Dissertations / Theses: 'Wittgenstein'

1

Dias, Aline da Silva. "Wittgenstein versus Wittgenstein sobre regras." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFPR, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1884/37342.

Full text

Abstract:

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Alexandre Noronha Machado
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciências Humanas, Letras e Artes, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Defesa: Curitiba, 06/02/2014
Inclui referências
Área de concentração: História da filosofia moderna e contemporânea
Resumo: Esta dissertação apresenta duas interpretações sobre as considerações de Wittgenstein a respeito do seguir regras nas Investigações Filosóficas (§§138- 242). A primeira delas é a exposta por Saul Kripke em seu livro Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, na qual este afirma que, nos §§138-242, Wittgenstein desenvolve um paradoxo cético para mostrar que não há fatos constituintes da significação. Contudo, isso não implica na negação da significatividade da linguagem, pois ele oferece uma solução cética a esse paradoxo, que apela a um comunitarismo linguístico, como indicaremos ao longo dessa pesquisa. Segundo Kripke, Wittgenstein sustentaria que a linguagem é essencialmente social. A segunda proposta interpretativa é a de Colin McGinn em seu livro Wittgenstein on Meaning. Ele propõe que o intuito de Wittgenstein com as considerações dos §§138-242 seria afastar concepções mentalistas equivocadas a respeito do seguir regras, significar ou entender algo por uma palavra. De acordo com McGinn, Wittgenstein não é um cético semântico, pois ele oferece uma explicação sobre o que é significar algo com uma palavra, explicação que apela às nossas capacidades ou habilidades de utilizar um sinal; para ele, Wittgenstein tampouco seria um comunitarista, pois essas capacidades e habilidades poderiam ser exercidas por uma única pessoa (individualmente), sem qualquer referência a uma comunidade. Diante dessas duas leituras, avaliaremos qual delas explica de modo mais satisfatório as reflexões de Wittgenstein sobre esse tema. Palavras-chave: seguir regras, paradoxo cético, solução cética, comunitarismo, individualismo.
Abstract: It will be discussed two interpretations regarding the Wittgenstein's considerations on the "following rules", in the Philosophical Investigations (§§138-242). The first one, it is suggested by Saul A. Kripke, as he pointed out in the book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, in which he holds that, in the §§138-242, Wittgenstein develops a sceptical paradox to maintain the idea that there are not facts of meaning. However, it doesn't implie that the language is meaningless, because he offers a sceptical solution to this paradox in which he appeals to a linguistic comunitarism, as we will indicate in this research. According to Kripke, Wittgenstein argues that the language is fundamentally social. The second interpretation is held by Colin McGinn in his book Wittgenstein on Meaning. He suggest that Wittgenstein tried to dismiss the misleading mentalist conceptions of following rules, meaning and understanding something through a word. According to McGinn, Wittgenstein is not a sceptic, because he offers an explanation of meaning something through a word: employing our capacities or abilities to use a sign; he is not even a communitarist, since the capacities and the abilities could be exercised by only one single person, without any reference to a certain community. After the presentation of these two interpretations, we will evaluate which one explains more satisfactorily Wittgenstein's thought related to this matter. Key-words: following rules, sceptical paradox, sceptical solution, comunitarism, individualism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Höhler, Philipp. "Wittgenstein als politischer Philosoph : Wittgensteins Philosophie als Grundlage für eine politische Philosophie /." Hamburg : Diplomica Verl, 2008. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=3070495&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Fatturi, Arturo. "Wittgenstein." Florianópolis, SC, 2002. http://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/82264.

Full text

Abstract:

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia.
Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-19T13:31:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Spica, Marciano Adilio. "Wittgenstein." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 2012. http://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/92990.

Full text

Abstract:

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2009.
Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-24T14:54:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0
O objetivo primeiro deste trabalho é apresentar e discutir as idéias de Wittgenstein a respeito da religião a partir de suas concepções de linguagem, mostrando que ele não a condena a um silêncio absoluto. Para cumprir esta tarefa, mostramos, num primeiro momento, as idéias do autor sobre linguagem e religião à época do Tractatus elucidando que suas idéias a respeito dos limites da linguagem não levam à condenação da religião a um silêncio absoluto. Ao delimitar o campo do sentido e colocar a religião para fora deste campo, Wittgenstein não a está condenando ao desaparecimento. Ao contrário, está salvando tal ramo da vida humana da interferência da metafísica e da ciência. Seu objetivo é mostrar que a religião, assim como a ética e a estética, não devem ser tomadas como se fossem um discurso científico e se isso for feito, tais atividades humanas tendem a desaparecer, pois aquilo que realmente importa nestes discursos não pode ser expresso em proposições figurativas. O Tractatus estabeleceu os limites do que pode e do que não pode ser dito, mostrou que devemos nos abster de tentativas filosóficas e científicas de explicar e fundamentar a religião, pois esta é uma esfera da vida humana que está ligada ao sentido da vida e não a critérios de verdade ou falsidade. A religião, para o jovem Wittgenstein, dá um caminho a seguir, uma maneira de agir e uma forma de compreender e suportar o mundo contingente dos fatos. Num segundo momento, apresentamos as idéias sobre linguagem e religião pós-Tractatus, elucidando a possibilidade de jogos de linguagem religiosos e caracterizando tais jogos. Mostramos, também, que neste período a religião é entendida como um saber autônomo que possui regras, práticas e uma gramática própria. A religião é um saber eminentemente prático e continua, da mesma forma como o era na época do Tractatus, ligada ao sentido da vida e não a critérios de verdade ou falsidade. Ao saber religioso não interessam questões factuais e não há necessidade de teorias filosóficas que o justifiquem. Mostramos ainda, a forte influencia do cristianismo tolstoiano nas concepções de Wittgenstein a respeito da religião, defendendo que esta herança faz com que o filósofo em questão tenha uma concepção extremamente positiva do sentimento religioso, atribuindo a ele o papel de dar uma resposta ao desejo humano por encontrar um sentido para a vida. Assim, ao final de nosso trabalho, chegamos à conclusão que a obra de Wittgenstein, em nenhum momento, condena a religião a um mutismo. Sua obra mostra a grande importância deste saber e a grande ligação do sentimento religioso com a vida prática. Para ele, não importa ao religioso dizer que é religioso, o importante é que a vida prática mostre a crença religiosa. É na ação, no dia-a-dia do crente religioso, que encontra-se o critério de correção para sabermos se uma cumpre bem seu papel enquanto religiosa.
The main aim of this work is to present and discus the Wittgenstein#s ideas about religion from their conceptions of language, showing that he not condemns to the one absolute silence. To accomplish this task, we first present the author#s ideas about language and religion in the Tractatus#s Time, explaining that their ideas about limits of language does not lead to the condemnation of religion to an absolute silence. To the delimit sense field and put religion out of this field, Wittgenstein is not condemning the religion to the disappearance. On the contrary, are saving this branch of human life of the interference of metaphysics and science. Your goal is to show that religion, as well as ethics and aesthetics should not be taken as if a scientific discourse and if this is done, such human activities tend to disappear, because what really is important in these speeches do not can be expressed in figurative propositions. The Tractatus established the limits of what can and cannot be said, it showed that we must abstain of philosophical and scientific attempts to explain and justify religion, because this is a sphere of human life that is linked to the meaning of life and not to the truth or falsity criteria. The religion, for the young Wittgenstein, gives a way forward, a way to act and a way to understand and support the contingent world of facts. In a second moment, we present the ideas about language and religion after Tractatus, explain the possibility of religious language games, characterizing such games. We show also that during this period the religion is understood as a autonomous knowing, with own rules, practice and grammar. The religion it is eminently a practical knowing and continues, in the same way as it was at the time of Tractatus, linked to the meaning of life and not to the criteria truth or falsity. To the religious knowing not is interested fact inquiry and philosophical theories that it justified. We also showed the great influence of the tolstoian Christianism in religion Wittgenstein#s conceptions, arguing that this inheritance does with that the philosopher has a positive conception of religious sentiment, giving him the role of providing a response to the human desire to find a sense for life. Thus, at the end of our work we conclude that the Wittgenstein#s work do not condemns the religion to a mutism. His work shows the great importance of this knowledge and the great connection between religious sentiment and practical life. For him, not is essential to the religious to say that it is religious, but is important that his practical life showed the belief. It is in the action, on the day-a-day of the believer which is the correction riterion for we understand whether a person is good executing your function while religious.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Höhler, Philipp. "Wittgenstein als politischer Philosoph Wittgensteins Philosophie als Grundlage für eine politische Philosophie." Hamburg Diplomica-Verl, 2006. http://d-nb.info/987556681/04.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Biggs, Michael A. R. "The illustrated Wittgenstein : a study of the diagrams in Wittgenstein's published works." Thesis, University of Reading, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.385076.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Delfin, Solveig. "Wittgenstein och skepticismen." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-18370.

Full text

Abstract:

In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) Saul Kripke claims that Wittgenstein argues for a certain form of scepticism in his book Philosophical Investigations (1953), namely a new form of philosophical scepticism, a result of Wittgenstein´s idea of language as language games. Nihilism, scepticism of meaning or of concept, constitutive scepticism are other commentators´ different names of the same phenomenon. The philosophy of Wittgenstein accounts for how our words, including the words of mathematics, have no meaning and there are no a priori justified objective facts as to what I mean about a word. We follow the rules blindly and without justification. We are unable to find any facts against this proposal. Like a ´sceptic´ Wittgenstein denies the ´superlative fact,´ a fact supposed to give an a priori justification to our words. The consensus of a language community is enough to give meaning and assertions to what we in ordinary language call facts, but objective facts in logical meaning a priori, do not exist, a sceptical view in Kripke´s interpretation. Wittgenstein rejects explicit scepticism, but Kripke thinks Wittgenstein did not want to repudiate common belief as a common sense philosopher.

This paper ´Wittgenstein and Scepticism´ says that Wittgenstein certainly denies ´superlative fact´, but his reason was founded on conclusions from his investigation of grammar and language, which we use and misuse according to what we want, not to how it is. We demand that logic ought to be absolute, general and consistent, but there is no such logic a priori. Wittgenstein thinks we have to stick to reality and facts of experience. Facts a priori are very convincing facts, but they are not ´sublime´ in a logical metaphysic way. Logic is not rejected and the philosophy of logic uses the same words as common language. Logic has a normative function in our language. We learn words and rules in a certain context and use them in certain situations. How we use the word tells us the meaning of the word and the correct understanding. Our following the rules depends on how they work in real life.

I Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages (1982) hävdar Saul Kripke att Wittgensteins resonemang i Filosofiska undersökningar (1953) leder till en speciell form av skepticism, en filosofisk skepticism, en konsekvens av Wittgensteins uppfattning om språket som språkspel. Nihilism, meningsskepticism, begreppsskepticism, konstitutiv skepticism är andra kommentatorers beteckningar. Wittgensteins filosofi visar att språkets ord, inklusive matematikens ord, saknar mening och inga rättfärdigade objektiva a priori fakta finns om vad jag menar med ett ord. Vi följer språkets regler blint och som det passar oss Argument saknas för att vederlägga detta påstående. Som en skeptiker förnekar Wittgenstein filosofins "superlative fact", som förmodas ge en a priori grund för vad jag menar med ett ord. En språkgemenskaps konsensus ger dock orden mening och bekräftar vad som i vanligt språk kallas fakta, men objektiva fakta i logisk mening, fakta a priori saknas, d.v.s. en skeptisk uppfattning, enligt Kripkes tolkning Att Wittgenstein själv tar avstånd från skepticismen beror på att han inte vill bryta med den allmänna uppfattningen om fakta och mening.

Uppsatsen "Wittgenstein och skepticismen" visar att visserligen överger Wittgenstein "superlative fact", men detta är ett resultat av hans grammatiska undersökning av språket, vilket vi brukar och missbrukar för våra syften, inte som det är. Vi önskar och fordrar att logiken ger oss ett absolut, generellt och beständigt svar, men ett sådant svar kan inte logikens a priori ge. Wittgenstein menar att verkligheten och erfarenhetsfakta är vad vi har att hålla oss till. A priori fakta är enligt Wittgenstein mycket övertygande fakta, men inte i den "sublima" logikens metafysiska mening. Logiken förkastas inte, ty logikens filosofi talar inte om ord i någon annan mening än vi gör i det vanliga livet. Logiken har en styrfunktion i språket. Orden lärs in i ett sammanhang och används i ett sammanhang. Användningen av ordet visar om ordets mening är korrekt uppfattad. Vi följer regler efter hur de fungerar i en verklighet

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Sarkar, Priyambada. "Wittgenstein and solipsism." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.730920.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Corrigan, Daniel Patrick. "Wittgenstein and Religion." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2006. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/13.

Full text

Abstract:

This thesis considers the implications of Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy for the issue of religious belief, as well as the relation of religion to Wittgenstein’s thought. In the first chapter I provide an overview of the Tractatus and discuss the place of religion within the Tractarian framework. I then provide an overview of Philosophical Investigations. In the second chapter I consider interpretations by Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in relation to religion, as well as Kai Nielsen’s famous critique of ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism.’ The third and final chapter takes up the issue of construing religious belief as a distinctive language-game. I consider arguments from D. Z. Phillips and criticisms of Phillips from Mark Addis and Gareth Moore.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Ammereller, Erich. "Wittgenstein on intentionality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.295494.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Pan, Mengqi. "Wittgenstein and Certainty." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/640.

Full text

Abstract:

This thesis discusses the idea of certainty in Wittgenstein's On Certainty and various interpretations of this text. Many deny a relativist reading of Wittgenstein because they think such reading fails to achieve Wittgenstein's goal, which is refuting skepticism. This thesis suggests the possibility of maintaining the certainty of our notion of truth while at the same time being open to the metaphysical possibility of relativism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Wilson, Philip. "Translation after Wittgenstein." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2012. https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/42354/.

Full text

Abstract:

In this thesis, I examine how a reading of the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein can be of use to the reflective practitioner of literary translation. Wittgenstein, whilst a key figure in twentieth-century philosophy, remains peripheral to the field of translation studies and I argue that his later work, because it deals with the nature of language and meaning, is potentially of great significance: the story that Wittgenstein tells can change the field. It can rid translators of pictures of translation that are detrimental to literary translation and can also offer tools that will facilitate the task of literary translation, such as: the language-game; the form of life; the surveyable representation. In Chapter 1, I discuss the relation between philosophy and translation studies, presenting the later work of Wittgenstein, in particular the 1953 Philosophical Investigations. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I relate Wittgenstein’s work to translation by examining respectively: the reading for translation of the source text; the writing of the target text; the theorising of the target text. In Chapter 5, I draw conclusions. In the central three chapters, I offer case studies of the translation of the poetry of Eduard Mörike and of the New Testament to illustrate my arguments. My aim is that the thesis will form the basis for a greater concern for Wittgenstein in translation studies than has previously been the case.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Goyet, Bertrand. "L’Esthétique chez Wittgenstein." Thesis, Nancy 2, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009NAN21020.

Full text

Abstract:

Cette thèse étudie le thème esthétique dans l’œuvre de Wittgenstein. Dans le Tractatus logico-philosophicus, esthétique et éthique sont une et ineffables. C’est le lien du microcosme au macrocosme qui explique leur unité dynamique. L’esthétique dans le Tractatus se rapproche du sentiment esthétique. Dans les Leçons sur l’Esthétique ce concept se rattache à l’approbation esthétique laquelle demeure inexprimable. Les Leçons apportent une positivité à l’esthétique à travers l’appréciation. Mais la parenté entre éthique et esthétique se retrouve dans le concept de raisons. En esthétique les raisons sont systématiques. La psychologie n’y intervient pas et réactions esthétiques procèdent d’un art incorporé ; le corps de l’artiste imprègne ses œuvres si bien que l’on peut parler d’un art incarné. L’esthétique est présente dans la pensée de Wittgenstein dans des métaphores empruntées aux arts ou dans des références s’y rapportant. L’art apparaît donc comme une source de la réflexion de Wittgenstein. L’étude de la compréhension artistique sert aussi à montrer plus qu’à dire la compréhension, concept qui constitue une sorte de point aveugle de la grammaire. Cette possibilité de monstration par les arts peut être la clef pour résoudre les paradoxes du Tractatus. En dernier lieu, le changement d’aspect se relie à l’essence de l’œuvre d’art et permet de trouver la grammaire qui exprime cette essence dans l’explication par les raisons. On peut ainsi penser que dans tout domaine de l’activité humaine où il y a changement d’aspect, l’esthétique est engagée. La pensée de Wittgenstein, qui cherche à trouver de nouveaux aspects pour nous guérir de la passion métaphysique, participe aussi de cette caractérisation esthétique
The aim of this dissertation is to study aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s works. In the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, ethics and aesthetics are one and unsayable. The bound between microcomos and macrocosmos explains their dynamic unity. In the Tractatus aesthetics is all about the aesthetic feeling. In the Lectures on Aesthetics, this concept, called aesthetic approval, remains unutterable. Nevertheless, the Lectures bring some positivity to aesthetics through the concept of appreciation. But ethics and aesthetics remain linked through the notion of reasons. In aesthetics reasons are systematic. It’s not a psychological question. Aesthetic reactions relate to an incorporated art, through the mastering of technics; the body of the artist is expressed by his works so much that one may talk about incarnated art. Aesthetics in the thought of Wittgenstein appears also as metaphors taken from the arts or references to them. Thus, art is often a source for the reflection of Wittgenstein. The study of the comprehension of works of arts is a way to show rather than to tell the process of comprehension, a concept which is, for the grammar, a kind of blind spot. This possibility of showing rather than saying may be the key to solve the paradoxes of the Tractatus. Last but not least, the change of aspect relates to the essence of the work of art and allows to find the grammar which expresses it in the explanation by reasons. One may think then that in every domain of human activity where there is a change of aspect, aesthetics is concerned. The thought of Wittgenstein searches for new aspects to heal from metaphysical passion; in this way, it partakes also of this aesthetic characterization

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Tirelli, Francesca <1990&gt. "Wittgenstein e Adorno." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/6669.

Full text

Abstract:

L'indagine si interroga sulla possibilità di accostare il pensiero di Wittgenstein a quello di Adorno. Una prima parte indaga il giudizio che Adorno esprime nei confronti di Wittgenstein all'interno dei suoi testi. Una seconda ne propone una discussione alla luce dell'opera di Wittgenstein e della letteratura secondaria su questo autore. Nell'ultima sezione si propone un confronto tra i due autori che mira a indagarne le convergenze, dando spazio alla complessità e problematicità di tale accostamento.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Lundgren, Lars. "Ludwig Wittgenstein som folkskollärare." Thesis, Södertörn University College, Lärarutbildningen, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-1228.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper studies the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein during his years (1920–26) as an elementary school teacher in remote Niederösterreich, Austria. The paper gives a survey of his life, and also a brief account of three of his main works: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Attention is given to his alphabetical word list, Wörterbuch für Volksschulen, published for educational use in elementary schools. The study is focused on Wittgenstein’s educational practise, and establishes a connection between his experience as a teacher and his late philosophy.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

McDonald, Joseph F. "Wittgenstein: Representation and therapy." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/6677.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Bix, Brian. "Wittgenstein and legal determinacy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1991. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:fd66944d-fc4b-4b67-8824-3c820900b49f.

Full text

Abstract:

In the jurisprudential literature, much attention has recently been given to the role of language within law, with various writers asserting that certain theories of meaning or theories of interpretation offer new insights into the nature of law. My survey of portions of this on-going debate will have two overlapping foci: the issue of legal determinacy and the application of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas to legal theory. In the context of a number of different discussions, I argue that a proper understanding of the nature of language and its role within law compels neither the conclusion that law is radically indeterminate nor the conclusion that law is completely determinate. I disagree with the usual reading of H.L.A. Hart on "open texture", arguing instead that Hart's argument was as much about the proper way to apply legal rules as it was about the nature of language. I offer a reading of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations which differs from Saul Kripke's reading as well as from the reading some legal theorists have offered, and which I believe justifies only a modest view of the direct applicability of Wittgenstein to jurisprudence. I argue that Ronald Dworkin's recent work leaves a number of unresolved questions regarding right-answer theories and that there are basic difficulties with his holistic-interpretative approach to law. Finally, I discuss Wittgenstein's critique of platonism as part of an argument that Michael Moore's metaphysically realist approach to law offers no advantages compared to more conventional approaches.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Tirelli, Soriente Guillermo Adrian. "L’indicible. Heidegger, Lévinas, Wittgenstein." Thesis, Paris 4, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA040199.

Full text

Abstract:

W. von Humboldt introduit une pensée romantique du langage, s’éloignant ainsi des interprétations nées chez les philosophes grecs. La langue est considérée digne d’une étude philosophique sérieuse.Plus tard, les courants contemporains du langage élaborent de nouveaux rapports entre langue et réalité. La tradition herméneutique et, principalement, le tournant linguistique donnent une clé de compréhension des philosophes du vingtième siècle. En outre, la lecture constructiviste de Derrida est aussi considérée mais ses atouts sont finalement contestés en estimant l’argumentation de Marion.Dans ce cadre, les philosophies de Heidegger, Lévinas et Wittgenstein sont abordées, d’abord dans une étude du rapport entre langue et être et ensuite dans des problématiques discrètes qui illuminent le sujet.Au fil du texte, la question sur l’indicible et sur les limites du langage est toujours présente et guide le récit.Les analyses faites sur des œuvres principales des trois philosophes ainsi que des critiques faites à ce propos signalent tant le rejet de l’héritage métaphysique traditionnel et de sa conception du langage que des nouvelles façons de considérer le rôle du langage dans la philosophie contemporaine. Pour chaque philosophe, en dépit des différences, la langue devient centrale et sa source se trouve en elle-même.Ces analyses mènent à l’affirmation qu’il n y a pas de place pour un indicible proprement dit dans leurs pensées. Au contraire, le tournant vers le langage a pris le chemin vers une dicibilité totale
W. von Humboldt introduced a romantic approach to language, far from the interpretations which originated with the Greek philosophers. Language is considered worthy of serious philosophical study.Later, new relationships between language and reality would develop from contemporary thought about language. The hermeneutics tradition and, mainly, the linguistic turn provide a key to understanding the philosophers of the twentieth century. The text also considers a constructivist reading of Derrida but such a reading is ultimately weakened by Marion’s argumentation.In this context, the philosophies of Heidegger, Levinas and Wittgenstein are discussed, first in a study of the relationship between language and being, then in terms of more specific issues which help to throw light on the subject.In the course of the text, the question of the unsayable and of the limits of language is always present and guides the discourse.Analyses of major works of the three philosophers and their critics show a rejection of inherited metaphysical conceptions and the consequent views of language as well as new ways of looking at the role of language in contemporary philosophy. For every philosopher, despite their differences, language becomes central and its source is found in itself.These analyses lead to the assertion that there is no place for a proper unsayable in the thought of the three philosophers. On the contrary, the turn towards language has forged a path to a full sayability

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

McKale, Annick. "Wittgenstein, éthique et esthétique." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ39056.pdf.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Secky, Frank Michael. "Wittgenstein, rules, and normativity." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ51796.pdf.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Li, Puqun. "Wittgenstein on nonsignificant propositions." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/NQ66166.pdf.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Scherer, Fernando [Verfasser], and Michael [Akademischer Betreuer] Kober. "Subjekt-Konzeptionen bei Wittgenstein." Freiburg : Universität, 2011. http://d-nb.info/1123463298/34.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Johnston, P. "Wittgenstein and moral philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.375906.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Rol, Marco Cees Abraham. "The comprehension of Wittgenstein." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615298.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Cordua, Carla. "Wittgenstein: analogues of language." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113164.

Full text

Abstract:

The paper explores one of the most important analogues of language in the later work of Wittgenstein, the comparison of language with tools. It explains first the comparative method used by Wittgenstein in his investigations of linguistic usage. Then it analyzes the chief aspects and results of the comparison with tools. The paper criticizes, among others, R. Bubner's objections against comparing language with tools and proceeds to contrast this term of comparison with other employed by Wittgenstein in the study of language.
El ensayo trata de uno de los principales análogos del lenguaje en la obra tardíade Wittgenstein, la comparación de lenguaje e instrumento. Presenta, para comenzar, las ideas generales del método analógico de Wittgenstein en las Investigaciones filosóficas; analiza, en seguida, los principales aspectos de la comparación instrumental y los resultados que arroja. Polemiza con las críticas que R. Bubner, entre otros, ha dirigido contra la comparación del lenguaje con un instrumento y establece algunos contrastes entre este objeto comparativo y otros distintos que Wittgenstein usa para la investigación del lenguaje.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Lemaire, Eric. "Wittgenstein et la métaphysique." Paris 7, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA070081.

Full text

Abstract:

Le second Wittgenstein fut l'un des penseurs les plus importants dans l'histoire de la philosophie analytique. Il est connu, notamment, pour sa conception provocante de la philosophie au coeur de la laquelle se trouve l'idée que les propositions métaphysiques - et plus généralement philosophiques - sont dépourvues de sens. Ainsi comprise, la philosophie a pour principal objectif d'éliminer les propositions métaphysiques, en montrant que les problèmes auxquels elles tentent de répondre ne sont que des pseudo problèmes. De nombreux commentateurs de Wittgenstein estiment non seulement que cette conception de la philosophie concerne toute forme de métaphysique mais qu'elle est vraie. Dans le même temps, au sein de la tradition analytique, nous assistons à un renouveau de la métaphysique. Ce contexte historique soulève une question : Le second Wittgenstein a-t-il réellement montré que la métaphysique est illégitime ? Notre principal objectif est de montrer que ce n'est pas le cas. Au contraire, le second Wittgenstein peut être compris comme un métaphysicien du sens commun, comme un philosophe qui nous donne des outils, des idées et une méthode pour repenser l'entreprise métaphysique et défendre sa légitimité
The second Wittgenstein was one of the most important thinkers in the history of analytic philosophy. He is known for his provocative conception of philosophy according to which metaphysical propositions - and more generally philosophical propositions - are nonsensical. Thus understood, the main task of philosophy is to eliminate these propositions and to show that metaphysical problems are pseudo-problems. Many commentators of the second Wittgenstein's works assume that this conception affects any form of metaphysics and that he showed the illegitimacy of any metaphysics. In the meanwhile metaphysics renewed in the analytic tradition. In such a context a question raises: Did the second Wittgenstein really undermine the legitimacy of metaphysics? Our main aim here is to show that he did not. On the contrary, the second Wittgenstein can be understood as a common sense metaphysician, that is as a philosopher who gives us tools, ideas, and a method to rethink the metaphysical enterprise. Hence, he does offer us means to defend the legitimacy of metaphysics

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Liu, Chang. "Wittgenstein über das Aspektsehen." Berlin mbv, Mensch-und-Buch-Verl, 2007. http://d-nb.info/997008695/04.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Aly, Laurence. "Wittgenstein : l'envers de l’œuvre." Paris 8, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA083808.

Full text

Abstract:

Dans L'envers de la psychanalyse, Lacan déclare que la philosophie de Wittgenstein est une extraordinaire parade à la vérité du maître que cache le désir de savoir dans le discours universitaire. Nous montrons qu'à la différence des philosophes qui veulent capter le désir de l'autre en occupant la place du Grand Autre, Wittgenstein ne veut pas sauver la vérité, ce qui ne va pas sans une position subjective psychotique pour autant que la vérité chez lui, n'est pas un roc mais bien plutôt ce dont il ne veut rien savoir. Aussi philosophe-t-il sans la vérité, déjouant ainsi ce qui s'impose de la vérité du symptôme et s'opposant à tout mi-dire. Rien ne peut se dire d'elle car il faudrait pour ce faire occuper une position d'extériorité par rapport au langage : la vérité est identifiée à l'indicible de telle sorte qu'elle se trouve être neutralisée. Nous faisons ainsi apparaître que l'opération wittgensteinienne force la vérité à se taire: elle procède du rejet de l'inconscient. Sur son pommier, nous dit Lacan, il n'y a pas de fruit : son œuvre n'est pas faite pour plus-de-jouir et tue le désir de savoir en débusquant le croire dans le savoir. Aussi, philosopher sans la vérité est aussi bien un nom de sinthome pour autant que s'y découvre une jouissance opaque qui exclut le sens-joui dans la mesure où celui-ci se trouve court-circuité par les butées logiques que Wittgenstein découvre dans le langage comme limite artificielle du sens: il y a de l'inexprimable. Notre discussion finale porte sur la question de savoir si Wittgenstein incarne le sinthome: peut-il l'incarner dès lors qu'il bride sa parole par le féroce impératif: « Sur ce dont on ne peut parler, il faut se taire »?
In his Seminar XVII, Lacan says that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a special reply to the truth of the master hidden by the desire for knowledge within the university discourse. We wish to show that, contrary to the philosophers’ tendency to capture the other’s desire by occupying the place of the Big Other, Wittgenstein does not want to save the truth, which does not go without a psychotic subjective position in as much as the truth, from his standpoint, is not a rock but much rather what he does not want to know anything about. In that light, he philosophizes without the truth, thus thwarting that which, about the truth of the symptom, cannot be escaped, and opposing any half-saying. Nothing about it can be said, because to do so one should place oneself outside of language : the truth is identified with the unspeakable in such a way that it gets neutralized. We thus reveal that Wittgenstein’s operation forces the truth to silence : it proceeds from the rejection of the unconscious. On Wittgenstein’s tree, says Lacan, there are no fruits : his work is not done for more-of-to enjoy and kills the knowledge by hunting out the belief contained in it. Thus, to philosophize without the truth is tantamount to a name of sinthome in so far as, in it, clears up an opaque enjoyment which excludes the enjoyed-sense since it is short-circuited by the logic stops that Wittgenstein finds out in the language as an artificial limit of meaning : there is inexprimable. Our final discussion concerns the question of whether Wittgenstein embodies the sinthome : can he embody it since he bridles his word by the fierce imperative : "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Redecker, Christine. "Wittgensteins Philosophie der Mathematik : eine Neubewertung im Ausgang von der Kritik an Cantors Beweis der Überabzählbarkeit der reellen Zahlen /." Frankfurt [Main i.e.] Heusenstamm ; Paris ; Ebikon ; Lancaster ; New Brunswick : Ontos-Verl, 2006. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2845897&prov=M&dokv̲ar=1&doke̲xt=htm.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Arroyo, Gustavo. "Wittgensteins analogisches Denken." Hamburg Kovac, 2006. http://www.verlagdrkovac.de/3-8300-2633-1.htm.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Ercan, Ahmet Bora. "Wittgenstein And Zen: A Comparison." Master's thesis, METU, 2010. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12611853/index.pdf.

Full text

Abstract:

This thesis is a comparison of the philosophical systems of Zen Buddhism, which is an Eastern Philosophy, with Ludwig Wittgenstein&rsquo
s philosophical studies, who is an extraordinary name of the Western Philosophy in the 20th century. The history and sources of Zen Buddhism were given with its adoption in the use of language and arts. Besides, this study exemplifies the philosophy of Zen Buddhism with the examples from the life story of Wittgenstein. The thesis is written with a full awareness of the sensitivity of comparing different systems which always embody counterexamples and speculations. This is the reason why speculative ideas and resources were deliberately ignored. The aim is to contribute the cultural life of Turkey by taking such a subject to the academic milieu. Moreover, Turkey is the passage of the East and the West both geographically and culturally. There are resemblances between Zen and Wittgenstein by means of method and the useof language. Furthermore, it was given the names of the books that Wittgenstein read and the philosophers who influenced Wittgenstein. The parallels between Zen and Wittgenstein are justified.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Wong, Wendy H. W. "Paul Wittgenstein in Great Britain." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2016. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33743/.

Full text

Abstract:

Most of the existing research on Paul Wittgenstein (1887–1961) focuses on his performing career in central Europe as a left-hand pianist and his commissions from the most prominent composers of the 20th century such as Richard Strauss and Maurice Ravel, and his favourite composer, Franz Schmidt. His British performing career and the compositions Ernest Walker, Norman Demuth and Benjamin Britten composed for and dedicated to him, however, remain relatively unexplored. By examining a variety of primary sources that are disclosed here for the first time, this thesis offers the first scholarly research into Wittgenstein’s performing activities in Great Britain in the 1920s–50s and his British commissions in order to fill a major research gap in Wittgenstein studies. Chapter 1 explores Wittgenstein’s self-recognition as a member of the Viennese aristocracy and the shaping of his musical identity, conception and taste, followed by an overview of the related primary sources that are currently located in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, a detailed summary of his performing activities in Great Britain and a discussion of the British reception of him as a left-hand pianist. Chapter 2 focuses on Walker and the three compositions he wrote for piano left-hand, two of which he composed before meeting Wittgenstein and one after, and the pianist’s attitude towards them. Chapter 3 brings to light the much-neglected composer Demuth and the two works he composed for Wittgenstein and discusses possible reasons why the pianist never performed them. Chapter 4 examines Wittgenstein’s first and only official British commission, the Diversions, Op. 21 by Britten, and investigates the interaction between composer and pianist in the compositional process and their differing conceptions of the work.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Stoffman, Hart. "The later Wittgenstein, linguistic idealist?" Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ57227.pdf.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Fasula, Pierre. "Musil, Wittgenstein : l'Homme du possible." Phd thesis, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2013. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00839117.

Full text

Abstract:

Au chapitre 4 de "L' Homme sans qualités", Musil présente son personnage principal, Ulrich, comme doué d'un sens du possible, qu'il définit ainsi : " L'homme qui en est doué, par exemple, ne dira pas : ici s'est produite, va se produire, doit se produire telle ou telle chose; mais il imaginera : ici pourrait, devrait se produire telle ou telle chose; et quand on lui dit d'une chose qu'elle est comme elle est, il pense quelle pourrait aussi bien être autre. Ainsi pourrait-on définir simplement le sens du possible comme la faculté de penser tout ce qui pourrait être "aussi bien", et de ne pas accorder plus d'importance à ce qui est qu'à ce qui n'est pas " (L''Homme sans qualités, §4). De manière générale, nous examinons ce sens du possible, dans ses différentes mises en œuvre, à l'aune des remarques conceptuelles de Wittgenstein sur la possibilité. Dans le domaine théorique, l'interprétation de la thèse de Musil sur Mach permet de montrer que, par comparaison avec la démarche scientifique, le sens du possible est la capacité a penser non seulement toutes les possibilités réelles mais aussi toutes les possibilités concevables, et ce par opposition a l'induction et à la recherche de causes. Dans le domaine de la conduite de la vie, la lecture philosophique d'un roman de Musil permet de montrer que le sens du possible est non pas la solution mais l' expression du problème de la vie juste (" comment dois-je vivre ?"). Enfin, dans une dernière partie, on rapporte le sens du possible au développement d'utopies, c'est-à-dire des vies et des hommes concevables mais pas nécessairement possibles en vertu de la réalité

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Dain, Edmund. "Nonsense and the new Wittgenstein." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2006. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/54250/.

Full text

Abstract:

This thesis focuses on 'New' or 'Resolute' readings of Wittgenstein's work, early and later, as presented in the work of, for instance, Cora Diamond and James Conant. One of the principal claims of such readings is that, throughout his life, Wittgenstein held an 'austere' view of nonsense. That view has both a trivial and a non-trivial aspect. The trivial aspect is that any string of signs could, by appropriate assignment, be given a meaning, and hence that, if such a string is nonsense, that will be because we have failed to make just such an assignment. The non-trivial aspect is this: that there is no further, non-trivial story to be told, and so nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give signs a meaning. Hence, too, logically speaking, all nonsense is on a par. That view, both of nonsense and of Wittgenstein, has attracted a great deal of controversy. It is particularly controversial in relation to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, where Wittgenstein famously declares, in the penultimate remark, that the reader is to recognise Wittgenstein's own elucidatory propositions there as nonsensical, and must eventually throw them away in coming to understand Wittgenstein himself. I defend the austere view and its attribution to Wittgenstein, early and later (but focussing primarily on the earlier), against a number of exegetical and substantial criticisms put forward by, for instance, Peter Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock and Adrian Moore.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Brandt, Stefan Geoffrey Heinrich. "Wittgenstein and Sellars on intentionality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0d9c1102-17bf-493b-a1a0-aa983d277717.

Full text

Abstract:

The aim of the thesis is to explore Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Wilfrid Sellars’s views on intentionality. In the first chapter I discuss the account of intentionality and meaning the early Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus. I present his idea that sentences are pictures of states of affairs with which they share a ‘logical form’ and to which they stand in an internal ‘pictorial relationship’. I argue that Wittgenstein thought of this relationship as established by acts of thought consisting in the operation of mental signs corresponding to the signs of public languages. In the second and third chapters I discuss the later Wittgenstein’s criticism of ideas at the heart of the Tractarian account of intentionality, as well as his explanations of the phenomena that motivated it. In the second chapter I examine his rejection of the idea that thinking consists in the operation of mental signs and his criticism of the idea that meaning and understanding are mental processes accompanying the use of language. In the third chapter I turn to Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea that representations stand in an internal ‘pictorial relation’ to objects in the natural order that are their meaning. I illuminate his later views by discussing Sellars’s non-relational account of meaning, in particular his claim that specifications of meaning do not relate expressions to items that are their meaning, but rather specify their rule-governed role in language. I conclude with a discussion of the later Wittgenstein’s account of the relationship between intentional phenomena and the objects at which they are directed. In the final fourth chapter I provide a detailed discussion of Sellars’s account of thinking. I conclude with some criticisms of Sellars’s views.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Gomes, Cláudio Alexandre Figueira. ""Sentido” e “impressão” em Wittgenstein." Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2011. http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/4753.

Full text

Abstract:

Submitted by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2015-10-23T14:25:21Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Claudio Alexandre Figueira Gomes - 2011.pdf: 1082762 bytes, checksum: 0fadc2c1cf247e7acb3c2e502087bf6a (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5)
Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2015-10-23T14:27:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Claudio Alexandre Figueira Gomes - 2011.pdf: 1082762 bytes, checksum: 0fadc2c1cf247e7acb3c2e502087bf6a (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2015-10-23T14:27:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Claudio Alexandre Figueira Gomes - 2011.pdf: 1082762 bytes, checksum: 0fadc2c1cf247e7acb3c2e502087bf6a (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-15
Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq
This dissertation is a study of the relationship between the concepts of “sense” and “impression” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In the Tractatus, the sense of a proposition is given by an a priori possibility of deducting its truth’s conditions. From 1929 onwards, with the publication of the article Some Remarks on Logical Form, Wittgenstein begins to explicitly conceive the ontological statute of tractarian reality as “phenomenological”. In the year 1930, Wittgenstein, surprisingly, presents a new philosophy rejecting what, perhaps, could be the Tractatus most characteristic thesis - the thesis of The Complete Determination of Sense. In this dissertation, we intent to investigate the possible reasons that would have caused this mutation and evaluate some probable consequences of the new conceptions of “sense” and “impression” for the Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the thirties.
Esta dissertação é um estudo da relação entre os conceitos de “sentido” e “impressão” na filosofia de Wittgenstein. No Tractatus, o sentido de uma proposição é dado pela possibilidade a priori de se deduzir suas condições de verdade. A partir de 1929, com a publicação do artigo Some Remarks on Logical Form, Wittgenstein passa a conceber explicitamente o estatuto ontológico da realidade tractariana como “fenomenológico”. A partir do ano de 1930, Wittgenstein, surpreendentemente, apresenta uma nova filosofia ao rejeitar o que, talvez, seja a tese mais característica do Tractatus – a Tese da Completa Determinação do Sentido. Com esta dissertação, pretendemos investigar as possíveis razões que teriam causado essa mutação e avaliar algumas prováveis consequências das novas concepções de “sentido” e de “impressão” para a filosofia de Wittgenstein na década de trinta.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

PASSERIEU, DIT JEAN MARC. "Wittgenstein et l'idee de culture." Paris 1, 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996PA010563.

Full text

Abstract:

1) visees problematiques : ce travail repond a une double exigence philo sophique a) demontrer la fonction interne de l'idee de culture dans la conceptualite de wittgenstein ("w") - en chacune de ses "epoques" presu mees -, son incidence regulatrice dans l'usage des concepts de sprache, grammatik, sprachspiel, lbensform. . . B) clarifier plus generalement les conditions d'une hermeneutique culturelle et d'une axiologie possibles a partir de l'examen par w des notions de kultur et zivilisation. 2) methodologie : apres une etude critique de la figure de w dans notre pay sage culturel, la 1ere partie etablit ce qui distingue w des conceptions theoriques de la kultur et des "visions du monde". Une genealogie du jeu de langage philosophique (cultura, civilta, kultur, zivilisation) situe w dans l'histoire de la philosophie et de l'anthropologie. La 2eme par tie suit la formation de cette pensee multiple de la culture. 3) conclusions entre la problematique "logique" et celle des jeux de langage existe une consequence. La visee "pragmatique" de w differe aussi bien de l'em pirisme que de l'eidetique transcendantale, de l'ontologie fondamentale et de la lebensphilosophie. Les fins dernieres de la culture n'induisent pas le nihilisme ou le relativisme en matiere d'anthropologie et d'esthetique. La decision ethique et l'acte de la foi fondent la logique de la gewissheit et decident de la possibilite d'un ordre culturel
1) conceptual views : this work fulfils two philosophical requirements. A) to describe how the concept of culture is internally connected with the fundamental conceptuality of w's philosophy (in each one of his socalled "periods"); to show the normative relevance of culture in the philosophical use of "sprache", "grammatik", "sprachspiel", "lebensform"; b) from a more general point of view, the second requirement consists of the clarification of all possible hermeneutics and theory of values. Following the w's insight of culture and civilization. 2) methodology : after a critical investigation of the w's legend in our cultural landscape, our first part shows the way w rejects the theoretical conceptions of culture and the world views; a grammatical study of the philosophical language games of culture replaces w inside the historical development of philosophy and anthropology. The second part describes the complex evolution of his inquiry and the role of culture. 3) conclusions a specific continuity links the "logical" problematics to the "language game's one. W's "pragmatic" point of view is as far as from empiricism as from transcendental philosophy or "lebensphilosophie". Against nihilism and relativism, the logic of certainty is founded on acts and faith

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Orozco, Jonathan Elizondo. "Wittgenstein y la (meta)ética." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 2017. https://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/178108.

Full text

Abstract:

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2017.
Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-08T04:12:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 346420.pdf: 1881862 bytes, checksum: d8ebf19e8e5f85dc4b9dcdaf68dac66e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017
Introdução: No Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, publicado em 1921 por Ludwig Wittgenstein, o autor avisa que resolveu os problemas da filosofia. Mas o que dissolveu foram os pseudoproblemas filosóficos, pois na introdução do livro o próprio Wittgenstein explica que a formulação desses problemas se dá como consequência de um mal entendimento da lógica da linguagem. Por este motivo, Wittgenstein tenta traçar os limites da expressão dos pensamentos: demarcar o campo de ação da nossa linguagem ajudaria a evitar mal-entendidos. À primeira vista, parece que Wittgenstein estava preocupado pela possibilidade de conhecimento das ciências empíricas, pois considerava que era trabalho da filosofia delimitar aquelas. Porém, nessa mesma introdução ele adianta: ?? que pouco tem se conseguido uma vez que estes problemas têm sido resolvidos?. Nas Investigações Filosóficas, publicado em 1953, Wittgenstein explicou sua vontade de reler as teses do Tractatus; incluso considerou uma boa ideia a possibilidade de realizar uma publicação conjunta de ambos livros. Ao introduzir conceitos como jogos de linguagem, formas de vida, gramática e parecidos de família, o filósofo austríaco continuou trabalhando para traçar os limites do expressável por meio da linguagem. Mas esta vez a linha que separa o expressável do nao- expressável torna-se difusa e menos exata. Em ambos casos, aonde se pode localizar a ética? Está esta área da filosofia dentro dos limites do expressável? Existe uma mudança radical respeito a postura wittgensteiniana na relação com a ética em ambas obras? Na presente tese procuro responder essas perguntas e para fazê-lo, parto da premissa de que, na primeira etapa de seu pensamento, Wittgenstein era um não-cognitivista, porém não era um cético, um subjetivista, nem um relativista respeito à ética. A hipótese do meu trabalho é que Wittgenstein não muda radicalmente esta posição na sua segunda etapa. Contrário ao que alguns autores defendem, considero que não se pode deduzir um relativismo ético a partir das Investigações Filosóficas. Defenderei que a apertura de condições de sentido, proposta na publicação de 1953, poderia ser vista como uma apertura na possibilidade de expressão do conhecimento; porém, resulta difícil a inclusão da ética dentro dos âmbitos susceptíveis de serem conhecidos e, más difícil ainda, dentro daqueles conhecidos relativamente. Objetivo geral: O objetivo geral da pesquisa é estudar a influência da filosofia wittgensteiniana no âmbito da ética. Analisar até que ponto a obra de Wittgenstein pode ser utilizada para defender o relativismo ético. Objetivos secundários: a) Analisar as principais correntes do Cognitivismo e do Não- Cognitivismo metaético, especificamente respeito às premissas da normatividade moral. b) Contrastar ambas etapas da filosofia wittgenteiniana no plano epistemológico. c) Aplicar os conceitos epistemológicos subtraídos da filosofia wittgensteiniana ao discurso moral. d) Analisar os pressupostos da normatividade desde a perspectiva wittgensteiniana. f) Determinar se é possível a existência de uma visão que seja cognitivista e também relativista. Metodologia a ser usada: O principal instrumento metodológico a utilizado foi a análise conceitual, ou seja, analisaram-se as premissas de necessidade para que a aplicação dos conceitos mais importantes da filosofia wittgensteiniana seja possível. A investigação foi baseada na interpretação bibliográfica. A partir disso, foram elaboradas algumas conclusões gerais sobre o tema pesquisado procurando atingir os objetivos apresentados acima. Resultados da pesquisa: Depois de expor os principais conceitos da primeira etapa wittgensteiniana e compará-los com os principais conceitos da segunda etapa, concluiu-se que Wittgenstein continuou sendo um não-cognitivista metaético, e de sua filosofia não se segue um relativismo ético.

Abstract : The main goal of this thesis is to analyze if an ethical relativism could follow from Ludwig Wittgenstein´s Philosophical Investigations. My hypothesis is that an ethical relativism does not follow from the opening of the conditions of meaning that Wittgenstein presented in that book. To prove my hypothesis, I will list the conditions of sense that were defended in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and then I will try to locate ethics among those conditions. Afterwards, I will enumerate the main concepts of the Philosophical Investigations to search for the changes that happened regarding the Tractatus, and also to locate those points in which the Austrian philosopher did not change his perspective. Finally, I will list the different types of relativism that could be found among the different types of ethical discourse to question if the opening that the Philosophical Investigations proposed implies the possibility of the existence of ethical language games. Finally, I will argue that if the concept of form of life is read as a limit of the possibility of language, this means, as a transcendental limit knowledge, we can conclude that there is no ethical relativism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Mandeli, Alison Vander. "Wittgenstein sobre as crenças religiosas." Universidade Estadual de Londrina. Centro de Letras e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2012. http://www.bibliotecadigital.uel.br/document/?code=vtls000171696.

Full text

Abstract:

A dissertação tem como principal objetivo apresentar uma interpretação da filosofia da religião de Wittgenstein, mostrando como as ideias do filósofo, referentes às crenças religiosas, são melhor compreendidas quando contrapostas às pressuposições de uma tradicional interpretação da religião, que chamaremos de visão factual das crenças religiosas. Mostraremos que dois pressupostos da visão factual não se sustentam frente ao enfoque wittgensteiniano, a saber, tratar Deus como se fosse um objeto entre objetos e considerar as proposições religiosas como proposições empíricas, que para serem justificadas precisariam se basear em evidências. A abordagem wittgensteiniana mostrará que ao analisarmos a gramática do conceito ―Deus‖ e a categoria lógico/gramatical das proposições religiosas, os pressupostos da visão factual revelam confusões. Para melhor apresentação da pesquisa dividimos o texto em três capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, apresentaremos os pressupostos da visão factual através da reconstrução dos clássicos argumentos em favor da existência de Deus, o argumento ontológico, cosmológico e físico-teológico. No segundo capítulo apresentaremos as ideias de Wittgenstein em relação às crenças religiosas, mostrando como elas se afastam radicalmente da visão factual. No terceiro capítulo apresentaremos algumas objeções e possíveis respostas.
The dissertation has as main goal to present an interpretation of Wittgensteins philosophy of religion, showing how his ideas, referring to religious beliefs, are better comprehend when opposed to presuppositions from traditional interpretation of religion, which we will call target view of religious beliefs. We will show that two presumptions of the target view dont support themselves in front of Wittgensteins approach namely, to treat God as if an object between objects and to consider religious propositions as empirical propositions, that to be justified need to be based on evidences. Wittgensteins approach will show that by analyzing the grammar of the concept ―God‖ and the logical/grammatical category of religious propositions, the target views presumptions reveal confusions. For the best presentation of the research we divided the text in three chapters. In the first chapter, we will present the presumptions of the target view throughout the reconstruction of classical arguments for the existence of God, the ontological argument, cosmological and the argument from design. In the second chapter we will present Wittgenstein ideas due to religious beliefs, showing how they radically stray from target view. In the third chapter we will present some objections and possible answers.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

ANDRONICO, MARILENA. "MORFOLOGIA E ANTROPOLOGIA IN WITTGENSTEIN." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Trieste, 1996. http://thesis2.sba.units.it/store/handle/item/12812.

Full text

Abstract:

1993/1994
La tesi indaga l’influenza dello stile di indagine morfologico di Goethe e Spengler sul metodo dei giochi linguistici elaborato da Wittgenstein dopo il Tractatus. Il filosofo ridisegna l’ambito di applicazione del metodo, concependolo come un metodo comparativo per l’analisi concettuale. Impiegandolo nella sua critica alle Note al Ramo d’oro di Frazer, egli anticipa aspetti rilevanti delle riflessioni metodologiche dell’antropologia novecentesca.
VI Ciclo
1957
Versione digitalizzata della tesi di dottorato cartacea.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Valeri, Elena <1991&gt. "Wittgenstein su immagine e visione." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/7973.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Kim, Hwa-gyŏng. "Gewissheit und Skeptizismus bei Wittgenstein : neue Untersuchungen und Einsichten zu alten Zweifeln." Hamburg Kovac, 2006. http://www.verlagdrkovac.de/3-8300-2233-6.htm.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Farrow, Stephen John. "Wittgenstein and grammar : a study of the theoretical implications of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations for general linguistics." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.315892.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Birk, Andrea. "Vom Verschwinden des Subjekts : eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zur Solipsismusproblematik bei Wittgenstein /." Paderborn : mentis, 2006. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2776157&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Bengtsson, Gisela Susanna. "Wittgenstein and dogmatism in two traditions /." Oslo : University of Oslo, Unipub, 2008. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=017748850&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Börjeson, Björn. "En jämförelse mellan Wittgenstein och Rorty." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Philosophy, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-6505.

Full text

Abstract:

Avhandlingen ”En jämförelse mellan Wittgenstein och Rorty”, syftar till att ge ett svar på frågan om Richard Rorty har rätt att hänvisa till Ludwig Wittgensteins filosofi som överensstämmande med sin egen filosofi, nypragmatismen. En analys av texter från de båda filosoferna visar att de skiljer sig ifråga om vad filosofi är genom att Rortys åsikt grundas på ett historicistiskt och allmänvetenskapligt synsätt medan Wittgensteins är av filosofisk art; deras åsikter om vad filosofin borde vara genom att Rorty vill ha en friare filosofi med betoning på diskussion medan Wittgenstein menar att filosofin även i framtiden kommer att syssla med samma problem som de gamla grekerna; deras åsikter om filosofins värde genom att Rorty anser att filosofin har ett värde som vägledare och diskussionsform medan Wittgenstein endast tillskriver filosofin ett värde som en terapi för att klarlägga olika frågor. En ytterligare analys visar att frågeställningarna är två; är Wittgenstein pragmatist och är han politiskt liberal? Det svar som ges är att Wittgenstein inte är pragmatist i Rortys mening och att det inte finns några belägg för hans liberalism och att dessa tolkningar från Rorty endast beror på att han missförstått Wittgenstein på dessa punkter. Slutsatsen som ges är att Wittgensteins filosofi inte kan sägas överensstämma med Rortys nypragmatism. Dels på grund av olikheten i deras åsikter om filosofi; dels för att Rorty missförstått Wittgenstein på viktiga punkter och dels för att Rorty är influerad av många andra filosofer och att därför hans filosofi som slutprodukt inte är överensstämmande med Wittgensteins.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Ersahin, Direnc. "An Inquiry On Wittgenstein&#039." Master's thesis, METU, 2007. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12609103/index.pdf.

Full text

Abstract:

This study aims at investigating Wittgenstein&rsquo
s conception of meaning. In this sense, philosopher&rsquo
s early and later periods will be examined. Key notions of Wittgenstein&rsquo
s philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, language-game, rule following, Private Language Argument and his assertion that &lsquo
meaning is use&rsquo
will be analyzed. Out of this analysis, Wittgenstein&rsquo
s answer to the following basic question will be sought: How is meaning derived in a language? The outcome of this query will be comparatively read with four linguistic theories so as to position Wittgenstein&rsquo
s conception of meaning with regard to the linguistic turn. As a result of this, it will be argued that Wittgensteinian meaning can be regarded as the very first step of post-structural understanding of meaning and discourse theory.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Cavassane, Ricardo Peraça [UNESP]. "A concepção de filosofia de Wittgenstein." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/93146.

Full text

Abstract:

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2013-09-27Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:15:09Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 cavassane_rp_me_mar.pdf: 723388 bytes, checksum: 24dcf56e4b75c539dccf686fe49d00bb (MD5)
Os objetos desta dissertação são a concepção de filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus e nas Investigações Filosóficas, bem como a transformação que a concepção de filosofia de Wittgenstein sofreu do Tractatus às Investigações. Interpretaremos todos os trechos das referidas obras relevantes para os temas a serem tratados, e justificaremos nossa interpretação em dois níveis. No primeiro nível de justificação, recorreremos à interpretação de Oskari Kuusela a fim de mostrar que nossa interpretação se justifica por sua concordância com a de Kuusela, pois entendemos que Wittgenstein procura elaborar uma concepção de filosofia desprovida de teorias e, portanto, livre de dogmatismo, tendo falhado em sua primeira tentativa, no Tractatus, mas sendo bem sucedido em sua segunda tentativa, nas Investigações. No segundo nível de justificação, recorreremos às interpretações dos principais comentadores da filosofia de Wittgenstein a fim de mostrar que a interpretação de Kuusela se justifica por solucionar os problemas que as interpretações dos principais comentadores da filosofia de Wittgenstein não solucionam, uma vez que tais interpretações não são capazes de explicar como Wittgenstein falha no Tractatus e tem sucesso nas Investigações em sua empresa de conceber uma filosofia livre de dogmatismo
The objects of this dissertation are Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in the Philosophical Investigations, as well as the transformation that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy suffered from the Tractatus to the Investigations. We will interpret every passage of the referred works relevant to the subjects to be treated, and we will justify our interpretation in two levels. At the first level of justification, we will appeal to the interpretation of Oskari Kuusela in order to show that our interpretation is justified by its agreement with Kuusela’s, because we understand that Wittgenstein seeks to elaborate a conception of philosophy devoid of theories and, therefore, free of dogmatism, having failed in his first attempt, in the Tractatus, but succeeding in his second attempt, in the Investigations. At the second level of justification, we will appeal to the interpretations of the main commentators of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in order to show that Kuusela’s interpretation is justified by solving the problems that the interpretations of the main commentators of Wittgenstein’s philosophy do not solve, once that such interpretations are not able to explain how Wittgenstein fails in the Tractatus and succeeds in the Investigations in his enterprise of conceiving a philosophy free of dogmatism

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Thompson, James M. "The phenomenological Wittgenstein : a philosophical interlude /." Available to subscribers only, 2006. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1240700411&sid=12&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Wittgenstein'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles