Academic literature on the topic 'World War, 1939-1945 – Great Britain – Influence'

The following paper deals with the views of the ambassadors of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, expressed in telegrams for foreign affairs agencies. Rolling the world to a new global confrontation, the aggressive rhetoric of each participating country, specific actions to build up political and military capabilities required some kind of balanced assessment from experts who were well-versed in the political and social development of states that appeared after the Second World War on different sides of the barricade. In addition, the third world acquired special importance in the new conditions. The disintegration of the colonial system opened great prospects for each of the great powers. Therefore, besides the analyses of prospects and characteristics of relations between the USSR and Western countries, diplomats in their analytical reports affected the prospects for the development of the former colonies, as well as tried to forecast the actions of the probable enemy and the closest allies, comprehended the existing contradictions on this issue and tried to give some assessment, propose solutions to these problems. Considering the influence of the telegrams analyzed in the framework of this study on the formation of the Cold War, conclusions are drawn about the impact of assessments expressed by diplomats on the development of relations with the countries of the third world. The analysis of J. Kennan, N. Novikov and F. Roberts notes shows the difference in the approaches and understanding of each country, both its opponents and its allies, a different view of the process of decolonization and its prospects. The paper is based on the sources on the diplomatic history of the Cold War and on some references on the topic.

The article reveals mutual relationships between Great Britain and Poland on the verge of the Second World War based on the British National Archives documents. The authors acknowledge principles of the British foreign policy towards Poland and the activity of its diplomatic corps along with the War Cabinet. The paper determines that diplomatic and military-political relations between Great Britain and Poland have been multidimensional with deep historical roots. The article represents the analysis of the main misunderstandings and challenges that determined British-Polish relations before and at the beginning of the Second World War. Sequentially, the British position and interest regarding the establishment of the strategic military partnership with Poland are shown. The authors examined British-Polish agreements that were signed during the spring-summer period of 1939 in order to designate the nature of the negotiation process between the states. The publication also reveals the reasons for a weak practical element of the negotiation process, emphasising the difficulties concerning the Royal force on the European continent deployed on the Polish border. Also, the authors analyse scenarios of the counteractions towards the aggressive steps of Germany and search for the mechanisms of the aggression deterrence considering different dynamics of the events. It is stated that along with the British influence regarding the situation in Poland, either France took an active part in the decision-making process. Based on the documents from the British National Archives, the authors established that diplomatic commentaries and reports written by ambassadors and state officials with regards to German actions on the Polish territories on the verge of the Second World War. Emphasising the cruel legacy of the Nazi regime, the rapid nature of German army attacks and brutal treatment towards the Polish population in the first days of September 1939 are described. The authors concluded that actions of the British political and military circuits concerning aid to Poland at the start of the Second World War seem to have been inconsistent, unconfident and did not bring strategic effect. After the Nazi occupation of Poland, British authorities had to change their approaches to the realisation of British-Polish relations. London accepted the idea of recognition of Polish emigrated government officials headed by V. Sikorsky, providing them with substantial empowerment to the Non-Aligned Movement.

The article is devoted to the problems of modernizing Iran’s foreign policy strategy on the eve of World War II, the implementation of a set of measures to diversify its relations with the leading world powers. The factors influencing the formation of the conflict relations of Iran with Great Britain and the USSR are revealed. The features of the nationalist policy of the Reza Shah regime, aimed at liberating the country from British control and weakening Soviet influence in the country, are traced. Particular attention is paid to the formation of a pro-German course in Iran’s foreign policy. The author emphasizes that the ideological factor (Nazi propaganda about the common Aryan origin of the Germans and Iranians) played an important role in the rapprochement of the Shah’s regime of Iran with the Nazi leadership of Germany. It is stated that the rapprochement of Iran with Germany contributed to the growth of tension in Europe, the intensification of the confrontation between the bloc of fascist states and the camp of anti-fascist forces. It is also noted that as a result of the Iranian-German rapprochement, Moscow’s relations with Tehran found themselves in a crisis situation: the strengthening of Nazi influence in Iran prompted the USSR leadership to take urgent measures to ensure reliable protection of the country’s southern borders against the threat of a German attack.

This research intends to cover the process of establishment of the U.S.–Saudi relations, and the factors it was influenced by. It is based on the study of the U.S. foreign policy documents. The research has revealed that the United States recognized the government of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd (February 1931) after an agreement was reached to elevate its diplomatic representation in Iraq to the ambassadorial level. That means that the U.S. prioritized relations with the Kingdom of Iraq to relations with the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd. The United States recognized the government of the King Ibn Saud due to commercial interests. Hereafter the Department of State initiated the U.S.–Saudi Provisional Agreement in regard to Diplomatic and Consular Representation, Juridical Protection, Commerce and Navigation, signed in November 1933. It was aimed at protecting the rights of the U.S. citizens, who worked in the Kingdom since 1931, especially after obtaining the oil concession by the California Standard Oil company in May 1933. However, the diplomatic representative to Saudi Arabia was not appointed. This issue was mainstreamed when commercial volumes of oil were discovered in Saudi Arabia in 1938, the U.S. oil company signed its second concession agreement in 1939, and the U. S. commercial interests in Saudi Arabia had significantly increased. Besides, the representatives of Great Britain, Germany and Japan intensified their activities to obtain oil concessions in Saudi Arabia. The King Ibn Saud highly appreciated exclusively commercial U.S. interests, the absence of its intentions to expand political influence or to take over Saudi territories. For these reasons, he preferred cooperation with the United States to other nations. The U.S.–Saudi diplomatic relations were established on February 4, 1940, when B. Fish, who was the U. S. Minister–resident in Egypt, presented his credentials to the King Ibn Saud. The decision to establish diplomatic representation in Saudi Arabia was taken in June–July 1939. It was caused by the increasing competition for Saudi oil, not a beginning of the World War, as some scholars suggest.

In the years 1989–1944 two different wars against the Soviet Union were imposed upon Finland. During the Winter War of 1989–1940 Germany remained strictly neutral on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact&&Great Britain and France planned intervention in favour of Finland. When the second, so-called Continuation War broke out in the summer of 1041, Finland was co-belligerent of Germany, and Great Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941. De jure, however, Finland was never an ally of Germany, and at the end of the war, in the winter 1944–1945, the Finnish armed forces expelled the German troops from Lapland, which was devastated by the Germans during their retreat to Norway. Military service was compulsory for each male citizen of Finland. In 1939 the Jewish population of Finland numbered 1 700. Of these, 260 men were called up and approximately 200 were sent to serve at the front during the Winter War.

This article examines Soviet foreign policy during the Second World War in the light of new evidence from the Russian archives. It highlights the theme of spheres of influence and the relationship between the pursuit of this goal by the USSR and the outbreak of the Cold War. It argues that the Cold War was the result of an attempt by Moscow to harmonise spheres of influence and postwar cooperation with Britain and the United States with the ideological project of a people’s democratic Europe.

The exile years of Janusz Jędrzejewicz (1939-1951), a prominent and reputed educator of the inter-war Poland, deserve much of our attention. After the outbreak of the war, Jędrzejewicz initially took some effort to return to active military duty but these attempts failed to be successful. Along with the evacuation of the government, the Jędrzejewiczs had to leave Poland for Romania and had to remain there as exiles. Dull, everyday routine in exile in Romania was interspersed with Jędrzejewicz’s involvement in teaching maths and in meetings with fellow exiles, the followers of Józef Piłsudzki. The years from July 1940 until the end of the year, Jędrzejewicz and his family spent in Turkey. In the dire straits he was in at the time, to minimize stress and inconvenience in housing, he managed to find some balance and relief in his political and social activity. Jędrzejewicz managed to establish contacts with other exiles, notably Tatar, Caucasian and Ukrainian exiles. As a result of the meetings with the non-Polish émigrés, the concept of the so-called “Międzymorze – Intermarum”, a proposed federation of countries stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, emerged. The years between 1940 and 1942 Jędzerzejowicz and his family spent in Tel-Aviv in Palestine. The local Polish political and military circles were closely associated with former “colonels” and Gen. Sławoj-Składkowski’s supporters and were labelled as “steadfast” or “unyielding”. In a straightforward way, the leadership of this group fell to Jędrzejewicz as the one who was the highest ranking Pilsudski-ite among them. The group became the core of the political movement founded upon a concept that underlined the ideas of the late marshal and represented their supporters in the Near East. Jędrzejewicz was very active in writing articles on social and political subjects and in giving lectures, including notably the one delivered on March 19, 1941 and entitled “On the occasion of the anniversary of the name day of First Marshal of Poland” He was also involved in talks with leaders of local Jewish and Arabic population. The presented concept of “Intermarum” was received with interest by politicians in exile from the Baltics, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. It also formed an alternative to the realpolitik exercised by the government in exile.An important initiative of the group of the Pilsudski-ites was to publish Biuletyn Informacyjny (News Bulletin), and then to transform it into the official monthly Na Straży (On guard). The editor-in-chief of the periodical was Jędrzejewicz himself (from issue 18th onwards). In the course of time, still in Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem, the Piłsudski-ite groups grew more and more members. These circles, physically far from the government in exile in London and its influence, were thus more independent and formed a sort of a mutation and an alternative to the London-based Związek Pracy Państwowej (State Labour Union). Under the leadership of Janusz Jędrzejewicz, the Piłsudzki-ites in Palestine organized themselves in Związek Pracy dla Państwa (Union of Work for the State). The Polish political scene in exile was going through many dramatic changes and transformations. Political tension was aggravated further by Prof. Kot’s action who had returned from the Soviet Union in mid-1942. He perceived the activity of some of Polish exiles in the Near East as politically detrimental and anti-government. As for Prof Kot’s intense dislike for Jędrzejewicz, it was guided by the two following reasons: the latter’s influence in circles overtly reluctant to accept the stance adopted by the government represented by Gen. Sikorski, and, secondly, his personal grudge and resentment towards the former minister of religious affairs and education (Polish: MriOP). The political situation of the years 1944-1946 was decisive in creating the atmosphere less negative and more cooperative, and ultimately led to the emergence of the idea of a common platform for reconciliation and understanding for all splinter groups of Piłsudski followers. The common denominator for all was to be the Independence League, a political party in exile, of which, until 1947, Jędrzejewicz knew very little about. From 1942 the Jędrzejewiczs lived in Jerusalem, where they enjoyed good rapport and relations with local Arab leaders. Despite some health problems, Jędrzejewicz engaged himself in a series of lectures and continued to edit the periodical Na Straży. Soon, however, he was forced to step down this post due to aggravating health problems. Towards the end of 1946, the former prime minister was transferred to the reserve. This helped Jędrzejewicz to obtain a decision to be moved to Great Britain. Before he left Jerusalem, however, he spent half a year with his family in harsh conditions of El Kantara field hospital, which was also a transit camp for war refugees. The circles of the London-based Pilsudski-ites were very much counting on Jędrzejewicz’s Związek Pracy dla Państwa. The promoters of the Independence League also viewed the former prime minister, who was a one-time trustworthy aide to Marshal Piłsudski, as their potential leader. Jędrzejewicz himself was quite aware of his assets and the position he enjoyed within the hierarchy of values as a Piłsudski-ite and, despite bad health, was ready to support the League. In the first half of 1948, with the help of Jędrzejewicz, the fundamentals of the political program of the Poland’s Independence League were established. However, the following infightings and quarrels as to who was to head the League made Jędrzejewicz step down from the position of the leader of the League. From that time on, his activity was limited to writing articles and the participation in the work for the board of trustees of the London Piłsudski Institute. Jędrzejewicz’s last years of his life were undoubtedly influenced by his poor health (1948-1951). He was repeatedly hospitalized, which was taken advantage of by his political opponents in 1948. His physical state was very much influenced by his mental condition, which was a result the victimization and persecution he experienced between 1939-1943. An emotional shock for him was undoubtedly the news about his son who had been shot by the Germans in 1943, and the death of his former wife, Maria Stattler, in 1944. Eventually, all his energy was directed at administrative and research work. With his participation, or at his initiative, four research institutes were established at the time. The intention was to conduct historical or political science research there. Janusz Jędrzejewicz died on March 16th 1951. In exile, he was unfortunate enough to experience ostracism from fellow Poles, both as a politician and as a man. Still, he was far from shunning the world and, with dignity, he carried out his mission of executing the tasks once set by his Commander. As an exile, he was just as well a good representative of a Piłsudski-ite with a characteristic appropriate system of values that determined his life style. The ongoing internalization of the imponderables of his beloved Commander was though respected in the multi-faceted realities of Polish exile life.

The article talks about Kindertransports – the major rescue action organized by British-Jewish organizations, and run from the territory of Great Britain between 1938 and 1939. The Kindertransports aimed at gathering and sending to Great Britain Jewish children under the age of seventeen, in order to prevent them from witnessing, or being victims of the acts of violence in Nazi controlled Europe. Once in Great Britain, the children were supposed to spend several weeks with British families willing to give them shelter and support. Those for whom foster parents would not be found, were to be sent to boarding schools or temporary shelters. In the action’s planning phase the institutions involved considered the Kindertransports to be a temporary solution. As the situation of the Jewish population in Nazi controlled Europe worsened, it became clear that the character of the action needed to be revised, and the families were expected to guest the children for a longer and unspecified time. In the end approximately 10.000 Jewish children, who travelled to the Isles, were allowed to stay throughout the times of war. In 1945 it became clear that vast majority of them had no place or family to get back to. They stayed in Great Britain becoming an important and vital part of the British society, with British citizenships granted shortly after the end of the war. The article discusses the organization of the Kindertransport and talks about other solutions taken under consideration both by the program organizers, and the British government. It elaborates on the experiences the children shared, that is being separated from their families, feeling homesick, or finding oneself in the new environment. It explains the question of the lost identity of the participants of the program and speaks on how the subjects dealt with it. It also shows how the British legislature and laws connected to the Enemy Alien status together with the Defence Regulation 18B influenced lives of the underage survivors. The article ends with an attempt of estimation of what happened to the Kindertransport children after the war. How many of them remained in Great Britain and considered themselves British, how many shown high level of mobility and spend their lives changing their place of residence. In the end how many of them kept their self-identification as Jews, and how many converted.

ABSTRACT During the Second World War, the central Mediterranean island of Malta was famously besieged by the Italian navy and intensively bombed by Italian and later German air forces, from June 1940 until Allied victory in North Africa in May 1943 brought an end to the siege. It was then scheduled as a staging post to support the Allied invasion of Sicily from North Africa in July 1943 and of mainland Italy from Sicily in September. From 1941 until 1945, two Tunnelling Companies Royal Engineers, overlapping in succession, excavated underground facilities safe from aerial or naval bombardment. In 1943 and then 1944–1945, two Boring Sections Royal Engineers in succession drilled wells to enhance water supplies, initially for increased troop concentrations. Borehole site selection was guided in 1943 by the Director of the Geological Survey of Great Britain (Edward Battersby Bailey: 1881–1965) and by geologists Captain Frederick William Shotton (1906–1990) and Major Gordon Lyall Paver (1913–1988). In 1944, it was guided by geologist Captain Howard Digby Roberts (1913–1971), leading a detachment from 42nd Geological Section of the South African Engineer Corps that pioneered earth resistivity surveys on the island. Overall, these military studies generated a new but unpublished geological map of the island at 1:31,680-scale and refined knowledge of its geological structure: a much faulted but otherwise near-horizontal Oligo-Miocene sedimentary sequence. Further refinement was achieved as a consequence of the 1944–1945 drilling programme, led principally by geologist Captain Thomas Owen Morris (1904–1989) of the Royal Engineers. By 1945, this had helped to develop an improved water supply system for the island, and plans to develop groundwater abstracted from a perched upper aquifer (in the Upper Coralline Limestone and underlying Greensand formations, above a ‘Blue Clay’) as well as from the main lower aquifer, near sea level (in the Globigerina Limestone and/or underlying Lower Coralline Limestone formations).

This thesis examines the literary journal Horizon, its editor Cyril Connolly, and a selection of its editorial articles, poems, short stories and essays in the context of the Second World War, from 1939-45. Analyses of these works, their representation of wartime experience, and their artistic merit, serve as evidence of a shared and sustained literary engagement with the war. Collectively, they demonstrate Horizon’s role as one of the primary outlets for British literature and cultural discourse during the conflict. Previous assessments of the magazine as an apolitical organ with purely aesthetic concerns have led to enduring critical neglect and misappraisal. This thesis shows that, contrary to the commonly held view, Horizon consistently offered space for political debate, innovative criticism, and war-relevant content. It argues that Horizon’s wartime writing is indicative of the many varied types of literary response to a war that was all but incomprehensible for those who experienced it. These poems, stories and essays offer a distinctive and illuminating insight into the war and are proof that a viable literary culture thrived during the war years. This thesis also argues that Horizon, as a periodical, should be considered as a creative entity in and of itself, and is worthy of being studied in this light. The magazine’s constituent parts, interesting enough when considered separately, are shaped, informed, and granted new shades of meaning by their position alongside other works in Horizon. Chapters in the thesis cover editorials and editing, poetry, short stories, political essays, and critical essays respectively. Analyses of individual works are situated in the context of larger concerns in order to demonstrate the coherence of debate and discourse that characterised Horizon’s wartime run. In arguing that Horizon is a singular creative entity worthy of consideration in its own right, this thesis locates itself within the emerging field of periodical studies. Further, by arguing that the magazine demonstrates the value of Second World War literature, it articulates with other recent attempts to reassess the scope and quality of that literature. More specifically, this thesis offers the first focused and in-depth analysis of Horizon’s formative years.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
This thesis examines the literary journal Horizon, its editor Cyril Connolly, and a selection of its editorial articles, poems, short stories and essays in the context of the Second World War, from 1939-45. Analyses of these works, their representation of wartime experience, and their artistic merit, serve as evidence of a shared and sustained literary engagement with the war. Collectively, they demonstrate Horizon’s role as one of the primary outlets for British literature and cultural discourse during the conflict. Previous assessments of the magazine as an apolitical organ with purely aesthetic concerns have led to enduring critical neglect and misappraisal. This thesis shows that, contrary to the commonly held view, Horizon consistently offered space for political debate, innovative criticism, and war-relevant content. It argues that Horizon’s wartime writing is indicative of the many varied types of literary response to a war that was all but incomprehensible for those who experienced it. These poems, stories and essays offer a distinctive and illuminating insight into the war and are proof that a viable literary culture thrived during the war years. This thesis also argues that Horizon, as a periodical, should be considered as a creative entity in and of itself, and is worthy of being studied in this light. The magazine’s constituent parts, interesting enough when considered separately, are shaped, informed, and granted new shades of meaning by their position alongside other works in Horizon. Chapters in the thesis cover editorials and editing, poetry, short stories, political essays, and critical essays respectively. Analyses of individual works are situated in the context of larger concerns in order to demonstrate the coherence of debate and discourse that characterised Horizon’s wartime run. In arguing that Horizon is a singular creative entity worthy of consideration in its own right, this thesis locates itself within the emerging field of periodical studies. Further, by arguing that the magazine demonstrates the value of Second World War literature, it articulates with other recent attempts to reassess the scope and quality of that literature. More specifically, this thesis offers the first focused and in-depth analysis of Horizon’s formative years.

This study examines Churchill's struggle during the summer of 1940 to preserve Britain's naval superiority worldwide, through the neutralization of the French fleet and by securing the active participation of the United States. Sources consulted included autobiographies of the participants, especially those by Churchill, Reynaud, Baudouin, and Weygand, document collections, and British and American official histories. This study is organized to give a chronological analysis of Churchill's efforts from 10 May to 2 September 1940, ending with the United States' acceptance of the destroyers-for-bases agreement. This act committed them to shared strategical responsibilities with Great Britain. The thesis concludes that Churchill's efforts in this period laid the foundation for later Allied victory.

There are few events in the history of humankind which have been more compelling than the Second World War (1939-1945). Unfortunately, most of what transpired during this period of history stands obscured by events such as D-Day, Kursk, and Midway, all happenings which popular history has been more than happy to dwell upon. This study' s intent is to, with the use of primary materials, analyze one of the more "obscured" happenings of the Second World War, the Rashid Ali al-Kilani Revolt of April and May 1941. Central to this work is an assessment of the policy responses of both Great Britain and Germany to the Baghdadbased revolt. It also seeks to answer the following question: why did Great Britain approach the coup with great urgency, while Germany, for the most part, paid it very little attention? In the case of Great Britain, its traditional power position in the Middle East, and possession of both the Suez Canal and extensive oil stocks, was challenged by Axis activity in north Africa, the Balkans and Crete. The Iraqi coup simply exacerbated the British problem. London's fears were valid and its successful response reflected as much. For Germany and its leader Adolf Hitler, ideological concerns took precedence over a Middle Eastern campaign. A Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, an event which, by design, would destroy Slavism, Bolshevism, and much of world Jewry, plus gain greater Germany "living space," was primary to Hitler's thinking in the spring of 1941. Furthermore, the Fuehrer's desire for an Anglo-German "understanding" seems to have influenced his attitude in regards to the coup. Conclusions are also drawn that the policy paths chosen by each European player during the coup were met with dissension. In Great Britain's case, Middle Eastern Commander-in-Chief Archibald Wavell felt that aggressive British action in Iraq might antagonize Arab nationalism. For Germany, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was a major advocate of an antiBritish strategy and corresponding Nazi activity in Iraq. The Rashid Ali coup represented the last opportunity for Ribbentrop, prior to "Barbarossa," to expose the great vulnerability of the British Empire. From this, proffered is the theory that Ribbentrop, through an exploitation of the Iraq coup, was perhaps attempting to dissuade Hitler from an invasion of the Soviet Union.

This thesis examines the use of prisoners of war (POWs), agents and other groups of persons as source of information in the British conduct of war against Germany during the Second World War and demonstrates its significance. While the successes of Bletchley Park in decrypting German wireless traffic are well-known, human intelligence (HUMINT) has received considerably less scholarly attention. During the years 1939 to 1945, the British used an extensive espionage network, maintained informal contacts in neutral cities, and questioned refugees, convicted enemy spies and soldiers who had escaped from German captivity. Most notably, the military services established a far-reaching system of interrogation facilities to obtain intelligence from German prisoners of war in all theatres of war. These activities provided a valuable amount of intelligence on German weaponry, tactics, plans and mentality, which not only constituted useful background information in rapidly changing war conditions but also improved decision-making processes and resulting actions. During the past decades, the main focus of academic research lay on signals intelligence and its influence on British strategy and operations which resulted in a neglect of other forms of intelligence. Recent academic research has not only emphasised a more holistic view of intelligence and its impact on warfare but also points to several successful HUMINT operations such as the international cooperation in espionage and the so-called Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, United Kingdom (CSDIC(UK)). At the same time, studies in intelligence provide an extensive framework dealing with various theoretical, practical and ethical aspects which facilitates the analysis of intelligence in historical context. In light of these developments and the unprecedented access to archival material, a re-evaluation of the role of human intelligence in Great Britain during the Second World War is necessary. This thesis combines the theoretical approaches of intelligence with an examination of the organisation of human intelligence during wartime. It utilises three case studies covering the tactical, operational and strategic level of war. First, it offers a model of “main areas”, collection, analysis, dissemination and use, to examine the intelligence process in historical context. These elements constitute a set of interacting steps which describe the way from a specific piece of raw material to its use as human intelligence in decision-making. The human origin influences the characteristics of the intelligence process such as the interaction of individuals during collection, the inherent problem of reliability and accuracy, and the question of acceptance by potential users. The model also serves as a basis for an evaluation scheme: the internal value addresses the intelligence process itself, whereas the external value measures the effect within decision-making and its impact on resulting actions. Regarding the organisational aspect, the intelligence agencies responsible for human intelligence used their previous experience from the last war and grew significantly in size during the Second World War. The interrogation of prisoners of war consisted of a multi-step process with the CSDIC(UK) at the top, which over 10 000 POWs passed through. The combination of interrogation techniques – such as the omniscient trick and friendly approach, concealed microphones, and former refugees or prisoners acting as stool pigeons – resulted in a high output of accurate and appreciated HUMINT. The Secret Service (SIS) recovered after some setbacks at the beginning of the war and – supported by contacts in occupied territory – it was able to deliver reports covering a wide range of topics. In addition, the Security Service (MI5) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) supplemented the work of the SIS – besides their primary objectives. In addition to the use of enemy prisoners and agents in the field, there were three other sources for HUMINT: the questioning of refugees in the specifically designed London Reception Centre, regular contacts with interned British soldiers and individual arrangements in neutral countries, most notably in Sweden and Switzerland, which provided the Foreign Office with news of varying quality. The outcome of these extensive efforts is discussed in the three case studies. The tactical example deals with the defence against German attacks during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz in 1940/1941. POW Intelligence supplemented the other sources of intelligence with the perspective of the enemy: it provided actual data on armament, armour and equipment of German bomber and fighter aircraft; it added details on the order of battle and combat readiness of the German Luftwaffe; and it gave insight into enemy tactics, targeting and the effectiveness of British countermeasures. Therefore, HUMINT made a valuable contribution to the overall intelligence picture which supported and optimised the efforts of Fighter Command. It helped to prepare fighter pilots for their engagements with the enemy and to counter new tactics and technologies such as navigational aids for night bombing. The operational case study covers the detection of the German plans to use a liquid rocket and cruise missile (the so called V-weapons V1 and V2) against British cities, where human intelligence played a key role. In early 1943, SIS reports and secret records of conversations between German POWs convinced the authorities in London of the danger of a long range weapon of a new type. HUMINT later gave indications of the existence of two distinct weapons and the V1 firing system in Northern France. In 1944, it provided details on the characteristics and launching procedures of the V2. These contributions enabled the British not only to direct other intelligence resources such as aerial reconnaissance towards the new threat but also to develop effective offensive and defensive countermeasures. These delayed the deployment of the two weapons and significantly reduced the inflicted damage. The strategic example deals with the British efforts to assess the state of morale of the German military and civilian population. This aspect was primarily covered by human intelligence. Although the amount of raw material gradually expanded and the analytical methods became more sophisticated – especially after the drastic increase of prisoner of war interrogations after D-Day –, the impact of HUMINT remained ambivalent. Until 1943, preconceived opinions about an inferior German morale and an especially vulnerable civilian population were not altered by intelligence products provided by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee and a separate “morale committee”. The conviction in the second half of 1943 that Germany would collapse from within as it had happened in 1918 was the most visible result. In the following months, intelligence analysis improved considerably and finally falsified previous hopes; however, that development did not restrain British authorities from over-enthusiastic expectations of a rapid end of war in the summer of 1944. Ultimately, human intelligence provided a considerable insight into the inner state of the enemy, but the intelligence task to detect a predefined collapse and the attempt to conceive an elaborated concept of morale overburdened the intelligence services. This thesis combines theoretical approaches with a historical analysis and shows that human intelligence was a powerful force multiplier which the British early recognized and successfully utilized. Therefore, this thesis offers a new perspective on British intelligence and military history during the Second World War. Furthermore, it seeks to contribute to general discussions about the relevance of intelligence in decision-making up to the present day.

From 1940 through 1943, British grand strategy was shaped by a broad consensus, generally accepted and understood in the central direction of the war. This consensus was based on the assumption of relative weakness, and was expressed by what may be termed the "wear down" approach: "to knock out the props" from under Axis military power by a combination of blockade, bombing, raids, subversion and sabotage, and peripheral campaigns. An ultimate direct assault would only be launched after enemy power had visibly declined. The balance, emphasis, and specific thrust of this outline changed; its essence did not. Even as a powerful Grand Alliance emerged, the British remained convinced that the assumption of relative weakness must continue to guide its grand strategy. This assumption was finally rejected by the coalition as a whole, but it proved well founded for the British themselves. Ultimately, however, this formulation of grand strategy by consensus was, in general, a sober and responsible interpretation of the overall British situation.

This work is a critical assessment of the role of neuropsychiatry in the management of aerial warfare. Focussing almost exclusively on the Second World War (1939-45), the thesis demonstrates how the Royal Air Force (RAF) mobilised specialist medical knowledge to improve wastage and combat efficiency in flying personnel. Neurological and psychiatric expertise was enlisted to improve service performance and reduce the burden of neuropsychiatric disorders. To meet these key objectives, the RAF neuropsychiatric division undertook important administrative and therapeutic duties in the areas of personnel selection, service discipline, neuropsychiatric research, and the treatment of mental disorders. The work therefore assesses how the division responded to these challenges and contributed to the management of aerial warfare. The thesis assesses the factors that shaped the practice of neuropsychiatry in the service. Historically, the training and personal interests of specialists and the context of therapeutic practice guided the development of mental health specialties. To gain a fuller appreciation of the administrative and therapeutic duties of the division, this work explores the medical, social, military, and professional factors that shaped neuropsychiatric thought and practice. Secondly, the work engages with the 'human element' of aerial combat. The physical and mental health of aircrew was fundamental to the conduct of the air war and underpinned the administrative decisions of the air force. It was the primary objective of the neuropsychiatric division to preserve and develop these vital human resources. Neuropsychiatric disorders represented a challenge to efficiency, for they could affect the performance and motivation of a flyer. The thesis will examine how the neuropsychiatric division attempted to sustain aircrew by preventing and treating the disorders that compromised their efficiency.

Abstract This chapter focuses on the role played by Anglicans in shaping the culture of Remembrance in Great Britain, the Dominions, and the United States in the formative years after the First World War. In doing so, it highlights the defining role of the King James Bible and the 1662 Book of Common Prayer in the idiom of Remembrance, questioning assumptions as to its innately ‘secular’ quality. It also illustrates Anglican influence on the work of the Imperial War Graves Commission and how this was accompanied by the phenomenon of post-war Anglican ‘pilgrimage’ to the battlefields of 1914 to 1918. Besides considering the significance of the practical demands and iconography of Remembrance and memorialization, it also examines the political overtones of Anglican-sponsored Remembrance, especially its quest for social harmony and its affirmation of loyalty to the Empire. The chapter explores the inter-war multiplication of regimental chapels in the cathedrals and major churches of England and Wales, their place in the vaunted regimental system of the British Army, and their potency as symbols of Anglican identification with the service and sacrifice of local communities. The chapter concludes with a consideration of how these tendencies persisted after 1945, especially with the creation of the Battle of Britain Memorial Chapel in Westminster Abbey and in the imperatives which drove the transformation of St Clement Danes in London into the Central Church of the Royal Air Force in the 1950s.

The Brexiteers presented a revived partnership with the United States as the cornerstone of Britain’s new Anglosphere-centered diplomacy. Without the United States, any Anglosphere project would lose meaning, and the future of Britain outside the European Union would be grim. But this chapter argues that the focus on the “special relationship” was based on a delusional national myth. Historically, the specialness, which discounted an enormous gap in terms of power and influence between the two countries, has been more keenly felt in London than in Washington. Since 1945, America’s absolute strength and Britain’s relative weakness has always determined a highly unbalanced relationship. In the eyes of Dean Acheson—Secretary of State in the Truman Administration—British rhetoric surrounding the “special” connection between the two countries reflected nothing more than the UK’s unwillingness to accept its post-imperial status: that of a simple transatlantic intermediary and Anglo-Saxon balancer in European affairs. It has been observed that, from 1945 onwards, the “special relationship” rapidly assumed the character of a “special dependancy”, with Britain being very much the junior partner. Currently, the difference in terms of power and influence between the two countries is as great as in the past—if not even greater, given Britain’s diminished influence in European affairs. On top of that, bridging the policy inconsistencies between “America First” (based on unilateralism and protectionism) and “Global Britain” (based on multilateralism and free markets) might represent an insurmountable obstacle.

While most naval action within the Mediterranean during the First World War took place in the east and in the Adriatic, in waters that lapped the shores of the disintegrating empires of the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, the entire Mediterranean became the setting for rivalry between 1918 and 1939. At the centre of the struggle for mastery of the Mediterranean lay the ambitions of Benito Mussolini, after he won control of Italy in 1922. His attitude to the Mediterranean wavered. At some moments he dreamed of an Italian empire that would stretch to ‘the Oceans’ and offer Italy ‘a place in the sun’; he attempted to make this dream real with the invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, which, apart from its sheer difficulty as a military campaign, was a political disaster because it lost him whatever consideration Britain and France had shown for him until then. At other times his focus was on the Mediterranean itself: Italy, he said, is ‘an island which juts into the Mediterranean’, and yet, the Fascist Grand Council ominously agreed, it was an imprisoned island: ‘the bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunisia, Malta and Cyprus. The guards of this prison are Gibraltar and Suez.’ Italian ambitions had been fed by the peace treaties at the end of the First World War. Not merely did Italy retain the Dodecanese, but the Austrians were pushed back in north-eastern Italy, and Italy acquired much of Italia irredenta, ‘unredeemed Italy’, in the form of Trieste, Istria and, along the Dalmatian coast, Zara (Zadar), which became famous for the excellent cherry brandy produced by the Luxardo family. Fiume (Rijeka) in Istria was seized by the rag-tag private army of the nationalist poet d’Annunzio in 1919, who declared it the seat of the ‘Italian Regency of Carnaro’; despite international opposition, by 1924 Fascist Italy had incorporated it into the fatherland. One strange manifestation, which reveals how important the past was to the Fascist dream, was the creation of institutes to promote the serious study (and italianità, ‘Italianness’) of Corsican, Maltese and Dalmatian history.