Relevant bibliographies by topics / Wittgenstein's use of language

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Academic literature on the topic 'Wittgenstein's use of language'

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Journal articles on the topic "Wittgenstein's use of language"

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Button, Tim. "Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (July 2018): 205–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000061.

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AbstractIn the early-to-mid 1930s, Wittgenstein investigated solipsism via the philosophy of language. In this paper, I want to reopen Wittgenstein's ‘grammatical’ examination of solipsism.Wittgenstein begins by considering the thesis that only I can feel my pains. Whilst this thesis may tempt us towards solipsism, Wittgenstein points out that this temptation rests on a grammatical confusion concerning the phrase ‘my pains’. In §1, I unpack and vindicate his thinking.After discussing ‘my pains’, Wittgenstein makes his now famous suggestion that the word ‘I’ has two distinct uses: a subject-use and an object-use. The purpose of Wittgenstein's suggestion has, however, been widely misunderstood. I unpack it in §2, explaining how the subject-use connects with a phenomenological language, and so again tempts us into solipsism. In §§3–4, I consider various stages of Wittgenstein's engagement with this kind of solipsism, culminating in a rejection of solipsism (and of subject-uses of ‘I’) via reflections on private languages.
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Von Savigny, Eike. "Use, Meaning, and Theoretical Commitment." Grazer Philosophische Studien 71, no. 1 (April 24, 2006): 175–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-071001011.

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This paper is on theoretical commitments involved in connecting use and meaning. Wittgenstein maintained, in his , that meaning more or less 'is' use; and he more or less proclaimed that in philosophy, we must 'not advance any kind of theory' (PI § 109). He presented a connection between use and meaning by describing a sequence of language-games where richness of vocabularies and complexity of embedding behaviour grow simultaneously. This presentation is very in the sequence of PI §§ 2, 8, 15, and 21, even if it needs sympathetic touching up. If supplemented, the presentation makes a for claiming that there is a connection between use and meaning in the following sense: This may be a very modest statement of the meaning-is-use connection. However, , as sober analysis of the sequence presented by Wittgenstein will reveal. This is not to say that the modest statement is in any way fishy. Rather, I want to remind readers of how desirable it is to restrict the interpretation of Wittgenstein's famous hostile remarks on theories to that kind of metaphysical misunderstandings of our everyday language which the context of PI § 109 is about. In (1) I characterize, by way of listing examples from the , the area of what I think Wittgenstein regarded as innocent, everyday meaning talk, talk that is not yet infected by bad philosophy. In (2), I argue that what Wittgenstein wanted to show was that such talk is in some sense replaceable by use descriptions, i.e. by descriptions of language-games. In (3), I argue that not all kinds of language-games are relevant; in particular, those of teaching and explaining words have to be excluded. As I restrict myself to the four remaining 'primitive' language-games in PI §§ 2, 8, 15, and 21, I have to defend my approach, in (4), against Joachim Schulte's case for reading Wittgenstein's comparison of these language-games with real languages as ironical. How the invitation to regard such a language-game as a complete, primitive language should in fact be construed is a question I discuss in (5), defending my interpretation against Richard Raatzsch in particular. How increases of expressive power are brought about by increases of the use repertoires is shown by an analysis of modified versions of the language-games in question, and of alternatives thereof, in (6), (7), (8), and (9) respectively, pointing out the places where theoretical commitments enter. Section (10) sums up commitments that have emerged from a sympathetic defence of a modest reading of the meaning-and-use connection.
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Baker, G. P., and P. M. S. Hacker. "Malcolm on Language and Rules." Philosophy 65, no. 252 (April 1990): 167–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100064457.

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In ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’, Professor N. Malcolm took us to task for misinterpreting Wittgenstein's arguments on the relationship between the concept of following a rule and the concept of community agreement on what counts as following a given rule. Not that we denied that there are any grammatical connections between these concepts. On the contrary, we emphasized that a rule and an act in accord with it make contact in language. Moreover we argued that agreement in judgments and in definitions is indeed necessary for a shared language. But we denied that the concept of a language is so tightly interwoven with the concept of a community of speakers (and hence with actual agreement) as to preclude its applicabilty to someone whose use of signs is not shared by others. Malcolm holds that ‘This is an unwitting reduction of Wittgenstein's originality. That human agreement is necessary for “shared” language is not so striking a thought as that it is essential for language simpliciter.’ Though less striking, we believe that it has the merit of being a true thought. We shall once more try to show both that it is correct, and that it is a correct account of Wittgenstein's arguments.
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Gorlée, Dinda L. "Wittgenstein, Translation, and Semiotics." Target. International Journal of Translation Studies 1, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): 69–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/target.1.1.06gor.

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Abstract Wittgenstein discusses interlingual and intersemiotic translation, both in its own right and, more often, as an object of comparison. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), he puts forth a pictorial view which can be construed in Saussurian terms. This rule-governed notion of translation is, in Wittgenstein's later work, dynamized and based upon the use of signs. Translation is one of the language-games in Philosophical Investigations (1953). Wittgenstein's language-game of translation approaches Peirce's semiosis. Language-games are thirds which, in their nonverbal aspects, also partake of secondness and firstness. The language-game of translation occurs, at least theoretically, in three stages corresponding to the three logical interpretants.
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Gaita, Raimond. "Language and Conversation: Wittgenstein's Builders." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 28 (March 1990): 101–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005269.

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We may reflect on language in different ways. There is the way familiar to analytical philosophers. That may take different forms, but most of them are strikingly different from the way of someone like Elias Canetti or F. R. Leavis, whose thought is shaped by their concern with literature. In the latter case language appears as an essentially human phenomenon, not because it is limited to the species Homo sapiens, but because it is essentially connected with the culture and histories of peoples, whose plurality is underdetermined by any elaboration on the nature and environmental conditions of Homo sapiens. It is rare to find analytical philosophers of language for whom that is important or who have tried even to sketch the kind of importance it may have. That is because they assume that it is not important to language as such (to what makes something language) but only to the sophisticated use of language in poetry or literature. They have tended to misunderstand the sense in which a language such as English is a natural language.
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Robinson, Guy. "Language and the Society of Others." Philosophy 67, no. 261 (July 1992): 329–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100040444.

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The solitary language user is again stalking the critical fields of Europe (and America, one should add). This pre-social individual, abstracted from all social and historical context, has been seemingly revived after what many of us saw as a death-blow dealt by Wittgenstein in his analysis of the notion of following a rule, and his related discussions bringing out the impossibilities of a ‘private’ language—what has come to be known as Wittgenstein's ‘private language argument’. Just what a ‘private language’ is has become the issue. Did Wittgenstein show that language-use and rule-following essentially and necessarily involved others, and were therefore necessarily social in character (thus showing that to be human and to be rational was necessarily to be social—as Aristotle had it)? Or did his arguments bear only against the notion of a language which was essentially and necessarily private, one which could not in principle be taught to another?
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Jacquette, Dale. "Later Wittgenstein's Anti-Philosophical Therapy." Philosophy 89, no. 2 (March 11, 2014): 251–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819114000011.

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AbstractThe object of this essay is to discuss Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks inPhilosophical Investigationsand elsewhere in the posthumously published writings concerning the role of therapy in relation to philosophy. Wittgenstein's reflections seem to suggest that there is a kind of philosophy or mode of investigation targeting the philosophical grammar of language uses that gratuitously give rise to philosophical problems, and produce in many thinkers philosophical anxieties for which the proper therapy is intended to offer relief. Two possible objectives of later Wittgensteinian therapy are proposed, for subjectivepsychologicalversus objectivesemanticsymptoms of ailments that a therapy might address for the sake of relieving philosophical anxieties. The psychological in its most plausible form is rejected, leaving only the semantic. Semantic therapy in the sense defined and developed is more general and long-lasting, and more in the spirit of Wittgenstein's project on a variety of levels. A semantic approach treats language rather than the thinking, language-using subject as the patient needing therapy, and directs its attention to the treatment of problems in language and the conceptual framework a language game use expresses in its philosophical grammar, rather than to soothing unhappy or socially ill-adjusted individual psychologies.
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Snellman, Lauri Juhana Olavinpoika. "Hamann's Influence on Wittgenstein." Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7, no. 1 (June 26, 2018): 59. http://dx.doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v7i1.3467.

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The paper examines Johann Georg Hamann’s influence on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. Wittgenstein’s letters, diaries and Drury’s memoirs show that Wittgenstein read Hamann’s writings in the early 1930s and 1950s. Wittgenstein’s diary notes and the Cambridge lectures show that Wittgenstein’s discussion of Hamann’s views in 1931 corresponds to adopting a Hamannian view of symbols and rule-following. The view of language as an intertwining of signs, objects and meanings in use forms a common core in the philosophies of Hamann and Wittgenstein. The harmony of language and reality takes place in communicative use, so non-communicative private languages and pre-linguistic ideal forms of representation are not possible. Language is a free response to reality, and it involves belief-systems and trust.
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Phillips, D. Z. "Religion in Wittgenstein's Mirror." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 28 (March 1990): 135–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100005282.

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There is a well-known remark in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations which even some philosophers sympathetic to his work have found very hard to accept. It reads:Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language;it can in the end only describe it.For it cannot give it any foundation either.It leaves everything as it is. (PI, I, 24)Surely, it is said, that is carrying matters too far. Wittgenstein's hyperbole should be excused as a harmless stylistic flourish.
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Evans, K. L. "Why the Tractatus, like the Old Testament, is ‘Nothing but a Book’." Philosophy 88, no. 2 (March 19, 2013): 267–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819113000053.

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AbstractIn The Education of the Human Race, G. E. Lessing helps his readers understand why the propositions of the Old Testament are pseudo-propositions, or why they do not resemble the significant propositions of natural science but the tautological propositions of mathematics and of logic. That is, the so-called propositions of the Old Testament do not teach readers whether what actually happens is this or that; rather what they teach us is to imagine expressions by substitution in such a way as to throw their structure into relief. One of Lessing's most attentive readers was Wittgenstein. Or perhaps only Wittgenstein would have been able to grasp so immediately Lessing's insight that the tautological or pseudo-propositions of the Old Testament invite thinking only when readers use them to understand ‘what is the case’ in the pictures (the thoughts) the propositions have – logically – constructed. Thus in this essay I use Wittgenstein's reading of Lessing to throw light on his work in the Tractatus. Rather than take up the new logician's interest in completely analyzing expressions (which would include settling the way a referent is referred to in an expression), Wittgenstein insists in the Tractatus that the expressions we use, even those that seem to be propositions or that contain assertions, are in fact designed to be elucidatory without saying anything about the nature of the subjects that figure in them. Wittgenstein's great insight was to see that the propositional signs of our language are able to bring something to mind without saying what is a representation of what.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Wittgenstein's use of language"

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Cranmer, R. "Fundamental aspects of Wittgenstein's later conception of language." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.381832.

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Lourenço, Denise Moraes [UNESP]. "Educação e linguagem: algumas considerações sob a perspectiva filosófica de Wittgenstein." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/96378.

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Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:28:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2008-02-28Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:37:03Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 lourenco_dm_me_mar.pdf: 498199 bytes, checksum: 6044ba0e068d039cfbf87a2746c1aea1 (MD5)
Ao analisar o funcionamento da linguagem, Wittgenstein, nas Investigações Filosóficas, problematizou, por um lado, os sistemas filosóficos modernos, que se apoiaram em um ideal de racionalidade unidimensional, pois consideraram a razão, o único meio de se alcançar o conhecimento verdadeiro e, por outro lado, colocou em dúvida a linguagem como estrutura de representação firmemente estabelecida e seu uso instrumentalizado. Nessa análise, o filósofo descreveu a categoria jogos de linguagem e seus usos nas mais diversas formas de vida em contraposição ao ensino ostensivo assegurado na concepção agostiniana de linguagem. Wittgenstein considerou que a teoria referencial compreendia a linguagem como um sistema logicamente estruturado, reduzido ao exercício da designação, enquanto que os jogos de linguagem permitiam, à linguagem, uma infinidade de funções. Dessa forma, ao invés de nos atermos a uma única forma de expressão dos pensamentos, podemos utilizar inúmeras maneiras de pensar os problemas que nos afligem. Embora Wittgenstein não tenha elaborado uma Filosofia da Educação, suas críticas ao ensino ostensivo e a caracterização da categoria jogos de linguagem parecem evidenciar a complexidade da linguagem, quando nos remetemos à discussão de seus limites. Essas críticas e categoria, depreendidas de sua filosofia, ao nosso ver, fornecem elementos para que os educadores se contraponham à unidimensionalidade da razão e do uso na linguagem pelas teorias e práticas pedagógicas, no presente, levando-os a refletir sobre os seus limites e, quem sabe, a possibilidade de pensá-las em sua multiplicidade.
Analyzing the language working, Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, put in doubt the modern philosophical systems, that based on a model of unidimensional reason because it considers the reason the only way to reach the true knowledge and, otherwise, he placed in doubt the language as structure of representation firmly fixed and how its is used. In this study of facts, the philosopher related the category language games and its uses in differents life forms in contraposition to the ostensive teaching insured on the agostiniana’s conception of language. Wittgenstein considered that the referential theory had comprised the language as a structured system, reduced to exercise of designation, and the language games let, to the language, an infinity of functions. This way, opposite to cling to the only form of expression of the thoughts, we can use many ways of thinking about the problems we have fear. Although Wittgenstein hadn’t elaborated a Philosophy of the Education, his discernments about the ostensive education and the characterization of the category language games look to evidence the language complexity, when we refer to the discussion of his limits. Those discernments and category, deduced of his philosophy, in our point of view, give elements for the teachers compare to the unidimensionality of the reason and of the use in the language by theories and pedagogic practices, at the present time, taking them to think about their limits and, maybe, the possibility of thinking about its multiplicity. We can, in this dissertation, to think about the own questions of the education when we relate the referential language to the possibilities of communication limited to the transmission of formulated knowledges and, the language games, to the condition of plural possibilities, that consider the differents uses of the language in the educative activity.
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Delfin, Solveig. "Wittgenstein och skepticismen." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-18370.

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 In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) Saul Kripke claims that Wittgenstein argues for a certain form of scepticism in his book Philosophical Investigations (1953), namely a new form of philosophical scepticism, a result of Wittgenstein´s idea of language as language games. Nihilism, scepticism of meaning or of concept, constitutive scepticism are other commentators´ different names of the same phenomenon. The philosophy of Wittgenstein accounts for how our words, including the words of mathematics, have no meaning and there are no a priori justified objective facts as to what I mean about a word. We follow the rules blindly and without justification. We are unable to find any facts against this proposal. Like a ´sceptic´ Wittgenstein denies the ´superlative fact,´ a fact supposed to give an a priori justification to our words. The consensus of a language community is enough to give meaning and assertions to what we in ordinary language call facts, but objective facts in logical meaning a priori, do not exist, a sceptical view in Kripke´s interpretation. Wittgenstein rejects explicit scepticism, but Kripke thinks Wittgenstein did not want to repudiate common belief as a common sense philosopher.

This paper ´Wittgenstein and Scepticism´ says that Wittgenstein certainly denies ´superlative fact´, but his reason was founded on conclusions from his investigation of grammar and language, which we use and misuse according to what we want, not to how it is. We demand that logic ought to be absolute, general and consistent, but there is no such logic a priori. Wittgenstein thinks we have to stick to reality and facts of experience. Facts a priori are very convincing facts, but they are not ´sublime´ in a logical metaphysic way. Logic is not rejected and the philosophy of logic uses the same words as common language. Logic has a normative function in our language. We learn words and rules in a certain context and use them in certain situations. How we use the word tells us the meaning of the word and the correct understanding. Our following the rules depends on how they work in real life.


I Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages (1982) hävdar Saul Kripke att Wittgensteins resonemang i Filosofiska undersökningar (1953) leder till en speciell  form av skepticism, en filosofisk skepticism, en konsekvens av Wittgensteins uppfattning om språket som språkspel. Nihilism, meningsskepticism, begreppsskepticism, konstitutiv skepticism är andra kommentatorers beteckningar. Wittgensteins filosofi visar att språkets ord, inklusive matematikens ord, saknar mening och inga rättfärdigade objektiva a priori fakta finns om vad jag menar med ett ord. Vi följer språkets regler blint och som det passar oss Argument saknas för att vederlägga  detta påstående. Som en skeptiker förnekar Wittgenstein filosofins "superlative fact", som förmodas ge en a priori grund för vad jag menar med ett ord. En språkgemenskaps konsensus ger dock orden mening och bekräftar vad som i vanligt språk kallas fakta, men objektiva fakta i logisk mening, fakta a priori saknas, d.v.s. en skeptisk uppfattning, enligt Kripkes tolkning Att Wittgenstein själv tar avstånd från skepticismen beror på att han inte vill bryta med den allmänna uppfattningen om fakta och  mening.

Uppsatsen "Wittgenstein och skepticismen" visar att visserligen överger Wittgenstein "superlative fact", men detta är ett resultat av hans grammatiska undersökning av språket, vilket vi brukar och missbrukar för våra syften, inte som det är. Vi önskar och fordrar att logiken ger oss ett absolut, generellt och beständigt svar, men ett  sådant svar kan inte logikens a priori ge. Wittgenstein menar att verkligheten och erfarenhetsfakta är vad vi har att hålla oss till. A priori fakta är enligt Wittgenstein mycket övertygande fakta, men inte i den "sublima" logikens metafysiska mening. Logiken förkastas inte, ty logikens filosofi talar inte om ord i någon annan mening än vi gör i det vanliga livet. Logiken har en styrfunktion i språket. Orden lärs in i ett sammanhang och används i ett sammanhang. Användningen av ordet visar om ordets mening är korrekt uppfattad. Vi följer regler efter hur de fungerar i en verklighet

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4

Lourenço, Denise Moraes. "Educação e linguagem : algumas considerações sob a perspectiva filosófica de Wittgenstein /." Marília : [s.n.], 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/96378.

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Orientador: Pedro Ângelo Pagni
Banca: Lúcio Lourenço Prado
Banca: Marcus Vinícius da Cunha
Resumo: Ao analisar o funcionamento da linguagem, Wittgenstein, nas Investigações Filosóficas, problematizou, por um lado, os sistemas filosóficos modernos, que se apoiaram em um ideal de racionalidade unidimensional, pois consideraram a razão, o único meio de se alcançar o conhecimento verdadeiro e, por outro lado, colocou em dúvida a linguagem como estrutura de representação firmemente estabelecida e seu uso instrumentalizado. Nessa análise, o filósofo descreveu a categoria jogos de linguagem e seus usos nas mais diversas formas de vida em contraposição ao ensino ostensivo assegurado na concepção agostiniana de linguagem. Wittgenstein considerou que a teoria referencial compreendia a linguagem como um sistema logicamente estruturado, reduzido ao exercício da designação, enquanto que os jogos de linguagem permitiam, à linguagem, uma infinidade de funções. Dessa forma, ao invés de nos atermos a uma única forma de expressão dos pensamentos, podemos utilizar inúmeras maneiras de pensar os problemas que nos afligem. Embora Wittgenstein não tenha elaborado uma Filosofia da Educação, suas críticas ao ensino ostensivo e a caracterização da categoria jogos de linguagem parecem evidenciar a complexidade da linguagem, quando nos remetemos à discussão de seus limites. Essas críticas e categoria, depreendidas de sua filosofia, ao nosso ver, fornecem elementos para que os educadores se contraponham à unidimensionalidade da razão e do uso na linguagem pelas teorias e práticas pedagógicas, no presente, levando-os a refletir sobre os seus limites e, quem sabe, a possibilidade de pensá-las em sua multiplicidade.
Abstract: Analyzing the language working, Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, put in doubt the modern philosophical systems, that based on a model of unidimensional reason because it considers the reason the only way to reach the true knowledge and, otherwise, he placed in doubt the language as structure of representation firmly fixed and how its is used. In this study of facts, the philosopher related the category language games and its uses in differents life forms in contraposition to the ostensive teaching insured on the agostiniana's conception of language. Wittgenstein considered that the referential theory had comprised the language as a structured system, reduced to exercise of designation, and the language games let, to the language, an infinity of functions. This way, opposite to cling to the only form of expression of the thoughts, we can use many ways of thinking about the problems we have fear. Although Wittgenstein hadn't elaborated a Philosophy of the Education, his discernments about the ostensive education and the characterization of the category language games look to evidence the language complexity, when we refer to the discussion of his limits. Those discernments and category, deduced of his philosophy, in our point of view, give elements for the teachers compare to the unidimensionality of the reason and of the use in the language by theories and pedagogic practices, at the present time, taking them to think about their limits and, maybe, the possibility of thinking about its multiplicity. We can, in this dissertation, to think about the own questions of the education when we relate the referential language to the possibilities of communication limited to the transmission of formulated knowledges and, the language games, to the condition of plural possibilities, that consider the differents uses of the language in the educative activity.
Mestre
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5

Isaacs, Ielhaam. "Wittgenstein's philosophy of language." Doctoral thesis, University of Cape Town, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/3675.

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Isaacs, Ielhaam. "Wittgenstein's tractatus and the limits of language." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/13415.

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Bibliography: leaves 106-108.
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is closely bound up with his conception of language. In fact, one could say that the status he designates to philosophy is a logical outcome of his conception of language. In both the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein attempts to articulate a conception of language by exploring its essence - that is, its structure and function. What this amounts to is giving an account of the limit of language - an account of which types of expression count as meaningful. So doing, the bounds of sense would be drawn. To use Wittgenstein's terminology, 'what can be said' and 'what cannot be said' would be clearly delineated. Since language is the expression of thought, an account of the limit of language amounts to an account of the limit of thought. And an account of the limit of thought is an account of the limit of what can be done intellectually. The boundary, we come to see, is drawn differently for different reasons in the two books. The Wittgenstein of the TLP believed that the logical structure of language lies beneath its surface structure. It is something hidden and not perspicuous to language users. By excavating its structure, he would thus reveal the limit of language and hence the limit of thought. On the TLP account of language, philosophical propositions come out as an attempt to go beyond the bounds of sense. Philosophy, as it is traditionally practised, does not, according to Wittgenstein, fall within the limit of thought. It does not fall within the bounds of what can be done intellectually. Philosophical propositions are attempts to say what cannot be said. They are attempts to transcend, in language, the limit of language, and hence the limit of what we are able to do intellectually. Any attempt to transgress the bounds of sense ends, according to Wittgenstein, in nonsensical discourse. That is, it does not qualify as meaningful discourse. Philosophical propositions, being such attempts, are thus meaningless or nonsensical. They are not false, but simply lack sense. They are pseudo-propositions. As with the TLP, where Wittgenstein's views on philosophy were seen to be the logical consequences of this account of language, so too with the PI. However, the PI endorses a conception of language different to that of the TLP. But the conception of philosophy remains, in essence, the same. And his task is the same: to draw the limit of sense - to indicate what can be said and what cannot be said, and hence draw the limit of what we can do intellectually. Whereas the early Wittgenstein believed that he had discovered the essence of language and thus revealed the limit of language, the later Wittgenstein (post-TLP Wittgenstein) does not speak of the language but of different uses of language or 'language-games'. Consequently, there is no such thing as the limit of language, but limits of language. There are thus no absolute criteria of meaningful propositions. What qualifies as a nonsensical proposition - one that cannot be said - is now given relative to a particular language-game or use of language. On the PI's account of language, philosophical propositions come out meaningless relative to a particular language-game, namely, factual discourse. That is, taken as factual statements (which is how philosophers take them), they are meaningless. In the PI philosophical propositions tum out to be attempts to pass off non-factual propositions as factual ones. It is in this sense that they transgress the bounds of sense. They go beyond what can be meaningfully said in the language-game they purport to belong to.
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Richers, Nikolaj. "Treating philosopher's disease Wittgenstein's language pathology and therapy /." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/NQ66362.pdf.

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Mezzadri, Daniele. "Language and logic in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/2432.

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This thesis discusses some central aspects of Wittgenstein’s conception of language and logic in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and brings them into relation with the philosophies of Frege and Russell. The main contention is that a fruitful way of understanding the Tractatus is to see it as responding to tensions in Frege’s conception of logic and Russell’s theory of judgement. In the thesis the philosophy of the Tractatus is presented as developing from these two strands of criticism and thus as the culmination of the philosophy of logic and language developed in the early analytic period. Part one examines relevant features of Frege’s philosophy of logic. Besides shedding light on Frege’s philosophy in its own right, it aims at preparing the ground for a discussion of those aspects of the Tractatus’ conception of logic which derive from Wittgenstein’s critical response to Frege. Part two first presents Russell’s early view on truth and judgement, before considering several variants of the multiple relation theory of judgement, devised in opposition to it. Part three discusses the development of Wittgenstein’s conception of language and logic, beginning with Wittgenstein’s criticism of the multiple relation theory and his early theory of sense, seen as containing the seeds of the picture theory of propositions presented in the Tractatus. I then consider the relation between Wittgenstein’s pictorial conception of language and his conception of logic, arguing that Wittgenstein’s understanding of sense in terms of bipolarity grounds his view of logical complexity and of the essence of logic as a whole. This view, I show, is free from the internal tensions that affect Frege’s understanding of the nature of logic.
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Leite, Sampaio Monteiro Luis. "Pour une phénoménologie du langage chez Wittgenstein." Thesis, Paris 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA010610.

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Cette thèse se propose de mettre en évidence l’existence d’une phénoménologie du langage dans le « Work in Progress » de Wittgenstein. Elle tentera de démontrer, par une approche globale de sa réflexion, l'unité de ses travaux bâtie autour d'un projet de fondation d'une science du langage qui serait le ciment et le fil conducteur de toute son œuvre. Grâce à l’hypothèse de travail « The Whole Wittgenstein », forgée pour les besoins de notre étude, cette recherche a permis de proposer une nouvelle interprétation de la pensée du philosophe, dépassant ainsi les exégèses classiques restées trop souvent attachées aux thèmes traditionnels du corpus wittgensteinien. Pour y parvenir, il aura fallu d'abord, asseoir et régler la question d’une phénoménologie wittgensteinienne à partir d'indices phénoménologiques probants, puis mettre en lumière son approche phénoménologique du langage. Cette perspective aura un double intérêt : montrer d'une part comment Wittgenstein récupère, forge puis intègre, au centre de ses préoccupations philosophiques, les concepts de la phénoménologie husserlienne, et comment d'autre part, au cours de ses différents changements de paradigmes linguistiques, il passera du langage phénoménologique â une phénoménologie du langage. En interrogeant dans la continuité la pertinence de la thèse d'une phénoménologie du langage chez l'auteur du Tractatus, un détour par l'histoire de la phénoménologie du langage s'est avéré indispensable pour cerner son sens et en délimiter ses contours. Dès lors, il ne restait plus qu'à la comparer avec cette phénoménologie du langage chez Wittgenstein pour préciser la nature, l'objet de cette étude et la méthode de cette dernière
This dissertation suggests highlighting the existence of a phenomenology of language in the “Work in Progress” of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It will demonstrate, by a global approach of his reflection, the unit of his works developed around the project of building a science of language which would be the cement and main thread of his whole thought. Thanks to the working hypothesis, called "The Whole Wittgenstein", created for the needs of our study, this research allowed us to submit a new interpretation of the thoughts of the Vienna philosopher, overtaking the classic exegeses often attached to the traditional themes of the wittensteinian corpus. To reach this point, it was first necessary to face and solve the question of a wittgensteinian phenomenology from very convincing phenomenological clues in his works. Then we had to bring to light its phenomenological approach of language. This perspective had a double interest : on one hand, to show how Wittgenstein borrowed, forged, and integrated in the center of its philosophical concerns the husserlian phenomenology concepts, and how on the other hand, during his various changes of linguistic paradigms, he switched from the phenomenological language to a phenomenology of language. By continuing the question the relevance of the thesis of a phenomenology of language in the “Tractatus” author’s philosophy, a detour by “the history” of the phenomenology of the language has become indispensable to encircle its sense and bound its outlines
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Grundy, W. P. "Language and world in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.599765.

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The author describes the replacement of the a priori conditions of representational activity in the Tractatus by a set of everyday conditions that underlie the application of terms such as ‘language’ and ‘world’. He assesses both the later Wittgenstein’s challenge to clear distinctions between language and non-language, as well as his replacement of philosophical analysis with the new technique of philosophical grammar. While analysis depends, in the Tractatus, on clearly demarcated categories of language and world, grammar aims to describe the complex network of social, political, historical, technological, interpersonal, and material factors that constitute our particular modes of bringing order to experience. The author presents Wittgenstein’s later writing as a therapeutic response to the philosophical subliming of the language/world distinction in the Tractatus. He considers the multiple forms of therapy that Philosophical Investigations performs, involving both the substantive discussion of themes in the philosophy of language, as well as the distinctive form of philosophical writing that Wittgenstein develops. He argues that the later Wittgenstein’s awareness of instabilities in absolute distractions between language and non-language is closely connected to the constraints of human embodiment. Where the language/world distinction in the Tractatus depends on a radically disembodied conception of language, of language users, and of philosophical reflections on language, the later Wittgenstein considers embodiment as central to the everyday ways in which we apply the term ‘language’. The author concludes by arguing that Wittgenstein’s awareness of the embodiment of the language user leads him to reflect also on the embodiment of the philosopher and of philosophical practice. The formal properties of Philosophical Investigations cause the reader to consider philosophical thinking and writing as performed within a medium, and to reflect on the consequences for philosophical argument when the medium of philosophy is itself subjected to therapeutic demystification.
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Books on the topic "Wittgenstein's use of language"

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The uses of sense: Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Mountain View, Calif: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1998.

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Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999.

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Logic and language in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. New York: Garland Pub., 2000.

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Wittgenstein's house: Language, space, and architecture. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008.

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Frascolla, Pasquale. Understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus. London: Routledge, 2007.

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Wilson, Brendan. Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations: A guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998.

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The world and language in Wittgenstein's philosophy. London: Macmillan, 1988.

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The world and language in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988.

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Hallett, Garth L. Wittgenstein's definition of meaning as use. Ann Arbor: UMI Books on Demand, 1996.

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Book chapters on the topic "Wittgenstein's use of language"

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Johnson, Michael L. "Wittgenstein, Use, Functionalism." In Mind, Language, Machine, 176–79. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19404-9_28.

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Demont-Biaggi, Florian. "Kripke’s Wittgenstein." In Rules and Dispositions in Language Use, 5–39. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137358608_2.

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Miller, Michael T. "Kaplan and Wittgenstein: Atheism, Phenomenology and the use of language." In Melilah: Manchester Journal of Jewish Studies (2015), edited by Daniel R. Langton, 70–83. Piscataway, NJ, USA: Gorgias Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.31826/9781463237141-008.

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Wrisley, George. "Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument." In Just the Arguments, 350–54. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444344431.ch94.

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Gebauer, Gunter. "Intention and Perspectives of the Language-Game." In Wittgenstein's Anthropological Philosophy, 109–29. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56151-6_5.

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Neves, Ana C. "Language Use." In Portuguese as an Additional Language, 51–71. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33316-4_4.

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Lewis, Moira, Courtenay Norbury, Rhiannon Luyster, Lauren Schmitt, Andrea McDuffie, Eileen Haebig, Donna S. Murray, et al. "Language Use." In Encyclopedia of Autism Spectrum Disorders, 1698. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1698-3_100788.

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Festini, Heda. "Dummett’s Conception as Theory of Meaning for Hintikka’s Type of Game-theoretical Semantics (I) (‘Use’ and ‘Language-game’ in Wittgenstein and Dummett)." In Foundations of Logic and Linguistics, 639–64. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0548-2_26.

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Segerdahl, Pär. "Introduction." In Language Use, 1–12. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230375093_1.

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Segerdahl, Pär. "Formal Pragmatics." In Language Use, 99–106. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230375093_10.

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Conference papers on the topic "Wittgenstein's use of language"

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Salehi, Bahar, Borhan Kazimipour, and Timothy Baldwin. "Differences in language use." In ADCS '19: Australasian Document Computing Symposium. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3372124.3372127.

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Savic, Dusan, Ilija Antovic, Sinisa Vlajic, Vojislav Stanojevic, and Milos Milic. "Language for Use Case Specification." In 2011 34th Annual IEEE Software Engineering Workshop (SEW). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/sew.2011.9.

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Skillicorn, D. B., and E. F. Reid. "Language use in Inspire magazine." In 2013 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isi.2013.6578827.

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Taylor, Jennyfer Lawrence, Wujal Wujal Aboriginal Shire Council, Alessandro Soro, Michael Esteban, Andrew Vallino, Paul Roe, and Margot Brereton. "Crocodile Language Friend: Tangibles to Foster Children's Language Use." In CHI '20: CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3334480.3383031.

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Suryani, Adi, Soedarso Soedarso, and Setiawan Setiawan. "Language and Identity: Promoting Dolly's Community Identity through Language Use." In Fourth Prasasti International Seminar on Linguistics (Prasasti 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/prasasti-18.2018.6.

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Agustina, Noni, Ilza Mayuni, and Ninuk Lustyantie. "Language Attitude toward Vernacular Language Use: A Case of Jakarta." In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Innovation in Education (ICoIE 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icoie-18.2019.73.

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Tolvanen, Juha-Pekka. "MetaEdit+ for collaborative language engineering and language use (tool demo)." In SLE '16: Software Language Engineering. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2997364.2997379.

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Leshed, Gilly, Dan Cosley, Jeffrey T. Hancock, and Geri Gay. "Visualizing language use in team conversations." In the 28th of the international conference extended abstracts. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1753846.1754195.

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McDonald, David D., and Federica Busa. "On the creative use of language." In the Seventh International Workshop. Morristown, NJ, USA: Association for Computational Linguistics, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.3115/1641417.1641427.

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Chernysh, Oksana, and Olena Syvak. "E-DICTIONARY USE IN LANGUAGE ACQUISITION." In EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF TODAY: INTERSECTORAL ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCES. European Scientific Platform, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.36074/logos-19.03.2021.v2.45.

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Reports on the topic "Wittgenstein's use of language"

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Wahl, M., and T. Howes. Use of Language Codes in LDAP. RFC Editor, May 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc2596.

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Huber, Jeanine. The Use of the First Language (L1) and the Target Language (TL) in the Foreign Language Classroom. Portland State University Library, January 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/etd.6905.

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Brock, Derek P. A Language Use Approach to Human-Computer Interaction. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada389099.

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Pack, Daniel, and Clifford Weinstein. The Use of Dynamic Segment Scoring for Language-Independent Question Answering. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada460584.

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Banducci, Naomi. Teaching hearing-impaired children language through the use of musical rhythm. Portland State University Library, January 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/etd.1281.

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Mills, Charlene. Use of Language Learning Strategies by Proficient and Less Proficient Learners. Portland State University Library, January 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/etd.6921.

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El-Sherbiny, A., M. Farah, I. Oueichek, and A. Al-Zoman. Linguistic Guidelines for the Use of the Arabic Language in Internet Domains. RFC Editor, February 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc5564.

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Knerr, C. M., and V. M. Holland. Technology Review of the Use of Continuous Speech Recognition for Language Training. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, July 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada327561.

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Hollenbeck, S., M. Rose, and L. Masinter. Guidelines for the Use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) within IETF Protocols. RFC Editor, January 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc3470.

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Brandt, Lauren M., Sean Gasperson, Reanna Poncheri Harman, Jennifer Lindberg McGinnis, Eric A. Surface, Stephen J. Ward, and Natalie A. Wright. Special Operations Forces Language and Culture Needs Assessment: General Use of Interpreters. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, November 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada634219.

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