Academic literature on the topic 'Yugoslavia – Foreign relations – Europe'
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Journal articles on the topic "Yugoslavia – Foreign relations – Europe"
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Kacarska, Simonida. "The foreign policies of post-Yugoslav states: from Yugoslavia to Europe." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 18, no. 1 (November 7, 2017): 146–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2017.1397971.
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Bielicki, Pawel. "THE MIDDLE EAST IN YUGOSLAVIA’S FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN THE 1970s." Istorija 20. veka 39, no. 2/2021 (August 1, 2021): 397–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.bie.397-414.
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The main purpose of this article is to present the most important conditions and variables characterizing the role of the Middle East in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy strategy in the 1970s, based on available literature and documentation. I also intend to analyze the conditions that contributed to intensifying Yugoslavia’s position in the region and led to a decrease in Yugoslavia’s importance in the Middle East in the second half of the decade. Firstly, I will describe Yugoslavia’s relations with the countries of the Middle East in 1970–1973, especially with Egypt, where Gamal Abdel Nasser, after his death, was succeeded by the country’s Vice President, Anwar Al-Sadat. It will also be important to shed light on the Yugoslav Government’s stance regarding the Middle East conflict from the point of view of the situation in Europe. Next, I will present the significance of the Yom Kippur War for Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and its implications for Belgrade’s relations with Cairo and Tel-Aviv. Moreover, it will be extremely important to explain why Yugoslavia’s importance in the Middle East gradually diminished as of the middle of the decade. In addition, I will address the issue of Yugoslav President Josip Broz-Tito’s position toward the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the fading of Yugoslavia’s interest in the region following Tito’s death and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the summary, I want to note that the period under analysis in Yugoslav-Middle Eastern relations was decisive for the country’s foreign policy and its internal situation, as Yugoslavia never again played a significant role in the Arab world.
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Saideman, Stephen M. "Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties." International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 721–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081897550500.
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With the end of the Cold War, many observers expected that international conflict would be less likely to occur and easier to manage. Given the successful resolution of the Gulf War and the European Community's (EC) efforts to develop a common foreign policy, observers expected international cooperation to manage the few conflicts that might break out. Instead, the disintegration of Yugoslavia contradicted these expectations. Rather than developing a common foreign policy, European states were divided over how to deal with Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Germany pushed for relatively quick recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, whereas other members of the EC wanted to go slower. Some observers expected Russia to fall in line with the West because of its need for investment and trade, but instead it supported Serbia. It is puzzling that Europe failed to cooperate regardless of whether greater international cooperation could have managed this conflict. How can we make sense of the international relations of Yugoslavia's demise? Since secession is not a new phenomenon, we should study previous secessionist conflicts to determine if they share certain dynamics, and we should consider applying to Yugoslavia the arguments developed to understand such conflicts.
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Vuletic, Dean. "Generation Number One: Politics and Popular Music in Yugoslavia in the 1950s." Nationalities Papers 36, no. 5 (November 2008): 861–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990802373579.
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Popular music is one of the cultural phenomena that has been most shared among the peoples inhabiting the territory of the former Yugoslavia; indeed, considering the persistence of a common popular music culture there even after the break up of the Yugoslav federation in 1991, there is perhaps little in cultural life that unites them more. It was in the 1950s that a Yugoslav popular music culture emerged through the development of local festivals, radio programs and a recording industry, at a time when popular music was also referred to as “dance,” “entertainment” or “light” music, and when jazz, pop and, by the end of the decade, rock and roll were the styles of it that were being listened to in Yugoslavia and around the world. However, the development of a Yugoslav popular music culture at this time was rooted not only in international cultural trends but was also shaped by the domestic and foreign policies that were pursued by the ruling Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), which was renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1952. Through its cultural, economic and foreign policies, the party sought to define Yugoslavia's position in Cold War international relations, develop a sense of Yugoslav identity among its multinational citizenry, and reconstruct and modernize a country that had suffered some of the greatest losses in Europe in the Second World War—and which had, just before it, been one of the Continent's least developed states, not only economically but also in terms of cultural infrastructure. In the cultural sphere, investments were needed immediately after the war to redress the facts that Yugoslavia had high rates of illiteracy and low rates of radio ownership by European standards, that cultural activities beyond folklore remained the purview of a small urban elite, and that it lacked musical artists, schools and instruments—with great disparities in all of these measures existing between its more developed northern areas (Slovenia, Croatia and northern Serbia) and the poorer south (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and southern Serbia). For example, with regards to radio ownership, in 1946 the number of individuals per radio ranged from 40 in Slovenia, 48 in Croatia and 91 in Serbia to 137 in Macedonia, 288 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 702 in Montenegro, with the average for all of Yugoslavia being 78.
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Guskova, Elena. "Yugoslavia on the brink of break-up: was it possible to avoid the war?" Slavs and Russia, no. 2019 (2019): 479–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2618-8570.2019.22.
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The article is devoted to the times when the foreign policy of the USSR in relation to socialist countries changed, and the “Gorbachev Doctrine” appeared in perestroika. M. S. Gorbachev was actively engaged in foreign policy issues, lying his particular attention to Europe. The author tries to fi nd an answer to the question: to what extent was he interested in the Balkans? To answer this question, the author refers to one of the signifi cant events of that time - M. S. Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1988. It was then when the foundations of the country's Balkan policy were laid, which manifested itself in the 1990s. The visit gave Mikhail Gorbachev an opportunity to get to know Yugoslavia better, to get a better idea of the life of the peoples of this country, to feel the love of the Yugoslavs for Russia and the Russian people. As Gorbachev's close party comrades supposed, it was during the years of perestroika that a full understanding was reached between the leadership of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The contents of the conversations, and the fi nal documents gave the Yugoslav side the assurance that mutual understanding reached will in case of possible difficulties allow it to be provided with Soviet help and support. It is this kind of assistance that Yugoslavia would need in two years, when the country began to fall apart, when Slovenia and Croatia decided to leave the Federation on their own and received full support from Germany and the United States. But Moscow refused to help.
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Entina, E. G. "EEC and Yugoslav cooperation in the frames of modern international relations in Europe." MGIMO Review of International Relations 13, no. 1 (March 3, 2020): 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-1-70-39-55.
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Traditionally the phenomenon of the European integration towards South East Europe is regarded starting from the XXI century. The explanation for such a periodization are resolution of the open conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and implementation of the complex EU strategy for the region. Starting point of the majority of researches is the year of 2003 when the EU Agenda for the Western Balkans was started in Thessaloniki. The topic of EEC-Yugoslavia relations, SFRY having been first socialist country to institutionalize its trade and economic relations with Brussels, are unfairly ignored in domestic and foreign scientific literature. It is regarded solely as a chronological period of trade agreements. Nevertheless, this issue is of fundamental importance for understanding the current neighborhood of the European Union. The main thesis the author proves is that in the 1960s and 1980s as it is the case nowadays, the main imperative of Brussels' policy towards the Balkans was to prevent Moscow from increasing its influence. This led to the formation of a very specific format of relations with Belgrade and was one of the reasons why the economic crisis in Yugoslavia became extreme and its economy irreformable. In addition, at a later and structurally much more complicated stage of relations between the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the European Union the specificity and main components of relations of the Cold War period did not fundamentally change. As for the policy of so-called containment of the external actors one could see that besides Moscow, we can speak about similar attitude of the EU towards China. It makes it possible to consider the EU policy towards the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the paradigm of neoclassical realism, rather than in the paradigm of traditional liberal European integration approaches which allows us to unite neorealists elements with the specifics of internal processes, including the modernization of institutes, relations between society and state, types of political leadership.
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Yzeiraj, Emirjola. "King Zog’s Foreign Policy with Neighboring Countries." Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 12, no. 5 (September 5, 2021): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.36941/mjss-2021-0049.
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Zogu has resolutely defended the freedom and independence of his country. Zogu consolidated diplomatic relations with neighboring countries and the political strategy followed by him brought not only economic stability, but also protection of the territory. Seen from that prespective, the purpose of this paper is to show that the policy pursued by King Zog, influenced the establishment of peace in the country and protected the entire Balkans by not further complicating the situation and neutralizing the greedy interests and intentions of Yugoslavia for the territory of Albania, especially St. Naum. In 1924 King Zog had also a possed Yugoslavia’s intervention and intrigues. Throughout his policy, he aimed to achieve Balkan’s peace, because Zogu understanding very well that this would bring peace to Albania as well. The foreign policy led by Zog, deprived neighboring countries of any wishing conflicts. Thus the peace in Europe would have been in jeopardy as a result of threatening Balkans’s peace. Received: 7 July 2021 / Accepted: 30 August 2021 / Published: 5 September 2021
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Simon, Djerdj. "Economic transition in Yugoslavia: A view from outside." Medjunarodni problemi 55, no. 1 (2003): 104–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp0301104s.
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Yugoslavia, once an advanced country in market reforms, was one of the least transformed countries in Eastern Europe in the nineties. Such a situation was caused by the civil war, policy of the Milosevic?s regime and international sanctions. The resistance of the ruling conservative forces made it impossible to establish an adequate reform policy. Thus, the transition stopped short halfway. The situation has radically changed only since the autumn of 2000, after Milosevic?s downfall, when after the gradual lifting of international isolation, economic and political reforms were given a new stimulus, and the country could start the process of European integration. This article is an attempt to give an overview of the transition of the Yugoslav economy in the last ten years or so. The growth rate of Yugoslavia?s GDP is compared not only with that of its neighbouring countries, i.e. other former socialist countries of South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania) but also with that of other transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Commonwealth of Independent States. A particular attention is given to the role of research and development (R&D) in Yugoslavia in the nineties as compared to Croatia, Slovenia, and the United States. The structural changes in the Yugoslav economy during the past decade are analysed together with property relations as well as the issues concerning small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). At the sectoral level, it is the performance of manufacturing and agriculture that is separately explored. In relation to this, wage formation and relative wage levels in Yugoslavia?s manufacturing are viewed regarding the country?s international competitiveness and wider characteristics of globalising world economy. In analysing the role of external sources in the Yugoslav economy, the problems of foreign trade, external indebtedness, and attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) are emphasized together with the economic assistance rendered to the FRY by the European Union. Regarding the important indicator of openness, i.e. the share of exports and imports in GDP, a comparison is made between Yugoslavia, on one hand, and Croatia, Slovenia, the European Union, and the United States, on the other. The economic policy of Milosevic?s regime is contrasted with that of the new democratic government that came to power after the events in October 2000. Stabilisation, liberalisation, privatisation, and institutional reform are considered giving particular attention to the experience of the member republics of the Yugoslav federation: Serbia and Montenegro. The author comes to the following conclusions: in transition countries stabilisation, liberalisation, and privatisation cannot be successful without carrying out a comprehensive, deep reform of the system of political institutions that along with creation of conditions for establishment of democracy and its strengthening also enables building of a modern and efficient market economy. This complicated and often contradictory process could come across serious obstacles if the old state and party nomenclature in power retains the command economy without planning, and under demagogical, nationalistic, and populist slogans gets involved in wars even taking the risks of being put under international isolation. However, such an outdated economic system characterised by autarchy can only temporarily exist and hinder the unravelling of market reforms in the epoch of globalisation.
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Drapac, Vesna. "The End of Yugoslavia." Contemporary European History 10, no. 2 (July 2001): 317–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777301002089.
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Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 288 pp., $35.00, ISBN 0-8133-2096-8. Eric D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 230 pp., $17.95, ISBN 0-271-01958-1. Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 246 pp., $40, ISBN 0-271-01629-9. Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Monographs, 1996), 436 pp., £35.00, ISBN 0-19-829200-7. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, trans. Sabrina Petra Ramet (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 279 pp., £16.99, ISBN 0-415-18596-3. Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 2nd edn (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 2000), 243 pp., £42.50, ISBN 0-312-23084-2. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 354 pp., $30.00, ISBN 0-8133-2559-5. Richard H. Ullman, ed., The World and Yugoslavia's Wars (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 230 pp., $18.95, ISBN 0-87609-191-5. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 536 pp., $16.95, ISBN 0-8157-9513-0.
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Dimitrijevic, Dusko. "The relations of Serbia and the People’s Republic of China at the beginning of the 21st century." Medjunarodni problemi 70, no. 1 (2018): 49–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp1801049d.
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The current relations of the Republic of Serbia with the People?s Republic of China (hereinafter: Serbia and China) are conditioned by many political, economic, legal and social factors. The mentioned factors point to the existence of asymmetry in many aspects which, however, is not an issue that implies that the two parties can not develop good and friendly relations. In the historical and international legal sense, the relations of the two countries are characterized by the continuity of diplomatic relations established on January 2, 1955, between the then Federal People's Republic Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China. Serbia as the successor state of SFR Yugoslavia continues to treat China as one of its most important partners in international relations, which is manifested through the foreign policy course, according to which China is one of the main ?pillars? of Serbia's foreign policy alongside the European Union, Russia and the United States. The mere reference to the main ?pillars? in Serbia's foreign policy orientation indicates that China is a key player in world politics and a great power with which Serbia needs to build relations of a ?comprehensive strategic partnership?. It is not surprising, therefore, that the deepening of the Serbian-Chinese relations on a bilateral and multilateral level (especially within the UN, regional international organizations and political forums such as the 16 + 1 mechanism between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) contributed to better strategic positioning of Serbia in modern international relations.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Yugoslavia – Foreign relations – Europe"
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Mandalenakis, Helene. "Recognizing identity : the creation of new states in former Yugoslavia." Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=102808.
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This dissertation examines the emergence of norms and the process through which these influence state behaviour. State identity conceptualized in ethnic or civic terms, shapes state preferences concerning the recognition of new states. Hence, the ethnic or civic identity of Germany, France, Greece and Italy influenced their policy on recognition of the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, FYROM (Macedonia) and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the examination of these policies indicates that these preferences were tempered by security concerns and perceptions of threat. Hence, although this thesis supports the constructivist claim on the power of principles such as identity, it also incorporates the realist claims on the significance of geopolitics in foreign policy. Consequently, it does not claim the supremacy of one theory over another instead it attempts to provide a better framework for understanding the sources of foreign policy.
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Chen, Xi Ying. "Actions and constraints of the European Union as an international actor : the case of Former Yugoslav crisis." Thesis, University of Macau, 2011. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b2555595.
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Doty, Daniel Jonas. "European Union Foreign Policy Construction During the Yugoslav Wars Using the Multiple Autonomous Actors Decision Unit." Miami University / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami1312758521.
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Heuser, Beatrice. "Yugoslavia in Western Cold War policies, 1948-1953." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:fabf0ed5-37c7-44ba-8908-863fdc824763.
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When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, the Western Powers (Britain, the USA, France) were taking action to counter a perceived Soviet threat. This included the policy of liberating Eastern Europe from Communist domination. Tito's expulsion was misinterpreted by the Western Powers: assuming that Tito had initiated it, the Western Powers hoped for similar "defections" by other Communis regimes. The sowing of discord between the Satellite leaders (including Mao) and Stalin became a new facet of the Liberation policy. Yugoslavia was treated as show-case to demonstrate to Satellite leaders that they could obtain aid from the West if they ceased to support Stalin. In the case of the European Satellite leaders, this policy was a miscalculation: they had no intention of breaking with Stalin and the alternative of obtaining help from the Western Powers had little credibility in view of their anti-Communist propaganda and subversive secret operations. The Americans for other reasons failed to encourage existing emancipatory trends among the Chinese Communist leaders. British recognition of Mao's regime was not enough to draw Mao away from Stalin. Yugoslavia's other role was strategic and it gained particular importance for the West in the context of increased defensive measures after the outbreak of the Korean War. The Western Powers gave Yugoslavia arms and economic aid to strengthen her as a shield for the defence of NATO territory. Yet Yugoslavia was discouraged from committing herself to the West by Western reluctance to give away NATO information. Italo- Yugoslav defence co-ordination would have been necessary but was made impossible by disagreements about Trieste, also involving the Western Powers. The Trieste crisis of late 1953 set back Western-Yugoslav relations significantly, perhaps irretrievably. The ephemeral Balkan defence pact of 1954 between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey was no substitute, and with the waning of the Soviet threat for Yugoslavia after Stalin's death in 1953 Tito became less interested in defence-cooperation with the Western Powers.
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Kobzar, Svitlana Anatolievna. "'The return to Europe' : Ukraine's foreign policy, 1994-2004." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.609777.
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Lojko, Miklos. "Britain and central Europe, 1919-1925." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.248846.
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Al-Imam, Jamal D. "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Gas Pipeline to Western Europe." Thesis, North Texas State University, 1985. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc663015/.
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This paper surveys U.S. foreign policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the American administration reacted to the Soviet Union's interventions in Afghanistan and Poland and to its planned gas pipeline to Western Europe. Chapter I outlines the origins of the pipeline project; Chapters II and III describe U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviets during the Carter and Reagan administrations. Chapter IV focuses on the economic sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union by the United States and their failure to block or delay the pipeline, and Chapter V stresses the inability of economic sanctions-- in this and other instances--to achieve political ends.
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Ioannidis, Eudoxia. "British foreign policy toward southeastern Europe and the restoration of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece." Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=61105.
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The aim of the thesis is to analyze Britain's Mediterranean strategy and his relationship to the acquisition of the Dodecanese islands to Greece. Chapter I of this study includes a historical background of the islands prior to the Second World War. Chapter II examines British policy toward Greece and the Dodecanese between 1923-43. Chapter III provides an analysis of the role of the Dodecanese within British policy and military operations in the eastern Mediterranean. The last section deals with the actual restoration of the Dodecanese islands to Greece.
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Reitz, Julianne M. "Tito's Balkan Federation attempts : the immediate factor in the Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948." Virtual Press, 2003. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/1265457.
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This study has presented an overview of the significant impact the Balkan Federation attempts had upon the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav split. Furthermore, this thesis argues that Yugoslav Communist leader Josip Broz-Tito's intentions to create a federation of Balkan countries and East European bloc states challenged Joseph Stalin's monolithic dominance. United under Tito, this federation could have provided resistance to Stalin's plans to subjugate Communist Europe under his command. Furthermore, for Tito, the Balkan Federation represented the opportunity to maintain control over Yugoslavian affairs while enhancing his influence in the region. Such a demonstration of independence by Tito could cause other Soviet dominated areas to question Stalin's authority. It is this scenario of a Balkan Federation inside Stalin's Communist realm that became the immediate factor in the Moscow-Belgrade break.Department of History
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Bàtonyi, Gàbor. "Britain and Central Europe, 1918-1932." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:4364e5ed-bbf2-44c3-8d4b-587cb14f69cc.
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This thesis is a study of British policy towards three Central European states in the wake of World War I. The aim of this thesis is to illustrate the continual British attempts to promote a union or at least economic cooperation in 'Danubia'. The first section concerns Anglo-Austrian relations. Chapter I. deals with British plans for the federalisation of the Habsburg Monarchy during the war. Chapter II. compares the Austrian policy of the British Delegation in Paris, the Foreign Office in London, and the Military Representative in Vienna. Chapter III. explains British involvement in the reconstruction of Austria. Chapter IV. traces the reasons for British disentanglement from Austrian affairs after the failed * Eastern Locarno'. The second section deals with the x special relationship' between London and Budapest. Chapter I. highlights the role of two British individuals in exploding the x Hungarian myth' in London. Chapter II. shows how the Bolshevik Revolution affected British diplomatic activities in Hungary. Chapter III. documents British involvement in the establishment of the Horthy regime. Chapter IV. analyses the impact of Anglo-French rivalry in Budapest on the whole of Central Europe. Chapter V. elaborates on British economic policy and the rehabilitation of the 'Pariah of the New Europe'. Chapter VI. illustrates the gradual cooling in Anglo-Hungarian relations. The third section concerns Czechoslovakia. Chapter I. examines the conflict between Czechophiles and Czechophobes in London. Chapter II. is an account of British efforts to prevent French domination in Prague. Chapter III. deals with the manoeuvres of Benes in London and Paris, and the cooling in Anglo-Czech relations. Chapter IV. explores the origins of British indifference towards Czechoslovakia, which resulted in the Munich crisis. The thesis concludes that Britain lost interest in Central Europe because of its failed efforts to promote reconcilation in the Danubian triangle.
Books on the topic "Yugoslavia – Foreign relations – Europe"
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Nomikos, John M. Europe and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Oslo: Europa-programmet, 1993.
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The hour of Europe: Western powers and the breakup of Yugoslavia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.
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Lucarelli, Sonia. Europe and the breakup of Yugoslavia: A political failure in search of a scholarly explanation. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000.
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Grenzebach, William S. Germany's informal empire in East-Central Europe: German economic policy toward Yugoslavia and Rumania, 1933-1939. Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1988.
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Caplan, Richard. Europe and the recognition of new states in Yugoslavia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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Regime change in the Yugoslav successor states: Divergent paths toward a new Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.
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Panagiotou, Ritsa A. FYROM's transition: From Yugoslavia to the European Union? Athens: Centre for Planning and Economic Research, 2008.
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The first domino: International decision making during the Hungarian crisis of 1956. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004.
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Citizen's Conference for the Peaceful and Democratic Integration of the Balkans into Europe (1992 Valencia, Spain). Ex-Yugoslavia: From war to peace. Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana Pub. Dept., 1993.
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Koyama, Yoji. South Eastern Europe in transition: A quest for stabilization of the region after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Niigata, Japan: Niigata University, 2003.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Yugoslavia – Foreign relations – Europe"
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Udovič, Boštjan. "“Going International”: the (Non-)Importance of Non-Aligned Countries’ Markets in the Foreign Economic Relations of Yugoslavia." In Diplomacy in Southeastern Europe, 11–32. Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.14220/9783737014106.11.
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Smith, Karen E. "EU Foreign Policy and Asia." In Europe—Asia Relations, 47–65. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230583467_3.
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Shifrinson, Joshua. "Europe and Asia (and China) in US grand strategy." In US–China Foreign Relations, 99–114. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2021. |: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003056683-12.
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Balme, Richard. "A European Strategy Towards China? The Limits of Integration in Foreign Policy Making." In Europe—Asia Relations, 125–44. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230583467_7.
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Bátora, Jozef. "Europeanization of Foreign Policy: Whither Central Europe?" In Regional and International Relations of Central Europe, 219–38. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137283450_12.
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Ash, Timothy Garton. "Europe and the US: Five Frank Thoughts and One Proposal for the Foreign Ministers of Europe." In EU-US Relations, 73–74. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230503670_12.
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Smith, Karen E. "The Community’s Relations with Eastern Europe through 1988." In The Making of EU Foreign Policy, 22–42. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230536784_2.
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Smith, Karen E. "The Community’s Relations with Eastern Europe Through 1988." In The Making of EU Foreign Policy, 22–42. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230375741_2.
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Plowiec, Urszula. "U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Towards Eastern Europe." In The Impact of Governments on East-West Economic Relations, 95–104. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12419-0_7.
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Marer, Paul. "Foreign Trade Strategies in Eastern Europe: Determinants, Outcomes, Prospects." In The Impact of Governments on East-West Economic Relations, 119–52. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12419-0_9.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Yugoslavia – Foreign relations – Europe"
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Özgün, Tevfik Orçun, and Onur Koçak. "Turkey-Macedonia Relations from Cultural and Historical Perspective." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c05.00975.
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Balkans can be defined as a region which had been under different cultures’ and civilizations’ reign, and experienced different nations, religions and cultures. It is likely possible to see the effects of these multicultural and multinational structure on international politics and economy. In that sense, Macedonia is inevitably placed in an important point for Balkan and Ottoman history, and even for international politics. It is very possible to see Turkish influence on Macedonia, which -ruled by Ottoman for 542 years- has gained its independence, as a result of disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991.When we take a look at condensing political and economic relations between Macedonia and Turkey, the effect of shared cultural and historical heritage on regional and wide economic development and cooperation can be seen with no huge effort. From that point of view, Ottoman Empire’s historical, sociological and cultural effect on sustainable and improvable economic relations are a topic of discussion. If we focus on the changing balance in Europe, resulted by disintegration of Yugoslavia, and developing approaches towards Macedonia, Turkey’s relations with Greece and other regional countries become very important, which are still being operated in terms of development and sustaining. In this study, Turkey’s attitude in recognition of Macedonia, and structure of Turkic population in Macedonia will be inspected and from Macedonia perspective, international politics and economic cooperation will be examined with historical, political and cultural emphasis.
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Luptáková, Anabela, and Elena Kašťáková. "The Position of the Eurasian Economic Union in the EU’s Foreign Trade Relations." In The 20th International Joint Conference: Central and Eastern Europe in the Changing Business Environment. Prague University of Economics and Business, Oeconomica Publishing House, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/pr.2020.cer.2395.13.
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Liu, Siyang. "China-Czech Relations from the Perspective of Chinese Foreign Policy in Central and Eastern Europe Under Xi Jinping." In 2021 International Conference on Social Science:Public Administration, Law and International Relations (SSPALIR 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210916.033.
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Nagy, Péter Artúr. "Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on the V4." In The European Union’s Contention in the Reshaping Global Economy. Szeged: Szegedi Tudományegyetem Gazdaságtudományi Kar, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/eucrge.2020.proc.7.
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The aim of the research is to explore the development of trade relations between the Visegrád countries and their major Western European partners since accession to the European Union. The topic is currently an important one, as the Visegrád region is highly dependent on Western European countries, especially in the area of foreign trade. The research analyzed how the 2008-2009 global economic crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe affected these trade relationships, i.e. did it cause significant changes in levels of relationship and/or trends. To answer this question, this paper used a time-series analysis method called Interrupted Time Series Analysis. As a result, statistically significant changes in the level and trend of foreign trade relations between the Visegrád countries and their Western European partners were detected. Finally, a more detailed breakdown of product groups also revealed which product groups are most responsible for slowing down the growth of trade relations.
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Gromyko, Alexey Anatolievich. "Cooperation between Russia and Belarus: The time of strategic decisions." In 5th International Conference “Futurity designing. Digital reality problems”. Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.20948/future-2022-6.
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In 2021-2022 a team of well-known Russian and Belorussian specialists conducted a major work on assessment of the current conditions and prospects of relations between Russia and Belorussia and the Union State. The project was organized by the Institute of Europe (RAS) and Andrei Gromyko Association of Foreign Policy Studies with the support of Belorussian State University’s Faculty of International Relations and other partners. The present material highlights key results of the research, which have been reflected in several recent publications. Conceptually members of the project share the view that Russia and Belorussia belong to a common civilization with a joint history, culture, the Russian language, economy and geopolitics.
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Karluk, S. Rıdvan. "EU Enlargement to the Balkans: Membership Perspective to the Balkan Countries." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c05.01163.
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After the dispersion of the Soviet Union, the European Union embarked upon an intense relationship with the Central and Eastern European Countries. The transition into capital market and democratization of these countries had been supported by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1989 before the collapse of the Soviet Union System. The European Agreements were signed between the EU and Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on December 16th, 1991. 10 Central and Eastern Europe Countries became the members of the EU on May 1st, 2004. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU on January 1st, 2007, the number of the EU member countries reached up to 27, and finally extending to 28 with the membership of Croatia to the EU on July 1st, 2013. Removing the Western Balkan States, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina from the scope of external relations, the EU included these countries in the enlargement process in 2005.The European Commission has determined 2014 enlargement policy priorities as dealing with the fundamentals on preferential basis. In this context, the developments in the Balkans will be closely monitored within the scope of a new approach giving priority to the superiority of law. The enlargement process of the EU towards the Balkans and whether or not the Western Balkan States will join the Union will be analyzed.
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Akbulut, Gizem. "The Role of Extensive and Intensive Margins in Export Growth of Turkey to Central and Eastern European Countries." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c07.01643.
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In the recent years, Central and Eastern Europe Countries-10 (CEEC-10) countries are implementing policies for developing in international trade relations and these countries are relatively small and open economies. On the other hand, they increase both provide a dynamic increase in exports and export market share, to facilitate the European Union (EU) and their activities to integrate into world trade.
The purpose of this study, with CEEC-10 of Turkey’s sectoral export growth rates decomposes into extensive and intensive margins. Also intensive margin decomposes into price and quantity components. By building on the methodology pioneered by Feenstra (1994) and Hummels and Klenow (2005) and then “the decomposition of export growth rates” method developed by Bingzhan (2011). Intensive margin is the growth in products that were exported in both periods. Extensive margin is the growth in product variety or new trade partners. In the empirical part of the study were used the BACI international trade database from CEPII. The database provides the export values and quantities for Turkey to CEEC-10 at the Harmonized System’s (HS96) six-digit level over period 2006 to 2013.
Foreign trade activities of countries is an important channel both to gain of international qualification and to the realization of economic growths and/ or in terms of sustainability of the current growth rates. According to results of a study, with CEEC-10 Turkey’s export is mainly explained generally by the quantity growth rather than price growth. In other words, export growth carries with the low added value product.
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Cieślik, Ewa. "THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES IN THE ERA OF INDUSTRY 4.0 AND CHINESE DIGITAL SILK ROAD." In Economic and Business Trends Shaping the Future. Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Economics-Skopje, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.47063/ebtsf.2022.0018.
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Over the recent decades, the changes in the paradigm of international trade have been observed. As the result of decreasing of trade barriers as well as the reduction in trade costs allowed companies to divide their production into stages and to locate it in different countries according to their competitive advantage. Eventually, the production process has become more fragmented, both geographically and vertically. It means that intermediate products are shipped across boarders many times and every exporting economy provides some value added according to its competitive advantage. As a result, global value chains have become one of the most important feature of international trade. Following (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011), in this study global value chains are defined as “the full range of activities that firms and workers do to bring a product from its conception to its end use”. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) pointed out four types of upgrading in global value chains: product, process, functional and chain. Product and process upgrading involve companies retaining their positions in global value chains by enhancing productivity gains through adopting new product processes or “new configurations of product mix”. Thus, functional upgrading involves a slicing up the global value chains into new activity which generates higher value added, e.g. own brand manufacturing. In turn, chain upgrading involves a going up to new activity, which needs higher skills and capital and value added. Milberg and Winkler (2013) offered similar classifications of upgrading. Production fragmentation has caused a rapid increase in trade in intermediate goods as often companies offshore an intermediate stage of production process. Offshoring production has been typical to manufacturing (Timmer, et al., 2012), however, services have been often overlooked, but play a major role, especially in supporting global value chains (Kommerskollegium 2013). In turn, Digital Silk Road, announced in 2015, has become a significant part of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative strategy. China has implemented this strategy as a part of its long-term technological plan, under which China provides support to its exporters, including many well-known technology companies and builds a network of cooperation with selected countries in the field of technology, including ICT infrastructure, services, 5G networks, e-commerce, etc. China's rapid technological changes must not go unnoticed by trading partners, including analysed European countries, which, to maintain international competitiveness, are increasing the technological advancement and enhancing market protection against Chinese technology. Until recently, the value added from China to European countries was concentrated mainly on medium technology industries and value added from Europe to China focused more on advanced goods and services. Nowadays, there is a redirection of Chinese value added to high-tech activities (including service activities), which reflects China's ambition to build an economy that leads to innovation and industry 4.0. The transition of the CEE states’ economic and political systems initiated in the early 1990s, earned them the EU membership in 2004. The accession to the EU’s structures meant that these countries achieved the free-market economy status and they should be treated as the full member of the global business networks. Moreover, the decline in trade costs (transport and transaction), greater openness of their market and the removal of trade barriers have all helped the CEE states to join global value chains. Hence, the CEE economies are going to be more heavily involved in global production linkages. Many empirical studies have presented the close and dynamic integration of these countries with the EU market (especially the EU-15) and in a more limited scope with the whole global economy as well (Behar and Freund 2011). Generally, democratisation, the strengthening of political and economic relations (particularly with the EU), and the modernisation of many sectors (including financial sector, more advanced industries), were common elements of the CEE countries long-term development policies. One of their priorities was the redirection of foreign trade towards the EU and joining the global production linkages where China has become the core producer. Recently, the role of the economy in global value chains is more determined by the advancement of value added that it offers. Companies move toward services and innovations in the business model (Nenenen & Storbacka, 2010) and introduce industry 4.0 (Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, 2016). A symptom of these novelty is a concept of servicification of manufacturing (Neely et al. 2011) and cross-sectoral connections, which have reconstructed traditional global value chains (Naude et al. 2019) and, together with Industry 4.0, is expected to change the landscape of global manufacturing. As a result of facilitation of manufacturing, economies placed in the downstream market can improve their role in global value chains. In Europe, this can be an opportunity for most Central and Eastern European countries. Analyzing changes in CEE’s role in technological global value chains, we should take into account its two most important value-added suppliers: China and Germany, as well as their most important value-added buyer - Germany. These three economies established a sort of value added flows triangle. The regional supply chains built by Germany in the CEE allowed it to maintain a comparative advantage in sectors important for the economy, while helping the CEE countries join global value chains, positively influencing economic growth, but also reducing them to entities operating in less advanced stages of production (Jacoby, 2010; Fortwengel, 2011). Today, Germany also cooperates strongly with China (as a result of Digital Silk Road), and the CEE economies (especially the Visegrad Group) are increasingly dependent on Chinese value added, still linked to German value added. The most visible connections can be found in automotive and electronics. Hence, the question is: how strong are these links in servicification of manufacturing and whether there are visible trends in value-added flows in between this triangle in the era of industry 4.0 and Chinese Digital Silk Road. The research question seems to be relevant, thus in the subject literature, little is known about the mentioned relations (Roland Berger, 2021). The research method based on the analysis of data from the OECD Trade in Value Added databases, containing the world input-output tables for the period 2005–2018. The system of balance equations in the input-output model for one economy has been adopted to a multi-economy model. The model is described in more detail in (Koopman et al. 2013 or Hummels et al, 2001) and is based on the decomposition of gross exports. The method includes not only estimates of total value added in global value chains, but also calculations at both the mezoeconomic level and cross-sectoral flows of value added (including servicification of manufacturing). The results of analysis showed that most relations between economies continued to deepen the imbalance in flows of value added. The CEE economies are making their manufacturing increasingly dependent on advanced services (both from Germany and China). On the other hand, the share of CEE services to Chinese and German manufacturing is decreasing or remains steady. However, some trends could be observed in the last years, especially between Germany and China. German manufacturing is starting to rely more on Chinese value added (information and communication technologies services and the subgroup computer programming, consultancy and information services activities in manufacturing, information and communication technologies services' value added in transport equipment), although previously Germany provided more of these services to China. In telecommunications in manufacturing between CEE and Germany, the trend has turned against CEE. However, there was no direct compensation between pairs of economies, but the decrease in German value-added flows to China resulted in a much larger increase in value-added from China in German manufacturing. If the presented changes in flows were to reflect the effectiveness of Chinese industry 4.0 and Digital Silk Road. These strategies serve their purposes and increases not only the advancement of Chinese value-added exports, but also makes important economies dependent on this added value. On the contrary, the industry 4.0 strategy in CEE has not improved its position in the triad. Germany has still a strong position as a provider of value added, but its dependence on foreign value added is high, which derives from the links with CEE.
Reports on the topic "Yugoslavia – Foreign relations – Europe"
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Romero, Antonio. The Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement and relations between European Union and Cuba. Fundación Carolina, February 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.33960/issn-e.1885-9119.dtff01en.
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This document makes an assessment of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between Cuba and the European Union (EU) in its four years of validity, and of the evolution of political and economic relations between both parties. The analysis is structured in five headings that address the background, determinants and significance of the PDCA between Cuba and the EU; the main elements discussed in the political dialogue —and in thematic dialogue— between the two parties since 2018, and the central aspects of trade, investment and cooperation relations between Cuba and the EU. The report concludes that, unlike the United States, the EU is able to support the complex process of economic and institutional transformations underway in Cuba, in four fundamental areas: i) technical assistance and advice for the design and implementation of public policies, macroeconomic management, decentralisation and local development; ii) cooperation to fight climate change and transform Cuba’s productive and technological structure; iii) the promotion and encouragement of foreign investment flows from Europe, targeting key productive sectors; and iv) the exploration of financial opportunities for Cuba through the European Investment Bank (EIB) under the current PDCA.
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Allan, Duncan, and Ian Bond. A new Russia policy for post-Brexit Britain. Royal Institute of International Affairs, January 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.55317/9781784132842.
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The UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign policy describes Russia as ‘the most acute direct threat to [the UK’s] security’ in the 2020s. Relations did not get this bad overnight: the trend has been negative for nearly two decades. The bilateral political relationship is now broken. Russian policymakers regard the UK as hostile, but also as weaker than Russia: a junior partner of the US and less important than Germany within Europe. The consensus among Russian observers is that Brexit has reduced the UK’s international influence, to Russia’s benefit. The history of UK–Russia relations offers four lessons. First, because the two lack shared values and interests, their relationship is fragile and volatile. Second, adversarial relations are the historical norm. Third, each party exaggerates its importance on the world stage. Fourth, external trends beyond the UK’s control regularly buffet the relationship. These wider trends include the weakening of the Western-centric international order; the rise of populism and opposition to economic globalization; and the global spread of authoritarian forms of governance. A coherent Russia strategy should focus on the protection of UK territory, citizens and institutions; security in the Euro-Atlantic space; international issues such as non-proliferation; economic relations; and people-to-people contacts. The UK should pursue its objectives with the tools of state power, through soft power instruments and through its international partnerships. Despite Brexit, the EU remains an essential security partner for the UK. In advancing its Russia-related interests, the UK should have four operational priorities: rebuilding domestic resilience; concentrating resources on the Euro-Atlantic space; being a trusted ally and partner; and augmenting its soft power. UK decision-makers should be guided by four propositions. In the first place, policy must be based on clear, hard-headed thinking about Russia. Secondly, an adversarial relationship is not in itself contrary to UK interests. Next, Brexit makes it harder for the UK and the EU to deal with Russia. And finally, an effective Russia policy demands a realistic assessment of UK power and influence. The UK is not a ‘pocket superpower’. It is an important but middling power in relative decline. After Brexit, it needs to repair its external reputation and maximize its utility to allies and partners, starting with its European neighbours.