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Journal articles on the topic 'Voting – Europe, Western'
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1
Stegmueller, Daniel. "Religion and Redistributive Voting in Western Europe." Journal of Politics 75, no. 4 (October 2013): 1064–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613001023.
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Lubbers, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. "Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe." European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 3 (May 2002): 345–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00015.
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Birchfield, Vicki L. "Book Review: Voting Radical Right in Western Europe." Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 9 (November 2006): 1165–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414006289244.
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Dassonneville, Ruth, and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. "Economic Policy Voting and Incumbency: Unemployment in Western Europe." Political Science Research and Methods 1, no. 1 (June 2013): 53–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2013.9.
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The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, in which voters reward or punish governments at the ballot box according to the nation's economic performance. The alternative (policy-oriented) hypothesis, in which voters favor parties that are closest to their issue position(s), has been neglected in this literature. This article explores policy voting with respect to an archetypal economic policy issue—unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series cross-sectional pool of Western European nations, this study finds some evidence for economic policy voting. However, it is conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, left incumbents experience a net electoral cost if the unemployment rate climbs. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that might accrue to the left due to the issue of unemployment.
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Coleman, Stephen. "The Effect of Social Conformity on Collective Voting Behavior." Political Analysis 12, no. 1 (2004): 76–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpg015.
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This article investigates the effect of social conformity on voting behavior. Past research shows that many people vote to conform with the social norm that voting is a civic duty. The hypothesis here is that when conformity motivates people to vote, it also stimulates conformist behavior among some voters when they decide which party to vote for. This produces a distinctive relationship between voter turnout and the distribution of votes among parties—a relationship not anticipated by rational choice theory. I test a mathematical model of this behavior with linear and nonlinear regression analyses of state-level data for presidential elections in the United States from 1904 to 1996, longitudinal data on parliamentary elections in Western Europe over most of the twentieth century, and cross-sectional data for recent elections in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia. The results generally validate the model.
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Rydgren, Jens. "Social Isolation? Social Capital and Radical Right-wing Voting in Western Europe." Journal of Civil Society 5, no. 2 (September 2009): 129–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17448680903154915.
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Oltay, Edith. "Concepts of Citizenship in Eastern and Western Europe." Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies 11, no. 1 (September 1, 2017): 43–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auseur-2017-0003.
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AbstractThe classical meaning of citizenship evokes a nation-state with a well-defined territory for its nationals, where national identity and sovereignty play a key role. Global developments are challenging the traditional nation-state and open a new stage in the history of citizenship. Transnational citizenship involving dual and multiple citizenships has become more and more accepted in Europe. Numerous scholars envisaged a post-national development where the nation-state no longer plays a key role. While scholarly research tended to focus on developments in Western Europe, a dynamic development also took place in Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. Dual citizenship was introduced in most Eastern European countries, but its purpose was to strengthen the nation by giving the ethnic kin abroad citizenship and non-resident voting rights. In Western Europe, the right of migrants to citizenship has been expanded throughout the years in the hope that this would result in their better integration into society. Eastern Europe and Western Europe operate with different concepts of citizenship because of their diverging historical traditions and current concerns. The concept of nation and who belong to the national community play a key role in the type of citizenship that they advocate.
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Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca, and Matthew S. Winters. "The Link Between Voting and Life Satisfaction in Latin America." Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 04 (2011): 101–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00135.x.
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AbstractWhat is the relationship between voting and individual life satisfaction in Latin America? While studies of Western Europe suggest that voters are happier than nonvoters, this relationship has not been explored in the younger democracies of the developing world, including those of Latin America. Using multilevel regression models to examine individual-level survey data, this study shows a positive correlation between voting and happiness in the region, noting, however, that the relationship is attenuated in those countries that have enforced compulsory voting. We then explore the causal direction of this relationship: while the existing literature points to voting as a possible determinant of individual happiness, it is also possible that happier individuals are more likely to vote. Three different strategies are used to disentangle this relationship. On balance, the evidence suggests that individual happiness is more likely to be a cause rather than an effect of voting in Latin America.
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van der Waal, Jeroen, and Willem de Koster. "Populism and Support for Protectionism: The Relevance of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in The Netherlands." Political Studies 66, no. 3 (November 10, 2017): 560–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032321717723505.
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Leftist and rightist populist parties in Western Europe both oppose trade openness. Is support for economic protectionism also relevant for their electorates? We assess this in the Netherlands, where both types of populist parties have seats in parliament. Analyses of representative survey data ( n = 1,296) demonstrate that support for protectionism drives voting for such parties, as do the well-established determinants of political distrust (both populist constituencies), economic egalitarianism (leftist populist constituency) and ethnocentrism (rightist populist constituency). Surprisingly, support for protectionism does not mediate the relationship between economic egalitarianism and voting for left-wing populists, or the link between political distrust and voting for either left-wing or right-wing populist parties. In contrast, support for protectionism partly mediates the association between ethnocentrism and voting for right-wing populists. We discuss the largely independent role of protectionism in populist voting in relation to the cultural cleavage in politics and electoral competition, and also provide suggestions for future research.
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Uggla, Fredrik. "Incompetence, Alienation, or Calculation?" Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 8 (February 13, 2008): 1141–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414007301702.
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This article focuses on the casting of invalid ballots and voting for extra-parliamentary parties. Drawing on evidence from more than 200 elections in Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the Americas during the 1980-2000 period, it tests how well four sets of factors serve as explanations for the extent of such behavior in parliamentary contests. The main finding is that the structure of political competition provides an important explanation for extra-parliamentary voting and, in particular, the number of invalid ballots. Thus, rather than being the unfortunate circumstances of an uninformed or incompetent electorate, these forms of voting, to a large extent, appear to reflect a political situation that offers voters little effective choice in the form of clear alternatives.
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Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig. "The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe." American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 4 (April 18, 2018): 936–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12358.
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Molina, Oscar. "Book Review: Parties, Elections and Policy Reforms in Western Europe: Voting for Social Pacts." ILR Review 66, no. 1 (January 2013): 270–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001979391306600112.
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Cornelis, Ilse, and Alain Van Hiel. "Extreme-Right Voting in Western Europe: The Role of Social-Cultural and Antiegalitarian Attitudes." Political Psychology 36, no. 6 (April 1, 2014): 749–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12187.
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ROVNY, JAN, and JONATHAN POLK. "Still blurry? Economic salience, position and voting for radical right parties in Western Europe." European Journal of Political Research 59, no. 2 (September 24, 2019): 248–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12356.
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Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. "Radical Right Parties: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market and Voting Radical Right in Western Europe." Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (March 2007): 267–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423907070370.
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Radical Right Parties: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, Pippa Norris, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 349.Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, Terri E. Givens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 178The growing importance of immigration politics in Western Europe during the past two decades and the connected rise of radical right parties have justifiably received much scholarly attention. While a first generation of scholars treating this phenomenon were mostly concerned with the social bases for the growing political influence of such parties, recent studies have begun to emphasize the importance of purely political factors, such as institutional frameworks and strategic party competition. The books on this topic by Norris and Givens are two of the most prominent accounts in this second generation of studies.
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Vass, Ágnes. "The Extended Nation as a Political Project – Hungarian Diaspora Living in Western Canada." Polish Political Science Review 6, no. 2 (December 1, 2018): 91–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ppsr-2018-0015.
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AbstractPolicy towards Hungarians living in neighbouring countries has been a central issue for Hungarian governments, yet Hungarian diaspora living mainly in Western Europe and North America have received very little attention. This has changed after the 2010 landslide victory of Fidesz. The new government introduced a structured policy focused on engaging Hungarian diaspora, largely due to the nationalist rhetoric of the governing party. The article argues that this change reflects a turn of Hungarian nationalism into what Ragazzi and Balalowska (2011) have called post-territorial nationalism, where national belonging becomes disconnected from territory. It is because of this new conception of Hungarian nationalism that we witness the Hungarian government approach Hungarian communities living in other countries in new ways while using new policy tools: the offer of extraterritorial citizenship; political campaigns to motivate the diaspora to take part in Hungarian domestic politics by voting in legislative elections; or the never-before-seen high state budget allocated to support these communities. Our analysis is based on qualitative data gathered in 2016 from focus group discussions conducted in the Hungarian community of Western Canada to understand the effects of this diaspora politics from a bottom-up perspective. Using the theoretical framework of extraterritorial citizenship, external voting rights and diaspora engagement programmes, the paper gives a brief overview of the development of the Hungarian diaspora policy. We focus on how post-territorial nationalism of the Hungarian government after 2010 effects the ties of Hungarian communities in Canada with Hungary, how the members of these communities conceptualise the meaning of their “new” Hungarian citizenship, voting rights and other diaspora programmes. We argue that external citizenship and voting rights play a crucial role in the Orbán government’s attempt to govern Hungarian diaspora communities through diaspora policy.
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Ramiro, Luis. "Support for radical left parties in Western Europe: social background, ideology and political orientations." European Political Science Review 8, no. 1 (December 9, 2014): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773914000368.
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Radical left parties (RLP) have been significant actors in many Western European party systems since the expansion of mass democracy. In some cases, they have been very relevant forces in terms of popular support. Despite this fact, they have not received a great deal of attention in past decades from a comparative perspective. Through examination of the role of an important set of factors, this article provides, for the first time, a cross-national empirical account of the variation in voting for RLPs across Western Europe, based on individual-level data. It evaluates the effect of key socio-demographic and attitudinal individual-level variables on the RLP vote. The findings point to the continuing relevance of some social and political factors traditionally associated with votes for RLPs, and to the relevance of attitudinal variables.
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Messina, Anthony M. "Voting Radical Right in Western Europe and Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market." Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 03 (August 16, 2007): 658. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592707071988.
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Karapin, Roger. "Explaining Far-Right Electoral Successes in Germany: The Politicization of Immigration-Related Issues." German Politics and Society 16, no. 3 (September 1, 1998): 24–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/104503098782487086.
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Most explanations that have been advanced regarding the recentsuccesses of far-right parties in Western Europe suggest that theseparties should have also done well in Germany. With a high percapitaincome and a strong export-oriented economy, Germany hasexperienced large-scale immigration, a shift toward postindustrialoccupations, economic restructuring, unemployment, and socialmarginalization of the poorest strata. These socioeconomic developmentshave been accompanied by political responses whichshould also benefit the far right: political parties have lost credibility, non-voting has increased, and ecological parties have becomeestablished and have spurred environmental, feminist, and proimmigrantpolicies.
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Wincławska, Maria. "The Freedom Union. The Decline and Fall of the Party in Postcommunist Poland." Polish Political Science Yearbook 35, no. 1 (March 31, 2006): 160–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2006012.
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Emergence of parties and party systems in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism, in comparison with the emergence of parties and party systems in Western Europe, was different in at least two ways. First, they were forming up in the time of crisis of political parties in general. Western political parties, as Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan indicated were a result of sociolopolitical cleavages (Lipset, Rokkan 1967), which enabled them to formulate their programmes and define their electorates. However, since the late 1960’ there have been many changes, due to new socio-political context. Relations between parties and their electorates started to diminish as a result of new sociopolitical differences and the parties themselves started to look for new supporters (tried, with the help of media, to become catch all parties). Parallel to this, ideologies stopped playing the main, defining role in the process of voting for the party. But still, as Lipset claims in an article describing party systems in postcommunist Europe, parties must have steady voter alignments based on sociopolitical divisions in order to successfully take part in consecutive general elections, until then they are unstable.
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Harteveld, Eelco, Wouter Van Der Brug, Stefan Dahlberg, and Andrej Kokkonen. "The gender gap in populist radical-right voting: examining the demand side in Western and Eastern Europe." Patterns of Prejudice 49, no. 1-2 (March 15, 2015): 103–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.2015.1024399.
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Aidt, Toke S., and Peter S. Jensen. "Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938." International Tax and Public Finance 16, no. 3 (April 26, 2008): 362–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-008-9069-9.
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Safronov, Viacheslav V. "Voting for Radical Right Parties in Europe: the Role of Cultural Change and Party Polarization." Telescope: Journal of Sociological and Marketing Research, no. 6 (December 20, 2018): 15–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.33491/telescope2018.602.
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The article is devoted to the problem of rapid growth in recent decades of electoral support for radical right-wing parties in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. The first part of the article discusses the general theoretical foundation of approaches to this problem in the scientific literature - social changes caused by modernization and globalization, and the main varieties of these approaches. One of them assumes that there is an increase in public "demand" for populist and nationalist ideology, while the other indicates the emergence of favorable political opportunities due to electoral institutions of proportional multi-party systems and strategies of party competition, leading to a change in the polarization of the party system in the economic and socio-cultural dimensions. A brief review of empirical studies is given, and the ambiguity of the results is noted.
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Inglehart, Ronald, and Scott C. Flanagan. "Value Change in Industrial Societies." American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (December 1987): 1289–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962590.
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Ronald Inglehart has argued that, while most of the major political parties in Western countries tend to be aligned along a social class–based axis, support for new political movements and new political parties largely reflects the tension between materialist and postmaterialist goals and values. This has presented something of a dilemma to the traditional parties, and helps account for the decline of social-class voting. Scott Flanagan takes issue with Inglehart's interpretation in several particulars. Although their views converge in many respects, Flanagan urges conceptual reorientations and adumbrates a different interpretation of post–World War II political development in Europe and Japan.
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Kranendonk, Maria, Floris Vermeulen, and Anja van Heelsum. "“Unpacking” the Identity-to-Politics Link: The Effects of Social Identification on Voting Among Muslim Immigrants in Western Europe." Political Psychology 39, no. 1 (January 18, 2017): 43–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12397.
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Aidt, Toke S., and Bianca Dallal. "Female voting power: the contribution of women’s suffrage to the growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869–1960)." Public Choice 134, no. 3-4 (October 10, 2007): 391–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9234-1.
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Safronov, Viacheslav V. "Voting for Radical Right Parties in Europe: The Role of Cultural Change and Party Polarization (Part 2)." Telescope: Journal of Sociological and Marketing Research, no. 1 (February 14, 2019): 2–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.33491/telescope2019.101.
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The article is devoted to the problem of rapid growth in recent decades of electoral support for radical right-wing parties in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. It presents the results of empirical testing of the theory of silent counterrevolution and two-dimensional party polarization. Data from the European Social Survey (ESS 2006-14) and content analysis of electoral party manifestos (CMP/MARPOR), and statistics on migrants, electoral institutions and liberal culture for 56 parliamentary elections in 24 European countries were analyzed using two-level logistics modeling. The results show that anti-immigration attitudes and distrust of parliament are the most important distinguishing features of supporters of nationalists and populists. In accordance with the silent counter-revolution theory, the voting mobilization of nationalist supporters in parliamentary elections, according to the facts revealed, depends on the spread of liberal culture in society. The analysis also revealed that the conditions for their mobilization are favorable when party positions in the economic dimension converge and cultural polarization increase at the same time, although this conclusion needs further verification.
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Grossman, Emiliano, and Nicolas Sauger. "Economic internationalization and the decline of the left–right dimension." Party Politics 25, no. 1 (January 2019): 36–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068818816975.
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This article examines the continuing importance of the left–right dimension for voting behavior in Western Europe. We test the extent to which economic internationalization may affect the capacity of this dimension to structure party preferences. We explore two dimensions of internationalization, long-term openness and short-term changes, assessing, respectively, the impact of international trade and foreign investments on voters’ preference formation. To study the influence of changing context, we use four waves of the European Election Study (1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014). We show that openness to international economic exchanges tends to weaken the left–right cleavage. At the same time, long-term economic openness appears to soften the impact of short-term shocks for the relevance of left–right politics.
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Rickardsson, Jonna. "The urban–rural divide in radical right populist support: the role of resident’s characteristics, urbanization trends and public service supply." Annals of Regional Science 67, no. 1 (February 12, 2021): 211–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00168-021-01046-1.
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AbstractIn a number of recent elections in Western Europe, support for far-right populist parties has been significantly higher in non-urban areas than in urban areas. This paper answers the following questions; (1) Can the urban–rural divide in voting behavior be explained by the fact that urban and non-urban populations differ in terms of education, income and other individual characteristics of voters, or by variations in immigration? (2) Can variations in public service supply explain parts of the urban–rural divide in far-right populist support? and (3) How does population growth and public services relate to voting behavior when examining urban and rural municipalities separately? The analyses combine survey data on individual characteristics and register data aggregated on municipalities. The results in this paper suggest that voter characteristics and immigration explain a substantial part of the urban–rural divide. However, the propensity to vote for a far-right populist party is still higher in regions with lower population growth even when controlling for individual characteristics and immigration. When considering public service supply, the urban–rural divide is further weakened. The propensity to vote for a far-right party decreases with higher public service supply and higher share of immigrants. The findings in this paper thereby support the hypothesis that individuals in shrinking areas with lower access to public services are likely to respond to the deterioration of their location by casting a vote on the far-right (i.e., protest voting).
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Fernandez-Vazquez, Pablo, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. "The Informational Role of Party Leader Changes on Voter Perceptions of Party Positions." British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (November 1, 2017): 977–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000047.
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According to spatial models of elections, citizen perceptions of party policy positions are a key determinant of voting choices. Yet recent scholarship from Europe suggests that voters do not adjust their perceptions according to what parties advocate in their campaigns. This article argues that voters develop a more accurate understanding of parties’ ideological positions following a leadership change because a new leader increases the credibility of party policy offerings. Focusing on Western European parties in the 1979–2012 period, it shows that having a new leader is a necessary condition for voters to more accurately perceive the left–right placements of opposition parties. Voters do not use party platforms to form perceptions of incumbent parties’ positions, regardless of whether the leader is new or veteran. These results have important implications for models of party competition and democratic representation.
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Pop-Eleches, Grigore. "Throwing out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties after Communism." World Politics 62, no. 2 (March 23, 2010): 221–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887110000043.
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The electoral rise of unorthodox parties (UOPs) in recent East European elections raises some puzzling questions about electoral dynamics in new democracies. Why did the power alternation of the mid-1990s not result in party-system consolidation, as suggested by some earlier studies, but instead give way to a much more chaotic environment in which established mainstream political parties lost considerable ground to new political formations based on personalist and populist appeals? Why did this reversal in Eastern Europe happen during a period of economic recovery, remarkable Western integration progress, and a broad acceptance of electoral democracy as the only game in town? This article suggests that these electoral dynamics can be explained by focusing on the interaction between protest voting and election sequence. While protest voting to punish unpopular incumbents has been a widespread but understudied practice since the collapse of communism, the beneficiaries of these protest votes have changed in recent elections. Whereas in the first two generations of postcommunist elections, disgruntled voters could opt for untried mainstream alternatives, in third-generation elections (defined as elections taking place after at least two different ideological camps have governed in the postcommunist period) voters had fewer untried mainstream alternatives, and therefore opted in greater number for unorthodox parties. This explanation receives strong empirical support from statistical tests using aggregate data from seventy-six parliamentary elections in fourteen East European countries from 1990 to 2006, survey evidence from twelve postcommunist elections from 1996 to 2004, and a survey experiment in Bulgaria in 2008.
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Mosimann, Nadja, Line Rennwald, and Adrian Zimmermann. "The radical right, the labour movement and the competition for the workers’ vote." Economic and Industrial Democracy 40, no. 1 (August 24, 2018): 65–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0143831x18780317.
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This article analyses the capacity of radical right parties to attract support from union members in recent elections in Western Europe. It is argued that unionized voters resist the appeals of the radical right better than non-union members. Using data from the European Social Survey 2010–2016, the article shows that union members are overall less likely to vote for the radical right than non-union members. Even though it is found that unionized working-class and middle-class voters are less likely to vote radical right than their non-unionized peers in the pooled sample, it is also observed that these subgroups of unionized voters and especially unionized working-class voters are not immune to radical right voting in all the countries analysed. The article thus indicates a growing capacity of the radical right to attract unionized working-class segments of the electorate in some countries and to directly compete with left parties for these voters.
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Weaver, Vesla M. "Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy." Studies in American Political Development 21, no. 2 (2007): 230–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x07000211.
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Civil rights cemented its place on the national agenda with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, fair housing legislation, federal enforcement of school integration, and the outlawing of discriminatory voting mechanisms in the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Less recognized but no less important, the Second Reconstruction also witnessed one of the most punitive interventions in United States history. The death penalty was reinstated, felon disenfranchisement statutes from the First Reconstruction were revived, and the chain gang returned. State and federal governments revised their criminal codes, effectively abolishing parole, imposing mandatory minimum sentences, and allowing juveniles to be incarcerated in adult prisons. Meanwhile, the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 gave the federal government an altogether new role in crime control; several subsequent policies, beginning with the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and culminating with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, ‘war on drugs,’ and extension of capital crimes, significantly altered the approach. These and other developments had an exceptional and long-lasting effect, with imprisonment increasing six-fold between 1973 and the turn of the century. Certain groups felt the burden of these changes most acutely. As of the last census, fully half of those imprisoned are black and one in three black men between ages 20 and 29 are currently under state supervision. Compared to its advanced industrial counterparts in western Europe, the United States imprisons at least five times more of its citizens per capita.
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Calvo, Ernesto. "The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation." World Politics 61, no. 2 (March 18, 2009): 254–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887109000100.
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One of the most noteworthy political regularities in the early twentieth century was the shift away from majoritarian electoral rules in Western Europe. The conventional wisdom suggests that proportional representation (PR) was introduced by elites who believed that under the existing majoritarian rules (simple plurality, block-vote, two-ballot rules) they would soon lose power to rapidly growing socialist parties. But this does not explain why many electoral reforms were carried out in countries with weak or nonexistent socialist parties. The author shows that increasing the number of parties distorts the seat-vote properties of electoral rules to a larger degree than previously anticipated. Under increasing party competition, electoral regimes display larger partisan biases than those observed in two-party races and crowd out minority parties that have territorially dispersed constituencies in favor of minority parties that have territorially concentrated constituencies. Using a dynamic Bayesian model for seats and votes, the author measures the partisan biases brought about by the expansion of voting rights in the late nineteenth century to explain the drive to reform majoritarian electoral systems.
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Jaynes, Gerald D. "MIGRATION AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION." Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 4, no. 1 (2007): 5–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1742058x07070026.
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AbstractThe dawn of the twenty-first century confronts Western democracies with a racialized class problem. The globalization of capitalism—mass geographic movement of peoples, capital, and markets on scales unprecedented since the Atlantic slave trade—has brought poor migrants into affluent nations. Migrants' descendants are replicating conditions associated with poor Blacks. Affluent Western democracies are hurtling toward biplural stratification defined by a multiracial underclass. Racialized class stratification stems from economic policies. Capitalist democracies' edifice of social policies—sanctioning expectations of rising prosperity, welfare “safety nets” for minimal consumption, low-wage migration policies—erroneously assumed that jobs and wages would continuously grow to absorb expanding populations. Overuse of low-wage migration policies commodified work relations in low-skilled jobs. Acculturated to demand affluent living standards and egalitarian human relations, educationally deprived descendants of migrants find commodified work regimens repellent. Despite large populations of jobless natives, some maintain that affluent democracies need more migrants to do the jobs that natives won't do. But jobless youth are alienated and prone to agency, as riots in England, the United States, and, more recently, France and other areas of Europe suggest. To avert the solidification of biplural societies, social policy must slow rates of migration from low living-standard economies, expand minimum wages and income transfers to working-citizen households, and provide documented immigrants clear avenues to citizenship. This agenda is more likely to succeed in the United States, where minority voting strength is gathering considerable momentum.
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Kibreab, Gaim. "Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees." International Migration Review 37, no. 1 (March 2003): 24–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00129.x.
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This article examines the relationship between access to or lack of access to citizenship rights in countries of asylum and the propensity of refugees to return. It hypothesizes that in situations where refugees enjoy civil, social and economic citizenship rights in the context of favorable structural factors — relatively secure employment, self-employment, social services such as housing, schools, health care and social security – the importance of repatriation may diminish as a viable option. In North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand, where refugees are able to enjoy rights of citizenship with definite prospects for becoming citizens (through naturalization) or denizens through acquisition of permanent status, and where favorable structural factors provide for the enjoyment of a decent standard of living, they tend to remain regardless of whether the conditions that prompted displacement are eliminated. The policy environments and the structural factors for refugees sheltering in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are the antithesis of those refugees in Developed Countries (DCs). As a result, millions of refugees in the South have been ‘voting with their feet’ homewards to recoup citizenship rights which they lost in connection with displacement and which they have been unable to achieve in exile.
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Fennema, Meindart. "Book Review: Terri E. Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 178 pp. ISBN 978 0 521 85134 3 (hbk)." Party Politics 14, no. 4 (July 2008): 510–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/13540688080140040605.
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Reitz, Tilman, and Dirk Jörke. "The reshaping of political representation in post-growth capitalism: A paradigmatic analysis of green and right-wing populist parties." Anthropological Theory 21, no. 3 (January 6, 2021): 287–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1463499620977992.
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This article aims to provide an analysis of the reconfiguration of political orientations in the face of weakening economic growth. We address a widely observed new polarization in the party systems of Western democracies, with radically universalist and ecological orientations, often represented by green parties, versus industrialist and authoritarian values, mainly represented by right-wing populism. In our effort to explain this constellation, we offer an alternative to accounts that merely focus on an underlying change of class structures or that, conversely, declare socio-economic factors obsolete in their relevance for voting behaviour. While the one side focuses on the ‘losers of modernization’ or deindustrialization, the other side emphasizes a cultural conflict between new cosmopolitan values and a defence of male, white, heterosexual, non-migrant privileges. In contrast to such accounts, we analyse how the general trend towards decelerated economic growth provoked new orientations on the (liberal) left and on the (populist) right. In a first step, we provide an overview of diagnoses of ‘secular stagnation’ and of the rise of radically universalist and right-wing parties in Western Europe, focusing in particular on the last decade and looking to the US by way of comparison. We then focus on the attitudes which the political actors in question entertain towards economic growth and offer an interpretation of their ‘cultural’ motives as struggles over economic distribution. The third and last step presents a Gramscian extension of socio-economic analysis beyond the study of voter groups and their attitudes. Here, we take into account the interests of the ruling classes along with the quest for legitimacy and projected changes in the regime of accumulation—if indeed the term accumulation is still adequate in a post-growth context.
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Nureev, Rustem M., and Islam D. Surkhaev. "Digitalization of the Economy: the New Role of Social Media." Journal of Institutional Studies 13, no. 2 (June 25, 2021): 006–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.17835/2076-6297.2021.13.2.006-026.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of social networks, the role of which is constantly growing in the context of the digitalization of the economy. The Internet has become an important prerequisite for their spread. If at the beginning of 1990, even in the most developed countries, less than 1% of the population used the Internet, then by 2020 the level of its prevalence in North America and Western Europe exceeded 90%, and in the countries of East, Southeast and West Asia, and Latin America has exceeded 2/3. We live in a rapidly changing world, when the number of active Internet users exceeded 4.66 billion people in early 2021. The speed of obtaining information is currently an important factor in economic activity. Therefore, contacts are growing rapidly, which is reflected in e-mail, which has become an integral part of modern life, pushing far back other forms of communication (newspapers, mail, telegraph, etc.). The rapid acceleration of conflicting information increases the risk of decision-making, many of which must be made in the face of uncertainty. With the growth of social networks, the density of contacts increases and the importance of a fuller use of network benefits increases. Not only is the number of participants changing, but so is the quantity and quality of the most popular websites. Citizens of modern states are more informed than their previous generations. Conducting an electoral system under such conditions turns out to be a task with many unknowns. In these conditions, voting manipulation takes on new features, which were clearly manifested during the American presidential campaigns in the United States in 2008, 2012, 2016. In addition, opportunities are being created to improve the quality of public finance management by increasing the openness of budgeting at the federal and regional levels, that is, the actual implementation of the Vernon Smith auction in practice, which will be an important step in the formation of a genuine civil society.
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Parlyk, Vladislav. "The search of ways out of crisis of the Social Democratic Movement of Austria." Науково-теоретичний альманах "Грані" 22, no. 2 (April 22, 2019): 69–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.15421/171924.
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The article is devoted to the crisis of social democratic movements in Western Europe in the XXI century. Emphasis is placed on the evolution of the Social Democratic Party of Austria. Of great importance are the developments of such scientists who dealt with this problem, as K. Kholodkovsky, N. Rabotyazhev, A. Vilkov, G. Nidermyulbihler, G. Sidl, G. Moschonas. The structure of the article is as follows. The first part shows a tendency to reduce electoral support for socialist and social democratic parties in countries such as France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Austria and Greece. The general causes of the crisis of the Social Democrats are highlighted. Firstly, in the conditions of depopulation of the population and globalization of production, the working class is being eroded, conditions which supported decades social democrats across the whole Europe disappear. Secondly, social democrats, addressing target audience ceased to consider its specifics. Thirdly, owing to the crisis phenomena in the EU, migration crisis, deepening of inequality there is a radicalization as right and left electorate.The analysis of researches of the Austrian Institute of social researches and consulting of SORA indicates that the Social Democratic Party of Austria has ceased to be a «party of workers», its support base is currently voting more for the Austrian Freedom Party. Also the analysis of flows of voters between parliamentary parties (NET) of the last four electoral cycles in Austria states a steady trend of transition of bigger number of votes from social democrats to the right populists.In the second part in a chronological order four stages of modernization of ideology and complex organizational reform of the Social Democratic Party of Austria which captured the period from May, 2014 to November, 2018 are allocated and analysed. The main provisions of the new political program of the party, in which the Social Democratic Party of Austria offers voters their vision of solving the problems of the 21st century, as well as the structure and important points of the new organizational Statute, are considered. The key points of the new program are the digital revolution, the fair distribution of work and working time, resources and opportunities, as well as education, social security, a dignified old age, the expansion of non-commercial housing construction, forced migration, environmental problems, in particular global warming. Important points of the new Statute include the strengthening of the role of ordinary members of the party, the possibility of obtaining guest member status for one year with the right to become a permanent member of the party, the expansion of thematic and project initiatives.In conclusions major factors which acted as the trigger to fundamental updating of the Social Democratic Party of Austria, feature of this process are allocated. Results of a research can have a certain value for the scientists researching the social democratic movement and also subjects of party and political life.
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Shevchenko, Nataliya. "Latin American and the Caribbean countries approaches to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014." American History & Politics: Scientific edition, no. 12 (2021): 104–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2021.12.10.
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The aim of this article is to study the positions of the leading states of the Latin American region and the Caribbean on the issue of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the context of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. The research methodology is based on the principle of historicism and problem-chronological and integrated approaches, comparative and analytical methods, which helped to trace the positions of the states of the region on this issue when voting for the UN General Assembly resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine of March 27, 2014 and to determine internal and external factors that might affect them. The scientific novelty of the study is based on the fact that for the first time in the Ukrainian historical science the author conducted a comprehensive analysis of the positions of the LAC states on this issue. Obtained results will help our Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping Ukraine’s strategy in this region, including in the context of the implementation of the «Crimean Platform». Conclusions: In their attitude to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the LAC countries were divided into several regional groups. Mainly the countries of the Pacific Alliance and some states of Central America and the Caribbean supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation was supported by the main members of the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) – Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. The members of the regional association MERCOSUR and part of the English–speaking states of the Caribbean have shown «restrained» positions. The «Crimean precedent» has become not only a «challenge» for regional security, but also a «challenge» at the global level. This showed that the LAC countries, which for the past several decades in a multipolar world have tried to position themselves in the international arena as states that do not recognize the division into «spheres of influence» during the Cold War and build their relations on the basis of equal partnership, in fact have demonstrated not just solidarity with the Russian Federation, but the recognition of its sphere of geopolitical influence in Ukraine and, more broadly, in the post–Soviet space and in Eastern Europe. And this, in turn, could potentially lead to attempts to restore «spheres of influence» in other parts of the world, including the Western Hemisphere itself.
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LYNCH, FRANCES M. B. "FINANCE AND WELFARE: THE IMPACT OF TWO WORLD WARS ON DOMESTIC POLICY IN FRANCE." Historical Journal 49, no. 2 (June 2006): 625–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x06005371.
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Fathers, families, and the state in France, 1914–1945. By Kristen Stromberg Childers. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003. Pp. 261. ISBN 0-8014-4122-6. £23.95.Origins of the French welfare state: the struggle for social reform in France, 1914–1947. By Paul V. Dutton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 251. ISBN 0-521-81334-4. £49.99.Britain, France, and the financing of the First World War. By Martin Horn. Montreal and Kingston: McGill – Queen's University Press, 2002. Pp. 249. ISBN 0-7735-2293-X. £65.00.The gold standard illusion: France, the Bank of France and the International Gold Standard, 1914–1939. By Kenneth Mouré. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. 297. ISBN 0-19-924904-0. £40.00.Workers' participation in post-Liberation France. By Adam Steinhouse. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001. Pp. 245. ISBN 0-7391-0282-6. $70.00 (hb). ISBN 0-7391-0283-4. $24.95 (pbk).In the traditional historiography of twentieth-century France the period after the Second World War is usually contrasted favourably with that after 1918. After 1945, new men with new ideas, born out of the shock of defeat in 1940 and resistance to Nazi occupation, laid the basis for an economic and social democracy. The welfare state was created, women were given full voting rights, and French security, in both economic and territorial respects, was partially guaranteed by integrating West Germany into a new supranational institutional structure in Western Europe. 1945 was to mark the beginning of the ‘30 glorious years’ of peace and prosperity enjoyed by an expanding population in France. In sharp contrast, the years after 1918 are characterized as a period dominated by France's failed attempts to restore its status as a great power. Policies based on making the German taxpayer finance France's restoration are blamed for contributing to the great depression after 1929 and the rise of Hitler. However, as more research is carried out into the social and economic reconstruction of France after both world wars, it is becoming clear that the basis of what was to become the welfare state after 1945 was laid in the aftermath of the First World War. On the other hand, new reforms adopted in 1945 which did not build on interwar policies, such as those designed to give workers a voice in decision-making at the workplace, proved to be short-lived.
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Kulakov, V. I. "ORIGIN OF HEAD CROWNS IN ANCIENT AESTIA AND PRUSSIANS." Vestnik Bryanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 03, no. 07 (September 27, 2021): 99–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.22281/2413-9912-2021-05-03-99-109.
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The archaeological material of the south-eastern Baltic States contains several rare specimens of typeset head corollas for the antiquities of the Western Balts. The conclusions obtained as a result of the analysis of the head corollas of the Western Balts of the I-XIV centuries can be presented as follows: 1. Northern European masters at the beginning of our era created their own versions of head wreaths, based on examples of ancient votive wreaths. The latter were used both in triumphal events and at the burial of notable members of ancient society. It remains unclear under what conditions the Scandinavians could adopt the idea of a votive wreath, reworking it in the form of head corollas. 2. In phase B1, individual representatives of the northern tribes appear on Sambia, who brought crowns with them to the Amber Coast as part of the matrimonial "import", which were attached in especially solemn (cult ?) in cases of head covering. 3. In Roman times, head crowns did not find their place in the material culture of the population of the western outskirts of the Baltic world. In the early Middle Ages, through the mediation of master jewelers of south-eastern Europe, the tradition of wearing corollas made using Byzantine traditions spread in the Baltic States. It is possible that these traditions came to the Baltic States with groups of artisans along the Vislin trade route – the ancient Great Amber Road.
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Scheid, John. "NOT SO UNUSUAL AFTER ALL: REMARKS ON THE LATIN CURSE TABLETS OF THE IMPERIAL AGE." Greece and Rome 69, no. 1 (March 7, 2022): 72–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017383521000231.
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This article examines the ritual contexts of two recent discoveries of materia magica in complex and carefully excavated archaeological sites, and situates the prayers found there within the wider range of prayer in traditional Roman religion. Both the texts found in the so-called ‘magician's cellar’ in Chartres and those on the lead tablets found behind the temple of Magna Mater in Mainz date to the first century ce and are thus among the earliest surviving magical texts in the West. Despite the usual assumption that many magical rituals migrated from east to west across the Mediterranean and then up into western Europe, it shows how these two early caches of magical text reflect, in fact, the pattern and style of early Latin votive formulae, as well as traditional Roman prayers, like those of the Arval Brethren, and traditional Roman rituals.
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Zhiltsov, S. S. "History of the Ukrainian State Formation (Prior to the USSR Breakup)." Post-Soviet Issues 5, no. 3 (August 24, 2018): 309–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2018-5-3-309-328.
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The changeover of the ruling of the modern Ukrainian territory between East and West had lasted for around 800 years beginning from the Mongol-Tatar invasion. It was that time when Batu Khan defeated Ancient Rus that the present territory of Ukraine came under complete and absolute ruling of the Tatar East. In the 16th century as a part of Lithuania Ukraine was included into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and then passed under the rule of the Polish magnates, under the yoke of the Western Polish civilization. In 1569 the Union of Lublin was signed that formalized the accession of the Ukrainian territory to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the period from the 10th to the 19th centuries there was no such state as Ukraine on the world political map. In the 10th century some part of the territory of present Ukraine was taken by Kievan Rus, in the 13th century — by Golden Horde, in the 14th-15th centuries — by Lithuania, Golden Horde and Russia. In the next centuries the territory of Ukraine was controlled by the Ottoman Empire, Poland and Russia. And only in 1918 the state of Ukraine appeared on the political map.Single Soviet Ukraine created by Bolsheviks did not present any internal cultural and language unity as it was always shared by different empires being the hostile and irreconcilable centers of force in Europe — the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire.In 1917-1920 about dozens of different republics were established in the territory of Ukraine. They were isolated within the borders of their formations. Accordingly, it may be said that in 1917-1920 Ukraine presented a mosaic of different formations which were often formed due to ambitions of some scoundrels and political adventurers striving to get to power and to become the leader of a state. But only the tough policy of Bolsheviks aimed to prevent the disintegration process permitted Ukraine to preserve its territory. After its election the Supreme Council started preparation of the Draft Declaration of Ukraine State Sovereignty simultaneously with the Draft Law on Ukraine State Sovereignty. Both drafts were considered in May 1990. After their discussion it was decided to develop the Draft Declaration of State Sovereignty.On July 16, 1990 the Ukrainian Parliament after long discussions adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine by majority voting. This declaration which did not change and substitute the Constitution of Ukrainian SSR became a very important document for establishment of the Ukrainian statehood having laid the basis for the future Constitution of Ukraine.The concept of the new Constitution of Ukraine envisaged the establishment of the presidential republic. As a result, in June 1991 the laws «On Establishment of the Office of President of Ukrainian SSR with Making Alterations and Additions in the Constitution», «On President of Ukrainian SSR” and “On Election of President of Ukrainian SSR». The office of president was established to strengthen the vertical of executive power and to make it in the future independent of executive power of union bodies. The law assigned broad authorities to the president. Thus, the president acquired the right to cancel the decisions of the USSR bodies of executive power in the territory of Ukrainian SSR if they contradicted its constitution.By mid-1991 the legislative base was created in Ukraine which, in fact, made it an independent state as the laws adopted in 1990 and in the first half of 1991 brought out Ukraine from subordination to the USSR powers. The single economic, political and military space of the USSR practically ceased to exist. By this time Ukraine subordinated only nominally to union authorities. On August 24 the Extraordinary Meeting of Supreme Rada passed the Act on Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. That time it was also decided to conduct on December 01 the republican referendum to confirm the Act of Independence. This was done with a view to demonstrate to the union authorities that the Ukrainian people were endeavoring to become independent, thus, making legitimate the Act of Independence. After becoming independent in 1991 Ukraine entered the new stage of its development. The regional system of Ukraine revealed two clear poles — Donbass and Galichina which determined the country’s development for decades ahead.
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van Peski, Caecilia J. "Good Cop, Bad Cop." Security and Human Rights 24, no. 1 (2013): 49–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02401008.
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Over the summer month of August 2008, Georgia launched a large-scale military offensive against South Ossetia in an attempt of reconquering the territory. Four years later, on October 1, 2012, Georgia is holding its first Parliamentary Elections after the conflict that caused so much harm. The Parliamentary Elections constitute the 7th legislative elections held since Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. It is however the first time for Georgia to elect an alternative party from the ruling party solely based on principle of democratic vote. The article examines the almost ten years of President Saakashvili’s Administration. During this decade, Saakashvili’s United National Movement government realized many positive works. Works like the successful reform of police forces and the determined force-back of corruption. These liberating works were all eagerly welcomed by Europe and other western nations. However, in the apparent loss of sense of reality towards the end of its reign, Georgia’s United National Movement government turned to dictating and ordering as a main style of governing. This in turn pushed citizens away from Saakashvili’s politics into voting for the opposition. Unforeseen by even the most experienced Southern Caucasus and Georgia experts, Georgia’s 2012 Parliamentary Elections gave way to the opposition coalition Georgian Dream to sweep to victory, leaving President Saakashvili to ceded defeat. Despite President Saakashvili’s statement that he would go into opposition there has not been a complete paradigm shift in Georgia’s domestic politics. With the Georgian Dream’s failure to gain a constitutional majority and questions over the ideological compatibility of the coalition – along with the fact that United National Movement still has the greatest representation in Parliament relative to the other parties, Saakashvili and his supporters keep hold to substantial political leverage. Also, Saakashvili will remain President until the October 2013 election. His opponent, Prime Minister Ivanishvili is expected to manifest himself, bringing in a less contentious, more pragmatic approach to relations with the country’s giant neighbour to the north. Overall, it can be said that Georgia’s unrivalled ballot-box transfer of power elevated the country to a category fundamentally higher in terms of democratic development than virtually all other post-Soviet states. This has been the more remarkable even since Georgia had been widely cited as an example case of a failed state, with a destroyed infrastructure and economy, dysfunctional state institutions and something approaching anarchy as its governance model. The impact of the ongoing reform of Georgia’s constitution and electoral law has lead to major shifts in Georgia’s political landscape. However, opinions vary as to whether the farsighted amendments made to the Georgian constitution on the initiative of the United National Movement are a genuine attempt to improve the country’s system of governance or that they rather are an effort by the incumbent president to cling on to power. The adoption of the amendments and the timing of their entry into force strongly suggest that the latter might be the case. Meanwhile, as a result of the changes to the Georgian constitution, a system of dual power has come in place. These and other factors suggest that Georgia’s political landscape is set to become more predictable. The article examines the degree to which this can be held true. In the streets of Tbilisi, hundred days into the reign of the new government, there is an air of optimism amongst the people. This holds especially true when it comes to youth. The hope is that the Georgian Dream becomes a Georgian reality. The disappointment otherwise might be shattering. In spring 2013, the new leadership offers new opportunities for Georgia. It can improve its democratic system and economic growth and establish a dialogue with Russia and the breakaway districts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This would alleviate the frozen conflict and tense security dilemma’ on the Administrative Boundary Lines. Yet, if the transition of power does not go well, there will be prolonged power struggles that could cripple the policy making and cast Georgia back to pre-Saakashvili times. The article addresses the overall question whether the smooth transfer of power Georgia achieved after October’s election sets a standard for democracy in the region depending on whether the new government can strengthen the independence and accountability of state institutions in what remains a fragile, even potentially explosive political climate. The victory of the Georgian Dream Coalition over the United National Movement has brought pluralism into Georgian policymaking. However this political pluralism also includes that awkward dual powers; Georgia’s good cop and bad cop.
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Ondrkál, Filip. "The Súl′ov-Hradná II: Military deposit of Lusatian culture from Western Slovakia." Archaeologiai Értesítő 147, no. 1 (March 3, 2023): 105–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/0208.2022.00036.
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AbstractThe Final Bronze Age (ca. 1080–725 BC) in the Western Carpathians is characterized by increased cross-cultural militarization, which culminated in the collapse horizon era in Ha C1a. Here, the Lusatian culture introduced a series of investments in defensive infrastructure in the Ha A2–B1 period, many of which were maintained and reinforced over the following centuries. Spectacular finds of deposited weapons, including bronze swords (Komjatná, Martinček, Liptovské Sliače), which are rarely found in graves of that time, are known from the Váh river valley. The Final Bronze Age hoard of Súľov-Hradná II, Bytča dist. (Ha B1; 1080–960 BC), newly represents a multi-typic find of 9 bronze swords (reine Schwerthort) and magnificently illustrates the recurring codified behaviour of votive weapon deposition in the aquatic and mountain environment of the Western Carpathians. As the Old Germanic toponym of Žibrid hill (867 m; germ. Sivrit/Sieg-fried = victorious peace) suggests, the knowledge of the deposition event may have survived to the present day, and it recalls the old Celto-Germanic rule of sacrificing the weapons of the defeated party, and provides a powerful addition to the understanding some characteristic and strikingly recurring patterns in the bronze archaeological record in Central Europe.A késő bronzkort (kb. Kr. e. 1080–725) a Nyugati-Kárpátokban a kultúrák közötti fegyveres konfliktusok jellemzik, amelyek a bronzkort követő Ha C1a periódusban érik el a csúcspontjukat. A Lausitz-kultúra Ha A2–B1 fázisában építik ki azt a védelmi infrastruktúrát, melynek részeit a következő évszázadokban is megtartják és megerősítik. Ebből az időszakból származnak a Vág völgyéből előkerült, fegyvereket – többek között a korabeli sírokban csak elvétve előforduló bronz kardokat – tartalmazó kincsleletek, fegyverdepók (Komjatná, Martinček, Liptovské Sliače). A késő bronzkori Súľov-Hradná II (Bytča körzet) lelőhelyről (Kr. e. 1080–960) egy 9 bronzkardból álló lelet (reine Schwerthort) került elő, amely ismételten illusztrálja a Nyugati-Kárpátok vizes és hegyi környezetében jellemző, rendszeres, votív fegyverdeponálási szokást. Amint azt a Žibrid-hegy (867 m t.f.m.; germán Sivrit/Sieg-fried = győzelem-béke) ógermán eredetű neve is jelzi, a deponálási szokás ismerete a mai napig megőrződhetett a terület toponímiájában. A legyőzött fél fegyvereinek ősi kelta–germán feláldozási szokása fontos adalékot jelent a közép-európai bronzkor néhány ismétlődő jelenségének megértésében.Neskorá doba bronzová (ca. 1080–725 pr. Kr.) je v Západných Karpatoch charakteristická zvýšenou medzikultúrnou militarizáciou, ktorá vyvrcholila érou zánikového horizontu v Ha C1a. Lužická kultúra tu v období Ha A2–B1 zaviedla sériu investícií do obrannej infraštruktúry, z ktorých mnohé boli udržiavané a zosilnené počas nasledujúcich storočí. Práve z tohto obdobia sú z údolia rieky Váh známe veľkolepé nálezy deponovaných zbraní vrátane bronzových mečov (Komjatná, Martinček, Liptovské Sliače), ktoré sa v hroboch tej doby vyskytujú zriedkavo. Neskorobronzové depozitum Súľov-Hradná II, okr. Bytča (1080–960 pr. Kr.) novo reprezentuje homogénny nález 9 bronzových mečov (reine Schwerthort) a ilustruje opakujúce sa kodifikované správanie votívneho ukladania zbraní vo vodnom a vysokohorskom prostredí Západných Karpát. Ako uvádza aj starogermánske toponymum vrchu Žibrid (867 m; germ. Sivrit/Sieg-fried = víťazný mier), znalosť udalosti deponovania mohla pretrvať až do súčasnosti, a pripomína staré keltsko-germánske pravidlo obetovania zbraní porazenej strany, a poskytuje silný doplnok v pochopení niektorých charakteristických a nápadne sa opakujúcich vzorcov v archeologickom zázname bronzu v strednej Európe.
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Kaczmarek, Romuald. "Relief with Crucifixion Scene in St Martin’s Church in Jawor – the Oldest Silesian Pictorial Epitaph and its Ideological and Artistic Contexts." Ikonotheka, no. 31 (September 20, 2022): 113–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/2657-6015ik.31.5.
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This paper provides an analysis of the relief block with the Crucifixion scene preserved in the St. Martin’s parish church in Jawor, an important town in the Duchy Jawor-Świdnica in the 14th century. According to the 17th century’s written sources the relief was originally located on the wall of the church’s cemetery mortuary, however the primary written source pertaining to the artwork in question is the inscription running along its three sides. The slab commemorates Johann Sapiens and his family. It is the earliest preserved pictorial epitaph in Silesia and in this part of Europe. Its votive purpose is stated. Moreover, a passage referring to biblical texts as well as formulations, which entered into the consecration rites of churches and altars, provide a premise to interpret this family memorial and epitaph, at the same time, also as an ossuary foundation memorial. These circumstances allow searching for possible models and references in places where the pictorial epitaph found favourable conditions for development already at the dawn of its existence as a type of sepulchral monument. At first sight, Thuringia with Erfurt seem the place geographically closest to Silesia, where stylistically and typologically related artworks have been preserved. However, the crucifix depicted in the relief from Jawor turned out to be rather typical for the contemporary Silesian sculpture too, in contrast to the assisting figures of Virgin Mary and St. John. In consequence, the references and sources of inspiration applied in the process of creation of the assisting figures in relief from Jawor should be searched in western territories of Silesia or having regard to the possibility of drawing inspiration from much older portable microplastic objects as, for example, Byzantine or Romanesque ivory.
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Vlaskin, Mikhail, and Aleksandr Symonenko. "Ritual Deposit of the Sarmatian Age from the Barrow on the Lower Don Basin." Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, no. 4 (October 2020): 151–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2020.4.10.
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Introduction. In 2007 the archaeological expedition of the State Autonomic Cultural Facility of Rostov Region “The Don Heritage” excavated burial ground Krasny IV in Aksay district of Rostov Region. In the mound of barrow No. 13 a bronze rod-shaped frontlet plate with a hook, a bronze lunula-shaped harness pendant, six bronze bridle roundels, a bone cheek-piece, and iron fragments of the, most likely, bits have been discovered. Methods and materials. In the study the standard methods of archaeological analysis are used: comparative-typological, the method of analogies, chronological, and cartographic ones. The materials are the discovered artifacts. Analysis. According to the conditions of location and composition, the assemblage from barrow No. 13 can be identified as a ritual deposit. Such assemblages are known in special literature as “hoards”, “strange assemblages” or “votive hoards”. They have been found in mounds of barrows or in natural hills without traces of human burials. Usually they consist of cauldrons or situlae (often the rest items are put into them), bridle sets with peculiar frontlet plate with a hook, silver and bronze phalerae, helmets of Western types, weapons (most often spear- and arrowheads), expensive and socially prestigious items (silver and glassware, jewelry). The presence of all these items in the ritual deposit is not necessary. These sites are concentrated in geographically opposite regions: the basins of the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut and in the east of European Sarmatia – in the AzovDonbass, Don and Kuban basins, the Lower Volga basin and North Caucasus. Results. Close parallels to the frontlet plate, bronze lunula-shaped pendant, and bridle roundels were found in the South Bug basin (Marievka), the Dniester and Prut interfluve (Brãviceni), Romania (Zimnicea), the North Caucasus (Prochnookopskaya, Geymanovsky, Giaginskaya), the Don and Volga interfluve (Kachalinskaya). All of these sites are identified as ritual deposits of the late 2nd – 1st centuries BC. The assemblage from barrow No. 13 should be dated to the same time. The ritual deposits of Eastern Europe could be divided into two chronologically different groups. The sites of the early group (3rd – early 2nd century BC) have appeared in the North Caucasus and concentrated in the North-Western Pontic region. It is assumed that they belong to the Хsaiai, Saudaratai and Thissamatai mentioned in the Olbian decree in honor of Protogenes. The sites of the late group (the late 2nd – 1st centuries BC) in the Northern Pontic Region, the Don basin, the North Caucasus and adjacent territories belong, most likely, to the Sarmatians.
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"Voting radical right in Western Europe." Choice Reviews Online 43, no. 10 (June 1, 2006): 43–6143. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/choice.43-6143.
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