Literatura académica sobre el tema "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
Mahmood, Faiq, Amir Inam Bhutta y Muhammad Usman. "Effect of Executive Ownership on the Relationship between Agency Cost and Equity Mispricing". Global Social Sciences Review IV, n.º IV (30 de octubre de 2019): 171–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2019(iv-iv).23.
Texto completoSackley, William H. "Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity". CFA Digest 35, n.º 4 (noviembre de 2005): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v35.n4.1790.
Texto completoJensen, Michael C. "Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity". Financial Management 34, n.º 1 (marzo de 2005): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00090.x.
Texto completoKałdoński, Michał y Tomasz Jewartowski. "Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and Earnings Management in Companies Listed on WSE". Economics and Business Review 3 (17), n.º 1 (2017): 7–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.18559/ebr.2017.1.2.
Texto completoJensen, Michael C. "The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance". European Financial Management 10, n.º 4 (diciembre de 2004): 549–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-7798.2004.00265.x.
Texto completoLiu, Chia-Ying, Shiu-Chen Huang y Shieh-Liang Chen. "The Effects of Agency Costs and Insiders’ Shareholdings on Financing Choices". Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 8, n.º 1 (16 de abril de 2016): 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ajfa.v8i1.9288.
Texto completoWarr, Richard S., William B. Elliott, Johanna Koëter-Kant y Özde Öztekin. "Equity Mispricing and Leverage Adjustment Costs". Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47, n.º 3 (17 de enero de 2012): 589–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109012000051.
Texto completoBargeron, Leonce y Alice Bonaime. "Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information". Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55, n.º 8 (18 de octubre de 2019): 2431–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000851.
Texto completoKrishnaswamy, C. R. "An analysis of the performance of private equity: Agency cost approach". Corporate Ownership and Control 6, n.º 3 (2009): 424–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c4p1.
Texto completoMajeed, Muhammad Ansar, Xianzhi Zhang y Muhammad Umar. "Impact of investment efficiency on cost of equity: evidence from China". Journal of Asia Business Studies 12, n.º 1 (2 de enero de 2018): 44–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jabs-09-2015-0163.
Texto completoTesis sobre el tema "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
Raoli, Elisa. "Market misvaluation and earnings management. Evidence from Italian financial market". Doctoral thesis, Luiss Guido Carli, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/11385/200809.
Texto completoHijazi, Bassem. "Bank Loans as a Financial Discipline: A Direct Agency Cost of Equity Perspective". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2006. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc5411/.
Texto completoZhu, Yin. "Essays on accounting and incentives in Chinese equity markets". Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/essays-on-accounting-and-incentives-in-chinese-equity-markets(74adb2ee-0cfc-40f6-8d62-392ab7bbdc1b).html.
Texto completoPuleo, Michael. "Insider Share-Pledging and Firm Investors". Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/386109.
Texto completoPh.D.
Corporate insiders frequently borrow from lending institutions and pledge personal equity shares as collateral for the loan. Using manually collected pledge data for January 2007-December 2011, I examine how this phenomena affects firm investors and analyze agency conflicts between pledging managers and (a) outside shareholders, and (b) bondholders. Pledging potentially influences investor risk through changing managerial incentives and/or contingency risk from ill-timed margin calls. Findings suggest influential insiders extract private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders through pledging. Difference-in-differences regressions utilizing an exogenous shock to lending supply indicate pledging corresponds with a 9.9% relative increase in stock volatility – controlling for changes in fundamentals – and support a causal interpretation of the relation between pledging and equity risk. Despite apparently harming equity investors however, further analysis suggests pledging benefits bondholders, and corresponds with an economically and statistically significant reduction in yield spreads on corporate bonds. Robustness tests evidence reductions in risky financing when insiders pledge, corroborating the negative relation between pledging and cost of debt and consistent with mitigated agency conflicts between managers and bondholders.
Temple University--Theses
Burkhardt, Kirsten. "Le rôle des sociétés de capital-investissement dans la formation d'alliances stratégiques". Thesis, Dijon, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014DIJOE009/document.
Texto completoThis research analyses the role of Private Equity firms in the formation of strategic alliances within the field of the French Private Equity market. We start to provide evidence of its importance from new survey information, before offering an explanation of the organizational phenomenon. The study addresses the questions of how and why Private Equity firms act as relational intermediaries to help their portfolio companies form alliances. Both questions are investigated in the light of the Private Equity firms’ contribution to the value creation process that comes with alliance formation. Answers are provided by means of three jointly used theoretical frameworks: (1) mainstream theories (transaction cost theory and the positive theory of agency); (2) the knowledge based view; and 3) social network theories to complement the resulting from jointly use of the previous two theories. The theoretical construct is then tested empirically by means of a multi-method study with explanatory design, based on the pattern of joint evidence from both statistical tests and a multiple case study. Results show that French Private Equity firms do play a role in alliance formation. This role can be intentional as well as non-intentional. Furthermore, although arguments from the knowledge-based perspective finds more support in explaining this behavior than from the mainstream theories, our study highlights the benefits of the joint use of these theories and the complementary nature of them to better explaining the phenomenon as a whole
HUANG, YU-CHEN y 黃昱甄. "Overvalued Equity and Agency Costs". Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/01100880424095238787.
Texto completo國立臺北大學
會計學系
94
The main purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between overvalued equity and agency costs. A series of papers by Jensen (2002; 2005) demonstrate that, when a firm’s equity is overvalued that it will not, except by pure luck, be able to deliver the financial performance the market requires justifying that valuation, managers are likely to take actions designed to meet the market’s optimistic expectations and sustain the overvaluation, instead of disseminating information disappoint capital markets. They are more likely to generate the appearance of improved performance in the short run. Such actions, however, may sacrifice equity value of the firms in the long run. Kothari, Loutskina, Nikolaev (2005) find that, there is a positive relation between leading period returns and year zero accruals for high accrual-decile firms, however the price reverses in subsequent year. In addition, investment-financing decisions and insider trading activity also correspond with the agency theory of overvalued equity. This study uses Earnings-Based Valuation Model to estimate the theoretical value of a firm’s equity with public available information and management foresight information. The difference between actual and theoretical value is misvaluation. By comparing with the misvaluations which happen in different situations, we test whether asymmetric information exists or not. Moreover, taking assets utilization rate, discretional expense rate and firm size as the proxies of agency costs to examine the connection between agency costs and misvaluation. Research data were collected from TSEC listed companies issued seasoned equity from 1994 to 2002, and the major findings are summarized as follows: 1.SEO companies are more likely to issue equity when stock price are overestimated. 2.Misevaluation based on management foresight information is more than misvaluation based on public available information, and the result shows that when the equity is overvalued, information asymmetries is more serious. 3.There is a significantly negative relation between assets utilization rate and misvaluation, as well as firm size and misevaluation. However, as we separate samples into over-group and under-group by positive or negative value of misevaluation, such significant relation only exists in over-group. This finding implied that the relation between agency costs and misvaluation may not be linear.
孫惠莉. "Threshold Effect in the Relationship between Overvalued Equity and Agency Costs-Evidence from TSE-listing Hi-tech Companies". Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08202896953135855304.
Texto completo逢甲大學
會計學系
101
The study is based on TSE-listing high-tech companies from 1997 to 2005 to probe into the relationship between overvalued equity and agency costs. The present study adopts panel smooth transition regression model (PSTR) to examine the effect of overvalued/undervalued equity (PF) on agency costs. The empirical evidence confirms the non-linear relationship between the market value of equity and agency costs. When the PF ranges from 0.4631 to 1.3351, the PF is negative relevant to the free cash flow. However, when the PF is above 1.3351 or below 0.4631, it is positive relevant to the free cash flow. Meanwhile, when the PF is below 1.569, the PF is positive relevant to the management’s share; however, when it is above 1.569, the PF is negative relevant to the management’s share. The former literature mostly went to extremes, roughly categorizing the market value of equity into the overvalued and the undervalued groups. The present study confirms the non-linear relationship between the PF and the agency costs to improve the former literature.
Huang, Hong-Fei y 黃鴻飛. "Does Managerial Ability Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?" Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/mh65jd.
Texto completo國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
102
This study explores the relation between the managerial ability and the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) by employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years. We employ Demerjian (2012) to estimate CEO ability and Chen, Liao, Chen (2012) to estimate the cost of B-E agency problem.The empirical results of this study show that, CEO’s ability significantly affects the firm’s B-E agency problem. The higher a firm''s CEO''s ability, the more serious the firm''s B-E agency problem. Furthermore, we find that the instability in a firm''s CEOs’ ability also significantly affect the firm''s B-E agency problem.
Chang, Yi-Huan y 張翊桓. "Does Firm Location Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?" Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54125249309753847366.
Texto completo國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
101
This study explores the relation between the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) and firm location by using the B-E agency proxy developed by Taylor (2010). By employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years, we hypothesize that remotely located firms are more likely to suffer higher B-E agency problem because geographic location limits the ability of minority equity investors to monitor the boards of remotely located firms. We use five different variables to represent location and remoteness of the firm’s headquarters. The empirical results of this study show that a firm’s location significantly affects its B-E agency problem. Higher distance to major city worsens the B-E agency problem.
Chen, Guo-Chang y 陳國彰. "A Study of the Relationships Between Corporate Governance and the Equity Capital Cost for Taiwan Listing Electronic Companies by Central Agency Problems". Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57135979041366215808.
Texto completo國立交通大學
經營管理研究所
94
Based on the central agency problem between controlling shareholder and minor shareholders, this research uses the five dimensions, which namely ownership structure, board composition, manage pattern, abnormal relatet party transaction, and stock overinvestment of controlling shareholder amounting to fourteen variables, to investage the relationships between central agency problem and the equity capital cost for Taiwain listing electronic companies. Empirical results are summarized below:1.In terms of ownership structure, the larger the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder is, the larger the positive incentive effect is, and leads to higher equity capital cost.2.When the deviation between the voting rights and the cash flow rights is larger, it implys larger negative invasion effect and results in higher equity capital cost.3.In terms of the board composition, when controlling shareholder members occupy fewer directors or supervisor sits and the company has more independent directors or supervisors, the board is less dominated by controlling shareholder and leads to the lower equity capital cost. 4.In terms of management pattern, when the shares held by institutional investors are higher, the external monitors are better for the companies and lead to lower equity capital cost.5.In terms of abnormal related party transaction, there is no obvious relationships between the variable and the equity capital cost.6.In terms of stock overinvestment of the controlling shareholder, when the pledged share ratio and the overinvestiment ratio is higher, stock overinvestment behavior of the controlling shareholder is more apparent and results in higher equity cpital cost. We combine the fourteen variables into one Corporate Governance Index (CGI) and have shown that index is negatively related to equity capital cost. Higer CGI leads to lower equity cost because the central agency problem is slight and the interests of the minor shareholder could be less deprived by the controlling shareholder.
Libros sobre el tema "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
Thompson, R. Steve. U.K.management buyouts deals: Debt, equity and agency cost implications. Nottingham: Centre for Management Buy-Out Research, 1990.
Buscar texto completoCapítulos de libros sobre el tema "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
Owen, Geoffrey, Tom Kirchmaier y Jeremy Grant. "Michael Jensen on Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity". En Corporate Governance in the US and Europe, 21–24. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230512450_2.
Texto completo"Agency Cost Mitigation". En Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment in Private Equity, 47–72. Cambridge University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108641838.004.
Texto completoWirtz, Peter. "Entrepreneurial Finance and the Creation of Value". En Advances in Business Strategy and Competitive Advantage, 552–68. IGI Global, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-8348-8.ch030.
Texto completoActas de conferencias sobre el tema "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
Wan, Congying y Jian Xu. "The Impact of Equity Structure Reform on the Relationship between Equity Structure and Equity Agency Cost: An Empirical Analysis of Retail Listed Companies". En 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2009.5301172.
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