Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'World War, 1939-1945 – Great Britain – Influence'

This thesis examines the literary journal Horizon, its editor Cyril Connolly, and a selection of its editorial articles, poems, short stories and essays in the context of the Second World War, from 1939-45. Analyses of these works, their representation of wartime experience, and their artistic merit, serve as evidence of a shared and sustained literary engagement with the war. Collectively, they demonstrate Horizon’s role as one of the primary outlets for British literature and cultural discourse during the conflict. Previous assessments of the magazine as an apolitical organ with purely aesthetic concerns have led to enduring critical neglect and misappraisal. This thesis shows that, contrary to the commonly held view, Horizon consistently offered space for political debate, innovative criticism, and war-relevant content. It argues that Horizon’s wartime writing is indicative of the many varied types of literary response to a war that was all but incomprehensible for those who experienced it. These poems, stories and essays offer a distinctive and illuminating insight into the war and are proof that a viable literary culture thrived during the war years. This thesis also argues that Horizon, as a periodical, should be considered as a creative entity in and of itself, and is worthy of being studied in this light. The magazine’s constituent parts, interesting enough when considered separately, are shaped, informed, and granted new shades of meaning by their position alongside other works in Horizon. Chapters in the thesis cover editorials and editing, poetry, short stories, political essays, and critical essays respectively. Analyses of individual works are situated in the context of larger concerns in order to demonstrate the coherence of debate and discourse that characterised Horizon’s wartime run. In arguing that Horizon is a singular creative entity worthy of consideration in its own right, this thesis locates itself within the emerging field of periodical studies. Further, by arguing that the magazine demonstrates the value of Second World War literature, it articulates with other recent attempts to reassess the scope and quality of that literature. More specifically, this thesis offers the first focused and in-depth analysis of Horizon’s formative years.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
This thesis examines the literary journal Horizon, its editor Cyril Connolly, and a selection of its editorial articles, poems, short stories and essays in the context of the Second World War, from 1939-45. Analyses of these works, their representation of wartime experience, and their artistic merit, serve as evidence of a shared and sustained literary engagement with the war. Collectively, they demonstrate Horizon’s role as one of the primary outlets for British literature and cultural discourse during the conflict. Previous assessments of the magazine as an apolitical organ with purely aesthetic concerns have led to enduring critical neglect and misappraisal. This thesis shows that, contrary to the commonly held view, Horizon consistently offered space for political debate, innovative criticism, and war-relevant content. It argues that Horizon’s wartime writing is indicative of the many varied types of literary response to a war that was all but incomprehensible for those who experienced it. These poems, stories and essays offer a distinctive and illuminating insight into the war and are proof that a viable literary culture thrived during the war years. This thesis also argues that Horizon, as a periodical, should be considered as a creative entity in and of itself, and is worthy of being studied in this light. The magazine’s constituent parts, interesting enough when considered separately, are shaped, informed, and granted new shades of meaning by their position alongside other works in Horizon. Chapters in the thesis cover editorials and editing, poetry, short stories, political essays, and critical essays respectively. Analyses of individual works are situated in the context of larger concerns in order to demonstrate the coherence of debate and discourse that characterised Horizon’s wartime run. In arguing that Horizon is a singular creative entity worthy of consideration in its own right, this thesis locates itself within the emerging field of periodical studies. Further, by arguing that the magazine demonstrates the value of Second World War literature, it articulates with other recent attempts to reassess the scope and quality of that literature. More specifically, this thesis offers the first focused and in-depth analysis of Horizon’s formative years.

This study examines Churchill's struggle during the summer of 1940 to preserve Britain's naval superiority worldwide, through the neutralization of the French fleet and by securing the active participation of the United States. Sources consulted included autobiographies of the participants, especially those by Churchill, Reynaud, Baudouin, and Weygand, document collections, and British and American official histories. This study is organized to give a chronological analysis of Churchill's efforts from 10 May to 2 September 1940, ending with the United States' acceptance of the destroyers-for-bases agreement. This act committed them to shared strategical responsibilities with Great Britain. The thesis concludes that Churchill's efforts in this period laid the foundation for later Allied victory.

There are few events in the history of humankind which have been more compelling than the Second World War (1939-1945). Unfortunately, most of what transpired during this period of history stands obscured by events such as D-Day, Kursk, and Midway, all happenings which popular history has been more than happy to dwell upon. This study' s intent is to, with the use of primary materials, analyze one of the more "obscured" happenings of the Second World War, the Rashid Ali al-Kilani Revolt of April and May 1941. Central to this work is an assessment of the policy responses of both Great Britain and Germany to the Baghdadbased revolt. It also seeks to answer the following question: why did Great Britain approach the coup with great urgency, while Germany, for the most part, paid it very little attention? In the case of Great Britain, its traditional power position in the Middle East, and possession of both the Suez Canal and extensive oil stocks, was challenged by Axis activity in north Africa, the Balkans and Crete. The Iraqi coup simply exacerbated the British problem. London's fears were valid and its successful response reflected as much. For Germany and its leader Adolf Hitler, ideological concerns took precedence over a Middle Eastern campaign. A Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, an event which, by design, would destroy Slavism, Bolshevism, and much of world Jewry, plus gain greater Germany "living space," was primary to Hitler's thinking in the spring of 1941. Furthermore, the Fuehrer's desire for an Anglo-German "understanding" seems to have influenced his attitude in regards to the coup. Conclusions are also drawn that the policy paths chosen by each European player during the coup were met with dissension. In Great Britain's case, Middle Eastern Commander-in-Chief Archibald Wavell felt that aggressive British action in Iraq might antagonize Arab nationalism. For Germany, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was a major advocate of an antiBritish strategy and corresponding Nazi activity in Iraq. The Rashid Ali coup represented the last opportunity for Ribbentrop, prior to "Barbarossa," to expose the great vulnerability of the British Empire. From this, proffered is the theory that Ribbentrop, through an exploitation of the Iraq coup, was perhaps attempting to dissuade Hitler from an invasion of the Soviet Union.

This thesis examines the use of prisoners of war (POWs), agents and other groups of persons as source of information in the British conduct of war against Germany during the Second World War and demonstrates its significance. While the successes of Bletchley Park in decrypting German wireless traffic are well-known, human intelligence (HUMINT) has received considerably less scholarly attention. During the years 1939 to 1945, the British used an extensive espionage network, maintained informal contacts in neutral cities, and questioned refugees, convicted enemy spies and soldiers who had escaped from German captivity. Most notably, the military services established a far-reaching system of interrogation facilities to obtain intelligence from German prisoners of war in all theatres of war. These activities provided a valuable amount of intelligence on German weaponry, tactics, plans and mentality, which not only constituted useful background information in rapidly changing war conditions but also improved decision-making processes and resulting actions. During the past decades, the main focus of academic research lay on signals intelligence and its influence on British strategy and operations which resulted in a neglect of other forms of intelligence. Recent academic research has not only emphasised a more holistic view of intelligence and its impact on warfare but also points to several successful HUMINT operations such as the international cooperation in espionage and the so-called Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, United Kingdom (CSDIC(UK)). At the same time, studies in intelligence provide an extensive framework dealing with various theoretical, practical and ethical aspects which facilitates the analysis of intelligence in historical context. In light of these developments and the unprecedented access to archival material, a re-evaluation of the role of human intelligence in Great Britain during the Second World War is necessary. This thesis combines the theoretical approaches of intelligence with an examination of the organisation of human intelligence during wartime. It utilises three case studies covering the tactical, operational and strategic level of war. First, it offers a model of “main areas”, collection, analysis, dissemination and use, to examine the intelligence process in historical context. These elements constitute a set of interacting steps which describe the way from a specific piece of raw material to its use as human intelligence in decision-making. The human origin influences the characteristics of the intelligence process such as the interaction of individuals during collection, the inherent problem of reliability and accuracy, and the question of acceptance by potential users. The model also serves as a basis for an evaluation scheme: the internal value addresses the intelligence process itself, whereas the external value measures the effect within decision-making and its impact on resulting actions. Regarding the organisational aspect, the intelligence agencies responsible for human intelligence used their previous experience from the last war and grew significantly in size during the Second World War. The interrogation of prisoners of war consisted of a multi-step process with the CSDIC(UK) at the top, which over 10 000 POWs passed through. The combination of interrogation techniques – such as the omniscient trick and friendly approach, concealed microphones, and former refugees or prisoners acting as stool pigeons – resulted in a high output of accurate and appreciated HUMINT. The Secret Service (SIS) recovered after some setbacks at the beginning of the war and – supported by contacts in occupied territory – it was able to deliver reports covering a wide range of topics. In addition, the Security Service (MI5) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) supplemented the work of the SIS – besides their primary objectives. In addition to the use of enemy prisoners and agents in the field, there were three other sources for HUMINT: the questioning of refugees in the specifically designed London Reception Centre, regular contacts with interned British soldiers and individual arrangements in neutral countries, most notably in Sweden and Switzerland, which provided the Foreign Office with news of varying quality. The outcome of these extensive efforts is discussed in the three case studies. The tactical example deals with the defence against German attacks during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz in 1940/1941. POW Intelligence supplemented the other sources of intelligence with the perspective of the enemy: it provided actual data on armament, armour and equipment of German bomber and fighter aircraft; it added details on the order of battle and combat readiness of the German Luftwaffe; and it gave insight into enemy tactics, targeting and the effectiveness of British countermeasures. Therefore, HUMINT made a valuable contribution to the overall intelligence picture which supported and optimised the efforts of Fighter Command. It helped to prepare fighter pilots for their engagements with the enemy and to counter new tactics and technologies such as navigational aids for night bombing. The operational case study covers the detection of the German plans to use a liquid rocket and cruise missile (the so called V-weapons V1 and V2) against British cities, where human intelligence played a key role. In early 1943, SIS reports and secret records of conversations between German POWs convinced the authorities in London of the danger of a long range weapon of a new type. HUMINT later gave indications of the existence of two distinct weapons and the V1 firing system in Northern France. In 1944, it provided details on the characteristics and launching procedures of the V2. These contributions enabled the British not only to direct other intelligence resources such as aerial reconnaissance towards the new threat but also to develop effective offensive and defensive countermeasures. These delayed the deployment of the two weapons and significantly reduced the inflicted damage. The strategic example deals with the British efforts to assess the state of morale of the German military and civilian population. This aspect was primarily covered by human intelligence. Although the amount of raw material gradually expanded and the analytical methods became more sophisticated – especially after the drastic increase of prisoner of war interrogations after D-Day –, the impact of HUMINT remained ambivalent. Until 1943, preconceived opinions about an inferior German morale and an especially vulnerable civilian population were not altered by intelligence products provided by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee and a separate “morale committee”. The conviction in the second half of 1943 that Germany would collapse from within as it had happened in 1918 was the most visible result. In the following months, intelligence analysis improved considerably and finally falsified previous hopes; however, that development did not restrain British authorities from over-enthusiastic expectations of a rapid end of war in the summer of 1944. Ultimately, human intelligence provided a considerable insight into the inner state of the enemy, but the intelligence task to detect a predefined collapse and the attempt to conceive an elaborated concept of morale overburdened the intelligence services. This thesis combines theoretical approaches with a historical analysis and shows that human intelligence was a powerful force multiplier which the British early recognized and successfully utilized. Therefore, this thesis offers a new perspective on British intelligence and military history during the Second World War. Furthermore, it seeks to contribute to general discussions about the relevance of intelligence in decision-making up to the present day.

From 1940 through 1943, British grand strategy was shaped by a broad consensus, generally accepted and understood in the central direction of the war. This consensus was based on the assumption of relative weakness, and was expressed by what may be termed the "wear down" approach: "to knock out the props" from under Axis military power by a combination of blockade, bombing, raids, subversion and sabotage, and peripheral campaigns. An ultimate direct assault would only be launched after enemy power had visibly declined. The balance, emphasis, and specific thrust of this outline changed; its essence did not. Even as a powerful Grand Alliance emerged, the British remained convinced that the assumption of relative weakness must continue to guide its grand strategy. This assumption was finally rejected by the coalition as a whole, but it proved well founded for the British themselves. Ultimately, however, this formulation of grand strategy by consensus was, in general, a sober and responsible interpretation of the overall British situation.

This work is a critical assessment of the role of neuropsychiatry in the management of aerial warfare. Focussing almost exclusively on the Second World War (1939-45), the thesis demonstrates how the Royal Air Force (RAF) mobilised specialist medical knowledge to improve wastage and combat efficiency in flying personnel. Neurological and psychiatric expertise was enlisted to improve service performance and reduce the burden of neuropsychiatric disorders. To meet these key objectives, the RAF neuropsychiatric division undertook important administrative and therapeutic duties in the areas of personnel selection, service discipline, neuropsychiatric research, and the treatment of mental disorders. The work therefore assesses how the division responded to these challenges and contributed to the management of aerial warfare. The thesis assesses the factors that shaped the practice of neuropsychiatry in the service. Historically, the training and personal interests of specialists and the context of therapeutic practice guided the development of mental health specialties. To gain a fuller appreciation of the administrative and therapeutic duties of the division, this work explores the medical, social, military, and professional factors that shaped neuropsychiatric thought and practice. Secondly, the work engages with the 'human element' of aerial combat. The physical and mental health of aircrew was fundamental to the conduct of the air war and underpinned the administrative decisions of the air force. It was the primary objective of the neuropsychiatric division to preserve and develop these vital human resources. Neuropsychiatric disorders represented a challenge to efficiency, for they could affect the performance and motivation of a flyer. The thesis will examine how the neuropsychiatric division attempted to sustain aircrew by preventing and treating the disorders that compromised their efficiency.

This thesis is a history of the Polish Country Section of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a British organisation whose purpose was to infiltrate agents behind enemy lines during World War II. The thesis covers the period 1940 – 1946, the entire period that SOE existed, and its close connection with the Polish special department, formally known as the Sixth Bureau of the Polish Government in Exile. Chapters contained herein each cover a full year of operations from 1941 -1943, followed by two chapters for 1944, and one chapter for 1945-1946. Covered are details of agent training, information on the first flight to Poland to drop agents and couriers and the problems encountered. The German invasion of the Soviet Union and SOE’s thoughts on the predicted outcome is covered, as are also Polish operations in France and indications of support for Polish operations in other parts of the world. Throughout, is evidence of the difficulties in obtaining sufficient air support for flights to Poland which, although inadequate for Polish requirements, were more abundant than many realised at the time. This is especially true with reference to supplies dropped to Warsaw during the rising of 1944. Brief accounts of the meetings between the ‘Big Three’, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, at Teheran and Yalta in as much as they affected SOE/Polish relations. The thesis finishes with appendices detailing agent/courier parachute drops, lists of personnel involved, a bibliography and glossary.

This thesis explores the Anglo-American supply relationship, 1939-1941, and the ability of these two nations to wage a coalition war immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Organisationally, the first chapters of the thesis look at the impact of the Great War and the interwar period on this relationship. The remaining chapters are devoted to the evolution of the supply relationship between September 1939 and December 1941. The evidence found in British and American archives indicates that early supply discussions, conducted under the supervision of Arthur Purvis and Henry Morgenthau, established a common ground for Anglo-American co-operation during the early days of the Second World War. The fall of France prompted the British Government to seek much closer ties with the United States. However, in mid-1940 many senior US officials insisted that America should concentrate on its own defence against the Nazi threat because of the likelihood of Britain's defeat. By the end of 1940, the American defence planners were more confident of Britain's ability to survive, and therefore they were willing to consider the creation of Anglo-American defence plans. At the same time President Roosevelt requested Congressional approval for the Lend-Lease Act, to ensure the British Government could still acquire US war supplies even if it lacked the dollars to pay for them. Because of the inability of US industry to produce adequate war materiel for the British effort and American rearmament, representatives from the two countries were forced to work closely together to determine production and allocation priorities. Moreover, since these decisions influenced the fighting capability of British and American forces, war planners rather than civilians officials began to make these supply decisions. Subsequently, British and American officials determined that their efforts should be based on a joint strategy. Ultimately this realisation inspired the creation of the Victory Programme, which effectively acknowledged that supply needs, strategic considerations, and an overall commitment to defeat Germany and its allies were indistinguishable. Thus the supply relationship, 1939-1941, provided the foundation for the Anglo-American wartime coalition against Hitler.

This thesis examines the doctrinal and practical development of tactical air forces by the Royal Air Force until the end of the Second World War. It focuses on the fundamental disagreements over the uses of air power, the preference for a strategic vision and the pressing need for tactical air forces in the face of the exigencies of war. This paper will trace the gradual provision of air support to the land forces and the formidable and fundamental changes that occurred during operations in various theatres in the Second World War.

The purpose of this paper is to describe and explain the dynamics of the post-war British peace movement. This examination will account for, and link the two distinct phases of activity which encompassed at their peaks, the periods of 1958 to 1960, and 1981 to 1983. The defence issue declined in salience in the intervening years and was largely ignored. The paper sets out to account for these cycles of protest by determining four key factors; the creation of a potential clientele, the symbolic meaning of the movement, the catalytic historical events and the incentives for mobilisation. Three theories are used to explain these elements. Inglehart's 'Post-Materialism' thesis is utilised to explain the presence of a potential clientele in terms of a new value orientation that is emerging among post-war generations due to the unprecedented affluence experienced in their formative years. Parkin's case study of the first phase of the movement provides the symbolic protest element, that explains the salience of the peace movement to these post-materialists. It also suggests that the clientele's interest in the issue lasts as long as the issue is significant and that as soon as it declines other issues claim their attentions and energies. The final vital element is explained by adapting Olson's cost and benefit 'Collective Action' theory to this non-economic case. This theory suggests that the prominent peace movement organisation, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, provided and distributed vital selective incentives that motivated the existing clientele into protest activity. However, once the costs of non-achievement of policy goals add to the costs of protest activity (which are being raised by the radicalisation of tactics) and the organisation becomes inefficient at distributing these selective goods, the incentive to participate is removed and activity begins to decline. The combination of these three theories with the impact of historical atmosphere and a catalytic event creates a coherent explanation of the movement in both phases.
M.A.

This thesis is an exploration of the links between modernist literature and film and society at a period of historical crisis, in Gramscian terms a moment of national 'popular will'. In general, these works are informed by a greater organicity of form, replacing the previous avant-garde model of a serial or mechanical structure. This organicity, however, maintains an element of disjunction, in which, as with filmic montage, the organicity is constituted on the level of the work seen as a totality. Herbert Read's aesthetics are shown to develop with these changes in the Thirties and the war years. The work of H.D. and T.S. Eliot is explored in the light of these new structural elements, and the formal questioning of the subject through the interplay of 'we' and montages of location and address in the poems. The pre-war years are portrayed in these works as a time of shame, and the war as a possible means of redemption, perhaps through suffering, or through the new subjectivity of the wartime community. The documentary movement provides an opportunity to trace these formal changes in a historical and institutional context, and with the work of Dylan Thomas, the relations between mass and high culture, film and poetry, are investigated, as well as the representation of the Blitz, in which guilt is sublimated into celebratory transcendence. These aspects, and the adaptation of a European avant-garde to meet British cultural needs, are examined in the work of the Apocalyptic movement. The last structure of feeling is reconstruction, which is related to Herbert Read's thought, but shown to inform all these other works and to be a linking-point between ideology and the structure of the text, formed as an organic unity that promises a reconstructed post-war society.

This thesis charts the development of area bombing in British theory and practice before its formal adoption in the Second World War, and seeks to discover where its earliest origins can be located. Area bombing was the official policy of Royal Air Force Bomber Command between 1942 and 1945 in its strategic air offensive against Germany, and involved the bombing of industrial cities with the purpose of breaking down civilian morale and disrupting the German war economy. Most historical accounts present area bombing as a gradual development in bombing policy during 1940 and 1941, forced by a lack of success in destroying precise industrial targets from the air. This was the Air Force’s stated policy during the previous two decades, but it proved impossible to implement under wartime conditions. Area bombing was thus gradually adopted by progressively broadening the definition of targets from individual installations to entire towns and cities. This thesis rejects the traditional view, arguing instead that area bombing was at the heart of British bombing policy as early as the First World War. The legacy of this saw an ‘area bombing mentality’ cemented in the strategy of the Royal Air Force during the interwar period. As it was not possible to openly advocate the bombing of civilians during the 1920s and 1930s, this was shrouded in ambiguous language and kept hidden. However, the roots of area bombing come to the surface several times between the wars, and the speed with which area bombing was adopted in 1940 and 1941 shows that they were never deeply buried. While many historians have uncovered individual details that collectively support this contention, none have traced the development of this thought across the period 1917-42. Using a selection of contemporary documents and a thorough review of the secondary literature, this work shows that far from being an improvisation forced by necessity, the adoption of area bombing was unsurprising and can be traced back to 1917.

This thesis deals with the economic and political circumstances leading to the decolonization of India. The aim of thesis is to analyze the political and economic situation in British India since the beginning of World War II until 1947. The work deals with key political negotiations, which immediately led to the decolonization of India. Also analyzes the impact of the World War II and the following years on industry, agriculture and foreign trade. It also discusses the issues of war funding and state finance during the World War II and explores its impact on the situation in India.

[Truncated abstract] Many historical accounts acknowledge the ‘reverberations’ of the Second World War that are still with the British today, whether in terms of Britain’s relationships with Europe, the Commonwealth, or America; its myths of consensus politics and national unity; or its conceptions of national character. The term ‘reverberations’, however, implies a disruptive, unsettling influence whereas today’s popular accounts and public debates regarding national identity, more often than not concerned with ‘Englishness’ as a category distinctive from ‘Britishness’, instead view the Second World War as a time when the nation knew what it was and had a clear understanding of the national values it embodied a time of stability and consensus. This thesis demonstrates that, in the postwar period, ‘British’ was not a homogeneous political category, ‘Britishness’ was not a uniformly adopted identity, and representations of the nation in popular cinema were not uncontested. British national identity in the postwar 1940s and 1950s was founded upon re-presentations of the war, and yet it was an identity transacted by class, gender, race and region. Understandings of national identity ‘mirrored’ by British films were influenced by the social and political context of their creation and reception, and were also a reflection of the cinema industry and its relationship to the state. Both ‘national cinema’ and ‘national identity’ are demonstrated to be fluctuating concepts dominant myths of the war were undermined and reinforced in response to the demands of the postwar present.

Cette thèse porte sur le traitement du paysage sonore de la Grande-Bretagne de la Seconde Guerre mondiale dans la propagande britannique de la période. Plus précisément, nous nous intéressons à la façon dont le Ministère de l’Information chercha, pendant toute la durée du conflit, à contrôler l’environnement sonore de la Grande-Bretagne en guerre. Ce contrôle se traduisit, d’une part, par une tentative de neutralisation des sons de la guerre que le gouvernement, avec l’appui de la communauté scientifique, considérait comme délétères pour la santé physique et mentale des citoyens britanniques pendant le Blitz. D’autre part, les principes de propagande formulés par le gouvernement à compter du début du Blitz en particulier (septembre 1940) tels que le « People’s War » (la « guerre du peuple ») ou le « pulling together » (« tous dans le même bateau ») trouvèrent une illustration particulière dans la mise en avant de sons fédérateurs considérés comme typiques de la nation britannique.Le cœur de notre travail réside dans l’étude de la bande-son des films officiels de propagande commandés, produits ou sponsorisés par la Films Division du Ministère de l’Information. À compter du début de la guerre, l’unité documentaire britannique GPO (General Post Office) Film Unit fut intégrée au Ministère et renommée Crown Film Unit. Son rôle fut donc, tout au long de la guerre, aux côtés du Army Film Unit et des unités documentaires indépendantes – telles que le Shell Film Unit, Strand Film Company, le Realist Film Unit ou Spectator Short Films – de relayer les messages du gouvernement à travers des courts-métrages, des moyens-métrages ou des longs-métrages documentaires. Nous démontrons notamment que les principes de propagande chers au gouvernement – le « People’s War », le « pulling together », le « business as usual », etc. – ainsi que la mise en avant de la grandeur de la nation britannique et de son peuple et sa supériorité sur l’Allemagne nazie, se traduisirent dans le traitement de la bande-son de ces films et notamment dans une esthétique sonore créative. Notre étude de la bande-son des films documentaires officiels porte notamment sur le processus de « mise en musique » des sons de la nation et sur l’instauration d’un ordre musical au sein de sons disparates ainsi que sur l’établissement de constantes sonores encourageant le peuple britannique à résister face à l’adversité
This thesis deals with the treatment of the soundscape of World War II Britain in British propaganda of the period. More specifically, it focuses on how the Ministry of Information sought to handle Britain’s wartime sonic environment through the projection of propaganda messages and the control of information and cultural productions. This resulted, on the one hand, in an attempt to neutralize the sounds of war that the government, with the support of the scientific community, considered harmful to the physical and mental health of British citizens during the Blitz. On the other hand, the propaganda principles formulated by the government such as the “People’s War” or the idea that British people were “pulling together”, were specifically illustrated by several “aural icons” that were considered typical of the British nation. At the heart of my study lies the analysis of the soundtracks of official propaganda films commissioned, produced or sponsored by the Films Division of the Ministry of Information. From the beginning of the war, the British General Post Office (GPO) Film Unit was integrated into the Ministry and renamed the Crown Film Unit. Its role throughout the war was therefore, alongside the Army Film Unit and independent documentary units – such as the Shell Film Unit, Strand Film Company, Realist Film Unit and Spectator Short Films – to convey the government’s messages through short, medium and feature-length documentaries. What I demonstrate is that the government’s propaganda principles as well as their extolling of the British nation and its people, and of their superiority over Nazi Germany, were reflected in the treatment of the soundtrack of these films. Through a creative sound aesthetics, these films endeavoured to “harmonize” the sounds of the nation and establish a musical order within discrete sounds, as well as soundmarks encouraging the British people to resist in the face of adversity

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2014.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are the largest disasters suffered by South Africa in its military history. Yet, despite their enormity, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are little understood and hardly remembered. South Africa declared war on Germany on the 6 September 1939, after a bitter internal debate, amounting to a conflict between Afrikaner nationalists and those who supported the British Empire. South Africa’s political ambivalence and disunity ran parallel to her unpreparedness for war in every important department from the lack of vital coastal defences to the miniscule size of her army and air force and complete lack of a navy. The first six months of 1941 saw the South Africans play a significant part in completely defeating the Italian colonial forces in East Africa. However, the campaign was poor preparation for what the South Africans were to encounter in the North African Desert months later. South African troops spent their time rebuilding fortifications in Egypt rather than in essential training to acclimatise this “bush war” army to harsh desert conditions. In a reluctant political decision, the unprepared South Africans were committed to Operation Crusader. The inexperienced South Africans met up with the battle hardened Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh on 23 November 1941 and were annihilated in the face of overwhelming odds. In revisiting this forgotten battle, it has been found, using primary and secondary sources, that the South Africans extracted an enormous price on the German armour in what may have been the true turning point of Operation Crusader. In May 1942, Rommel’s Afrika Korps sallied forth in a series of lightning moves that demonstrated the Axis grip on combined operations and managed to isolate the vital port of Tobruk commanded by an inexperienced South African, Major General H. B. Klopper. His surrender in one day is often compared to the previous siege endured under similar circumstances, where the Australians managed to hold Rommel at bay for 244 days until the siege was lifted. Klopper’s surrender of Tobruk resulted in a political crisis for Winston Churchill and for Jan Smuts, as the fiasco caused considerable tension within the Allied camp and within South Africa. On re-examination, interesting facts have emerged from the primary source material, as to the state of the Tobruk defences and of its unfortunate commander and how the United Kingdom, acting in concert with South Africa, sought to suppress the true facts. Immediate post-war memory has been shaped and distorted by sensitive political considerations that affected relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the memory of Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk was relegated first by a nationalistic Afrikaner government and then since by a democratically elected government, both of which have seen very little use in incorporating these two milestones into the national memory.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk is die grootste nederlae wat Suid-Afrika in sy militêre geskiedenis ervaar het. Ten spyte van hul omvang, word daar min van Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk verstaan of onthou. Na ‘n hewige interne debat wat tot konflik tussen Afrikanernasionaliste en pro-Britse Suid-Afrikaners gelei het, het Suid-Afrika op 6 September 1939 oorlog teen Duitsland verklaar. Suid-Afrika se politieke verdeeldheid het saamgeval met die Unie se totale onvoorbereidheid vir oorlog, wat gestrek het van kritieke tekortkominge in kusverdediging, tot die ontoereikende grootte van die leër en lugmag en die totale afwesigheid van ‘n vloot. Gedurende die eerste ses maande van 1941 het Suid-Afrika ‘n beduidende rol gespeel om die Italiaanse koloniale magte in Oos-Afrika te verslaan. Dié veldtog was egter nie effektiewe voorbereiding vir die uitdagings waarteen die Suid-Afrikaners kort daarna in Noord-Afrika te staan sou kom nie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse troepe het daarby hul tyd daaraan bestee om vestings in Egipte te herbou in plaas daarvan om noodsaaklike opleiding te ondergaan om hul “bosoorlog”-leër vir ruwe woestynoorlogvoering voor te berei. ‘n Huiwerige, teensinnige politieke besluit het die onvoorbereide Suid-Afrikaners tot Operasie Crusader verbind. Die onervare Suid-Afrikaners het op 23 November 1941 by Sidi Rezegh teen die geharde Afrika Korps te staan gekom, waar oorweldigende magte hulle verpletter het. ‘n Heroorweging van hierdie vergete veldslag aan die hand van primêre en sekondêre bronne het aan die lig gebring dat die Suid-Afrikaners ‘n hoë tol van die Duitse pantser geëis het, wat besmoontlik die ware keerpunt in Operasie Crusader gebring het. In Mei 1942 het Rommel se Afrika Korps deur ‘n reeks blitsige bewegings wat die greep van die Spilmagte op gekombineerde operasies gedemonstreer het, daarin geslaag om die kritiese hawe van Tobruk, waar die onervare Suid Afrikaanse generaal-majoor H.B. Klopper in bevel was, te isoleer. Sy oorgawe binne ‘n enkele dag word dikwels vergelyk met die vorige beleg van Tobruk toe die Australianers Rommel onder vergelykbare omstandighede vir 244 dae teruggehou het totdat die beleg opgehef is. Klopper se oorgawe het ‘n politieke krisis vir Winston Churchill en Jan Smuts geskep, deurdat dit aansienlike spanning binne sowel die Gealieerde kamp as Suid-Afrika veroorsaak het. Die herevaluering van die gebeure het interessante feite uit die primêre bronne na vore gebring ten opsigte van die toestand van Tobruk se verdedigingstellings, die ongelukkige bevelvoerder, en hoe die Verenigde Koninkryk in samewerking met Suid-Afrika die ware feite wou toesmeer. Die onmiddellike naoorlogse geheuebeeld van die gebeure by Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk is geskep en verwring deur sensitiewe politieke oorwegings wat die verhouding tussen Suid-Afrika en die Verenigde Koninkryk beïnvloed het. Sedertdien het ‘n nasionalistiese Afrikaner-regering en daarna ook die demokraties-verkose, post-apartheid-regering die herinneringe aan Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk tot die vergetelheid verdoem; nie een van die twee het die nut daarvan gesien om dié twee mylpale in die nasionale geheue te verewig nie. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

La Seconde Guerre mondiale occupe une place centrale dans la mémoire collective britannique. Érigée en véritable mythe national, la guerre a une telle prégnance dans l’espace public en Grande-Bretagne que certains commentateurs n’hésitent pas à parler d’une obsession nationale pour le conflit. Elle en vient à constituer l’une des facettes de la « Britishness », de l’identité nationale britannique, à une heure où celle-ci est plus que jamais débattue et soumise au questionnement. Afin de déterminer si la Seconde Guerre mondiale est un mythe britannique ou un mythe anglais, ses représentations dans les pays constitutifs du Royaume-Uni et en Irlande sont ici étudiées. Les aspirations nationalistes écossaises semblent en effet avoir une influence sur les représentations de la guerre en Écosse ; quant à l’Irlande, bien qu’elle soit restée neutre pendant le conflit, cette neutralité est aujourd’hui remise en question au profit d’une interprétation selon laquelle le pays aurait soutenu sans réserve – quoique tacitement – les Alliés. Alors que le visage de la Grande-Bretagne est résolument multi-ethnique, cette étude cherche à déterminer dans quelle mesure les anciens peuples coloniaux et du Commonwealth se reconnaissent dans les représentations traditionnelles dominantes. Au coeur d’une vague de commémoration de la Seconde Guerre mondiale sans précédent, un exemple fait figure d’exception : celui des équipages du Bomber Command. Longtemps critiqués et mis à l’écart des pratiques commémoratives et de la mémoire collective britannique de la Seconde Guerre mondiale en raison de leur participation à la très controversée campagne aérienne stratégique (dont les bombardements firent des dizaines de milliers de victimes parmi les populations civiles allemandes), les équipages du Bomber Command sont aujourd’hui élevés au rang de héros en Grande-Bretagne. Le tout nouveau statut héroïque du Bomber Command marque un tournant dans l’historiographie de la campagne aérienne stratégique et dans le débat public britannique
The Second World War occupies a central place in British collective memory. The war, which is considered to be a national myth in Britain, remains pervasive in the British public debate to the point that some commentators call it a national obsession. The war constitutes one of the facets of Britishness at a time when British national identity is much debated and open to question. The representations of the Second World War in Scotland, Wales and Ireland are examined in order to determine whether the war is a British myth or an English myth. Scottish nationalist aspirations, for instance, seem to have an influence on the way the conflict is represented in Scotland. At a time when Britain is more than ever ethnically diverse, this study seeks to determine the extent to which former colonial peoples are able to recognise themselves in the traditional representations of the war which dominate the public debate in Britain. In the midst of an unprecedented boom in remembrance, the Bomber Command crews are an exception. Although their role in the combined bomber offensive (which caused thousands of victims among the German civilian population) had been subjected to much criticism and excluded bomber crews from the myth of the war, they are now hailed as heroes in Britain. Bomber Command’s newly-found heroic status is a turning point in the historiography of the air offensive and the British public debate

Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Texas at Austin, 2007.
Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 420-428). Available electronically via the University of Texas at Austin's web site.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1991.
eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 436-450).

British influence on the diplomacy of WWII, as it relates to postwar planning, is underappreciated. This work explores how the use of astute tactical maneuvering allowed Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to impact the development of the post-war world in a greater degree than is typically portrayed in the narratives of the war. Detailing how the study of business negotiations can provide new insights into diplomatic history, Yalta exposes Britain’s impact on the creation of the post-war order through analyzing the diplomacy of WWII as a negotiation. To depict WWII post-war planning diplomacy as a negotiation means that the Yalta Conference of 1945 must be the focal point of said diplomacy with all the negotiations either flowing to or from the conference. This analysis reveals that Britain harnessed the natural momentum of the negotiation process to create bilateral understandings that protected or advanced their interests in ways that should not have been afforded the weakest party in the Grand Alliance. By pursuing solutions to the major wartime issues first and most stridently through the use of age-old British diplomatic tactics, they were able to enter into understandings with another member of the Grand Alliance prior to the tripartite conferences. Creating bilateral understandings with the Americans on the direction of military operations and the Soviets over the European settlement produced the conditions under which the tripartite negotiations transpired. Options available to the excluded party were thus limited, allowing for outcomes that aligned more favorably to British interests. A synthesis of diplomatic documents, diaries, and memoirs with historical writings as well as research on business and international negotiations brings to life the diplomatic encounters that led to the creation of the post-war order. To provide the reader a basis for analysis of wartime diplomacy, this work is broken down into two parts. Part I focuses on the strategies created for Yalta. Part II (future doctoral dissertation) will use these strategies to evaluate the performances of each party. Combined the two parts expose that British diplomatic maneuverings is an undervalued aspect of wartime diplomacy.