Relevant bibliographies by topics / Yablo's paradox

Academic literature on the topic 'Yablo's paradox'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 29 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Yablo's paradox"

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Priest, G. "Yablo's paradox." Analysis 57, no. 4 (October 1, 1997): 236–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/57.4.236.

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Borisov, Evgeny V. "Is Yablo's Paradox Self-Referential?" Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya, no. 50 (August 1, 2019): 233–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/50/20.

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Hardy, J. "Is Yablo's paradox Liar-like?" Analysis 55, no. 3 (July 1, 1995): 197–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/55.3.197.

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Beall, J. "Is Yablo's paradox non-circular?" Analysis 61, no. 3 (July 1, 2001): 176–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/61.3.176.

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Ketland, J. "Bueno and Colyvan on Yablo's paradox." Analysis 64, no. 2 (April 1, 2004): 165–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.2.165.

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Bernardi, Claudio. "A Topological Approach to Yablo's Paradox." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50, no. 3 (July 2009): 331–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2009-014.

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Sorensen, R. "Yablo's paradox and kindred infinite liars." Mind 107, no. 425 (January 1, 1998): 137–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/107.425.137.

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Cook, Roy T. "Patterns of paradox." Journal of Symbolic Logic 69, no. 3 (September 2004): 767–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/jsl/1096901765.

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We begin with a prepositional language Lp containing conjunction (Λ), a class of sentence names {Sα}αϵA, and a falsity predicate F. We (only) allow unrestricted infinite conjunctions, i.e., given any non-empty class of sentence names {Sβ}βϵB,is a well-formed formula (we will use WFF to denote the set of well-formed formulae).The language, as it stands, is unproblematic. Whether various paradoxes are produced depends on which names are assigned to which sentences. What is needed is a denotation function:For example, the LP sentence “F(S1)” (i.e., Λ{F(S1)}), combined with a denotation function δ such that δ(S1)“F(S1)”, provides the (or, in this context, a) Liar Paradox.To give a more interesting example, Yablo's Paradox [4] can be reconstructed within this framework. Yablo's Paradox consists of an ω-sequence of sentences {Sk}kϵω where, for each n ϵ ω:Within LP an equivalent construction can be obtained using infinite conjunction in place of universal quantification - the sentence names are {Si}iϵω and the denotation function is given by:We can express this in more familiar terms as:etc.
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Domanov, Oleg A. "On the Self-Reference of Yablo's Paradox." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya, no. 50 (August 1, 2019): 245–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/50/21.

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Surovtsev, Valeriy A. "Yablo's Paradox, Self-Reference and Mathematical Induction." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya, no. 50 (August 1, 2019): 262–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/50/24.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Yablo's paradox"

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Hassman, Benjamin John. "Semantic objects and paradox: a study of Yablo's omega-liar." Diss., University of Iowa, 2011. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1228.

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To borrow a colorful phrase from Kant, this dissertation offers a prolegomenon to any future semantic theory. The dissertation investigates Yablo's omega-liar paradox and draws the following consequence. Any semantic theory that accepts the existence of semantic objects must face Yablo's paradox. The dissertation endeavors to position Yablo's omega-liar in a role analogous to that which Russell's paradox has for the foundations of mathematics. Russell's paradox showed that if we wed mathematics to sets, then because of the many different possible restrictions available for blocking the paradox, mathematics fractionates. There would be different mathematics. This is intolerable. It is similarly intolerable to have restrictions on the `objects' of Intentionality. Hence, in the light of Yablo's omega-liar, Intentionality cannot be wed to any theory of semantic objects. We ought, therefore, to think of Yablo's paradox as a natural language paradox, and as such we must accept its implications for the semantics of natural language, namely that those entities which are `meanings' (natural or otherwise) must not be construed as objects. To establish our result, Yablo's paradox is examined in light of the criticisms of Priest (and his followers). Priest maintains that Yablo's original omega-liar is flawed in its employment of a Tarski-style T-schema for its truth-predicate. Priest argues that the paradox is not formulable unless it employs a "satisfaction" predicate in place of its truth-predicate. Priest is mistaken. However, it will be shown that the omega-liar paradox depends essentially on the assumption of semantic objects. No formulation of the paradox is possible without this assumption. Given this, the dissertation looks at three different sorts of theories of propositions, and argues that two fail to specify a complete syntax for the Yablo sentences. Purely intensional propositions, however, are able to complete the syntax and thus generate the paradox. In the end, however, the restrictions normally associated with purely intensional propositions begin to look surprisingly like the hierarchies that Yablo sought to avoid with his paradox. The result is that while Yablo's paradox is syntactically formable within systems with formal hierarchies, it is not semantically so.
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Eldridge-Smith, Peter, and peter eldridge-smith@anu edu au. "The Liar Paradox and its Relatives." The Australian National University. Faculty of Arts, 2008. http://thesis.anu.edu.au./public/adt-ANU20081016.173200.

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My thesis aims at contributing to classifying the Liar-like paradoxes (and related Truth-teller-like expressions) by clarifying distinctions and relationships between these expressions and arguments. Such a classification is worthwhile, firstly, because it makes some progress towards reducing a potential infinity of versions into a finite classification; secondly, because it identifies a number of new paradoxes, and thirdly and most significantly, because it corrects the historically misplaced distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I emphasize the third result because the distinction made by Peano [1906] and supported by Ramsey [1925] has been used to warrant different responses to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I find two types among the paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and membership, but the division is shifted from where it has historically been drawn. This new distinction is, I believe, more fundamental than the Peano-Ramsey distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. The distinction I investigate is ultimately exemplified in a difference between the logical principles necessary to prove the Liar and those necessary to prove Grelling’s and Russell’s paradoxes. The difference relates to proofs of the inconsistency of naive truth and satisfaction; in the end, we will have two associated ways of proving each result. ¶ Another principled division is intuitively anticipated. I coin the term 'hypodox' (adj.: 'hypodoxical') for a generalization of Truth-tellers across paradoxes of truth, satisfaction, membership, reference, and where else it may find applicability. I make and investigate a conjecture about paradox and hypodox duality: that each paradox (at least those in the scope of the classification) has a dual hypodox.¶ In my investigation, I focus on paradoxes that might intuitively be thought to be relatives of the Liar paradox, including Grelling’s (which I present as a paradox of satisfaction) and, by analogy with Grelling’s paradox, Russell’s paradox. I extend these into truth-functional and some non-truth-functional variations, beginning with the Epimenides, Curry’s paradox, and similar variations. There are circular and infinite variations, which I relate via lists. In short, I focus on paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and some paradoxes of membership. ¶ Among the new paradoxes, three are notable in advance. The first is a non-truth functional variation on the Epimenides. This helps put the Epimenides on a par with Curry’s as a paradox in its own right and not just a lesser version of the Liar. I find the second paradox by working through truth-functional variants of the paradoxes. This new paradox, call it ‘the ESP’, can be either true or false, but can still be used to prove some other arbitrary statement. The third new paradox is another paradox of satisfaction, distinctly different from Grelling’s paradox. On this basis, I make and investigate the new distinction between two different types of paradox of satisfaction, and map one type back by direct analogy to the Liar, and the other by direct analogy to Russell's paradox.
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Eldridge-Smith, Peter. "The Liar Paradox and its Relatives." Phd thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/49284.

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My thesis aims at contributing to classifying the Liar-like paradoxes (and related Truth-teller-like expressions) by clarifying distinctions and relationships between these expressions and arguments. Such a classification is worthwhile, firstly, because it makes some progress towards reducing a potential infinity of versions into a finite classification; secondly, because it identifies a number of new paradoxes, and thirdly and most significantly, because it corrects the historically misplaced distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I emphasize the third result because the distinction made by Peano [1906] and supported by Ramsey [1925] has been used to warrant different responses to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I find two types among the paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and membership, but the division is shifted from where it has historically been drawn. This new distinction is, I believe, more fundamental than the Peano-Ramsey distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. The distinction I investigate is ultimately exemplified in a difference between the logical principles necessary to prove the Liar and those necessary to prove Grelling’s and Russell’s paradoxes. The difference relates to proofs of the inconsistency of naive truth and satisfaction; in the end, we will have two associated ways of proving each result. ¶ ...
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Books on the topic "Yablo's paradox"

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Simmons, Keith. The Theory at Work. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791546.003.0007.

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Chapter 7 puts the singularity theory to work on a number of semantic paradoxes that have intrinsic interest of their own. These include a transfinite paradox of denotation, and variations on the Liar paradox, including the Truth-Teller, Curry’s paradox, and paradoxical Liar loops. The transfinite paradox of denotation shows the need to accommodate limit ordinals. The Truth-Teller, like the Liar, exhibits semantic pathology-but, unlike the Liar, it does not produce a contradiction. The distinctive challenge of the Curry paradox is that it seems to allow us to prove any claim we like (for example, the claim that 2+2=5). Paradoxical Liar loops, such as the Open Pair paradox, extend the Liar paradox beyond single self-referential sentences. The chapter closes with the resolution of paradoxes that do not exhibit circularity yet still generate contradictions. These include novel versions of the definability paradoxes and Russell’s paradox, and Yablo’s paradox about truth.
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The Yablo Paradox An Essay On Circularity. Oxford University Press, 2014.

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Book chapters on the topic "Yablo's paradox"

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Çevik, Ahmet. "Yablo's Paradox." In Philosophy of Mathematics, 239–46. Boca Raton: Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003223191-15.

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Wolf, Michael P. "Yablo's paradox." In Philosophy of Language, 144–48. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003183167-28.

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Santos, Paulo Guilherme. "Yablo’s Paradox and Self-Reference." In Diagonalization in Formal Mathematics, 41–51. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29111-2_4.

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Yatabe, Shunsuke. "Yablo’s Paradox, a Coinductive Language and Its Semantics." In New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, 109–24. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39931-2_9.

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Yatabe, Shunsuke. "Yablo-Like Paradoxes and Co-induction." In New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, 90–103. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25655-4_8.

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Cook, Roy T. "Generalizing the Yablo Paradox." In The Yablo Paradox, 129–72. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0004.

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Cook, Roy T. "Introduction: Why Should We Care?" In The Yablo Paradox, 1–10. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0001.

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Cook, Roy T. "Origins and Mathematics." In The Yablo Paradox, 11–70. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0002.

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Cook, Roy T. "The Yablo Paradox and Circularity." In The Yablo Paradox, 71–128. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0003.

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Cook, Roy T. "The Curry Generalization." In The Yablo Paradox, 173–84. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669608.003.0005.

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