Journal articles on the topic 'World War, 1939-1945 – Refugees – Ukraine'

The proposed article summarizes the vision of the problem of displaced persons and refugees on the European continent in last century. Their appearance was caused by military conflicts of different origins: from two world wars to a series of local armed confrontations. The historiographical story mainly presents the key works of Western European researchers, directly relevant to the topic outlined in the article, the leading researchers of the study of refugee issues. The study presents the original concept of the author – the periodization of the appearance and stay of refugees in Europe. The author assumes that during the XX – XXI centuries. there were nine waves of escape. Their appearance – military conflicts of different nature. There are two peaks of refuge, caused by the classic cause – the world wars with the epicenter on the European continent. Among the waves she named: the first – during the First World War (1914 – 1918); the second – the inter-war upheavals (1919 – 1939); third – the Second World War and the first years after its end (1939 – 1956); the fourth – refugees from Hungary (1956) and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1968); fifth – decolonization processes in the African continent (1960s); sixth – the breakup of Yugoslavia (1992-1997); the seventh – the collapse of the USSR (the beginning of the 1990s); eighth – Ukraine and the hybrid war (from 2014); ninth – the ‘European migration crisis’ (2015). The realities of the continent are still complex: the Russian Federation’s unleashed hybrid war against a sovereign state of Ukraine has provoked another wave of displaced persons. Within a year, the European Union’s authorities faced a new challenge – the “migration crisis”. A historical retrospective of the phenomenon shows that the problem is global and difficult to solve. The author singled out the period of the I World War (1914–1918) because it initiated the first mass appearance of refugees on different sides of the fronts, and therefore caused the first mass displacement of civilians on the continent. All subsequent waves of refugees can be considered as indirect consequences of this military conflict.

Abstract After 2015, the Hungarian and Polish governments voiced their vehement opposition to the idea of the European Union distributing refugees among its member states in a quota system while at the same time cherishing the history of Hungary welcoming Polish refugees during World War II. This episode in history fits into the proverbial tradition of camaraderie between the two countries. Meanwhile, aid to refugees in 1939 was strongly tainted by selective discriminatory criteria—as today (refugees from Ukraine: yes, from Syria: no)— which shows a repetition of regional practice toward refugees. Reading against the patterns of historiographical and commemorative traditions of both countries, this article discusses the sinusoidal presence of this refugee topic in Hungary and Poland. The recent discourses created around this case of international solidarity have depended strongly on political decisions and major debates taking place in both societies, including their coming to terms with the Holocaust and the refugee situation unfolding in Europe after 2015.

AbstractSeveral waves of Ukrainian refugees have arrived in the United States since 1945, each following a remarkably different resettlement and assimilation path. This article offers a comparative analysis of the role of religious affiliation and transnational religious organizations and networks in shaping processes of resettlement, ethnic group formation and the creation of attachments to Ukraine to explain the lower than expected levels of engagement of the last two waves with the Ukrainian diaspora and with Ukraine. Evolving global forces and the social structures within them render diasporic identities, which are closely associated with a territorially anchored sense of national culture, less appealing than the highly fluid transnational networks of religious groups. The role of religious-based resettlement organizations and their networks in the United States is likely to exert an ever greater effect on refugee resettlement and migration more generally.

In the result of the shift of borders, occurring after World War II, the Republic of Poland lost its south-eastern provinces in favour of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR). Nevertheless, a significant Ukrainian minority, estimated between 500 and 700 thousand, remained within the borders of Poland. In addition, a significant number of Poles remained on the Soviet side. On September 9th, 1944, Polish communist government and the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic concluded an agreement on the relocation of people.Officially,the relocation was supposed to be voluntary. In September 1945 the Polish army, against the provisions of the agreement of September 9th, 1944, started forced displacement of the Ukrainian population to UkSSR. The dislocation of the Ukrainian population to the USSR lasted till the late 1946’s. Throughout 1944-1946, 488,057people were dislocated from Poland to Ukraine. At the same time 787,674people moved from Ukraine to Poland. In order to avoid dislocation to the Soviet Ukraine, some Ukrainians moved to the Carpathian Mountains, and sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak army and security services caught refugees and deported them back to Poland. Keywords: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the relocation of people, Czechoslovakia

The article outlines events that are indirectly and directly related to the OUN and the activities of the intelligentsia from Eastern Galicia in the territory of Lemkivshchyna during the first Sovietization of Western Ukraine. The outbreak of World War II became a new test for the population of the Ukrainian-Polish-Slovak borderlands in the context of the ethno-national transformations of Central and Eastern Europe. The methodological basis is a comprehensive approach to the analysis of this problem. Since the beginning of the Sovietization of Galicia in 1939 the authorities have resorted to increased propaganda among the Lemkos for their departure to the USSR while taking advantage of the deplorable social situation of the locals and their low level of self-consciousness. Simultaneously, the most active figures of the region together with the local representatives of the OUN underground tried in various ways, from agitation to deliberately provoked false calls, to prevent the Lemkos from departure to the USSR. In the study based on source materials revealed the peculiarities of counteraction of local representatives of the nationalist underground to the Bolshevik propaganda in Lemkivshchyna of the departure to the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time the article reveals the nature of the activity of the intelligentsia from Eastern Galicia among the Lemkos. It is emphasized that immediately since the beginning of the World War ІІ considering the Bilshovyks occupation of Eastern Galicia, conscious and committed Ukrainians, began to arrive in Galician Lemkivschyna. They led an active public activity among Lemkos in schools, cooperatives, in cultural and educational institutions. It has been proved that the emigrants-refugees of the local intelligentsia from Eastern Galicia, despite the short stay in the Lemkos territories, played an important role in consolidating the region's national forces, actively working to raise the level of self-consciousness of the population of the region, thereby affirming the strong national foundations of the Lemkos region. The prospects of further research are to find out how the Soviet regime prepared the ground for violent deportation, initially through voluntary resettlement of Lemkos. The lessons and consequences of this event show that important state-building processes require thorough preparation and unity of all national forces. Keywords Lemkivshchyna, Lemkos, OUN, Sovietization, resettlement, national-cultural movement, intelligentsia, Lemkivshchyna, Lemkos, Eastern Galicia, Bolshevik propaganda.

After World War II, the welfare workers of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and International Refugee Organization took care of refugee children in post-war Germany and assisted them in returning to their home countries. This article analyses the changes in welfare workers’ decisions about the future of unaccompanied displaced children of presumably Ukrainian origin in the light of the post-1945 transformations. It explores the relationship of transformations in the humanitarian approach to child resettlement with geopolitical ruptures between the former Allies after 1945. It aims to demonstrate that by 1947, welfare workers’ preconceived notion that the ‘best interests’ of Ukrainian children were served by reconnecting them with family and homeland, wherever possible, had given way in the face of political transformations that welfare workers confronted on the ground during the transition from war to peace. Despite their deep commitment to restoring children to their national and familial roots, they soon began to consider that allowing Ukrainian refugee children to emigrate was better for them than their repatriation to Soviet Ukraine.

After the fall of communism in 1989–1991, Poland and Ukraine could have become partners in international, economic, and cultural fields. Yet despite many positive achievements, the contemporary Polish-Ukrainian cooperation did not fully develop. Among many reasons that slow down the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement, historical memories seem to be especially detrimental. The remembrances of World War II are the most destructive. Both Poles and Ukrainians understand that the only way to change this situation is to study and discuss the common history. A list of works on Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II is long. Yet most of these publications offer broad pictures and present Polish-Ukrainian relations in general or in particular regions, such as Volhynia (Wołyń) or Eastern Galicia. This microstudy, devoted to the town of Boryslav (Borysław) in the years 1939 to 1945, tries to show how the conflicts were born, how they became embedded in human memory, and, finally, how they were transformed into historical stereotypes. The text concentrates on the crucial moments of World War II in Boryslav and describes how Poles and Ukrainians reacted differently to the consecutive challenges and how these various reactions shaped their relationship. The article ends with a conclusion that the five years of the war tore apart the Poles and Ukrainians of Boryslav and the post-1945 iron Polish-Soviet border divided the both sides and created a situation in which World War II attitudes froze for a long time.

This article seeks to demonstrate how Finnish refugee children experienced living in Swedish refugee camps during the Second World War (1939–1945). The study focuses on children’s opinions and experiences reflected through adulthood. The data were collected through retrospective interviews with six adults who experienced wartime as children in Finland and were evacuated to Sweden as refugees. Five of the interviewees were female and one of them was male. The study shows, it was of decisive importance to the refugee children’s well-being to have reliable adults around them during the evacuation and at the camps. The findings demonstrate that careful planning made a significant difference to the children´s adaptations to refugee camp life. The daily routines at the camp, such as regular meals, play time and camp school, reflected life at home and helped the children to continue their lives, even under challenging circumstances.

Abstract The Secord World War was a conflict which many British people feared might happen, but they strongly supported the efforts of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to seek a peaceful resolution of tensions with Germany over disputes in Continental Europe. Baptists in Scotland shared these concerns of their fellow citizens, but equally supported the declaration of war in 1939 after the German invasion of Poland. They saw the conflict as a struggle for spiritual values and were as concerned about winning the peace that followed as well as the war. During the years 1939 to 1945 they recommitted themselves to sharing the Christian message with their fellow citizens and engaged in varied forms of evangelism and extended times of prayer for the nation. The success of their Armed Forces Chaplains in World War One ensured that Scottish Baptist padres had greater opportunities for service a generation later. Scottish Baptists had seen closer ties established with other churches in their country under the auspices of the Scottish Churches Council. This co-operation in the context of planning for helping refugees and engaging in reconstruction at the conclusion of the war led to proposals for a World Council of Churches. Scottish Baptists were more cautious about this extension of ecumenical relationships. In line with other Scottish Churches they recognised a weakening of Christian commitment in the wider nation, but were committed to the challenge of proclaiming their faith at this time. They had both high hopes and expectations for the post-war years in Scotland.

The purpose of the research paper is to analyze the influence of the social and political conditions on changes in confessional life in the occupied Ukrainian lands during World War II. The scientific novelty: it is claimed that it was social and political conditions that caused drastic changes in the confessional map of Ukraine in 1939-1945. The determinant factor of the occupation policy – the destruction of the established confessional configuration that traditionally existed on Ukrainian lands in the USSR, Poland and Romania – has been proven. Autocephalous tendencies in Orthodox life in the General Governorate, Reichskommissariat ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Transnistria’ were studied. The personal visions of the leading Orthodox bishops regarding the institutional status of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine are reflected. The specific approaches of the German and Romanian administrations to the organization of church life are highlighted. Conclusions: it is proved that despite the attempt to create a single Orthodox Church in the territory occupied by the Wehrmacht, this did not happen due to the position of the German leadership and different views of the hierarchs of the Orthodox churches. It has been proven that all institutional changes of the occupiers grossly violated the existing traditions and canonical norms, which deprived the Church of its autonomy. It was determined that multiconfessionalism and the lack of autocephalous status of Ukrainian Orthodoxy complicated the process of forming a single Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The influence of the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as the opposition of Berlin, made this process impossible during the war. It is noted that the Romanian administration in the occupied south-western lands of Ukraine (‘Transnistria’), with the support of the Romanian Orthodox Mission, contributed to the revival of Christianity, relied on the pre-revolutionary church organization, clerics and monarchism. The Ukrainian-phobic attitudes of the majority of Romanian bishops and the occupation authorities which led to the fight against the sprouts of Ukrainian autocephaly are shown. It has been proven that the rebuilt churches, the restoration of services in them, the involvement of hundreds of clerics, Christian charity and charity, raising children in the spirit of piety, etc., contributed to the revival of ancient Christian traditions and, at the same time, were a tool for the affirmation of the occupation regime.

One of the negative phenomena of the modern world are attempts to falsify history and the results of the Second World War, 1939-1945., is an important component of the ideological confrontation in the information space of neoliberal forces of Russian society with patriotic and non-violent, is a tool for achieving geopolitical goals of a number of states. United States, European Union and Ukraine tend to distort the results of the Second World War to remove the history of the Great Patriotic War, the feat of the Soviet people, who saved the world from fascism, and the Soviet Union (Russian Federation), together with Nazi Germany put in the dock of history, accusing all the troubles of the XX century. At the same time attempts to rehabilitate fascism and substitution postwar realities lead to the destruction of the entire system of contemporary international relations and, as a consequence, to the intensification of the struggle for the redivision of the world, including military measures. China is actively implementing the historiography of the statement that World War II began June 7, 1937 and is linked to an open aggression of Japan against China. Given these circumstances, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation noted that the trend of displacement of military dangers and military threats in the information space and the inner sphere of the Russian Federation. The main internal risks attributable activity information impact on the population, especially young citizens of the country, which has the aim of undermining the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions in the field of defense of the Fatherland.

After World War II (1939-1945) a bipolar world order emerged under the leaderships of the United States and the Soviet Union. The postwar period was later called as the Cold War Era that witnessed a great tension between the Western and Eastern blocs. Both sides abstained from a direct war and generally competed in such fields as military, political, economic, cultural, and so on. Although avoiding from military interventions was the main principle, the continuous hostility between two nuclear superpowers inevitably forced them to consider military options. In this point, security question became a vital subject between the United States and the Soviet Union, and deeply influenced the shaping of characteristics of two powers’ relations. It was foreseen that the security concerns based on nuclear threat would come to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the end of the Cold War. However, the expansion of NATO to the Eastern Europe and Baltic region, and possibility of new member’s admission to NATO, including Ukraine, in one hand, Russia’s efforts to be a superpower in the world politics, on the other hand, revealed that the security concerns have not completely disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Thus, revisiting some discussions on the security concerns during the Cold War, and bringing them to the attention of academic world would be stimulating. This article will focus on some fundamental discussions on the security concerns during the Cold War. Firstly, the formation of the US national security understanding, and the role of National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) in shaping of the US security concept during the Cold War will be explained. Secondly, the role of nuclear deterrence in the establishment of national security concept will be discussed. Finally, the concept of ‘security dilemma’ and the opinions of Robert Jervis on security dilemma will be evaluated.

This essay contains a description and critical appraisal of the contemporary Ukrainian state’s policy in regard to memory of the Volhynian and Galician massacres of 1943–1945. The author engages in polemics with Tomasz Stryjek, who recently published a book on this and other issues: Ukraina przed końcem Historii. Szkice o polityce państw wobec pamięci [Ukraine Before the End of History: Essays on State Policy in Regard to Memory]. In the author’s opinion, Stryjek one-sidedly, or even naively, places hope in the idea that the EU, in the not-too-distant future, will exert effective pressure on the government in Kiev to make it adapt its narrative about the activities of the OUN and UIA against Poles and Jews to European standards of memory about the Second World War. In the author’s opinion, the Ukrainian narrative about the activities of the OUN and UIA is based on the erroneous conviction—which is comfortable for the Ukrainian side—of equal guilt in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of 1939–1947. He argues that there should be no cessation of efforts to remind Ukrainian historians and authorities about the responsibility to condemn, unambiguously, the mass crimes committed by national independence groups.

The article deals with the literature textbook published in Augsburg, Germany, in 1946 and entitled “Synopsis of the Lithuanian Literature”. It was edited by a Lithuanian writer and teacher Petronėlė Orintaitė-Janutienė, and its sources included a textbook “The Lithuanian Literature: Part 1”, published in the interwar Lithuania (in 1939) and edited by Motiejus Miškinis. However, Orintaitė-Janutienė emphasized having used the publication by Miškinis only “a little”, while writing all the rest “from the memory”. Therefore, the article aims to elucidate what image of the Lithuanian world this memory-based textbook rendition impressed upon the young person studying at a war refugees’ camp, what support it proposed, and what kind of experience it prepared the young one for. The more detailed analysis focuses on the part from the textbook that briefly outlined the concept of folklore. This choice is grounded in the idea nationalism theory that oral culture bears special significance to the formation of the nationality and development of the national consciousness. The analysis also includes some folklore texts from the literary supplement (also edited by Orintaitė-Janutienė) to the Lithuanian weakly Žiburiai (‘Lights’), published in Augsburg in 1945–1949. The author notes that the outline of the Lithuanian folklore in the textbook and the selection of the folklore samples stemmed from the interwar Lithuanian schooling tradition, but they also reflected reaction to the complicated historical situation, in view of which the national community had to rally and act together, discovering new alternatives for survival. The analyzed material allows the author to conclude that the national consciousness of the Lithuanian student at the DP camp was strengthened by presenting certain past experiences inherited from the ancestors, by fostering the idea of historical continuity, by reviving and cherishing the topographic memory, emphasizing the most important existential attitudes, and listing the culture texts testifying to the Lithuanian national distinction.

POLAND IN UKRAINIAN CINEMAMultinational Ukraine in the time of Ukrainization conducted a policy which was supportive of the national identity, allowed the possibility of the cultural development of, among others, Jews, Crimean Tatars, and Poles. Cinema was exemplary of such policy, in 1925 through to the 1930s a number of films on Jewish and Crimean Tatar topics were released by Odessa and Yalta Film Studios. However, the Polish topic, which enjoyed most attention, was heavily politicized due to tensions between the USSR and the Second Commonwealth of Poland; the Soviet government could not forgive Poland the refusal to follow the Bolshevik path. The Polish topic was particularly painful for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic due to the fact that the Western fringe of Ukrainian lands became a part of Poland according to the Treaty of Riga which was signed between Poland and Soviet Russia. This explains why Polish society was constantly denounced in the Ukrainian Soviet films The Shadows of Belvedere, 1927, Behind the Wall, 1928. Particular propagandistic significance in this case was allotted to the film PKP Piłsudski Kupyv Petliuru, Piłsudski Bought Petliura, 1926, which showed Poland subverting the stability of the Ukrainian SSR and reconstructed the episode of joint battles of Ukrainians and Poles against the Bolsheviks in the summer of 1920 as well as the Winter Campaign. The episodes of Ukrainian history were also shown on the screen during this favorable for cinema time, particularly in films Zvenyhora 1927 by Oleksandr Dovzhenko and a historical epopee Taras Triasylo 1927. The 1930s totalitarian cinema presented human being as an ideological construct. Dovzhenko strived to oppose this tendency in Shchors 1939 where head of the division Mykola Shchors is shown as a successor of Ivan Bohun, specifically in the scene set in the castle in which he fights with Polish warriors. Dovzhenko was also assigned by Soviet power to document the events of the autumn of 1939, when Soviet troops invaded Poland and annexed Western Ukraine. The episodes of “popular dedications” such as demonstrations, meetings, and elections constituted his journalistic documentary film Liberation 1940. A Russian filmmaker Abram Room while working in Kyiv Film Studios on the film Wind from the East 1941 did not spare on dark tones to denunciate Polish “exploiters” impersonated by countess Janina Pszezynska in her relation to Ukrainian peasant Khoma Habrys. Ihor Savchenko interpreted events of the 17th century according to the topic of that time in his historical film Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1941 where Poles and their acolytes were depicted as cruel and irreconcilable enemies of Ukrainian people both in terms of story and visual language, so that the national liberation war lead by Khmelnytsky appeared as a revenge against the oppressors. The Polish topic virtually disappeared from Ukrainian cinema from the post-war time up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The minor exclusions from this tendency are Zigmund Kolossovsky, a film about a brave Polish secret service agent shot during the evacuation in 1945 and the later time adaptations of the theatre pieces The Morality of Mrs Dulska 1956 and Cracovians and Highlanders 1976. Filmmakers were able to return to the common Polish-Ukrainian history during the time of independence despite the economic decline of film production. A historical film Bohdan Zinoviy Khmelnitsky by Mykola Mashchenko was released in 2008. It follows the line of interpretation given to Khmelnitsky’s struggle with Polish powers by Norman Davies, according to whom the cause of this appraisal was the peasant fury combined with the actual social, political and religious injustices to Eastern provinces. The film shows how Khmelnitsky was able to win the battles but failed to govern and protect the independence of Hetmanate which he had founded. The tragedies experienced by Poland and Ukraine during the Second World War were shown in a feature film Iron Hundred 2004 by Oles Yanchuk based on the memoirs of Yuri Borets UPA in a Swirl of Struggle as well as in documentaries Bereza Kartuzka 2007, Volyn. The Sign of Disaster 2003 among others.Translated by Larisa Briuchowecka

POLAND IN UKRAINIAN CINEMAMultinational Ukraine in the time of Ukrainization conducted a policy which was supportive of the national identity, allowed the possibility of the cultural development of, among others, Jews, Crimean Tatars, and Poles. Cinema was exemplary of such policy, in 1925 through to the 1930s a number of films on Jewish and Crimean Tatar topics were released by Odessa and Yalta Film Studios. However, the Polish topic, which enjoyed most attention, was heavily politicized due to tensions between the USSR and the Second Commonwealth of Poland; the Soviet government could not forgive Poland the refusal to follow the Bolshevik path. The Polish topic was particularly painful for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic due to the fact that the Western fringe of Ukrainian lands became a part of Poland according to the Treaty of Riga which was signed between Poland and Soviet Russia. This explains why Polish society was constantly denounced in the Ukrainian Soviet films The Shadows of Belvedere, 1927, Behind the Wall, 1928. Particular propagandistic significance in this case was allotted to the film PKP Piłsudski Kupyv Petliuru, Piłsudski Bought Petliura, 1926, which showed Poland subverting the stability of the Ukrainian SSR and reconstructed the episode of joint battles of Ukrainians and Poles against the Bolsheviks in the summer of 1920 as well as the Winter Campaign. The episodes of Ukrainian history were also shown on the screen during this favorable for cinema time, particularly in films Zvenyhora 1927 by Oleksandr Dovzhenko and a historical epopee Taras Triasylo 1927. The 1930s totalitarian cinema presented human being as an ideological construct. Dovzhenko strived to oppose this tendency in Shchors 1939 where head of the division Mykola Shchors is shown as a successor of Ivan Bohun, specifically in the scene set in the castle in which he fights with Polish warriors. Dovzhenko was also assigned by Soviet power to document the events of the autumn of 1939, when Soviet troops invaded Poland and annexed Western Ukraine. The episodes of “popular dedications” such as demonstrations, meetings, and elections constituted his journalistic documentary film Liberation 1940. A Russian filmmaker Abram Room while working in Kyiv Film Studios on the film Wind from the East 1941 did not spare on dark tones to denunciate Polish “exploiters” impersonated by countess Janina Pszezynska in her relation to Ukrainian peasant Khoma Habrys. Ihor Savchenko interpreted events of the 17th century according to the topic of that time in his historical film Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1941 where Poles and their acolytes were depicted as cruel and irreconcilable enemies of Ukrainian people both in terms of story and visual language, so that the national liberation war lead by Khmelnytsky appeared as a revenge against the oppressors. The Polish topic virtually disappeared from Ukrainian cinema from the post-war time up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The minor exclusions from this tendency are Zigmund Kolossovsky, a film about a brave Polish secret service agent shot during the evacuation in 1945 and the later time adaptations of the theatre pieces The Morality of Mrs Dulska 1956 and Cracovians and Highlanders 1976. Filmmakers were able to return to the common Polish-Ukrainian history during the time of independence despite the economic decline of film production. A historical film Bohdan Zinoviy Khmelnitsky by Mykola Mashchenko was released in 2008. It follows the line of interpretation given to Khmelnitsky’s struggle with Polish powers by Norman Davies, according to whom the cause of this appraisal was the peasant fury combined with the actual social, political and religious injustices to Eastern provinces. The film shows how Khmelnitsky was able to win the battles but failed to govern and protect the independence of Hetmanate which he had founded. The tragedies experienced by Poland and Ukraine during the Second World War were shown in a feature film Iron Hundred 2004 by Oles Yanchuk based on the memoirs of Yuri Borets UPA in a Swirl of Struggle as well as in documentaries Bereza Kartuzka 2007, Volyn. The Sign of Disaster 2003 among others.Translated by Larisa Briuchowecka

The present study investigates the predicament of Ukrainian women in post-war Austria, where numerous Ukrainian refugees found themselves after the end of the Second World War. Ukrainian women were active in public life, which led to attempts to resume the activities of the Ukrainian Women's Union. The relevance of this study is conditioned upon both the lack of its research and its importance for the history of the Ukrainian women's movement. The purpose of this paper is to consider the attempts to consolidate Ukrainian women, intensify the Ukrainian women's movement, resume the activities of the Union of Ukrainian Women in emigration, the main tasks and vectors of Ukrainian women's activities in post-war Austria. The study is based on the use of documentary materials stored in the Central State Archives of Ukraine in Lviv, the memories of people who were in DP camps and materials of the then Ukrainian press. The study employed general scientific methods of cognition (analysis, synthesis, induction, and deduction) and special-historical methods – problem-historical, chronological, comparative-historical, which enabled a comprehensive analysis of the problem. In the first post-war years, the Ukrainian women's movement was revived in camps for displaced persons and refugees in Austria and West Germany. The intensification of women’s activities was connected both with the need to solve a number of social and national problems of refugees and with the continuation of the traditions of the Ukrainian women’s movement. It was in Austria in 1945 that the Union of Ukrainian Women resumed its activities and the idea arose to establish a single organisational superstructure that would unite Ukrainian women in new political circumstances and emigration conditions (a project of the Union of Ukrainian Women of Europe). The authors of this study draw attention to the need to review the tasks of Ukrainian women in exile. Although the post-war living conditions of Ukrainian refugees in Austria did not allow for the implementation of part of the programme of the Ukrainian Women's Congress in Feldkirch, the activities of local branches of the Union of Ukrainian Women in DP camps were important for the life of Ukrainian communities, as women themselves were actively engaged in support activities, social work, organisation of cultural and educational activities, preservation of Ukrainian traditions in emigration. The present research can be used to write summary works on the history of life of Ukrainians in camps for displaced persons in Germany and Austria after the Second World War, the history of the women's movement and Ukrainian emigration

The article discusses the situation of Russian emigrants in Poland. factors of influence on its change. After the defeat of Poland in September 1939 and the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on the territory of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, Red Army troops entered on September 17, 1939. Here they first met with emigrants. Special groups of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) were stationed in the same territory. The board members of all without exception Russian emigrant organizations: cultural, educational, professional, student, charitable and others were arrested. All of them then disappeared in the Stalinist camps. In central Poland, the German invaders created the governor-general under their complete control. In October 1939, A. Hitler appointed G. Frank the Governor-General of the occupied zone. The latter believed that Poland should become a German colony, and the Poles should becomeslaves of the Great German Empire. In 1939, the Russian population of Poland consisted of Polish citizens and emigrants, their interests were defended by the Russian Committee created in 1940, and it was headed by S. L. Wojciechowski. The committee became a recognized representative of the occupation authority of the Russian part of the population of the Governor General. He issued documents for living in the country and leaving it. After the German attack on the USSR, the chairman of the Russian Committee, S. L. Wojciechowski, believed that the overthrow of the Bolshevik power was possible only with German help. However, A. Hitler and the conductor of German Eastern policy Rosenberg advocated the dismemberment of living space. This scenario does not suit most Russian emigrants. Such is the difficult fate of the Russian emigration during the Second World War.

Цель исследования – выявление круга основных проблем, находящихся в фокусе внимания украинских ученых, исследующих историю Второй мировой войны. Материалами послужили монографии, сборники статей и отдельные статьи в наиболее авторитетных научных журналах страны, опубликованные в 2014–2019 гг. Применены историко-генетический, сравнительно-исторический и типологический методы, позволившие установить, что в последние годы ведущие историки Украины продолжили менять концепцию истории Великой Отечественной войны с учетом «Методических материалов…» Украинского института национальной памяти. Сделаны выводы, касающиеся тематического спектра публикаций современных украинских историков. Отмечено, что особое внимание ими уделялось изучению пропаганды (как советской, так и гитлеровской), вопросам противоборства советских и нацистских спецслужб, уточнялись определения ряда терминов, связанных с событиями 1939–1945 гг. Выявлено большое влияние на содержание данных публикаций преобладающей сегодня на Украине идеологии. The aim of the study is to identify the circle of the main problems that are in the focus of attention of Ukrainian researchers of the history of World War II. In this case, materials published in 2014–2019 served as materials: monographs, collections of articles, and individual articles in leading scientific journals of the country (The Ukrainian Historical Journal and Pages of War History of Ukraine). The historical-genetic, comparative-historical and typological methods are applied. It is noted that, after the events of 2014, there have been quite noticeable changes in the Ukrainian historiography of World War II and its component, the Great Patriotic War. The author notes that, in recent years, leading historians of Ukraine continued to change the concept of the history of the Great Patriotic War, taking into account the “Methodological Materials for the 70th Anniversary of the Expulsion of Nazi Occupiers from Ukraine” by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, published in 2014. These recommendations consolidated the process associated with the exclusion of the term “Great Patriotic War” from scientific discourse in Ukrainian historiography. The author notes that Ukrainian historians clarified some basic military categories, concepts, and terms (military art, strategy, operational art, battle, military operation, etc.) used to describe the events of the Great Patriotic War. The material of theoretical articles is analyzed, which reflects the changes that are introduced into the mythologemes of the Ukrainian concept of World War II. It is indicated that, in many works, there is a negative criticism of the actions of the Soviet Union on the eve and during World War II, as well as criticism of the modern Russian concept of the Great Patriotic War, which is sometimes surprising. The importance of disclosing archival funds (including the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine, both central and regional) for historical research is emphasized. Conclusions are drawn regarding the thematic range of publications of modern Ukrainian historians. It is noted that a special attention is paid to studying both Soviet and Nazi propaganda, issues of confrontation between Soviet and Nazi intelligence services, the fate of German prisoners of war, celebration of the Victory Day on May 9 in different cities of the country. The author points out that the ideology prevailing in Ukraine has a great influence on the content of publications.

During World War II, the Soviet Union’s food supply was in a state of crisis. Hitler’s army had occupied the agricultural heartlands of Ukraine and Southern Russia in 1941 and, as a result, agricultural production for the entire nation had plummeted. Soldiers in Red Army, who easily ate the best rations in the country, subsisted on a daily allowance of just under a kilogram of bread, supplemented with meat, tea, sugar and butter when and if these items were available. The hunger of the Red Army and its effect on the morale and strength of Europe’s eastern warfront were causes for concern for the Soviet government and its European and American allies. The one country with a food surplus decided to do something to help, and in 1942 the United States agreed to send thousands of pounds of meat, cheese and butter overseas to help feed the Red Army. After receiving several shipments of the all-American spiced canned meat SPAM, the Red Army’s quartermaster put in a request for a more familiar canned pork product, Russian tushonka. Pound for pound, America sent more pigs overseas than soldiers during World War II, in part because pork was in oversupply in the America of the early 1940s. Shipping meat to hungry soldiers and civilians in war torn countries was a practical way to build business for the U.S. meat industry, which had been in decline throughout the 1930s. As per a Soviet-supplied recipe, the first cans of Lend-Lease tushonka were made in the heart of the American Midwest, at meatpacking plants in Iowa and Ohio (Stettinus 6-7). Government contracts in the meat packing industry helped fuel economic recovery, and meatpackers were in a position to take special request orders like the one for tushonka that came through the lines. Unlike SPAM, which was something of a novelty item during the war, tushonka was a food with a past. The original recipe was based on a recipe for preserved meat that had been a traditional product of the Ural Mountains, preserved in jars with salt and fat rather than by pressure and heat. Thus tushonka was requested—and was mass-produced—not simply as a convenience but also as a traditional and familiar food—a taste of home cooking that soldiers could carry with them into the field. Nikita Khrushchev later claimed that the arrival of tushonka was instrumental in helping the Red Army push back against the Nazi invasion (178). Unlike SPAM and other wartime rations, tushonka did not fade away after the war. Instead, it was distributed to the Soviet civilian population, appearing in charity donations and on the shelves of state shops. Often it was the only meat product available on a regular basis. Salty, fatty, and slightly grey-toned, tushonka was an unlikely hero of the postwar-era, but during this period tushonka rose from obscurity to become an emblem of socialist modernity. Because it was shelf stable and could be made from a variety of different cuts of meat, it proved an ideal product for the socialist production lines where supplies and the pace of production were infinitely variable. Unusual in a socialist system of supply, this product shaped production and distribution lines, and even influenced the layout of meatpacking factories and the genetic stocks of the animals that were to be eaten. Tushonka’s initial ubiquity in the postwar Soviet Union had little to do with the USSR’s own hog industry. Pig populations as well as their processing facilities had been decimated in the war, and pigs that did survive the Axis invasion had been evacuated East with human populations. Instead, the early presence of tushonka in the pig-scarce postwar Soviet Union had everything to do with Harry Truman’s unexpected September 1945 decision to end all “economically useful” Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union (Martel). By the end of September, canned meat was practically the only product still being shipped as part of Lend-Lease (NARA RG 59). Although the United Nations was supposed to distribute these supplies to needy civilians free of cost, travelers to the Soviet Union in 1946 spotted cans of American tushonka for sale in state shops (Skeoch 231). After American tushonka “donations” disappeared from store shelves, the Soviet Union’s meat syndicates decided to continue producing the product. Between its first appearance during the war in 1943, and the 1957 announcement by Nikita Khrushchev that Soviet policy would restructure all state animal farms to support the mass production of one or several processed meat products, tushonka helped to drive the evolution of the Soviet Union’s meat packing industry. Its popularity with both planners and the public gave it the power to reach into food commodity chains. It is this backward reach and the longer-term impacts of these policies that make tushonka an unusual byproduct of the Cold War era. State planners loved tushonka: it was cheap to make, the logistics of preparing it were not complicated, it was easy to transport, and most importantly, it served as tangible evidence that the state was accomplishing a long-standing goal to get more meat to its citizenry and improving the diet of the average Soviet worker. Tushonka became a highly visible product in the Soviet Union’s much vaunted push to establish a modern food regime intended to rival that of the United States. Because it was shelf-stable, wartime tushonka had served as a practical food for soldiers, but after the war tushonka became an ideal food for workers who had neither the time nor the space to prepare a home-cooked meal with fresh meat. The Soviet state started to produce its own tushonka because it was such an excellent fit for the needs and abilities of the Soviet state—consumer demand was rarely considered by planners in this era. Not only did tushonka fit the look and taste of a modern processed meat product (that is, it was standard in texture and flavor from can to can, and was an obviously industrially processed product), it was also an excellent way to make the most of the predominant kind of meat the Soviet Union had the in the 1950s: small scraps low-grade pork and beef, trimmings leftover from butchering practices that focused on harvesting as much animal fat, rather than muscle, from the carcass in question. Just like tushonka, pork sausages and frozen pelmeny, a meat-filled pasta dumpling, also became winning postwar foods thanks to a happy synergy of increased animal production, better butchering and new food processing machines. As postwar pigs recovered their populations, the Soviet processed meat industry followed suit. One official source listed twenty-six different kinds of meat products being issued in 1964, although not all of these were pork (Danilov). An instructional manual distributed by the meat and milk syndicate demonstrated how meat shops should wrap and display sausages, and listed 24 different kinds of sausages that all needed a special style of tying up. Because of packaging shortages, the string that bound the sausage was wrapped in a different way for every type of sausage, and shop assistants were expected to be able to identify sausages based on the pattern of their binding. Pelmeny were produced at every meat factory that processed pork. These were “made from start to finish in a special, automated machine, human hands do not touch them. Which makes them a higher quality and better (prevoskhodnogo) product” (Book of Healthy and Delicious Food). These were foods that became possible to produce economically because of a co-occurring increase in pigs, the new standardized practice of equipping meatpacking plants with large-capacity grinders, and freezers or coolers and the enforcement of a system of grading meat. As the state began to rebuild Soviet agriculture from its near-collapse during the war, the Soviet Union looked to the United States for inspiration. Surprisingly, Soviet planners found some of the United States’ more outdated techniques to be quite valuable for new Soviet hog operations. The most striking of these was the adoption of competing phenotypes in the Soviet hog industry. Most major swine varieties had been developed and described in the 19th century in Germany and Great Britain. Breeds had a tendency to split into two phenotypically distinct groups, and in early 20th Century American pig farms, there was strong disagreement as to which style of pig was better suited to industrial conditions of production. Some pigs were “hot-blooded” (in other words, fast maturing and prolific reproducers) while others were a slower “big type” pig (a self-explanatory descriptor). Breeds rarely excelled at both traits and it was a matter of opinion whether speed or size was the most desirable trait to augment. The over-emphasis of either set of qualities damaged survival rates. At their largest, big type pigs resembled small hippopotamuses, and sows were so corpulent they unwittingly crushed their tiny piglets. But the sleeker hot-blooded pigs had a similarly lethal relationship with their young. Sows often produced litters of upwards of a dozen piglets and the stress of tending such a large brood led overwhelmed sows to devour their own offspring (Long). American pig breeders had been forced to navigate between these two undesirable extremes, but by the 1930s, big type pigs were fading in popularity mainly because butter and newly developed plant oils were replacing lard as the cooking fat of preference in American kitchens. The remarkable propensity of the big type to pack on pounds of extra fat was more of a liability than a benefit in this period, as the price that lard and salt pork plummeted in this decade. By the time U.S. meat packers were shipping cans of tushonka to their Soviet allies across the seas, US hog operations had already developed a strong preference for hot-blooded breeds and research had shifted to building and maintaining lean muscle on these swiftly maturing animals. When Soviet industrial planners hoping to learn how to make more tushonka entered the scene however, their interpretation of american efficiency was hardly predictable: scientifically nourished big type pigs may have been advantageous to the United States at midcentury, but the Soviet Union’s farms and hungry citizens had a very different list of needs and wants. At midcentury, Soviet pigs were still handicapped by old-fashioned variables such as cold weather, long winters, poor farm organisation and impoverished feed regimens. The look of the average Soviet hog operation was hardly industrial. In 1955 the typical Soviet pig was petite, shaggy, and slow to reproduce. In the absence of robust dairy or vegetable oil industries, Soviet pigs had always been valued for their fat rather than their meat, and tushonka had been a byproduct of an industry focused mainly on supplying the country with fat and lard. Until the mid 1950s, the most valuable pig on many Soviet state and collective farms was the nondescript but very rotund “lard and bacon” pig, an inefficient eater that could take upwards of two years to reach full maturity. In searching for a way to serve up more tushonka, Soviet planners became aware that their entire industry needed to be revamped. When the Soviet Union looked to the United States, planners were inspired by the earlier competition between hot-blooded and big type pigs, which Soviet planners thought, ambitiously, they could combine into one splendid pig. The Soviet Union imported new pigs from Poland, Lithuania, East Germany and Denmark, trying valiantly to create hybrid pigs that would exhibit both hot blood and big type. Soviet planners were especially interested in inspiring the Poland-China, an especially rotund specimen, to speed up its life cycle during them mid 1950s. Hybrdizing and cross breeding a Soviet super-pig, no matter how closely laid out on paper, was probably always a socialist pipe dream. However, when the Soviets decided to try to outbreed American hog breeders, they created an infrastructure for pigs and pig breeding that had a dramatic positive impact of hog populations across the country, and the 1950s were marked by a large increase in the number of pigs in the Soviet union, as well as dramatic increases in the numbers of purebred and scientific hybrids the country developed, all in the name of tushonka. It was not just the genetic stock that received a makeover in the postwar drive to can more tushonka; a revolution in the barnyard also took place and in less than 10 years, pigs were living in new housing stock and eating new feed sources. The most obvious postwar change was in farm layout and the use of building space. In the early 1950s, many collective farms had been consolidated. In 1940 there were a quarter of a million kolkhozii, by 1951 fewer than half that many remained (NARA RG166). Farm consolidation movements most often combined two, three or four collective farms into one economic unit, thus scaling up the average size and productivity of each collective farm and simplifying their administration. While there were originally ambitious plans to re-center farms around new “agro-city” bases with new, modern farm buildings, these projects were ultimately abandoned. Instead, existing buildings were repurposed and the several clusters of farm buildings that had once been the heart of separate villages acquired different uses. For animals this meant new barns and new daily routines. Barns were redesigned and compartmentalized around ideas of gender and age segregation—weaned baby pigs in one area, farrowing sows in another—as well as maximising growth and health. Pigs spent less outside time and more time at the trough. Pigs that were wanted for different purposes (breeding, meat and lard) were kept in different areas, isolated from each other to minimize the spread of disease as well as improve the efficiency of production. Much like postwar housing for humans, the new and improved pig barn was a crowded and often chaotic place where the electricity, heat and water functioned only sporadically. New barns were supposed to be mechanised. In some places, mechanisation had helped speed things along, but as one American official viewing a new mechanised pig farm in 1955 noted, “it did not appear to be a highly efficient organisation. The mechanised or automated operations, such as the preparation of hog feed, were eclipsed by the amount of hand labor which both preceded and followed the mechanised portion” (NARA RG166 1961). The American official estimated that by mechanizing, Soviet farms had actually increased the amount of human labor needed for farming operations. The other major environmental change took place away from the barnyard, in new crops the Soviet Union began to grow for fodder. The heart and soul of this project was establishing field corn as a major new fodder crop. Originally intended as a feed for cows that would replace hay, corn quickly became the feed of choice for raising pigs. After a visit by a United States delegation to Iowa and other U.S. farms over the summer of 1955, corn became the centerpiece of Khrushchev’s efforts to raise meat and milk productivity. These efforts were what earned Khrushchev his nickname of kukuruznik, or “corn fanatic.” Since so little of the Soviet Union looks or feels much like the plains and hills of Iowa, adopting corn might seem quixotic, but raising corn was a potentially practical move for a cold country. Unlike the other major fodder crops of turnips and potatoes, corn could be harvested early, while still green but already possessing a high level of protein. Corn provided a “gap month” of green feed during July and August, when grazing animals had eaten the first spring green growth but these same plants had not recovered their biomass. What corn remained in the fields in late summer was harvested and made into silage, and corn made the best silage that had been historically available in the Soviet Union. The high protein content of even silage made from green mass and unripe corn ears prevented them from losing weight in the winter. Thus the desire to put more meat on Soviet tables—a desire first prompted by American food donations of surplus pork from Iowa farmers adapting to agro-industrial reordering in their own country—pushed back into the commodity supply network of the Soviet Union. World War II rations that were well adapted to the uncertainty and poor infrastructure not just of war but also of peacetime were a source of inspiration for Soviet planners striving to improve the diets of citizens. To do this, they purchased and bred more and better animals, inventing breeds and paying attention, for the first time, to the efficiency and speed with which these animals were ready to become meat. Reinventing Soviet pigs pushed even back farther, and inspired agricultural economists and state planners to embrace new farm organizational structures. Pigs meant for the tushonka can spent more time inside eating, and led their lives in a rigid compartmentalization that mimicked emerging trends in human urban society. Beyond the barnyard, a new concern with feed-to weight conversions led agriculturalists to seek new crops; crops like corn that were costly to grow but were a perfect food for a pig destined for a tushonka tin. Thus in Soviet industrialization, pigs evolved. No longer simply recyclers of human waste, socialist pigs were consumers in their own right, their newly crafted genetic compositions demanded ever more technical feed sources in order to maximize their own productivity. Food is transformative, and in this case study the prosaic substance of canned meat proved to be unusually transformative for the history of the Soviet Union. In its early history it kept soldiers alive long enough to win an important war, later the requirements for its manufacture re-prioritized muscle tissue over fat tissue in the disassembly of carcasses. This transformative influence reached backwards into the supply lines and farms of the Soviet Union, revolutionizing the scale and goals of farming and meat packing for the Soviet food industry, as well as the relationship between the pig and the consumer. References Bentley, Amy. Eating for Victory: Food Rationing and the Politics of Domesticity. Where: University of Illinois Press, 1998. 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