Journal articles: 'Voto strategico'

1

Gnani, Luca. "Proporzionale quasi per caso: il singolo voto trasferibile." Quaderni dell'Osservatorio elettorale QOE - IJES 62, no. 2 (December 30, 2009): 75–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/qoe-10154.

Full text

Abstract:

Una lontana genesi e una scarsa adozione Come funziona I difetti logico-formali Il voto strategico Il coordianmento strategico dei partiti Strategia e processo di formazione del Governo La proporzionalistà del STV Inplicazioni politiche del STV in EIRE: numero di partiti, stabilità del governo e sottorappresentazione dei partiti radicali Come classificarlo?

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Morrone, Cinzia. "L'incerta razionalità dell'elettore: il voto strategico in italia." Quaderni dell Osservatorio elettorale QOE - IJES 63, no. 1 (June 30, 2010): 43–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/qoe-9725.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Chiaramonte, Alessandro. "L'EFFETTO MANCATO DELLA RIFORMA MAGGIORITARIA: IL VOTO STRATEGICO." Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 26, no. 3 (December 1996): 703–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0048840200024540.

Full text

Abstract:

La riforma elettorale tra speranze e scetticismoAl tempo della campagna in favore dell'adozione del principio maggioritario di rappresentanza in Italia, la speranza di molti era che il nuovo sistema elettorale potesse produrre effetti simili a quelli delle democrazie anglosassoni cui intendeva ispirarsi, ossia che strutturasse la competizione partitica in termini bipolari – se non bipartitici – e favorisse quindi l'alternanza dei governi.Sebbene siano trascorsi ormai più di tre anni da allora e, soprattutto, abbiano avuto luogo due elezioni, è ancora presto per dire se le nuove regole abbiano prodotto gli effetti desiderati. La transizione politica italiana è un processo ancora lontano dall'approdo finale e non consente ad oggi valutazioni definitive. Certo è che i sistemi elettorali introdotti nel 1993 sono stati caricati da molti di attese taumaturgiche, nonostante i moniti lanciati dal mondo scientifico sulla necessità di una modifica ben più incisiva dell'architettura istituzionale del sistema politico italiano. Qualunque sistema elettorale, infatti, costituisce di per sésolouna struttura di vincoli e di opportunità, dunque di vincoli più o meno stringenti e di opportunità che possono essere colte o meno. Inoltre, riguardo all'effettiva configurazione della normativa elettorale approvata dal Parlamento nell'agosto del 1993, la cautela sulle prospettive del cambiamento muoveva dalla considerazione che le nuove regole incarnavano entrambi i principi maggioritario (pur prevalente) e proporzionale di rappresentanza, quindi due logiche distinte di competizione e di voto sulla combinazione delle quali era difficile fare previsioni.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Berg, Sven. "The House of Nobility Revisited: Benchmen Elections and Subgroup Voting Power*." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 9, no. 2 (October 1, 1991): 95–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569298x15668907345289.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract Viene esaminato, dal punto di vista probabilistico, il potere di voto, nell’ambito del sistema parlamentare svedese del secolo scorso.Nella prima metà del secolo decimonono, la Camera della Nobiltà, nella quale era applicato il metodo di votazione doppiamente indiretto, fornisce esempi interessanti di situazioni in cui un gruppo di persone determinato e coesivo esercita una sproporzionata influenza sul risultato delle elezioni in un’assemblea. I casi esaminati sono due: quello degli «Indipendenti», che nel 1823 formarono un gruppo del tipo «caucus»; e il caso in cui nel 1840 l’opposizione riportò una sorprendente vittoria sui governativi, malgrado questi ultimi godessero della maggioranza in Parlamento.Appare dal primo caso che, sebbene il potere d’influenzare i risultati si riduca con la suddivisione in piccoli gruppi, tuttavia le minoranze organizzate sono in grado di ricorrere a scambi di voti e altri tipi di comportamento strategico che possono ampiamente compensare tale effetto. Nel secondo caso, la vittoria dell’opposizione à probabilmente dovuta ad una distribuzione ad essa favorevole dei votanti all’interno dei sottogruppi.Rimangono alcuni quesiti che dovrebbero essere esaminati alia luce delle moderne teorie del voto, come quello degli effetti distorsivi del metodo di voto indiretto adottato dalla Camera e quello dei problemi strategici che deriverebbero qualora fosse consentita la vendita di voti prima delle elezioni.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Pappalardo, Adriano. "SISTEMI ELETTORALI, SISTEMI PARTITICI CAUSE E CONSEGUENZE." Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 33, no. 2 (August 2003): 195–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0048840200027155.

Full text

Abstract:

IntroduzioneIn un passaggio frequentemente citato, Giovanni Sartori definisce il sistema elettorale «il più specifico strumento manipolativo della politica» (1968, 273; 1996, 11). In questo articolo, mi propongo di verificare le più tipiche «manipolazioni» attribuite al maggioritario o alla rappresentanza proporzionale, quelle sul sistema partitico. Al riguardo, è ancor oggi utile partire da Duverger (1954), il quale distingueva oltre cinquanta anni fa effetti psicologici ed effetti meccanici. Gli effetti psicologici entrano in causa prima, o al momento, del voto, condizionando la decisione degli elettori di votare o meno e, in caso affermativo, per quale partito. In questo, evidentemente, ha un plausibile peso la percezione che ogni sistema fornisce incentivi, o pone vincoli, a certi comportamenti, ed esige, quindi, una misura di adattamento alla sua logica di funzionamento. Date le alte soglie di rappresentanza associate ai sistemi maggioritari, l'adattamento si manifesta empiricamente sotto forma di voto strategico, cioè con la tendenza degli elettori a votare «utilmente», disertando i partiti senza possibilità di vincere e concentrandosi sui più forti.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Artabe, Alaitz, and Javier Gardeazabal. "Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals." Political Analysis 22, no. 2 (2014): 243–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpt047.

Full text

Abstract:

The random utility model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this article is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calculations indicate that strategic voting in Spain is about 2.19%.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Xefteris, Dimitrios, and Nicholas Ziros. "Strategic vote trading under complete information." Journal of Mathematical Economics 78 (October 2018): 52–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.009.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Bartholdi, John J., and James B. Orlin. "Single transferable vote resists strategic voting." Social Choice and Welfare 8, no. 4 (October 1991): 341–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00183045.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Xefteris, Dimitrios, and Nicholas Ziros. "Strategic Vote Trading in Power Sharing Systems." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9, no. 2 (May 1, 2017): 76–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150254.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election in which prior to the voting stage, voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework, we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equilibrium (an equilibrium in which nobody refrains from vote trading). Moreover, we argue that vote trading in such systems unambiguously improves voters' welfare. (JEL C72, D71, D72, D82)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Anbarci, Nejat. "Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 20, no. 3 (April 1993): 319–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(93)90029-o.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Ley, Sandra. "To Vote or Not to Vote." Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 9 (May 22, 2017): 1963–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002717708600.

Full text

Abstract:

Organized crime-related violence has important electoral consequences. Analyses of aggregate panel data on Mexican elections and an original postelectoral survey conducted in Mexico show that the strategic use of violence by organized crime groups during electoral campaigns demobilizes voters at large. Regions where criminal organizations attempted to influence elections and politics by targeting government officials and party candidates exhibited significantly lower levels of electoral participation. Consistently, at the individual level, results reveal that voters living in regions where organized crime engaged in high-profile violence were more cautious when deciding whether to vote or not. Prior research has focused on the role of crime victimization in nonelectoral participation, but the empirical evidence presented here suggests that the impact of a criminal context on turnout transcends personal victimization experiences.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Daoust, Jean-François, and Damien Bol. "Polarization, Partisan Preferences and Strategic Voting." Government and Opposition 55, no. 4 (December 5, 2018): 578–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.42.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractIn this article, we study how polarization affects the propensity of supporters of non-viable parties to cast a strategic vote. To do so, we rely on Canadian election panel surveys from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project that were specifically designed to identify strategic voting. We find that the polarization between viable parties increases the probability of a supporter of a non-viable party casting a strategic vote, because it increases how much she likes her favourite viable party, and decreases how much she dislikes her least favourite viable party. Polarization thus increases strategic voting because it alters partisan preferences.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Santucci, Jack. "Variants of Ranked-Choice Voting from a Strategic Perspective." Politics and Governance 9, no. 2 (June 15, 2021): 344–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3955.

Full text

Abstract:

Ranked-choice voting has come to mean a range of electoral systems. Broadly, they can facilitate (a) majority winners in single-seat districts, (b) majority rule with minority representation in multi-seat districts, or (c) majority sweeps in multi-seat districts. Further, such systems can combine with rules to encourage/discourage slate voting. This article describes five major versions used, abandoned, and/or proposed for US public elections: alternative vote, single transferable vote, block-preferential voting, the bottoms-up system, and alternative vote with numbered posts. It then considers each from the perspective of a ‘political strategist.’ Simple models of voting (one with two parties, another with three) draw attention to real-world strategic issues: effects on minority representation, importance of party cues, and reasons for the political strategist to care about how voters rank choices. Unsurprisingly, different rules produce different outcomes with the same sets of ballots. Specific problems from the strategist’s perspective are: ‘majority reversal,’ serving ‘two masters,’ and undisciplined third-party voters (or ‘pure’ independents). Some of these stem from well-known phenomena, e.g., ranking truncation and ‘vote leakage.’ The article also alludes to ‘vote-management’ tactics, i.e., rationing nominations and ensuring even distributions of first-choice votes. Illustrative examples come from American history and comparative politics. A running theme is the two-pronged failure of the Progressive Era reform wave: with respect to minority representation, then ranked voting's durability.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Dekel, Eddie, and Michele Piccione. "The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, no. 4 (November 1, 2014): 164–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.4.162.

Full text

Abstract:

Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others, then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good, then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting). (JEL D72)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Cox, Gary W. "Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote." American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 608–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2944798.

Full text

Abstract:

Previous investigations of strategic voting equilibria in mass electorates have looked only at single-member districts. I shall investigate such equilibria in multimember districts operating under the single nontransferable vote system. What appear to be the most natural equilibria conform to the M + 1 rule, according to which strategic voting in M-seat districts produces exactly M + 1 vote-getting candidates in equilibrium, any others having their support totally undercut. This result provides the beginnings of a formal underpinning for Reed's recent extension of Duverger's Law to the Japanese case. The model also generates specific and empirically testable hypotheses concerning the exceptions to the M + 1 rule that one ought to expect in equilibrium. I test these hypotheses with Japanese data. Finally, the model also reveals a type of strategic voting that is specific to multimember districts. I use Japanese data again to explore the empirical importance of this kind of strategic voting.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Austen-Smith, David. "Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas." American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (December 1987): 1323–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962591.

Full text

Abstract:

The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known, and these are typically private data. I show that under complete information, if decision making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Aspinall, Edward, Noor Rohman, Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, Rubaidi, and Zusiana Elly Triantini. "VOTE BUYING IN INDONESIA: CANDIDATE STRATEGIES, MARKET LOGIC AND EFFECTIVENESS." Journal of East Asian Studies 17, no. 1 (January 30, 2017): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2016.31.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractWhat underlying logic explains candidate participation in vote buying, given that clientelist exchange is so difficult to enforce? We address this question through close analysis of campaigns by several dozen candidates in two electoral districts in Java, Indonesia. Analyzing candidates’ targeting and pricing strategies, we show that candidates used personal brokerage structures that drew on social networks to identify voters and deliver payments to them. But these candidates achieved vote totals averaging about one quarter of the number of payments they distributed. Many candidates claimed to be targeting loyalists, suggestive of “turnout buying,” but judged loyalty in personal rather than partisan terms, and extended their vote-buying reach through personal connections mediated by brokers. Candidates were market sensitive, paying prices per vote determined not only by personal resources, but also by constituency size and prices offered by competitors. Accordingly, we argue that a market logic structures Indonesia's system of vote buying.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

ALVAREZ, R. MICHAEL, and JONATHAN NAGLER. "A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections." British Journal of Political Science 30, no. 1 (January 2000): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000712340000003x.

Full text

Abstract:

Whether citizens vote strategically, using their votes to defeat their least-preferred candidate, or vote sincerely, voting for their first choice among the alternatives, is a question of longstanding interest. We offer two innovations in searching for the answer to this question. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Secondly, we incorporate a new operationalization of the objective potential for strategic behaviour. We offer a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British general election based on the variance in strategic setting across constituencies in Britain. We allow voters to use available information about the relative standings of parties in their constituency in deciding whether or not to cast a strategic vote. We estimate a lower level of strategic voting than many other methods have estimated. We also demonstrate that the use of self-reported vote motivation causes errors in estimating the amount of strategic voting, and that this problem is exacerbated the further from the election the self-report is obtained.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Singh, Shane P. "Compulsory Voting and Parties’ Vote‐Seeking Strategies." American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 1 (August 30, 2018): 37–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12386.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Elmelund-Praestekaer, Christian, and Patrick Emmenegger. "Strategic Re-framing as a Vote Winner: Why Vote-seeking Governments Pursue Unpopular Reforms." Scandinavian Political Studies 36, no. 1 (February 4, 2013): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2012.00295.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Kawato, Sadafumi. "Strategic Contexts of the Vote on Political Reform Bills." Japanese Journal of Political Science 1, no. 1 (May 2000): 23–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109900000128.

Full text

Abstract:

This article employs a simple model of sophisticated voting under incomplete information and explores the strategic contexts of the vote on political reform bills in Japan. The government-sponsored political reform bills were voted down by the defection of government coalition members in the House of Councillors before a final compromise was reached in the joint committee of both houses and passed subsequently. In contrast to the accepted view that the defectors were short-sighted sincere voters, I show that Japan's institutional arrangements created an uncertainty about the agenda in the legislative process and led to the sophisticated voting behavior of pivotal voters whose preferences were different from the party leadership. The analysis underscores the importance of sophisticated voting for the empirical study of Japanese legislative politics.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Navarra, Pietro. "Voting Diversification Strategy: A Risk-Bearing Model of Voter Behaviour in Italian National Elections*." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 15, no. 1 (April 1, 1997): 37–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569298x15668907540651.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract L’ipotesi dell’elettore razionale afferma che i votanti valutano i costi e i benefici della loro partecipazione elettorale e li combinano secondo i precetti della massimizzazione dell’utilità attesa.In questo scritto il voto è analizzato come decisione d’investimento. Come tale l’atto del voto implica alcuni elementi d’incertezza. Nel caso italiano, peraltro, l’usuale imprevedibilità dei risultati elettorali è accompagnata da due altre fonti d’incertezza: quella delle nuove regole elettorali e quella del rischio connesso con le promesse elettorali di partiti che occupano uno spettro completamente cambiato, da sinistra a destra.Questo scritto si concentra su alcuni effetti prodotti dalle nuove regole sul comportamento di voto dell’elettorato italiano. L’analisi è limitata all’elezione per la Camera dei deputati dell’aprile 1996.Secondo i risultati conseguiti, i votanti che si sono spostati verso il centrosinistra possonoessereconsiderati come desiderosi d’intraprendere strategic di diversificazione più rischiose nel Nord e meno nel Centro e nel Sud d’Italia. Ciò può essere spiegato con la considerazione che al Nord la competizione elettorale nei collegi uninominali era più elevata e più imprevedibile rispetto all’Italia Centrale e Meridionale, a motivo del consenso elettorale della Lega Nord.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Roy, Jason, and Shane Singh. "Canadian and American Voting Strategies: Does Institutional Socialization Matter?" Canadian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (June 2012): 289–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423912000339.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract. This paper uses data from an online voting experiment to examine the impact of institutional socialization on the vote decision process. More specifically, we examine how Canadian and American voters differ in their vote decision processes in two- and four-party elections. Our expectation is that Canadian voters, who are more familiar with multiparty electoral context, will adjust to the increased complexity of the four-party competition by engaging in a more detailed decision process. Alternatively, we expect US voters, who are less familiar with multiparty competitions, will not undertake such an adjustment, perhaps even engaging in a less detailed vote calculus under more complex conditions. Results lend support to our expectations, offering insight into how institutional design and socialization can affect voter decision processes.Résumé. Cet article utilise des données tirées d'une expérience de vote en ligne pour examiner l'impact de la socialisation institutionnelle sur le processus décisionnel menant au vote. Nous examinons en particulier comment les électeurs canadiens et américains diffèrent dans leur processus décisionnel lors d'élections à deux et à quatre partis. Nos attentes sont les suivantes : Les électeurs canadiens, plus familiers avec le multipartisme, s'ajusteront à la plus grande complexité d'une élection à quatre partis en s'engageant dans un processus décisionnel plus sophistiqué. Les électeurs américains, quant à eux habitués davantage au bipartisme, ne feront pas de tels ajustements lorsque le contexte électoral se complexifiera et auront peut-être même tendance à simplifier leur processus décisionnel. Nos résultats tendent à confirmer nos attentes, offrant ainsi un aperçu de la façon dont le contexte institutionnel et la socialisation qui en résulte peuvent influencer le processus décisionnel des électeurs.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Bosco, Joseph. "Faction versus Ideology: Mobilization Strategies in Taiwan's Elections." China Quarterly 137 (March 1994): 28–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000034032.

Full text

Abstract:

On 2 December 1989, voters on Taiwan cast ballots to elect national legislators (lifaweiyuan), provincial and city representatives (sheng/shiyiyuari) and county executives (xianzhang). Though the Nationalist Party (KMT) received 59 per cent of the overall vote, the election was widely viewed as a surprising success for the fledgling opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), since the KMT had polled over 70 per cent of the vote in all previous elections. James Soong, Secretary-General of the KMT, announced after an emergency meeting of the shocked KMT leadership, “We calmly accept an upset.”

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Koenig, Laura L. "Laryngeal Factors in Voiceless Consonant Production in Men, Women, and 5-Year-Olds." Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research 43, no. 5 (October 2000): 1211–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/jslhr.4305.1211.

Full text

Abstract:

Voicing control in stop consonants has often been measured by means of voice onset time (VOT) and discussed in terms of interarticulator timing. However, control of voicing also involves details of laryngeal setting and management of sub- and supraglottal pressure levels, and many of these factors are known to undergo developmental change. Mechanical and aerodynamic conditions at the glottis may therefore vary considerably in normal populations as functions of age and/or sex. The current study collected oral airflow, intraoral pressure, and acoustic signals from normal English-speaking adults and children producing stop consonants and /h/ embedded in a short carrier utterance. Measures were made of stop VOTs, /h/ voicing and flow characteristics, and subglottal pressure during /p/ closures. Clear age and gender effects were observed for /h/: Fully voiced /h/ was most common in men, and /h/ voicing and flow data showed the highest variability among the 5-year-olds. For individual participants, distributional measures of VOT in /p t/ were correlated with distributional measures of voicing in /h/. The data indicate that one cannot assume comparable laryngeal conditions across speaker groups. This, in turn, implies that VOT acquisition in children cannot be interpreted purely in terms of developing interarticulator timing control, but must also reflect growing mastery over voicing itself. Further, differences in laryngeal structure and aerodynamic quantities may require men and women to adopt somewhat different strategies for achieving distinctive consonantal voicing contrasts.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Bitan, Moshe, Ya’akov Gal, Sarit Kraus, Elad Dokow, and Amos Azaria. "Social Rankings in Human-Computer Committees." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 27, no. 1 (June 30, 2013): 116–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8610.

Full text

Abstract:

Despite committees and elections being widespread in thereal-world, the design of agents for operating in humancomputer committees has received far less attention than thetheoretical analysis of voting strategies. We address this gapby providing an agent design that outperforms other voters ingroups comprising both people and computer agents. In oursetting participants vote by simultaneously submitting a ranking over a set of candidates and the election system uses a social welfare rule to select a ranking that minimizes disagreements with participants’ votes. We ran an extensive studyin which hundreds of people participated in repeated votingrounds with other people as well as computer agents that differed in how they employ strategic reasoning in their votingbehavior. Our results show that over time, people learn todeviate from truthful voting strategies, and use heuristics toguide their play, such as repeating their vote from the previous round. We show that a computer agent using a bestresponse voting strategy was able to outperform people in thegame. Our study has implication for agent designers, highlighting the types of strategies that enable agents to succeedin committees comprising both human and computer participants. This is the ﬁrst work to study the role of computeragents in voting settings involving both human and agent participants.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

NICHTER, SIMEON. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." American Political Science Review 102, no. 1 (February 2008): 19–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055408080106.

Full text

Abstract:

Scholars typically understand vote buying as offering particularistic benefits in exchange for vote choices. This depiction of vote buying presents a puzzle: with the secret ballot, what prevents individuals from accepting rewards and then voting as they wish? An alternative explanation, which I term “turnout buying,” suggests why parties might offer rewards even if they cannot monitor vote choices. By rewarding unmobilized supporters for showing up at the polls, parties can activate their passive constituencies. Because turnout buying targets supporters, it only requires monitoring whether individuals vote. Much of what scholars interpret as vote buying may actually be turnout buying. Reward targeting helps to distinguish between these strategies. Whereas Stokes's vote-buying model predicts that parties target moderate opposers, a model of turnout buying predicts that they target strong supporters. Although the two strategies coexist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data in Stokes 2005 are more consistent with turnout buying.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Cohen, Linda R., and Roger G. Noll. "How to vote, whether to vote: Strategies for voting and abstaining on congressional roll calls." Political Behavior 13, no. 2 (June 1991): 97–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00992292.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Glazer, Amihai, Robert Griffin, Bernard Grofman, and Martin Wattenberg. "Strategic Vote Delay in the U. S. House of Representatives." Legislative Studies Quarterly 20, no. 1 (February 1995): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/440148.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Blais, André, Simon Labbé-St-Vincent, Laslier Jean-François, Nicolas Sauger, and Karine Van der Straeten. "Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections." Political Research Quarterly 64, no. 3 (March 4, 2010): 637–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912909358583.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Barclay, Linda. "Cognitive Impairment and the Right to Vote: A Strategic Approach." Journal of Applied Philosophy 30, no. 2 (May 2013): 146–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/japp.12020.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Renault, Régis, and Alain Trannoy. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example." SERIEs 2, no. 4 (September 21, 2011): 497–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0077-0.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Rich, Timothy S. "Strategic Voting and the Role of Polls: Evidence from an Embedded Web Survey." PS: Political Science & Politics 48, no. 02 (April 2015): 301–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s104909651400208x.

Full text

Abstract:

ABSTRACTWhat motivates people to vote strategically? Although a broad literature addresses this question, few studies capture the point at which individuals shift from sincere to strategic voters. Furthermore, the influence of polling information remains debated. The analysis in this article tackles strategic voting with an original embedded experiment in a web survey. Empirical analysis finds that respondents who were told of the margin of error in preelection polls were more likely to vote strategically. This analysis also suggests the limits to strategic voting even in ideal settings.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Marquette, Christopher J., and Thomas G. E. Williams. "Ownership of dual class shares and passive investment strategies." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 1-2 (2008): 301–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i1c2p7.

Full text

Abstract:

Previous studies of firms with two classes of stock find a price premium for the class with superior voting rights over the restricted voting rights shares. This premium changes over time and is related to the likelihood of a contested takeover attempt. These findings have implications for both passive and active investors. We find that for passive, buy-and-hold investors, restricted voting shares dominate superior voting shares in mean-variance space. This relationship also holds for a four factor model specification of stock returns. Our evidence indicates that passive, buy-and-hold investors can achieve a higher return with restricted vote shares than superior vote shares with no increase in either stand-alone or portfolio risk

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Riambau, Guillem. "Do citizens vote for parties, policies or the expected winner in proportional representation systems? Evidence from four different countries using a multiple-type model." Party Politics 24, no. 5 (December 20, 2016): 549–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068816668669.

Full text

Abstract:

This article presents a unified framework that allows us to disentangle to what extent agents in proportional representation (PR) systems engage in the different strategies that the available voting models have separately suggested: ‘party’, ‘coalitional’, ‘bandwagon’ and ‘other’ voting (i.e. neither of the previous three). Results using data from multiple countries reveal that at least 75% of agents cast a sincere party vote. Around 10% of voters try to affect policymaking by casting a coalitional vote. Since most coalitional agents use their vote to ‘push’ coalitions away from the centre, extreme parties are the most benefited. Hence, strategic coalitional voting may increase rather than preclude fragmentation of a party system in PR contexts. Another 5% of voters support the expected winner regardless of their own party and coalition preferences. Finally, 5–10% of voters fall into the category of other types. The characteristics and motivations of each type are uncovered. Political sophistication increases the likelihood of sincere and coalitional voting. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with parties voted for in the past increases other voting. In particular, recent growth of European right-wing nationalist parties is shown to rely more on other voting and less on sincere and coalitional support.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Blais, André. "Why is there so Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality Rule Elections?" Political Studies 50, no. 3 (August 2002): 445–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00378.

Full text

Abstract:

Using the 1988 Canadian Election Study I examine why there was only restricted strategic voting in single-member district plurality elections. In that election 19 percent of Canadian voters preferred the party that actually finished third in their constituency, but among these third party supporters only one in eight decided to vote strategically for one of the top two contenders. Strategic voting was relatively rare for two key reasons. First, many third party supporters had a strong preference for their party over all others and were therefore reluctant to rally to either of the top two contenders. Second, many overestimated their party's chance of winning and as a consequence did not feel that their vote would be wasted.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

EGGERS, ANDREW C., and NICK VIVYAN. "Who Votes More Strategically?" American Political Science Review 114, no. 2 (February 10, 2020): 470–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000820.

Full text

Abstract:

Strategic voting is an important explanation for aggregate political phenomena, but we know little about how strategic voting varies across types of voters. Are richer voters more strategic than poorer voters? Does strategic behavior vary with age, education, gender, or political leaning? The answers may be important for assessing how well an electoral system represents different preferences in society. We introduce a new approach to measuring and comparing strategic voting across voters that can be broadly applied, given appropriate survey data. In recent British elections, we find that older voters vote more strategically than younger voters and that richer voters vote more strategically than poorer voters, even as strategic behavior varies little across the education level. The differences in strategic voting by age and income are smaller than observed differences in turnout by age and income, but they tend to exacerbate these better-known inequalities in political participation.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Coughlan, Peter J. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting." American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 375–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586018.

Full text

Abstract:

The requirement of unanimous jury verdicts in criminal trials is widely believed to reduce the likelihood of convicting the innocent. This belief depends largely upon the assumption that jurors will vote nonstrategically based on their impression of the trial evidence. Recent literature, however, has questioned this assumption, and Feddersen and Pesendorfer propose a model in which it is never a Nash equilibrium for jurors to vote nonstrategically under unanimity rule, and equilibrium behavior produces higher probabilities of both convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty under unanimity rule than under numerous alternatives. I extend this work by incorporating two additional features of actual jury procedure: the possibility of mistrial and communication among jurors. Under each circumstance, I demonstrate that nonstrategic voting is a Nash equilibrium under fairly general conditions and that unanimity performs better than any alternative rule in minimizing probability of trial error and maximizing expected utility.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Bochsler, Daniel. "The strategic effect of the plurality vote at the district level." Electoral Studies 47 (June 2017): 94–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.11.019.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Fournier, Patrick, and Masaru Kohno. "Japan's Multimember SNTV System and Strategic Voting: A Rejoinder." Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, no. 2 (November 2001): 241–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109901000251.

Full text

Abstract:

Five major claims are made in our paper on strategic voting within the context of Japan's multimember single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system (Fournier and Kohno, 2000). Two claims deal with the reconciliation of Steven Reed's (1990) and Gary Cox's (1997) important work on extending Duverger's law to the Japanese case, and three claims deal with the informational effects of partisan labels on strategic voting.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Castro Cornejo, Rodrigo. "Do (Perceptions of) Electoral Polling Affect Voters' Behavior? Campaigns, Partisan Bias, and Strategic Voting." Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública 11, no. 2 (January 10, 2023): 73–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.14201/rlop.29606.

Full text

Abstract:

The manuscript highlights the major role that partisanship plays in moderating voters’ interpretation of polling information and incentives to behave strategically. While prior studies highlight that partisans are less likely to vote strategically as the expressive costs of defection increase, this study sheds light on the conditions in which voters—even partisans—behave strategically and which contribute to an increase in the proportion of voters who change their vote intention during campaigns. Only partisans informed about polls are able to overcome their partisan bias and engage in strategic voting. By taking strategic voting into account in the study of campaigns, the present work builds a bridge between the campaigns effects literature and studies on strategic voting.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Bruera, Hernán F. Gómez. "Participation under Lula: Between Electoral Politics and Governability." Latin American Politics and Society 57, no. 2 (2015): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00265.x.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThis article shows how and why the initial attempts of the Lula administration in Brazil to promote innovative counterhegemonic participatory strategies, such as those put in place by the PT in some of its subnational governments, fell by the wayside. It is argued that the implementation and scope of participatory initiatives under Lula were caught between electoral motivations and the need to secure governability. On the one hand, the need to produce quick results in order to maximize vote-seeking strategies hindered attempts to promote counterhegemonic participation, while Lula and his inner circle opted for policies that would score immediate marks with the poorest sectors or influence public opinion. On the other hand, participation also took a back seat because the PT concentrated most of its energies on reaching agreements with strategic actors, such as opposition parties or powerful economic groups.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Di Virgilio, Aldo. "From proportional representation to plurality and back: Post-Christian Democratic parties compared." Modern Italy 13, no. 4 (November 2008): 429–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13532940802367703.

Full text

Abstract:

This article analyses the competition strategies adopted by the Christian Democratic (DC) and post-Christian Democratic (post-DC) parties after the electoral reforms of 1993 and 2005. Four main aspects are considered: the significance of cultural (ideological and cognitive) factors in the DC's exit from the political stage; the need to adapt post-DC strategy to bipolarism and the nostalgia for an autonomous centre; the nature and geography of the post-DC vote; and the attitudes of the middle-level elites of the three principal post-DC parties (the DL, the UDEUR and the UDC) vis-à-vis the competitive and strategic decisions they had to make. The article reaches the following conclusions: the post-DC parties share the same cultural orientations and have similar politico-electoral characteristics (a confessional background, the relevance of patronage networks and personalistic vote mobilisation); all three parties adapted, in different ways and with different degrees of success, to the new structure of coalitional bipolarism in the decade 1996–2006; and both research data on the main post-DC parties’ national congress delegates and the evolution of their electoral strategies on the eve of the 2008 elections show that the post-Christian Democrats felt more at home in the centre-left alignment, together with the post-communist PDS-DS, than in the centre-right alignment led by Berlusconi.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Prafitri, Wilma, and Muhammad Alim Akbar Nasir. "Persuasive Strategies in Donald Trump's Political Speeches." EBONY: Journal of English Language Teaching, Linguistics, and Literature 3, no. 1 (January 24, 2023): 33–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.37304/ebony.v3i1.7780.

Full text

Abstract:

This study analyses persuasive strategies on Donald Trump’s political speeches. This study uses qualitative research as the design and Content Analysis as the approach. The researcher explores persuasive strategies used by Donald Trump using Aristotle’s Theory to see what persuasive strategies are used and how Trump’s political speech could affect audiences to vote for him. The researcher selected three speeches such as campaign speech (2015),victory speech (2016) and inauguration speech (2017) as the object of study. These speeches are selected based on some considerations, such as lexical density, political concepts described by Trump, academic scrutiny and also to make this research more manageable. Furthermore, the researcher found that Trump has used persuasive strategies in order to convince Americans to vote him as President. According to Aristotle , there are three types of Persuasive Strategies such as Logos, Ethos and Pathos. The researcher found thirty one statements indicated of containing pathos, thirteen statements of Logos and fifteen statements as Ethos. Pathos encompasses the emotional influence on the audience. Based on the analysis, the researcher concludes that persuasive strategies played crucial part to evoke audience’s emotions and feelings.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

CLOUGH, EMILY. "Strategic Voting Under Conditions of Uncertainty: A Re-Evaluation of Duverger's Law." British Journal of Political Science 37, no. 2 (March 20, 2007): 313–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123407000154.

Full text

Abstract:

Political scientists have long recognized that the number of parties in a country influences the way that interests are represented in that country. One explanation for the number of parties in a system relies on the idea of strategic voting, i.e. voters may not want to ‘waste a vote’ by voting for a third party. However, work in this area does not address the role of an important factor that may affect party systems through strategic voting: information. Without polls, how could voters know which parties were likely to win, and hence how to vote strategically? Using an agent-based model, this article assesses the role that information plays in shaping the party system through strategic voting. The results of this model demonstrate that, contrary to Duverger's Law, more than two parties may emerge in single-member plurality systems, even when all voters are strategic.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Metz, Dale Evan, Nicholas Schiavetti, and Pat Richard Sacco. "Acoustic and Psychophysical Dimensions of the Perceived Speech Naturalness of Nonstutterers and Posttreatment Stutterers." Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders 55, no. 3 (August 1990): 516–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/jshd.5503.516.

Full text

Abstract:

The purpose of this study was twofold: to determine through psychophysical comparison of scaling data whether speech naturalness is a prothetic or a metathetic continuum, and to examine the relationship between selected acoustic characteristics of the speech of nonstutterers and treated stutterers and listeners' judgments of their speech naturalness. Comparison of magnitude estimation and interval scaling data indicated that speech naturalness behaves like a metathetic continuum, suggesting that either scaling procedure is valid for the quantification of this dimension. The speech of the nonstutterers was judged more natural than the speech of the treated stutterers, and a global voice onset time (VOT) measure (averaged across places of articulation) and a sentence duration measure were found to be the acoustic parameters most highly correlated with and predictive of speech naturalness. These results suggest the possibility that stuttering treatments that employ strategies like gentle voicing onset and prolonged speech may result in somewhat slower posttherapy speech patterns characterized by prolonged VOTs that could influence listeners to judge the speech as more unnatural than the speech of nonstutterers.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Rogers, Todd, Leanne ten Brinke, and Dana R. Carney. "Unacquainted callers can predict which citizens will vote over and above citizens’ stated self-predictions." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 23 (May 23, 2016): 6449–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1525688113.

Full text

Abstract:

People are regularly asked to report on their likelihoods of carrying out consequential future behaviors, including complying with medical advice, completing educational assignments, and voting in upcoming elections. Despite these stated self-predictions being notoriously unreliable, they are used to inform many strategic decisions. We report two studies examining stated self-prediction about whether citizens will vote. We find that most self-predicted voters do not actually vote despite saying they will, and that campaign callers can discern which self-predicted voters will not actually vote. In study 1 (n = 4,463), self-predicted voters rated by callers as “100% likely to vote” were 2 times more likely to actually vote than those rated unlikely to vote. Study 2 (n = 3,064) replicated this finding and further demonstrated that callers’ prediction accuracy was mediated by citizens’ nonverbal signals of uncertainty and deception. Strangers can use nonverbal signals to improve predictions of follow through on self-reported intentions—an insight of potential value for politics, medicine, and education.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Mouw, Calvin J., and Michael B. MacKuen. "The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics." American Political Science Review 86, no. 1 (March 1992): 87–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1964017.

Full text

Abstract:

We examine the politics of the strategic agenda. Abstracting a politics on the liberal-conservative dimension, we analyze Key Vote roll call data from the U.S. House of Representatives during the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations. The data suggest that politicians set the policy agenda in a strategic fashion. Because they consider such factors as long-term political goals, the changing institutional setting, and plebiscitary presidential politics, agenda-setters propose legislation that only imperfectly reflects their and the membership's wishes on the issue at hand. Thus, as the final stage in the political process, the strategic selection of an agenda provides a means by which factors other than policy preferences affect policy outcomes. The analyses affirm the strategic agenda as a core element in political life.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

CHHIBBER, PRADEEP, and MARIANO TORCAL. "Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in a New Democracy." Comparative Political Studies 30, no. 1 (February 1997): 27–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414097030001002.

Full text

Abstract:

Electoral studies of the Spanish party system have consistently noticed that social class has no influence on the vote. This paper will argue that social class has emerged as influential in determining the vote between the two major parties—the PSOE and PP. The development of these links between social class and political parties resulted from the strategic programmatic choice made by the political elites of both major parties since 1989 and the policy adopted by the governing PSOE. Evidence for this argument will be drawn from a very large Spanish survey conducted in 1992, a textual analysis of party platforms, and a survey of government economic policy since 1989. The attribution of this association between social class and the vote in Spain to the strategic policy choices made by elites also offers an additional perspective on how social divisions come to be linked to party systems.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Born, Richard. "Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters." American Political Science Review 80, no. 2 (June 1986): 599–612. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1958276.

Full text

Abstract:

To resolve the paradoxical finding that economic conditions and presidential popularity powerfully relate to quadrennial movement in the House vote, but explain little individual voting variation, Jacobson and Kernell have advanced their “strategic politicians” model of midterm elections. Purportedly, the early-year political environment helps determine how many of a party's strong potential contenders risk challenging incumbents; voters in turn respond to the quality of candidates before them in November, and thus indirectly reward the party favored by this early-year environment. Despite its current prominence, however, the theory does not stand up to empirical investigation. A time-series equation of midterm outcomes regressed on early-year national conditions does not fare particularly well when contrasted with comparable equations assuming direct-effects voting. Furthermore, challenger quality has only a weak influence on individual voters—subordinate, in fact, to the effects of economic attitudes and presidential evaluations.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Journal articles on the topic 'Voto strategico'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles