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1
Plėšnys, Albinas. "DUNSO ŠKOTO MINČIŲ ATGARSIAI WITTGENSTEINO ETIKOJE." Problemos 84 (January 1, 2013): 111–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2013.0.1774.
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Straipsnyje analizuojamos Wittgensteino etinės pažiūros, pateiktos jo veikale „Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus“ ir „Lecture on Ethics“. Juose Wittgensteinas tvirtina, kad etikos dalykai nepriklauso faktų sričiai. Todėl negali būti jokių etikos teiginių ir etika negali būti išreikšta. Wittgensteinas buvo vienas iš analitinės filosofijos kūrėjų ir etikos problemas svarsto būdu, kuris vėliau tapo įprastas šios filosofijos atstovams. Jis analizuoja, kaip kalboje funkcionuoja etikai būdingos sąvokos, ir tuo grindžia savo išvadas. Klasikinėje tradicijoje etinių sąvokų funkcionavimo ypatumai buvo aiškinami remiantis proto ir valios santykiu. Wittgensteinas etiką irgi sieja su valios subjektu, laikydamasis tam tikros proto ir valios santykio sampratos. Mūsų nuomone, ji labiausiai artima Dunso Škoto pasiūlytai proto ir valios santykio interpretacijai. Tačiau ne ja Wittgensteinas grindžia savo išvadą apie tai, kad etika neišreiškiama.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: absoliučios vertybės, etika, faktai, valios subjektas, santykinės vertybės.Ripples of Duns Scotus’ Thinking in Wittgenstein’s EthicsAlbinas Plėšnys Abstract The paper deals with Wittgenstein’s interpretation of ethics which was given in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in his Lecture on Ethics. He asserts that there are no propositions which we would call ethical propositions and that statements of facts can express nothing ethical. It is clear for him that ethics cannot be expressed. Wittgenstein was a pioneer in the field of analytic philosophy and he considered ethical questions in the manner of thought typical for its protagonists. He analyses the working of ethical conceptions in spoken language and draws the conclusions on this basis. On the other hand, in the classical tradition the peculiarity of ethical concepts had been founded on the relations of subject’s mind and volition. Wittgenstein linked ethics with the willing subject too. What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world, says he. We think Wittgenstein’s opinion is closest to Duns Scotus’ understanding of the relation of mind and will. On the other hand, Wittgenstein argues the conclusion that ethics is inexpressible without appealing on mind and will relation.Keywords: absolute values, ethics, facts, subject of the will, relative values.
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Munz, Volker. "Bachmann und Wittgenstein. Versuch einer Annäherung." Colloquium: New Philologies 9, no. 1-2 (2024): 54–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.23963/cnp.2024.9.1.3.
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The following contribution focuses on Ingeborg Bachmann’s reception of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly the central theses of his famous Tractatus logico-philosophicus, published in 1922. Her two radio essays from 1953, Sagbares und Unsagbares – Die Philosophie Ludwig Wittgensteins, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Zu einem Kapitel der jüngsten Philosophiegeschichte show Bachmann’s deep understanding of essential aspects in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. Bachmann was also responsible for the German publication of Wittgenstein’s Werkausgabe Band I, including the Tractatus and his second masterpiece Philosophical Investigations in 1960. On several occasions Bachmann mentions the influence Wittgenstein had on her. The text will focus on selected topics of his philosophy that also had a strong impact on Bachmann, such as his famous concept of the unsayable, the limits of language, or his understanding of the Western civilization and culture at his times.
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Li, Yecheng. "Research on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language in the Later Period." Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media 42, no. 1 (March 14, 2024): 95–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/42/20240803.
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Wittgenstein puts forward two different theories of language in his philosophical career. This paper discusses the transformation from early Wittgenstein's theory to later Wittgensteins theory, and analyzes and evaluates the latter. Early Wittgenstein still adopted the western traditional philosophys mode of thinking , based his theory on ontology and languages image theory, and constructed an ideal artificial language to describe facts in the form of proposition. However, such theories and mode of thinking faced many difficulties and challenges, and the necessity and rationality of constructing an ideal language are questioned. Later Wittgenstein realized the countless ways in which language is used in daily life, and believed that each use of language in life should be regarded as a "language game". Given that, the proposition discussed in the earlier theory is just one of the countless "language games". Therefore, Wittgensteins early theory seems to oversimplify the use of language. Later Wittgenstein believed that in order to explore the meaning of language, we should not search for the essence from a metaphysical perspective, but should search for the form of human life and the daily use of language. This is the core of notion meaning is usage . The endless debate of philosophers for thousands of years, therefore, results from the fact that philosophers have been trapped in the dilemma of language and have vainly tried to overcome the upper limit of their mind. Later Wittgenstein thus classify the use of language into misuse and normal use, and reminded human to always reflect on their use of language. Although his theory seems to disobey the traditional mode of thinking of Western philosophy, it should be regarded as a great and valuable idea.
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König, Christoph. "The Unutterable as a Mode of Utterance: Wittgenstein’s Two Remarks on “Count Eberhard’s Hawthorn” by Ludwig Uhland." Wittgenstein-Studien 12, no. 1 (February 3, 2021): 91–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2021-0005.
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Abstract Uhland’s poem has found fame as a litmus test in philosophical debates about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Like many works of art, the poem is dynamically produced in its effort to resolve a fundamental conflict. The poem’s conflict arises from the difficulty to connect the count’s life and his daydream. In the end, the poem as a whole serves to embody a critique of the capacity of a daydream to recover memories faithfully. Wittgenstein makes two remarks in a 1917 letter to Paul Engelmann that pertain to the poem. They are to be read in keeping with a resolute reading (James Conant, Cora Diamond) of the Tractatus; Wittgenstein’s first remark imitates the very movement of thought we find in the poem – and in doing so Wittgenstein makes good on his claim to talk about the poem: “the unutterable is, – unutterably – contained in what is uttered.” His second remark has, thus far, played no role in literature – Wittgenstein speaks of Engelmann’s dreams, yet he does not explicitly formulate the poem’s bearing on them. Here, too, he reenacts, in the formulation of his remark, the core conflict of the poem. My interpretation of the poem, finally, distinguishes three interpretive approaches (symbolistic, realistic, critical) in order to capture the understanding of the poem embodied in Wittgenstein's remarks.
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Mühlhölzer, Felix. "Witigenstein and the Regular Heptagon." Grazer Philosophische Studien 62, no. 1 (January 24, 2001): 215–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-06201011.
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The later Wittgenstein holds that the sole function of mathematical propositions is to determine the concepts they invoke. In the paper this view is discussed by means of a single example: Wittgenstein's investigation of the concept of a regular heptagon as used in Euclidean geometry (i.e., the Euclidean construction game with ruler and compass) and in Cartesian analytic geometry. Going on from some well-known passages in Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, and completing these passages, it is shown that Wittgenstein’s view makes perfectly good sense and can be very well defended.
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Muresan, Maria Rusanda. "Wittgenstein in Recent French Poetics: Henri Meschonnic and Jacques Roubaud." Paragraph 34, no. 3 (November 2011): 423–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/para.2011.0034.
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Two recent French poets, Henri Meschonnic and Jacques Roubaud, have found in Wittgenstein's philosophy an alternative to post-structuralist poetics. Meschonnic's poetry and his theoretical writings show a sustained critical engagement with Wittgenstein, whom he reads in conjunction with Emile Benveniste. The writers inform his theory of poetic rhythm and his practice of biblical translation. Roubaud's use of Wittgenstein, by contrast, here examined in the collection Quelque chose noir (1984), is linked partly with the poet's grief following the death of his wife Alix Cléo Roubaud, a photographer and an avid reader of Wittgenstein. In Roubaud, Wittgenstein opens up the space for a meditation on disappearance and absence. Roubaud reformulates passages from Wittgenstein's On Certainty (Wittgenstein's last philosophical text written when he was already seriously ill) in poems evoking Alix's memory.
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Somavilla, Ilse. "Wittgenstein in seinen Briefen." Jahrbuch für Internationale Germanistik 53, no. 2 (January 1, 2021): 177–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/ja532_177.
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Abstract Wittgensteins philosophischer Nachlass umfasst ca. 20.000 Seiten und ist seit dem Jahr 2000, in der vom Wittgenstein Archiv der Universität Bergen erarbeiteten elektronischen Fassung, zugänglich. Seit 2014 wird an der Wittgenstein Source gearbeitet, die direkten Zugang zu den Faksimiles ermöglicht.
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Owesen, Erlend Winderen Finke. "Wittgenstein's Critique of Moore in On Certainty." Nordic Wittgenstein Review 6, no. 2 (January 25, 2018): 71–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v6i2.3440.
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This paper clarifies Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore in On Certainty, and argues that this critique is largely misunderstood, for two reasons. Firstly, Wittgenstein partly misrepresents Moore. Secondly, Wittgenstein is wrongly taken to be an (access-) internalist regarding justification for knowledge. Once we realize these two points, we can understand Wittgenstein’s critique properly as a grammatical argument in that Moore fails to see how the concepts of knowledge and certainty relate to those of justification and evidence. On this reading, we can also understand that Moore and Wittgenstein were in more agreement than many people have thought, even though Moore was not able to exploit and express his philosophical insights (which he shares with Wittgenstein) properly.
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Segal, Alex. "Deconstruction, Literature, and Wittgenstein’s Privileging of Showing." Advances in Language and Literary Studies 8, no. 6 (December 25, 2017): 112. http://dx.doi.org/10.7575/aiac.alls.v.8n.6p.112.
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Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing involves a privileging of the latter. This privileging, which is both ethical and aesthetic, emerges in Wittgenstein’s attitudes to literature. Involving the metaphysics of presence and an oppositional hierarchy, it seems to be a possible target of Derrida’s deconstruction. Indeed, in Wittgenstein, Derrida sees an effacement of theory, an effacement that Derrida criticises and that can be construed as part and parcel of Wittgenstein’s privileging of showing. For theory belongs to saying rather than to showing. Focusing on commentators of Wittgenstein who affirm the privileging of showing, this essay explores a tension between Wittgenstein and Derrida that pertains to this privileging.
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Morra, Lucia. "Wittgenstein and Piccoli." Wittgenstein-Studien 11, no. 1 (January 20, 2020): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2020-0002.
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AbstractIn 1929 Ludwig Wittgenstein met Raffaello Piccoli, the Serena Professor of Italian, with whom he arranged several meetings in the following terms. For a long time their intellectual friendship was suggested only by the occurrences of Piccoli’s name in Wittgenstein’s Cambridge Pocket Diaries, then a paper about Piccoli including hypothesis on his meetings with Wittgenstein was published (Marjanović 2005), and more recently, the diaries of a student of both Piccoli and Wittgenstein in 1929 – 1930 were discovered. The new material, on the background of data now available about Piccoli’s life and works, throws new light onto his relationship with Wittgenstein, and hypothesis on the topics of their conversations are also advanced. Piccoli’s perspective on the difference between ethics, religion and philosophy on the one hand and science on the other was in tune with Wittgenstein’s view and similar was also their aversion towards scientism; furthermore, Piccoli had read many of the authors for which Wittgenstein showed an interest in 1930 – 1931 – Freud, Spengler, Frazer, Augustine, and also James.
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Kumar, Eesha. "Wittgenstein in the Moonlight." Qui Parle 33, no. 1 (June 1, 2024): 35–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/10418385-11125474.
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Abstract Wittgenstein’s claims against private language and the existence of riddles have consolidated his reputation as a philosopher of the ordinary. This article makes a case for Wittgenstein as a thinker of enigma. His understudied remarks on riddles configure the ordinary and the transcendent in a novel and counterintuitive dynamic. This constitutes Wittgenstein’s most significant contribution to the study of the ordinary: a demarcation between language as the domain of the ordinary and mystery as the realm of meaning. The intricate interrelationship of these realms animates Wittgenstein’s abiding interest in the “limits” of knowledge and his pursuit of finely calibrated modes of analysis. The leitmotif of the riddle leads us through an exploration of Wittgenstein’s mottled oeuvre and serves as an occasion to ponder the question of “the question” in philosophy (as a matter of discursive form) as well as philosophy’s approach to “answers.” Acts of reading and interpretation, associated etymologically with “riddling,” are imbued with a special urgency in Wittgenstein’s thought, which this article brings to bear on recent debates on surface reading and close reading. To scholars of the ordinary, this article offers a critical reappraisal of Wittgenstein’s contribution, and to Wittgenstein scholars a (perhaps unfamiliar) moonlit Wittgenstein.
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Snellman, Lauri Juhana Olavinpoika. "Hamann's Influence on Wittgenstein." Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7, no. 1 (June 26, 2018): 59. http://dx.doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v7i1.3467.
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The paper examines Johann Georg Hamann’s influence on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. Wittgenstein’s letters, diaries and Drury’s memoirs show that Wittgenstein read Hamann’s writings in the early 1930s and 1950s. Wittgenstein’s diary notes and the Cambridge lectures show that Wittgenstein’s discussion of Hamann’s views in 1931 corresponds to adopting a Hamannian view of symbols and rule-following. The view of language as an intertwining of signs, objects and meanings in use forms a common core in the philosophies of Hamann and Wittgenstein. The harmony of language and reality takes place in communicative use, so non-communicative private languages and pre-linguistic ideal forms of representation are not possible. Language is a free response to reality, and it involves belief-systems and trust.
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Matar, Anat. "Wittgenstein and Modernism: an encounter of the third kind = Wittgenstein y el modernismo: un encuentro en la tercera fase." REVISTA DE HISTORIOGRAFÍA (RevHisto) 32 (November 20, 2019): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/revhisto.2019.4894.
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Abstract: In earlier works, the author has twice discussed Wittgenstein’s work in relation to the modernist Geist that prevailed during his time. In the first, it was argued that the Tractatus was a modernist cornerstone, and then the idea was advanced that Wittgenstein’s later thought exemplified an essential modernist trait. Without contradicting these claims, a criticism is now offered on the aestheticism crucial to modernism and also to Wittgenstein’s thought.Key words: Wittgenstein, modernism, Tractatus, criticism, Aesthetics.Resumen: En el pasado, dos veces trabajé discutiendo sobre el trabajo de Wittgenstein en relación con el Geist que prevalecía en su época. Argüí, primero, que el Tractatus era una piedra angular y entonces continué la idea de que el último pensamiento de Wittgenstein ejemplificaba un esencial tratado modernista. Sin contradecir estos propósitos, ofrezco ahora una visión crítica del esteticismo crucial para el Modernismo y también para el pensamiento de Wittgenstein.Palabras clave: Wittgenstein, Modernismo, Tractatus, teoría crítica, estética.
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Montibeller, Marcello. "L'Ubersetzungsregel in Wittgenstein." PARADIGMI, no. 2 (July 2009): 47–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2009-002005.
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In this paper we discuss the evolution of the concept of Übersetzungsregel in Wittgenstein's writings from the early period to the later manuscripts, focusing on: i) the relationship between the early formalist concept of translation and the work on experimental scale models Wittgenstein carried out as engineering researcher in Manchester; ii) the relationship between Piero Sraffa's critique to neo-classical economy and Wittgenstein's new, anthropologically oriented, idea of translation, in which a formal concept of "translation rule" is no longer acceptable.Parole chiave: Wittgenstein, Traduzione, Sraffa, Modello sperimentale, Antropologia, FrazerKeywords:Wittgenstein, Translation, Sraffa, Experimental model, Anthropology, Frazer. 198 Paradigmi. Rivista di critica filosofica
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da Silva, Rui Sampaio. "Wittgenstein e a Hermenêutica." Phainomenon 7, no. 1 (October 1, 2003): 129–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2003-0049.
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Abstract The article attempts to articulate Wittgensteinian and hermeneutic views of knowledge, language and understanding. Wittgenstein is not a member of the so-called hermeneutic tradition, but his late work has important affinities with the work of hermeneutic thinkers like Heidegger and Gadamer. Firstly, Wittgenstein and hermeneutics share a basic philosophical altitude that can be termed as “phenomenology of everydayness”. An important result of such an approach is the acknowledgement of the pragmatic and social dimension of knowledge. Secondly, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Gadamer reject formal or systematic theories of meaning and claim that language is the universal medium of human experience. Thirdly, they conceive of understanding as a practical ability. Wittgenstein helps us to clarify some hermeneutic themes and develops them from an antimetaphysical standpoint. On the other hand, hermeneutics can refine some aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought; a case in point is the Gadamerian doctrine of the fusion of horizons, which avoids the danger of relativism that lurks in Wittgenstein’s late work. A comparative study of Wittgenstein and hermeneutics contributes therefore to effective philosophical progress.
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Kober, Michael. "Wittgenstein and Religion." Grazer Philosophische Studien 71, no. 1 (April 24, 2006): 87–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-071001007.
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It will be shown that Wittgenstein's philosophical approach to religion is substantially shaped by William James' . For neither during the period nor later does Wittgenstein thematise religious doctrines, but rather struggles to determine what it means for a sincere person to have a specific religious (James called these attitudes "experiences"). Wittgenstein's almost exclusive focus on attitudes explains, (i) why he is able to strictly discriminate between scientific and empirical claims on the one hand and religious utterances on the other, (ii) why religious and mythical narrations should not be understood as promoting (pre-scientific) theories, (iii) why Wittgenstein non-cognitively interprets religious utterances such as "This is God's will" as avowals, and (iv) why he seems to promote fideism. Wittgenstein's one-sided way of reflecting on religious matters, however, should not be understood as adumbrating or even promoting any more specific account of religion, especially bearing in mind that many of his remarks concerning religion are connected to or motivated by reflections on his own life. This thesis is meant to imply that Wittgenstein does not, as the usual understanding holds, offer a theology for atheists.
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HJ, Ribeiro. "Wittgenstein’s Ignorance of Argumentation Theory and Toulmin’s Rehabilitation of Wittgenstein." Philosophy International Journal 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2024): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.23880/phij-16000326.
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The author- following his own research on the subject- argues that Wittgenstein ignores argumentation theory and in general, the problems of rhetoric and argumentation. From this point of view, he frames Stephen Toulmin’s reading of Wittgenstein, arguing that the British philosopher- who was a student of the Austrian- advocates precisely the same thesis. He explains that this happens in a very peculiar (rhetorical) context on Toulmin’s part; a context in which, in essence, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is being rehabilitated.
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Rosa, Marcos Henrique. "Wittgenstein, necessidade e linguagem." Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 14, no. 1 (August 1, 2013): 53–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.v14i1.571.
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O objetivo do texto é elucidar a concepção wittgensteiniana de necessidade lógica. Minha estratégia é a de contrastar a posição de Wittgenstein com duas outras formas de convencionalismo: o convencionalismo dos empiristas lógicos e o convencionalismo "full-blooded". O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como a explicação fornecida por Wittgenstein evita certos problemas que assolam outras formas de convencionalismo linguístico. AbstractThe purpose of the text is to clarify Wittgenstein's conception of logical necessity. My strategy is to contrast Wittgenstein's position with other two forms of conventionalism: the conventionalism of the logical positivists and the " full-blooded" conventionalism . The aim of this paper is to show how Wittgenstein's account of logical necessity avoids some pitfalls of other forms of linguistic conventionalism.
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De Iaco, Moira. "New Philosophical Aspects and the Philological Questions Emerging by Exploring the Digital Edition of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass." Wittgenstein-Studien 14, no. 1 (June 21, 2023): 207–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2023-0011.
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Abstract The main goals of this paper are to highlight the new philosophical aspects emerging from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and to analyze some of the philological questions that should be considered by editors and translators of Wittgenstein’s writings and by scholars of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. There are undoubtedly advantages to be had from exploring Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and this contribution will be focused on them. However, there are also some critical issues to be taken into account. They concern Wittgenstein’s way of writing and doing philosophy as well as the status of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and the history of their publication. The advantages of investigating Wittgenstein’s movements of thought through and across the Nachlass and the resulting critical issues will be argued from the perspective of direct work editing Wittgenstein (e. g., the edition of two discovered letters of 1934 from Wittgenstein to Sraffa) and through the semantic reconstruction of crucial concepts from Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This reconstruction has been realized by the searching of Wittgenstein’s concepts occurrences and the recording and exploration of the nuances of meaning represented by each occurrence within the project to compose a Wittgenstein dictionary from the Nachlass.
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Angerer, Simon. "Ludwig Harigs Sprechstundenroman, Wittgensteins Gebrauchstheorie und die Nachkriegsavantgarden: ein Fallbeispiel." Germanica 74 (2024): 73–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/11w1f.
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Der Artikel behandelt Ludwig Harigs ‚Roman‘ Sprechstunden für die deutsch-französische Verständigung und die Mitglieder des gemeinsamen Marktes, ein Familienroman im Rahmen einer Bezugnahme auf Wittgenstein, die sich implizit und explizit in vielen Texten der deutschsprachigen Nachkriegsavantgarden findet. Fokussiert werden soll hierbei die literarische Appropriation von Wittgensteins Gebrauchstheorie und seines Konzepts des Sprachspiels, die auf der Form- und Verfahrensebene des Textes nachvollzogen werden soll. Zugleich wird ein Seitenblick auf die Wittgenstein-Rezeption der Wiener Gruppe und die daraus hervorgehende Wittgenstein-Kritik Oswald Wieners geworfen und mit Harigs Position in Beziehung gesetzt, wodurch sehr unterschiedliche – aber immer von Wittgenstein ausgehende – Wege neoavantgardistischer Sprachreflexion und Sprachkritik unter die Lupe genommen werden.
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Cohen, Michael. "Was Wittgenstein a Plagiarist?" Philosophy 76, no. 3 (July 2001): 451–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819101000390.
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Laurence Goldstein has ‘re-created’ Wittgenstein's doctoral viva, arguing that had Wittgenstein's dissertation, his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, ‘been judged by normal standards of originality and philosophical argumentation, it would have failed’. Goldstein claims that Wittgenstein ‘lifted’ central doctrines from Russell and from Bernard Bolzano. I point out that passages allegedly plagiarized from Russell are actually criticisms of his doctrines, and that there is no evidence that Wittgenstein even knew Bolzano's work, directly or indirectly. I argue that alleged similarities, substantial and stylistic, between his work and Bolzano's give no support even to a weaker claim of influence.
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Summerfield, Donna M. "Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Kantian Geometry." Dialogue 29, no. 4 (1990): 531–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300048241.
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That Wittgenstein in the Tractatus likens logic to geometry has been noticed; however, the extent and force of the analogy he develops between logical form and a broadly Kantian account of geometry has not been sufficiently appreciated. In this paper, I trace Wittgenstein's analogy in detail by looking closely at the relevant texts. I then suggest that we regard the fact that Wittgenstein develops his account of logical form by analogy with a Kantian account of geometry as evidence for the bold thesis that Wittgenstein belongs within a Kantian epistemological tradition. Finally, I supply two small pieces of the interpretive puzzle needed to support the larger thesis: first, evidence that Wittgenstein's concern with logical form involves a crucial epistemological component; second, a sketch of how Wittgenstein's account of logical and mathematical knowledge can be viewed as continuing a Kantian tradition.
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Bojin, Nis. "Language Games/Game Languages: Examining Game Design Epistemologies Through a ‘Wittgensteinian’ Lens." Eludamos: Journal for Computer Game Culture 2, no. 1 (February 29, 2008): 55–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.7557/23.5972.
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Recent theorizing around games and notions of play has drawn from a pool of mid-20th century scholars including such notables as Johann Huizinga, Gregory Bateson, Roger Caillois and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Through his articulation of the concept of language as a type of game, Wittgenstein has been both adopted and critiqued for purposes of circumscribing what are now commonly held as the necessary constituents of games including their systemic nature and the acquiescence of their participants to an agreed-upon rule structure: a set of rules which Wittgenstein likens to the ‘grammar’ of language (Salen and Zimmerman, 2001;Suits, 1978; Juul, 2005; Wittgenstein, 1953; Finch, 2001; Brenner, 1999). Although thus far Wittgenstein has served as a pillar of 20th and 21st century game theory canon, this paper adopts Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games not for purposes of examining games, but for purposes of examining the design of games. The pursuit of this paper is to utilize Wittgenstein’s lens of the language-game to investigate what it is that informs and consequently shapes and reinforces game design epistemologies in an attempt to encourage a reflexivity about the design practices behind the games we create.
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Hansen, Kaj Børge. "REMARKS ON WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHY: PRIVATE LANGUAGE AND MEANING." DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY 42, no. 1 (August 2, 2007): 33–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300_0420103.
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This essay is a critical analysis of some themes in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It is not primarily Wittgenstein-exegesis. Much more modestly, my purpose is to express my own thoughts about some questions which Wittgenstein has treated in his writings. It is the first in a series of two articles. The second article, “Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Philosophical Method and Contradictions”, will occur in next year’s issue of the present YEARBOOK. Section 1, “The Private Language Argument”. An independent argument is given for Wittgenstein’s thesis that there is no private language. I show that psychological terms in ordinary language, in contrast to an implication of Wittgenstein’s own private language argument, in their meanings do contain references to inner states, processes, or events. Section 2, “Meaning”. Wittgenstein’s definition of meaning as use in the language is criticised. Meaning is instead identified with something in the content of a conscious mind. Applications are given to some suggestions in philosophy of language by Chomsky, Grice, Harman and Fodor, and Kripke. For orientation, I also include here the abstract for the second article, “Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Philosophical Method and Contradictions”. Section 1, “Philosophical Method”. Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as language therapy is criticised. Instead philosophy is construed as foundational research. Wittgenstein’s statement that mathematical logic cannot contribute to progress in philosophy is repudiated. Several examples of ideas and results in mathematical logic which have led to the solution of philosophical problems are given. Section 2, “Contradictions: The Wittgenstein-Turing Debate”. In lectures on the foundations of mathematics given in 1939, Wittgenstein claimed that contradictions in mathematical theories are harmless. A debate ensued on this question between him and Alan Turing. In support of Turing’s standpoint, I use the theorem on Taylor series, Church’s Theorem, and Gentzen’s Cut-Elimination Theorem to show that Wittgenstein’s standpoint is untenable.
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Hansen, Kaj Børge. "REMARKS ON WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD AND CONTRADICTIONS." DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY 43, no. 1 (August 2, 2008): 7–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300_0430102.
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This essay is a critical analysis of some themes in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It is not primarily Wittgenstein-exegesis. Much more modestly, my purpose is to express my own thoughts about some questions which Wittgenstein has treated in his writings. It is the second in a series of two articles. The first article, “Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Private Language and Meaning", was published in Volume 42, 2007, of the present YEARBOOK. Section 1, “Philosophical Method”. Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as language therapy is criticised. Instead philosophy is construed as foundational research. Wittgenstein’s statement that mathematical logic cannot contribute to progress in philosophy is repudiated. Several examples of ideas and results in mathematical logic which have led to the solution of philosophical problems are given. Section 2, “Contradictions: The Wittgenstein- Turing Debate”. In lectures on the foundations of mathematics given in 1939, Wittgenstein claimed that contradictions in mathematical theories are harmless. A debate ensued on this question between him and Alan Turing. In support of Turing's standpoint, I use the theorem on Taylor series, Church's Theorem, and Gentzen’s Cut-Elimination Theorem to show that Wittgenstein’s standpoint is untenable. For orientation, I also include here the abstract for the first article in the series, “Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Private Language and Meaning”. Section 1, “The Private Language Argument”. An independent argument is given for Wittgenstein’s thesis that there is no private language. I show that psychological terms in ordinary language, in contrast to an implication of Wittgenstein’s own private language argument, in their meanings do contain references to inner states, processes, and events. Section 2, “Meaning”. Wittgenstein’s definition of meaning as use in the language is criticised. Meaning is instead identified with something in the content of a conscious mind. Applications are given to some suggestions in the philosophy of language by Chomsky, Harman and Fodor, Grice, and Kripke.
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Harré, Rom. "The Complexity of Wittgenstein's Methods." Philosophy 83, no. 2 (April 2008): 255–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819108000491.
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AbstractIn claiming to draw out an inconsistency between Wittgenstein's declarations on method and his actual practice, John Cook argues that Wittgenstein retained a radical distinction between material things (bricks) and immaterial things (spooks). I argue that on the contrary Wittgenstein showed in detail how this dichotomy is to be rejected in favour of a spectrum of more or less ‘minded' beings, at one pole of which are persons as animated bodies. Discussing the grammar of ‘know', Cook claims that Wittgenstein depended on philosophers' distinctions rather than a surview of vernacular uses. I argue that it was the expression/description distinction that Wittgenstein used to make sense of the grammar of ‘know'.
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Azarov, K. V. "Tolstoy and Wittgenstein on education." Abyss (Studies in Philosophy, Political science and Social anthropology), no. 3 (September 15, 2023): 85–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.33979/2587-7534-2023-3-85-92.
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Tolstoy deeply influenced Wittgenstein. They both shared an anti-foundationalist position on many philosophical questions. Not surprisingly, Tolstoy and Wittgenstein’s views on education were germane. They both advocated a creative free educational process. The two can be compared to how educational philosophy develops out of anti-foundationalist premises. The article shows the Tolstoyan influence in non-religious spheres of Wittgenstein’s thought, particularly in Wittgenstein’s view on education.
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Button, Tim. "Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (July 2018): 205–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000061.
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AbstractIn the early-to-mid 1930s, Wittgenstein investigated solipsism via the philosophy of language. In this paper, I want to reopen Wittgenstein's ‘grammatical’ examination of solipsism.Wittgenstein begins by considering the thesis that only I can feel my pains. Whilst this thesis may tempt us towards solipsism, Wittgenstein points out that this temptation rests on a grammatical confusion concerning the phrase ‘my pains’. In §1, I unpack and vindicate his thinking.After discussing ‘my pains’, Wittgenstein makes his now famous suggestion that the word ‘I’ has two distinct uses: a subject-use and an object-use. The purpose of Wittgenstein's suggestion has, however, been widely misunderstood. I unpack it in §2, explaining how the subject-use connects with a phenomenological language, and so again tempts us into solipsism. In §§3–4, I consider various stages of Wittgenstein's engagement with this kind of solipsism, culminating in a rejection of solipsism (and of subject-uses of ‘I’) via reflections on private languages.
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Sánchez Durá, Nicolás. "“Die Künstlerische Betrachtungsweise…”: Wittgenstein on miracles = “Die Künstlerische Betrachtungsweise...”, Wittgenstein sobre los milagros." REVISTA DE HISTORIOGRAFÍA (RevHisto) 32 (November 20, 2019): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/revhisto.2019.4893.
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Abstract: Miracles are certainly a matter for the philosophy of religion. A defence is here raised, however, of the idea that Wittgenstein’s conception of miracles is closely connected with the artistic way of seeing in general, and with the consideration of literary fiction in particular. The connection can be established through a family of closely related concepts: “seeing as”, “the dawning of an aspect”, “image” and “perspective”. They are all involved in Wittgenstein’s aesthetic conceptions, in his analyses of art and also in his conception of miracles.Key words: Wittgenstein, miracles, art, religion.Resumen: Los milagros son ciertamente una cuestión de filosofía de la religión. En cualquier caso, me gustaría defender que la concepción de los milagros de Wittgenstein está íntimamente conectada con la forma de contemplación artística en general y con la consideración de la ficción literaria en particular. La conexión puede establecerse a través de una familia de conceptos relacionados: «ver como», «el fulgurar de un aspecto», «imagen» y «perspectiva». Estos conceptos están incluidos en las concepciones estéticas de Wittgenstein, en sus análisis del arte y también en su concepción de los milagros.Palabras clave: Wittgenstein, milagros, arte, religión.
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Hommen, David. "Wittgenstein, Ordinary Language, and Poeticity." KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 35, no. 4 (December 1, 2021): 313–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0036.
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Abstract The later Wittgenstein famously holds that an understanding which tries to run up against the limits of language bumps itself and results in nothing but plain nonsense. Therefore, the task of philosophy cannot be to create an ‘ideal’ language so as to produce a ‘real’ understanding for the first time; its aim must be to remove particular misunderstandings by clarifying the use of our ordinary language. Accordingly, Wittgenstein opposes both the sublime terms of traditional philosophy and the formal frameworks of modern logics—and adheres to a pointedly casual, colloquial style in his own philosophizing. However, there seems to lurk a certain inconsistency in Wittgenstein’s ordinary language approach: his philosophical remarks frequently remain enigmatic, and many of the terms Wittgenstein coins seem to be highly technical. Thus, one might wonder whether his verdicts on the limits of language and on philosophical jargons might not be turned against his own practice. The present essay probes the extent to which the contravening tendencies in Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy might be reconciled. Section 2 sketches Wittgenstein’s general approach to philosophy and tracks the special rôle that the language of everyday life occupies therein. Section 3 reconstructs Wittgenstein’s preferred method for philosophy, which he calls perspicuous representation, and argues that this method implements an aesthetic conception of philosophy and a poetic approach to philosophical language, in which philosophical insights are not explicitly stated, but mediated through well-worded and creatively composed descriptions. Section 4 discusses how Wittgenstein’s philosophical poetics relates to artificial terminologies and grammars in philosophy and science.
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Figueiredo, Florian Franken. "Wittgensteins Manuskriptbände aus dem Jahr 1929." Wittgenstein-Studien 14, no. 1 (June 21, 2023): 95–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2023-0006.
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Abstract Wittgenstein's manuscript volumes from 1929: Reflections on the Chronology of MSS 105 – 107. In this paper I identify the evidence that might be used to establish a viable chronology for Wittgenstein’s writing of his manuscript volumes 105 – 107 and sections thereof. Since Wittgenstein omits to date his entries in these three 1929 volumes between February 15 and September 11, the evaluation of these different chronologies must remain somewhat speculative, but the justifications for each can, as I will show, be revealingly compared. I also argue that such attempts at a genealogical appreciation of Wittgenstein’s remarks is not only worthwhile on its own terms but it also further paves the way for an increased understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I articulate and evaluate three possible chronologies for the year 1929 and argue for the one I take to be the most plausible.
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Eisele, Thomas D. "“Our Real Need”: Not Explanation, But Education." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 3, no. 2 (July 1990): 5–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900001144.
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The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination around. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)Wittgenstein wrote nothing on legal theory or law, so there is no obvious textual basis on which to draw possible connections between Wittgenstein and legal theory. And Wittgenstein abhorred theorizing in philosophy. So the odds are slim that Wittgenstein would have accommodated himself or his work to similar activity in the law. Where does this leave us?At sea, which is where we normally are in life and, thus, where Wittgenstein wants us to recognize ourselves as being when doing philosophy too. But theory can disguise this fact from us, as it also can make us think that we have unrivalled powers of knowledge and understanding and explanation. Wittgenstein’s criticism of theory, or the activity of theorizing, is meant to get us to see, and to acknowledge, our limits in this respect. But even though his terms and intent are mostly negative in tone and thrust, his criticism of theorizing has positive implications for how we should try to understand what we are doing and what we have done, including what we are doing and have done in the law. So, if understanding the law better is something that legal theory does or tries to do, and Wittgenstein’s later work can help us understand the law better, then Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is connected to the task set legal theory.
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Stalmaszczyk, Piotr. "The good, the bad and the creative." International Review of Pragmatics 13, no. 1 (January 20, 2021): 113–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18773109-01301004.
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Abstract The following text is a review of Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language, edited by Sebastian Sunday Grève and Jakub Mácha (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. ISBN 978-1-137-47253-3. xxi + 314 pages). Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language is a collection of eleven essays investigating the creative potential of language within Wittgensteinian philosophy language. The essays are grouped into five sections, and cover a whole range of issues including language creativity, conceptions of art, ethics, metaphysics, but also Wittgenstein’s comments on Gödel’s proof, and Alfred Loos’s influence on Wittgenstein.
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Cook, John W. "Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein." Religious Studies 23, no. 2 (June 1987): 199–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500018722.
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In recent years there has been a tendency in some quarters to see an affinity between the views of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on the subject of religious belief. It seems to me that this is a mistake, that Kierkegaard's views were fundamentally at odds with Wittgenstein's. That this fact is not generally recognized is, I suspect, owing to the obscurity of Kierkegaard's most fundamental assumptions. My aim here is to make those assumptions explicit and to show how they differ from Wittgenstein's.
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Szabados, Béla. "Autobiography after Wittgenstein." Tekstualia 2, no. 61 (August 15, 2020): 37–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.3811.
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Béla Szabados claims that Wittgenstein in his observations on the roles, functions and possibility of autobiography anticipates the death of the traditional autobiography and points to a way of transforming the genre so as to make it suit our present concerns. The article addresses Wittgenstein’s strategies in his own autobiographical projects. Szabados points out that the eclipse of the traditional autobiography, as described and performed by Wittgenstein, refl ects the exhaustion of cultural forms that previously shored up confessional practices, and this exhaustion can be seen in the changes to the autobiographical form that have occurred since Augustine and Rousseau.
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Stango, Marco. "Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Death." Idealistic Studies 49, no. 1 (2019): 45–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies20198699.
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The paper presents a Peircean criticism of Wittgenstein’s views on death. By exploring the notion of ‘limit’ central to both Wittgenstein and Peirce, the paper claims that a Peircean pragmatic notion of death can retain the advantages of Wittgenstein’s ‘limit’ notion of death without incurring the shortcomings of the latter, which I identify with semantic and metaphysical externality. I conclude by sketching out some consequences of the Peircean view for a metaphysics of death.
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Malcolm, Norman. "Wittgenstein on Language and Rules." Philosophy 64, no. 247 (January 1989): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100044004.
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A paradoxical situation exists in the study of Wittgenstein. There is a sharp disagreement in the interpretation of his thinking about the concept of following a rule. According to one group of philosophers Wittgenstein's position is that this concept presupposes a human community in which there is agreement as to whether doing such-and-such is or is not following a particular rule. A second group of philosophers hold that this interpretation of Wittgenstein is not merely wrong, but is even a caricature of Wittgenstein's thought: for when Wittgenstein says that following a rule is ‘a practice’ he does not mean a social practice, he does not invoke a community of rule-followers, but instead he emphasizes that following a rule presupposes a regularity, a repeated or recurring way of acting, which might be exemplified in the life of a solitary person. On the first interpretation it would have no sense to suppose that a human being who had grown up in complete isolation from the rest of mankind could be following rules. On the second interpretation such isolation would be irrelevant.
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Nakano, Anderson Luis. "WITTGENSTEIN, FORMALISM, AND SYMBOLIC MATHEMATICS." Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 61, no. 145 (April 2020): 31–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-512x2020n14502aln.
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ABSTRACT In a recent essay, Sören Stenlund tries to align Wittgenstein’s approach to the foundations and nature of mathematics with the tradition of symbolic mathematics. The characterization of symbolic mathematics made by Stenlund, according to which mathematics is logically separated from its external applications, brings it closer to the formalist position. This raises naturally the question whether Wittgenstein holds a formalist position in philosophy of mathematics. The aim of this paper is to give a negative answer to this question, defending the view that Wittgenstein always thought that there is no logical separation between mathematics and its applications. I will focus on Wittgenstein’s remarks about arithmetic during his middle period, because it is in this period that a formalist reading of his writings is most tempting. I will show how his idea of autonomy of arithmetic is not to be compared with the formalist idea of autonomy, according to which a calculus is “cut off” from its applications. The autonomy of arithmetic, according to Wittgenstein, guarantees its own applicability, thus providing its own raison d’être.
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Lindsay, Pete, Tim Pitt, and Owen Thomas. "Bewitched by our words: Wittgenstein, language-games, and the pictures that hold sport psychology captive." Sport & Exercise Psychology Review 10, no. 1 (March 2014): 41–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.53841/bpssepr.2014.10.1.41.
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Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) was arguably one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Despite previous interest in philosophical approaches (Corlett, 1996), and the value given to philosophy in relation to applied practice (Poczwardowski, Sherman & Ravizza, 2004), almost no attention has been given to Wittgenstein’s works in sport psychology. In this article, we suggest that our discipline frequently suffers with conceptual confusions and misunderstandings driven by our unintentional misguided use of language. Through the philosophical thinking of Wittgenstein, we explore the tacit language-games and the pictures that hold thinking captive within sport psychology, and attempt to provide an alternative lens through which researchers and practitioners can view the discipline. By drawing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and the methods of previous psychologists whose works were shaped by Wittgenstein (e.g. Watzlawick, Weakland & Fisch, 1974), the wider implications for applied sport psychology and the training of practitioners are considered.
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Uth, Melanie. "Möchte Chomsky erklären, was Wittgenstein beschreibt?" Wittgenstein-Studien 10, no. 1 (January 16, 2019): 105–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2019-0005.
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AbstractThis article examines the relation between the philosophy of language proposed by the later Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, and his ambition to cure philosophy from the mapping of linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic entities, on the one hand, and Chomsky's statements regarding language, meaning, and thought, and regarding the sense and non-sense of different fields of linguistic research, on the other. After a brief descriptive comparison of both approaches, it is argued that Chomsky's criticism on Wittgenstein's theory of meaning (Chomsky 1974 – 1996), or on Wittgenstein's basic concepts such as e. g. rule-following (Chomsky 2000 onwards), respectively, is (a) unwarranted and (b) caused by a fundamental misconception. Moreover, it is argued that the hypothesis evoked by Grewendorf (1985: 126), according to which „Chomsky would like to explain what Wittgenstein describes“, is misleading since the objects of investigation of Chomsky and Wittgenstein are in complementary distribution one to the other.
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Harré, Rom. "Wittgenstein: Science and Religion." Philosophy 76, no. 2 (April 2001): 211–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819101000249.
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Extra-philosophical influences were very important in shaping Wittgenstein's philosophical ruminations. The Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus is misunderstood unless it is seen as deriving from the pre-Machian physics of the German tradition, adapted to the problems Russell confronted Wittgenstein with. In like manner, particularly in relation to the discussions of meanings and rules, the philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations is shaped by the role played by a powerful religious sensibility in Wittgenstein's extraordinary and tormented life.
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Kienzler, Wolfgang. "Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman on Certainty." Grazer Philosophische Studien 71, no. 1 (April 24, 2006): 117–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-071001008.
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Wittgenstein read and admired the work of John Henry Newman. Evidence suggests that from 1946 until 1951 Newman's was probably the single most important external stimulus for Wittgenstein's thought. In important respects Wittgenstein's reactions to G. E. Moore follow hints already given by Newman.
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Lemberger, Dorit. "Bakhtin and Wittgenstein on Dialogue as a Methodological Concept and Theme." Journal of Dialogue Studies 6 (2018): 37–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/rvto2437.
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The concept of dialogue is a central element of Bakhtin’s writings, whereas Wittgenstein’s references to dialogue are generally in the negative vein. However, there does not seem to be another modern philosopher who has actually employed the dialogic method. But Wittgenstein’s dialogic texts also include monologic aspects, such as sensation and private transition. Bakhtin, by contrast, sometimes blurs the boundaries between dialogue in language and dialogue as a criterion for literary value. The article shows how Wittgenstein helps clarify the role of the monological in Bakhtin’s dialogic approach and how Bakhtin can facilitate a better understanding of the dialogicity in Wittgenstein.
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McDonough, Richard. "Wittgenstein and Whitehead Revisited." Process Studies 45, no. 2 (October 1, 2016): 250–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/44798508.
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Abstract In this article I criticize the treatment of the relationship between Wittgenstein and Whitehead asserted by Jerry Gill in a 2014 article in Process Studies. I argue that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is much more sympathetic to Whitehead’s view than Gill thinks.
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Krkač, Kristijan. "Wittgenstein in Croatia." Disputatio philosophica 19, no. 1 (January 11, 2018): 101–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.32701/dp.19.1.8.
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In the paper the author supplies an overview of the secondary research of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in Croatia in period 1941–2016. It was commonly assumed that the reception of his philosophy in Croatia started in 1960 when TLP was translated, and accompanied with substantive afterword by G. Petrović. However, the author found an earlier mention and description of Wittgenstein’s philosophy from TLP, which appeared in 1941 in the entry “Bečki krug (Wiener Kreis)” in “Croatian Encyclopedia” and was written by Croatian philosopher Stjepan Pataki. The entry is cited and analyzed. In addition, the author provides the list of translations of Wittgenstein’s work to Croatian, and the list of a majority of secondary literature on Wittgenstein by Croatian philosophers in the same period.
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Junquera Smith, Plínio. "Wittgenstein and pyrrhonism." Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía 49 (November 14, 2022): 17–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.36576/2660-9509.49.17.
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The aim of this paper is to assess Wittgenstein’s later philosophy relation to skepticism. Despite the fact that he explicitly rejects it, it is argued that his conception of philosophy has strong affinities to ancient Pyrrhonism, and not to Human skepticism, as some claim. Among other features, it is highlighted that both Wittgenstein and the ancient Pyrrhonist think of philosophy as a therapy requiring some specific abilities, whose goal is to bring about tranquility, leaving everyday life as it is without any dogmatic commitment. Lastly, it is suggested that Wittgenstein renewed this skeptical tradition inventing a new method, or methods, to achieve this goal.
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Helgeson, James. "What Cannot Be Said: Notes on Early French Wittgenstein Reception." Paragraph 34, no. 3 (November 2011): 338–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/para.2011.0029.
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Although Wittgenstein's philosophy long went untranslated in France, he was not entirely unread. Yet the relatively minor impact of Wittgenstein in mid-century French-language philosophy stands in marked contrast to the centrality of Wittgenstinian themes in Anglo-American thinking. Early French writings on Wittgenstein, as well a colloquium on analytic philosophy held at Royaumont in 1958, are discussed, and explanations proposed for Wittgenstein's limited reception in France in the five decades following the publication of the Tractatus in 1921/22. Possible effects of Wittgenstein's quasi-absence from French discussion in the period on more recent theoretical reflection are briefly examined. It is suggested that Oxford philosophers of the 1950s, and in particular J.L. Austin, had a more immediate impact on French readers.
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Spiegel, Thomas J. "Wittgenstein and Dilthey on Scientism and Method." Wittgenstein-Studien 12, no. 1 (February 3, 2021): 165–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2021-0010.
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Abstract While Wittgenstein’s work has been extensively investigated in relation to many other important and influential philosophers, there is very little scholarly work that positively investigates the relationship between the work of Wittgenstein and Wilhelm Dilthey. To the contrary, some commentators like Hacker (2001a) suggest that Dilthey’s work (and that of other hermeneuticists) simply pales or is obsolete in comparison to Wittgenstein’s own insights. Against such assessments, this article posits that Wittgenstein’s and Dilthey’s thought most crucially intersects at the related topics of scientism on the one hand and scientific and philosophical method on the other. In reconstructing Dilthey’s conceptions of understanding versus explaining and central points of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, it becomes apparent that they share a staunch rejection of scientism and use the notion of understanding as a means to prevent methodologies from the natural sciences encroaching onto the human sciences (in Dilthey’s case) and philosophy (in Wittgenstein’s case). Notwithstanding a number of central ways in which these thinkers differ, this article closes by suggesting that there is some evidence according to which Wittgenstein, like Dilthey, can reasonably be understood as championing some central tenets of the hermeneutical tradition.
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Rowe, M. W. "Goethe and Wittgenstein." Philosophy 66, no. 257 (July 1991): 283–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100064901.
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The influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein is just beginning to be appreciated. Hacker and Baker, Westphal, Monk, and Haller have all drawn attention to significant affinities between the two men's work, and the number of explicit citations of Goethe in Wittgenstein's texts supports the idea that we are not dealing simply with a matter of deeplying similarities of aim and method, but of direct and major influence. These scholarly developments are encouraging because they help to place Wittgenstein's work within an important tradition of German letters which goes far beyond his contemporaries and immediate forebears in Vienna; and they show that Wittgenstein's profound interest in literature and music is ceasing to be merely a matter of biographical anecdote, and is being used to illuminate some of the most central areas of his work.
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Funk, Michael. "Repeatability and Methodical Actions in Uncertain Situations." Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 22, no. 3 (2018): 352–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/techne201812388.
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In this paper Ludwig Wittgenstein is interpreted as a philosopher of language and technology. Due to current developments, a special focus is on lifeworld practice and technoscientific research. In particular, image-interpretation is used as a concrete methodical example. Whereas in most science- or technology-related Wittgenstein interpretations the focus is on the Tractatus, the Investigations or On Certainty, in this paper the primary source is his very late triune fragment Bemerkungen über die Farben (“Remarks about the Colours”). It is argued that Wittgenstein’s approach can supplement Don Ihde’s concept of material hermeneutics, and that Wittgenstein’s constructivist and pragmatist claims relate to current authors in the philosophy of technology like Peter Janich, Carl Mitcham or Jürgen Mittelstraß. Ludwig Wittgenstein enables a philosophical approach of transcendental grammars, techno-linguistic forms of life and technoscientific language games. In detail, several methodological aspects regarding relations between language and technology are summarized. Here concretely repeatability and methodical actions play major roles in uncertain situations of language and technology practice. It is shown that Wittgenstein is still underestimated in the philosophy of technology—although his thoughtful conceptualizations of language, social practice and technology bear important methodical insights for current technosciences like synthetic biology, robotics and many others.