellant cylinders inside. Additionally, Crusader’s high rate of fire and automated ammunition handling system does not permit the soldier to manually take the temperature of the charge. During August 1998 a series of test firings of the new gun barrel were conducted with the XM232s. Selected XM232s were instrumented with thermocouples located at different locations within the cylinder as shown in figure 1. The MACS were then soaked for 24 hours at either 50C or −30C. The MACS were then placed on wooden racks in a large thermal chamber maintained at 20C. The temperatures of the thermocouples were then recorded over a period of time as they either warmed or cooled. With this transient experimental data in hand a numerical model could be developed to predict the temperature of the MACS under varying environmental conditions. It was desired to achieve a thermal model in the most simple manner as possible. Thus the first effort was to model the XM232 cylinders as a homogeneous material. If reasonable predictions of the XM232 temperature could be achieved in this mode — more complex efforts could be avoided. Consultations with the propellant manufacturer in Radford, Virginia provided the basic thermal properties of the material. A thermal circuit was then created between the outer surface of the XM232 to the inner core. Thermal energy has to pass through the outer shell material and then through the numerous small propellant cylinders and air voids between them. The material was handled as a homogeneous material and the porous nature of the insides was ignored. It was understood that there would be some thermal stratification of the air inside as shown from the experimental data. But it was hoped that reasonable predictions could be accomplished without considering the bouancy of air trapped between the small cylinders. Series and parallel thermal circuits were developed with either the air and propellant in series or in parallel to get the range of thermal resistances between the two situations. It was expected that the actual thermal resistance would lie somewhere between the two situations. Initial efforts involved superimposing transient solutions to one dimensional problems (infinite cylinder and plane wall) to obtain the multidimensional solution to the short cylinder. While that method provided reasonable comparison to the experimental results after an initial two hour period — there was not a very good comparison prior to that time. The Fluent software package was then used with the ambient air temperature profile in the experiments and the initial temperatures of the XM232s to obtain the predicted three dimensional internal temperatures of the XM232. A three dimensional tetrahedral grid was created with approximately 74,000 nodes. Time steps of 100 seconds were applied for the first 20 minutes with longer time steps being applied as the gradients between the outer surface and the surrounding air decreased. The XM232s were cooled or warmed via natural convection from the surrounding ambient air. At the beginning of each time step the average surface temperature would be obtained from the Fluent software package and then the average convective heat transfer coefficient “h” between the outer surface and surrounding ambient air would be calculated usingreadily available correlations from standard heat transfer books. Comparison of the experimental and numerical predictions at various locations within the XM232 for both the hot to ambient and cold to ambient were very good. The numerical predictions were a bit low on the upper half of the cylinder and a bit high on the lower half of the cylinder. This was expected as we did not consider buoyancy in this analysis. The experimentally measured temperature along the outer edge of the inner core tube matched up very well for both the hot and cold XM232 predictions. This was good news considering that the temperature at this location provided excellent correlation to the exit velocity of the projectile. The result of the above efforts was that a simple three dimension numerical model was developed to predict the temperature near the center of the XM232 for both a warming and cooling situation. The next use of the model is to predict the XM232 average temperature under a variety of transient ambient conditions. It is expected that these studies will facilitate higher first fire accuracy for the new Crusader Artillery System.
Informes sobre el tema "Division Artillery"
1
Starry, Michael D. Close Support Artillery for the U.S. Light Infantry Division. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, diciembre de 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada181322.
Texto completo
2
Mirabella, Angelo y James F. Love. Self-Assessment Based Mini-After Action Review (SAMAAR) Methodology: Developmental Application to Division Artillery Staff Training. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, julio de 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada352838.
Texto completo