Literatura académica sobre el tema "Attaques par Inférence en Ligne"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Attaques par Inférence en Ligne"
Golse, Bernard y Michel Botbol. "Ce que l’Institut contemporain de l’enfance peut apporter à la pédopsychiatrie actuelle". Cahiers de l'enfance et de l'adolescence 10, n.º 2 (12 de febrero de 2024): 167–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/cead.010.0167.
Texto completoPrado Jr., Plínio W. "A DESORIENTAÇÃO GERAL". Revista Observatório 4, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2018): 995. http://dx.doi.org/10.20873/uft.2447-4266.2018v4n2p995.
Texto completoGallagher, Adrienne, Odette Gould, Michael LeBlanc, Leslie Manuel y Diane Brideau-Laughlin. "Knowledge and Attitudes of Hospital Pharmacy Staff in Canada Regarding Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD)". Canadian Journal of Hospital Pharmacy 72, n.º 1 (26 de febrero de 2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.4212/cjhp.v72i1.2864.
Texto completoTesis sobre el tema "Attaques par Inférence en Ligne"
Alipour, Pijani Bizhan. "Attaques par inférence d'attributs sur les publications des réseaux sociaux". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lorraine, 2022. http://www.theses.fr/2022LORR0009.
Texto completoOnline Social Networks (OSN) are full of personal information such as gender, age, relationship status. The popularity and growth of OSN have rendered their platforms vulnerable to malicious activities and increased user privacy concerns. The privacy settings available in OSN do not prevent users from attribute inference attacks where an attacker seeks to illegitimately obtain their personal attributes (such as the gender attribute) from publicly available information. Disclosure of personal information can have serious outcomes such as personal spam, bullying, profile cloning for malicious activities, or sexual harassment. Existing inference techniques are either based on the target user behavior analysis through their liked pages and group memberships or based on the target user friend list. However, in real cases, the amount of available information to an attacker is small since users have realized the vulnerability of standard attribute inference attacks and concealed their generated information. To increase awareness of OSN users about threats to their privacy, in this thesis, we introduce a new class of attribute inference attacks against OSN users. We show the feasibility of these attacks from a very limited amount of data. They are applicable even when users hide all their profile information and their own comments. Our proposed methodology is to analyze Facebook picture metadata, namely (i) alt-text generated by Facebook to describe picture contents, and (ii) commenters’ words and emojis preferences while commenting underneath the picture, to infer sensitive attributes of the picture owner. We show how to launch these inference attacks on any Facebook user by i) handling online newly discovered vocabulary using a retrofitting process to enrich a core vocabulary that was built during offline training and ii) computing several embeddings for textual units (e.g., word, emoji), each one depending on a specific attribute value. Finally, we introduce ProPic, a protection mechanism that selects comments to be hidden in a computationally efficient way while minimizing utility loss according to a semantic measure. The proposed mechanism can help end-users to check their vulnerability to inference attacks and suggests comments to be hidden in order to mitigate the attacks. We have determined the success of the attacks and the protection mechanism by experiments on real data
Nunez, Del Prado Cortez Miguel. "Attaques d'inférence sur des bases de données géolocalisées". Phd thesis, INSA de Toulouse, 2013. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00926957.
Texto completoCapítulos de libros sobre el tema "Attaques par Inférence en Ligne"
DORANDEU, F., C. LHERMITTE, H. DELACOUR y Ch RENARD. "Ypérite : la levée de rideau". En Médecine et Armées Vol. 45 No.1, 51–60. Editions des archives contemporaines, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.17184/eac.7455.
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