Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'W. V. Quine'

This dissertation explores the works of W. V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It provides a detailed and comprehensive discussion of their distinct conceptions of philosophy. It shows how Quine is involved in a scientific philosophy aimed at the discovery of truth and explanation. It also demonstrates how Wittgenstein's critical approach attempts to dissolve philosophical problems and theories. The main purpose of this work is to explain how a proper understanding of each philosopher's framework of study, is crucial to the understanding and criticism of their respective philosophical ideas. The only way to properly refute Quine's theories is to evaluate them in a scientific framework. Any other interpretation could change his intention and weaken his arguments. Similarly, the only way to refute Wittgenstein's claims is to interpret them in everyday language. However, this is not to say that either view can be refuted. It is simply to point out that any attempt to oppose Wittgenstein's claims from a scientific viewpoint, or Quine's from a non-scientific perspective, will be flawed since it is contrary to the way in which each view was conceived.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
To present dissertation it is the result of an investigation on the conception behaviorist of the language of Quine, tends as pretension your exposition and defense, alleging your permanence in elapsing of all the quinean works. The importance of this work is due to the fact that many critics were made Quine with regard to your linguistic perspective. Among the critics, what promotes contusing objections, it is Noam Chomsky. This alleges that Quine suffers from inconsistency and incoherence when proposing your language conception, and he still affirms that Quine abandons the behaviorism in your last works in favor of a mentalism. To accomplish the defense of Quine front to the accusations of Chomsky it was had as reference Roger Gibson, which elaborated a defense of the position of Quine, that however it was not very clear. This way, in this dissertation it is made an analysis not only of the critics of Chomsky, but also of the defense of Gibson in the search of offering a better explanation of the conception of Quine. It is sustained that the program behaviorist quinean is presented mainly in Word and Object, published in 1960, but it stays until your last publications. In these some are observed explanations and amplifications than it was already presented in 1960, but non incoherences. The sustentation of your conception is found in your rejection to the semantics traditional mentalist that accepts intension concepts as mental entities when correlating words with ideas. Quine defends that the linguistic meaning is a property of the behavior and, for this reason, not meeting differentiates comportamental, it is not possible to allege semantic difference. Quine assumes, then, that a perspective behaviorist is necessary for the study of the acquisition of the language, even if it is not enough. Besides, the defense of a behaviorism is not only important for your semantic aspect, but also epistemological, because Quine defends that the only possible road to understand the relationship between theory and world is, if before, the subject psychogenetic of "as it is acquired the language" it is answered. Starting from that, the conception behaviorist ends up assuming a central paper in the philosophy of Quine and, for the which, a lot of subjects are answered.
A presente dissertação é o resultado de uma investigação sobre a concepção behaviorista da linguagem de Quine, tendo como pretensão a sua exposição e defesa, alegando a sua permanência no decorrer de todos os trabalhos quineanos. A importância deste trabalho se deve ao fato de que muitas críticas foram feitas a Quine com respeito a sua perspectiva linguística. Dentre os críticos, o que promove objeções contundentes, é Noam Chomsky. Este alega que Quine sofre de inconsistência e incoerência ao propor sua concepção de linguagem, e ainda afirma que Quine abandona o behaviorismo nos seus últimos trabalhos em favor de um mentalismo. Para realizar a defesa de Quine frente às acusações de Chomsky teve-se como referência Roger Gibson, o qual elaborou uma defesa da posição de Quine, que, entretanto, não ficou muito clara. Desta forma, nesta dissertação é feita uma análise não só das críticas de Chomsky, mas também da defesa de Gibson na tentativa de se apresentar um melhor esclarecimento da concepção de Quine. Sustenta-se que o programa behaviorista quineano é apresentado principalmente em Word and Object, publicado em 1960, mas permanece até suas últimas publicações. Nestas são observados alguns esclarecimentos e ampliações do que já era apresentado em 1960, mas não incoerências. A sustentação da sua concepção é encontrada na sua rejeição à semântica mentalista tradicional que aceita conceitos intensionais como entidades mentais ao correlacionar palavras com ideias. Quine defende que o significado linguístico é uma propriedade do comportamento e, por esta razão, não se encontrando diferença comportamental, não é possível alegar diferença semântica. Quine assume, então, que uma perspectiva behaviorista é necessária para o estudo da aquisição da linguagem, mesmo que não seja suficiente. Além disso, a defesa de um behaviorismo não é importante somente pelo seu aspecto semântico, mas também epistemológico, visto que Quine defende que a única via possível para entender a relação entre teoria e mundo é, se antes, a questão psicogenética de como é adquirida a linguagem é respondida. A partir disso, a concepção behaviorista acaba assumindo um papel central na filosofia de Quine e, pela qual, muitas questões são respondidas.

In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral on epistemology. Although Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and existence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological commitment to individuals. Quine's choice of a first-order language of regimentation without constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commitments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquaintance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine's language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine's behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose function is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine's position. It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism. My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine's, which confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose criteria of ontological commitment are 'to be is to be the referent of a name' or 'to be is to be the value of a constant or variable'.

La question du statut de la logique chez quine parait d'emblee paradoxale: la logique est a la fois ce qui pour quine n'est jamais mis en question, comme le montrent les exemples de la traduction radicale et de l'apprentissage linguistique, et une discipline affirmee comme revisable au meme titre que les autres sciences. Comment concilier le point de vue logique et le point de vue epistemologique, expliquer que la logique soit a la fois obvie et revisable? c'est en analysant l'apprentissage de la logique comme integration a une communaute linguistique, et le modele qu'il constitut pour l'evolution de notre scheme conceptuel, que l'on peut repondre a cette question, qui est au centre du systeme philosophique de quine
The question of the place of logic in quine's philosophy seems a highly paradoxical one: standard logic is never criticized nor questioned in quine's work - as is shown by its role in the case of radical translation and language learning - but is claimed to be revisable just as the other sciences are. How can the logical point of view and the epistemological one be conciliated? how can logic at the same time be obvious and revisable? only by a careful exmination of our ways of learning logic with language, and of the ways logic offers a model for the learning and evolution of our conceptual scheme, can that question, central to quine's whole philosophical system, be answered

Doctor of Philosophy
Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía
La presente tesina realiza en su marco teórico una breve introducción a las ideas del Círculo de Viena sobre el significado, para a continuación presentar el ataque frontal a las bases del positivismo lógico llevado a cabo por Quine, cuyo original sistema filosófico involucra sostener tesis filosóficas de carácter abarcador, dejándolas en un sector indefinido entre lo semántico, lo epistemológico y lo metafísico. Por lo anterior, la estructura de la exposición del sistema quineano se hará desde “fuera” hacia “adentro”, es decir, yendo del ataque hacia Carnap y el Círculo, pasando por sus tesis del compromiso ontológico, el holismo semántico, la indeterminación de la traducción, la relatividad ontológica y la indeterminación de la referencia, para luego ir hacia las presuposiciones empíricas tácitas que hacen su sistema creíble, o sea, la reificación como punto de continuidad entre el lenguaje natural y la teoría científica, junto con su concepción de un significado estimulativo compatible con el conjunto de sus proposiciones filosóficas. Una vez en el interior del sistema se atacará la noción de “reificación quineana” que involucra que el mundo es concebido desde nuestra niñez como un conjunto no ordenado de experiencia siendo ordenado recién con la adquisición de un lenguaje cualquiera, cosa incompatible con lo que la investigación en psicología del desarrollo ha descubierto. Finalmente, considerando que lo que muestran los experimentos hechos en niños prelingüísticos es una prueba suficiente de la falta de plausibilidad del edificio quineano, entonces se intentará hacer una reconstrucción sobre las soluciones que se han formulado históricamente a los problemas del “significado”, la “referencia” y la “comunicación”, lo que implicará inmediatamente una propuesta sobre las nociones conceptuales que debe contener una teoría más completa cuyo objeto sean los lenguajes naturales.

Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 215-225). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Cette étude constitue une interprétation de la philosophie de la logique de W. V. Quine à l’aune de ce que nous considérons comme étant un problème fondamental qui la gouverne et dont on peut considérer qu’elle en constitue une réponse. Ce problème a trait à la compatibilité entre logique et paroissial. Il admet la formulation condensée suivante : soit il y a un sens à dire que la logique est paroissiale, mais alors le paroissial se trouve être une restriction et est en droit éliminable ; soit le paroissial n’est pas une restriction et est inéliminable, mais alors il n’y a aucun sens à dire que la logique est paroissiale. Le problème se nourrit de ce que la qualification de la logique comme paroissiale fait l’objet d’une revendication explicite et délibérée par Quine, i.e. n’est ni de l’ordre d’une concession, ni de l’ordre d’un moment argumentatif dialectiquement résorbable. En d’autres termes, Quine revendique et cherche à se donner les moyens de revendiquer ce contre quoi une conception « universaliste » de la logique comme celle de Frege lutte, ordonnée qu’elle est à un présupposé ou une prémisse anti-paroissialiste d’unicité de la logique. Affirmer que Quine cherche à se donner les moyens de revendiquer la paroissialité de la logique, c’est dire qu’il prit tout à fait au sérieux les arguments anti-psychologistes de Frege contre toute conception paroissiale de la logique. Plus généralement,cette étude et la lecture de la conception quinienne de la logique que nous y proposons sont organisées par le principe d’une lecture frégéenne de Quine : si nous voulons comprendre ce que signifie de dire que la logique est paroissiale chez Quine, alors il faut revenir à Frege, que ce soit par la manière dont Quine s’y oppose ou par la manière dont il s’approprie certains thèmes et principes fondamentaux de la conception frégéenne de la logique. Cette étude consiste alors à mettre au jour et à examiner les raisons et les modalités de la revendication par Quine d’une paroissialité de la logique. Tout en étant ordonnés au traitement du problème de l’incompatibilité apparente du paroissial et de la logique, les cinq chapitres qui la composent parcourent successivement la critique de « Truth by Convention » du projet syntaxique de Carnap et de son principe de tolérance (chapitre 1), la philosophie de la notation logique de Quine (chapitre 2), le point de vue anthropologique en matière de logique que Quine fait sien (chapitre 3), le critère d’engagement ontologique (chapitre 4) et, enfin, la définition substitutionnelle de la vérité logique (chapitre 5)
This study is an interpretation of W.V. Quine’s philosophy of logic taken as an answer to what we consider to be a fundamental problem. This problem has to do with the compatibility between logic and parochial. It can be briefly expressed in the following manner: either that there is sense in saying that logic is parochial, but the parochial therefore happens to be a restriction and could be eliminated, or that the parochial is not a restriction and could not be eliminated, but that there is thus no sense in saying that logic is parochial. The problem is fueled by the fact that Quine explicitly and deliberately claims logic to be parochial. Such a qualification is neither a concession nor an argumentative moment that could be dialectically reduced. In other words, what Quine claims – and is seeking means to claim – is precisely that which a “universalist” conception of logic like Frege’s challenges, since it assumes an anti-parochial premise concerning the uniqueness of logic. Quine seeks means to claim the parochiality of logic in the sense that he seriously considered Frege’s anti-psychologist arguments against all parochial conceptions of logic. More generally, this study – and the understanding of Quine's conception of logic that it promotes – follows the principle of a Fregean reading of Quine: if one wants to understand what it means to say that logic is parochial in Quine, one has to go back to Frege, either through Quine’s opposition to him or through his appropriation of certain themes and fundamental principles of the Fregean conception of logic. Connected to the problem of the apparent incompatibility of logic and the parochial, the five chapters contained within this study successively explore the criticism of Carnap’s syntaxical project and of its principle of tolerance found in “Truth by Convention” (chapter 1); Quine’s philosophy of logical notation (chapter 2); the anthropological point of view in logic that Quine makes his own (chapter 3); the criterion of ontological commitment (chapter 4) and the substitutional definition of logical truth (chapter 5)

Dissertação (mestrado) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Curitiba, 2006
Inclui bibliografia
Willard Quine constrói um sistema filosófico dentro do qual cada uma de suas teses tem um papel e tomam certo sentido. São essas principais teses que dão sustentação à epistemologia naturalizada, que se apresenta central na obra do autor. Em sua motivação

Au sein de cette dissertation, j'avance la thèse que la pensée quinienne systématise une épistémologie des sciences et que son système veut avant tout donner une réponse, partant d'un point de vue empirique unique,à ce que Quine estime être la question centrale de l'épistémologie, à savoir "comment construisons-nous notre théorie du monde?".
Doctorat en Philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

L'auteur entreprend dans ce mémoire de proposer une interprétation formaliste de la signification et du statut logique de la critique que mène Quine, dans son article Two Dogmas of Empiricism de 1951, à l'encontre de la distinction classique en philosophie entre les énoncés analytiques et synthétiques. Contre l'interprétation standard qui persiste à concevoir cette critique comme un rejet catégorique de la distinction, l'auteur reconstruit la théorie de la signification quinienne afin de relever la distinction renouvelée qu'introduit Quine entre "analytique" et "synthétique" dans son dernier ouvrage, From Stimulus to Science. Par une étude comparative de la conception de Quine et de celles de Churchland et Searle sont spécifiés le sens et le statut que l'on doit assigner à sa notion de "signification". Réinterprétée à la lumière de ces considérations, la critique quinienne se révèle être une remise en question de niveau métaépistémologique de la pratique philosophique de l'empirisme logique.
In this dissertation, the author proposes a formalist interpretation of the meaning and logical status of the critique that Quine put forward against the classical philosophic distinction between analytic and synthetic statements in his 1951 article Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Against the standard interpretation that prevails in the literature, according to which this critique is categorical and without appeal, the author undertakes to rationally reconstruct Quine's theory of meaning in order to reveal the renewed distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" as it was introduced in his last book, From Stimulus to Science (1995). The meaning and logical status that ought to be assigned to his notion of "meaning" are specified by means of a comparative study between Quine's own conception and that of Churchland and Searle. Reinterpreted in the light of these considerations, the Quinian critique proves to be a metaepistemological reassessment of the logical empiricism's philosophical practice.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2005.
Thesis directed by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 195-198).

吳國志.
稿本(據電腦打印本複印)
Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1989.
Gao ben (ju dian nao da yin ben fu yin)
Includes bibliographical references: leaves 80-83.
Wu Guozhi.
Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1989.
簡語表 --- p.i
導論 --- p.1
Chapter 第一章 --- 剌激意義 --- p.3
Chapter 1.1 --- 對心靈語意學的批判
Chapter 1.2 --- 如何建構剌激意義
Chapter 1.3 --- 對景語句和持存語句
Chapter 1.4 --- 行為主義的語意觀
Chapter 第二章 --- 翻譯不確定論旨 --- p.17
Chapter 2.1 --- 同義與翻譯
Chapter 2.2 --- 始基翻譯與分析假設
Chapter 2.3 --- 翻譯不確定論旨與物理理論的不足決定性
Chapter 2.4 --- 對心靈實體進一步的揚棄
Chapter 第三章 --- 整體主義與語意理論 --- p.29
Chapter 3.1 --- 溫和的整體主義
Chapter 3.2 --- 整體主義與翻譯不確定論旨
Chapter 3.3 --- 方法論上的一元論
Chapter 3.4 --- 整體主義與自然主義
Chapter 第四章 --- 論何物存在 --- p.42
Chapter 4.1 --- 語言與本體論
Chapter 4.2 --- 本體論的許諾
Chapter 4.3 --- 物理主義的概念架構
Chapter 4.4 --- 卡納普和奎因對抽象實體看法之異同
Chapter 第五章 --- 本體論的相對性 --- p.55
Chapter 5.1 --- 指涉的不透視性
Chapter 5.2 --- 本體論相對性論旨
結論 --- p.67
注釋 --- p.69
參考書目 --- p.80
論文撮要