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Mustakallio, Mikko, Erkko Autio y Shaker A. Zahra. "Relational and Contractual Governance in Family Firms: Effects on Strategic Decision Making". Family Business Review 15, n.º 3 (septiembre de 2002): 205–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.2002.00205.x.
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Governance of family firms differs from mainstream corporate governance in an important respect: Important owners, i.e., family members, may have multiple roles in the business. In this paper, we develop and test a model of family firm governance that incorporates both formal control and social control aspects of governance. Governance based on the formal control draws on agency theory, whereas the social control aspects draw on social theories of governance, addressing social capital embedded in relationships. Drawing on these theories, we examine the influence of different governance mechanisms on the quality of strategic decision making. The Family Business Governance Model is tested using survey data from 192 family firms in Finland. We use structural equation modeling in testing the empirical validity of the model. The empirical analysis largely supports our hypotheses on formal control and social control as well as their influences on the decision-making quality.
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NAJEH, WASSIM ABDESSALAM y HOUDA BENARBI. "Towards new perspectives in corporate governance : A literature review". International Journal of Performance and Organizations 2, n.º 2 (31 de diciembre de 2023): 146–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.55897/ijpo.2023.02.17.
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Corporate governance is a multidisciplinary concept that concerns the first place the relationship between the shareholders and the manager (separation of ownership and control) in a contractual approach of the agency theory concerns the second place other stakeholders known by the Stakeholders model. In the recent past, this concept has evolved to include other dimensions (cognitive and behavioral) to remedy the inefficiencies of the shareholder approach. This article is a documentary research that explores a range of theories related to a new non-contractual approach to the firm: the behavioral approach to corporate governance. The results show that, like agency costs, there are behavioral costs (internal and external) that are costs associated with behavioral errors due to cognitive or emotional imperfections.
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Mansouri, Ali, Mouaad Chafai y Nada Moufdi. "Family business governance: An integrated approach using agency, stewardship, and social capital theories". Corporate and Business Strategy Review 5, n.º 1 (2024): 108–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbsrv5i1art11.
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The governance of family businesses has been a subject of great interest and research in recent years. As these enterprises contribute significantly to global economies, understanding their governance becomes crucial. Indeed, managing the governance of these organizations presents a unique challenge due to a variety of factors. One prominent aspect is their intricate and enduring stakeholder framework, which encompasses family members, senior executives, and controlling boards (Moufdi & Manosuri, 2021). This contribution, which is theoretical in scope, aims to open a debate on the theoretical approaches of corporate governance that researchers must mobilize while highlighting their main strengths and limitations when it comes to understanding the “family business” phenomenon. The results obtained show that the analysis of their governance requires a combination of the contractual view (agency theory being the dominant theory of this current) and the relational view (encompassing stewardship theory and social capital theory) of corporate governance. We believe that the theoretical framework thus adopted provides a multidimensional understanding of family business governance and provides comprehensive insight and significant relevance in understanding the intricacies of this organization’s governance, offering valuable perspectives for researchers interested in this field of investigation.
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Czyżewski, Bazyli, Agnieszka Sapa y Piotr Kułyk. "Human Capital and Eco-Contractual Governance in Small Farms in Poland: Simultaneous Confirmatory Factor Analysis with Ordinal Variables". Agriculture 11, n.º 1 (9 de enero de 2021): 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/agriculture11010046.
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Human capital (HC) plays an important role in modern agriculture. The difference in efficiency of assets explains only about a half of the economic performance of agricultural farms, while the other half relies on HC. Although education and training are the main components of HC, it may also be viewed from the perspective of behavioral theories that were taken under consideration in this study. The role of HC in sustainable farming has not been sufficiently explained when it comes to contractual governance (CG). In this study, the meaning of contractual governance was extended and the eco-contractual governance (ECG) concept was proposed, which stands for CG induced by agri-environmental contracts. The main objective of the article is to confirm the latent concepts of HC and ECG and to verify their correlation in view of the standards imposed by the agricultural policy. To achieve this goal, a structural equation model was developed and simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis with ordinal variables was carried out based on the sample of 674 small farms in Poland. The analysis has confirmed a relatively strong correlation between HC and ECG. It was revealed that training plays a crucial role in this relationship, while economic dependence on agricultural policy weakens the effectiveness of both HC and ECG.
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Czyżewski, Bazyli, Agnieszka Sapa y Piotr Kułyk. "Human Capital and Eco-Contractual Governance in Small Farms in Poland: Simultaneous Confirmatory Factor Analysis with Ordinal Variables". Agriculture 11, n.º 1 (9 de enero de 2021): 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/agriculture11010046.
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Human capital (HC) plays an important role in modern agriculture. The difference in efficiency of assets explains only about a half of the economic performance of agricultural farms, while the other half relies on HC. Although education and training are the main components of HC, it may also be viewed from the perspective of behavioral theories that were taken under consideration in this study. The role of HC in sustainable farming has not been sufficiently explained when it comes to contractual governance (CG). In this study, the meaning of contractual governance was extended and the eco-contractual governance (ECG) concept was proposed, which stands for CG induced by agri-environmental contracts. The main objective of the article is to confirm the latent concepts of HC and ECG and to verify their correlation in view of the standards imposed by the agricultural policy. To achieve this goal, a structural equation model was developed and simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis with ordinal variables was carried out based on the sample of 674 small farms in Poland. The analysis has confirmed a relatively strong correlation between HC and ECG. It was revealed that training plays a crucial role in this relationship, while economic dependence on agricultural policy weakens the effectiveness of both HC and ECG.
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Estevan de Quesada, Carmen y Moritz Renner. "Contractual Business Networks: The Case of Syndicated Loans". European Review of Contract Law 13, n.º 2 (11 de julio de 2017): 164–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2017-0007.
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AbstractThere is a growing debate in law, economics and sociology about contractual business networks as a hybrid form of cooperation that combines governance elements from market and firm. Most treatments of the subject focus on the structures of supply and distribution networks and their consequences on liability and contractual interpretation. This article confronts network theory with the case of cross-border syndicated loans. Syndicated loans are a highly important instrument of corporate finance, and they merge contractual and corporate cooperation in a particularly sophisticated manner. Theories of network contracts can thus be helpful to address the legal issues of syndicated loans in different fields of law, ranging from conflict of laws to antitrust law. In turn, the analysis of syndicated loans as an example of horizontal business networks can help generate insights for the general discussion of networks in private law.
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Dhaouadi, Karima. "Corporate Board and Upper Echelons: The Case of the American Most Admired Firms". International Journal of Business and Management 13, n.º 4 (19 de marzo de 2018): 245. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v13n4p245.
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The purpose of the paper is to study the effect of board effectiveness on the Top Management Team demographic characteristics of 274 American firms. The research mobilizes theoretically the upper echelons, the agency and the cognitive theories and empirically the clustering and the discriminating analysis. The results indicate that the TMT demographic attributes are not tied systematically to the board efficiency according to contractual approach of corporate governance. The relationship between the board characteristics and the TMT traits is not linear. The study contributes to corporate governance knowledge by highlighting the strategic role of the boards dealing with the TMT choice.
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Prakash, Chandra, Vivek Roy y Parikshit Charan. "Mitigating interorganizational conflicts in humanitarian logistics collaboration: the roles of contractual agreements, trust and post-disaster environmental uncertainty phases". International Journal of Logistics Management 33, n.º 1 (10 de diciembre de 2021): 28–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlm-06-2021-0318.
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PurposeGovernance is the key to establishing effective collaboration among humanitarian logistics partners addressing an ongoing relief work. With a focus on humanitarian interorganizational collaboration, this research draws on governance theories to investigate how conflicts can be mitigated in this challenging setting.Design/methodology/approachThe focus on governance extends attention to the frontiers of contractual agreement, trust and environmental uncertainty to be applied in the humanitarian setting. To develop perspectives, an online survey of 289 field executives working in humanitarian organizations across the globe is conducted. The findings are based on hierarchical regressions.FindingsEnvironmental uncertainty, in humanitarian logistics, is not straightforward, but wields distinctive challenges in the response phase (immediate to the disaster) as well as the recovery phase (beginning of build back) – to loom prospects of conflict between partners. Findings outline that contractual agreement can increase conflict during the response phase (high environmental uncertainty), but mitigate it during the recovery phase (low environmental uncertainty). Furthermore, contractual agreement interactively strengthens the ability of trust to reduce conflict. Yet, trust acting alone shows best outcome to mitigate conflict.Research limitations/implicationsContrary to the established understanding in traditional logistics suggesting the vitality of contracts to easily mitigate challenges posed by environmental uncertainty, the humanitarian setting extends a unique outset for interorganizational governance based on the temporality of response and recovery phases.Originality/valueThis research pioneers to quantitatively examine the setting of humanitarian logistics based on survey. Given the difficulty of data acquisition, the extant research has largely relied on qualitative investigations when considering the agenda of governance.
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Commine, Quentin. "Understanding Theoretical Aspects of Outsourcing: Common Features and Discrepancies Between Transaction Costs Economics and Contractual Incompleteness". Contemporary Applied Business Research in Light of Standard Academic Literature 3, n.º 1 (1 de febrero de 2022): 2–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.51137/ijarbm.2022.3.1.1.
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Outsourcing is a phenomenon regularly explored through two theories: transaction cost economics and incomplete contract theory. The second approach is frequently seen as an extension of the first but is it right to do so? Could the theory of incomplete contracts be regarded as a "2.0" transaction cost economics? This article addresses this question through the main theoretical axes of renowned researchers, notably by being awarded a Nobel Prize. While transaction costs, particularly theorized by Coase and Williamson, focus on an organizational perspective centered on governance, contractual incompleteness focuses on non-human assets and the mechanical aspects of contracts. We confront these two theories to show the points and counterpoints that can be overlapping but also deeply diverging. This article therefore provides a succinct point of view that allows the reader to quickly gain a perspective on the study of two theories at the foundation of the study of an ancient and pervasive phenomenon.
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Sarhan, Saad, Christine Pasquire, Emmanuel Manu y Andrew King. "Contractual governance as a source of institutionalised waste in construction". International Journal of Managing Projects in Business 10, n.º 3 (6 de junio de 2017): 550–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmpb-07-2016-0058.
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Purpose The construction industry has been subject to substantial criticism for its short-term “hit-and-run” relationships which are focussed on win-lose situations. Despite the wide recognition of these problems the industry persistently resists the radical demanded of it. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to investigate why this might be the case by reviewing the governance problem confronting clients and decision makers in construction procurement, as conceptualised in transaction cost economics (TCE). Second, to critically analyse and question the efficiency and effectiveness of various safeguarding approaches, which are taken for granted and commonly practiced in construction, from a lean perspective. Design/methodology/approach The analysis of this paper is based on an in-depth critical review of 76 construction procurement and contractual-related articles, ranging from 1994 to 2016, using theories of Lean construction and TCE as an analytical lens. Findings Findings reveal that clients and decision makers often tend to safeguard their project-specific assets, against opportunism and exploitation, through the deployment of formal contractual arrangements and governance structures. These arrangements and structures typically dominate the management of the project delivery often to the detriment of the project itself; but because there is a belief that interests are safeguarded, clients and decision makers feel they have taken the best course of action. This goes a long way to explaining the coherence of the current construction model. Research limitations/implications To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to demonstrate the usefulness of using principles of Lean construction in association with TCE when analysing construction-procurement-related issues. In particular, the use of a “lean” lens helps to expose the impact of procurement governance arrangements on process flow. The study also provides a potential research agenda that can lead to the development of prescriptive conceptual frameworks for causal analysis of institutionalised waste in construction. Practical implications The paper attempts to expose to clients and decision makers the amount of waste (and unnecessary cost) they embed by adhering to prevailing unfit-for-purpose contractual governance approaches. It also helps decision makers to consider alternative procurement arrangements and organisational techniques that could be of value and support collaborative ways of working. Originality/value The study contributes to the overall understanding of waste in construction by providing insight into various imperfect procurement and contractual arrangements, which are taken for granted and impede efficiency and improvement efforts in construction. The findings presented provide a theoretical anchor and rationale for developing alternative approaches to the design and delivery of capital projects.
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Parvinen, Petri y Essi Pöyry. "Towards a governance approach to determinants of reseller management success". Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 33, n.º 2 (5 de marzo de 2018): 153–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jbim-04-2016-0074.
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Purpose In mature global business-to-business (B2B) product markets, management of external sales channels, governed by contractual relationships, is a key determinant of business performance. However, existing sales channel management literature lacks focus on contractual governance and reseller management success. The purpose of the study is to systematically review different governance theories in relation to sales channel management and to show which factors are the most influential in making or keeping external sales channels effective. Design/methodology/approach A case study on a large B2B information and communication technology (ICT) company is used to reflect on the way the different theoretical governance perspectives explain sales channel management success. Interviews and mini-questionnaires were used to collect data. Findings Expressions of interdependence and equality alongside persevered personal relationships are important in managing daily business activities and in avoiding bad will at the reseller’s grass-root level. Future-oriented planning, long-term-oriented support and jointly set incentive systems are important for reseller management. Degree of professional management sets resellers apart through shifts in power balance. Research limitations/implications A multi-theory governance perspective offers a holistic view over reseller management and provides a comprehensive view over different sales channel management issues and their relative importance. Practical implications The findings highlight the importance of long-term orientation and cooperation in setting up a reseller management system to gain and nurture distributors’ trust and commitment towards the manufacturer. Originality/value The study is the first to comprehensively use governance perspective in studying reseller management.
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Fort, Timothy L. y James J. Noone. "Banded Contracts, Mediating Institutions, and Corporate Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of the Firm". Law and Contemporary Problems 62, n.º 3 (1999): 163. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1192231.
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Zhang, Lihan, Peter Fenn y Yongcheng Fu. "To insist or to concede? Contractors’ behavioural strategies when handling disputed claims". Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 26, n.º 3 (15 de abril de 2019): 424–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ecam-05-2018-0219.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyse factors that affect contractors’ behavioural strategies in resolving disputed claims. Design/methodology/approach Factors were explored by a literature review and an open-ended questionnaire survey. In total, 9 hypotheses involving 12 factors were developed accordingly. Then a structured questionnaire survey was conducted, and 248 valid questionnaires were received from Chinese contractors. Partial least squares structural equation modelling was employed to test the hypotheses. Findings Factors that have the largest impacts on the contractual approach and the relational approach regarding obliging and compromising are favourability of evidence, time pressure and reputation, respectively. Unexpected results show that obliging behaviours are negatively correlated with procedural fairness but positively correlated with occurrence time of the dispute. Research limitations/implications The results are based on correlation, although the research design improves the internal validity. Furthermore, this study belongs to single-level research. In the future, researchers can conduct multilevel research to enrich theories. Practical implications The findings not only enhance practitioners’ understanding of the factors influencing contractors’ behavioural strategies when dealing with disputed claims, but also offer insights into both parties’ ex ante focus of attention on specific factors to facilitate the subsequent dispute resolution. Originality/value This study furnishes a nuanced picture of multiple factors’ impacts on contractors’ behavioural strategies of claim-related dispute resolution, and thus supplements the relevant construction dispute management literature. From the perspective of contractual governance, it is one of those exploring drivers of contract application in problem situations. It extends the body of knowledge on this topic and hopefully will encourage more research on contractual governance from the reactive perspective.
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Ireland, Paddy. "Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory". Legal Studies 23, n.º 3 (septiembre de 2003): 453–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2003.tb00223.x.
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This paper critically evaluates the contractual theories of companies and company law which have risen to prominence in recent years. It argues that history reveals as misguided the attempt to depict public companies as essentially contractual in nature, one of the most striking features of the development in nineteenth century Britain of the first body of (joint stock) company law having been its gradual move away from the principles of agency and contract underlying the law of partnership from which it emerged. Against this backdrop, the paper moves on to explore the ways in which theorists have tried, against the odds, to characterise public Companies as contractual and the reasons for their attempting to do so. While it might be apposite to view many private or closely held companies through the prism of contract, the paper argues, public companies and much of company law itself can only properly be understood when viewed through the prism of financial property. Indeed, it suggests, this is implicitly confirmed by the Company Law Review and (paradoxically) by the recent work of corporate governance specialists and financial economists in the US, with its focus on investor protection and the preservation of financial property's integrity, and its emphasis on the crucial role of (public) regulation in these processes. The paper concludes that these property forms are not merely the objects, but the products of regulation and that this has important implications for our understanding of both company law and corporate governance. In making these arguments, it seeks to cast some light on the nature of intangible property, on the differences between contract-based and property-based rights, on the neo-liberal idea of ‘deregulation’, and on the unity and scope of company law as a legal category.
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Abbott, Kenneth W., Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal y Bernhard Zangl. "Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration". British Journal of Political Science 46, n.º 4 (21 de julio de 2015): 719–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123414000593.
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This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegation is premised on hard ‘contractual’ control over the agent, however, orchestration relies on the soft control of like-minded intermediaries through material and ideational support. The two models overlap, and governors mix them in practice, but distinguishing between them analytically can broaden and deepen analysis of indirect forms of governance. This article discusses the circumstances under which each model provides a better fit for real-world problems, as well as the key limitations of each model. Among other things, orchestration is relatively more likely in democratic than authoritarian systems, when governors have limited direct capacities of their own and when veto players are more numerous. Orchestration is not always more desirable than delegation, but it provides an important alternative in some circumstances. Multiple examples from both domestic and international settings are used to illustrate this claim. The article closes with key considerations regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of orchestration.
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Viljanen, Mika. "Actor-Network Theory Contract Theory". European Review of Contract Law 16, n.º 1 (7 de abril de 2020): 74–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2020-0005.
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AbstractFirms increasingly use complex hybrid governance structures to manage value generation networks. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the structures contain soft, “enforcement-challenged” contractual devices. Existing contract theories, however, fail to recognize and explain how these soft contract devices work as legal devices. The article seeks to address this failure.The article uses a conceptual innovation by Schepker et al to construct an actor-network theory (ANT) inspired contract theory. Schepker et al argued that contracts are best understood as often concurrently serving safeguarding, coordination, and adaptation goals. The article argues that combined with ANT the functional contracting frame allows us to recognize that contracts work and gain efficacy in multiple ways. To understand how the soft, “enforcement-challenged” contract devices work, the article traces the efficacy mechanisms the devices perform and enact.The tracings lead the article to propose an ANT contract theory that builds on three intertwined ideas: 1) contract devices have no core efficacy networks but multiple parallel efficacies, 2) contracts should be understood as bricolage collages of small-scale contractual point intervention devices that each deploy and rely on their own efficacy mechanisms and patterns, and 3) the force of contract resides in the socio-material assemblages contracts are capable of creating and sustaining.
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Boddewyn, Jean J. "The provisioning of collective goods by MNEs in emerging markets". PSU Research Review 1, n.º 1 (13 de abril de 2017): 4–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/prr-12-2016-0023.
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Purpose This paper aims to determine the essential “collective goods” which a foreign multinational enterprise (MNE) must have before production can start in a remote area of an emerging economy, and to consider the alternative governance modes available to procure or create these goods. Design/methodology/approach This purpose is examined conceptually and theoretically. First, the concept of “collective goods” is presented, followed by a consideration of the traditional “buy, ally or make” contractual approaches available to obtain goods and services. These approaches are repositioned in the context of an “emerging economy” so that alternative “ordering systems” as well as “non-contractual” means of obtaining things have to be considered in the context of internalization and reciprocity theories. Findings It is difficult to obtain collective goods in remote areas of emerging economies where private ordering prevails and even succeeds but at high transaction costs and with substantial government intervention. However, the use of non-contractual modes of exchange such as reciprocity is available to facilitate exchanges between market MNEs and nonmarket state offices and civil-society associations such as non-governmental organizations with which collaboration is necessary but which cannot be acquired or controlled by MNEs. However, market firms can use philanthropy and lobbying to obtain the help of these nonmarket actors who know how to operate under private and state-ordering systems. Research limitations/implications Theoretical implications: Internalization theory explains why MNEs are able to obtain collective goods by providing them “in-house”, while reciprocity theory exemplifies how non-contractual modes of exchange can substitute for the traditional but contractual “buy, ally and/or make”. Practical implications Managerial implications: In terms of the organizational structure of the subsidiary of an MNE operating in an emerging economy, it appears that the line functions of procurement, engineering and production may rely more on contractual exchanges with foreign suppliers, while the staff functions of public affairs, government relations and human resources may be more adept at using reciprocal exchange with local suppliers. Originality/value The provisioning of the collective goods when a firm builds its facilities in a remote and underdeveloped part of an emerging economy has hardly received any research attention nor have the non-contractual ways – such as reciprocity – available in the context of private ordering to obtain these goods.
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Pankowska, Malgorzata. "Information Technology Outsourcing Chain: Literature Review and Implications for Development of Distributed Coordination". Sustainability 11, n.º 5 (9 de marzo de 2019): 1460. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11051460.
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The paper aims to analyse how the management science literature explains sustainable coordination and management of Information Technology (IT) outsourcing chains. The IT outsourcing theories,—that is, transaction cost theory, theory of agency, resource based view, activity based theory, contractual theory, partnership and alliance theory and stakeholder theory—are applied as a background to the analysis. A systematic literature review reveals that IT outsourcing is developed in collaborative networks and chains. There are some mechanisms identified in the literature for outsourcing chains’ management, interchain sustainability, coordination and interchain activities’ cohesion. The complexity of outsourcing relationships presented among outsourcers and outsourcees stimulate looking for new business models. Furthermore, outsourcing chains research would benefit from considering strategy-based theoretical discussions, relationship modelling and project management. The literature survey aims to present outsourcing chains in different aspects, that is, dynamics and agility, communication in chains, compensation and compliance, contracting, stakeholders, decision making models, governance problems, integration, performance measurement, project management and strategy development. This paper intends to emphasize that interchain coordination can be improved by enterprise architecture modelling as well as by the application of blockchain economy.
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Hu, Qinfang, S. Fiona Chan, Guangling Zhang y Zhilin Yang. "The joint-liability mechanism: controlling opportunism through peer monitoring among Chinese supplier groups". Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 31, n.º 5 (6 de junio de 2016): 640–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jbim-01-2015-0012.
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Purpose Grounded in agency and clan theories, this study aims to examine how, when and why joint liability works as a control mechanism to reduce opportunism among tea supplier groups in China. Design/methodology/approach Survey data from 82 supplier groups (three respondents per group) were collected. Findings Joint liability is related positively to peer monitoring (as mediator) and negatively to opportunism, whereas the mediated relationship is moderated positively by group leaders’ perceived legitimate authority and negatively by reciprocity and shared norms. Social implications Opportunism is operationalized as the use of illegal pesticides, the violation of manufacturer–supplier contractual agreements and joint liability, as suppliers’ liability of having the whole group’s seasonal production is rejected by the manufacturer if a single act of opportunism is detected in the group. Originality/value Our study demonstrates how and under what conditions the joint-liability mechanism is linked with the reduction of multi-suppliers’ opportunism. We pave the way for future applications of the control mechanism to fields related to inter-organizational governance. Most importantly, we apply Ouchi’s clan theory (1979, 1980) to conceptualize manufacturer–supplier and supplier–supplier relationships in China and provide first-hand evidence to validate its applicability and generalizability to the context. The study also offers insights on network influences in inter-organizational relationships (Gu et al., 2010; Wathne and Heide, 2004) and confirms the important roles of network factors in inter-organizational relationships. In particular, peer monitoring operates as a mediator and normative factors operate as facilitators (moderators) for the joint liability to work as a mechanism to control opportunism in this relationship context.
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Chen, Chenxuan y Abeer Hassan. "Management gender diversity, executives compensation and firm performance". International Journal of Accounting & Information Management 30, n.º 1 (7 de diciembre de 2021): 115–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijaim-05-2021-0109.
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Purpose This paper aims to contribute to the discussion on the executives’ team and firm performance by investigating the relationships between executives’ compensation, management gender diversity and firm financial performance in growth enterprises market (GEM) listed firms in China. Design/methodology/approach Data are collected from 461 companies listed on GEM boards during the period from the year 2016 to 2018. Specifically, executives’ compensation and female executives are set as the independent variables, and the proxy selected of corporate performance is Tobin’s Q ratio. Findings The results show that the correlation between corporate performance and executive cash payment is not significant, while executives’ equity-based compensation shows a significant positive correlation with firm performance. In addition, the participation of female executives is negatively associated with firm performance. Research limitations/implications The results have practical implications for governments, policymakers and regulatory authorities, by indicating the importance of women to corporate success. In particular, the findings of this paper emphasize the specific background of GEM in China and provide empirical support for the value of women’s participation in corporate governance. In addition, the finding on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of GEM listed companies provides guidance for the establishment of a performance compensation system of GEM listed companies in China. Originality/value This paper provides new evidence for the current literature of executive team and corporate performance. This is the first paper to adopt triangulation in theories from different disciplines including optimal contractual approach, managerial power approach as new perspectives of agency theory, upper echelons theory, motivational-hygiene theory and women leadership style theory. The results will contribute to provide guidance for enterprises to formulate an efficient compensation system and build a reasonable senior management team structure.
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Cassely, Ludovic, Sami Ben Larbi, Christophe Revelli y Alain Lacroux. "Corporate social performance (CSP) in time of economic crisis". Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal 12, n.º 5 (28 de junio de 2021): 913–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/sampj-07-2020-0262.
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Purpose This study aims to compare the different effects of the 2008 economic crisis on companies’ corporate social performance (CSP) in coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs). Design/methodology/approach This paper mobilizes a pluralistic theoretical framework that borrows from neo-institutional and corporate governance theories to compare the impacts of the 2008 economic crisis on long-term CSP in an international context. Based on the longitudinal database of Vigeo Eiris (2004–2015), the panel was decomposed between two models of capitalism (LME and CME). For each model, this paper conducted a series of regressions, taking into account the longitudinal nature of the data using estimates based on generalized estimating equations (Liang and Zeger, 1986). Findings The paper shows that the economic crisis prompted companies operating in LMEs and CMEs to reorient their corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in quite different ways during the four-year period that the crisis lasted, as well as the succeeding four-year post-crisis period. While CSR was perceived in LMEs as a threat during the crisis period because of the additional costs it generated, it offered CME companies a way of redefining how they relate to the rest of society, with their goal becoming the creation of greater shared value. Research limitations/implications The results are dependent from the data, and specifically from the Vigeo Eiris database. It would be interesting to extrapol this kind of research with the use of other CSP/environmental, social and governance (ESG) databases as Morgan Stanley Capital International, Sustainalytics or RepRisk, to compare and conclude more globally on tendencies. Another limitation relates to the binary nature of Hall and Soskice’s (2001) typology, with its neo-institutionalist inspiration, that puts Continental European and social-democratic models of capitalism on the same plane. Practical implications This study teaches managers, analysts and policymakers that CSR can be a powerful strategic lever capable of remedying the harmful effects that economic crises have in both LMEs and CMEs, notwithstanding the cultural, socio-economic and political differences between these models of capitalism. Economic and social crises must help companies to rethink and revisit their business models and CSR practices to subsequently implement sustainability strategies more in sync with the values forced upon them by the economic systems to which they belonged but also by all their stakeholders. Social implications From a managerial standpoint, this study allows practitioners to consider CSR as an opportunity to rethink their strategy and business models in a period of crisis, and no more a threat that could reduce the economic performance in increasing the costs, and thus, the cost of financing. Originality/value After reading the literature on the topic, this paper clearly thinks about the high degree of contribution of the paper, as the topic is not so developed and that the study implies several contributions. First, from a theoretical level, the study differs from previous research studies insofar as it compares the impacts of the economic crisis on companies’ CSP in CMEs and LMEs using a theoretical framework that operationalizes both contractual and neo-institutional theories. Second, from a methodological standpoint, the approach using an ESG data provider known worldwide (Vigeo Eiris) has not been down yet. Third, on a managerial level, the present study teaches managers, analysts and policymakers that CSR can be a powerful strategic lever capable of remedying the harmful effects that economic crises have in both LMEs and CMEs, notwithstanding the cultural, socio-economic and political differences between these models of capitalism.
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Goergen, Marc y Luc Renneboog. "Contractual corporate governance". Journal of Corporate Finance 14, n.º 3 (junio de 2008): 166–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.04.003.
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Wang, Longwei, Xiaodong Li y Min Zhang. "Severe or lenient contracting with friends: the shadow of the past on contractual governance". Baltic Journal of Management 14, n.º 3 (1 de julio de 2019): 370–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/bjm-04-2018-0146.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of cooperation history on contractual governance and the moderating effects of dependence asymmetry on those relationships from the perspective of a weaker firm in emergent economies. Drawing from resource dependence theory and contingency theory, this paper develops a conceptual model to investigate the impact of cooperation history on contractual governance. Design/methodology/approach The authors use data from 188 buyer–supplier relationships in China Findings The authors find that cooperation history is positively associated with contractual governance when dependence asymmetry is high but negatively associated with contractual governance when dependence asymmetry is low. Furthermore, the negative moderating effect of dependence asymmetry on the relationship between cooperation history and contractual complexity is stronger than the relationship between cooperation history and contract enforcement. Originality/value This study contributes to a better understanding of how cooperation history affects contractual governance with respect to the various levels of dependence on partners by incorporating a contingency view. This study also advances the literature on interfirm governance by distinguishing contractual governance into contractual complexity and contract enforcement.
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Liu, Hua y Shaobo Wei. "Leveraging interorganizational governance for bridging responses to supply chain disruptions: a polynomial regression analysis". International Journal of Operations & Production Management 41, n.º 8 (29 de junio de 2021): 1350–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijopm-07-2020-0480.
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PurposeDrawing on the transactional cost economics (TCE) perspective, we aim to investigate the effects of the balance and imbalance between contractual and relational governance on a firm's bridging responses to supply chain disruptions. By adopting the institutionally contingent perspective, we further examine the moderating effect of cultural distance on the relationship between governance mechanisms and bridging responses.Design/methodology/approachBased on data collected from 183 firms in China, we use polynomial regression and response surface analyses to test our research model.FindingsThe bridging responses increase along with an increasing balance level between contractual and relational governance and decrease along with an increasing imbalance level between contractual and relational governance. Moreover, the positive effect of balance between contractual and relational governance is strengthened by a large cultural distance. We also find that a large cultural distance amplifies the negative effect of the combination of high relational governance and low contractual governance yet weakens that of the combination of high contractual governance and low relational governance.Originality/valueOur study provides nuanced insights into the effects of the balance and imbalance between contractual and relational governance on bridging responses and into the cultural boundary conditions under which these effects vary.
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Jiang, Danrong, Yajing Liu, Xinke Kang y Lili Liu. "Research on the Influencing Factors and Regulation Mechanism of Entrepreneurial Team Governance". E3S Web of Conferences 409 (2023): 03014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202340903014.
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Current research on entrepreneurial teams has increasingly focused on governance issues, particularly the outcome variables of entrepreneurial team governance. However, there is less examination of the antecedent variables and mediating mechanisms that influence entrepreneurial team governance. This study uses a questionnaire survey to empirically test the factors influencing entrepreneurial team governance and the moderating effect of ethical leadership. Survey data from 187 entrepreneurial teams were analyzed. Results show that founder-member relationships positively affect contractual and relational governance, and human capital specificity positively affects contractual governance and partially affects relational governance. Equity balance negatively affects relational governance and partially affects contractual governance, while equity concentration has no significant effect on governance. Ethical leadership weakens the positive impact of founder-member relationships on contractual governance, but has no significant effect on other relationships. These findings provide theoretical and empirical evidence for understanding the antecedent variables that influence entrepreneurial team governance and the moderating effect of leadership style.
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Li, Zihanxin, Ting Wan y Jing Lan. "Substitution or Complementarity: Influence of Industry–University–Research-Institute Cooperation Governance Mechanism on Knowledge Transfer—An Empirical Analysis from China". Sustainability 14, n.º 13 (22 de junio de 2022): 7606. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14137606.
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China’s economic growth is transforming from being traditional and factor-driven to being innovation-driven. How to improve the independent innovation ability and build the sustainable competitiveness of enterprises through knowledge transfer in industry–university–research-institute (IUR) cooperation has become an urgent problem to be solved. The obstacles to knowledge transfer in an IUR cooperation include internal and external cooperation risk factors. Improving the governance mechanism of an IUR cooperation, reducing cooperation risks, and promoting knowledge transfer are effective means for overcoming such obstacles in the short term. Interorganizational governance mechanisms include contractual governance and relationship governance. Obvious differences exist in the target functions of the different types of governance mechanisms, and their effects on knowledge transfer also differ. Based on a questionnaire survey on the IUR cooperation innovation of 364 enterprises, this study discusses the impact of the contractual governance mechanism and relationship governance mechanism on knowledge transfer in the IUR cooperation. Different types of contractual governance mechanisms have different effects on knowledge transfer. The contractual coordination mechanism significantly promotes explicit knowledge transfer in an IUR cooperation but has no significant impact on tacit knowledge transfer, whereas the contractual control mechanism significantly promotes explicit knowledge transfer but hinders tacit knowledge transfer. Meanwhile, the relationship governance mechanism has a significant positive impact on explicit knowledge transfer and tacit knowledge transfer. The joint use of the contractual coordination mechanism and relationship governance mechanism can significantly promote explicit knowledge transfer and tacit knowledge transfer, whereas the joint use of the contractual control mechanism and relationship governance mechanism can significantly weaken the two types of knowledge transfer. This study provides not only a theoretical explanation for the dispute over the “complementarity” or “substitution” relationship between the contractual governance mechanism and relationship governance mechanism in knowledge transfer in an IUR cooperation, thereby enriching relationship governance theory and knowledge management theory, but also a reference to the government, enterprises, and universities/scientific institutions participating in an IUR cooperation.
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Crawford, Adam. "'Contractual Governance' of Deviant Behaviour". Journal of Law and Society 30, n.º 4 (diciembre de 2003): 479–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2003.00267.x.
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Enquist, Bo, Mikael Johnson y Carolina Camén. "Contractual governance for sustainable service". Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management 2, n.º 1 (enero de 2005): 29–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/11766090510635370.
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Zhang, Qiyuan, Jason Lu Jin y Defeng Yang. "How to enhance supplier performance in China: interplay of contracts, relational governance and legal development". International Journal of Operations & Production Management 40, n.º 6 (27 de agosto de 2020): 777–808. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijopm-02-2020-0093.
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PurposeGiven the pivotal influence of institutional forces, an important yet underexplored question in supply chain management literature is how contractual and relational governance jointly affect supplier performance under weak legislative environments. This study tends to solve the debate by distinguishing contractual definability from contractual enforceability and by considering the contingent role of legal development in China.Design/methodology/approachUsing a combined dataset of secondary data and a survey of 224 buyer–supplier dyads in China, this study examines how contractual definability and contractual enforceability interact with relational governance differently in driving supplier performance, and assesses the contingent role of legal development.FindingsThis study finds that contractual definability complements yet contractual enforceability substitutes relational governance in affecting supplier performance. Moreover, legal development weakens the complementary effect but strengthens the substitutive effect.Originality/valueThe study firstly enriches supply chain management literature by classifying the roles of contracts into contractual definability and contractual enforceability and showing their differential interplay with relational governance. Second, the study contributes to the complements–substitutes debate by revealing the shifting role of legal development. Third, the research enriches the understanding of supply chain management in the Chinese market.
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Gutiérrez Aguilar, Ricardo. "Obligación contractual = Contractual obligation". EUNOMÍA. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad, n.º 18 (1 de abril de 2020): 164. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/eunomia.2020.5271.
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Resumen: El presente trabajo se plantea los interrogantes tanto legales como morales a que una teoría del contrato –y de su equivalente deóntico, la promesa– aboca. Encontramos esta doble naturaleza de las obligaciones legales ya desde los tiempos del derecho romano clásico, pero no es sino desde los años 80 que el tema ha experimentado una segunda vida académica. Con el advenimiento de la llamada muerte del contrato, los teóricos de la materia han discutido si el derecho civil no debería reabsorber la teoría general sobre el contrato como disciplina independiente, y reducir su componente moral. Las obras de Charles Fried y de Patrick Atiyah, reivindicando un compromiso moral fuerte en el ejercicio de la teoría y práctica jurídica de la promesa han abierto el camino a la actualidad del debate y presentado una alternativa a la exitosa teoría económica del contrato. Palabras clave:Obligación, contrato, promesa, teorías económicas del contrato, teorías deónticas del contrato Abstract: The aim of present article is to lay out the usual legal and moral enquiries to which a theory of contract –and its deontic equivalent, promise– leads. We can assess this dual nature of legal obligations even in classic Roman Law times, but it is not until the 80s that the issue has experienced a second academic life. With the sudden rise of scholarship around the so-called death of contract, theorists on the subject have discussed if would not be more convenient to reabsorb the general theory of contract as an independent discipline within tort law, reducing in this exercise its moral component. Charles Fried’s and Patrick Atiyah’s work vindicating a strong moral commitment in legal theory and practice through the underlying idea of promise has left opened the trail to contemporary debate and offered an alternative to the otherwise successful economic theory of contract. Keywords: Obligation, contract, promise, economic theories of contract, deontic theories of contract
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Raue, Jan Simon y Andreas Wieland. "The interplay of different types of governance in horizontal cooperations". International Journal of Logistics Management 26, n.º 2 (10 de agosto de 2015): 401–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlm-08-2012-0083.
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Purpose – Over the last decades, horizontal cooperations between logistics service providers (LSPs) have become a well-established organizational form and their use is expected to grow even further in the future. In spite of this increasing importance of horizontal LSP cooperations, little research has been done to reveal how to govern these relationships successfully. Particularly, the role of contractual governance and its interplay with operational governance mechanisms remain to be investigated. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – This research analyzes the influence of contractual governance on the effectiveness of two types of operational governance (a formal and a relational type). It relates contractual governance and operational governance to two major outcome dimensions of horizontal cooperations between LSPs (cooperation-based firm performance and cooperation-based learning) and uses multivariate statistical methods. Findings – The results reveal that contractual safeguarding is able to partly replace process formalization when aiming for better cooperation-based firm performance and complement process formalization when aiming for cooperation-based learning. At the same time, relational capital is always complemented by contractual safeguarding independently from the desired cooperation outcome. Originality/value – This is the first study analyzing the role of contractual safeguarding in horizontal cooperations between LSPs. It shows its interplay with operational governance mechanisms, and, thereby, not only considers a relational type of operational governance, but also a formal type.
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Wang, Dedong, Shaoze Fang y Kaili Li. "Dynamic changes of governance mechanisms in mega construction projects in China". Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 26, n.º 4 (20 de mayo de 2019): 723–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ecam-03-2018-0137.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the mechanisms governing dynamic changes in relational and contractual governance at different stages of government-funded mega construction projects (MCPs) by studying their different effects on project performance and participants’ opportunism. Design/methodology/approach Partial least squares structural equation modeling was used to test eight hypotheses based on data collected from 147 respondents in different participating organizations in Chinese MCPs. Findings First, contractual governance has a stronger positive impact on project performance than relational governance in the early stage of MCPs, while relational governance exerts more positive effects on project performance than contractual governance in the middle and late stages. Second, opportunism is a mediator variable between governance mechanisms and project performance, and relational governance is more effective than contractual governance in restricting opportunism. Originality/value In contrast to a static analysis of project governance mechanisms, this study examines dynamic changes in the governance mechanisms of MCPs in the Chinese context by considering the mediating role of opportunism as well as guanxi as an element of relational governance, thus filling in gaps in the literature on MCP governance and contributing to the development of MCP management theory.
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Peng, Xiaoqi, Wenhua Hou y Lin Wang. "The influence of contractual and relational governance on the sustainable performance of public-private partnership projects: Findings from PLS-SEM". Advances in Economics and Management Research 1, n.º 3 (8 de febrero de 2023): 314. http://dx.doi.org/10.56028/aemr.3.1.314.
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As a widely adopted model of infrastructure and public service provision, the goal of PPP projects is gradually shifting from traditional economic orientation to sustainable development orientation. During this process, contractual governance and relational governance are regarded as effective ways to improve the sustainable performance of PPP projects. This paper extends contractual governance (control, coordination, adaptation) and relational governance (trust, communication, reciprocity, and industry practices) to second-order constructs. On this basis, partial least squares structural equation model (PLS-SEM) is adopted to analyze the questionnaire data of 114 PPP project practitioners, aiming to study the influence of contractual and relational governance on the sustainable performance of PPP projects. The results of PLS-SEM verify the support effect of contractual and relational governance on sustainable performance, and the effect of relational governance is more significant. This paper enriches the governance mechanism of PPP projects from the perspective of sustainable development. At the same time, the research results can also help PPP project managers rationally use the governance mechanism of both contract and relationship to promote the project to achieve its sustainable performance.
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Ryciuk, Urszula. "Ambidextrous governance impact on supply chain performance – buyer and supplier perspectives". JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 15, n.º 1 (30 de marzo de 2022): 47–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2022/15-1/3.
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The purpose of the paper is to investigate the impact of governance on supply chain performance. Two dimensions of governance: contractual and relational and its simultaneous interplay called ambidextrous governance were considered. The study presents alternatives models from buyer and supplier perspectives. The analysis is based on Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews among buyers and suppliers from manufacturing companies. For the model development structural equation modelling was applied. The obtained results confirmed that supply chain performance is impacted by relational governance from both buyer and supplier perspectives; contractual governance influences the supply chain performance in case of suppliers and there is a second-order construct called ambidextrous governance confirming interplay or relational and contractual governance when impacting supply chain performance from supplier’s perspective.
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Liu, Shan, Shiqian Guan, Qing Zhu y Chao Fang. "Effects of governance on crowdsourcer satisfaction in crowdsourcing: moderating roles of task and environment complexities". Industrial Management & Data Systems 122, n.º 4 (24 de marzo de 2022): 1002–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/imds-08-2021-0474.
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PurposeThis study aims to explore how relational and contractual governance affect crowdsourcer satisfaction under boundary conditions, including internal (i.e. task complexity) or external (i.e. environmental complexity) factors.Design/methodology/approachWe empirically validate the hypotheses using survey data collected from 255 crowdsourcers on a leading platform (i.e. Zhubajie.com). Partial least squares technique and hierarchical regression analysis are used to test the research model.FindingsBoth forms of governance mechanisms positively affect crowdsourcer satisfaction. Task complexity negatively moderates the linkage of relational governance and crowdsourcer satisfaction. However, environmental complexity weakens the positive effect of contractual governance but enhances the effect of relational governance on satisfaction.Originality/valueThis study deepens the current understanding of governance mechanism in crowdsourcing by discovering the effectiveness of contractual and relational governance. We also contribute to the governance and crowdsourcing literature by revealing the mechanisms of how governance takes effect under task and environmental complexities.
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Luu, Ngoc, Jack Cadeaux y Liem Viet Ngo. "Governance mechanisms and total relationship value: the interaction effect of information sharing". Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 33, n.º 5 (4 de junio de 2018): 717–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jbim-08-2017-0191.
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Purpose The purposes of this study are to examine how contractual and relational governance mechanisms influence total value created in a buyer–supplier relationship and to investigate how supplier’s information sharing and information sharing asymmetry between two exchange parties differentially moderate these associations. Design/methodology/approach The study is conducted with a sample of 110 buyer–supplier matched dyads in various industries in Vietnam. Findings This study confirms that contractual governance and relational governance have curvilinear effects on total relationship value. Governance mechanisms have distinct interactions with supplier’s information sharing and information sharing asymmetry to influence total relationship value. Research limitations/implications Future study could expand the sample to various countries to investigate the role of cultural factors in the effects of contractual and relational governance. Practical implications This study draws implications for supplying managers about how to govern a relationship with a buying firm with which they are sharing information. It also provides implications about how to use contractual and relational governance to control the effects of supplier’s information sharing and information sharing asymmetry, on total relationship value. Originality/value This study extends the information sharing literature by looking into the effect of supplier’s information sharing on both parties’ relationship value. It contributes to the governance literature by investigating curvilinear effects of contractual and relational governance on relationship performance.
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Zeng, Lijun, Junyi Wan y Qinying He. "Member commitment in farmers’ cooperatives in China: The role of contractual and relational governance mechanisms". PLOS ONE 18, n.º 7 (27 de julio de 2023): e0288925. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0288925.
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Farmers’ cooperatives play a critical role in social, economic, and environmental sustainability in terms of poverty reduction, food quality and safety, farm sustainability, and members’ well-being. However, they are generally faced with low or declining member commitment, which restricts their performance and sustainable development. This study aims to investigate the effect of cooperative governance on member commitment as well as the moderating effects of cooperative types through an empirical exploratory study applying a random sampling survey. The results indicate that both contractual and relational governance have significant positive effects on member commitment, but vary with cooperative types. Specifically, there is a greater effect of contractual governance in company-affiliated cooperatives than in primary cooperatives, while the effects of relational governance increase in the order of company-affiliated, primary, and company-led cooperatives. Moreover, relational governance displays a greater positive influence on member commitment than contractual governance. These findings suggest that cooperatives should take organizational features, contractual and relational governance into consideration to improve member commitment and sustainable development.
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Zhang. "How do Information Technology Resources Facilitate Relational and Contractual Governance in Green Supply Chain Management?" Sustainability 11, n.º 13 (3 de julio de 2019): 3663. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11133663.
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Although a plethora of studies demonstrate that information technology (IT) has a positive influence on integration, collaboration and coordination side of green supply chain management, our knowledge about the influence of IT resources on governance side remains limited, especially the relational and contractual governance, two of the fundamental governances in green supply chain management. Based on the transaction and agency cost perspective and literature of information systems and B2B governance, this study investigates how IT resources affect the effects of relational and contractual governance. The results show that IT resources could improve the relational governance (i.e., joint-actions) and contractual governance (explicit and contingent contract clauses designing), and thus, effectively mitigate partner’s opportunism. Finally, the theoretical contribution and implications for managers are also given in the end.
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VINCENT-JONES, P. "Contractual Governance: Institutional and Organizational Analysis". Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20, n.º 3 (1 de septiembre de 2000): 317–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/20.3.317.
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Kali, Raja. "Contractual governance, business groups and transition". Economics of Transition 10, n.º 2 (julio de 2002): 255–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0351.00111.
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Mixon, Franklin G. y Kamal P. Upadhyaya. "Contractual Governance in Trucking: A Comment". American Economist 38, n.º 2 (octubre de 1994): 85–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/056943459403800210.
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Eckerd, Stephanie y Kevin Sweeney. "The role of dependence and information sharing on governance decisions regarding conflict". International Journal of Logistics Management 29, n.º 1 (12 de febrero de 2018): 409–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlm-12-2016-0301.
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Purpose Contemporary supply chain exchanges are governed by both contractual and relational governance mechanisms. However, the decision about when to use these mechanisms is likely driven by key relationship characteristics as well as the context in which they are needed. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the influence of dependence and information sharing on the governance decision within the context of inter-organizational conflict, and assess the degree to which contractual and relational governance approaches lead to more satisfying outcomes. Design/methodology/approach This research builds on both transaction cost and conflict resolution arguments to build hypotheses. To test the hypotheses, survey data were collected from supply chain professionals regarding specific episodes of conflict and analyzed using an ordinary least squares regression. Findings The results show a strong reluctance for the use of relational governance mechanisms to resolve conflict when the relationship is characterized by strong joint dependency or information sharing asymmetries. A strong dependence asymmetry and high degree of joint information sharing are associated with greater use of contractual and relational governance approaches, respectively. Finally, the authors find that contractual mechanisms do not necessarily lead to a dissatisfactory outcome for the manager involved. Originality/value This research investigates not only the use of contractual and relational governance mechanisms in inter-firm conflict resolution, but also the relationship specific factors that influence a firm’s decision to leverage either type of governance mechanism.
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Kim, Sojung y Seonyoung Shim. "Governance Mechanism and Structural Power Fit: Evidence from an Information System Development Project". International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems 29, n.º 04 (13 de octubre de 2020): 2050006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218843020500069.
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This study identifies how relational and contractual governance mechanisms differently influence the distinct output of information systems development (ISD) performance at the project level. This study also reveals how the consequence of two modes of inter-organizational relationships (IOR) governance mechanism is affected by the gap of a dyadic partner’s centrality within the network — the client’s structural power (CSP). We collected dyadic samples of clients and vendors for 107 ISD projects and explored their governance mechanisms and project performances, all of which were evaluated by both parties. Our results first reveal a positive relationship between relational (or contractual) governance and qualitative (or quantitative) performance, respectively, but not vice versa. Second, the results incorporating a structural position within the network reveal that CSP facilitates the efficacy of relational governance to lead the quantitative performance, but surprisingly, CSP also mitigates the efficacy of contractual governance.
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Liu, Zhixue y Ronggui Ding. "Dynamic Evaluation of Project Governance in Collaborative Innovation Projects: A Case of Industry Technology Research Institute". Sustainability 15, n.º 16 (17 de agosto de 2023): 12493. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su151612493.
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Collaborative innovation projects (CIPs) are a typical type of inter-organizational collaboration project to deliver innovative results, in which diverse and dynamic collaborative relationships exist among stakeholders. The project’s success depends on appropriate governance mechanisms to coordinate the relationship between stakeholders. Contractual governance and relational governance both play an important role in successful project delivery. Existing research on the static evaluation method of project governance has obvious contradictions with the dynamic characteristics of stakeholder collaboration relationships during the innovation process. In response, this study proposes a dynamic evaluation method of CIP governance that uses stakeholder networks as the evaluation object, thus filling in gaps in the literature on CIP governance and contributing to the development of governance theory. A project of the Industry Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was chosen as a case study to evaluate the effectiveness of the procedure. The results show that contractual governance and relational governance both have a strong impact on stakeholder collaboration in the whole stage of CIPs. The governance effect is determined by the changeable contractual and relational governance structure, not just the stakeholder’s power of the general understanding. The findings have implications for the governance of CIPs and mainstream project governance research.
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Reuer, Jeffrey J. y Africa Ariño. "Contractual Renegotiations in Strategic Alliances". Journal of Management 28, n.º 1 (febrero de 2002): 47–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920630202800104.
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This study provides an empirical investigation of the incidence and antecedents of contractual renegotiations in strategic alliances. We bring together initial conditions based on transaction cost theory and ex post contingencies highlighted by recent conceptual and qualitative research on the evolution of collaborative agreements. The results indicate that firms tend to change the governance of alliances when a misalignment exists between the chosen governance structure and features of the transaction. Further, we find that asset specificity affects alliance design as well as post-formation governance decisions. Contractual alterations are also more likely when firms employ less extensive contractual safeguards in their alliances and when a parent firm’s strategy changes. We find no evidence that cross-border alliances are any more or less likely to experience contractual renegotiations than domestic alliances.
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Reid, Eamon. "Contractual Gravities". Extrapolation 65, n.º 1 (14 de abril de 2024): 23–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/extr.2024.4.
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In this paper, I present a critical reading of the space opera television series Babylon 5 ( B5 ) (1994–98) from a Millsian radical liberal perspective filtered through a flat ontology. I argue that B5 ’s world is nonmodern, where various entities and their “gravities” affect how social forms are structured. The legal and contractual aspects of governance and politics are discussed, focusing on the issue of race. Whilst Charles Mills’s critique of racial contracts is fruitful, his political theory remains all-too human. B5 illustrates that any future republic ought to be nonmodern and rhizomatic in character, including nonhumans as elements.
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Boulay, Jacques. "Contractual Governance, Relational Governance: Why Do Firms Continue Drafting Contracts?" Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 29, n.º 3 (23 de abril de 2013): 863. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v29i3.7786.
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<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoBodyText"><span lang="EN-GB" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Governing relationships effectively is central to marketing channel performance. Relational governance theory singles out two key mechanisms, contracts and norms, and suggests that norms surpass contracts in their ability to minimize opportunistic behaviour. Recent research has disputed that perspective though, by noting the dark side of norms and calling for a renewed perspective on contractual governance. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>An analysis of existing empirical research on contractual versus relational governance of marketing channels leads into the proposal of four research directions that can help better understand why firms keep drafting contracts. </span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>
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Saravia Matus, Jimmy A. y Silvia Saravia-Matus. "Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure". Corporate Board role duties and composition 12, n.º 1 (2016): 33–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv12i1art4.
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This paper extends the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory of the equity governance structure by introducing a (hitherto absent) full analysis of the key TCE issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its shareholders. In addition, the paper discusses the implications of the analysis for the topic of corporate governance and firm performance. We find that when bilateral dependency holds contractual hazards are mitigated as predicted by TCE, but that when it does not contractual safeguards are altered to the disadvantage of shareholders and managerial discretion costs increase as reflected by lower firm valuation. Importantly, our study documents for the first time a class of transactions where business relationships persist indefinitely even though transaction costs are not minimized.
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Salminen, Jaakko. "Towards a Genealogy and Typology of Governance Through Contract Beyond Privity". European Review of Contract Law 16, n.º 1 (7 de abril de 2020): 25–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2020-0003.
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AbstractContracts are used to extend governance on supply chain and platform actors in ways that could not be envisaged when the foundations of current conceptualizations of contractual privity were laid down in the 19th century. This results in a stark contradiction. Firms use contracts to extend governance on actors beyond privity when it suits their interests, for example for reasons of supply-chain-wide cost-management. At the same time, law offers few means of holding a firm liable for the inadequate governance of social, environmental, cultural, and economic sustainability in its supply chain or platform eco-system. I propose two tools for uncovering the multiple societal tensions that this disjuncture between law and contractual practice entails. The first is a genealogy of how contractual paradigms have contributed to the rise of new forms of production, such as centralized mass production in the 19th century, global value chains in the 20th century, and the platform economy in the 21st century. The second is a multidisciplinary typology of the contractual mechanisms used to extend governance beyond privity. My hope is that these two tools will help us better understand, research, teach, and balance the implications of contractual paradigms on the social, environmental, cultural, and economic sustainability of production.
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Urbanek, Piotr. "Academic Governance Theories". Gospodarka Narodowa 300, n.º 4 (27 de diciembre de 2019): 5–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/gn/113062.
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