Tesis sobre el tema "Contrarietà"

The aim of this thesis is to examine the meanings and functions of paradox in the late Renaissance. My understanding of Renaissance paradox, in contrast to that of most critics and historians, rests entirely on contemporary definitions of the term, rather than on its present-day meaning. Paradoxes as they are envisaged in this study begin to appear in the wake of the humanist rediscovery and dissemination of Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum. In this work, paradoxes are characterized as 'admirabilia contraque opinionem omnium', a definition that draws attention to two important traits of paradox, repeatedly invoked in the Renaissance: its association with wonder, and its opposition to common opinion. This thesis examines the history of classical paradox as it was revived, expanded beyond the narrow confines of Stoic ethics, and adapted to new purposes so successfully that it became a recognisable genre of polemical writing, with hundreds of works in Latin and the vernacular being described as paradoxes. Previous studies of Renaissance paradox have centred almost exclusively on its literary and vernacular manifestations, and on the paradoxical encomium in particular. My own work charts the rise to prominence and the ensuing transformations of paradox in a range of disciplines: rhetoric and ethics, theology, law, medicine, and natural philosophy. I compare the different associations that paradoxes acquire in all these areas, and the argumentative strategies that they deploy. My analysis of specific examples of paradox is informed by the methods of both literary analysis and intellectual history. Paradoxes, I argue, offered their authors the possibility of departing from established norms and of voicing novel views in a period of intellectual unrest. In their challenge to received and common opinion, they paved the way for more radical ideas in the following century, and they have much to tell us about dissident ways of thinking in the late Renaissance.

The agreement, currently known in judiciary praxis as patto di quota lite, through which a lawyer undertakes the defence of a client with the understanding that he will receive as fee a part of the amount the latter will achieve in case of victory of the lawsuit, derives from Roman juridical experience. The institution of quota litis is often subject to unbending prohibitions: examples of such reaction of the legal system, even if with different gradation, are found in both the Swiss and Italian norms. On the one hand, in the Helvetian Confederation, both at cantonal and federal level, the pactum de quota litis has been always prohibited to protect the public interest so that the lawyer handling a lawsuit might be independent in his decisions and not forced by personal interests that somehow could undermine his neutrality. On the other hand, this institution in Italy has been subject to several reforms that sometimes have apparently produced a partial opening of the legal system but, in essence, have always maintained firm the principle of its unlawfulness; this, as emerges from the sentences of the Corte di Cassazione, aims to avoid the lawyer taking advantage of his influence to ascribe to himself the majority of the dispute and consequently does not guarantee a role of independence in regard to the lawsuit he is handling. After this initial comparative digression, the Roman sources which in all probability concern the illicit covenant, have been examined with exegetic method. A dubitative attitude is obligatory because the expression pactum de quota litis, continuously recalled in the juridical literature of every later time, is not a creation of the Roman people but of their medieval exegetes, glossators and commentators, who first created the expression we know nowadays. It is mostly a question of late classical juridical sources, in particular of two responsa of the jurist Ulpianus (D.50.13.1.12; D.2.14.53), a text taken from the Institutio Oratoria of the rhetor Quintilianus and a pair of constitutions of the emperor Constantinus (C.2.6.5 and C.Th.2.10.4), which show the blame that such agreement between the lawyer and his client (or sometimes between the procurator ad litem and his dominus litis too) provoked. Its contrariety to boni mores is understandable in these texts through expressions like malo more, non licet, abominanda negotiatio and illicita compendia. However, the ratio of this opposition to morality is not made clear; this issue has been pursued considering social and economic reasons that have marked the passage, from the unbreakability of the principle of gratuity of lawyer activity to provisions legally defined and certified by imperial constitutions. However, it was not possible to leave another issue out of consideration because of its strict relation and complexity within the doctrinal opinions that have been studied and compared in the present analysis. I refer to the institution of redemptio litis that, according to jurists of the XVI and XVII century (for instance Johann Schiller, Johann Brunnemann, Iacobus Curtius), was completely assimilable to the hypothesis of the so called patto di quota lite. I have attempted to take up a position following the literature of the last century about the subject (for instance Vittorio Scialoja and the up-to-date Mariano Scarlata Fazio and Gianni Santucci). According to their opinions there are two behaviours, although equally illegal, different as to content. Redimere litem generally means “taking on the risk of the lawsuit” against the payment of a fee (as D.17.1.6.7, D.17.1.7; C.2.12.15 and C.4.35.20 explain), by having recourse to the mechanism of trial replacement that made the transfer of credits and debts possible for a procurator in rem suam, but it assumes also the meaning of “purchasing a credit at low cost” to recover from the transferred debtor the whole nominal value (as in C.4.35.22, where the content of the lex Anastasiana is reported). In both cases speculation is dominant and both cases in point were not tolerated by the system of laws because considered opposite to morality. Certainly the redemptio litis could be used also to pay the lawyer (or the substitute in a trial), like the pactum de quota litis which shared the imputation of immorality, but in any case it was a different agreement in nature (transfer of contentious credit and not simple pactum) and in content (purchase of the whole trial position of the surrender and not of a part of the proceeds in case of victory of the lawsuit). The inseparable linkage between the technical contrivance by means of which the redemptio litis was carried out, the procuratio ad litem in rem suam, and the mandate have been the crucial points to elaborate the final considerations about the unlawfulness of such an agreement within the classical Roman legal and late classic experience.
Die Vereinbarung, welche gegenwärtig in der Rechtspraxis als quota-litis-Vereinbarung bekannt ist, hat ihre Wurzeln im römischen Recht. Bei dieser Vereinbarung übernimmt der Rechtsanwalt die Vertretung des Mandanten mit der Absprache, dass jener als Honorar einen Teil von dem erhalten soll, was dieser im Fall eines Prozessgewinns erlangen wird. Das Institut der quota-litis-Vereinbarung ist häufig Gegenstand strenger Verbote. Beispiele einer solchen Reaktion der Rechtsordnung findet man – wenn auch mit verschiedenen Abstufungen – im schweizerischen wie auch im italienischen Recht. Einerseits war die quota-litis-Vereinbarung in der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft sowohl auf kantonaler als auch auf föderaler Ebene schon seit jeher verboten, um das öffentliche Interesse daran zu schützen, dass der Berufsträger in seinen Entscheidungen unabhängig ist, wenn er eine Rechtssache führt, und sich nicht von persönlichen Interessen leiten lässt, die auf irgendeine Art seine Neutralität gefährden können. Andererseits erfuhr sie in Italien verschiedene Reformen, die zwar bisweilen eine Teilöffnung der Rechtsordnung mit sich brachten, aber stets an dem Prinzip ihrer Widerrechtlichkeit festhielten; wie sich aus der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung ergibt, verfolgt man damit den Zweck zu vermeiden, dass der Rechtsanwalt seinen Einfluss missbraucht, um den Großteil der streitgegenständlichen Sache zu beanspruchen, und infolgedessen keine Position der Unparteilichkeit und Unabhängigkeit im Hinblick auf den Rechtsstreit gewährleistet, an dem er mitwirkt. Nach diesem anfänglichen rechtsvergleichenden Exkurs werden mit Hilfe der exegetischen Methode diejenigen römischen Quellenzeugnisse untersucht, welche höchstwahrscheinlich diese rechtswidrige Vereinbarung betreffen. Eine skeptische Haltung ist zwingend erforderlich, da die Urheberschaft des Ausdrucks pactum de quota litis, anders als in der juristischen Literatur aller Epochen immer behauptet wird, nicht den Römern selbst zuzuerkennen ist, sondern ihren mittelalterlichen Exegeten, den Glossatoren und den Kommentatoren, die als erste den Ausdruck geprägt haben, den wir heute kennen. Es handelt sich hauptsächlich um klassische und spätantike Rechtsquellen, insbesondere um zwei responsa des Juristen Ulpian (D. 50, 13, 1, 12; D. 2, 14, 53), um einen Ausschnitt aus der Institutio Oratoria des Rhetors Quintilian (Inst. 12, 7, 11) und um zwei constitutiones des Kaisers Konstantin (C. 2, 6, 5 und CTh. 2, 10, 4), in denen das missbilligende Empfinden aufscheint, welches eine solche Vereinbarung zwischen dem Anwalt (oder zuweilen auch zwischen dem procurator ad litem und dem dominus litis) und dem Klienten auslöste. Ihr Widerspruch zu den boni mores ergibt sich in den Texten aus Wendungen wie malo more, non licet, abominanda negotiato und illecita compendia. Allerdings geht aus diesen nicht die ratio dieses Widerspruchs zu den guten Sitten hervor. Auf diese Frage wurde versucht, eine Antwort zu geben, indem auf die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Beweggründe verwiesen wurde, welche den Übergang von der Unabdingbarkeit des Prinzips der Unentgeltlichkeit der Anwaltstätigkeit zu der Festlegung gesetzlich bestimmter Honorare kennzeichneten, die auch durch kaiserliche Reskripte bezeugt sind. Es konnte jedoch nicht von der Vertiefung einer weiteren Frage abgesehen werden, deren enger Zusammenhang und deren gleichzeitige Komplexität in den Lehrmeinungen deutlich wurde, die an dieser Stelle untersucht und überprüft wurden. Ich beziehe mich auf das Institut der redemptio litis, welches gemäß der allgemeinen Überzeugung der Gelehrten des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts (z. B. Johann Schilter, Johann Brunnemann, Iacobus Curtius) mit dem Fall einer quota-litis-Vereinbarung völlig vergleichbar war. Es wurde versucht, hierzu Stellung zu nehmen, indem der Literatur des vergangenen Jahrhunderts zu diesem Thema zugestimmt wurde (z. B. Vittorio Scialoja und jüngst Mariano Scarlato-Fazio und Gianni Santucci), gemäß der es sich um zwei Tatbstände handeln soll, die zwar gleichermaßen unrechtmäßig gewesen seien, sich aber dem Inhalt nach unterschieden hätten. Redimere litem bedeutet in den Quellen für gewöhnlich “das Prozessrisiko übernehmen” gegen Zahlung eines Entgelts (so in D. 17, 1, 6, 7; D. 17, 1, 7; C. 2, 12, 15; C. 4, 35, 20), indem man auf den Mechanismus der Prozessübernahme zurückgreift, der die Übertragung von Forderungen und Schulden auf den procurator in rem suam gestattete; dieser Terminus erlangt auch die Bedeutung “kostengünstig eine Forderung erwerben”, um von dem Schuldner der abgetretenen Forderung ihren gesamten Nominalwert einzutreiben (so in C. 4, 35, 22, wo der Inhalt der lex Anastasiana berichtet wird). In beiden Fällen herrscht das spekulative Element vor und beide Tatbestände wurden von der Rechtsordnung nicht toleriert, da man sie als den guten Sitten zuwider beurteilte. Sicherlich konnte auch die redemptio litis ebenso wie die quota-litis-Vereinbarung, mit der sie die Sittenwidrigkeit gemein hatte, verwendet werden, um den Anwalt (oder den Prozessübernehmer) zu entlohnen; aber es handelte sich in jedem Fall um eine nach Art (Zession einer streitbefangenen Forderung und nicht einfach ein pactum) und Inhalt (Erwerb der ganzen prozessualen Lage des Zedenten und nicht eines Teils des Erlöses im Fall des Prozessgewinns) andere Vereinbarung. Die untrennbare Verbindung zwischen dem technischen Hilfsmittel, mit dem man die redemptio litis verwirklichte, der procuratio ad litem in rem suam, und dem Mandat bildete den Schwerpunkt der Ausarbeitung von abschließenden Erwägungen betreffend die Widerrechtlichkeit einer derartigen Vereinbarung im römischen Recht der Klassik und Spätklassik.

À partir d'une étude philologique attentive de l'Esprit géométrique, je montre l'évolution épistémologique de Pascal qui, découvrant la corruption naturelle d'un langage humain impuissant à assurer ses propres fondements, quitte ses positions cartésiennes. Par contrecoup, la prétention de la raison à formuler des principes universels est anéantie : toute connaissance rationnelle se fonde sur un socle autoritaire. Je souligne alors l'importance actuelle de l'œuvre mathématique pascalienne par sa mise en perspective dans la crise moderne des fondements. En lui appliquant les méthodes de la poétique aristotélicienne, je la caractérise par sa sensibilité figurative, qui s'étend à l'œuvre non scientifique et en révèle l'unité esthétique. Je montre ensuite l'originalité philosophique de Pascal qui sort du scepticisme en recherchant de nouveaux usages de la langue propres à communiquer la certitude. Je reprends le débat sur le chantier des Pensées pour en distinguer les éditions objectives, qui restituent le seul classement dont nous disposons effectivement, des éditions apologétiques qui le recomposent à partir de certaines des indications laissées par l'auteur. La grande originalité des Pensées classées est de proposer une recherche du bonheur sans a priori religieux. Elles établissent les contrariétés de la condition humaine, que philosophies et sciences humaines sont impuissantes à décrire ou résoudre car elles refusent, par principe, la contradiction. L'Écriture chrétienne entre alors en scène pour présenter le seul langage capable de faire aboutir la recherche, parce qu'acceptant et faisant signifier la contradiction. La double nouveauté est ici d'introduire la Bible dans le champ de l'existence par nécessité, et comme un simple livre, dont il s'agit de décrire le pouvoir cognitif. Structuré par la narration et par la figure (typologique), ce modèle biblique élargit la connaissance rationnelle et son référentiel spatio-temporel restreint. Il ouvre ainsi à son lecteur un horizon d'existence et lui montre un chemin pour réparer ses ses contrariétés. On voit là chez Pascal un profond renouveau de la pensée figurative et de l'approche littéraire de la Bible
A thorough philological study of l'Esprit géométrique shows an evolution in Pascal's epistemology. Discovering a form of natural corruption in the incapacity of self foundation of the human langage, he leaves his former Cartesian positions. As a consequence, Reason's pretention to formulate universal principles is erased : every rational knowledge is based on a form of authority. This reveals the importance of Pascal's scientific work as regards to the crisis of fundation in modern Science. Using Aristotle's Poetic's methods, I show that Augustinian notion of figuration both applies to mathematics and Biblic litterature, and gives the aesthetic unity of the whole Pascal’s work . Its originality in philosophy is to get rid of scepticism by searching new languages capable of certitude. I reopen a long debate on the unaccomplished Pensées. I propose to distinguish between objective and apologetic editions. The latter are based on some of the author's indications on his intentions, the former use the only classification available. The thorough originality of what I call Les Pensées classées is to propose a quest for happiness with no religious a priori. After having established the contrarieties of humain condition which no philosophy or human science can describe or resolve because they reject contradiction, as a principle, this classification introduces the Christian Scripture as it carries the only language capable of accepting contradiction and giving a meaning to it. There are two new approaches here : introducing the Bible in the field of existence by necessity, and as a simple book with cognitive power. Structured by narration and figuration (typology), this Biblical model extends rational knowledge by extending its restricted space-time referential. It enlarges the horizon of existence of the reader and shows a path for repairing their contrarieties. Pascal deeply renews the classic figurative thought and the poetic approach of the Bible

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 336-360). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users. Address: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9963442.

Les contrariétés de décisions de justice sont extrêmement nocives. D’une part, elles représentent une menace pour la cohérence du droit. D’autre part, elles pèsent lourd sur la situation des parties, mettant ces dernières dans des situations inextricables. En tant que mode juridictionnel de règlement des litiges, l’arbitrage international n’échappe pas à ce phénomène. Au contraire, les spécificités de la matière en font un terrain de prédilection pour le développement des contrariétés de décisions. En effet, les contrariétés résultent de la conduite parallèle de procédures portant sur des questions litigieuses identiques, sur lesquelles sont portées des appréciations divergentes. Or, l’arbitrage international se présente comme un facteur d’aggravation de ces causes classiques de contrariété, à savoir la concurrence juridictionnelle et l’incohérence des solutions. Le risque de contrariété y est à la fois fréquent et varié. Il se présente dans diverses configurations, opposant tantôt des décisions étatiques d’encadrement de l’arbitrage, tantôt une sentence arbitrale et une décision étatique ou encore deux sentences arbitrales.En dépit de la gravité du problème et de la fréquence du risque de contrariété, l’arbitrage international paraît mal armé pour y faire face. Il est confronté d’une part aux limites de l’efficacité des remèdes curatifs, qui se contentent souvent d’écarter la contrariété d’un territoire donné, et, d’autre part aux difficultés de mise en œuvre des remèdes préventifs
The phenomenon of conflicting decisions is extremely hazardous. On the one hand, they represent a threat to the coherence of the legal systems. On the other hand, it places a burden on the parties, putting them in an inextricable situation. Being a jurisdictional dispute resolution method, international arbitration does not escape this phenomenon. On the contrary, the specificities of arbitration make it the territory of predilection for the appearance of conflicting decisions. In fact, conflicting decisions result from the conduction of parallel proceedings concerning identical issues, which receive a different analysis. International arbitration aggravates the classical causes resulting in conflicting decisions. These causes are the competition between jurisdictions and the incoherence of the solutions.The risk of the existence of conflicting decisions is frequent and it presents itself is several manners. It can oppose national courts’ decisions assisting and controlling the arbitration, an arbitral award and a national court’s decision or even two arbitral awards.Despite the gravity of the problem and the frequency of the risk of having conflicting decisions, international arbitration seems unarmed to deal with it. Firstly, it is confronted with the limited efficiency of the curative solutions, and secondly, with the difficulties of applying preventive solutions

D'abord, nous examinons la formation originairement et explicitement politique de la signification de la catégorie d’opposition dans le programme spéculatif de Hegel, à travers l’analyse de deux articles de la période pré-phénoménologique de Iéna, relatifs à la vie éthique : Différence de la philosophie de Fichte et de Schelling et Des manières de traiter scientifiquement du droit naturel. Ensuite, nous nous penchons sur la logique de l’opposition dialectique, qui culmine dans la contradiction après un débat avec l'opposition réelle développée par Kant dès 1763. Celle-ci, bien que résistant mal à la critique qu’en fait Hegel, est susceptible d'une radicalisation qui l’apparenterait à la contrariété spinozienne. L’examen de cette dernière montre que c’est elle qui imprègne le mot de Marx sur les ‘vrais extrêmes effectifs’ lancé à propos de la société civile et de l’État dans le fameux manuscrit de Kreuznach, brouillon de commentaire littéral et critique de la philosophie hégélienne de droit, prise au chapitre de la Sittlichkeit : le mot de Marx, au lexique entièrement emprunté au langage oppositif, le déborde en réalité hardiment en direction de l’idée de destruction réciproque, propre à la contrarietas spinozienne. Enfin, nous avons cherché à tirer les conséquences de pareille dévaluation de la catégorie d’opposition au profit de la notion de contrariété, ou antagonisme, pour une esquisse de théorie de la transformation sociale qui s’oriente vers une destitution sociale de la politique comme domination, signant l’abolition non sursomptive de cette dernière ainsi que du mode pastoral de socialité, procèdant par unification extérieure, et dont la domination en question est la matrice
Through this work, we have been trying to criticize the notion of opposition from a social transformation theory point of view. With this aim, we first attempted to review the various theories of opposition through modern philosophical history, and then disqualified them all but one, of which we showed the highest relevance for our purpose: spinozian contrarietas. Particularly we focused on hegelian essentialities within the ‘difference dialectics’ of his great logic of essence: opposition and dialectical contradiction. We confronted them with Kantian notions of Realopposition, Realentgegensetzung, etc. Summing up the discussion that Hegel himself has with Kant. It appears that the various expressions of Kantian ‘real opposition’ are just the dynamized version of dialectical opposition. Our starting point was, together with a already existing discussion by L. Colletti of the contrast between real opposition and contradiction, the reminiscence of the marxian 1843 manuscript of Kreuznach, namely the Kritik des hegelschen Staatsrecht. There indeed can be found the famous paradoxical expresssion of ‘really opposed extremities’, which do not appeal to each other, nor do they attract or repel each other, because their essences are opposed – entgegengesezt: State versus civil society. Even if the mentioned text remained unpublished during the author's life, it seemed to us that this paradox was worth being retrieved, for it expresses the break of the State-society dialectics. Although this break never was theorized as such by Marx, it means to us the end of a certain recapitulative ratio oriented toward domination, and the renewed passage to a spinozian culture of oblivion as a method of social transformation

La notion de cause est l’alpha et l’oméga de l’Éthique. Mais elle apparaît principalement de manière oblique : à travers « l’idée d’une cause extérieure » qui accompagne les passions dérivées. La cause, imaginée de façon assignable, n’est en fait plus assignable. L’individu étant complexe, il est difficile de démêler ce qui lui arrive de l’extérieur, de ce qui est produit par l’intérieur. Dans la passion, on se modifie à son insu pour devenir un sujet de ce qui lui arrive, et comprend la cause de ce changement sous la forme d’un récit. Cette dynamique imaginaire, nous l’appelons « causalité imaginaire » et nous l’expliquons en termes mécaniques. Nous dégageons d’abord l’essentiel de la mécanique spinoziste : la positivité ontologique de chaque idée (nature agissante) ; la multiplicité des référentiels qui se croisent en une seule et même nature (enveloppement) ; et le concept d’individu originairement composé (emboîtement des individus). La coexistence de ces référentiels autour d’un seul, voilà ce qui constitue la structure de la causalité imaginaire, et la variation de leur proportion, son contenu effectif. Conformément à cette structure, nous appliquons le « conatus », principe d’autoconservation, en premier aux idées ou affects, pour montrer que le désir, essence actuelle de l’homme, est un complexe d’affects qui, individus eux-mêmes, médiatisent l’influence des autres. Il en résulte que la causalité imaginaire est la causalité mécanique elle-même, relative aux individus complexes. Enfin, tout en nous référant à la causalité psychique freudienne, nous tentons d’esquisser un nouveau concept d’Inconscient, comme rapport sans sujet ou structure sans centre
The notion of cause is the alpha and omega of Ethics. But it appears mostly in an oblique way: through "the idea of ​​an external cause" that accompanies the derived passions. The cause, imagined assignable, is actually no more assignable. As the individual is complex, it is difficult to disentangle what is happening in it from the exterior, from what is produced by the interior. In passion, one is modified unwittingly to become a subject of what happens to him, and understand the cause of this change under the form of a story. This imaginary dynamics, I call it "imaginary causality" and explain it in mechanical terms. I establish first the key features of Spinoza’s mechanics: the ontological positivity of each idea (acting nature); the multiplicity of referential frames that intersect at a single nature (envelopment); and the concept of the individual as originally composed (nesting individuals). The coexistence of these referential frames around only one of them, this is precisely what constitutes the structure of imaginary causality, and the variation of their proportion, its actual content. In accordance with this structure, I apply "conatus", self-preservation principle, to ideas or affects at first, to show that desire, actual essence of a man, is a complex of affects which, as individuals themselves, mediate the influence of others. It turns out that imaginary causality is the very mechanical causality, concerning the complex individuals. Finally, while I refer to Freudian psychic causality, I attempt to outline a new concept of the unconscious: as relation without a subject or structure without a center

This thesis seeks to explicate, and develop an appropriate method for the elucidation of, the antecedents to the theology of William Blake in the writings of the seventeenth-century divine, Peter Sterry (1613-1672). While the radical religious scene of the English Revolution has long been recognised as offering important antecedents to Blake's thought, Sterry is a figure who has largely been overlooked. The exception to this is an essay, published in 1929, in which Vivian de Sola Pinto asserted the existence of 'startling affinities' between their ideas. Pinto's study was, however, limited by its failure to consider, firstly, the implications of its findings for our general understanding of the antecedents to Blake's thought in the seventeenth century and, secondly, the insight Sterry's writings may be able to offer into Blake's theological vision. These are the very questions at the heart of this dissertation. By addressing them, it seeks to shed new light on the nature of Blake's theology and its anticipations in earlier English thought. Given the lack of evidence that Blake read Sterry, and the limited effectiveness of the 'genealogical' method when it comes to Blake, it pioneers a bespoke 'analogical' method for the exploration of these issues. It proposes that Sterry is actually closer to the intellectual milieu of Commonwealth radicalism than one might expect and that his writings function effectively as a lens through which it is possible to discern how Blake consistently uses 'dualistic' language and imagery in an ethical and epistemological sense. The first finding suggests that the established view of the radical religious environment in Blake studies needs to be extended; the second challenges the widespread perception that Blake's thought is ultimately dualistic in an ontological sense, thus contributing to the elucidation of a perennial problem for Blake scholarship. Together, they underline Sterry's importance as a neglected theological precursor to the thought of William Blake.

ALes instances civile et pénale parallèles suscitent des risques de contrariétés que le droit positif prévient traditionnellement par l'utilisation de la règle de l'autorité du pénal sur le civil et du sursis à statuer de l'article 4 du Code de procédure pénale. Or ce double mécanisme de la primauté du pénal sur le civil est tout à fait singulier. Il assure en effet une cohérence entre les motifs des décisions concernées, dont le droit positif ne se soucie guère au sein des autres contentieux. Il est de plus unilatéral, puisqu'il ne joue qu'au bénéfice des décisions pénales. Justifié initialement par l'importance et les garanties de vérité des décisions pénales, il s'avère cependant, à l'analyse, largement discutable. Quant à ses fondements d'abord, ce mécanisme assure certes une certaine cohérence des choses jugées, mais maintient une apparence de vérité plus qu'il ne la garantit. Or précisément, la cohérence entre motifs de jugements distincts n'est légitime qu'autant qu'elle sert l'objectif de vérité. Quant à son régime, ensuite, l'autorité du pénal sur le civil entrave la liberté du juge civil et viole, par son caractère absolu, le principe du contradictoire, tandis qu'une application systématique du sursis à statuer est source de lenteur des procédures et contrevient à l'objectif de célérité. Afin de pallier ces inconvénients, le législateur et la jurisprudence se sont d'abord efforcés de restreindre les effets les plus néfastes de ce principe, en dissociant les concepts civils et répressifs, puis en le cantonnant étroitement. Néanmoins, l'objectif de célérité l'a finalement emporté, et le législateur, par la loi du 5 mars 2007, n'a maintenu le caractère obligatoire du sursis à statuer de l'article 4 qu'à l'égard de l'action civile en réparation du dommage né de l'infraction. Le nouveau dispositif consacre désormais le principe d'une indépendance des procédures parallèles, au risque de l'incohérence, même si pour l'heure les juridictions du fond tiennent compte du risque de contrariété et maintiennent la règle de l'autorité du pénal sur le civil. Il conviendrait néanmoins de revenir sur cette dernière règle, et d'attribuer aux énonciations qui constituent le soutien nécessaire de la décision pénale, la valeur d'une présomption réfragable de vérité. Il serait ainsi tenu compte des spécificités des décisions pénales, de même que seraient préservées les exigences, parfois antagonistes, d'autonomie des juridictions, de cohérence des choses jugées, et de recherche de vérité
AWhen civil and penal proceedings occur in parallel, there is a risk of conflicting judgments, which positive law traditionally precludes by making penal proceedings paramount and by deferring adjudication on article 4 of the Criminal Code. This double mechanism, which ensures supremacy of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings, is quite singular. Indeed, it guarantees that the justifications for the decisions made are coherent. In other contentious matters, positive law pays little attention to such concerns. Moreover, it is unilateral, since it exclusively favours criminal law decisions. Though this supremacy was initially justified by the notion that criminal law decisions guaranteed truth, analysis has shown that this is largely debatable. First of all, with regard to the foundations themselves, this mechanism of course ensures a certain coherence of the matters judged, but maintains an appearance of truth rather than a guarantee of truth. Yet, precisely, the coherence of the justifications for distinct judgments is only legitimate insofar as it seeks to determine the truth. Then with regard to the system itself, the supremacy of criminal over civil proceedings interferes with the freedom of the civil judge, and violates by its absolute nature, the adversarial principle, while the systematic deferral of adjudication slows down procedures and undermines the objective of celerity. In order to remedy these drawbacks, legislators and jurisprudence have made an effort to limit the most damaging effects of this principle, by dissociating civil from repressive concepts, then by compartmentalising each within strict limits. Nevertheless, the objective of celerity finally won the day and legislators, through the law of 5th March 2007, retained the compulsory nature of the deferral of adjudication of article 4, but only with regard to civil action for damages resulting from the offence. The new law now establishes the principle of independence of parallel proceedings, even though it carries a risk of conflicting results. For the time being, however, the jurisdictions take into account the risk of conflicting results and have maintained the supremacy of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings. It is nonetheless desirable to revise the recent law, and to incorporate in the reasons which are necessary support for the criminal decision, the value of a refragable presumption of truth. The specific nature of decisions in criminal proceedings would thus be taken into account, and the sometimes antagonistic requirement of autonomy of the different jurisdictions, the coherence of the matters being judged, and the search for truth would thus be preserved

Il presente studio affronta gli argomenti della concorrenza e delle invenzioni nel rapporto di lavoro subordinato statunitense. L’attività di ricerca è stata svolta in parte presso la School of Law della Boston University, USA, sotto la supervisione di Micheal C. Harper, professore di diritto del lavoro. L’argomento presenta una crescente rilevanza, considerato che nella nuova organizzazione produttiva, fondata in gran parte sulla conoscenza globalizzata, al lavoro dipendente si chiede ormai sempre maggiore professionalità, innovazione e creatività. La scelta di esaminare questa tematica dalla prospettiva del “laboratorio USA”, è dovuta al primato di cui tale nazione gode a livello internazionale sul piano economico, scientifico e dell’innovazione dei processi lavorativi, che fanno emergere criticità in altri Paesi probabilmente ancora non avvertite. Al fine di inquadrare gli istituti giudici menzionati nel modello statunitense, si è reso opportuno dare conto del sistema delle fonti normative negli USA, con particolare focus sul Restatement of Employment Law, cioè la raccolta di principi fondamentali elaborati negli anni dal common law in materia di rapporto di lavoro. All'esame delle fonti segue la definizione del concetto di lavoratore subordinato (employee) e lavoratore autonomo (independent contractor), necessario per l’inquadramento del campo di applicazione degli obblighi scaturenti dal rapporto di lavoro subordinato, tra cui il duty of loyalty, implicato nel rapporto fiduciario. In tale ambito, si è osservata l’evoluzione giurisprudenziale che ha condotto all'adozione dei criteri relativi alla distinzione in esame, prevalentemente concernenti il giudizio sulla rilevanza degli elementi fattuali determinanti per l’accertamento della subordinazione. Delineati i contorni della fattispecie di lavoro subordinato, il presente studio affronta la tematica della tipica forma del contratto di lavoro statunitense, il c.d. employment-at-will, cioè il rapporto a libera recedibilità. Tale peculiarità scaturisce dal principio fondamentale per cui le parti non sono vincolate ad alcun obbligo di fornire la motivazione per il licenziamento. La terza parte del lavoro ha ad oggetto la disciplina della concorrenza del lavoratore effettuata sulla base delle conoscenze acquisite, legalmente o illegalmente, durante il rapporto e le relative tecniche di tutela del datore di lavoro, a fronte della violazione del duty of loyalty, quale obbligo del lavoratore subordinato di esecuzione della prestazione lavorativa nell'interesse esclusivo dell’imprenditore e, conseguentemente, di astensione dal porre in essere condotte pregiudizievoli nei confronti di quest’ultimo. Quanto alle tecniche di tutela esperibili in caso di violazione degli obblighi esaminati, vengono illustrati i rimedi legali e equitativi che il diritto statunitense offre al datore di lavoro. La parte finale del presente studio si occupa della disciplina relativa alla titolarità dei diritti scaturenti dalle invenzioni sviluppate dai dipendenti nel corso del rapporto di lavoro. In questo senso si sono esaminate le definizioni di “invenzione” e “brevetto” ed il loro rapporto nel contesto della regolamentazione giuslavoristica; si è posta in rilievo la differenza tra invenzione come opera di ingegno e proprietà intellettuale tutelata dal diritto d’autore. Inoltre, si sono osservati i meccanismi sottesi alle norme fondamentali che regolano la materia e la loro convivenza con la libertà contrattuale delle parti e il loro potere di disporre dei suddetti diritti.
This work addresses the issues of competition and inventions in the U.S. employment relationships. The research was carried out in part at the Boston University School of Law of, under the supervision of Micheal C. Harper, professor of Labour Law. The selection of the topic is justified in the light of its importance, given that in the new production organization, based largely on globalized knowledge, employees are now increasingly being asked for professionalism, innovation and creativity. The decision to examine this issue from the perspective of the "U.S. laboratory" is due to the primacy that this nation holds at international level on the economic, scientific and innovation of work processes, which bring out critical issues that in other Countries probably have not yet been raised. In order to frame the above-mentioned topics, it has become appropriate to give an account of the system of regulatory sources in the USA, with particular focus on the Restatement of Employment Law, i.e. the collection of fundamental principles developed over the years by common law in the field of employment relationships. The examination of the sources is followed by the definition of the concept of employee and self-employed worker (independent contractor), necessary for the assessment of the application of the obligations arising from the employment relationships, including the duty of loyalty, involved in the fiduciary law. In this context, the evolution of the case law has been observed, as well as the examination of the criteria relating to the distinction between employees and independent contractors, mainly concerning the judgement on the relevance of the factual elements determining the assessment of the existence of an employment relationship. Subsequently, this study addresses the issue of the typical form of the U.S. employment contract, the so-called employment-at-will. This peculiarity is originated from the principle that the parties are not bound by any obligation to provide reasons for termination. The third part of the work has as its object the discipline of competition of the worker carried out on the basis of the knowledge acquired, legally or illegally, during the relationship and the relative legal remedies for the employer, against the violation of the duty of loyalty, intended as an obligation of the employee to perform the work in the exclusive interest of the entrepreneur and, consequently, to refrain from engaging in prejudicial conduct against the company. About the remedies available in the event of breach of the obligations examined, the legal and equitable remedies that U.S. law offers the employer have been explained. The final part of this study deals with the rules governing the ownership of rights arising from inventions developed by employees in the course of their employment. The definitions of "invention" and "patent" and their relationship in the context of employment law has been examined and the difference between invention as a work of genius and intellectual property protected by copyright has been highlighted. In addition, the mechanisms underlying the basic rules governing the subject matter and their coexistence with the contractual freedom of the parties and their power to dispose of these rights have been observed.

This thesis explores the eighteenth-century aesthetic of the sublime in application to Mozart’s Symphony No. 41 Jupiter, K. 551. Using Immanuel Kant’s definition of the mathematical sublime and Johan Georg Sulzer’s idea of the sublime, I argue that Mozart achieves this aesthetic through the synthesis of stylistic opposites: the learned and the galant. The culmination of such is best articulated in the fugue found in the Coda of the fourth movement. In this segment, Mozart combines five galant motives into a learned fugue; this intricate combination of stylistic opposites creates an elevated effect, one in keeping with eighteenth-century philosophies of the sublime. Drawing from my own experiences, I further argue for the subjectivity of the sublime and discuss its occurrence both in composition and as emotion.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Toronto, 1991.
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Due to their inclusion of characters or objects that are the result of scientific investigation or subject to scientific scrutiny, Frankenstein, Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, and “The Colour Out of Space” are works that may be classified as science fiction. However, despite these narratives’ engagement with scientific practice, at crucial moments when scientific description would be expected, it is prominently absent. This report investigates the effects of these absences within the narratives and suggests that such absences do not appear due to the author’s unfamiliarity with the science of her or his era, but rather serve the positive purpose of creating the effect of the sublime through horror, which is most effective when the reader is forced to confront the unknown or unreadable. To corroborate this hypothesis, this report also examines the treatment of certain hybrids within the three stories and the way that the terror they inspire seems to rely on the ways in which they mingle the known with the unknown and resist coherent description. Overall, this report seeks to illuminate the complex interaction of the known and the not yet known that has enabled a fruitful interaction between science fiction and horror as genres since the inception of science fiction as a definable genre.
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Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.