Journal articles on the topic 'Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 – Religion'

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in 1889, son of parents of Jewish extraction but not Jewish religion. Asked how his family came by the name ‘Wittgenstein’ Ludwig said they had been court Jews to the princely family and so had taken the name when Jews were required by law to have European-style names. The father, Karl, was a Protestant, the mother a Catholic. The Jewish blood was sufficient to bring the family later on into danger under Hitler's Nuremberg Laws. They did not think of themselves as Jews or belong to the Jewish community in Vienna. The children were brought up sort-of Catholic though so far as I know only the eldest, Hermine, towards the end of her life, took this seriously and made a profession of faith before friends and household. At 9 years of age Ludwig and Paul, a year or two older than Ludwig, talked together and decided that their religion was all nonsense. Paul became a pianist of some fame, but soon after his debut in Vienna he became a wounded prisoner on the Russian front and his arm was lopped off by a surgeon who did not know he was a pianist.

Efter sin tilbagevenden til Cambridge tidligt på året i 1929 accepterede Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) en invitation i november fra sprogforskeren, filosoffen og oversætteren af Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) C.K. Ogden til at holde en forelæsning i foreningen 'The Heretics" (2). Det er den første og eneste gang, Wittgenstein udarbejdede og holdt en "populær" forelæsning (3); den formodes at være holdt i løbet af 1930.

Although Elisabeth Lutyens (1906-83) was a pioneer of British twentieth-century music, her work is relatively unknown in North America. This article begins with an introduction to her life and compositions, before going on to a detailed analysis of text-music relations in selected passages of her Motet, op. 27 (1953). The analysis forms the basis for a discussion of the concept of text as representation of music: Lutyens began to compose the music of the Motet first, and chose its text—excerpts from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921) by the Austrian-born English philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)—because it seemed a fitting expression of the musical ideas that had already begun to develop.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) was arguably one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Despite previous interest in philosophical approaches (Corlett, 1996), and the value given to philosophy in relation to applied practice (Poczwardowski, Sherman & Ravizza, 2004), almost no attention has been given to Wittgenstein’s works in sport psychology. In this article, we suggest that our discipline frequently suffers with conceptual confusions and misunderstandings driven by our unintentional misguided use of language. Through the philosophical thinking of Wittgenstein, we explore the tacit language-games and the pictures that hold thinking captive within sport psychology, and attempt to provide an alternative lens through which researchers and practitioners can view the discipline. By drawing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and the methods of previous psychologists whose works were shaped by Wittgenstein (e.g. Watzlawick, Weakland & Fisch, 1974), the wider implications for applied sport psychology and the training of practitioners are considered.

The article examines the multilevel influence of the personality and ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) on the literary text of the significant German writer (and academic literary researcher) of the 1990s W.G. Sebald (1944–2001) — first of all, on the example of his final work, the novel Austerlitz (2001), in which the most important themes and main stylistic and artistic strategies of the writer culminate. It is shown that the features of this text, including ways and patterns of movement and unfolding of thought in it, reflect and echo Wittgenstein’s ideas on “family resemblance” as a hidden principle organizing human language and experience (Philosophical Investigations, 1953). Since the research methodologically relies on a systematic approach, within which the writer’s creative heritage is viewed as a unity with its own hierarchy, structure, network of internal and external correspondences, an assumption is made, confirmed by several examples from other writer’s texts, that the identified functions and ways of existence of L. Wittgenstein’s image and ideas are characteristic for the literary text of the writer as a whole.

The article examines the multilevel influence of the personality and ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) on the literary text of the significant German writer (and academic literary researcher) of the 1990s W.G. Sebald (1944–2001) — first of all, on the example of his final work, the novel Austerlitz (2001), in which the most important themes and main stylistic and artistic strategies of the writer culminate. It is shown that the features of this text, including ways and patterns of movement and unfolding of thought in it, reflect and echo Wittgenstein’s ideas on “family resemblance” as a hidden principle organizing human language and experience (Philosophical Investigations, 1953). Since the research methodologically relies on a systematic approach, within which the writer’s creative heritage is viewed as a unity with its own hierarchy, structure, network of internal and external correspondences, an assumption is made, confirmed by several examples from other writer’s texts, that the identified functions and ways of existence of L. Wittgenstein’s image and ideas are characteristic for the literary text of the writer as a whole.

Résumé Le but de cet article est d’évaluer l’hypothèse de John Rupert Firth (1890–1960) énonçant que l’article de l’anthropologue Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages” (1923), constituerait une des sources d’inspiration ayant conduit Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) à élaborer une nouvelle conception de la signification en termes d’‘usage’. S’appuyant sur certains passages des Philosophical Investigations (1953), Firth établit ainsi une filiation entre les deux grandes idées phares de Malinowski, à savoir l’importance de la notion de ‘contexte de situation’ et l’idée que le langage serait un ‘mode d’action’ et les principales thèses (la signification comme usage, l’acquisition du langage, le langage comme un ensemble de jeux) que développera Wittgenstein. L’examen du bien fondé de cette hypothèse conduira à préciser la synergie des idées qui eut lieu en matière de pragmatique dans l’Angleterre de la première moitié du XXe siècle.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) had considerable influence on the ‘modern’ world but did not consider himself part of it. His search for a way of thinking, to give a deeper understanding than the science of his day, has considerable analogies with that of Goethe. He was less sanguine than Goethe about the possibility of a renewal of culture in his own day but his philosophical work, in its stress on restraint and concreteness, is permeated by the ethical ideals that he attempted to realize in his life and that of his friends. He also shows some kinship with Goethe's non-theistic mysticism. His philosophical work is a guide that, perhaps rightly, requires readers to find the answer for themselves.

<p>Este trabalho investiga a questão da verdade em Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Buscar-se-á analisar o artigo <em>Wittgenstein on Truth</em> (2016) de Paul Horwich, confrontando-o com o de Hans-Johann Glock, intitulado <em>Truth in the Tractatus</em> (2006), tendo como objetivo compreender os pressupostos filosóficos centrais das teorias correspondencialista e deflacionária da verdade. Para tanto, na primeira parte, faremos uma caracterização geral dos elementos centrais das teorias substancialista e não-substancialista da verdade; na segunda parte, comentaremos as dificuldades apontadas por Horwich (2016) e Glock (2006) na identificação da concepção de verdade do <em>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</em> (1922) enquanto correspondencialista e caracterizaremos, conforme Horwich (2016), os três defeitos da teoria da verdade do primeiro Wittgenstein; na terceira parte, mostraremos que Horwich também se baseia no que Glock denomina de teoria da verdade oficial do <em>Tractatus</em>, bem como as razões pelas quais Horwich (2016) considera ilegítima a introdução no deflacionismo no <em>Tractatus</em> como tentativa de salvar a teoria da verdade tractatiana; na quarta parte, faremos uma breve caracterização da concepção de verdade nas <em>Philosophical Investigations - PI</em> (1953), apontando a sua centralidade na reorientação do pensamento wittgensteiniano. E, por fim, como considerações finais, mostraremos as diferentes conclusões de Horwich (2016) e Glock (2006), assinalando também um aspecto positivo e outro negativo do deflacionismo.</p>

O presente estudo tem como objetivo elaborar uma análise referente ao modo com o qual as experiências fenomênicas de primeira pessoa são trabalhadas na filosofia da linguagem de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), mais precisamente em sua obra Investigações Filosóficas (1953), assim como, apresentar a necessidade do uso da hermenêutica para a interpretação das mesmas nos jogos de linguagem. A metodologia abordada para o presente trabalho, visando alcançar os objetivos propostos, se dará da seguinte forma: primeiramente faremos uma breve análise relacionada ao conceito de qualia. Em um segundo momento, analisaremos os conceitos acerca da impossibilidade de uma linguagem privada em Wittgenstein e o conceito de jogos de linguagem por ele formulado. Em uma terceira etapa, observaremos o papel fundamental exercido pela hermenêutica nos jogos de linguagem. Acredito que o presente estudo trará para o leitor uma melhor compreensão em relação ao conceito de qualia, assim como, uma iniciação à filosofia wittgensteiniana referente à teoria dos jogos de linguagem. O leitor também irá perceber os motivos pelos quais a hermenêutica é fundamental para a compreensão correta das expressões linguísticas.

AbstractInterjections are exclamatory signs fostering a realistic conception of the perils and uncertainties of human experience. Natural interjections are reactionary signs in degenerate pre-signs (preverbs or prenouns), unconnected to other syntactic forms of grammar. The simplicity of natural interjections are distinguished from the more complex occasional interjections, expressed in full pseudo-sentences with grammatical constructions. The prehistory of the natural interjections are first the simple cries of babies, and second the artificial construction of pidgin (creolization) of mixed languages. In interjections, literal language becomes transformed into figurative and metaphorical “language,” that is intermedial speech with vocalization and gestures. Peirce’s “syntax” (Charles Sanders Peirce 1839–1914) argues for the pragmatic interjections in the exclamations of spontaneous cries and shouts. In the framework of Peirce’s logical categories, interjections represent first of secondness. The degenerate form analyzes the vague or indeterminate meaning through pictures of diagrams. Wittgenstein’s social “grammar” (Ludwig Wittgenstein 1889–1951) of language-games is subject to cultural forms of life. Wittgenstein disagrees on accepting the “nonsensical” or meaningless interjections, but in his later writings he will agree to giving the interjections fuzzy meanings.

The objective of the essay is to follow the tracks of silence philosophically, as multiplicity not reducible to unity; there are instances of silence, not silence, neither objectively nor subjectively considered; it is not an 'object' or a 'subjective experience'. Recognize the relevance of silence based on its apparent irrelevance, and, nevertheless, point out the importance that it can have in the attempt to lead to philosophical reflection and to philosophize in general what is essential in it: THINKING. The proposed path requires LISTENING to language, rather than taking for granted the immediate disposition and transparency with which the world appears to us. To do this, we will reflect on excerpts from works written by three thinkers who lived 'war' up close: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929). This work proceeds peripathetically, alone, reflections emerge in the middle of a world that crumbles between the complexity and destruction that technique and modernity have brought. It is undertaken by welcoming resonances, sensations, representations, images, verses and musings, reflecting in the midst of daily daze. Is there a logical-grammatical silence or an ethicalmystical-liturgical silence? Is silence equivalent to an impossibility of saying or is it the result of an impossibility of saying itself, which does not say when what it most wants to say? Silence of existence or silence in the face of events that threaten to overwhelm us? Is silence silent or is being silent?

<div><p><strong>Abstract :</strong> In general, this article intends to answer a fundamental question, whether a mystical experience can or cannot be expressed through language. If the answer is positive, what kind of language can ‘formulate’ an inner space of human experience to penetrate into the heart of the most real reality? What kind of consciousness can “bring” the light of God to the ‘empirical’ world? h en how to formulate a mystical consciousness in expressing spiritual experience that is “subjective” and therefore, has limitations? How, in fact, the status of “non-subjective phenomenal” consciousness in Islamic epistemology? h e above questions, of course, are just a small ripple for those who seek to dive into the depth of “Mystical Ocean without shore”. To give an answer, this article then presents two contemporary philosophers from the genre of analytic philosophy, but from a diff erent background from that of tradition: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi (1923 to 1999). h is article appears to be a “resistance” epistemic: to show the fragile philosophical structure of positivism to capture the invisible ‘realities’. h is last genre of philosophy, which is concerned mostly with the reliability of facts, the necessity correspondence between the facts and language, and glorifi es the verifi cation principles, has experienced “stutters” in every endeavor to reveal the world of meaning. h is article, also seeks reveal the way to the world of “experience” and does not stop at the world of knowledge. By adopting the approach of Analytic Philosophy, this article shows the folds of meaning and reality: empirical, meta-empirical, existential, and spiritual. For the author, the all layers of reality can only be revealed through a mystical experience, a presential knowledge (al-’ilm al-hudhūrī) in a perfect ontological state.</p><p><em>Keywords : Mystical experience, Logical-positivism, al-‘ilm al-hudhūrī, Language games, Logosentrism, Metalanguage, Perceptive</em></p><p> </p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Secara umum artikel ini ingin menjawab sebuah pertanyaan fundamental apakah pengalaman mistik (mystic experience) dapat diekspresikan melalui bahasa. Jika jawabnya positif, bahasa jenis apakah yang bisa ‘merumuskan’ sebuah pengalaman inner space manusia hingga menembus ke jantung realitas yang paling sejati? Kesadaran jenis apakah yang mampu “menghadirkan” cahaya Tuhan ke dunia ‘empiris’? Lalu bagaimana merumuskan sebuah kesadaran mistik dalam ungkapan- ungkapan pengalaman keruhanian yang bersifat “subyektif ” dan karena itu memiliki keterbatasan-keterbatasan? Bagaimana sejatinya posisi kesadaran “subyektif-non fenomenal” dalam bangunan epistemologi Islam? Deretan pertanyaan di atas, tentu hanyalah riak kecil dari gelombang tanya yang ingin menyelami kedalaman “lautan mistik” yang tak bertepi. Untuk menjawab terhadap pertanyaan di atas, artikel ini lalu menghadirkan dua fi lsuf kontemporer yang berasal dari genre fi lsafat analitik (analytic philosophy) namun dari latar belakang tradisi yang berbeda: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) dan Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi (1923-1999). Artikel ini hadir untuk sebuah “perlawanan” epistemik: memperlihatkan betapa gawatnya bangunan filsafat Positivisme dalam memotret ‘realitas-realitas’ yang tak kasat mata. Genre fi lsafat terakhir ini, meski berhasil memesona tradisi fi lsafat Barat yang memuja, keterandalan fakta, keharusan korespondensi antara fakta dan bahasa, dan mengagungkan verifi cation principles, tetapi ia mengalami “kegagapan” dalam setiap ikhtiar menyingkap dunia makna (meaning). artikel ini, sebaliknya, memperlihatkan pentingnya menempuh jalan ke dunia “pengalaman”(experience) dan tidak berhenti pada dunia pengetahuan (knowledge). Dengan menggunakan pendekatan Filsafat Analitik, penulis memperlihatkan lipatan makna dan realitas yang berlapis: empirik, meta-empirik, eksistensial, dan spiritual. Dan seluruh lapisan realitas tersebut hanya dapat disingkap melalui pengalaman mistik via al-‘ilm al-hudhūrī dalam sebuah ‘ketercelupan ontologis’ yang sempurna.</p><p><em>Kata kunci : Pengalaman mistik, Logika-positivistik, al-‘ilm al-hudhūrī, Permainan bahasa, Logosentrime, Metabahasa, Perseptif</em></p></div>

All religion have different expressions in articulating the truth of their teachings. The differences occur not onlyamongst different religions, but also in school of thoughts, sects, and ideologies in the same religion. Thismeans that the use of religious language amongst the groups is not necessarily lead to one goal and to thesame meaning. This paper aims to examine the use of religious language from the perspective of its usageusing ordinary language philosophy approach (language philosophy) or more specifically known as languagegames intiated by the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889). Such study is veryimportant to compenstate for current analysis which tends to be empirical-positivistic. This trend emphasizesthe pragmatic aspects of the language than the grammatical aspect. Thus, in the context of religious language,one the same language of riligous language is used not for one purpose only. This means that there is no onlyone way for religious sentences to gain the meaning, but it can discribe some realities depending on the users.Key Word: Language, Bahasa Agama, Makna AbstrakSemua agama memiliki ekspresi berbeda dalam mengartikulasikan kebenaran ajarannya. Cara pengungkapanyang berbeda ini bahkan tidak hanya terjadi antar-agama yang berbeda, tetapi terjadi juga dalam aliran,mazhab, dan ideology dalam satu agama yang sama. Artinya bahwa penggunaan bahasa agama antarkelompokbelum tentu megarah pada satu sasaran makna yang sama. Tulisan ini bertujuan mengkaji bahasaagama dari perspektif penggunaannya melalui pendekatan filsafat bahasa biasa (language philosophy) ataulebih spesifik dikenal dengan language games yang digagas oleh filsuf kelahiran Austria, Ludwig Josef JohannWittgenstein (1889). Studi semacam ini dipandang sangat penting guna mengimbangi analisis yang selama inicenderung empiris-positivistik. Kecenderungan ini menekankan bahasa pada aspek pragmatic daripada aspekgramatikalnya. Dengan demikian, dapat disimpulkan dalam konteks bahasa agama, bahwa satu bahasa yangsama dari bahasa agama dipakai tidak hanya untuk satu tujuan saja. Ini artinya bahwa pernyataan-pernyataanagama tidak mendapatkan maknanya dengan satu cara saja, tetapi bisa menggambarkan beberapa relaitasmenurut aturan main si pemakainya.Kata Kunci: Language, Bahasa Agama, Makna

That Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) was one of the most influential twentieth-century philosophers is hardly a controversial claim. However, Wittgenstein’s own works, principally the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) and Philosophical Investigations (1953; second edition 1997), have engendered a considerable range of widely diverse—and divisive—commentary. In The Fate of Wonder Wittgenstein’s Critique of Metaphysics and Modernity, Kevin M. Cahill has produced a useful and at times provocative addition to this literature.

Analisar a conotação formativa da linguagem quando travada pelo conhecimento metafísico é a meta proposta da investigação, tendo como referência a filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Bem sabemos, em relação ao conhecimento, desde a Grécia antiga ou medieval e, ainda hoje, grande parte dos filósofos insistem em construir um sistema de proposições universalmente válidas. Para tanto, é necessário, antes de tudo, fazer uma exposição histórica das questões epistemológicas que levaram esse filósofo a entender que a linguagem é um caminho seguro e pode oferecer uma solidez não apenas à linguagem, mas também ao trabalho da filosofia. E assim, em seguida, debruçar à demonstração das razões que nos levam a entender que as pretensões filosóficas nem sempre são legítimas como assim pensavam os tradicionais da filosofia. Digamos de passagem, nossa reflexão é trivial na esfera filosófica. Alavancado metodologicamente por uma trilha analítica, o trabalho se divide em dois momentos, o primeiro, aborda questões sobre o conhecimento metafísico e a aparente pretensão finalística de um suposto conhecimento metafísico, num segundo momento, trata-se de investigar a linguagem na dimensão dos jogos de linguagem. As fontes principais de investigação são: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1968) e, Investigações Lógicas (1999).