Academic literature on the topic 'Western European press'

Piero Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003)Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay, eds., Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)

At the end of November 1755, news of the Lisbon earthquake spread rapidly to all capital cities of Europe. Horrific reports gave rise to a wealth of sensational journalism. As Samuel Johnson and others attest, this was particularly marked in Great Britain. The catastrophe remained a popular subject of flysheets, newspapers, and engravings for months on end. The event was magnified many times over in the eyes and minds by the popular press, which led to forms of public distress. For the first time in the western world, the press, on the occasion of the Lisbon earthquake, helped create the illusion of proximity and unity between the peoples of different nations in Europe. As Voltaire said, ‘L'Europe ressemblait à une grande famille réunie après ses différences’.

Flesh and stone. The body and the city in western civilization. By Richard Sennett. London: Faber & Faber, 1994. Pp. 431. ISBN 0-571-17390-X. £25.00Renaissance warrior and patron. The reign of Francis I. By R. J. Knecht. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xxv+612. ISBN 0-521-41796-1. £45.00.The early modern city 1450–1750. By Christopher R. Friedrichs. London: Longman, 1995. Pp. ix+381. ISBN 0-582-01321-6. £14.99.The court artist. On the ancestry of the modern artist. By Martin Warnke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. xx+299. ISBN 0-521-36375-6. £35.00.Renaissance and revolution. Humanists, scholars, craftsmen & natural philosophers in early modern Europe. Edited by J. V. Field and Frank A. J. L. James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xv+291. ISBN 0-521-43427-0. £37.50.

The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe, Anthony M. Messina, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. xv, 290.One of the most contentious and politically sensitive issues in Europe is immigration. The demographic trends indicate that the Old Continent is indeed getting older. To maintain their living standards, Europeans have to either increase birth rates or open the gates to immigrants in an orderly and welcoming way. Yet despite the practicality and, sooner rather than later, the necessity for an open, comprehensive and pro-active immigration policy, European countries are far from having one. At best, they have procedures concerning how to handle foreigners. The main “culprits” for this state of affairs are the people rather than governments. The Europeans, however rational the arguments for increasing immigration may be, are unwilling to embrace it. Paradoxically, those who are most opposed (and vote accordingly) are older people, even though they depend most on a large taxpayer base without which cheques from government-run pension plans would stop flowing eventually and publicly managed health care systems would run out of money.

Eastern European societies became victims of the western economic expansion after the Berlin Wall had collapsed; their states were ruined and they were subsequently robbed. The expansion of the EU to the east, in reality, is nothing else but subduing half of the European continent to the interests and the logic of Western European companies. Brutal expansion, in which the end justifies the means, creates the boomerang effect that endangers basic values of liberal society as a whole. Hence, the law that sanctions public doubt in verdicts of the Hague Tribunal on the events in Srebrenica that took place in July 1995, is now transforming into jeopardy for freedom of the press, bringing back verbal censorship and even focusing the attention of historians to the one and only truth.

The article examines the image of the West in the Russian press of the era of Nicholas I. When considering the image of the West, the emphasis is on negative trends that the Russian press found in modern Western life. One of the main subjects of criticism was parliamentarism. The parliamentary system was criticized for its weakness and inability to pursue a consistent policy. Also, Russian magazines criticized the West for abandoning traditional values and deviating from religion. The departure from religious morality in France and other countries was perceived as a cause of cultural decline. Capitalism was criticized by Russian journals from the moral point of view. The commercialization of life, coupled with the decline of morality, was seen as the main reason for the decline of Western European literature. It is concluded that all trends spotted by the Russian press in Western life began to manifest themselves in Russia at the end of the reign of Nicholas I and became public in the era of Alexander II.

AbstractThe debate about a resurgence of religion in the public life of Western European societies is ongoing in media and academic circles. Yet there is a shortage of systematic and longitudinal empirical studies of the coverage of religion in European mass media. This article presents some empirical findings, but the focus is on methodological considerations in a longitudinal quantitative content analysis of indicators of religion in editorials in the Swedish daily press from 1976 to 2010. We present and discuss how the selection of keywords and of analytical units affects the outcome of our analysis as to tendencies over time regarding the frequency of religion indicators. As our results show, the question of a resurgence of religion in the daily press has no simple answer. Thus, methodological issues concerning reliability, validity and reflexivity are of crucial importance for this and similar studies measuring cultural change as reflected in the daily press.

AbstractThis article responds to critics of Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems (Cambridge University Press, 2016). It provides a rejoinder to challenges to the attempted synthesis of process sociology and the English School analysis of international society. It rebuts the postcolonial contention that the process-sociological analysis of the impact of the European ‘civilizing process’ on the modern states-system is Eurocentric. The article explains how process sociology contributes to the postcolonial critique of ‘civilization’. It concludes by arguing that their combined strengths of the two perspectives can inform the comparative study of Western and non-Western ‘civilizing processes’ and support the development of a more ‘global IR’.

Jørgen Nielsen's Towards a European Islam provides a very good introduction to the role that Islam plays in the experience of most non-European immigrants to Western Europe. As Nielsen correctly notes, there is an overwhelmingly Muslim character to immigration in the region, but few of the recent studies on immigration have looked systematically at the issue of the role religion plays in the lives of these newly arrived migrants. This relative silence is surprising given that there are an estimated 9 million Muslims in Western Europe, which makes them the largest religious minority in the region. Nielsen's book, therefore, is a healthy corrective for a literature that too often ignores this important question. The book's greatest strength is its description of the complex process by which Muslims seek to integrate their religious values and practices into social and political cultures that are not well suited to accommodating those views.

This research looks at the way Australia is portrayed in the Western European press, particularly in the light of Australia's recent emphasis on being a clever country, within the Asia Pacific region. The research is based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of all articles explicitly referring to Australia, in seven newspapers from Belgium (2), France (2), Germany (1) and the United Kingdom (2), over a 6 month period. The main hypothesis was that those newspapers without Australian based correspondents or stringers picture Australia in a stereotypical way and that "news" in those papers, instead of giving "news", reinforces existing ideas and images held of Australia. My research supports the hypothesis, but also uncovers the very important role played by editors at home. They decide what is important, what is news and their choice will go to consonant "news". The research shows that newspapers in Europe largely portray Australia's older images, with its kangaroos, koalas and beaches peopled by sportsmen. Australia is largely portrayed as an almost untouched country inhabited by animals to be found nowhere else, and by people (mainly white Anglo- Saxon males) reputed for their friendliness, as well as for their laziness and sometimes their strangeness. "Newer" images of Australia promoted by the Australian government (e.g. Australia as a clever country and part of the Asia-Pacific region) get relatively little coverage in the Western European press.

This thesis analyses processes of discursive European identity formation in three cultural journals: Esprit, from France, the British New Left Review and the German Merkur during the time periods 1989-92, and, a decade later, during 2003-06. The theoretical framework which the thesis brings to bear on this analysis is that of the European Public Sphere. This model builds on Jürgen Habermas’s original model of a “public sphere”, and alleges that a sphere of common debate about issues of European concern can lead to a more defined and integrated sense of a European identity which is widely perceived as vague and inchoate. The relevancy of the public sphere model and its connection to the larger debate about European identity, especially since 1989, are discussed in the first part of the thesis. The second part provides a comparative analysis of the main European debates in the journals during the respective time periods. It outlines the mechanisms by which identity is expressed and assesses when, and to what extent, shared notions of European identity emerge. The analysis finds that identity formation does not occur through a developmental, gradual convergence of views as the European public sphere model envisages. Rather, it is brought about in much more haphazard back-and-forth movements. Moreover, shared notions of European identity between all the journals only arise in moments of perceived crises. Such crises are identified as the most salient factor which galvanizes expressions of a common, shared sense of European identity across national boundaries and ideological cleavages. The thesis concludes that the model of the EPS is too dependent on a partial view of how identity formation occurs and should thus adopt a more nuanced understanding about the complex factors that are at play in these processes. For the principled attempt to circumscribe identity formation as the outcome of communicative processes alone is likely to be thwarted by external events.

Els governs de coalició poden, per una banda, dividir-se les tasques i funcionar de forma compartimentalitzada, on cada soci decideixi sol les polítiques sota les seves jurisdiccions ministerials. Per contra, també poden optar pel compromís entre els partits i decidir col•lectivament en cada àrea sectorial, amb independència del repartiment de carteres. En el seu primer paper, aquesta tesis ofereix un marc teòric per entendre aquesta variació, amb la intenció d’identificar les condicions sota les quals és més probable un tipus de governança coalicional o altra. El segon paper testa empíricament les implicacions d’aquests arguments sobre la manera com els membres d’una coalició es vigilen mútuament mitjançant l’ús de mecanismes de control. Finalment, en el tercer paper s’ofereix un exercici empíric on s’analitza fins a quin punt els votants jutgen de manera diferent cada un dels socis de govern en funció del tipus de coalició a què s’enfronten.
At an extreme, coalition partners can divide tasks and individually decide policy in their ministerial jurisdictions in a compartmentalized way. At the other extreme, parties sharing office can compromise and collectively set policy in each dimension regardless of portfolio allocation. In its first paper, this dissertation provides a theoretical account of this variation, trying to unravel the conditions under which one type of governance is more likely than the other. The second paper tests empirically the implications of these arguments on the way coalition partners keep tabs on each other through the establishment of control mechanisms. Finally, an empirical exercise is offered in the third paper to study the extent to which voters assess each coalition partner differently depending on the type of coalition they face. Variation in the types of coalition governance, we conclude, is an important factor to take into account in political science research in the field.

Die Arbeit rekonstruiert jugendliche Mitgestaltung und jugendkulturelle Artikulationen in westdeutschen Schulen entlang eines umfassenden Bestandes an Schülerzeitungen. Zur Mitgestaltung der Schulgemeinschaft und zum Erlernen demokratischer Handlungsweisen wurden Schülerzeitungen von den Alliierten zusammen mit der Schülermitverantwortung (SMV) insbesondere an Gymnasien eingeführt. Erstmals wird hier auch die Entwicklung der Schülerzeitungen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts nachgezeichnet. Schülerzeitungen zeugten gegenüber der Schülermitverantwortung (SMV) von deutlich unproblematischer und erfolgreicher zu etablierenden Mitgestaltungs- und Artikulationsmöglichkeiten und trugen zur Entwicklung von stärker durch Liberalisierung und Partizipation geprägte Schulkulturen bei. Dies wird für prägende Themen in der behandelten Zeit dargestellt: mit Blick auf (1) die Diskussion von Technik und naturwissenschaftlich-technischen Entwicklungen während des Kalten Krieges, (2) auf die Beschäftigung mit den USA und ihrem kulturellen Einfluss sowie (3) auf die Auseinandersetzungen mit jugendkulturellen Entwicklungen. Die zunehmende Öffnung der Schule für jugendkulturelle Ausdrucksweisen wird sowohl thematisch als auch auf materieller Ebene untersucht. Dazu wird u. a. die symbolische Kommunikation auf Titelblättern von Schülerzeitungen analysiert. Die dargestellten produktiven Bemühungen um Meinungsfreiheit in der Schule verdeutlichen auch die Bedeutung von Schülerzeitungen für das Lehrer-Schüler-Verhältnis. Die Arbeit bekräftigt die Relevanz von Schülerzeitungen für die Rekonstruktion von Jugendkulturen bzw. peer cultures im schulischen Raum sowie als ertragreiche Quelle für die Jugend- und Schulforschung. Schülerzeitungen sind darüber hinaus ein internationales und auch transnationales Phänomen. Für weitere Forschungen wird daher zudem ein erster umfassender Forschungsbericht zu Schülerzeitungen in Westeuropa, in der DDR und in den USA gegeben.
This doctoral thesis reconstructs youth participation and youth-cultural articulations at West German secondary schools. After 1945, the Allies introduced student newspapers along with student councils in order to foster the acquisition of democratic behaviors and codetermination of the school community. This project first offers a thorough documentation of the development of student newspapers in the first half of the 20th century, and then focuses on their development in the 1950s and 1960s. By the mid-1950s, the editors of the student newspapers had claimed independence vis-a-vis student councils. Student newspapers, meanwhile, bespoke far less problematic, and more successful, potentials for participation and youth-cultural articulation. They thereby contributed to school cultures more strongly influenced by liberalization and participation. The following defining themes from the era are presented in these articles: (1) the discussion of technology and natural science/technical developments during the cold war, (2) engagement with the USA and its cultural influence, and (3) involvement with youth-cultural developments. The increasing opening of schools for youth-cultural forms of expression is examined on both thematic and material levels. In addition, newspaper elements such as the symbolic communication in title pages will be analyzed. The productive efforts toward freedom of opinion in schools show the importance of school newspapers in terms of the teacher-student relationship and the development of participatory structures in schools. This project underlines the relevance of school newspapers for the reconstruction of youth cultures and peer cultures in schools in addition to being sources for youth research and school research. Moreover, school newspapers are an international and transnational phenomenon. Areas for further research are indicated in a literature review for Western Europe a consideration of the GDR and the USA.
Cette thèse reconstruit la participation des jeunes et les articulations culturelles des jeunes dans les écoles ouest-allemandes à travers une collection de plus de 7 500 journaux scolaires archivés à la Bibliothek für Bildungsgeschichtliche Forschung (BBF) de Berlin. Afin d'aider à façonner la communauté scolaire et d'apprendre à agir de manière démocratique, les journaux scolaires ont été introduits après 1945 par les Alliés en collaboration avec le conseil des élèves, en particulier dans les écoles secondaires. Ce faisant, certaines préformes réussies du passé ont été poursuivies. Pour la première fois, cet ouvrage retrace l'évolution des journaux scolaires dans la première moitié du XXe siècle, puis se concentre sur les développements des années 1950 et 1960. A partir du milieu des années 1950, les rédacteurs en chef des journaux de l'école ont revendiqué avec succès leur indépendance vis-à-vis du conseil des élèves, dont les possibilités de codécision ont été désillusionnées à un stade précoce. Contrairement au conseil des élèves, les journaux scolaires ont témoigné de possibilités de co-design et d'articulation à établir nettement moins problématiques et plus fructueuses et ont ainsi contribué au développement de cultures scolaires plus fortement influencées par la libéralisation et la participation. Il est présenté dans le présent document pour les thèmes de formation au cours de la période couverte : en vue (1) de la discussion sur la technologie et les développements scientifiques et techniques pendant la Guerre froide, (2) de l'occupation avec les Etats-Unis et son influence culturelle, et (3) des confrontations avec les développements culturels des jeunes. L'ouverture croissante de l'école aux expressions culturelles des jeunes est examinée tant au niveau de la thématisation que sur le plan matériel sous la forme d'une analyse des artefacts. A cet effet, la communication symbolique sur les pages de titre des journaux scolaires sera analysée. Les efforts productifs présentés pour la liberté d'opinion dans les écoles illustrent également l'importance des journaux étudiants pour la relation enseignant-élève et le développement de structures participatives dans les écoles. Les travaux confirment la pertinence des journaux scolaires pour la reconstruction des cultures des jeunes ou des cultures des pairs dans les écoles et en tant que source productive pour les jeunes et la recherche scolaire. Les journaux scolaires sont également un phénomène international et transnational. Pour des recherches plus approfondies, ce document fournit un premier rapport de recherche complet pour l'Europe occidentale ainsi qu'une présentation pour la RDA et les Etats-Unis.

The Ottoman reforms of the mid-nineteenth century accelerated the process of opening up Syria to European travellers and traders, and gave Syria's Jews access to European Jewish communities. The resulting influx of Western ideas led to a decline in the traditional economy. It also allowed for the introduction of Western education, influenced the structure and the administration of Jewish society in Syria, and changed the balance of the relationship between Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Initially Syria's Jewish communities flourished in these new circumstances, but there was a developing recognition that their future lay overseas. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the bankruptcy of the Ottoman Empire in 1875, and the suspension of the Ottoman constitution in 1878, this feeling intensified. A process of decline set in that ultimately culminated in large-scale Jewish emigration. Thereon, the future for Syrian Jews lay in the West, not the East. This book covers Jewish community life, the legal status of Jews in Syria, their relationship with their Muslim and Christian neighbours, and their links with the West. It draws on a range of archival material in six languages, including Jewish, Christian Arab, and Muslim Arab sources, Ottoman and European documents, consular reports, travel accounts, and reports from the contemporary press and by emissaries to Syria of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. Rabbinic sources are particularly important in opening a window onto Syrian Jewish life and concerns. Together these sources bring to light an enormous amount of material and provide a broad, multifaceted perspective on the Syrian Jewish community.

In this work, a sequel to my A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in an Age of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), I study some major aspects of the scholarly study of religion in the long nineteenth century—from the Enlightenment to the First World War. More precisely, I seek to understand the new status of Judaism and Islam in the formative period of the new discipline. In order to do that, I focus on the concept of Semitic monotheism, a concept developed by Ernest Renan around the mid-nineteenth century, on the basis of the postulated (and highly problematic) contradistinction between Aryan and Semitic families of peoples, cultures, and religions. This contradistinction grew from the Western discovery of Sanskrit and its relationship with European languages, at the time of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Together with the rise of scholarly Orientalism, this discovery offered new perspectives on the East, as a consequence of which the Near East was demoted, as it were, from its traditional status as the locus of the biblical revelations. The book essentially studies a central issue in the modern study of religion. Doing so, however, it emphasizes that the new dualistic taxonomy of religions had major consequences and sheds new light on the roots of European attitudes to Jews and Muslims in the twentieth century and up to the present day.

Forging Germans explores the nationalization and eventual National Socialist mobilization of ethnic German children and youth in interwar and World War II Yugoslavia, particularly in two of its multiethnic, post-Habsburg borderlands: the Western Banat and the Batschka. Drawing upon original oral history interviews, untapped archival materials from Germany, Hungary, and Serbia, and historical press sources, the book uncovers the multifarious ways in which political, ecclesiastical, cultural, and military agents from Germany colluded with local nationalist activists to inculcate Yugoslavia’s ethnic Germans with divergent notions of “Germanness.” As the book shows, even in the midst of Yugoslavia’s violent and shifting Axis occupation, children and youth not only remained the subjects, but became agents of nationalist activism, as they embraced, negotiated, redefined, proselytized, lived, and died for the “Germanness” ascribed to them. Forging Germans is conceptualized as a contribution to the study of National Socialism from a transnational and comparative perspective, to the mid-twentieth-century history of Southeastern Europe and its relation to Germany, to studies of borderland nationalism and experiences of World War II occupation, and to the history of childhood and youth.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

This chapter examines the introduction of the Western concept of press freedom into imperial China. The initial introduction of freedom of the press was a product of the transnational interaction between China and the West in the nineteenth century. From the 1830s, Western businessmen, European Protestant missionaries, and Chinese diplomats introduced scattered ideas of press freedom into China, though these had very little influence at the time. This chapter documents this initial process of conceptual transplantation and summarizes the differing interpretations of press freedom through an in-depth textual analysis of primary sources.

This chapter explores modern domesticity as articulated by men and women in the pages of the press and on lecture podiums, arguing for a project that carved out an economic and cultural place for an emerging middle class. As industrial production in Europe and the United States brought wider swathes of society in contact with new commodities, articles in the press on the use and disposition of objects at home attempted to differentiate the consumption habits of the middle class from the tasteless riches of the upper classes. While this functioned to culturally distinguish the nascent middle class in its social surroundings, the chapter argues that the debate went beyond, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing this middle class from “ifranji” (Western/European) modes of consumption and attempting to ground modern domesticity in “Oriental” or “Syrian” authenticity.

This chapter examines Norman Davies's Heart of Europe (1984). The delicate subject of Polish–Jewish relations in history, not being strictly relevant to the main theme of Heart of Europe, receives little attention. Davies writes with sympathy about the extermination of most of the Jewish community by the Germans during the last war and with restraint about the participation of Jews in the activities of the Communist Party before the war and in those of the political police in the post-war period. Those who regard the Poles as traditional anti-semites will do well to note the autonomy and the scope for economic activity and religious life enjoyed by the Jewish community in the Republic of Poland–Lithuania. In the later 19th and early 20th centuries, a conjunction of pressure and reform opened the flood gates of a reservoir of Jewish talent stored up in those areas, making a unique contribution to Polish, and very soon also to western European culture. Nevertheless, Heart of Europe can be considered as an initiation into the arcane elements of Polish history and politics.

The archaeological record of Italy is long and complex, suggesting continuous peopling since the Middle Pleistocene (Mussi 2001; Mussi et al. in press). The evidence of Palaeolithic art, however, is rather restricted: Early Upper Palaeolithic (EUP) art is close to nil, including just a few notched implements; the Middle Upper Palaeolithic (MUP), admittedly, is much richer, with some twenty Gravettian Wgurines, the largest such sample in Western Europe (Mussi et al. 2000; Mussi 2004); parietal art is also documented at Grotta Paglicci, where painted horses and positive handprints were discovered (Boscato and Palma di Cesnola 2000; Zorzi 1962); when Late Upper Palaeolithic (LUP) lithic industries were produced which belong to the Epigravettian, portable and parietal art is known at a number of sites. In the late 1980s, Zampetti (1987) reviewed twenty-one Epigravettian cave sites, and a single open-air site, all of them with zoomorphic art. Three more have been discovered since: Riparo Dalmeri, Riparo di Villabruna, and Grotta di Settecannelle. I will examine below the artistic record of Sicily and Sardinia, both of them at the periphery of Italy, which, in turn, is secluded from Europe by the Alps. My aim is to contrast the effects of geographic isolation, with the circulation of people and ideas, if any, as documented by portable and cave art. Sicily, currently an island of 25; 700km² and the largest in the Mediterranean, lies 140 km from Africa, and a few kilometres off southern Italy. The strait of Messina is 3 to 25 km wide, but is far from easy to cross, because of violent tidal currents, and whirlpool, also known as ‘Charybdis’ by Greeks and Romans. The depth is just 72 m at the Sill of Peloro. Because of intense neotectonic activity, however, any palaeogeographic reconstruction is highly speculative. Analysis of the faunal assemblages, which during oxygen isotope stage (OIS) 2 include a limited number of species, none of which is endemic, suggests that intermittent connection with the mainland possibly existed around the Last Glacial Maximum (Mussi et al. in press). The large mammals, found in varying percentages, are the deer, Cervus elaphus, the aurochs, Bos primigenius, the small steppe horse, Equus hydruntinus, and Sus scrofa, the wild boar.

The third chapter discusses the northeastern state of Bahia, particularly its capital Salvador, which emerged as something of a mecca for Brazilian and other South American youth, who identified with the counterculture. An important center for Afro-Brazilian culture, Bahia was imagined as a place of non-western spirituality and cultural alterity, much in the way that Mexico and India were respectively seen by North American and European hippies. Youth from all over Brazil and South America flocked to Salvador and to the beach community Arembepe, where they founded a permanent commune. Bahian musicians, including former tropicalists who toured together as the Doces Bárbaros (“Sweet Barbarians”) popularized this image with songs alluding to Candomblé, an Afro-Brazilian religion, and other symbols of regional black culture. The local alternative press, such as the paper Verbo Encantado, also promoted Bahia as a destination for alternative youth. In an effort to boost tourism, the state government promoted Bahia as a mystical destination for young travelers, even as it sought to control and suppress the influx of hippies and the spread of drug consumption.

The challenges to traditional ante-bellum or ante-Mussolini ways of ruling and running societies were perhaps most visible in the area of fundamental changes affecting the most popular mass media at that time: newspapers. Virtually all across Europe, the vast majority of hitherto operating daily newspapers were shut down at the moment of liberation, and a new antifascist press often took over production facilities vacated by their compromised former owners. After some cursory glances at the politics of the post-liberation press in Germany and Italy, I then go into considerable detail in the case of France. For it was in France where the challenges to published opinion in the wake of Nazi occupation went further and deeper than anywhere else. In France, however, too, within very few years the power of money regained the upper hand, turning back the clock to the status quo ante bellum.

If locals in rural frontiers are in the thrall of powerful globals based in a network of world cities, they are not without power themselves. In the global core as well as the periphery, countrysides are the sources and scenes of resistance to decisions and actions taken in capitals and corporate boardrooms. French farmers seeing their privileges endangered by economic reforms demonstrate, and occasionally riot, in the streets of Paris. Often their banners proclaim their causes, but sometimes they show the name of a French region or even the flag of a département, reminding the authorities that they are dealing with an entity that has emotional resonance as well as economic interests. Chinese villagers organize to protest grievances ranging from the summary expropriation of land for factory building by industrialists empowered by the Beijing government, to oppressive rule by bosses whose loyalties are to the Communist Party rather than to the locals they are supposed to serve. They decry a new two-China policy—not involving Beijing and Taipei, but dividing their country into eastern “haves” and western “have-nots.” South Africans in rural KwaZulu-Natal stage rallies in support of their embattled deputy president facing charges in urban courtrooms including rape and corruption, certain that his trials constitute a political assault on the Zulu nation he represents and shouting not only for justice but also for secession. Ours may be an era of globalization and worldly flattening, but we also witness the resurgence of another of humanity’s ancient predispositions: the territorial imperative. The very Internet-enabled dissemination of information driving the breakdown of barriers among globals also spreads ideas about power and autonomy among locals that arouse the kinds of nationalisms and ethnic aspirations economic globalization is supposed to mitigate. On a planet fractured into nearly 200 countries, the European Union (EU) has taken a lead by enmeshing 27 of them in a multinational entity designed to integrate economies and coordinate laws, but the European paradox is that a widespread revival of chauvinism seeks to reverse this unifying, globalizing process. In several areas of Europe, there are provinces, regions, and other entities that press for more self-determination as opposed to international integration.