Relevant bibliographies by topics / Wittgenstein

Academic literature on the topic 'Wittgenstein'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 31 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Wittgenstein"

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Plėšnys, Albinas. "DUNSO ŠKOTO MINČIŲ ATGARSIAI WITTGENSTEINO ETIKOJE." Problemos 84 (January 1, 2013): 111–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2013.0.1774.

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Straipsnyje analizuojamos Wittgensteino etinės pažiūros, pateiktos jo veikale „Tractatus Lo­gico-Philosophicus“ ir „Lecture on Ethics“. Juose Wittgensteinas tvirtina, kad etikos dalykai nepriklauso faktų sričiai. Todėl negali būti jokių etikos teiginių ir etika negali būti išreikšta. Wittgensteinas buvo vie­nas iš analitinės filosofijos kūrėjų ir etikos problemas svarsto būdu, kuris vėliau tapo įprastas šios filoso­fijos atstovams. Jis analizuoja, kaip kalboje funkcionuoja etikai būdingos sąvokos, ir tuo grindžia savo išvadas. Klasikinėje tradicijoje etinių sąvokų funkcionavimo ypatumai buvo aiškinami remiantis proto ir valios santykiu. Wittgensteinas etiką irgi sieja su valios subjektu, laikydamasis tam tikros proto ir valios santykio sampratos. Mūsų nuomone, ji labiausiai artima Dunso Škoto pasiūlytai proto ir valios santykio interpretacijai. Tačiau ne ja Wittgensteinas grindžia savo išvadą apie tai, kad etika neišreiškiama.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: absoliučios vertybės, etika, faktai, valios subjektas, santykinės vertybės.Ripples of Duns Scotus’ Thinking in Wittgenstein’s EthicsAlbinas Plėšnys Abstract The paper deals with Wittgenstein’s interpretation of ethics which was given in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in his Lecture on Ethics. He asserts that there are no propositions which we would call ethical propositions and that statements of facts can express nothing ethical. It is clear for him that ethics cannot be expressed. Wittgenstein was a pioneer in the field of analytic philosophy and he considered ethical questions in the manner of thought typical for its protagonists. He analyses the working of ethical conceptions in spoken language and draws the conclusions on this basis. On the other hand, in the classical tradition the peculiarity of ethical concepts had been founded on the relations of subject’s mind and volition. Wittgenstein linked ethics with the willing subject too. What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world, says he. We think Wittgenstein’s opinion is closest to Duns Scotus’ understanding of the relation of mind and will. On the other hand, Wittgenstein argues the conclusion that ethics is inexpressible without appealing on mind and will relation.Keywords: absolute values, ethics, facts, subject of the will, relative values.
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Munz, Volker. "Bachmann und Wittgenstein. Versuch einer Annäherung." Colloquium: New Philologies 9, no. 1-2 (2024): 54–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.23963/cnp.2024.9.1.3.

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The following contribution focuses on Ingeborg Bachmann’s reception of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly the central theses of his famous Tractatus logico-philosophicus, published in 1922. Her two radio essays from 1953, Sagbares und Unsagbares – Die Philosophie Ludwig Wittgensteins, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Zu einem Kapitel der jüngsten Philosophiegeschichte show Bachmann’s deep understanding of essential aspects in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. Bachmann was also responsible for the German publication of Wittgenstein’s Werkausgabe Band I, including the Tractatus and his second masterpiece Philosophical Investigations in 1960. On several occasions Bachmann mentions the influence Wittgenstein had on her. The text will focus on selected topics of his philosophy that also had a strong impact on Bachmann, such as his famous concept of the unsayable, the limits of language, or his understanding of the Western civilization and culture at his times.
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Li, Yecheng. "Research on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language in the Later Period." Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media 42, no. 1 (March 14, 2024): 95–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/42/20240803.

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Wittgenstein puts forward two different theories of language in his philosophical career. This paper discusses the transformation from early Wittgenstein's theory to later Wittgensteins theory, and analyzes and evaluates the latter. Early Wittgenstein still adopted the western traditional philosophys mode of thinking , based his theory on ontology and languages image theory, and constructed an ideal artificial language to describe facts in the form of proposition. However, such theories and mode of thinking faced many difficulties and challenges, and the necessity and rationality of constructing an ideal language are questioned. Later Wittgenstein realized the countless ways in which language is used in daily life, and believed that each use of language in life should be regarded as a "language game". Given that, the proposition discussed in the earlier theory is just one of the countless "language games". Therefore, Wittgensteins early theory seems to oversimplify the use of language. Later Wittgenstein believed that in order to explore the meaning of language, we should not search for the essence from a metaphysical perspective, but should search for the form of human life and the daily use of language. This is the core of notion meaning is usage . The endless debate of philosophers for thousands of years, therefore, results from the fact that philosophers have been trapped in the dilemma of language and have vainly tried to overcome the upper limit of their mind. Later Wittgenstein thus classify the use of language into misuse and normal use, and reminded human to always reflect on their use of language. Although his theory seems to disobey the traditional mode of thinking of Western philosophy, it should be regarded as a great and valuable idea.
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König, Christoph. "The Unutterable as a Mode of Utterance: Wittgenstein’s Two Remarks on “Count Eberhard’s Hawthorn” by Ludwig Uhland." Wittgenstein-Studien 12, no. 1 (February 3, 2021): 91–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2021-0005.

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Abstract Uhland’s poem has found fame as a litmus test in philosophical debates about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Like many works of art, the poem is dynamically produced in its effort to resolve a fundamental conflict. The poem’s conflict arises from the difficulty to connect the count’s life and his daydream. In the end, the poem as a whole serves to embody a critique of the capacity of a daydream to recover memories faithfully. Wittgenstein makes two remarks in a 1917 letter to Paul Engelmann that pertain to the poem. They are to be read in keeping with a resolute reading (James Conant, Cora Diamond) of the Tractatus; Wittgenstein’s first remark imitates the very movement of thought we find in the poem – and in doing so Wittgenstein makes good on his claim to talk about the poem: “the unutterable is, – unutterably – contained in what is uttered.” His second remark has, thus far, played no role in literature – Wittgenstein speaks of Engelmann’s dreams, yet he does not explicitly formulate the poem’s bearing on them. Here, too, he reenacts, in the formulation of his remark, the core conflict of the poem. My interpretation of the poem, finally, distinguishes three interpretive approaches (symbolistic, realistic, critical) in order to capture the understanding of the poem embodied in Wittgenstein's remarks.
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Mühlhölzer, Felix. "Witigenstein and the Regular Heptagon." Grazer Philosophische Studien 62, no. 1 (January 24, 2001): 215–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-06201011.

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The later Wittgenstein holds that the sole function of mathematical propositions is to determine the concepts they invoke. In the paper this view is discussed by means of a single example: Wittgenstein's investigation of the concept of a regular heptagon as used in Euclidean geometry (i.e., the Euclidean construction game with ruler and compass) and in Cartesian analytic geometry. Going on from some well-known passages in Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, and completing these passages, it is shown that Wittgenstein’s view makes perfectly good sense and can be very well defended.
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Muresan, Maria Rusanda. "Wittgenstein in Recent French Poetics: Henri Meschonnic and Jacques Roubaud." Paragraph 34, no. 3 (November 2011): 423–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/para.2011.0034.

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Two recent French poets, Henri Meschonnic and Jacques Roubaud, have found in Wittgenstein's philosophy an alternative to post-structuralist poetics. Meschonnic's poetry and his theoretical writings show a sustained critical engagement with Wittgenstein, whom he reads in conjunction with Emile Benveniste. The writers inform his theory of poetic rhythm and his practice of biblical translation. Roubaud's use of Wittgenstein, by contrast, here examined in the collection Quelque chose noir (1984), is linked partly with the poet's grief following the death of his wife Alix Cléo Roubaud, a photographer and an avid reader of Wittgenstein. In Roubaud, Wittgenstein opens up the space for a meditation on disappearance and absence. Roubaud reformulates passages from Wittgenstein's On Certainty (Wittgenstein's last philosophical text written when he was already seriously ill) in poems evoking Alix's memory.
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Somavilla, Ilse. "Wittgenstein in seinen Briefen." Jahrbuch für Internationale Germanistik 53, no. 2 (January 1, 2021): 177–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/ja532_177.

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Abstract Wittgensteins philosophischer Nachlass umfasst ca. 20.000 Seiten und ist seit dem Jahr 2000, in der vom Wittgenstein Archiv der Universität Bergen erarbeiteten elektronischen Fassung, zugänglich. Seit 2014 wird an der Wittgenstein Source gearbeitet, die direkten Zugang zu den Faksimiles ermöglicht.
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Owesen, Erlend Winderen Finke. "Wittgenstein's Critique of Moore in On Certainty." Nordic Wittgenstein Review 6, no. 2 (January 25, 2018): 71–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v6i2.3440.

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This paper clarifies Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore in On Certainty, and argues that this critique is largely misunderstood, for two reasons. Firstly, Wittgenstein partly misrepresents Moore. Secondly, Wittgenstein is wrongly taken to be an (access-) internalist regarding justification for knowledge. Once we realize these two points, we can understand Wittgenstein’s critique properly as a grammatical argument in that Moore fails to see how the concepts of knowledge and certainty relate to those of justification and evidence. On this reading, we can also understand that Moore and Wittgenstein were in more agreement than many people have thought, even though Moore was not able to exploit and express his philosophical insights (which he shares with Wittgenstein) properly.
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Segal, Alex. "Deconstruction, Literature, and Wittgenstein’s Privileging of Showing." Advances in Language and Literary Studies 8, no. 6 (December 25, 2017): 112. http://dx.doi.org/10.7575/aiac.alls.v.8n.6p.112.

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Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing involves a privileging of the latter. This privileging, which is both ethical and aesthetic, emerges in Wittgenstein’s attitudes to literature. Involving the metaphysics of presence and an oppositional hierarchy, it seems to be a possible target of Derrida’s deconstruction. Indeed, in Wittgenstein, Derrida sees an effacement of theory, an effacement that Derrida criticises and that can be construed as part and parcel of Wittgenstein’s privileging of showing. For theory belongs to saying rather than to showing. Focusing on commentators of Wittgenstein who affirm the privileging of showing, this essay explores a tension between Wittgenstein and Derrida that pertains to this privileging.
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Morra, Lucia. "Wittgenstein and Piccoli." Wittgenstein-Studien 11, no. 1 (January 20, 2020): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2020-0002.

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AbstractIn 1929 Ludwig Wittgenstein met Raffaello Piccoli, the Serena Professor of Italian, with whom he arranged several meetings in the following terms. For a long time their intellectual friendship was suggested only by the occurrences of Piccoli’s name in Wittgenstein’s Cambridge Pocket Diaries, then a paper about Piccoli including hypothesis on his meetings with Wittgenstein was published (Marjanović 2005), and more recently, the diaries of a student of both Piccoli and Wittgenstein in 1929 – 1930 were discovered. The new material, on the background of data now available about Piccoli’s life and works, throws new light onto his relationship with Wittgenstein, and hypothesis on the topics of their conversations are also advanced. Piccoli’s perspective on the difference between ethics, religion and philosophy on the one hand and science on the other was in tune with Wittgenstein’s view and similar was also their aversion towards scientism; furthermore, Piccoli had read many of the authors for which Wittgenstein showed an interest in 1930 – 1931 – Freud, Spengler, Frazer, Augustine, and also James.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Wittgenstein"

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Dias, Aline da Silva. "Wittgenstein versus Wittgenstein sobre regras." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFPR, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1884/37342.

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Orientador: Prof. Dr. Alexandre Noronha Machado
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciências Humanas, Letras e Artes, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Defesa: Curitiba, 06/02/2014
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Área de concentração: História da filosofia moderna e contemporânea
Resumo: Esta dissertação apresenta duas interpretações sobre as considerações de Wittgenstein a respeito do seguir regras nas Investigações Filosóficas (§§138- 242). A primeira delas é a exposta por Saul Kripke em seu livro Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, na qual este afirma que, nos §§138-242, Wittgenstein desenvolve um paradoxo cético para mostrar que não há fatos constituintes da significação. Contudo, isso não implica na negação da significatividade da linguagem, pois ele oferece uma solução cética a esse paradoxo, que apela a um comunitarismo linguístico, como indicaremos ao longo dessa pesquisa. Segundo Kripke, Wittgenstein sustentaria que a linguagem é essencialmente social. A segunda proposta interpretativa é a de Colin McGinn em seu livro Wittgenstein on Meaning. Ele propõe que o intuito de Wittgenstein com as considerações dos §§138-242 seria afastar concepções mentalistas equivocadas a respeito do seguir regras, significar ou entender algo por uma palavra. De acordo com McGinn, Wittgenstein não é um cético semântico, pois ele oferece uma explicação sobre o que é significar algo com uma palavra, explicação que apela às nossas capacidades ou habilidades de utilizar um sinal; para ele, Wittgenstein tampouco seria um comunitarista, pois essas capacidades e habilidades poderiam ser exercidas por uma única pessoa (individualmente), sem qualquer referência a uma comunidade. Diante dessas duas leituras, avaliaremos qual delas explica de modo mais satisfatório as reflexões de Wittgenstein sobre esse tema. Palavras-chave: seguir regras, paradoxo cético, solução cética, comunitarismo, individualismo.
Abstract: It will be discussed two interpretations regarding the Wittgenstein's considerations on the "following rules", in the Philosophical Investigations (§§138-242). The first one, it is suggested by Saul A. Kripke, as he pointed out in the book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, in which he holds that, in the §§138-242, Wittgenstein develops a sceptical paradox to maintain the idea that there are not facts of meaning. However, it doesn't implie that the language is meaningless, because he offers a sceptical solution to this paradox in which he appeals to a linguistic comunitarism, as we will indicate in this research. According to Kripke, Wittgenstein argues that the language is fundamentally social. The second interpretation is held by Colin McGinn in his book Wittgenstein on Meaning. He suggest that Wittgenstein tried to dismiss the misleading mentalist conceptions of following rules, meaning and understanding something through a word. According to McGinn, Wittgenstein is not a sceptic, because he offers an explanation of meaning something through a word: employing our capacities or abilities to use a sign; he is not even a communitarist, since the capacities and the abilities could be exercised by only one single person, without any reference to a certain community. After the presentation of these two interpretations, we will evaluate which one explains more satisfactorily Wittgenstein's thought related to this matter. Key-words: following rules, sceptical paradox, sceptical solution, comunitarism, individualism.
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Höhler, Philipp. "Wittgenstein als politischer Philosoph : Wittgensteins Philosophie als Grundlage für eine politische Philosophie /." Hamburg : Diplomica Verl, 2008. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=3070495&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.

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Fatturi, Arturo. "Wittgenstein." Florianópolis, SC, 2002. http://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/82264.

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Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia.
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Spica, Marciano Adilio. "Wittgenstein." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 2012. http://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/92990.

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Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2009.
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O objetivo primeiro deste trabalho é apresentar e discutir as idéias de Wittgenstein a respeito da religião a partir de suas concepções de linguagem, mostrando que ele não a condena a um silêncio absoluto. Para cumprir esta tarefa, mostramos, num primeiro momento, as idéias do autor sobre linguagem e religião à época do Tractatus elucidando que suas idéias a respeito dos limites da linguagem não levam à condenação da religião a um silêncio absoluto. Ao delimitar o campo do sentido e colocar a religião para fora deste campo, Wittgenstein não a está condenando ao desaparecimento. Ao contrário, está salvando tal ramo da vida humana da interferência da metafísica e da ciência. Seu objetivo é mostrar que a religião, assim como a ética e a estética, não devem ser tomadas como se fossem um discurso científico e se isso for feito, tais atividades humanas tendem a desaparecer, pois aquilo que realmente importa nestes discursos não pode ser expresso em proposições figurativas. O Tractatus estabeleceu os limites do que pode e do que não pode ser dito, mostrou que devemos nos abster de tentativas filosóficas e científicas de explicar e fundamentar a religião, pois esta é uma esfera da vida humana que está ligada ao sentido da vida e não a critérios de verdade ou falsidade. A religião, para o jovem Wittgenstein, dá um caminho a seguir, uma maneira de agir e uma forma de compreender e suportar o mundo contingente dos fatos. Num segundo momento, apresentamos as idéias sobre linguagem e religião pós-Tractatus, elucidando a possibilidade de jogos de linguagem religiosos e caracterizando tais jogos. Mostramos, também, que neste período a religião é entendida como um saber autônomo que possui regras, práticas e uma gramática própria. A religião é um saber eminentemente prático e continua, da mesma forma como o era na época do Tractatus, ligada ao sentido da vida e não a critérios de verdade ou falsidade. Ao saber religioso não interessam questões factuais e não há necessidade de teorias filosóficas que o justifiquem. Mostramos ainda, a forte influencia do cristianismo tolstoiano nas concepções de Wittgenstein a respeito da religião, defendendo que esta herança faz com que o filósofo em questão tenha uma concepção extremamente positiva do sentimento religioso, atribuindo a ele o papel de dar uma resposta ao desejo humano por encontrar um sentido para a vida. Assim, ao final de nosso trabalho, chegamos à conclusão que a obra de Wittgenstein, em nenhum momento, condena a religião a um mutismo. Sua obra mostra a grande importância deste saber e a grande ligação do sentimento religioso com a vida prática. Para ele, não importa ao religioso dizer que é religioso, o importante é que a vida prática mostre a crença religiosa. É na ação, no dia-a-dia do crente religioso, que encontra-se o critério de correção para sabermos se uma cumpre bem seu papel enquanto religiosa.
The main aim of this work is to present and discus the Wittgenstein#s ideas about religion from their conceptions of language, showing that he not condemns to the one absolute silence. To accomplish this task, we first present the author#s ideas about language and religion in the Tractatus#s Time, explaining that their ideas about limits of language does not lead to the condemnation of religion to an absolute silence. To the delimit sense field and put religion out of this field, Wittgenstein is not condemning the religion to the disappearance. On the contrary, are saving this branch of human life of the interference of metaphysics and science. Your goal is to show that religion, as well as ethics and aesthetics should not be taken as if a scientific discourse and if this is done, such human activities tend to disappear, because what really is important in these speeches do not can be expressed in figurative propositions. The Tractatus established the limits of what can and cannot be said, it showed that we must abstain of philosophical and scientific attempts to explain and justify religion, because this is a sphere of human life that is linked to the meaning of life and not to the truth or falsity criteria. The religion, for the young Wittgenstein, gives a way forward, a way to act and a way to understand and support the contingent world of facts. In a second moment, we present the ideas about language and religion after Tractatus, explain the possibility of religious language games, characterizing such games. We show also that during this period the religion is understood as a autonomous knowing, with own rules, practice and grammar. The religion it is eminently a practical knowing and continues, in the same way as it was at the time of Tractatus, linked to the meaning of life and not to the criteria truth or falsity. To the religious knowing not is interested fact inquiry and philosophical theories that it justified. We also showed the great influence of the tolstoian Christianism in religion Wittgenstein#s conceptions, arguing that this inheritance does with that the philosopher has a positive conception of religious sentiment, giving him the role of providing a response to the human desire to find a sense for life. Thus, at the end of our work we conclude that the Wittgenstein#s work do not condemns the religion to a mutism. His work shows the great importance of this knowledge and the great connection between religious sentiment and practical life. For him, not is essential to the religious to say that it is religious, but is important that his practical life showed the belief. It is in the action, on the day-a-day of the believer which is the correction riterion for we understand whether a person is good executing your function while religious.
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Höhler, Philipp. "Wittgenstein als politischer Philosoph Wittgensteins Philosophie als Grundlage für eine politische Philosophie." Hamburg Diplomica-Verl, 2006. http://d-nb.info/987556681/04.

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Biggs, Michael A. R. "The illustrated Wittgenstein : a study of the diagrams in Wittgenstein's published works." Thesis, University of Reading, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.385076.

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Delfin, Solveig. "Wittgenstein och skepticismen." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-18370.

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 In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) Saul Kripke claims that Wittgenstein argues for a certain form of scepticism in his book Philosophical Investigations (1953), namely a new form of philosophical scepticism, a result of Wittgenstein´s idea of language as language games. Nihilism, scepticism of meaning or of concept, constitutive scepticism are other commentators´ different names of the same phenomenon. The philosophy of Wittgenstein accounts for how our words, including the words of mathematics, have no meaning and there are no a priori justified objective facts as to what I mean about a word. We follow the rules blindly and without justification. We are unable to find any facts against this proposal. Like a ´sceptic´ Wittgenstein denies the ´superlative fact,´ a fact supposed to give an a priori justification to our words. The consensus of a language community is enough to give meaning and assertions to what we in ordinary language call facts, but objective facts in logical meaning a priori, do not exist, a sceptical view in Kripke´s interpretation. Wittgenstein rejects explicit scepticism, but Kripke thinks Wittgenstein did not want to repudiate common belief as a common sense philosopher.

This paper ´Wittgenstein and Scepticism´ says that Wittgenstein certainly denies ´superlative fact´, but his reason was founded on conclusions from his investigation of grammar and language, which we use and misuse according to what we want, not to how it is. We demand that logic ought to be absolute, general and consistent, but there is no such logic a priori. Wittgenstein thinks we have to stick to reality and facts of experience. Facts a priori are very convincing facts, but they are not ´sublime´ in a logical metaphysic way. Logic is not rejected and the philosophy of logic uses the same words as common language. Logic has a normative function in our language. We learn words and rules in a certain context and use them in certain situations. How we use the word tells us the meaning of the word and the correct understanding. Our following the rules depends on how they work in real life.


I Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages (1982) hävdar Saul Kripke att Wittgensteins resonemang i Filosofiska undersökningar (1953) leder till en speciell  form av skepticism, en filosofisk skepticism, en konsekvens av Wittgensteins uppfattning om språket som språkspel. Nihilism, meningsskepticism, begreppsskepticism, konstitutiv skepticism är andra kommentatorers beteckningar. Wittgensteins filosofi visar att språkets ord, inklusive matematikens ord, saknar mening och inga rättfärdigade objektiva a priori fakta finns om vad jag menar med ett ord. Vi följer språkets regler blint och som det passar oss Argument saknas för att vederlägga  detta påstående. Som en skeptiker förnekar Wittgenstein filosofins "superlative fact", som förmodas ge en a priori grund för vad jag menar med ett ord. En språkgemenskaps konsensus ger dock orden mening och bekräftar vad som i vanligt språk kallas fakta, men objektiva fakta i logisk mening, fakta a priori saknas, d.v.s. en skeptisk uppfattning, enligt Kripkes tolkning Att Wittgenstein själv tar avstånd från skepticismen beror på att han inte vill bryta med den allmänna uppfattningen om fakta och  mening.

Uppsatsen "Wittgenstein och skepticismen" visar att visserligen överger Wittgenstein "superlative fact", men detta är ett resultat av hans grammatiska undersökning av språket, vilket vi brukar och missbrukar för våra syften, inte som det är. Vi önskar och fordrar att logiken ger oss ett absolut, generellt och beständigt svar, men ett  sådant svar kan inte logikens a priori ge. Wittgenstein menar att verkligheten och erfarenhetsfakta är vad vi har att hålla oss till. A priori fakta är enligt Wittgenstein mycket övertygande fakta, men inte i den "sublima" logikens metafysiska mening. Logiken förkastas inte, ty logikens filosofi talar inte om ord i någon annan mening än vi gör i det vanliga livet. Logiken har en styrfunktion i språket. Orden lärs in i ett sammanhang och används i ett sammanhang. Användningen av ordet visar om ordets mening är korrekt uppfattad. Vi följer regler efter hur de fungerar i en verklighet

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Sarkar, Priyambada. "Wittgenstein and solipsism." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.730920.

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Corrigan, Daniel Patrick. "Wittgenstein and Religion." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2006. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/13.

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This thesis considers the implications of Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy for the issue of religious belief, as well as the relation of religion to Wittgenstein’s thought. In the first chapter I provide an overview of the Tractatus and discuss the place of religion within the Tractarian framework. I then provide an overview of Philosophical Investigations. In the second chapter I consider interpretations by Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in relation to religion, as well as Kai Nielsen’s famous critique of ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism.’ The third and final chapter takes up the issue of construing religious belief as a distinctive language-game. I consider arguments from D. Z. Phillips and criticisms of Phillips from Mark Addis and Gareth Moore.
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Ammereller, Erich. "Wittgenstein on intentionality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.295494.

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Books on the topic "Wittgenstein"

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J, Ayer A. Wittgenstein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

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1889-1951, Wittgenstein Ludwig, Kosuth Joseph, Wiener Secession, and Palais des beaux-arts (Brussels, Belgium), eds. Wittgenstein. Wien: Wiener Secession, 1989.

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Fredriksson, Gunnar. Wittgenstein. Stockholm: Bonnier, 1993.

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Celma, José Luis Prades. Wittgenstein. Madrid: Editorial Cincel, 1990.

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Jolley, Kelly Dean, ed. Wittgenstein. Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/upo9781844654420.

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Sluga, Hans. Wittgenstein. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444343311.

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Luntley, Michael, ed. Wittgenstein. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470776223.

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Kenny, Anthony, ed. Wittgenstein. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470776643.

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Luntley, Michael. Wittgenstein. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118978504.

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Hermans, Willem Frederik. Wittgenstein. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1990.

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Book chapters on the topic "Wittgenstein"

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Schroeder, Severin. "Wittgenstein." In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, 554–61. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444323528.ch68.

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Loughlin, Victor. "Wittgenstein." In 4E Cognitive Science and Wittgenstein, 49–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89463-4_4.

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Hamawaki, Arata. "Wittgenstein." In The Routledge Handbook of Essence in Philosophy, 487–502. New York: Routledge, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003008750-38.

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Shaw, James R. "Kripkensteinean Skepticism through a Wittgensteinean Lens." In Wittgenstein on Rules, 179—C8.N21. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197609989.003.0008.

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Abstract This chapter develops one way of understanding of the force behind Saul Kripke’s formulation of meaning skepticism and explains how this challenge takes on a distinctive shape within Wittgenstein’s approach to foundational questions. The chapter begins by arguing that on the reading of Part I, Wittgenstein is beholden to produce a nontrivial answer to the meaning skeptic that does not merely dismiss skeptical worries as borne out of confusion. The chapter then explains that because of Wittgenstein’s commitment to “meaning” being a family resemblance term, the answer we should expect Wittgenstein to supply to the meaning skeptic would take on a form that the skeptic may not have anticipated.
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Shaw, James R. "Dispositions." In Wittgenstein on Rules, 193—C9.N7. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197609989.003.0009.

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Abstract This chapter explores the extent to which Wittgenstein could appeal to dispositionalist resources in responding to meaning skepticism, especially since these represent one of the most popular modes of trying to cope with such skepticism. It discusses how different kinds of dispositions play different roles in Wittgenstein’s Justificatory and Grammatical Investigations, and that these roles surprisingly allow Wittgenstein to appeal to dispositions of some kinds in the foundations of semantics. This helps show how Wittgenstein’s work in the foundations of semantics might harmonize with contemporary work on the subject in ways that are not easy to glean directly from his texts. Still, Wittgenstein’s work points to several limits to the use of dispositions in developing the foundations of meaning, which suggests that we should look to other aspects of his work for a fuller reply to the meaning skeptic.
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Shaw, James R. "Kripke v. Wittgenstein." In Wittgenstein on Rules, 299–302. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197609989.003.0012.

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Abstract This chapter sides with many standard critics of Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein, but stresses that the exegetical problems with Kripke’s approach all trace to a single failure: the failure to distinguish between the Justificatory and the Grammatical Investigations. The chapter emphasizes that in spite of this misstep, Kripke manages to keep many of the most important lessons of Wittgenstein’s discussion in view. A further consequence of this reading is that the form of skepticism attributed by Saul Kripke to Wittgenstein is (as some have suspected) in fact an ingenious creation of Kripke himself. Wittgenstein is not to be credited with formulating the problem, but rather for giving rich foundations for semantics among which we can locate the resources for a solution.
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Cook, John W. "Standard Ordinary Language Philosophy." In Wittgenstein, Empiricism, And Language, 101–16. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195132984.003.0010.

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Abstract Wittgenstein is, without doubt, a very difficult philosopher, and those who have tried to understand him have gone about this in various ways. Some have picked out a few passages whose meaning seemed unproblematic and used them as a Rosetta stone for deciphering Wittgenstein’s more obscure remarks. (A favorite seems to be the passage about bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use, as though there could be no doubt about which uses Wittgenstein took to be metaphysical and which not.) Others have tried to locate Wittgenstein’s philosophical position by employing a triangulation procedure, using as their coordinates G. E. Moore, common sense, and ordinary language.
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Maddy, Penelope. "Wittgenstein on Hinges." In A Plea for Natural Philosophy, 148–70. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508855.003.0006.

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Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is often regarded as the sourcebook of contemporary hinge epistemology. However that may be, this essay argues that Wittgenstein himself was not a hinge epistemologist. He did feel the draw, but in the end, hinge propositions were not part of his considered view. Rather, they characterize one of the competing voices in his treatment of external world skepticism, the so-called voice of correctness (analogous to the Kripkean skeptical solution in the rule-following case), with the voice of temptation represented by Moore, as Wittgenstein understands him (analogous to a straight solution in the role-following case). To support this reading of the first-draft notes collected by the editors into OC, the argument extrapolates from readings of the Tractatus, the Philosophical Investigations, and the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, supplemented by new biographical and philological work by Brian Rogers on Wittgenstein’s final months.
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"L. Wittgenstein (1938) Wittgenstein's Tailor." In Rules and Meanings, 202–4. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315015835-42.

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Shaw, James R. "Wittgenstein and Kripke." In Wittgenstein on Rules, 175—C7.N1. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197609989.003.0007.

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Abstract This chapter describes the aims of Part II of the book: to lay out the form of meaning skepticism developed by Saul Kripke in his celebrated reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks, and to show how although Wittgenstein never countenanced meaning skepticism, his work on the foundations of meaning contains novel and insightful resources for avoiding that skepticism. This chapter also previews several important steps on the way to appreciating this point about Wittgenstein’s relationship to Kripke. These include developing a contrast in how these two authors regard the role of constitutive grounds for meaning, and getting clearer on the roles that dispositions can and should play in Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Investigation.
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Conference papers on the topic "Wittgenstein"

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Marchesin, Marco. "Wittgenstein, metalogic and meaning." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.03.

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Lozev, Kamen. "Tolstoy’s religious influence on young Wittgenstein." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.12.

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Kassabov, Ognian. "Wittgenstein on übersichtliche Darstellung and gaining clarity." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.08.

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SANTOS, Thaís Ap Ferreira. "O INTERIOR E O EXTERIOR EM WITTGENSTEIN." In XI Seminário de Pesquisa em Ciencias Humanas. São Paulo: Editora Edgard Blücher, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.5151/sosci-xisepech-gt10_43.

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Vinokurov, Vladimir. "LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURES OF LIFE." In 5th SGEM International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on SOCIAL SCIENCES and ARTS SGEM2018. STEF92 Technology, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2018h/21/s06.033.

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Bakalova, Marina. "Beyond Wittgenstein’s musical formalism." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.09.

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Aksoy, Neşe. "The transcendentality of Wittgenstein’s ethics." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.10.

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Hoyt, Christopher. "Wittgenstein’s therapeutic aim reconsidered." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.11.

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Elchinov, Dimitar. "The last language-game." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.06.

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Held, Jonas. "“Logic isn’t as simple as logicians think it is”: Wittgenstein on Moore’s paradox." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.01.

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Reports on the topic "Wittgenstein"

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Souza, Geysa G. R. de, and Américo Grisotto. QUANDO HÁ ARTE? APRENDIZADO ESTÉTICO EM WITTGENSTEIN. Editora Blucher, September 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.5151/sosci-xisepech-gt18_249.

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Seus, Sarah, Susanne Bührer, and Eva Heckl. Evaluation of the START Programme and the Wittgenstein Award. Fraunhofer-Institut, April 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.22163/2016.1.

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Sandner, Karl. Evaluierung des START-Programmes und des Wittgenstein-Preises (Kurzfassung). FWF - Der Wissenschaftsfonds, April 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.22163/fteval.2006.176.

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Seus, Sarah, Susanne Bührer, and Eva Heckl. Evaluation of the START Programme and the Wittgenstein Award. Fraunhofer-Institut ISI, April 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.22163/fteval.2016.1.

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Zeman, Kryštof, and Tomáš Sobotka. Selected Wittgenstein Centre databases on fertility across time and space. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, December 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1553/populationyearbook2020.dat01.

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Clark, Andrew E. Demography and well-being. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, January 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1553/populationyearbook2021.deb02.

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Demography studies the characteristics of populations. One such characteristic is well-being: this was the subject of the 2019 Wittgenstein Conference. Here, I discuss how objective well-being domains can be summarised to produce an overall well-being score, and how taking self-reported (subjective) well-being into account may help in this effort. But given that there is more than one type of subjective well-being score, we would want to know which one is “best”. We would also need to decide whose well-being counts, or counts more than that of others. Finally, I briefly mention the potential role of adaptation and social comparisons in the calculation of societal well-being.
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