Literatura académica sobre el tema "Creditore apparente"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Creditore apparente"
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Eaton, Jonathan. "Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts". Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, n.º 1 (1 de febrero de 1990): 43–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.4.1.43.
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It is now apparent that the governments of many developing countries will not repay their debts as initially contracted. Creditors and creditor governments must now adjust to the realization that full repayment is either infeasible or that enforcing full payment is undesirable from the point of view of creditor countries as a whole. The question now is what to do with these debts. The Baker and Brady plans have increased U.S. government involvement in the debt crisis and have allocated public money toward its resolution. The Kenen plan, discussed in this issue, proposes still more public involvement and, in all likelihood, more public money. Each of these plans is an ad hoc response to the impasse that has arisen between some highly indebted countries and their private creditors, and aspects of each plan may help resolve this impasse. But none of these plans confronts the features of international capital markets that led to the crisis in the first place. My argument here is that the debt crisis that began in 1983 arose from defects in how international capital markets operated the previous decade. A goal of any redesign of the institutions involved in these markets should be not only to resolve the current crisis, but to keep it from happening again.
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RYNGAERT, CEDRIC. "Embassy Bank Accounts and State Immunity from Execution: Doing Justice to the Financial Interests of Creditors". Leiden Journal of International Law 26, n.º 1 (5 de febrero de 2013): 73–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156512000659.
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AbstractEmbassy bank accounts are among the properties of states most widely present in foreign states. Accordingly, they constitute an ideal target for attachment by creditors. International instruments have largely upheld state immunity from execution regarding bank accounts, however. Likewise, state practice largely – and apparently increasingly – supports state immunity from measures of attachment, by applying a presumption that funds in embassy bank accounts are used for governmental non-commercial purposes. This approach is overly deferential to the state. Instead, it is argued that domestic courts should require that the state, at least partially, discharge the burden of proof regarding the nature (commercial/sovereign) of the funds in the bank account. A failure to discharge this burden should result in a rejection of immunity. Only such an approach adequately balances the interests of states and creditors, and does sufficient justice to the creditor's right of access to a court. In addition, it is argued that such a balance is also brought about by construing literally general waivers of immunity from attachment, as not requiring an additional specific waiver regarding embassy bank accounts.
3
Ostřanský, Josef. "Sovereign Default Disputes in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Jurisdictional Considerations and Policy Implications". Groningen Journal of International Law 3, n.º 1 (29 de mayo de 2015): 27. http://dx.doi.org/10.21827/5a86a874244cc.
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In the aftermath of Argentina’s 2001 economic crisis, creditors not participating in the country sovereign debt restructuring insisted on full payment. The triplet of investment arbitration decisions upheld jurisdiction over the mass claims presented by the holdout creditors.1 Two cases were, however, accompanied by forceful dissents. Subsequently, opinions diverged into two camps on the legal appropriateness and policy desirability of using investment arbitration for solving sovereign default disputes: the first camp supporting the majority’s view, and the second siding with the dissenting arbitrators. This article analyses the two approaches as far as jurisdictional requirements for hearing the sovereign bond disputes are concerned as well as potential policy consequences of the use of investment arbitration for these types of disputes. The article assumes a critical position towards the reasoning of the three awards, mostly due to the misconceived apprehension of the requirement of territoriality. In the policy part, the article argues that even if one assumes that enhancement of the creditor’s rights is desirable (something which is debatable), investment arbitration does not seem to bring advantages towards that goal. First, the argument of better enforcement of arbitral awards seems to be more apparent than real. Second, as Bilateral Investment Treaties base their protection on nationality, this fact creates unjustifiable preference towards certain creditors and increases unpredictability. This uncertainty upsets the original contractual bargain agreed on the issuance of bonds and has negative repercussions in financial markets. The ad hoc nature of investment arbitration only furnishes the uncertainty. Lastly, investment arbitration is a tool for correcting past grievances. Tools for dealing with orderly sovereign defaults should focus on the preventive aspects of sovereign defaults. As a robust multilateral treaty system dealing with sovereign defaults is currently politically unfeasible, a better solution is to reinforce the current system of contractual protections such as collective action clauses or exit consents. Rather than attempting to expand the role of arbitration, resolving sovereign debt issues should be left to actors in financial markets (lenders and borrowers). Financial markets have always proved capable of dealing with sovereign defaults.
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Nowak-Far, Artur. "The European Union, its Economic and Monetary Union, and the (Apparent) Perception of Crisis Reflected in Immediate Regulatory Actions". Polish Review of International and European Law 9, n.º 2 (14 de noviembre de 2020): 147–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/priel.2020.9.2.06.
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While neither its institutional, nor legal arrangements fundamentally contributed to the emergence of the Eurozone crisis in the late 10’s of the 21st Century, the crisis exposed significant weaknesses of the EU economic governance, especially its inability to achieve a sustainable level of budgetary discipline. The crisis in particular highlighted the existing divisions of the EU Member States into different integration groups having divergent interests. Notably, it sharpened the division between the Eurozone states and non-Eurozone ones, as well as between the creditor-countries and debtor-countries. The EMU reform agenda adopted after 2008 gave more weighting to the interests of the former states. The emerging post-2008 economic governance-reform arrangements also gave more weight to the ECOFIN Council, at an expense of the European Commission. In the resulting institutional setting, the main aim of the EMU reform agenda was to assure the stability of the Eurozone and to reinforce its resistance to economic shocks. In this context, however, benefits arising from the reformed EMU are unevenly distributed, as they are more likely to avail the Eurozone countries than non- Eurozone countries, and more the creditor countries than the debtor ones.
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Jedlicki, Claudio. "Évolution des rapports entre les États débiteurs de l’Amérique latine et les créanciers occidentaux". Études internationales 16, n.º 1 (12 de abril de 2005): 37–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/701793ar.
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This article is about the problem of the debt incurred by countries of Latin America, preference being given to the notion of net transfer of currency as being the main element which can explain relations between debtors and creditors. It shows that the recent evolution in the attitude of the debtor states, as has been apparent since the meeting at Quito, in January 1984, up to that at Mar del Plata in September 1984, is accounted for by the inversion of the flow of the net transfer of money. Latin America today has become a net exporter of currency. Similarly, the future evolution between the pursuance of the monetary adjustment and the cessation of payment will be determined, in a large measure, by the scope and the meaning lying behind the net transfer of borrowed money. The economical, social and political consequences deriving from the actual reimbursement of the debt are such that they may promote the advent of regimes which will be compelled to implement deep structural reforms. Whether this comes about or not will depend a lot on the creditors.
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Baraldi, Mario. "Finalità apparenti e reali del trust: azione di simulazione e azione revocatoria (Trib. Firenze, 25 luglio 2022)". N° 1 (gennaio-febbraio), n.º 1 (2 de febrero de 2023): 41–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.35948/1590-5586/2023.234.
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MassimaLa sola allegazione del perseguimento, da parte del disponente, di un fine reale – frodare i creditori – divergente dalla finalità apparente del trust non vale a provare la simulazione del trust. È revocabile ex art. 2901 cod. civ. il trust autodichiarato a beneficio dei discendenti istituito dal disponente-trustee, fideiussore di una s.a.s. nei confronti della banca creditrice agente in revocatoria, successivamente al rilascio della fideiussione: l’eventus damni sussiste per il fatto che nessun ulteriore bene immobile residua nel patrimonio del disponente-trustee, a nulla rilevando che, ai sensi dell’atto istitutivo, il trustee può garantire i debiti verso le banche della s.a.s., pure considerato che mai il trustee si è avvalso di detta facoltà; la scientia damni in capo al disponente-trustee, requisito soggettivo richiesto in considerazione della natura gratuita del trust, si desume dalla qualità di socio della s.a.s. in capo al disponente-trustee (che era quindi a conoscenza del dissesto societario), dalla natura autodichiarata del trust e dal fatto che il disponente-trustee poteva discrezionalmente impiegare i redditi a vantaggio dei beneficiari (così permanendo nella disponibilità dei beni in trust).
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Mukenge, André Kabasele. "« Toutefois, il n’y aura pas de nécessiteux chez toi » La stratégie argumentative de Deut. 15:1-11". Vetus Testamentum 60, n.º 1 (2010): 69–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/004249310x12580043372264.
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AbstractBy pointing out the apparent contradictions between verses 4, 7 and 11, the diachronic approach has often considered Deut. 15:1-11 as work from disparate sources. However a close reading that takes into account the rhetorical and stylistic effects as well as the syntactic arrangements of this pericope may reveal that we are in front of a coherent whole. The redactor anticipates the objections by introducing restrictions and prolepses, by using insistence formula (e.g. intensifying infinitive) to persuade the target audience, and by valuing the debtor, who is presented as a brother. All these are strategies for convincing the creditor to implement a difficult law.
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Ismail, R. "Contentious Issues Arising from Payments made in Full and Final Settlement". Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 11, n.º 4 (4 de julio de 2017): 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2008/v11i4a2788.
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Payments made in full and final settlement have on several occasions presented interpretative difficulties for our judiciary, as will become apparent from this case discussion: Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing v Kingtex Marketing 2008 3 SA 327 (SCA). The Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the judgments of the trial court and the appeal court (full bench of the Cape Provincial Division) which were in favour of the creditor. In such cases, the essential enquiry is whether an agreement of compromise exists. A transactio or compromise (in the form of a legal agreement) exists where the relevant parties agree to settle previously disputed or uncertain obligations. Like any other agreement, a compromise is based on the contractual rules of offer and acceptance. The first material enquiry in this case wherein the debtor delivered the cheque payment to the creditor (in full and final settlement of the account), is whether 1) an intended offer of compromise exists; or 2) did the debtor merely intend to make payment towards an admitted liability. The court in the Be Bop (SCA) case came to the correct finding that an offer of compromise existed. Whilst the judgment is brief, the finding itself gives practical recognition to the principle that admission of liability for a specific amount, accompanied by payment (in full and final settlement), may still be accompanied by an intended offer of compromise, instead of merely making payment towards an admission of liability.
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Fauzi, Ahmad. "Legal Satisfaction for the Creditors to Obtain a Return of the Credit From the Debtor". Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI-Journal) : Humanities and Social Sciences 3, n.º 1 (10 de febrero de 2020): 428–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.33258/birci.v3i1.788.
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In the process of granting credit by the bank to the debtor, a careful analysis has been done, but in the implementation there are often many factors that can cause the debtor to become unable to repay the credit received. So as to guarantee repayment of credit given to the debtor, the bank asks for a guarantee from the debtor in the form of property or personal collateral. In accordance with the nature of the collateral, the collateral in the form of land and buildings is generally preferred by banks because the value tends to be stable in the long run. Thus, it is necessary to have a regulation governing the guarantee of assets in the form of land and buildings so that an ease and certainty is obtained for the bank in obtaining repayment of loans given to debtors if in the future the debtor is apparently unable to repay these obligations. It is necessary to create a strong guarantee institution and be able to provide legal certainty for all parties with an interest in providing credit by banks, the government has enacted and enforced it. to impose Mortgage Rights cannot be withdrawn or cannot be terminated by any reason except because it has been implemented or has expired. The provisions are intended so that the encumbrance of the Underwriting Right is actually implemented so as to provide legal certainty for the holder and the giver of the Underwriting Right.
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Anderson, Colin. "Viewing the proposed South African Business Rescuie Provisions from an Australian Perspective". Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 11, n.º 1 (26 de junio de 2017): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2008/v11i1a2753.
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This article makes some comparisons between the Australian corporate rescue provisions and those proposed to be adopted in South Africa in the Companies Bill 2007. By so doing it may assist in the debate in South Africa over how the legislation is framed as the experience in Australia may be useful as an indicator of issues to be considered. One of the findings of the comparison is that the aims of the Australian legislation and that proposed in South Africa are almost identical. The article identifies a clear concern in the South African proposals with the position of employees which is not apparent in Australia. On the other hand there appears to be less concern in South Africa with the position of secured creditors than is evident in the Australian provisions. The article also notes that the South African proposals do not divide the procedure clearly into a decision-making stage and the period whilst the company is operating under the rescue plan. The Australian provisions provide for a clear break between a period where the creditors have yet to make a choice about the company’s future and the period once a plan (or deed of company arrangement) has been adopted. The article also finds that the South African model of rescue as proposed does cover many similar areas as identified in the Australian legislation. It therefore argues that there are sufficient similarities to suggest that much will be common in the experience if they are adopted into the legislation.
Tesis sobre el tema "Creditore apparente"
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DE, ROSA CORRADO. "IL FINANZIAMENTO ALLE IMPRESE IN CRISI". Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/282730.
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The subject of the analysis relates the liabilities against the banks arising from the lending to companies in economic distress or default ("concessione abusiva di credito").
Traditional doctrines, from France and Belgium, affirmed that the bank should be considered liable for the damages caused to the creditors of the company. This claim is based on the principle of entrust and deceptive appearance: the creditor negotiates with the company, and trusts the company's solvency, because the bank funded (and keeps on founding) it.
Italian courts (see also Cassazione Sezioni Unite 7029-7030-7031/2006) followed the above mentioned interpretation, but determined that the creditor's claim is personal: the bank cannot be sued by the official receiver ("curatore fallimentare"). As a consequence of the above, banks are actually immune from any claim: single creditors do not have the power and information needed to prove the liability. “Concessione abusive del credito”, under this interpretation, is a rigid and limited tort.
Some Authors suggested that the banks, in case of negligent lending, can be considered as shadow directors - interfering in the company's decisions - and can be sued by the official receiver ("curatore fallimentare") for the damages caused to the company itself.
This analysis explores another solution, resulting from recent studies in Germany (H. KÖTZ, Vertragsrecht, Tübingen, 2009) and Italy (C. MIGLIO, L’autonomia privata nel rapporto di finanziamento bancario, Giust. Civ. 2013, 9, p. 473). Briefly, under this different interpretation, the bank's loan granted to companies defaulted and/or in distress, should be considered void. This different solution considers the “concessione abusive di credito” a threat to economic public order, generating negative externalities. Italian Constitution states that economic initiatives (“iniziativa economica”) cannot be contrary to public social utility (art. 41 co 2) – and bank law declares that the bank is obliged to a safe and prudent lending (art. 5 T.U.B.).
As a consequence of the above mentioned second interpretation, the banks lose every guarantee, mortgage and surety securing the relevant loans; furthermore the banks can be sued by “curatore fallimentare” for precontractual liability (art. 1338 c.c.): if someone does not disclose the voidness of a contract (that he knows or should know that it is void) the other part shall be compensated of the relevant damages suffered.
The last step of the analysis regards loan agreements executed in the framework of a restructuring procedure. Italian bankruptcy law has developed in the last 10 years three different restructuring procedures: “piani di risanamento” (art. 67 l.fall.), “concordato preventivo” (art. 160 l.fall.) and “accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti” (art. 182-bis l.fall.). According to the prevailing doctrine, in the context of a restructuring procedure, the bank cannot be considered liable of “concessione abousiva di credito”: the relevant loan agreement is promoted and fostered by Italian law. But under an economic analysis of such law, a “no liability” rule is inefficient: the bank could avoid any credit rating and investigation on the condition of the company, allocating the default risk on the other creditors.
We suggest that Italian law’s “favor” should be valued in considering bank’s malice or negligence. Only when the lender knows (or should have known) that the turnaround plan was inconsistent, he should be asked for compensation by the creditors. In this perimeter, the contract should be usually considered enforceable: Italian law encourages lending during the turnaround procedures – the contract is not contrasting economic public order, but it can be the base of a compensation plea.
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Rossi, Francesca. "Apparenza del diritto e rapporti di fatto nell’esperienza giuridica di Roma antica". Doctoral thesis, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2158/1172602.
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La tesi prende in esame la dialettica tra fatto e diritto nell’esperienza giuridica di Roma alla luce del principio di apparenza del diritto. Per ciascuna delle principali manifestazioni del principio di apparenza (erede apparente, creditore apparente, rappresentante apparente) è individuato un possibile antecedente storico nel diritto romano (possessor pro herede, falsus creditor, falsus procurator), di cui viene proposta una dettagliata analisi alla luce delle fonti antiche e delle interpretazioni dottrinali. Sono poi esaminati i rapporti familiari di fatto (relazioni more uxorio, matrimonium iniustum e concubinato), in quanto riconducibili a loro volta al principio di apparenza. La ricerca, interrogandosi sulle ragioni dell’estensione della disciplina giuridica alla fattispecie apparente, individua una tendenza comune ai vari fenomeni che, pur eterogenei, esprimono la medesima tensione tra fatto e diritto presente negli ordinamenti giuridici di ogni epoca storica.
The thesis examines the dialectic between fact and law in the juridical experience of Rome in light of the principle of appearance of law. For each of the main manifestations of the principle of appearance (apparent heir, apparent creditor, apparent representative) is identified a possible historical antecedent in Roman law (possessor pro herede, falsus creditor, falsus procurator), of which is proposed a detailed analysis in the light of ancient sources and doctrinal interpretations. Then are examined the “de facto” family relationships (more uxorio relations, matrimonium iniustum and concubinage), since they can in turn be traced back to the principle of appearance. The research, questioning the reasons of the extension of the juridical discipline to the apparent case, identifies a common tendency to the various phenomena which, although heterogeneous, express the same tension between fact and law present in the legal systems of every historical epoch.
Libros sobre el tema "Creditore apparente"
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Bunte, Jonas B. Raise the Debt. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190866167.001.0001.
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Governments frequently borrow money. It is often assumed that it is creditors, and creditors alone, who determine what loans developing countries obtain. Yet this is only partially true: the data show that countries with the same credit rating, income levels, and degree of democracy exhibit a remarkable diversity in the types of creditors used. Some borrow from China, while others turn to the United States; some borrow from private investors, while others rely on multilateral institutions. Apparently, developing countries have some choice. Developing countries are not merely passive recipients gobbling up whatever loans they can get, but active agents. This book systematically explains how governments choose among competing loan offers. The argument focuses on societal interest groups in recipient countries and the distributional consequences of external loans. For example, China and the International Monetary Fund might both offer the same loan volume, but the strings attached to the loans differ. As a result, domestic interest groups would benefit from one loan but not the other. Governments then cater to whichever domestic interest group coalition dominates by borrowing from that coalition’s preferred creditor. Interviews with decision-makers in Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia provide strong evidence that domestic politics shape borrowing decisions. A Statistical analyses confirms that borrowing portfolios around the world reflect the relative strength of societal interest groups. Understanding why certain loans are chosen is critical for gaining insights into the effects these loans might have on growth and democracy.
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Information for Sir Alexander Cockburn, Apparent Heir-Male of the Family of Langtoun, Pursuer, Against Sir William Cockburn of That Ilk and the Other Creditors of Langtoun, Defenders. Creative Media Partners, LLC, 2018.
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Orestes. An Enquiry Into the Case of the Prince of Wales; or, Reflections on the Pretended Insolvency of the Heir Apparent, for the Consideration of the ... the Satisfaction of the Prince's Creditors. Gale ECCO, Print Editions, 2018.
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Mokal, Riz, Ronald Davis, Alberto Mazzoni, Irit Mevorach, Madam Justice Barbara Romaine, Janis Sarra, Ignacio Tirado y Stephan Madaus. Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Insolvency. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198799931.001.0001.
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This volume examines the current resolution process for distressed micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), and proposes a different, more appropriate, ‘modular’ approach to the treatment of such entities when faced with insolvency proceedings. MSMEs play a vital role in virtually all global economies. They are a primary means of employment and the vehicle by which entrepreneurs bring new business propositions to the market and deliver a range of products and services to local economies. MSMEs tend to be more reliant than larger businesses on favourable legal and regulatory climates in order to survive and thrive. Yet in assuming an extensive insolvency estate of significant worth, the presence of creditors and other concerned stakeholders to participate in and oversee the process, and the extensive involvement of courts and insolvency and legal professionals, insolvency regimes are often more tailored to the circumstances of larger businesses. These assumptions and features generally sit incongruously with the reality of MSMEs, whose estates characteristically have modest value and many of whose stakeholders tend to be disinterested in the MSME’s insolvency process. The Modular Approach developed in this text addresses the imbalances, inconsistencies, and lack of supervision which are often apparent in the treatment of insolvent MSMEs. The volume provides an overview of existing approaches to MSME insolvency, the place of MSMEs in the global economy, and the particular needs of MSMEs in financial distress. It then sets out the procedural framework, policy objectives, and key components of the Modular Approach, detailing how a choice of modules enables national policymakers a more flexible process for resolution. The volume outlines the roles, positions, and obligations of key stakeholder groups, and explains the managerial, administrative, and judicial functions of this approach. Finally, it explains how elements of the broader legal system should be aligned with, and supportive of, the optimal functioning of the Modular Approach.
Capítulos de libros sobre el tema "Creditore apparente"
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Hansmann, Henry, Reinier Kraakman y Richard Squire. "Incomplete Organizations". En Roman Law and Economics, 199–232. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198787204.003.0008.
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This chapter analyzes ancient Rome’s law of business entities from the perspective of asset partitioning, the delimiting of creditor collection rights based on the distinction between business assets and personal assets. Asset partitioning, which is an essential legal attribute of modern business forms such as the partnership and the business corporation, reduces borrowing costs by simplifying credit-risk assessment and expediting insolvency proceedings. The chapter finds that ancient Roman business arrangements, such as the societas and the slave-run business endowed by the slaveowner with a peculium, did not give business creditors the first claim to business assets, making these forms of organization non-entities according to the criterion of asset partitioning. It appears that the only true legal entity used to form profit-seeking firms was the societas publicanorum, which roughly resembled the modern limited partnership. But use of that form was generally confined to firms that provided public services under contract with the state. Moreover, the societas publicanorum was essentially a creature of the Republic, and was largely abandoned during the Empire. Although Rome had a complex economy and sophisticated commercial law, and was familiar with most of the types of asset partitioning seen in modern legal systems, it ultimately failed to develop legal entities for general use in commerce. Apparent reasons include the Roman aristocracy’s disparagement of commerce, the emperors’ wariness of strong organizations outside the state, and the society’s continuing reliance on the family—a durable and complex legal entity in its own right—to handle many commercial needs.
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Watt, Gary. "6. Formality, perpetuity, and illegality: trust creation and public policy I". En Trusts & Equity, 181–217. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198854142.003.0006.
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Trust property apparently belongs to the person who is not the true owner despite having all the forms and powers of ownership. Thus, a trust creates an illusion of ownership that may prejudice trade creditors when the trustee becomes insolvent and deceive the state’s tax collection agencies. However, there are a number of safeguards designed to prevent the undesirable creation and operation of trusts. For example, the disposition of equitable interests under trusts must be made in writing and the creation of trusts of land must be evidenced in writing. This chapter discusses the ways in which the creation of trusts is influenced by special considerations of public policy, focusing on formality, perpetuity, and illegality. It also considers rules against perpetuities—the rule against remoteness of vesting, the rule against inalienability of capital, and the rule against accumulation of income—and finally, looks at the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009.
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Watt, Gary. "6. Formality, perpetuity, and illegality: trust creation and public policy I". En Trusts & Equity. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198804697.003.0006.
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Trust property apparently belongs to the person who is not the true owner despite having all the forms and powers of ownership. Thus, a trust creates an illusion of ownership that may prejudice trade creditors when the trustee becomes insolvent and deceive the state's tax collection agencies. However, there are a number of safeguards designed to prevent the undesirable creation and operation of trusts. For example, the disposition of equitable interests under trusts must be made in writing and the creation of trusts of land must be evidenced in writing. This chapter discusses the ways in which the creation of trusts is influenced by special considerations of public policy, focusing on formality, perpetuity, and illegality. It also considers rules against perpetuities—the rule against remoteness of vesting, the rule against inalienability of capital, and the rule against accumulation of income—and finally, looks at the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009.
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"Introduction: towards a sociology of debt". En The Sociology of Debt, editado por Mark Featherstone, 1–26. Policy Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447339526.003.0001.
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In this introductory chapter I consider the diverse meanings of the idea of debt in the contemporary world. Starting with the current problem of apparently ever-expanding debt, I explain the origins of the globalisation of the condition of indebtedness through a discussion of processes of financialisation, where money is entirely virtual and weightless. In order to situate the idea of financialisation in a sociological context, I show how the financial crisis of 2007-2008 gave weight to the weightless fictitious capital of the fully financialised world in the form of the dead weight of debt that crushes the indebted and creates a new power relation, which Maurizio Lazzarato writes of in terms of the creditor / debtor relation. While economics tends to conceive of debt in terms of number and objective mathematical calculation, the idea of the weight of debt focus upon the subjective experience of indebtedness founded upon a particular subordinate subject position, the debtor, which it then becomes possible to understand sociologically and critically oppose on the basis of different value systems.
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"Q 72-2 a) What was the primary blueprint for Art. 72 CISG? b) In what way has Art. 72 CISG extended this model? Q 72-3 a) How must the requirement that an anticipatory fundamental breach must be ‘clear’ be distinguished from the prerequisite in Art. 71 CISG that it must ‘become apparent’ that one party will not perform a sub-stantial part of its obligations? b) Wherein was the ‘clear’ committal of an anticipatory fundamental breach in C 72-1 to be seen? Q 72-4 Compare the ‘clarity’ requirement with the corresponding provisions in the UP 2004, the PECL, § 2-610(2) UCC, and § 323(4) BGB. Q 72-5 a) What is the purpose of the ‘notice’ requirement in Art. 72(2) CISG? b) In which cases will a notice within the meaning of Art. 72(2) CISG not be required? Cf. also C 72-2. Q 72-6 a) What are the consequences if no notice under Art. 72(2) CISG is given? b) What happens if the debtor cannot furnish any adequate assurance? Q 72-7 a) How is ‘repudiation’ defined in the UCC? b) Does the UCC make a similar distinction to that made under Arts 71, 72 CISG? c) What are the creditor’s possible remedies in case of repudiation by the other party? Q 72-8 a) How does the UCC settle the conflict between renewed willingness on behalf of the debtor to perform, and the creditor’s already having resorted to a remedy incompatible with the debtor’s performance of the contract? b) How is this question solved under the CISG? Q 72-9 In case of repudiation of the contract by one party, § 2-610(1)(b) UCC refers the other party to the general remedies in § 2-703(2). In fact, is there a difference, in comparison to the CISG, with respect to the remedies available to the conforming party?" En International Sales Law, 549–51. Routledge-Cavendish, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203945445-190.
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