Journal articles on the topic 'War crime tribunals'

The article analyses the development of the concept of international crime in the "Hague" period, which covers the last decades of the last century and is closely related to the establishment of ad hoc international tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The article reveals the legal grounds for the establishment of these tribunals, the features of their activities, jurisdiction and principles of responsibility of persons who committed crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The establishment of international justice bodies by UN Security Council decisions has provoked a number of debates about their legitimacy, but it is undeniable that the activities of ad hoc international tribunals have contributed to the initiation of a new stage in the development of international criminal justice, further development of international criminal law, in particular in the development of the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court. All types of tribunal jurisdictions are disclosed, but special attention is paid to the substantive and personal jurisdictions of tribunals, which became the basis for the theoretical justification of the "Hague" modification of international crime, as well as the practical implementation of this concept in tribunal decisions. It is shown that the categories of international crimes that constitute the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (serious violations of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity) and the categories of crimes defined in the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda against humanity and violations of the Geneva Conventions) in the documents of the tribunals have been developed in comparison with the Nuremberg and post-Nuremberg periods. ~ 74 ~ ВІСНИК Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка ISSN 1728-3817 It is shown that the substantive jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICC does not coincide with the provisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The differences relate to the list of categories of crimes; parallel jurisdiction of international ad hoc tribunals and national courts; extending the competence of ad hoc tribunals to cases of crimes committed both during wars between states and during internal armed conflict, etc. The content of the categories of crimes, their composition, the subjects of responsibility have been clarified. In particular, the characteristic features of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity are identified; the conditions, elements and subjects for the recognition of their qualifications are indicated. The author pays attention to the principles of personal jurisdiction, shows that in the decisions of international tribunals ad hoc has developed the principle of individual responsibility for international crimes that constitute substantive jurisdiction. The application of the principle of universal jurisdiction in the activity of tribunals is revealed. The author concludes that the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals and their activities has contributed to the development of the concept of international crime and the separation of a special "Hague" modification. Keywords: international crime, tribunal, "Hague" modification, international justice, jurisdiction, criminal liability

In their contribution to the AJIL Symposium, Robinson and MacNeil remark that a prolific legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is that “it is now commonsense that rape is and must be a war crime.” This line distills the complexity of the legacies of the tribunals regarding sexual and gender-based violence. On the one hand, it articulates the critical role of the tribunals in cementing the idea that sexual violence, hitherto largely relegated to indifference in international criminal law and policy frameworks, is worthy of international attention. Simultaneously, it encapsulates the ways in which the tribunals’ jurisprudence has been received globally to narrate a narrow conception of conflict-related sexual violence as a “weapon of war” or committed as part of “strategic” conflict-related goals. In fact, there is little that constitutes common sense about sexual violence in conflict, nor is it always, or even most predominantly, committed as a war crime, crime against humanity,or in pursuit of genocide as envisaged by international criminal law. Various studies suggest that sexual violence in war takes many forms and causalities with differentiation across and within conflict contexts.

According to the report of the United Nations commission on Human Rights, rape is the least condemned war crime (coomaraswamy, Further Promotion 64n263). Although wartime rape was listed as a crime against humanity by the Nuremberg Military Tribunals and by the Geneva Conventions, it was not until 2001 that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia identified rapists as war criminals. In that year the tribunal sentenced three men for violations of the laws or customs of war (torture, rape) and crimes against humanity (torture, rape) committed during the war in Bosnia during the 1993 takeover of Foca, where women were systematically raped and killed, the purpose being “to destroy an ethnic group by killing it, to prevent its reproduction or to disorganize it, removing it from its home soil.”

At the present day sometimes crime of genocide is practically described as a crime against humanity, and the latter is characterized as war crimes. Although some similarity does exist between these kinds of crimes, they have different peculiarities by their constituent elements. These peculiarities possibly may be linked with warfare, but it wouldn’t be correct to bind them entirely with warfare. This difference can be found even in the charters of international criminal tribunals, particularly in various articles of Statute of the International Criminal Court: crime of genocide in Article 6, crimes against humanity in Article 7, and war crimes in Article 8 respectively. Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity and crime of genocide can be perpetrated both in times of warfare and peace. It’s always important to distinguish the latter from war crimes.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have sentenced over 130 perpetrators for genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, or war crimes. Sentencing judgments discuss the factors considered by the judges and impose a term of imprisonment. We regressed the sentence length meted out for each perpetrator on the doctrinal factors said to explain the term of imprisonment and on other factors rumored to affect sentencing. We find that the gravity of the crime and aggravating factors declared by the Tribunals as sentencing factors are significantly related to sentence length but that the mitigating factors proclaimed by the tribunals—all but one of which are associated with diplomatic and policy objectives—are not significantly related to the term of imprisonment. We conclude that international criminal sentences prioritize punishment of the individual based on the seriousness of the crime over the other diplomatic and policy goals that the judges claim to be pursuing. We conjecture that this discrepancy is based on functional differences: the sentencing judgment discussion seeks to advance the many policy objectives of the Tribunals, while the declared term of imprisonment is largely an expressive act of retributive justice, which might also facilitate deterrence and reconciliation.

The Second World War caused the collapse of the rules prevailing in the world so far. The cruelty of warfare, which also affected civilians, made the international community aware that the principles of humanitarianism adopted so far are insufficient. The world demanded that war criminals be brought to justice. At that point, no international court existed to take on the challenge. Two tribunals were established – the International Military Tribunal based in Nuremberg and the International Tribunal for the Far East based in Tokyo, whose task was to try the most serious crimes committed during II World War. The civilian population, especially women, suffered from sexual violence and rape. The International Tribunal for the Far East did not remain silent on the subject of sex crimes and undertook to judge war criminals who were also responsible for rapes. The actions of the International Tribunal for the Far East were one of the first steps in history in the field of punishing the crime of rape committed during armed conflicts and influenced the development of international criminal law in this area.

Under universal jurisdiction, any state in the world may prosecute and try the core international crimes— crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, and war crimes—without any territorial, personal, or national-interest link to the crime in question whenit was committed.The jurisdictional claim is predicated on the atrocious nature of the crime and legally based on treaties or customary international law. Unlike the regime of international criminal tribunals created by the United Nations Security Council and the enforcement regime of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the regime of universal jurisdiction is completely decentralized.

Today, the boundaries of international crime involving states and transnational organized crime are slowly blurring, and as a result, the number of international crimes is steadily growing. The article analyzes two key groups of crimes: crimes indicated in the Rome Statute and transnational crimes under international conventions. This article is based on the analysis of the main groups of crimes: the first group of international crimes committed with state actors, which includes crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of aggression, crimes of genocide; and the second group, crimes committed by criminal groups organized in more than one country with the "international" or "transnational" character of such acts. The authors emphasize the norms of international law, according to which the International Criminal Court, together with international criminal tribunals, have jurisdiction over a small range of key international crimes, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, aggression, committed by state officials. The main objective of this research is to compare the mechanism for investigating crimes in the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court, together with the national procedure for investigating transnational crimes, through the ratification of international conventions and the establishment of the International cooperation. The article was made with the following methods: induction, deduction, analogy, as well as historical, dialectical and formal legal methods.

The concern for the safety and security of personnel involved in peacekeeping missions has grown in the last two decades, mainly because of the increased risks deriving from deployment in volatile environments and mandates comprising multiple tasks. This article provides an overview of the developments of international law regarding the protection of peacekeepers, with a special focus on international criminal law and its role in enhancing the safety of the personnel and objects involved in peacekeeping missions. Indeed, starting in 2008, international and hybrid tribunals have issued their first decisions and judgments against individuals indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in connection with attacks against peacekeepers.After an analysis of the legal regimes established by the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and by international humanitarian law, the article examines the relevant international criminal law provisions and their application and interpretation by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court. It is argued that the application of the specific war crime of attacking peacekeepers, introduced for the first time in the Rome Statute in 1998, presents particular challenges, but it has also led to the punishment of a broader range of offences against peacekeepers. Furthermore, the application of this crime may contribute to the broadening of the range of punishable offences under the more general war crime of attacking civilians, thus leading to the enhancement of the protection of civilians.

AbstractThis article critically analyses the reparations and asset forfeiture framework at the Extraordinary African Chambers and its application in the case against Hissène Habré. It identifies obstacles to implementing the reparations awarded and calls for states and international organizations to support their realization for the sake of Habré’s victims, without whose efforts the tribunal might not exist. It argues that international(ized) criminal tribunals should more readily utilize fines and forfeiture as penalties to alleviate the pressure on trust funds to implement reparations awards, particularly in cases where convicted persons possess substantial assets. Lastly, in light of the requirement that assets susceptible to forfeiture orders be derived directly or indirectly from the crime(s) of which a person is found guilty, the article questions the failure of the prosecutor to charge Habré with the war crime of pillage, despite its availability in the tribunal's statute and the finding that the suffering of many of Habré’s victims entitled to individual compensation resulted from pillage.

Ukrainian law enforcement agencies are investigating more than 18,000 war crimes and crimes of aggression, including 18,177 violations of the laws and customs of war, more than 5,000 murders and 6,000 civilian injuries, and about 23,000 destructions of civilian infrastructure. We note these figures without considering the number of crimes committed in the occupied territories and the places of active hostilities. The number of crimes increases every day. War crimes are a type of international crime, along with the crime of aggression, crimes against humanity, and genocide, which russia[1] is committing in Ukraine. However, in the article’s title, the term ‘war crimes’ is used in a unifying context. The researchers outline the range of war crimes and note the lack of systematisation due to the non-ratification of the Rome Statute by Ukraine, which significantly complicates the qualification of crimes for practicing lawyers. The authors then analyse such mechanisms of bringing the military, officers, and officials of russia to justice as: а) the International Criminal Court (ICC), b) ad hoc tribunals, с) the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), d) national judicial systems on the principle of universal jurisdiction e) criminal proceedings of Ukraine, f) eclectic forms of cooperation of justice bodies of Ukraine with foreign and international partners, together with the chronology of the first steps for each. The rationality of the establishment of a special international ad hoc tribunal exists because of the duration of the proceedings in the IСС, the ІСС workload and lack of funding, and the non-extension of the ICC jurisdiction to the crime of aggression due to Ukraine’s non-ratification of the Rome Statute; ensuring the impartiality of the court in the eyes of the international community. The authors draw the attention of the Ukrainian legislator to the need to improve the logistics of using foreign forensic experts’ opinions in criminal proceedings on war crimes in Ukraine by amending the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) on the procedure for its verification as sources of evidence. The research methodology includes logical, historical, statistical, comparative law, and system-structural methods. The information base consisted of international legal acts, national legislation, official resources of authorities and international institutions, and other open data.

The subject. The article analyses the practice of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and its Judgement of 18 August 2020, rendered against those found guilty of a terrorist act and the impact on the progressive development of international criminal law.The purpose. This article seeks to define what goal the international community pursued in establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon from the perspective of international security law, international criminal justice, and counter-terrorism cooperation. The legal nature of the terrorist attack of 14 October 2005 is essential in this regard: is the crime is comparable in its gravity and consequences to the crimes of genocide or war crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, which predetermined the subsequent establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals? Further, was the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon an attempt to make the crimes of terrorism an international crime in practice? Finally, was the establishment of the Tribunal an attempt to lay the groundwork for a new type of international judicial bodies with jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism? The methodology. The authors use such general theoretical and specific scientific methods as comparative analysis, generalization, interpretation and classification as well as systemic analysis and formal logical methods.The main results. The legal qualification and analysis of the circumstances of the terrorist attack do not enable the conclusion that the bomb explosion in Beirut was comparable in danger and consequences to any international crimes or was a threat to international peace and security. In its turn, the involvement of the Security Council in the establishment of the Tribunal does not unequivocally evidence its alleged attempt to create a purely international criminal structure.The choice of applicable law granted to Lebanon and the fact that the crime committed solely affected the interests of that State would qualify the Tribunal as an internationalized judicial body, whose work would focus on defining the crime of terrorism through a broader lens of interpreting national legislation. In other words, the impetus for development has been given not to international but national criminal law.The Tribunal was created neither to progressively develop international criminal law with regard to defining terrorism as an international crime nor to advance the international criminal justice system. Rather, it was an attempt to address Lebanon’s specific political and legal challenges.Conclusions. The outcome of the Tribunal’s work could have a rather negative impact on the development of international criminal law, discrediting the very idea of enabling “peace through justice” and uniform, consistent application and interpretation of international criminal law.

This term paper seeks to analyse the use of rape as a war crime and its status in international law today almost ten years after the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It also looks at the role of the United Nations(UN) and the special responsibility of peace workers. The paper tries to sort out which challenges the international community still has to cope with. My thesis is that with the policy of the International Criminal Tribunals ICTY and ICTR2 and the new Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) important improvements concerning the real acknowledgement of rape as a war crime have evolved. But on the other side, I also want to argue, that to identify the strategic or systematic use of rape for political reasons as the sole or even major cause for the abuse of women during wartime is simplistic and risks to suppress that women during wartime very often are raped or sexually abused not only by “their ethnic, national or religious enemies”, but also by men of their “own side” or even by UN soldiers or aid workers whose original task is to help and protect them.

Abstract Historically, international criminal tribunals have not included a specific provision criminalizing the use of starvation within their respective statutes or founding legal documents. In light of this, and after clarifying what material/objective and mental/subjective elements characterize starvation, the present article seeks to explore whether it can be adjudicated as a crime against humanity or as an act of genocide and how this could be accomplished within the existing framework of international criminal law. In this respect, it is submitted that the general absence of an explicit reference to a crime of starvation in the statutes of international criminal tribunals is not a legal bar to the prosecution of the corresponding behaviour. Furthermore, this article briefly considers starvation as a war crime, particularly pursuant to Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute — which criminalizes starvation in international armed conflicts at the ICC — and the conspicuous absence of a corresponding and parallel provision that would criminalize starvation as a war crime in non-international armed conflicts.

An issue has recently arisen in international criminal law concerning the gravity of the offences listed in the Statutes of the International Tribunals: Should offences be ranked according to their seriousness and, hence, as entailing heavier or lighter punishment? Should the same act when charged as a crime against humanity or genocide be punished more severely than when charged as a war crime?

AbstractUnlike most other areas of international law which address only State responsibilities, the law of war assigns to individuals the responsibility to observe positive rules. The threat of being charged with a war crime, with all the attached opprobrium, is the chief means by which observance of the law of war is ensured. No one could rightly argue that war crimes prosecutions, even if they were always effectively prosecuted – and they are not – ensure perfect compliance with the law, but they are the best mechanism devised to date. Although war crimes trials has earlier antecedents, the prosecutions following World War II marked the beginning of the modern war crimes model.World War II prosecutions were notable for the scale of atrocities alleged in the various indictments. Once the crimes were defined, and the architecture put in place to establish the various tribunals, proof of wrongdoing was rarely in doubt. There were expected legal issues to be sure: claims ofex post factocrimes, immunities for acts of state, and the defense of superior orders, among many others; but in general prosecutors fully expected convictions across the board. And many convictions did result, though there were several exceptions that resulted in full or partial acquittals.

The article addresses the objective side (actus reus) of aiding and abetting in the context of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The main goal is to find out where the line lies between legally relevant involvement and involvement that should not entail liability. The study is based on the analysis of the case law of international criminal tribunals and the jurisprudence of national courts as well. It is an interdisciplinary study, as it aims to formulate conclusions that would be relevant in the context of both criminal and tort liability. It is emphasized that the objective side of aiding and abetting comprises act and causation, since aiding and abetting does not have its own consequence, but instead shares the same consequence which is imputed to the principal perpetrator. Aiding and abetting entails liability as long as the physical assistance or moral support provided has a substantial effect upon the commission of a crime. The substantial effect criterion has to be ascertained based on the study of all the circumstances of a particular case. When assessing the substantiality, it should be taken into account that the actions of an aider and abettor may be related to the crime through a physical or intentional causation. It is not required that the actions of the aider and abettor be a conditio sine qua non (necessary condition) of the principal perpetrator's crime. In the context of mass crimes, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity, it is the mixing of causal contributions that makes it impossible to identify in the circumstances of a particular single episode the traces of each causative factor that was substantial to the overall criminal activity. This should not exempt an aider and abettor from liability, provided that his causal contribution to the overall criminal activity was substantial.

Since 1945 responsibility for atrocity has been individualized, and international tribunals and courts have been given effective jurisdiction over it. This article argues that the move to individual responsibility leaves significant ‘excesses’ of responsibility for war crimes unaccounted for. When courts do attempt to recognize the collective nature of war crime perpetration, through the doctrines of ‘command responsibility’, ‘joint criminal enterprise’ and ‘state responsibility’, the application of these doctrines has, it is argued, limited or perverse effects. The article suggests that instead of expecting courts to allocate excesses of responsibility, other accountability mechanisms should be used alongside trials to allocate political (rather than legal) responsibility for atrocity. The mechanisms favored here are ‘Responsibility and Truth Commissions’, i.e. well-resourced non-judicial commissions which are mandated to hold to account individual and collective actors rather than simply to provide an account of past violence.

In international criminal law theory, a conceptual divide is made between international crimes stricto sensu (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, aggression) and transnational organised crime. This differentiation sustains the direct, respectively indirect enforcement mechanism: the so called ‘core crimes’ belong to the subject matter jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court, whereas national jurisdictions aim to counter transnational crimes, by concluding ‘suppression conventions’ and seeking international cooperation on the basis of the aut dedere, aut judicare principle. Nevertheless, the division is questioned for being too rigid and simplistic, as the boundaries between the categories are increasingly blurred. On the one hand, political rebel groups and organised crime often unite to challenge the power monopoly of the state, while corrupt governments and private business conspire to exploit the local population (by pillage, deportation from their lands or pollution of the environment). On the other hand, there is an ongoing debate, triggered by the ICC Kenya Decision of March 2010, whether the commission of crimes against humanity is the ‘privilege’ of states and state-like groups, or whether the category should be expanded to cover larger organisations that are capable of committing such atrocities. In other words, there is a proliferation of state and non-state actors that engage in both ‘classic’ international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity) and transnational crime. These developments have fuelled the plea for supranational law enforcement in respect of transnational (organised) crime, exceeding the realm of inter-state cooperation on a horizontal basis. This essay will pay a modest contribution to this discussion by arguing that the quest for more effective law enforcement is bedeviled by the perplexity of fitting new patterns of crime and new perpetrators of international crimes into the classic mould of international criminal law. These two aspects are obviously intimately related and should not be considered in isolation. Any initiative to invigorate international criminal law enforcement - by for instance establishing new (international or regional) courts or by expanding the subject matter jurisdiction of existing courts – should therefore pay attention to both the elements of crimes and the modes of criminal liability.

The article is devoted to the first measures of the Bolsheviks government aimed to combat crime and ensure the defense of the proletarian regime, the formation of the extraordinary judicial bodies, i.e., revolutionary tribunals, which marked the beginning of the establishment of the Soviet legal system. The relevance of the article is due to the need for an objective analysis of the historical experience of creating the system of revolutionary tribunals, and to the presence of "blank spots" in the historiography of the formation of the system of extraordinary bodies of the Middle Volga region during the Civil War. Comprehensive analysis of the formation of revolutionary tribunals on the territory of the Middle Volga region in 1917 – 1923 is based on the previously unknown materials from the State Archive of the Ulyanovsk region, the State Archive of Contemporary history of the Ulyanovsk region, the State Archive of the Saratov region, the State Archive of the Penza region and the Central State Archive of the Samara region. The authors examine the formation and legal status of extraordinary judicial bodies, as well as their permanent reorganization, and come to the conclusion that the process of formation of the system of revolutionary tribunals was implemented by local party structures. Under the conditions of socio-economic and political crisis, the revolutionary tribunals quickly turned into effective judicial bodies and functioned until the end of the Civil War, when they were reorganized into People's courts.

The relevance of the article is obvious because the terrible crimes committed by the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine shook not only Ukrainian society but also the whole world. Russian military personnel and their command commit large-scale and systematic attacks on the civilian population - brutal murders, torture, torture, rape, enslavement, extermination, deportations, imprisonment, the crime of apartheid and other illegal acts of a cruel nature directed against the people of Ukraine. The relevance of the study is also related to the fact that the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter - the Criminal Code of Ukraine) does not contain a definition of crimes against humanity, unlike other crimes such as military or war crimes. We will try to figure out how the actions of criminals will be qualified by Ukrainian courts and who will be held criminally responsible at the international level in the event that crimes against humanity are committed in Ukraine. «Crimes against humanity» as a separate group of crimes in international law was first reflected in the joint declaration of the governments of France, Great Britain and Russia on May 28, 1915 as a protest against the genocide committed by Turkey against the Armenian population. The result of the criminal events was the killing of more than a million people, prompting the international community to label this shameful act as a «crime against civilization and humanity» for which the leaders of the Turkish government should be held accountable. Crimes against humanity are crimes designed to destroy the very nature of man. These crimes are considered the most heinous crimes, because they mean deliberate mass killings either by the fact of the very existence of people (crimes against humanity) or by the fact of belonging to an ethnic or national group (genocide). In a number of international documents, such as: the Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, article 6c; Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Article 5c; Law No. 10, adopted by the Control Council of the Allied Powers in Germany in 1945, Article II, 1c; UN Convention of December 9, 1948 on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and its Punishment; Statutes of international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia, Art. 3-5 and Rwanda Art. 2-3; Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7, such international crimes as crimes against humanity are reflected, from this it follows that universal jurisdiction extends to crimes against humanity.

Purpose: The article examines the trial of French General Paul Aussaresses (b. 1918, d. 2013) in the 2000s for war crimes committed during the Algerian War (1954 to 1962). Approach/Methodology/Design: A historiographical analysis covering topics such as colonialism, public memory, collective memory, counter-narratives, education, forgetting, and authenticity. Findings: Public history without individual memories or lived experiences of communities that have survived historical events can be viewed as inauthentic. It might even be called propaganda to present only state state-sanctioned accounts of historical events. Many governments will consequently enact laws to distinguish between what constitutes official national narratives—and what remains peripheral, or perhaps extremist individual, historical accounts. Practical Implications: This paper contributes to the scholarly literature examining oral testimonials in political and war crime tribunals, and the ethics of conducting public history research using media archives. Originality/value: Towards a greater understanding of collective memory processes, the case of the Algerian War reveals the constant negotiations, formal networks, and informal channels used to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate sources of historical memory—and the consequences on culture, law, and society.

Several armed conflicts have marked the past two decades in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As a result, the DRC is facing an unprecedented humanitarian disaster with the death of hundreds of thousands of people, the large-scale displacement of civilians and the rape of thousands of women, girls and men. These armed conflicts have led to the metamorphosis of the concept of ‘crime’ with the emergence of new forms of sexual violence, particularly the widespread sexual violence used by armed groups as a tactic of war. In response to this avalanche of sexual violence, the DRC has taken a series of legislative measures. It began with the ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) on 11 April 2002. This was followed by the promulgation of the Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code on 18 November 2002 (MJC and MCC, respectively) criminalizing, inter alia, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In 2006, the Congolese legislator criminalized various forms of sexual crimes as defined by international law in the Military Penal Code. On 31 December 2015, the Congolese authorities promulgated Law No. 15/022, amending and supplementing the Military Penal Code, for the implementation of the Rome Statute. Through this Law, the legislator has included in the Congolese Ordinary Criminal Code rape and other sexual assaults constituting war crimes, and in some circumstances, crimes against humanity. In terms of prosecutions, around 40 cases of rape classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity have been tried by Congolese military courts, and a few other cases are being investigated. This article seeks to assess the progress made by the DRC in prosecuting rape as a war crime and the challenges to such prosecutions. La République démocratique du Congo (RDC) a été marquée par plusieurs conflits armés au cours des deux dernières décennies. Il en résulte que ce pays est confronté à une catastrophe humanitaire sans précédent avec la mort de centaines de milliers de personnes, le déplacement à grande échelle de civils et le viol de milliers de femmes, de filles et d'hommes. Ces conflits armés ont entraîné une métamorphose du concept de ‘crime’ avec l'émergence de nouvelles formes de violence sexuelle, notamment la violence sexuelle généralisée utilisée par les groupes armés comme tactique de guerre. En réponse à cette avalanche de violences sexuelles, la RDC a adopté une série de mesures législatives. La première fut la ratification du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale (Statut de Rome) le 11 avril 2002. Cette ratification fut suivie par la promulgation du Code judiciaire militaire et du Code pénal militaire le 18 novembre 2002 (respectivement le CMJ et le CCM) qui criminalisent, entre autres, les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l'humanité et le génocide. En 2006, le législateur congolais a incriminé dans le Code pénal militaire diverses formes de crimes sexuels tels que définis par le droit international. Le 31 décembre 2015, les autorités congolaises ont promulgué la loi no 15/022, modifiant et complétant le Code pénal militaire, pour la mise en œuvre du Statut de Rome. A travers cette loi, le législateur a inclus dans le Code pénal ordinaire congolais les viols et autres agressions sexuelles constitutifs de crimes de guerre, et dans certaines circonstances, de crimes contre l'humanité. En termes de poursuites, une quarantaine de cas de viols qualifiés de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre l'humanité ont été jugés par les tribunaux militaires congolais, et quelques autres cas sont en cours d'instruction. Cet article vise à évaluer les progrès réalisés par la RDC en matière de poursuites pénales pour viol en tant que crime de guerre et les défis auxquels ces poursuites sont confrontées. Verschillende gewapende conflicten hebben de afgelopen twee decennia hun stempel gedrukt op de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC). Als gevolg daarvan wordt de DRC geconfronteerd met een ongekende humanitaire ramp die gepaard gaat met de dood van honderdduizenden mensen, de grootschalige ontheemding van burgers en de verkrachting van duizenden vrouwen, meisjes en mannen. Die gewapende conflicten hebben geleid tot een metamorfose van het begrip ‘misdaad’ met de opkomst van nieuwe vormen van seksueel geweld, in het bijzonder het wijdverspreide seksuele geweld dat door gewapende groepen als oorlogstactiek wordt gebruikt. Als reactie op die lawine van seksueel geweld heeft de DRC een reeks wetgevende maatregelen genomen. Het begon met de ratificatie van het Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof (Statuut van Rome) op 11 april 2002, gevolgd door de afkondiging van het militair gerechtelijk wetboek en het militair strafwetboek op 18 november 2002. Daarin worden onder meer oorlogsmisdaden, misdaden tegen de mensheid en genocide strafbaar gesteld. In 2006 heeft de Congolese wetgever verschillende vormen van seksuele misdrijven, zoals omschreven in het internationaal recht, strafbaar gesteld in het militair strafwetboek. Op 31 december 2015 hebben de Congolese autoriteiten wet nr. 15/022 tot wijziging en aanvulling van het militair strafwetboek uitgevaardigd, met het oog op de uitvoering van het Statuut van Rome. Met die wet heeft de wetgever verkrachting en andere vormen van seksueel geweld die te beschouwen zijn als oorlogsmisdaden, en in sommige omstandigheden misdaden tegen de mensheid, in het gewone Congolese Wetboek van Strafrecht opgenomen. Wat vervolging betreft, zijn ongeveer 40 gevallen van verkrachting die als oorlogsmisdaden en misdaden tegen de mensheid werden aangemerkt, door de Congolese militaire rechtbanken berecht, en enkele andere gevallen worden momenteel onderzocht. Deze studie heeft tot doel na te gaan welke vooruitgang de DRC heeft geboekt bij de vervolging van verkrachting als oorlogsmisdaad en voor welke uitdagingen dergelijke vervolgingen staan. Varios conflictos armados han dejado huella en las dos décadas pasadas en la República Democrática del Congo (RDC). A resultas de ello, la RDC se está enfrentando a un desastre humanitario sin precedentes con la muerte de cientos de miles de personas, desplazamiento de civiles a gran escala y la violación de miles de mujeres, niñas y hombres. Estos conflictos armados han llevado a la metamorfosis del concepto de ‘crimen’ con la aparición de nuevas formas de violencia sexual, en particular el uso generalizado de la violencia sexual por grupos armados como táctica de guerra. En respuesta a esta avalancha de violencia sexual, la RDC ha adoptado una serie de medidas legislativas. Todo comenzó con la ratificación del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional (Estatuto de Roma) el 11 de abril de 2002. A esto siguió la promulgación del Código Judicial Militar y del Código Penal Militar el 18 de noviembre de 2002 (Código Judicial Militar y Código Penal Militar, respectivamente), penalizando, entre otros, los crímenes contra la humanidad y el genocidio. En 2006, el legislador congoleño introdujo en el Código Penal Militar varias modalidades de crimen sexual tal y como se definen en el Derecho Internacional. El 31 de diciembre de 2015, la autoridades congoleñas promulgaron la Ley Núm. 15/022, reformando y complementando el Código Penal Militar, con objeto de implementar el Estatuto de Roma. A través de esta ley, el legislador ha tipificado en el Código Penal Común la violación y otros ataques sexuales que constituyen crímenes de guerra y, en algunas circunstancias, crímenes contra la humanidad. En términos de procedimientos instruidos, cerca de 40 casos de violación tipificada como crímenes de guerra y crímenes contra la humanidad han sido tramitados por los tribunales militares congoleños, y varios casos más continúan siendo objeto de investigación. Este estudio busca valorar el progreso de la RDC en la persecución de la violación como crimen de guerra y los retos a los que se ha tenido que hacer frente en dicha tarea. Gli ultimi due decenni della Repubblica Democratica del Congo (RDC) sono stati segnati da diversi conflitti armati. Di conseguenza, la RDC sta affrontando un disastro umanitario senza precedenti con la morte di centinaia di migliaia di persone, lo sfollamento di civili su larga scala e lo stupro di migliaia di donne, ragazze e uomini. Questi conflitti armati hanno portato alla metamorfosi del concetto di ‘crimine’ con l'emergere di nuove forme di violenza sessuale, in particolare la diffusa violenza sessuale usata dai gruppi armati come tattica di guerra. In risposta a questa valanga di violenza sessuale, la RDC ha adottato una serie di misure legislative. È iniziato tutto con la ratifica dello Statuto della Corte penale internazionale (Statuto di Roma) l'11 aprile 2002. A ciò è seguita la promulgazione del Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code il 18 novembre 2002 (rispet­tivamente Codice giudiziario militare e Codice penale militare), che hanno criminalizzato, tra l'altro, crimini di guerra, crimini contro l'umanità e genocidio. Nel 2006, il legislatore congolese ha definito come crimini varie forme di reati sessuali così come definito dal diritto internazionale nel Codice Penale Militare. Il 31 dicembre 2015 le autorità congolesi hanno promulgato la Legge n. 15/022, che modifica e integra il Codice Penale Militare, per l'attuazione dello Statuto di Roma. Attraverso questa legge, il legislatore ha incluso nel Codice penale Ordinario congolese lo stupro e altre aggressioni sessuali definiti crimini di guerra e, in alcune circostanze, crimini contro l'umanità. In termini di procedimenti penali, circa 40 casi di stupro classificati come crimini di guerra e crimini contro l'umanità sono stati processati dai tribunali militari congolesi e alcuni altri casi sono oggetto di indagine. Questo studio cerca di valutare i progressi compiuti dalla RDC nel perseguire lo stupro come crimine di guerra e l’impegno in tali procedimenti penali. Mehrere bewaffnete Konflikte haben die vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnte in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo (DRK) geprägt. Als Folge dessen steht die DRK vor einer beispiellosen humanitären Katastrophe mit dem Tod von Hunderttausenden von Menschen, der massiven Vertreibung von Zivilisten und der Vergewaltigung von Tausenden von Frauen, Mädchen und Männern. Diese bewaffneten Konflikte haben zu einer Metamorphose des Begriffs ‘Verbrechen’ mit dem Aufkommen neuer Formen sexueller Gewalt geführt, insbesondere der weit verbreiteten sexuellen Gewalt, die von bewaffneten Gruppen als Kriegstaktik eingesetzt wird. Als Reaktion auf diese Lawine sexueller Gewalt hat die DRK eine Reihe von gesetzlichen Maßnahmen ergriffen. Es begann mit der Ratifizierung des Statuts des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs (Römisches Statut) am 11 April 2002. Es folgte die Verkündung des Militärgerichtsgesetzbuchs und des Militärstrafgesetzbuchs am 18. November 2002, die unter anderem Kriegsverbrechen, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und Völkermord unter Strafe stellen. Im Jahr 2006 hat der kongolesische Gesetzgeber im Militärstrafgesetzbuch verschiedene Formen von Sexualverbrechen im Sinne des Völkerrechts unter Strafe gestellt. Am 31. Dezember 2015 haben die kongolesischen Behörden das Gesetz Nr. 15/022 zur Änderung und Ergänzung des Militärstrafgesetzbuchs im Hinblick auf die Umsetzung des Römischen Statuts verkündet. Mit diesem Gesetz hat der Gesetzgeber Vergewaltigung und andere sexuelle Übergriffe, die Kriegsverbrechen und unter gewissen Umständen auch Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit darstellen, in das kongolesische ordentliche Strafgesetzbuch aufgenommen. Was die Strafverfolgung anbelangt, so wurden etwa 40 Fälle von Vergewaltigung, die als Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit eingestuft werden, von kongolesischen Militär­gerichten abgeurteilt, und einige weitere Fälle werden derzeit untersucht. Diese Studie versucht, die Fortschritte der DRK bei der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung von Vergewaltigung als Kriegsverbrechen und die Herausforderungen für solche Verfolgungen zu bewerten.

The rape of women has for centuries been an endemic feature of war, yet perpetrators largely go unpunished. Women were sanctioned as the spoils of war in biblical times and more recently it has been claimed that it is more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in modern conflict. Nevertheless, until the establishment of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia – there was very little concern regarding the need to address the rape of women in conflict.This paper briefly maps historical attitudes towards rape in war, outlines some analyses and explanations of why rape in war occurs and finally turns more substantively to recent efforts by the international community to prosecute rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity. We argue, that while commendable in some ways, contemporary approaches to rape in war risk reinforcing aspects of women’s status which contribute to the targeting of women for rape and continue to displace women from the centre to the margins in debates and practices surrounding rape in both war and peace time. We conclude by arguing that criminal prosecutions alone are insufficient and that, if we are to end the rape of women and girls in war (and peace) we need a radical restructuring of gender relations across every sphere of social and political life.

The article discusses some aspects of the legal defense of the defendants of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial and Punishment of the Main War Criminals of the European Axis Countries and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. A comparative analysis of the provisions of the Statutes of international Tribunals concerning the rights of the accused to defense is given. The rights of the defendants are considered in detail, including the right to defend themselves personally, the right to choose a lawyer, and the right to provide evidence. The article is carried out within the framework of the study of the history of international criminal justice and the history of the formation of international criminal law. The analysis of some modern problems in the field of ensuring the rights of defendants to defense in the activities of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as their origins found in the activities of the ICTY, is carried out. Using the methods of comparative jurisprudence, the analysis of the norms of law established in the statutes of the Tribunals was carried out. The dogmatic method is applied in the interpretation of the norms of law set forth in the statutes. The dogmatic method is applied in the interpretation of the norms of law set forth in the statutes. The author concludes that some modern problems of international criminal justice originate in post-war tribunals. Thus, violations of the rights of the accused by the ICTY had their historical roots in the form of norms laid down in the Statute of the Tokyo Tribunal. A proposal was made on the need to develop basic rules for granting the right of protection to defendants, based on the experience of international criminal trials. It is also concluded that it is necessary to exclude the possibility of pressure from international courts, judges and prosecutors themselves on defenders. For this purpose, it is proposed to provide for the impossibility for judges to arbitrarily ban unwanted lawyers from participating in the process. It is also proposed to introduce a direct ban on the appointment of a lawyer to the defendant against his will and to provide for the possibility of recusal of a lawyer only in the case of a proven crime against the administration of international justice.

This article considers whether the Franco regime pursued a genocidal policy against Republicans after the formal ending of hostilities on 1 April 1939. In post-war Spain, the primary mechanism for punishing Republicans was military tribunals. Francoist military justice was based on the assumption that responsibility for the civil war lay with the Republic: defendants were tried for the crime of ‘military rebellion’. This was, as Ramón Serrano Suñer admitted his memoirs, ‘turning justice on its head’. But although it was extremely harsh, post-war military justice was never exterminatory. The article stresses that the institutionalisation of military justice from 1937, following the arbitrary murders of 1936, contributed to a relative decline in executions. Although the regime's determination to punish Republicans for ‘military rebellion’ inevitably led to the initiation of tens of thousands of post-war military investigations, only a minority of cases ended in execution. This was especially the case from January 1940, when the higher military authorities ended the autonomy of military tribunals over sentencing. This reassertion of central control in January 1940 was part of a wider policy to ease the self-inflicted problem of prison overcrowding; successive parole decrees led to a substantial and permanent decrease in the number of inmates by 1945. Allied victory in the Second World War did not mark the beginning but the end of the process of bringing to a close mass military justice.

Children enjoy special protection from the harms of armed conflict under international humanitarian law. While the protection of children in armed conflict has been widely researched with regard to recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, the research on protection of children from sexual violence has received less attention. In this paper I look at the protection of children in relation to sexual violence under international humanitarian law and its actualisation in the practise of international criminal courts and tribunals. I consider first how the protection of children from sexual violence under international humanitarian law made its way to Conventions. Second, I explore the case law of sexual violence as a war crime in international courts and tribunals and how the special protection of children is reflected in the case law. I argue that despite a gradual improvement, the provisions of the Conventions have not been recognised particularly well. While there have been cases in which more attention has been paid to sexual violence against children, the practice is mostly incoherent and sporadic: there exists a discrepancy between the Conventions, and the practice of international criminal courts and tribunals.

The recent decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman not only addresses the status of child recruitment as a war crime, but also provides an insight into how international criminal tribunals determine what conduct is criminal in international law. However, the authority of the decision is weakened by the unconvincing evidence relied upon by the Appeal Chamber in coming to its conclusions and by a strong dissent from Justice Robertson. The decision's faults, however, merely reflect problems in the process whereby violations of international humanitarian law are criminalized.

The qualification of military and war crimes in the legislation of the Tsardom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the RSFSR and modern Russia is considered. A conclusion about the primacy of military expediency over considerations of universal morality and humanism is made. Thus, the legislation of the Tsardom of Muscovy foresaw the possibility of turning the so-called boyar children (the younger layer of the boyars), suspended by the tsar from service, into kholops (serfs). The military legislation of Peter I does not distinguish between the suicide of a soldier and treason. The military reform of Alexander II, carried out by Minister Milyutin, somewhat liberalized military legislation and created a clear system of military courts. The refusal of the Provisional Government to use the death penalty disorganized the Russian army, and this was considered by the Bolsheviks while creating the Red Guards and the Red Army. During the civil war, the Bolshevik headship even used decimation regarding the Red Army men. After the end of hostilities, military crimes (Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1922) were generally punished more mildly, but the tightening of the screws in the direction of repression’s increase began almost immediately. These processes reached their apogee during the Second World War when the widest range of cases was handed over to military tribunals. In the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1960, the number of military crimes doubled, and the sanction became as severe as possible (up to the death penalty). The concept of a war crime is first mentioned in Article 67.1. The use of biological weapons, but it was introduced into the Code by the Law of the Russian Federation, dated 29.04.1993. The criminal code of the modern Russian Federation includes both military and war crimes, the sanctions are severe, but thesein no way restrain the Russian army, Rosgvardiya (National Guard of Russia), and paramilitary formations during a full-scale war against Ukraine. The world has witnessed numerous crimes against the civilian population, prisoners of war, and the environment (the blowing up of the Kakhovka HPP).

Straipsnyje analizuojamos Irako specialiojo tribu­nolo, įkurto 2003 m. gruodžio 10 d., statuto nuos­tatos, materialiniai ir procesiniai Tribunolo veiklos aspektai. Nurodoma, kad Statutu įdiegtas stebėtojų ir patarėjų tarptautinės teisės klausimais institutas – keliamas jų veiklos teisinio apibrėžtumo klausimas; apibūdinama Tribunolo jurisdikcija: nuo 1968 m. lie­pos 17 d. iki 2003 m. gegužės 1 d. padarytiems nusi­kaltimams, numatytiems Statuto 11–14 straipsniuo­se, už kuriuos gali būti traukiami tik Irako piliečiai ir nuolatiniai Irako gyventojai, nusikaltimus padarę Irake ir už jo ribų teisti. Nurodoma, kad nėra regla­mentuota asmenų, Tribunolo trauktinų baudžiamo­jon atsakomybėn, amžiaus riba; juridiniai asmenys (pvz., Baath partija) nėra teisiami. Taip pat, lyginant su Tarptautinio karinio tribunolo nuostatomis, Irako specialusis tribunolas negali paskelbti nė vienos gru­pės ar organizacijos kriminaline.Straipsnyje taip pat analizuojami nusikaltimai, už kuriuos gali teisti Irako specialusis tribunolas, lyginamas kitų ad hoc tribunolų veiklos teisinis re­glamentavimas. Autorė, be to, palyginusi Irako speci­aliojo tribunolo statuto ir Romos statuto bei 1949 m. Ženevos konvencijos papildomo protokolo nuostatas, daro išvadą, kad baudimas už kai kuriuos Irako spe­cialiojo tribunolo statute numatytus nusikaltimus būtų nesuderinamas su nullum crimen sine lege, nes tai nėra universaliai tarptautiniu lygiu pripažįstami nusikaltimai; terorizmo nusikaltimo Statute taip pat nenumatyta – tai būtų Irako nacionalinių teismų ju­risdikcijos klausimas.Taip pat teigiama, kad Statuto 11c) punktas turėtų būti traktuojamas kaip novela, nes numato agresiją kaip nusikalstamą veiką.Straipsnyje analizuojamos kaltinamųjų, liudytojų, nukentėjusiųjų teisės procese; pabrėžiama, kad Irako specialiojo tribunolo statute nenumatyta žalos atlygi­nimo instituto, kompensacijos už neteisėtą areštą ar sulaikymą; skiriama dėmesio reguliuojant procesą in absentia, Tribunolo sprendimo peržiūrai.The Iraqi Special Tribunal was established directly by the Iraqi Governing Council on December 10, 2003. The Tribunal has been mandated to try the accused for crimes under international law (genocide, crime against humanity and war crimes) and some violations of Stipulated Iraqi Laws.This article contains an analysis of the provisions of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal with regard to its material and procedural aspects. The Statute of this Tribunal was created taking for the pattern the Statute of International Criminal Court. However, the opinions of the Iraqis were also taken into account; the Iraqis wanted to have the solely power to exercise jurisdiction of this Tribunal.

The fight against impunity for war crimes is one of the basic principles of international law. The criminal prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes stems from international obligations that states have for the purpose of establishing facts and truth as the basis for establishing the rule of law. The right to the truth as a basic guarantee against repetition, the obligation to prosecute serious crimes under international law and the right to a fair trial, the right to effective legal remedies and reparations, and the obligation to remember and memorialize, are obligations prescribed to states by numerous international legal instruments. A fundamental contribution to the fight against impunity for crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the armed conflicts of the nineties of the twentieth century was made by the International Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. His legal legacy is significant both in the field of determining responsibility for crimes and in the development of international law. With the strategy for ending the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the obligation to process war crimes was placed under the jurisdiction of the national courts of the countries in the region. The judicial authorities in the region, with the support of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Courts, the successor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, took on the responsibility of prosecuting war crimes committed during the armed conflicts of the 1990s in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and for this purpose specialized departments were established courts and prosecutor's offices for processing war crimes. However, numerous suspects of high or middle military and civilian chain of command who participated in crimes, most of which were committed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and for which their superiors were convicted before the Hague Tribunal, have not yet been prosecuted, that is, the sentences have been carried out. The national courts in the region, which have the obligation to ensure the implementation of the international principle of the fight against impunity and to continue the work of the international judiciary, have proven to be ineffective in that area, if not in the service of realpolitik. Numerous high-ranking war crime suspects avoid criminal responsibility by fleeing to neighboring countries where they have or have acquired dual citizenship. By abusing the institution of extradition, impunity has been granted to those suspected of serious violations of international law. In addition, by unfoundedly applying the institute of universal jurisdiction in the prosecution of war crimes, national courts not only ignore the jurisprudence of international courts, but also contribute to the revisionism of established facts. The lack of regional cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes, despite numerous agreements signed for this purpose, the non-recognition of judgments of the courts of neighboring states in the region, are problems that continue to prevent the acceptance of facts and truth as the basis of a guarantee of non-repetition. Moreover, the facts established in the judgments before the international judiciary are the subject of institutional denial and revisionism in the territories of the states of the former Yugoslavia that participated in armed conflicts in the 90s. Negationism and revisionism, deeply institutionally rooted in the post-war societies of the former Yugoslavia, their toleration and approval, as well as the ineffective work of the national judiciary, led to the phenomenon of glorification of crimes and war criminals in the region. Through the reports of relevant international and national institutions and examples from court practice, this work aims to point out the obligations and key shortcomings in the work of national courts in the region of the former Yugoslavia and the problems of regional cooperation in the prosecution of war crimes.

Rape during conflict is often over-simplified and sensationalised in the accounts of international humanitarian agencies. This article suggests that such narratives on rape are connected to the way international tribunals and courts have narrowly framed the crime of rape. Limited legal constructions of rape reinforce a hierarchy where rape is seen as more worthy of protection than other forms of gender-based violence – a hierarchy that international humanitarian agencies perpetuate through their narratives on rape during conflict. Based on ethnographic accounts from Syrian women and men, this article draws attention to the problematic consequences of focusing on sensational narratives. It aims to reposition rape – and gender-based violence more broadly – within unequal power structures and a wider system of women’s subordination. It argues that while less incendiary, other kinds of gender-based violence during conflict may be just as insidious as rape.

Abstract. The article is devoted to the search for the way to justice restoration in counteraction to the crime of aggression. In this context, international approaches to the definition of the crime of aggression in Ukraine, the crime of aggression in the Ukrainian legislation on criminal responsibility and the prosecution of crimes of aggression under national jurisdiction through case law study were investigated. This approach made it possible to consider the crime of aggression through the prism of international legal acts adopted by the League of Nations, the UN, the activities of international courts and tribunals, which contributed to the condemnation of the crime of aggression. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court became an important international legal act in condemning the crime of aggression. It was paid attention to the long-term Russian aggression against Ukraine with the correlation among the activities of international organizations, the international definition of the crime of aggression, the current national legislation and the activities of criminal justice bodies in Ukraine. At the same time, the methods of analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, formal-legal, comparative-legal, historical-legal and other methods were applied, which in their combination made it possible to carry out a comprehensive study. The scientific novelty of the work consists in substantiating the possibility of bringing to criminal responsibility for certain manifestations of the crime of aggression not only in international institutions, but also in Ukraine. In addition, an important result of the study was the conclusion regarding the possibility of criminal liability within the jurisdiction of Ukraine not only of political leaders, but also of persons who played a special role in planning, preparing, unleashing or waging an aggressive war. At the same time, it is a prerogative to condemn political leaders within the limits of international jurisdiction. Study of Ukrainian judicial practice regarding registered criminal offenses under Art. 437 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine indicates that its development continues. In 2015–2017, five verdicts were found for six criminals who were not political leaders. In the future, certain limits of the application of Art. 437 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Coordination of the efforts of international and national criminal justice bodies regarding the prosecution of Russian political leaders for committing the crime of aggression also remains a promising direction.

The article examines how the concept of genocide has evolved at the international and national legal levels, beginning with its origins at the doctrinal level and culminating in international conventions and national regulatory acts. Challenges regarding the definition of genocide and ambiguous interpretation of genocide in relation to crimes against humanity were identified. It is demonstrated that international justice bodies interpret the concept of genocide differently. The study concluded that humanity did not fully utilize the potential of the United Nations and International Criminal Tribunals in order to develop a joint measured approach to assessing historical events, specifically World War II and the genocide in 1939–1945, in the context of actualizing history and triggering memory wars. The positions of states to consolidate the crime of genocide in criminal legislation are considered: compliance with the definition of genocide in international conventions, extension of the list of groups against whose members the genocide can be committed, leaving the list open as to which groups can be included. The preferences of the second option are shown. Examples of states turning to the facts of genocide committed in the past are given (for instance, Armenia towards Turkey, Namibia towards Germany, Poland towards Germany and Russia, Russia towards Germany and its allies during World War II), and it has been suggested that the material responsibility of states cannot be applied to events before 1945, since the desire to avoid it leads to non-recognition of political international-legal responsibility.

AbstractLegislating for international courts and tribunals is a delicate and complex process, which sometimes results in unintended consequences. Arguably, the inclusion of a special intent requirement, also known as dolus specialis, concerning “private or personal use” in the definition of pillage under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is one such consequence. But this is not the only reason why the war crime of pillage deserves special attention. On closer examination, other questions arise concerning its interpretation and application. What is the meaning of “military necessity” and “necessity” in relation to pillage, and how do they correlate with the special intent requirement? To answer these questions, the article examines the drafting history, law and current practice relating to the crime's ambiguous new element. It then proposes several avenues to address the recurring uncertainty regarding its meaning: conservative, radical and pragmatic.

AbstractThis article investigates the violent aftermaths of Rwanda's 1994 Genocide and Liberation war by analyzing its Gacaca Courts, which framed themselves as a “traditional” mechanism of transitional justice. These specialized genocide tribunals, in operation between 2002 and 2012, authorized laypersons to sentence their neighbors to up to life in prison. They passed judgment on almost two million cases, at an official conviction rate of 86 percent. I argue that through their practice, “genocide” came to be constituted as a crime whose contours extended far beyond the boundaries of any international legal definition. It included a wide range of acts, utterances, and inner states, as potentially infinite manifestations of a boundless criminal interiority named “genocide ideology,” the necessary ‘driving force’ behind acts of genocide. Within Gacaca, genocide ideology was constituted as the continuing destructive potential of Hutu to menace or even disrespect innocent Tutsi, who were constituted as metonymic of the “new” state. The paranoid hermeneutics of those trials led them to project such an interiority within ‘others,’ imagined as constantly on the verge of erupting into insurrectionary violence, threatening the state's very foundation. The figure of the “Hutu” was transformed into a negative political category operating as a spectral threat haunting the New Rwanda. Gacaca led to a realization throughout the vast population that it marked as “Hutu” that the crime of genocide could potentially inhabit any and perhaps even all of them, thereby producing a generalized fear and pervasive silence.

In 1941—1945. The inviolability of the Far Eastern borders with limited human resources, a poorly developed system of communication links and a lack of financial resources was maintained using the country's socio-political and military-economic capabilities. The demographic situation determined the mobilization capabilities of the region, the imbalance between the number of urban and rural residents, the personnel potential of military-industrial and civilian enterprises has increased, the problem of labor resources has become aggravated. The deployment of a military contingent in the Far East was, on the one hand, an incentive for the development of life-supporting industries, and on the other, an additional burden for limited regional resources. The introduction of a rationed supply of food and basic necessities to the population guaranteed a minimum of material benefits for the majority of the population. In the most difficult conditions, it was possible to preserve the social infrastructure at a level that ensures the reproduction of the labor force. The movement “Everything for the front, everything for the victory!” became a symbol of Soviet patriotism, citizenship and sacrifice. The war of the Soviet Union against Japan received the support of the world community. The Tokyo and Khabarovsk military tribunals established that the main Japanese criminals violated international law, treaties and agreements, unleashing aggressive wars against other countries, and committed a grave crime against humanity. The signed international agreements provided not only for the defeat of fascist Germany, Italy, militarist Japan and their allies, but also for the preservation of peace and the settlement of contradictions. The commonality of goals, the just nature of the war helped the Soviet people endure an incredibly difficult and prolonged test and win the Great Patriotic War, and bring the end of World War II closer.

Dr. Kauffman, friends. I am delighted to be back on my old stamping grounds at Yale Law School, which I attended some half-century ago in an era when World War II had been successfully completed and terrorism had not yet been defined as a global threat. The Nuremberg Tribunal was ongoing during part of my time at law school but I'm ashamed to say few of us paid much attention to it. We did not foresee any need to learn its lessons in our “brave new world.” But as we are so often reminded, those who do not heed the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them, and evil has reappeared in new guises over the past 50 years, requiring new responses on an international level. So fast forwarding to the present, I have recently returned from two years service as a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the Hague; this was after twenty years as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Yugoslav Tribunal has been in existence for more than 9 years and I believe its history and accomplishments are a worthy subject for scrutiny, especially in light of the new International Criminal Court just getting off the ground. I am therefore pleased to share some observations on the Tribunal's successes and problems, and to offer some modest recommendations to future tribunals.

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 constitutes a landmark in the development of International Criminal Law (ICL), which gained its first momentum after World War II through the foundation of International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. ICL is, however, not confined to these most prominent courts or their statutes providing for definitions of international crimes under their respective jurisdiction; rather, ad hoc international, or internationalized and hybrid special tribunals and criminal chambers also contribute to the development and shape of ICL and reflect its diverse legal and institutional basis. Perceived as another tribunal of “international character,” on August 18, 2020, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) pronounced its judgment on the merits in the Ayyash case. The long-awaited verdict raises the question of the Tribunal's contribution to the further evolution of ICL.

The International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh that has been found by the Bangladeshi Government to try war crimes during India Pakistan war of 1971. The tribunal is violating the fair trial rights as guaranteed by Constitution, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Humanitarian Law and the standard of the International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh is far below than that setup by The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. These irregularities imply serious concern over the proceedings of the said tribunal. Study seeks to describe the International Law about war crimes particularly with respect to fair trial provisions and it compare the proceedings of the Bangladeshi tribunal with the other internationally recognized tribunals.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 to prosecute war crimes committed during the Yugoslav conflict; the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in 1994 to prosecute war crimes committed during the Rwandan civil war. The Yugoslav Tribunal has the competence to try alleged offenders for crimes enumerated in Articles 2-5 of its Statute, namely, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Similarly, the Rwandan Statute accords the Tribunal authority to try defendants for crimes enunciated in Articles 2-4, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. Article 7, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the ICTR Statute grant jurisdiction to these ad hoc Tribunals to try the accused for individual criminal responsibility on the bases of individual culpability and superior authority.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are the first, post Cold War international criminal tribunals convicting perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Their sentencing practice has been largely criticized as inconsistent. This quantitative study addresses the criticism and empirically investigates the consistency of international sentencing. The extent to which the selected factors predict sentence length is tested in a multiple regression analysis. The analysis suggests that similar, legally relevant patterns have emerged in the sentencing practice of both tribunals. Sentencing in international criminal practice does not appear to be less consistent than sentencing under domestic jurisdictions.

From 1990s, a rising number of international and hybrid criminal tribunals and since 2002, the International Criminal Court have conducted various investigations on international crimes including crime against humanity, genocide and war crimes in various countries worldwide. These judicial organs have repeatedly relied upon witness’s testimonies, information and assistance from a wide variety of sources including governments, journalists, peacekeepers, human rights researchers and intelligence specialists and few forensic scientists, wherein some of these information and reports were driven by politics. Even though such information were very benefitting “there have also been many mishaps, misunderstandings in terms of differentiating information and evidence and missed opportunities in view of finding out the truth in way that information that could potentially have been of great use to criminal cases was lost or was collected or preserved in a manner that made it unusable at trial.” In today’s era, where there is a remarkable technological development in forensic science, it is time to use forensic methods in investigation of international crimes since a number of scientific and technological advances have improved the ability to document large-scale crimes with efficiency and precision. Yet, only in recent years have international criminal courts and other fact-finding institutions begun to embrace these innovations. There is a need of forensic science in investigating and prosecuting offenders of atrocities than traditional use of testimonies which are not easy to be relied on but still some legal and administrative issues still hinder the successful use of forensic evidences in investigating and prosecuting in international criminal proceedings. The present research focused on the practical use of forensic evidences like; pathology and DNA in exhumation of mass grave for determination of cause, manner and mechanism of death but to locate, excavate and exhume mass graves to produce forensic evidences of atrocities and to returning victims to loved ones and also discussed as tools for justice, humanitarian and documentation.The research also revealed the problems which are not only limited to the legal challenges of insufficiency of forensic evidence admissibility regulations and their maintenance of chain of custody, but also there are administrative issues like, lack of fund to be used during forensic investigation activities including, crime scene examination, collection of evidence and laboratory International Journal of Forensic Sciences 2 Thierry MB and Fred K. The Use of Forensic Evidences in Investigations and Prosecution in International Criminal Proceedings. Case Study of International Criminal Court (ICC). Int J Forens Sci 2024, 9(2): 000380. Copyright© Thierry MB and Fred K. examination of forensic evidence and all these can lead to unnecessary complications and prolongation criminal proceedings in international criminal court hence breach of fair trial principle. Finally, the research proposed reforms by establishing specific regulations related to the admissibility of forensic evidences in international criminal proceedings and chain of custody of forensic evidences as well as harmonizing the standard operating procedure of forensic investigation to regulate scientific investigation activities including, Crime Scene Management, Evidence Collection, Examination of forensic evidences and forensic expert report writing in investigation and prosecution of international criminal proceeding and also detailed mandate to solve administrative issues.

The aim of this paper is to examine the trial process and standard of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) in Bangladesh. The main aim of the paper is to explore whether the trial is about justice or politics. Two International Crimes Tribunals (ICTs) have been established following the amended ICT Act 2009 after 40 years of independence. To date, more than 30 verdicts have been delivered by the tribunals and most of the accused have been proved to be war criminals, as collaborators with the Pakistani army, and involved in the politics of Jamaat who have penalized for capital punishment. Jammat is name of a political party in Bangladesh. Although the tribunal is named ‘the International Crimes Tribunal’, no international judges or prosecutors – like those who have taken part in the tribunals of Nuremberg, Tokyo, Rwanda, Yugoslavia or the permanent International Criminal Court of The Hague – have been involved in this trial process. The Pakistani military who were involved and accused as war criminals have also been excluded from prosecution. Therefore, a lot of criticisms have made about the trial process and standard; however, some unique features can be found, such as an appeal to the Supreme Court and a mercy petition to the President. It has also been proved that politics are involved in the war crimes and even the trial process, which is not influenced solely by the abstract notions of justice. The paper takes the form of a descriptive case study and is based on mainly secondary sources of information.

It is a popular view that international war crimes tribunals are a tool for social transformation and reconciliation after conflicts. According to advocates, one of their strengths in this regard is the individual punishment of criminals, which is said to achieve justice for victims while avoiding the collectivization of guilt. This is also said to have the effect of endorsing the transformation of the nation by freeing it from the burden of collective guilt while detaching those responsible for war crimes from the society concerned and eliminating their political influence. Does individual criminal punishment achieve these? And is the de-collectivization of guilt through international trials desirable for post-conflict social transformation and reconciliation? This article addresses these questions by focusing on the impact of the Tokyo International Military Tribunal, which is analyzed through the ways in which it has been perceived in post-war Japan. It argues that the Tribunal's punishment of wartime leaders produced an ambiguous effect on the Japanese people's sense of war guilt and responsibility, which in turn became an obstacle for the nation to achieve reconciliation not only with its former victims but also with its own past. The article questions the assumption that international criminal justice can promote social transformation and reconciliation.

INTRODUCTION. The article examines various aspects of the international legal qualification of offences committed against internationally protected persons. The analysis of different elements of corpus delicti was laid at the heart of the study: namely, those of actus reus (whether the offence was perpetrate in the situation of an armed conflict), mens rea (whether the perpetrator was moved by a special intent, particularly the terrorist dolus specialis), and the legal status of a perpetrator (whether he or she was a state agent).MATERIALS AND METHODS. The materials of the study encompass international conventions, rules and principles of customary international law, case law of international courts and tribunals and international legal doctrine. The paper uses the comparative method and those of analysis and synthesis. RESEARCH RESULTS. The key result of the study consists in the assumption that offences against internationally protected persons can be considered as either a conventional crime within the meaning of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (including, if a terrorist dolus specialis is established, as a crime of terrorism), or (in case of armed conflict) a violation of laws and customs of war, for this category of persons falls within the definition of protected persons by implication of Article 4 of the 1949 IV Geneva Convention, which gives grounds for the application of Article 146 of the 1949 IV Geneva Convention for purposes of the their criminal prosecution.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. Given the result of the study, it is states that the following test can be applied for purposes of international legal qualification of offences against internationally protected persons: first, it is necessary to establish whether the offence of committed in a situation of armed conflict; second, it is highly important to enquire about the intent of the delinquent. If there is a terrorist dolus specialis, the offence can be qualified as terrorism-related. Moreover, it is necessary to establish the status of the delinquent and whether the one is a state agent or a private person, or, even if the person is a state agent, whether the one is a person acting sua sponte; additionally, the status of a delinquent and its relation with the belligerent state in regard to the situation of armed conflict is also significant for the qualification of respective offences in light of international law

AbstractInternational criminal tribunals try defendants for horrific acts: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. At sentencing, however, evidence often arises of what I will call defendants’ ‘good deeds’ – humanitarian behaviour by the defendants towards those on the other side of the conflict that is conscientious relative to the culture in which the defendants are operating. This article examines the treatment of good deeds in the sentencing practices of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. I show that the tribunals’ approaches are both undertheorized and internally inconsistent. I argue that the tribunals should draw upon the goals that underlie international criminal law in developing a coherent approach to considering good deeds for sentencing purposes.