Literatura académica sobre el tema "A bloody defeat in South Vietnam"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "A bloody defeat in South Vietnam"
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Vu, Anh Quy Tung. "Organizational structure and operations of the Republic of Vietnam Military Forces (1955-1963)". Science and Technology Development Journal 18, n.º 3 (30 de agosto de 2015): 32–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.32508/stdj.v18i3.847.
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The Republic of Vietnam Military Forces (RVNMF) is a product of the neocolonialism and the US war in South Vietnam. It is organized, staffed, well-equipped in a modern way to carry out combat operations with the US military. After understanding its organization and activities in the period 1955-1963, the author gives out some explanation for the failure of the US in the neocolonialism war in South Vietnam which is actually a military defeat.
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Barlow, Jeffrey G. "The Zhuang Minority Peoples of the Sino-Vietnamese Frontier in the Song Period". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 18, n.º 2 (septiembre de 1987): 250–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400020543.
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The Zhuang of south China are the most numerous of the Chinese minority peoples. In Vietnam the Zhuang were identified historically as the Nung, and more recently as the combined Tay-Nung minority, the largest of Vietnam's 36 minority peoples. One of the most critical points in Zhuang history occurred in the Song era [960–1126 A.D.], when the expanding Han Chinese and the Vietnamese began to make a sustained impact in the Zhuang heartlands. Many Zhuang resisted foreign control, striving for continued independence. Their subsequent defeat meant that the Zhuang were never again to have an opportunity for autonomous development.
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Haun, Phil y Colin Jackson. "Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War". International Security 40, n.º 3 (enero de 2016): 139–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00226.
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Most traditional accounts identify the Linebacker I and Linebacker II campaigns as the most effective and consequential uses of U.S. air power in the Vietnam War. They argue that deep interdiction in North Vietnam played a central role in the defeat of the Easter Offensive and that subsequent strategic attacks on Hanoi forced the North Vietnamese to accept the Paris accords. These conclusions are false. The Linebacker campaigns were rather ineffective in either stopping the Communist offensive or compelling concessions. The most effective and consequential use of U.S. air power came in the form of close air support and battlefield air interdiction directly attacking the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam. The success of these air strikes hinged on the presence of a U.S.-operated tactical air control system that incorporated small numbers of ground advisers, air liaison officers, and forward air controllers. This system, combined with abundant U.S. aircraft and a reasonably effective allied army, was the key to breaking the Easter Offensive and compelling Hanoi to agree to the Paris accords. The effectiveness of close air support and battlefield air interdiction and the failure of deep interdiction and strategic attack in the Vietnam War have important implications for the use of air power and advisers in contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.
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Vasiliev, A. M. "War and negotiations. How Vietnam defeated the American Colossus". MGIMO Review of International Relations 13, n.º 3 (8 de julio de 2020): 41–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-3-72-41-67.
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Over the course of the prolonged US war in Vietnam, the bloodiest one after World War II, it became obvious that there was no alternative to a negotiation process. Important reasons were the impossibility for Washington to win the battlefield and the rise of anti-war sentiment in the United States. The author tried to show how certain psychological characteristics of US leaders led to the war and then eventually to negotiations. When started negotiations were accompanied by military action. The course of the war and negotiations was influenced by Soviet military assistance to the DRV, as well as by relations in the triangle of the USSR - USA - China. The time of detente between the USSR and the USA coincided with war in Vietnam, which influenced the behavior of the Soviet leaders, as evidenced by the recollections of the USSR ambassador to the United States A. Dobrynin.The Politburo of the Central Committee had disagreements regarding Vietnam and detente with the United States. But the war weakened US international stance and contributed to the achievement of strategic agreements with the USSR.The main objectives of the DRV in the negotiations were to stop US bombings and then withdrawal of US troops. The United States sought to maintain the Saigon puppet regime for some time after the withdrawal of its troops from South Vietnam. Washington’s main goal was to “save its face”, declaring defeat a “victory”. To achieve this goal the war and negotiations dragged on for years, and on the eve of the signing of the agreements, the most fierce bombing of the DRV was carried out.Thanks to the powerful air defense created with the help of the USSR, the DRV won the “air Dien Bien Fu”.The United States was forced to sign a peace agreement, which provided for the complete cessation of all US military operations in Vietnam, the withdrawal of all American troops, but left the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam together with the armed forces of the National Liberation Front along with the decaying and doomed to death Saigon regime. In 1975 its army was defeated the regime capitulated, which ensured the subsequent reunification of South and North Vietnam.The Vietnamese people defeated the American colossus, having suffered terrible sacrifices themselves, but achieved the national goal - the withdrawal of the Americans and the unification of the country. The full support of Vietnam can be seen as a successes story of Soviet foreign policy.
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Shore, Zachary. "Provoking America: Le Duan and the Origins of the Vietnam War". Journal of Cold War Studies 17, n.º 4 (octubre de 2015): 86–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00598.
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This article concentrates on the North Vietnamese official who became the driving force within the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) and was crucial in shaping the Vietnamese Communists’ protracted war strategy. A great deal has been written about the personality and policies of Ho Chi Minh, but Le Duan's powerful influence on strategy has been largely overlooked. The article covers Le Duan's background and rise to power as the VWP First Secretary, as well as his strategic thinking about the United States from the 1950s through the deployment of U.S. ground troops in 1965. Although other VWP leaders influenced wartime strategy, Le Duan as First Secretary carried the greatest weight within the Politburo and exerted the strongest influence over the southern Communists, who were pivotal in fighting both U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. In his role as head of the southern Communists Le Duan developed strategies for defeating the United States and then implemented them as his power grew. The article spotlights several recurrent themes in his thinking: the nature of a protracted war, the role of casualties, and U.S. global standing. Each of these subjects influenced how the North Vietnamese intended to defeat the United States over the long term and offers insights into how Hanoi understood its enemy.
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Gilbert, David. "Memories of a U.S. Political Prisoner". Monthly Review 68, n.º 6 (4 de noviembre de 2016): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.14452/mr-068-06-2016-10_4.
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"We will fight from one generation to the next." In the 1960s and 1970s we anti-imperialists in the U.S. were inspired not only by that slogan from Vietnam but even more by how they lived it with their 2000-year history of defeating a series of mighty invaders. At the same time we felt that we just might be on the cusp of world revolution in our lifetimes. Vietnam's ability to stand up to and eventually defeat the most lethal military machine in world history was the spearhead. Dozens of revolutionary national liberation struggles were sweeping what was then called the "Third World," today referred to as the "global South." There was a strategy to win, as articulated by Che Guevara: to overextend and defeat the powerful imperial beast by creating "two, three, many Vietnams." A range of radical and even revolutionary movements erupted within the U.S. and also in Europe and Japan.… Tragically, the revolutionary potential that felt so palpable then has not been realized.… Today, fighting from one generation to the next takes on new relevance and intense urgency.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.
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Ivanov, Valery V. "THE END OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION AS ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE DEFEAT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SOUTH VIETNAM) IN CIVIL WAR 1973–1975". Scholarly Notes of Komsomolsk-na-Amure State Technical University 2, n.º 35 (24 de septiembre de 2018): 4–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.17084/iv-2(35).1.
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Kolotov, Vladimir. "Strategic priorities of the DRV and the US during the Second Indochina War". Vostok. Afro-aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost, n.º 5 (2022): 55. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s086919080018542-3.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of the strategic priorities of the DRV and the United States at the turning point and final stages of the Vietnam War. In the American army and historiography during the war and later an understanding of the origins of the Vietnamese strategy was not formed. First of all, the influence of Sun Tzu's treatise modernized by Ho Chi Minh was not taken into account. These approaches were creatively used by the Vietnamese command not only against the French, but also against the Americans during the war with the United States. Traditional Vietnamese strategic approaches created an effective counter-strategy against the American “search and destroy” strategy. Hanoi adopted a protracted war strategy for which the United States was unprepared. Accurate consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of both sides allowed Hanoi to seize the strategic initiative and implement a significant part of their schemes in an asymmetric war with a stronger enemy and finally achieve the withdrawal of American troops. In their struggle against the United States, the DRV skillfully and creatively used not only Soviet military equipment and the methods of its use in combat, but also the fundamental strategic principles of Sun Tzu, adapted to the conditions of modern warfare. After the Tet Offensive other strategic offensive operations followed again and again. From January 1968 to the spring of 1975, Hanoi carried out 5 major offensive operations in South Vietnam, which led to the defeat of the United States in the war.
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Naumkin, Vitaliy. "“It Is Favorable to the Forces of Socialism to Keep the Americans in South-East Asia Longer”. The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee in the Determination of the Strategic Line of the USSR in the Second Indochina War of 1965". Vostok. Afro-aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost, n.º 6 (2022): 6. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s086919080023344-5.
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Based on a scrupulous review of a large body of documents from the Russian and some foreign archives, for the first time introduced into scholarly discourse, this article contemplates a period in the Soviet Union history, when the influence of the USSR in world affairs reached its maximum. It was a short by historical standards span, when the so-called “collective leadership” headed by Leonid I. Brezhnev, Alexei N. Kosygin and Nikolay V. Podgorny was at the helm of the Soviet state. The authors of the article show that it is unlikely that the transformation of the USSR into one of the superpowers would have been possible if not the US defeat in Indochina. With the aim of proving this premise, the authors have focused on the developments related to one of the turning points of the Cold War – the first half of 1965. In this context, the article closely analyses the course and results of the negotiations between Kosygin and the leaders of the DRV, PRC and DPRK. In fact, it was then, as evidenced by the researched documents, that the Soviet Union turned de facto from an observer into an actual participant in the Vietnam War (and, more broadly, the confrontation with the United States in the Far East) as part of the anti-American coalition of the USSR – PRC – DRV – DPRK. And although the authors are talking about a strategic plan in place – as it happens in real politics – and also in this case, it was born almost by accident, while the genuine masterminds of the geopolitical combination have remained in the shadow of history for many years.
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Quiroga, Stefan Aguirre. "Together with Bloody Knife in South Vietnam: Old West Metaphors and the Kit Carson Scouts during the Vietnam War". Journal of War & Culture Studies, 25 de septiembre de 2022, 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17526272.2022.2126811.
Texto completoTesis sobre el tema "A bloody defeat in South Vietnam"
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Dunn, Natasha. "The American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 to the defeat of the South Vietnamese regime in 1975 /". Title page, contents and abstract only, 1993. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09AR/09ard9234.pdf.
Texto completoLibros sobre el tema "A bloody defeat in South Vietnam"
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Davies, Bruce y Jack Shulimson. Battle at Ngok Tavak: A Bloody Defeat in South Vietnam, 1968. Allen & Unwin, 2008.
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Battle at Ngok Tavak: A Bloody Defeat in South Vietnam 1968. Allen & Unwin, 2008.
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Hennessy, Michael A. Strategy in Vietnam. Praeger, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9798216019916.
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Grand strategy, strategy, and tactics—the three layers of policy and action inherent to all military efforts—are the focus of this historical analysis of the dynamics of the Vietnam War. The American theory of counterrevolutionary warfare is examined in light of American military practice, especially that of the Marine Corps, during the period of America's greatest involvement, 1965-1972, and at the site of the most intense combat, the five northern provinces known as I Corps. Drawing from two schools of thought that diverge over the appropriate strategy America should have pursued in South Vietnam, this inquiry indicates that both the number of troops and their tactical employment proved inadequate for redressing the threat within the parameters America set for itself. Specifically, this work demonstrates that the counterrevolutionary warfare strategy postulated for Vietnam was largely ignored in some quarters, and sowed the seeds of defeat in others.
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Toczek, David M. The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam. Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9798400616785.
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Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963. The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.
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O'Brien, Sean. In Bitterness and in Tears. Praeger, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9798400669163.
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The seldom-recalled Creek War of 1813-1814 and its extension, the First Seminole War of 1818, had significant consequences for the growth of the United States. Beginning as a civil war between Muscogee factions, the struggle escalated into a war between the Moscogees and the United States after insurgent Red Sticks massacred over 250 whites and mixed-bloods at Fort Mims on the Alabama River on August 30, 1813—the worst frontier massacre in U.S. history. After seven months of bloody fighting, U.S. forces inflicted a devastating defeat on the Red Sticks at Horseshoe Bend on the Tallapoosa River on March 27, 1814—the most disastrous defeat ever suffered by Native Americans. The defeat of the Muscogees (Creeks), the only serious impediments to U.S. westward expansion, opened millions of acres of land to the white settlers and firmly established the Cotton Kingdom and slavery in the Deep South. For southeastern Native Americans, the war resulted in the destruction of their civilization and forced removal west of the Mississippi: The Trail of Tears. O'Brien presents both the American and Native American perspectives of this important chapter of U.S. history. He also examines the roles of the neighboring tribes and African Americans who lived in the Muscogee nation.
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Li, Xiaobing. Building Ho's Army. University Press of Kentucky, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813177946.001.0001.
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As a Communist state bordering Vietnam, China actively supported Ho Chi Minh’s wars against France in 1950–1954 and then America in 1965–1970. This book uses new Communist sources to offer an unprecedented Chinese military perspective on the Vietnam War. By documenting the level of Chinese military assistance to Vietnam, it reveals the extent to which the Chinese support of Ho’s military and political objective in the wars was a crucial and indispensable factor in North Vietnam’s victory. The study offers an overview and the particulars of Chinese aid to Ho’s army, or PAVN, in terms of training, weaponry, logistics, advisors, and technology during its transformative years of 1950–1956 in depth and detail based on a foundation of multiple documentary sources, memoirs, interviews, and secondary sources both in China and in Vietnam. With Chinese assistance, the PAVN experienced three important transformative changes from a peasant, rebellion force to a regular, national army. In retrospect, international Communist support to North Vietnam proved to be the decisive edge that enabled the PAVN, or NVA, to survive the American Rolling Thunder bombing campaign and helped the NLF, also known as the Viet Cong, to prevail in the war of attrition and eventually defeat South Vietnam. An international perspective may help students and the public in the West to gain a better understanding of America’s long war.
Capítulos de libros sobre el tema "A bloody defeat in South Vietnam"
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Kelso, John R. "A Defeat and a Victory". En Bloody Engagements, editado por Christopher Grasso. Yale University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300210965.003.0007.
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In this chapter, John Russell Kelso gives an account of the events that transpired from May to July 1862, during which he and his regiment suffered defeat at the hands of the enemy before scoring a victory against the rebels. After their return from Linn Creek, Kelso and his group again remained in camp training. They were then ordered to Neosho, a large town about eighty miles distant in a south-westerly direction. In a letter written to his wife on June 6, Kelso described the principal events of this expedition, including their march to Mount Vernon and their return to Springfield. He also narrates what he considers one of the most disgraceful military affairs in which he was ever involved.
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Bergerud, Eric M. "The Challenge of Insurgency: South Vietnam, 1954–1965". En The Dynamics of Defeat, 11–43. Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429496660-3.
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Stoyle, Mark. "Defeat". En A Murderous Midsummer, 181–216. Yale University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300266320.003.0007.
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This chapter demonstrates how the rising was eventually crushed in August, after Lord Russell, who had by now received substantial reinforcements, first overcame the protestors in a series of pitched battles fought in East Devon. The chapter unfolds how it enabled him to relieve the siege of Exeter, then scattered the insurgent forces that had regrouped at Sampford Courtenay and finally advanced into Cornwall itself, at the head of a large army, in order to stamp out the last remaining embers of resistance there. The chapter also describes how the arrival of Lord Grey of Wilton and his forces transformed the military situation in the South-West. Following the defeat of the insurgents in Oxfordshire, Grey had not set off to join the lord privy seal straight away. Instead, he and Genoese Captain Paulo Baptist Spinola had directed their steps to Bristol — the second city of the kingdom, and another place in which serious disturbances had recently occurred — in order to pre-empt any further outbreaks of trouble there. The chapter concludes by exploring how money, ordnance, horsemen, and soldiers who were well versed in the use of the most up-to-date firearms proved crucial in the bloody battles that were soon to come.
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"Endgame: Nixon's Peace and the Abandonment of South Vietnam". En The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam, 147–65. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203045640-17.
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Schulzinger, Robert D. "The End of the Vietnam War, 1973–1976". En Nixon in the World, 204–24. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195315356.003.0011.
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Abstract In the four years from the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on Vietnam in January 1973 until the end of the administration of President Gerald Ford in January 1977, the Vietnam War ended and reflections on its meaning began. In early 1973, hopes were high that the cease-fire signed at Paris would lead to a genuine peace. Yet fighting among the forces of the government of the Republic of (South) Vietnam (RVN), the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam (DRV) and the National Liberation Front (NLF) never stopped. In 1975 the war in Vietnam ended in total defeat for America’s ally, South Vietnam.
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Tan-Tangbau, Stan BH y Quyền Văn Minh. "Interlude II". En Playing Jazz in Socialist Vietnam, 166–81. University Press of Mississippi, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.14325/mississippi/9781496836335.003.0010.
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While the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was undergoing a fervent socialist revolution, fighting a bloody war with the Americans and South Vietnam, and singing songs of revolution and patriotism, the rest of Asia was experimenting with jazz and trying to find its own individual voice in the world of jazz. As jazz entered Asia during the age of colonialism, its consumption by the local population was associated with a perceived experiencing of modernity. However, the popularity of jazz could also be interpreted as a foreign assault on the integrity of local cultures and values. The pursuit of jazz by local musicians invariably resulted in attempts to create their own language to speak in the world of jazz rather than simply mimicking what was blowing in from the US, the original home of the genre.
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Nhã, Hoàng Ðức. "Striving for a Lasting Peace: The Paris Accords and Aftermath". En The Republic of Vietnam, 1955-1975, 57–70. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501745126.003.0006.
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This chapter takes a look at the tumultuous relationship between President Thiệu and President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger from the perspective of Thiệu's personal secretary. The South Vietnamese government at that time was in a unique and challenging situation. On the one hand, it had to defend the Republic of Vietnam's territorial integrity and defeat the communist invasion, and on the other hand, it had to create transformational change for the betterment of the entire population. All this had to be done while cooperating with the Nixon administration to restore peace to the two parts of Vietnam. However, this chapter reveals that South Vietnam's negotiating position with the United States was being constantly frayed by secret exchanges and communications with Hanoi. Relations gradually took a turn for the worse when after it was revealed that President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger wanted to end the war their way, South Vietnamese opinions or objections be damned.
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McLaughlin, Sean J. "Drinking Sour Wine". En JFK and de Gaulle, 106–28. University Press of Kentucky, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813177748.003.0006.
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This chapter examines how the Kennedy-de Gaulle disagreement over Vietnam was exacerbated by fundamental disagreements over the nature of the Atlantic alliance and tolerance for neutral regimes outside the bloc system. Their dispute over Vietnam began at the spring 1961 summit as a clash of perception, but the Kennedy administration quickly retreated into clichéd views of de Gaulle to dismiss the French position rather than undertake the awkward, difficult task of questioning the assumptions that brought the United States to Vietnam. At the summit, Kennedy made a strong case that there were legitimate strategic concerns that focused his attention on South Vietnam and that a Western defeat there would do great damage to America’s global prestige. De Gaulle emphasized the region’s unsuitability for a military confrontation with the communists and its peripheral importance to the Cold War. What separated the two presidents at this point was de Gaulle’s preference for a low-risk diplomatic course of action that acknowledged the possibility—which he believed to be small—of strategic defeat, while Kennedy was willing to gamble on an idealistic, maximum effort campaign to forestall a communist victory.
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Bui, Long T. "Militarized Freedoms". En Returns of War, 122–68. NYU Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479817061.003.0004.
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This chapter explores stories of Vietnamese Americans who came of age after the Vietnam War and currently serve in the U.S. armed forces during the War on Terror in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. These soldiers not only wanted to give back to their adopted country for their free lives as refugees fleeing the war but also to make up for America’s loss of Vietnam as well as the defeat of South Vietnam. From the oral histories, the chapter moves on to a major published literary memoir from U.S. Marine Quang X. Pham. Pham, a well-known public figure, talks about his confused life through losing his father, a South Vietnamese former pilot. From these oral and written texts, the chapter analyzes the thoughts of these “children of war” on wide-ranging issues such as migration, nation, family, and citizenship through the concept of “militarized freedom”—defined for these professionals as the sense of freedom (both political and personal) as shaped through their experiences and trauma with militarism. The Vietnamese American soldier encounters a moral dilemma that moves beyond a “Vietnam Syndrome,” an “American Syndrome,” where their professional obligations to American nation-building projects pulsate through their personal status as the living embodiment and physical reminders of America’s loss in South Vietnam.
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Sandbrook, Dominic. "Salesmanship and Substance: The Influence of Domestic Policy and Watergate". En Nixon in the World, 85–104. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195315356.003.0005.
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Abstract Richard Nixon took office in January 1969 after one of the most turbulent years in recent American history, marked by assassinations, race riots, student protests, a crippling gold crisis and a bloody stalemate in South Vietnam. Many ordinary Americans had voted for Nixon because he stood for old- fashioned stability and respectability in bewildering, disorderly times. Yet as he contemplated the challenges of the 1970s, from campus unrest and drug use to rising crime and soaring inflation, Nixon could have been forgiven a shudder of trepidation. Deeply rooted in the changing social and cultural landscape of the postwar years, these problems were beyond the scope of any one man to solve.