Academic literature on the topic 'Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 – Religion'
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Journal articles on the topic "Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 – Religion"
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Anscombe, G. E. M. "Cambridge Philosophers II: Ludwig Wittgenstein." Philosophy 70, no. 273 (July 1995): 395–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910006558x.
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Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in 1889, son of parents of Jewish extraction but not Jewish religion. Asked how his family came by the name ‘Wittgenstein’ Ludwig said they had been court Jews to the princely family and so had taken the name when Jews were required by law to have European-style names. The father, Karl, was a Protestant, the mother a Catholic. The Jewish blood was sufficient to bring the family later on into danger under Hitler's Nuremberg Laws. They did not think of themselves as Jews or belong to the Jewish community in Vienna. The children were brought up sort-of Catholic though so far as I know only the eldest, Hermine, towards the end of her life, took this seriously and made a profession of faith before friends and household. At 9 years of age Ludwig and Paul, a year or two older than Ludwig, talked together and decided that their religion was all nonsense. Paul became a pianist of some fame, but soon after his debut in Vienna he became a wounded prisoner on the Russian front and his arm was lopped off by a surgeon who did not know he was a pianist.
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Westergaard, Peter K. "En indledning - til Wittgensteins forelæsning om etik." Slagmark - Tidsskrift for idéhistorie, no. 20 (February 3, 2018): 129–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/sl.v0i20.103709.
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Efter sin tilbagevenden til Cambridge tidligt på året i 1929 accepterede Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) en invitation i november fra sprogforskeren, filosoffen og oversætteren af Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) C.K. Ogden til at holde en forelæsning i foreningen 'The Heretics" (2). Det er den første og eneste gang, Wittgenstein udarbejdede og holdt en "populær" forelæsning (3); den formodes at være holdt i løbet af 1930.
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Parsons, Laurel. "Music and Text in Elisabeth Lutyens's Wittgenstein Motet." Canadian University Music Review 20, no. 1 (May 16, 2013): 71–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1015648ar.
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Although Elisabeth Lutyens (1906-83) was a pioneer of British twentieth-century music, her work is relatively unknown in North America. This article begins with an introduction to her life and compositions, before going on to a detailed analysis of text-music relations in selected passages of her Motet, op. 27 (1953). The analysis forms the basis for a discussion of the concept of text as representation of music: Lutyens began to compose the music of the Motet first, and chose its text—excerpts from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921) by the Austrian-born English philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)—because it seemed a fitting expression of the musical ideas that had already begun to develop.
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Lindsay, Pete, Tim Pitt, and Owen Thomas. "Bewitched by our words: Wittgenstein, language-games, and the pictures that hold sport psychology captive." Sport & Exercise Psychology Review 10, no. 1 (March 2014): 41–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.53841/bpssepr.2014.10.1.41.
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Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) was arguably one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Despite previous interest in philosophical approaches (Corlett, 1996), and the value given to philosophy in relation to applied practice (Poczwardowski, Sherman & Ravizza, 2004), almost no attention has been given to Wittgenstein’s works in sport psychology. In this article, we suggest that our discipline frequently suffers with conceptual confusions and misunderstandings driven by our unintentional misguided use of language. Through the philosophical thinking of Wittgenstein, we explore the tacit language-games and the pictures that hold thinking captive within sport psychology, and attempt to provide an alternative lens through which researchers and practitioners can view the discipline. By drawing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and the methods of previous psychologists whose works were shaped by Wittgenstein (e.g. Watzlawick, Weakland & Fisch, 1974), the wider implications for applied sport psychology and the training of practitioners are considered.
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Sokolova, Elizaveta V. "Figure and Scope of Ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein in W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz." Studia Litterarum 6, no. 2 (2021): 96–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/10.22455/2500-4247-2021-6-2-96-113.
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The article examines the multilevel influence of the personality and ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) on the literary text of the significant German writer (and academic literary researcher) of the 1990s W.G. Sebald (1944–2001) — first of all, on the example of his final work, the novel Austerlitz (2001), in which the most important themes and main stylistic and artistic strategies of the writer culminate. It is shown that the features of this text, including ways and patterns of movement and unfolding of thought in it, reflect and echo Wittgenstein’s ideas on “family resemblance” as a hidden principle organizing human language and experience (Philosophical Investigations, 1953). Since the research methodologically relies on a systematic approach, within which the writer’s creative heritage is viewed as a unity with its own hierarchy, structure, network of internal and external correspondences, an assumption is made, confirmed by several examples from other writer’s texts, that the identified functions and ways of existence of L. Wittgenstein’s image and ideas are characteristic for the literary text of the writer as a whole.
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Sokolova, Elizaveta V. "Figure and Scope of Ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein in W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz." Studia Litterarum 6, no. 2 (2021): 96–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.22455/2500-4247-2021-6-2-96-113.
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The article examines the multilevel influence of the personality and ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) on the literary text of the significant German writer (and academic literary researcher) of the 1990s W.G. Sebald (1944–2001) — first of all, on the example of his final work, the novel Austerlitz (2001), in which the most important themes and main stylistic and artistic strategies of the writer culminate. It is shown that the features of this text, including ways and patterns of movement and unfolding of thought in it, reflect and echo Wittgenstein’s ideas on “family resemblance” as a hidden principle organizing human language and experience (Philosophical Investigations, 1953). Since the research methodologically relies on a systematic approach, within which the writer’s creative heritage is viewed as a unity with its own hierarchy, structure, network of internal and external correspondences, an assumption is made, confirmed by several examples from other writer’s texts, that the identified functions and ways of existence of L. Wittgenstein’s image and ideas are characteristic for the literary text of the writer as a whole.
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Godart-Wendling, Béatrice. "L’hypothèse de Firth." Historiographia Linguistica 41, no. 1 (June 10, 2014): 79–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hl.41.1.03god.
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Résumé Le but de cet article est d’évaluer l’hypothèse de John Rupert Firth (1890–1960) énonçant que l’article de l’anthropologue Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages” (1923), constituerait une des sources d’inspiration ayant conduit Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) à élaborer une nouvelle conception de la signification en termes d’‘usage’. S’appuyant sur certains passages des Philosophical Investigations (1953), Firth établit ainsi une filiation entre les deux grandes idées phares de Malinowski, à savoir l’importance de la notion de ‘contexte de situation’ et l’idée que le langage serait un ‘mode d’action’ et les principales thèses (la signification comme usage, l’acquisition du langage, le langage comme un ensemble de jeux) que développera Wittgenstein. L’examen du bien fondé de cette hypothèse conduira à préciser la synergie des idées qui eut lieu en matière de pragmatique dans l’Angleterre de la première moitié du XXe siècle.
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MCGUINNESS, BRIAN. "In the shadow of Goethe: Wittgenstein's intellectual project." European Review 10, no. 4 (October 2002): 447–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1062798702000364.
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Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) had considerable influence on the ‘modern’ world but did not consider himself part of it. His search for a way of thinking, to give a deeper understanding than the science of his day, has considerable analogies with that of Goethe. He was less sanguine than Goethe about the possibility of a renewal of culture in his own day but his philosophical work, in its stress on restraint and concreteness, is permeated by the ethical ideals that he attempted to realize in his life and that of his friends. He also shows some kinship with Goethe's non-theistic mysticism. His philosophical work is a guide that, perhaps rightly, requires readers to find the answer for themselves.
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Carvalho, Marcondes Rocha. "Wittgenstein e a verdade." Investigação Filosófica 11, no. 1 (March 26, 2020): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.18468/if.2020v11n1.p19-30.
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<p>Este trabalho investiga a questão da verdade em Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Buscar-se-á analisar o artigo <em>Wittgenstein on Truth</em> (2016) de Paul Horwich, confrontando-o com o de Hans-Johann Glock, intitulado <em>Truth in the Tractatus</em> (2006), tendo como objetivo compreender os pressupostos filosóficos centrais das teorias correspondencialista e deflacionária da verdade. Para tanto, na primeira parte, faremos uma caracterização geral dos elementos centrais das teorias substancialista e não-substancialista da verdade; na segunda parte, comentaremos as dificuldades apontadas por Horwich (2016) e Glock (2006) na identificação da concepção de verdade do <em>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</em> (1922) enquanto correspondencialista e caracterizaremos, conforme Horwich (2016), os três defeitos da teoria da verdade do primeiro Wittgenstein; na terceira parte, mostraremos que Horwich também se baseia no que Glock denomina de teoria da verdade oficial do <em>Tractatus</em>, bem como as razões pelas quais Horwich (2016) considera ilegítima a introdução no deflacionismo no <em>Tractatus</em> como tentativa de salvar a teoria da verdade tractatiana; na quarta parte, faremos uma breve caracterização da concepção de verdade nas <em>Philosophical Investigations - PI</em> (1953), apontando a sua centralidade na reorientação do pensamento wittgensteiniano. E, por fim, como considerações finais, mostraremos as diferentes conclusões de Horwich (2016) e Glock (2006), assinalando também um aspecto positivo e outro negativo do deflacionismo.</p>
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Noara, André Renan. "Interpretação das sensações." Revista DIAPHONÍA 4, no. 2 (December 12, 2018): 63–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.48075/rd.v4i2.21315.
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O presente estudo tem como objetivo elaborar uma análise referente ao modo com o qual as experiências fenomênicas de primeira pessoa são trabalhadas na filosofia da linguagem de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), mais precisamente em sua obra Investigações Filosóficas (1953), assim como, apresentar a necessidade do uso da hermenêutica para a interpretação das mesmas nos jogos de linguagem. A metodologia abordada para o presente trabalho, visando alcançar os objetivos propostos, se dará da seguinte forma: primeiramente faremos uma breve análise relacionada ao conceito de qualia. Em um segundo momento, analisaremos os conceitos acerca da impossibilidade de uma linguagem privada em Wittgenstein e o conceito de jogos de linguagem por ele formulado. Em uma terceira etapa, observaremos o papel fundamental exercido pela hermenêutica nos jogos de linguagem. Acredito que o presente estudo trará para o leitor uma melhor compreensão em relação ao conceito de qualia, assim como, uma iniciação à filosofia wittgensteiniana referente à teoria dos jogos de linguagem. O leitor também irá perceber os motivos pelos quais a hermenêutica é fundamental para a compreensão correta das expressões linguísticas.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 – Religion"
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Fronda, Earl Stanley. "Wittgenstein from a theological point of view." Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.683343.
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Schmezer, Gerhard. "Entre le non-sens et l'exhortation : le religieux dans la recherche de Ludwig Wittgenstein." Paris 8, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006PA082626.
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Ce travail porte sur la dimension religieuse de l’œuvre de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 1951). Premièrement, nous démontrons que la notion du religieux chez Wittgenstein ne peut pas être comprise sans tenir compte de sa biographie. Deuxièmement, nous montrons le rapport étroit entre l’histoire de la publication de ses manuscrits et les diverses interprétations de son « point de vue religieux ». Troisièmement, nous esquissons l’itinéraire religieux de Wittgenstein en remettant les textes désormais disponibles dans leur contexte historique, afin de reconstruire son « imagination religieuse ». Nous montrons comment il abordait ses propres difficultés spirituelles, dialoguait avec des auteurs religieux et souvent élucidait des problèmes philosophiques par des exemples religieux. Finalement, nous abordons la notion de l’« âme » telle que Wittgenstein la décrit dans sa dernière philosophie ainsi que le rôle de ce concept dans la philosophie de la religion post-wittgensteinienneThis dissertation addresses the religious dimension of the life and work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 1951). First of all, we demonstrate that this religious element in Wittgenstein’s thought cannot be understood in isolation from his life. Secondly, we show that their exists a close relationship between the traditional interpretations of his “religious point of view” and the history of the publication of his manuscripts. Thirdly, we sketch Wittgenstein’s religious biography, placing the various texts now available in their historical context, with the intention of reconstructing his “religious imagination”. We show how he addresses his own spiritual difficulties, dialogues with religious authors and often elucidates philosophical problems with religious examples. Finally, we examine the notion of “soul” as Wittgenstein’s describes it in his last philosophy as well as its role in post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion
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Voizard, Alain. "Logique et langage chez Ludwig Wittgenstein." Paris 1, 1991. http://www.theses.fr/1991PA010501.
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Les arguments de wittgenstein contre une conception du langage comme calcul nousinterdisent d'esperer qu'une theorie systematique de la signification puisse etre developpee. En utilisant les arguments de wittgenstein et sa propre analyse du concept de suivre une regle, nous defendons l'idee que le statut qu'il attribue au langage,interdit la possiblite d'une theorie de la signification semblable a celle que propose dummett. Bien interpretee. La distinction wittgensteinienne entre dire et montrer tend a montrer qu'une position epistemologique doit decouler d'une bonne comprehension du fonctionnement de notre langue vernaculaire et qu'elle ne devrait pas etre imposee au langage. Nous montrons que cette erreur a ete faite par m. DummettOur belief in the possibility of a systematic theory of meaning is thwarted by l. Wittgenstein's arguments against a conception of language as calculus. Using wittgenstein's own arguments and his discusion of rule-following, we contend that the status he attributes to language forecloses the possibility of a dummettian (like) theory of meaning. If correctly interpreted, the distinction wittgenstein draws between maying and showing contributes significantly to show that an epistemological position must be the result of a correct understanding of the way our everyday language works, and not be imposed upon language. We show that this error has been made by m. Dummett
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Perrin, Denis. "Temps et langage chez Ludwig Wittgenstein." Grenoble 2, 2003. http://www.theses.fr/2003GRE29027.
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Cette étude a un objectif exégétique et un objectif de philosophie générale. Le premier est de mettre à jour l'existence d'une méditation continue (de 1929 à 1951) du temps chez L. Wittgenstein par une étude systématique de son Nachlass et de mesurer l'importance de cette méditation au sein de sa pensée. De cette façon, une lecture nouvelle de thèmes majeurs de cet auteur est élaborée ( cf. Les thèmes de la signification, de la règle, du critère de la mémoire et de l'attente). Le second objectif est de montrer que Wittgenstein conduit à bien (au moins en partie) un chantier majeur de la philosophie du langage ordinaire : celui du retour au langage ordinaire du temps. Il le fait dans le cadre de sa philosophie thérapeutique et déjoue au premier chef, toutes les manifestations du mythe du présent qui se sont insinuées dans notre philosophie (cf. Augustin, James et Russell). La radicalité de son propos est ici de nous faire renoncer à toute conception philosophique du temps.
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Cavassane, Ricardo Peraça [UNESP]. "A concepção de filosofia de Wittgenstein." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/93146.
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cavassane_rp_me_mar.pdf: 723388 bytes, checksum: 24dcf56e4b75c539dccf686fe49d00bb (MD5)Os objetos desta dissertação são a concepção de filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus e nas Investigações Filosóficas, bem como a transformação que a concepção de filosofia de Wittgenstein sofreu do Tractatus às Investigações. Interpretaremos todos os trechos das referidas obras relevantes para os temas a serem tratados, e justificaremos nossa interpretação em dois níveis. No primeiro nível de justificação, recorreremos à interpretação de Oskari Kuusela a fim de mostrar que nossa interpretação se justifica por sua concordância com a de Kuusela, pois entendemos que Wittgenstein procura elaborar uma concepção de filosofia desprovida de teorias e, portanto, livre de dogmatismo, tendo falhado em sua primeira tentativa, no Tractatus, mas sendo bem sucedido em sua segunda tentativa, nas Investigações. No segundo nível de justificação, recorreremos às interpretações dos principais comentadores da filosofia de Wittgenstein a fim de mostrar que a interpretação de Kuusela se justifica por solucionar os problemas que as interpretações dos principais comentadores da filosofia de Wittgenstein não solucionam, uma vez que tais interpretações não são capazes de explicar como Wittgenstein falha no Tractatus e tem sucesso nas Investigações em sua empresa de conceber uma filosofia livre de dogmatismo
The objects of this dissertation are Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in the Philosophical Investigations, as well as the transformation that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy suffered from the Tractatus to the Investigations. We will interpret every passage of the referred works relevant to the subjects to be treated, and we will justify our interpretation in two levels. At the first level of justification, we will appeal to the interpretation of Oskari Kuusela in order to show that our interpretation is justified by its agreement with Kuusela’s, because we understand that Wittgenstein seeks to elaborate a conception of philosophy devoid of theories and, therefore, free of dogmatism, having failed in his first attempt, in the Tractatus, but succeeding in his second attempt, in the Investigations. At the second level of justification, we will appeal to the interpretations of the main commentators of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in order to show that Kuusela’s interpretation is justified by solving the problems that the interpretations of the main commentators of Wittgenstein’s philosophy do not solve, once that such interpretations are not able to explain how Wittgenstein fails in the Tractatus and succeeds in the Investigations in his enterprise of conceiving a philosophy free of dogmatism
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Letourneur, Jérôme. "Du paradigme album à la recherche conceptuelle : connaissance, esthétique et synopticité chez Ludwig Wittgenstein." Paris 8, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA083996.
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Cette thèse éclaire le changement d'aspect de la recherche wittgensteinienne entre les Recherches Philosophiques comme paroxysme de son incompréhension, sa compréhension dans l'album et la recherche conceptuelle sur la cécité à l’aspect et son changement, qui en a résulté. Si celle-ci est inaugurée là où la première édition critique-génétique des Recherches Philosophiques situait en 2001 la fin de de l’œuvre, nous montrons que la question des aspects, leur changement et la cécité à ceux-ci était présente dans des manuscrits antérieurs. Sur cette base, nous décrivons comment l'incompréhension, que manifestent les Recherches Philosophiques, contredit toute demande d'insérabilité de matériau complémentaire dans l'ouvrage pour en figer la forme. Plutôt, par le rapport de la compréhension de cette incompréhension dite «Album» à la manière de voir les choses que constitue la synopticité, nous montrons, par la traduction et la mise en relation des Recherches Philosophiques aux principales étapes de la recherche conceptuelle, le biais par lequel l’œuvre vient s’insérer dans l'étude de Wittgenstein sur le changement d'aspect et la cécité à celui-ci. Nous soutenons qu’avec la relation du changement progressif du langage à la découverte véritable que constitue une sortie synoptique de la philosophie, cette recherche conceptuelle renouvelle par son esthétique la manière de voir la relation des conditions du langage à celles de la philosophie. Elle offre ainsi une alternative dynamique à la conception statique de la synopticité d'après laquelle l'oeuvre est hierarchisée aujourd'hui, alternative qui reste maintenant à transcrire dans l’édition désormais électronique des manuscrits de la succession (Nachlass) Wittgenstein“This thesis sheds light on the aspect change of Wittgensteinian research between the Philosophical Investigations as being in the ‘grip of stress’ due to incomprehension, contrasted with Wittgenstein’s album linked to comprehension of it, positioned as resulting in a conceptual investigation on blindness to aspect and aspect change. The grip of stress is itself an aspect. This conceptual investigation was inaugurated at the juncture where the Philosophical Investigations critical-genetic edition situated the end of the work in 2001. We demonstrate that the question of aspects, their change and blindness to it were already present in Wittgenstein’s earlier manuscripts. On this basis, we describe how the incomprehension the Philosophical Investigations manifest, contradicts any call for insertability of complementary material in the work that would freeze its form. Rather, by the relationship of comprehension of this incomprehension, called “Album”, to the way of seeing things that constitutes surveyability, we show, by the translation and connection of the Philosophical Investigations to the conceptual research milestones, the bias through which the work inserts itself in the study of Wittgenstein on aspect change and blindness to it. We argue that the relationship of progressive change in language to the true discovery that constitutes a synoptic way out of philosophy enables us via this conceptual research to renew the manner of seeing the relations of the condition of language to those of philosophy through its aesthetics. It thus offers an alternative dynamic to the static conception of surveyability after which the oeuvre is hierarchised today. This is an alternative that now should be transcribed in the electronic edition of Wittgensteins’s literary estate (Nachlass). ”
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Sekino, Tetsuya. "Peut-on parler de Dieu aujourd'hui ? : De Wittgenstein à simone weil." Thesis, Lyon, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016LYSE3024/document.
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On est consciemment ou inconsciemment influencé par le scientisme et le positivisme logique. Nous posons donc une question : Peut-on parler de Dieu aujourd’hui ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous choisissons deux philosophes : Wittgenstein et Simone Weil. Selon Wittgenstein, « sur ce dont on ne peut parler, il faut garder le silence ». Ce qu’il veut dire par là, ce n’est pas que Dieu n’existe pas ou que Dieu n’est pas intelligible comme le disent le scientisme et le positivisme logique. Ce qu’il veut dire par là, c’est que Dieu existe effectivement, mais que l’on ne peut parler de lui en raison de la limite de notre langage. Or, la faute de Wittgenstein consiste à détourner les yeux de l’intelligibilité religieuse ou métaphysique. En ce qui concerne Simone Weil, elle parle de Dieu dans ses écrits et ses lettres. Qu’est-ce qui lui permet de parler de Dieu ? C’est le premier intérêt de ce projet. Et le deuxième intérêt consiste à déterminer l’expérience mystique de Simone Weil, car l’utilisation du mot « mystique » dans les études sur elle est assez arbitraire. Le troisième intérêt est de mettre en relief la relation entre la non-lecture et l’intuition chez elle. Enfin, le cinquième intérêt est de traiter la relation entre le bouddhisme zen et la pensée de Simone Weil. A travers nos études sur le concept d’intuition chez Simone Weil, nous proposerons une autre vision du monde que le scientisme et le positivisme logiqueWe are consciously or unconsciously influenced by scientism and logical positivism. So we asked a question: Can we speak of God today? To answer the question, we focus on two philosophers, Wittgenstein and Simone Weil. According to Wittgenstein, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” What he means by that is not that God doesn’t exist or that God is not intelligible as say scientism and logical positivism. What he means by that is that God does exist, but we can’t talk about him because of the limits of our language. But the lack of Wittgenstein is to look away from religious or metaphysical intelligibility. As for Simone Weil, she speaks of God in her writings and letters. What allows her to speak of God? This is our first point of interest. And our second point of interest is to define the mystical experience of Simone Weil, because the use of the word “mystical” in studies of Weil is rather arbitrary. Our third point of interest is to highlight the relationship between “non-reading” and intuition in Simone Weil. Our fourth point of interest is to explore the relationship between Zen Buddhism and the thought of Simone Weil. Through studying them, we will answer this question and, through Weil’s concept of intuition, we propose a worldview that is different from scientism and from logical positivism
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Rogue, Évelyne. "Wittgenstein et l'esthétique : mise en perspective des différents points de vue." Paris 1, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995PA010568.
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Dans cet essai, intitule wittgenstein et l'esthetique, nous avons voulu montrer qu'il est impossible de definir le concept de beau, sur lequel repose l'esthetique traditionnelle toute entiere - theorie soutenue par wittgenstein. En effet, selon cet auteur, le beau est un conept indefinissable; notamment en raison des multiples usages que nous en faisons. Ainsi, l. Wittgenstein en conclut que l'esthetique est indicible. Mais, nous ne somme pas d'accord avec sa conclusion; et pensons que sa philosophie releve plus d'une philologologie que d'une philosophie du langage pure. De plus, si l'esthetique n'est pas condamnee au silence absolu, c'est parce qu'elle doit donner des raisons. Mais cet argument s'avere flou et tres discutable, car donner des raisons equivaut a comprendre les intentions de l'artiste; ce qui est tres difficile, voire impossible. Ainsi, pour wittgenstein, l'esthetique est exprimable sous forme reactionnelle et gestuelle. Ce qui suppose 1) une capacite a apprecier de maniere correcte et 2) une bonne connaissance des regles. Et si, a notre avis, wittgenstein a eu raison d'insister sur le contexte socioculturel dans lequel une oeuvre d'art s'insere, nous preferons substituer a l'esthetique traditionnelle, l'esthetique de l'implementation, puisque selonn. Goodman "execution consists of making a work; implementation of making it work". L'esthetique analytique s'oppose donc a l'esthetique pragmatique, puisque dans l'esthetique pragmatique "l'esthetique n'est pas une attitude, mais une action"In this thesis, entitled wittgenstein and aesthetics, we intend to show that it is impossible to define the conept of the beautiful, on which traditional aesthetics is based; a theory advocated by wittgenstein. For him, the "beautiful" is an indefinable concept, because of the many uses that we make of it. Thus, he concludes that aesthetics is inexpressible, in the same way as ethics is unspeakable. We don't agree with wittgenstein's conclusion, and we think that his philosophy is not a philosophy of pure language, but a philologology. However, for him, the aesthetics is not condemned to the absolute silence, for "it has to give reasons". But, this argument is blurred and very discutable, since "to give reasons" means to understand the artist's intentions, which is very difficult, perhaps impossible. . . Thus, for wittgenstein, aesthetics is expressible in the form of reactions. It supposes a capacity to appreciate correct manner and a good knowledge of rules, or "feeling of the rules". In our opinion , if wittgenstein was right in insisting on the socioculturalcontext, on which a work of art is founded, we prefer ro substitute aesthetics of implementation to traditional aesthetics. So, analytic esthetics is contrasted to pragmatic aesthetics. And when it is necessary to appreciate works of contemporary art, the spectator becomes an actor, elsewhere, aestheticians and
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Achondo, Parra Mayarí. "La terapia filosófica en el Tractatus logico-philosophicus y en las investigaciones filosóficas de Ludwig Wittgenstein." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2016. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/143302.
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PASSERIEU, DIT JEAN MARC. "Wittgenstein et l'idee de culture." Paris 1, 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996PA010563.
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1) visees problematiques : ce travail repond a une double exigence philo sophique a) demontrer la fonction interne de l'idee de culture dans la conceptualite de wittgenstein ("w") - en chacune de ses "epoques" presu mees -, son incidence regulatrice dans l'usage des concepts de sprache, grammatik, sprachspiel, lbensform. . . B) clarifier plus generalement les conditions d'une hermeneutique culturelle et d'une axiologie possibles a partir de l'examen par w des notions de kultur et zivilisation. 2) methodologie : apres une etude critique de la figure de w dans notre pay sage culturel, la 1ere partie etablit ce qui distingue w des conceptions theoriques de la kultur et des "visions du monde". Une genealogie du jeu de langage philosophique (cultura, civilta, kultur, zivilisation) situe w dans l'histoire de la philosophie et de l'anthropologie. La 2eme par tie suit la formation de cette pensee multiple de la culture. 3) conclusions entre la problematique "logique" et celle des jeux de langage existe une consequence. La visee "pragmatique" de w differe aussi bien de l'em pirisme que de l'eidetique transcendantale, de l'ontologie fondamentale et de la lebensphilosophie. Les fins dernieres de la culture n'induisent pas le nihilisme ou le relativisme en matiere d'anthropologie et d'esthetique. La decision ethique et l'acte de la foi fondent la logique de la gewissheit et decident de la possibilite d'un ordre culturel1) conceptual views : this work fulfils two philosophical requirements. A) to describe how the concept of culture is internally connected with the fundamental conceptuality of w's philosophy (in each one of his socalled "periods"); to show the normative relevance of culture in the philosophical use of "sprache", "grammatik", "sprachspiel", "lebensform"; b) from a more general point of view, the second requirement consists of the clarification of all possible hermeneutics and theory of values. Following the w's insight of culture and civilization. 2) methodology : after a critical investigation of the w's legend in our cultural landscape, our first part shows the way w rejects the theoretical conceptions of culture and the world views; a grammatical study of the philosophical language games of culture replaces w inside the historical development of philosophy and anthropology. The second part describes the complex evolution of his inquiry and the role of culture. 3) conclusions a specific continuity links the "logical" problematics to the "language game's one. W's "pragmatic" point of view is as far as from empiricism as from transcendental philosophy or "lebensphilosophie". Against nihilism and relativism, the logic of certainty is founded on acts and faith
Books on the topic "Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 – Religion"
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1970-, Pandey K. C., ed. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Ethics and religion. Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2008.
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Kross, Matthias. Klarheit als Selbstzweck: Wittgenstein über Philosophie, Religion, Ethik und Gewissheit. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993.
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Wittgenstein and religion. New York, N.Y: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
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Religion within the limits of language alone: Wittgenstein on philosophy and religion. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2001.
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An introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
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Z, Phillips D. Wittgenstein and religion. New York, N.Y: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
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Z, Phillips D. Wittgenstein and religion. London: Macmillan, 1993.
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Labron, Tim. Wittgenstein's religious point of view. London: Bloomsbury Academia, 2013.
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Wittgenstein and theology. London: T & T Clark, 2009.
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Wittgenstein's (misunderstood) religious thought. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 – Religion"
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Howard, Alex. "Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)." In Philosophy for Counselling and Psychotherapy, 313–26. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04644-4_30.
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von Savigny, Eike. "Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–1951)." In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 611–15. Elsevier, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.61137-6.
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von Savigny, E. "Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–1951)." In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 16517–22. Elsevier, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/00350-8.
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BURBULES, NICHOLAS C., and MICHAEL PETERS. "LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 1889–1951." In Fifty Modern Thinkers on Education, 15–23. Routledge, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203464694-4.
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"Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)." In Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language / La philosophie du langage, edited by Marcelo Dascal, Dietfried Gerhardus, Kuno Lorenz, and Georg Meggle. Berlin • New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110095838.1.2.563.
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Flesch, William. "Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)." In Edinburgh Encyclopaedia of Modern Criticism and Theory, 120–26. Edinburgh University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9780748672554-016.
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Flesch, William. "Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)." In Introducing Literary Theories, 120–26. Edinburgh University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781474473637-016.
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Halpern, Catherine. "Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)." In Les grands penseurs des Sciences Humaines, 55–58. Éditions Sciences Humaines, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/sh.journ.2016.01.0055.
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"WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1889–1951)." In Cultural Theory: The Key Thinkers, 227–30. Routledge, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203996423-87.
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Kompridis, Nikolas. "Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)." In The Cambridge Habermas Lexicon, 709–11. Cambridge University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316771303.206.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 – Religion"
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Lozev, Kamen. "Tolstoy’s religious influence on young Wittgenstein." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.12.
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