Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Virtue'

El objetivo de esta tesis es determinar tanto los límites como las posibilidades de la virtue ethics. Desde sus inicios hasta el momento actual, la virtue ethics ha evolucionado rápidamente desde revindicar una mayor atención a las virtudes en la ética contemporánea hasta convertirse en una de las tres teorías éticas normativas principales —juntamente con la deontología y el utilitarismo-. Es el momento de analizar este gran desarrollo con el objetivo de averiguar cuáles son los mayores problemas a los que se enfrenta la teoría y cuáles son sus posibilidades más prometedoras. El primer capítulo se destina a presentar las diferentes ideas y tesis contenidas en la virtue ethics. Después de encontrar una definición adecuada de la virtue ethics, se presenta un marco general de la teoría ética normativa. Este marco está compuesto por las principales cuestiones a las que toda teoría ética normativa debe enfrentarse y es apto para clasificar todas las ideas y tesis de cualquier teoría ética. Finalmente, las principales tesis de la virtue ethics concernientes a cada cuestión identificada previamente se anuncian y se clasifican en el interior del marco. El segundo capítulo analiza las objeciones y los límites de la virtue ethics. Se argumenta que la teoría puede hacer frente a algunas de las principales objeciones que se le han planteado, como la objeción del egoísmo y la del elitismo. Sin embargo, si la virtue ethics no quiere verse limitada por un concepto insubstancial de 'virtud', debe ocuparse de algunos aspectos fundamentales de la teoría antigua de la virtud que, en la actualidad, pueden constituir problemas filosóficos. El objetivo del capítulo tercero es explorar las posibilidades más prometedoras de la virtue ethics. Se defiende que estas posibilidades pueden encontrarse, precisamente, en el ámbito donde la teoría ha recibido las más duras críticas: el área de la normatividad. La virtue ethics no solo puede hacer frente a la objeción action-guiding, sino que puede hacer mucho más: puede desarrollar una propuesta normativa innovadora. A lo largo de varias secciones se presentan y analizan algunas ideas fundamentales de la virtue ethics. Todas estas ideas conducen a una nueva perspectiva sobre la normatividad que se centra en la formación global del carácter virtuoso. Este proyecto se denomina "el proyecto normativo como proyecto educativo". Se argumenta que la virtue ethics debería abandonar el propósito de presentar un procedimiento general diseñado para individuar la acción correcta en cada caso. En cambio, debería dirigir todos sus futuros esfuerzos normativos a desarrollar el nuevo proyecto normativo presentado aquí, desplegando así sus posibilidades más importantes. Para tal fin, debería adoptar una perspectiva multidisciplinar, contando especialmente con los resultados de la psicología empírica. Después de analizar el debate reciente entre la virtue ethics y la psicología social, se argumenta que el nuevo proyecto normativo se beneficiará de los hallazgos empíricos de la psicología. En el capítulo cuarto se reexaminan las varias tesis clasificadas en el primer capítulo, con el objetivo de seleccionar las mejores sobre la base de los resultados obtenidos en los capítulos centrales del trabajo. Para cada una de las cuestiones principales que toda teoría ética debe afrontar, se selecciona la respuesta más apropiada de la virtue ethics. El resultado es la versión máximamente adecuada de la virtue ethics.
The aim of this PhD thesis is to find the limits and the possibilities of virtue ethics. From its beginning until now, virtue ethics has developed evolved into one of the three main normative ethical theories —together with deontology and utilitarianism. It's time to take a look back to this great development in order to see what are the worst problems the theory has to face and what are its most promising possibilities. The first chapter is devoted to present the various ideas and thesis contained within the vast landscape represented by virtue ethics. After finding an adequate definition of virtue ethics, a general framework of a normative ethical theory will be presented. Finally, the main thesis of virtue ethics concerning each question previously identified will be classified within the framework. The second chapter deals with the objections and limits of virtue ethics. It is argued that the theory can face the objection of egoism and the objection of elitism. However, if virtue ethics does not want to find itself limited by an insubstantial concept of 'virtue', it should address fundamental aspects of the ancient theory of virtue which can now be problematic. The purpose of the third chapter is to explore the most promising possibilities of virtue ethics. The main contention is that these possibilities can be found precisely where the theory has received the hardest criticisms: normativity. Virtue ethics can face the action-guiding objection, but it can also develop a genuinely innovative normative approach. Along several sections some fundamental ideas of virtue ethics are presented and explored. All these ideas add to a new perspective on normativity which focuses on the formation of a global virtuous character. After reviewing the recent debate between virtue ethics and social psychology, it is argued that the new normative project will benefit from the empirical findings of psychology. In the fourth chapter the various theses classified in the first chapter are re-examined, in order to select the best ones on the basis of the results yielded by the central chapters of this work. The result is the most promising version of virtue ethics so far.

This thesis is about how we develop as moral agents and come to realise the virtuous activity on which flourishing depends. Aristotle’s account of how this is effected is familiar: we become virtuous through practice of the actions in which virtue finds its expression. But how should we understand the difference between the doings of the learner and the activity of the virtuous agent, and what is it that happens when a learner does these things that results in her realisation of virtuous activity? Whilst both agents perform virtuous actions, the two are engaged in different activities: one is in the process of acquiring a disposition, the other is engaged in its exercise. But we can also see each as related to the actions they perform in different ways. The learner is not yet the author of her actions in the strict sense that the virtuous agent is, who chooses these actions as an expression of a settled way of seeing and valuing things; indeed, the learner’s actions stand in the relation of copy to those of the virtuous agent, or so I argue. How, then, does the learner’s practice of these alienable actions result in her becoming an author of virtuous actions in the strict sense? I argue that by seeing the learner as engaged in the imitation of a virtuous agent we can begin to explain this transition. In imitating a virtuous agent and adopting her perspective, the learner is positioned so as to perceive the value of virtuous action, and thus to discover its attraction. With the aid of Aristotle’s psychological works, I offer a picture of the learner’s habituation which shows how it is that through acting, her perceptions, desires and other capacities are shaped in such a way that she comes eventually to perceive things and to act in the way that the virtuous agent does.

Rosalind Hursthouse, Mark LeBar, Martha Nussbaum, and other contemporary philosophers have brought virtue ethics into conversation with political philosophy. These philosophers agree with Aristotle that the function of political authority is to enable persons to live well. But we still lack an account of how the virtues, as characteristics of persons, relate to political authority as a property of institutions. I argue that the authority of political institutions depends on performing the function of enabling persons to live well, while the virtues require, but also limit, the authority of political institutions. According to the account I develop, living well consists in the exercise of practical wisdom within a socially embedded institutional context. Political institutions enable living well by means of institutionally defined rights such as property rights that protect the exercise of practical wisdom, and they promote its development through the institutions of civil society such as the family. But, I argue, political authority is limited by the individual virtue of justice, understood as balancing conformity to the existing social norms and laws of a community with their necessary updating through ideals of virtue. Ultimately, I conclude that political authority properly functions to promote an indirect conception of the common good, according to which persons relate to each other virtuously through their shared institutions.

What traits and virtues must a person possess to be considered environmentally virtuous? And further, must we recognize new human excellences specific to environmental contexts, or can the traditional virtues be 'extended' to apply to environmental interactions and relationships? Current disagreement in the environmental virtue ethics literature over how to identify and ratify environmental virtue represents a significant issue in the literature because its answer impinges upon other areas of an environmental virtue ethic's framework, including the acquisition and sufficiency of virtue, environmental practical wisdom, and the normative resources available to an environmental virtue ethic. Ronald Sandler, a proponent of non-extensionist environmental virtue ethics, has suggested the recognition of a novel human virtue called "ecological sensitivity".¹ However, Sandler left open at the time exactly what character dispositions and traits constitute that virtue, and how it ought to be fully understood. The thesis presented here attempts to identify the dispositions, attitudes, and traits that constitute ecological sensitivity (or eco-sensitivity).

This thesis aims at clarifying Machiavelli's notion of political virtue by having recourse to Machiavelli's opinion of the empirical value of historical data. Thus, it takes the Florentine Histories as a work that can be used as a tool in support of any interpretation of Machiavelli's virtue when it comes to its ethical substance. I contend that this virtue most closely resemble a moderately deontological system of ethics where necessity acts as the threshold-setter. In chapter two I compare the qualities and attributes of the best princes and republics in order to make the point that political virtue is the virtue of the ruler, regardless of whether said ruler is a single person or a government system. Finally, in chapter three I examine how my interpretation of Machiavelli's political virtue can be used to offer a new perspective on the "problem of dirty hands" in politics.
Cette thèse vise à clarifier le concept de vertu politique chez Machiavel en se basant principalement sur l'opinion que celui-ci avance quant à la valeur empirique de l'information fournie par l'histoire. Ce travail se base donc sur l'idée que les Histoires Florentines est un ouvrage dont le contenu peut être utilisé comme un outil ayant la capacité de vérifier toute conclusion ayant trait à la vertu politique de Machiavel en tant que concept éthique. L'idée principale de cette thèse est que la vertu politique de Machiavel correspond précisément à un système éthique de 'déontologie modérée,' dans lequel le concept de nécessité sers à identifier le 'moment seuil' où la valeur morale d'une action peut changer dans l'absolu. Ensuite, le chapitre deux examine les qualités communes des princes et des républiques les plus illustres et propose l'idée que la vertu politique doit donc être la vertu du dirigeant, qu'il soit un seul homme ou un gouvernement. Finalement, le chapitre trois explore comment cette interprétation de la vertu politique de Machiavel offre une nouvelle perspective sur le « problèmes des mains sales » en politique.

Deonticlogic, the logic of ethics, can apply to various moral theories. for example, those based on the concepts of virtue or on duty. A scholastic-style square of opposition isuseful in displaying logical relationships among moral notions oroperators such as ought and may. The system may be constructed with a single operator and the nothers may be added to parallel other expressions in ordinary language. Two principies are given to explain super erogation, the case of good but non obligatory acts or habits and to suggest a basic logic of virtue.
La lógica deóntica. la lógica de la ética, es aplicable a varias teorías morales, por ejemplo a las fundamentadas en la concepción de la virtud o en la del deber. Un cuadrado de oposición al estilo escolástico puede servir para exhibir las relaciones lógicas entre tales nociones morales u operadores como debe y puede. El sistema puede construirse sobre la base de un solo operador y luego otros pueden agregarse para indicar una correspondencia con otras expresiones del lenguaje ordinario. Se ofrecen dos principios para aclarar la super erogación.el caso del acto o hábito bueno no obligatorio. y para proponer una lógica básica de la virtud.

There is a prima facie incompatibility between a law conception of ethics, in which law concepts (e.g. ought, rule, action) are basic, and a virtue conception of ethics, in which virtue concepts (e.g. character trait, ideal, agent) are basic. However, both conceptions contain elements that are needed for an adequate ethical account. Aquinas's conception of ethics is of interest, because it combines virtue and law components within a broadly Aristotelian account. I argue that Aquinas's virtue-and-law ethical conception is not ad hoc, but emerges from, expresses, and is grounded normatively, rationally, and motivationally in his general conception of practical thought. My first objective in the thesis is to explicate and defend an interpretation of Aquinas's understanding of practical thought as the rational determination of general good into particular action. I argue, first, that this interpretation expresses Aquinas's conception of the nature of practical thought, as reflected in Aquinas's central practical concepts of order, nature, good, and reason. Second, I argue that this interpretation is expressed in Aquinas's conception of the structure of practical thought, as reflected in general, specific, and particular conceptual levels of practical thinking, reasons, and forms of reasoning. My second objective in the thesis is to show that Aquinas's virtue-and-law account presupposes and develops this conception of practical thought, and briefly to indicate how insights from Aquinas's account elucidate relationships between virtue and law ethical conceptions.

In this dissertation I argue that a neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethic is a viable position in moral philosophy, preferable to deontology, consequentialism and neo-Aristotelianism. I do this by arguing that, as Schopenhauer’s main criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy apply to contemporary deontology and consequentialism, virtue ethics is preferable to both. I defend the Schopenhauerian claim that compassion is the basis of morality by appealing to its intuitive plausibility and by arguing for a neo-Schopenhauerian version of the Aristotelian idea that the virtues are constitutive of the good life. I further support the claim that compassion is the basis of morality by illustrating how compassion can account for a range of our core moral concepts and intuitions. 1 also defend neo-Schopenhauerianism against, a number of criticisms of virtue ethics in general and neo-Schopenhauerianism in particular. I conclude by arguing that as the Aristotelian virtues of courage, temperance, prudence, etc., could be possessed by someone who is malicious and/or extremely selfish, and so do not capture our intuitions about what makes a person morally good, neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethics is preferable to Aristotelianism.

Why be moral? One possible, and compelling answer is that to act morally is in an agent's self-interest. Such an answer can be either elevationist (broadly speaking the Aristotelian/Platonic approach) where self-interest is elevated to coincide with living the good life, or reductionist where morality is defined as acting in an agent's self-interest. Elevationist moral theories appear flawed. If you are in possession of information that, if divulged, will bring about the deaths of others then it may be virtuous to stay silent. However, if staying silent results in you being slowly tortured to death in an effort to extract the information then it seems bizarre to suggest that in doing so you are flourishing, happy, or acting out of self-interest. Reductionist moral theories, acting for the 'good of self' rather than the 'good of others', are widely considered to be the antithesis of morality. Moral philosophers tend to attack such positions claiming that the doctrine of egoism is unworkable. It is commonly claimed that any theory which recommends 'an agent do x if x is in the agent's best interest' is inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory and fails to meet the basic requirements of a moral theory (notably the requirement of universalisability). I begin this thesis with an examination of ethical egoism in its most widely known consequentialist form; i.e. an agent ought to act so as to bring about the best consequences for that agent. I examine the major criticisms of this theory and demonstrate that the axioms of egoism can be developed so as to overcome these criticisms. I argue that consequentialist based ethical egoism is coherent, consistent and noncontradictory. However, I go on to argue that while egoism can be formulated in a manner that overcomes all the aforementioned analytic criticisms it is a flawed moral theory in that within certain contexts the action deemed morally correct by egoism is, as a matter of fact, morally pernicious. That a theory contains a flaw is not reason enough to discard the entire theory and I go on to contend that the problem with egoism is the consequentialist approach, not the fact that it is based on self-interest. In Part 2 of the thesis I abandon the consequentialist approach and examine the possibility of a flourishing-based form of ethical egoism. I further develop the axioms of egoism established in Part 1 through an examination of the concept of flourishing (as commonly associated with virtue ethics). Ultimately I tread a path between the consequentialist and elevationist positions. While I do not elevate self-interest to acting virtuously I do contend that an egoist must adopt certain virtues if that egoist is to have the best possibility to flourish. However, I further contend that an egoist ought to act so as to promote that which the egoist values and that this agent-relative hierarchy of values, which necessarily contains certain virtues, determines the manner in which an egoist ought to act.

In the 'Nicomachean Ethics' Aristotle presents four categories regarding character: vice, incontinence, continence and virtue. The question I will raise is whether these categories exhaust the possibilities of the psychological states that agents can find themselves in with regard to morality. Are we able to conceive of an agent who cannot be said to fall under any of the categories that Aristotle has presented, and is this state a plausible phenomenon? If such a scenario is not only conceivable, but highly plausible, then it would seem that Aristotle's account is unsatisfactory to the extent that he fails to account for this state in his ethical theory. The aim of this thesis is to raise a particular case of moral conversion where it will be argued that the agent depicted in the scenario fails to fall under the categories of character that Aristotle sets out. This agent, I will argue, possesses a set of psychological features that does not match the features that make up the other categories, and, to this extent, Aristotle's account is inadequate. The agent I describe is someone who does not experience the motivational conflict that characterises the continent agent, despite possessing some vicious appetites that have been weakened by means of reason. He is capable of taking the proper pleasure in the fineness of his act even though he has these residual appetites that are vicious. Consequently, this agent cannot be said to be either continent or virtuous, and falls under a distinct category that I will name good-willed. Even though Aristotle does not explicitly endorse this further category, it will be argued that the case I will raise (and what is to be said about it) is not inconsistent with Aristotle's account as a whole, and may even be suggested by it.

How to become morally virtuous? Among the students of Aristotle, it is often assumed that the philosopher does not have a fully worked-out theoretical answer to this question. Some interpreters (e.g. Burnyeat 1980, most recently Curzer 2012) have, however, recognised that Aristotle may have a comprehensive theory of moral development. However, even those interpreters have made only scarce attempts to study Aristotle’s theory in connection with the questions about his moral psychology. Unlike Aristotle’s theory of moral development as such, several of those questions are among the most debated issues in current Aristotle scholarship - for example, whether we need reason to identify good actions or whether habituated non-rational affects suffice; what makes us responsible for our actions, and how the philosopher conceives the relationship between phronesis and moral motivation. In my thesis, I aim at connecting these important questions with Aristotle’s theory of moral development. I hope to show that this approach will yield a picture on which Aristotle’s theory is divisible into two steps that one has to choose to take in order to become morally virtuous. I argue first that identifying good ends, and actions, requires reason. In order to become morally responsible, a person has thus to develop a rational ability to identify good actions. I show that Aristotle’s term for such ability is synesis. The first step to virtue, I conclude, is to use this ability well, to choose to become virtuous and habituate one’s character into acting well. The second step is to acquire phronesis, understanding why good actions are good, to complement a habituated character. Developing of phronesis requires both considerable experience in acting well and philosophical teaching about ethics, but it is necessary for moral virtue. Although a finely-habituated person is invulnerable to akrasia with regard to pleasures even if he did not have phronesis, Aristotle allows, I show, that he might still be prone to impetuous akrasia, whereas phronimos could avoid akratic behaviour in any situation.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan
This dissertation aims to give a theoretical account of the cardinal virtue of temperance that portrays it as an attractive (albeit demanding) virtue, and provides the justification and method for applying it to multiple spheres of life today. To this end, it offers a critical interpretation and retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas' account of the four causes of temperantia in the Summa Theologiae. I claim that, for Thomas, the four causes of a moral virtue are its mode (formal cause), matter and subject (material cause), proper end (final cause) and agent (efficient cause). Less technically, they can be expressed in terms of five guiding questions to be used in understanding any given virtue: What is the practical wisdom actualized by that virtue? What is the sphere of life with which the virtue is concerned? What aspect of the human heart and mind does the virtue modify? What is the virtue for? What causes the virtue to exist and increase? To answer to these five questions is to give an account of a moral virtue. This dissertation develops and applies this causal method for analyzing a moral virtue, both as a means of interpreting Thomas' account of temperance, and as a tool for constructing a theory of temperance for today. Temperance, I claim, can be defined as the modulation of attraction for the sake of right relationship. It is developed through both discipline and grace. Temperance does not repress desire, but forms and channels its positively, placing it at the service of right relationship to oneself, others, the earth and God. It does limit and restrain desire, but always for the sake of deeper and more meaningful goods. Temperance therefore modulates harmoniously between the restraint and the redirection of desire, the fast and the feast. Temperance is often misunderstood as proposing a purely negative ideal of repression and constraint. The dissertation claims that, on the contrary, temperance is a positive and attractive virtue, and one that is urgently needed in consumer society
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Theology

In this thesis I address two related and rarely asked questions: (i) Is a distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious possible? (ii) If such a theory is possible, and such a theory is also a credible theory in its own right, then what might such a theory look like? By ‘distinctively virtue ethical,’ I mean a theory in which the virtues and other aretaic concepts are foundational, and which does not collapse into forms of other ethical approaches, such as consequentialism and deontology. By ‘theoretically ambitious,’ I mean a systematic theory that seeks to fulfil all the principal aims of theories of practical reason: to explain, justify, prescribe and to guide action. In this thesis I argue that a distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious is possible. I do this by working out what such a theory might look like. In developing the theory, I also make a case that the theory is credible and attractive in its own right. In Chapter 1 I look at what makes an ethical theory distinctively virtue ethical. I also argue for a eudaimonic conception of virtue ethics, and determine a number of constraints on such a theory if it is to be distinctively virtue ethical. In Chapter 2 I look at what a more precisely characterised distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious might look like. I argue in favour of using some ideas derived from Plato. A serious problem remains: the virtue ethical theory I develop in Chapter 2 is unable to give adequate action-guidance, a requirement for the theory to be theoretically ambitious. In Chapter 3 I introduce the central strategy of the thesis: to combine the virtue ethical theory arrived at in Chapter 2 with a form of ethical constitutivism in order to arrive at a distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious, not least one able to give adequate action-guidance. Chapter 3 is concerned primarily with developing a form of ethical constitutivism suitable for combining with virtue ethics. The chapter is also concerned with examining objections to ethical constitutivism and diagnosing what is required to overcome these objections. In Chapter 4 I combine the virtue ethical theory favoured in Chapter 2 with the form of ethical constitutivism developed in Chapter 3 to form a combined theory. I call this theory: ‘constitutivist virtue ethics.’ I present what the theory involves, and I argue that although the theory incorporates elements from ethical constitutivism, it merits being considered distinctively virtue ethical. I also argue that constitutivist virtue ethics overcomes the objections that, as shown in Chapter 3, ethical constitutivism on its own is unable to overcome. Constitutivist virtue ethics therefore holds out the attractive prospect of a theory incorporating both the advantages of virtue ethics and some of the best of what ethical constitutivism has to offer. In Chapter 5 I address the biggest challenge to constitutivist virtue ethics being regarded as a theoretically ambitious theory: to be able to provide adequate action-guidance. To this end, I present an action-guidance procedure of eight action-guidance principles derived from constitutivist virtue ethics. I then argue that the action-guidance procedure can provide adequate action-guidance, even when faced with a difficult test case. I also examine two objections to the action-guidance procedure, and I argue that these can be overcome. I finish the thesis by considering some topics from the literature relevant to constitutivist virtue ethics, and which might be the basis for further work.

This paper evaluates some arguments made against the conceptions of right action within virtue ethics. I argue that the different accounts of right action can meet the objections raised against them. Michael Slote‘s agent-based and Rosalind Hursthouses agent-focused account of right action give different judgments of right action but there seems to be a lack of real disagreement between the two accounts. I also argue that the concept of right action often has two important parts, relating to action guidance and moral appraisal, respectively, and that virtue ethics can deal with both without a concept of right action.

Business plays a powerful role in contemporary society, but this increasing role has been accompanied by a growing concern regarding the social and moral impact of enterprising endeavour. One of the greatest challenges of our time is the need to channel entrepreneurial energies in ways that benefit, rather than harm, society. This research contributes to the development of a conceptual framework that addresses the practical issues at the intersection of business and society. The tension between the realms of business and society has revealed gaps in the management literature on a variety of levels. This research is directed toward the deep-seated assumptions that are commonly seen to govern and motivate contemporary business. The dominant economic and moral theories are no longer convincingly reconciled with observable practices, justifying the search for an alternative lens that can sufficiently bridge the gap. Epistemologically, it appears there is a paradigm shift taking place; a challenge to the set of assumptions, and very purpose, which business is seen to serve. The purpose of this study is to engage this challenge by identifying and outlining an alternative lens for resolving the oft-conflicting realms of business and society. After reviewing prominent contending paradigms, a pre-modern theory of virtue is shown to hold promising characteristics for addressing the present gaps while resolving the shortcomings of the dominant paradigm. This research attempts to answer the following question: How, if at all, does Aristotle's theory of virtue contribute to a better understanding of the strategic and normative issues at the intersection of business and society? This investigation begins by reviving an Aristotelian theory of virtue that is more dynamic and holistic than implied in recent studies. Aided by the work of Alasdair Maclntyre, Aristotelian concepts have been granted a philosophical grounding and definitional framework upon which contemporary insights are built, and conflicting interests are reconciled. After recasting Aristotle's theory of virtue in this fashion, it is possible to direct this conceptual lens to the study of organisations. A suitable unit of analysis has been found in entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurial process is shown to be amenable to such an exploration, due in part to its distinctive capacity to unify individual and institution, and at the same time, psychological and sociological considerations. Additionally, a rich level of analysis is identified in organisational culture. The cultural paradigm of an organisation provides an optimal setting for an inquiry based on Aristotelian concepts. In developing and directing the conceptual lens in this way, the methodological parameters of this study are significantly determined. This study explores the paradigmatic value of the theory of virtue, and attempts to ground Aristotle's theory in contemporary business practice. To this end, an inductive approach develops and compares cultural sensemaking as located in five consultancies. Inductive methods and indepth fieldwork were employed to obtain a deep understanding of the cultural paradigm of each venture. Comparative case research prescriptions were used for their capacity to provide new insight into phenomenon that has proven elusive to empirical investigation. Individually and comparatively, these five ventures have yielded a number of significant findings and practical implications for viewing business through the lens of virtue. In response to the research question, key components of a cultural paradigm of virtue are established, virtue is located in an organisational setting, and the powerful effect of Aristotelian concepts are studied among comparative contexts. This study was facilitated by the creation of an interactive joint inquiry instrument that is introduced, refined and applied herein. Through an iterative process, traversing frequently between the findings and emerging theory, a grounded approach was employed for divulging patterns and themes within and between specific contexts. As such, this investigation has not only succeeded in grounding the theory of virtue in business, it has shown the unique, practical benefits of this emerging theory for deepening the dialogue and resolving pressing social and moral conflicts. This investigation makes an original contribution in three significant ways: 1) offering a new interpretation of existing philosophy and scholarship, 2) providing a new synthesis of contexts and concepts, and 3) bringing new evidence to bear on an old issue. More specifically, this research has successfully applied Aristotle's theory of virtue to contemporary business, grounded virtue in organisational culture, and developed its components into a comprehensive paradigm that unifies normative and strategic claims, thus bridging the gap between theory and practice. Finally, in the entrepreneurial process, this research has identified a champion for establishing a revolutionary, pre-modern paradigm of business.

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney
The pursuit of living a good and moral life has been a longstanding ideal of philosophy, an ideal that dates back to the writings of Plato, and more specifically, Aristotle. This ideal establishes that a good life as a happy and flourishing life is pursued by developing the right motives and the right character. And in order to live this life, one must, then, develop a virtuous character, i.e., be a virtuous person, who desires the good. Finally, in the pursuit of the good, one must not do so alone; rather, one should pursue the virtuous life with others, i.e., friends, because they enhance our ability to think and to act. This specific position which is taken up by Aristotelian virtue ethics, however, has recently come under scrutiny by certain studies in social psychology. Particularly, the concept of character has been discredited by empirical studies. Furthermore, the classic model of the virtuous person has assumed only persons with able-bodies. As a result of these two criticisms, Aristotelian virtue ethics has been discredited as a fantasy ethics available for only a few to achieve. The principle aim of this dissertation is to develop and defend an account of Aristotelian virtue ethics which is grounded in empirical psychology and enables people with disabilities to flourish as moral exemplars within a society. The value of virtue and character for ethical debate is imperative for human happiness within moral life. Instead of happiness being something an individual strives to acquire or feel, Aristotelian virtue ethicists have argued that true happiness is human flourishing. In other words, in order to be happy, humans should focus not just on what it is good to do, but also, and more importantly, focus on who it is good to be. To live a good life, then, it is necessary that one is a good person, or has a good character. Thus, to acquire virtues such as charity, benevolence, honesty, and generosity and to shun vices such as dishonesty, cruelty, or stinginess, is the task, Aristotelian virtue ethicists have argued, that leads to eudaimonia, i.e., human flourishing. The person who has acquired virtuous character traits, then, is the person who is most happy in life. However, the attempt to understand human happiness as a result of a virtuous character has become vulnerable to criticism from philosophical positions grounded in empirical psychology and disability theory. In light of the charge that virtue ethics is a fantasy ethics, many philosophers argue that Aristotelian virtue ethics should be abandoned because it is an ethics with little or no scientific basis. In my defense of Aristotelian virtue ethics, I first address the objection that Aristotelian virtue ethics is a "fantasy ethics" which has no grounding in empirical psychology, and thus, as a result, should not be used for moral theory. This objection has been put forth by certain "Situationist" philosophers, who cite psychological studies which demonstrate that the idea of a virtue as a "global character trait" is something that humans do not actually, or very rarely, possess. This objection to Aristotelian virtue ethics has dealt a devastating blow. In response to this objection, philosopher Nancy Snow has mounted a defense of Aristotelian virtue ethics which is grounded in empirical psychology. Snow's defense, though superficially appealing, has two intractable problems. I address the failure of her proposal in Chapter One: The Problem of Virtue as Social Intelligence. The first problem Snow faces concerns her use of CAPS as a method for virtue ethics to be used throughout life. I call this problem the longitudinality problem, which argues that Snow's proposal for the constancy of virtue for longer than a period of six weeks is overreaching. The second problem Snow faces concerns her reliance on virtue as social intelligence for the actual achievement of being virtuous in daily living. This problem turns on the empirical criteria for what makes a person capable of virtuous action and I call this problem the exclusivity problem, which excludes people with "Autism" form being virtuous. As an alternative to Snow's account, I begin my defense of Aristotelian virtue ethics by developing the following account of empirical virtue based on a narrative identity which desires and actively pursues the good in life-long striving. This moral desire is encouraged through the shared dialogue of virtuous caregiving, which enables a moral novice to flourish and grow into a moral expert. This pursuit of the good enables everyone to flourish and incorporates insights from disability, embodied cognition and social psychology. To accomplish this task, I begin with an examination of the first of two foundational components of character, i.e., the four processing levels of CAPS theory in Chapter Two: Moral Perception. Although CAPS theory provides a solid beginning for an account of virtue, it is not a sustainable theory throughout life. This theory of social-cognitive moral psychology needs to be supplemented by developmental moral psychology. CAPS theory also assumes the individual's perspective in the dynamic interaction between situation and character. It assumes a person's intentions, and this assumption of intentionality - desires, intentions, and beliefs - assumes a person's embodiment in that situation. In other words, CAPS theory assumes lived embodiment. In this chapter, I turn to the method of phenomenology used by both psychologists and philosophers of embodied cognition to account for the moral "interpretation of the situation" experienced by people with illness or impairment. As a complimentary to CAPS and the second foundational component for character, certain moral psychologists have argued for the narrative development of Event Representations for virtuous character. This development begins with the shared dialogue of the caregiver and dependent asking the dependent to recall events which have just occurred. In this practice, the caregiver's aim is to help the dependent form memories and incorporate those memories into the creation of a narrative identity. In Chapter Three: Representations of Moral Events, I extend the caring relation to this practice of shared dialogue to incorporate certain forms of intellectual disability, such as "Autism" and Alzheimer's disease. To accomplish this, I incorporate the roles of narrative and trust in order to construct the relation of dependency and interdependency as trusting co-authorship rather than reciprocal capability. After establishing the importance of the caregiver in the development of one's narrative identity, I employ the life narrative longitudinal psychological approach to moral development as a structure for the moral event representations and schemas guided by the caregiver. Finally, I argue that the co-authorship of one's life story animates one's moral desire for the good and as a result, leads to the development of interdependent virtues. In Chapter Four: Moral Self-Coherence through Personal Strivings, I examine the importance of personal strivings for a sense of lived self-coherence for character over time. My argument is that our personal strivings are unified by the life story which animates and directs those strivings throughout our lives. Although our personal strivings may be altered or deterred due to life transitions including accident, illness, and "disabling injury," they still retain a sense of unity through our overarching life story. It is this narrative which gives unity to both our psychological intentions and bodily intentions, even when they are experienced as a phenomenally lived dualism due to illness, stroke, or impairment. In order to make my argument, I examine ten case studies from medical patients. I argue that our personal strivings toward the good guide our growth of character from a moral novice to become a moral expert. In Chapter Five: Flourishing Bodies, I develop an empirically grounded model of a virtuous character which begins with interdependent virtues and eventually grows into independent virtues. To do this, I draw on the two foundational components of character: CAPS theory and event representations. From the caring relation and shared dialogue of the caregiver, an individual begins to develop basic moral schemas, tasks, and scripts. This is when the individual is a moral novice. As the novice pursues excellences in these practices, the novice grows into a moral expert according to those virtues and becomes virtuously independent. The moral expert, unlike the moral novice, executes virtuous action with ease. Having acquired skills of virtue and knowledge, the moral expert knows the right thing to do at the right time and does so with the right reasons. MacIntyre, however, acknowledged the limit of ethics and turned to politics to address specific needs for people with disabilities such as care, financial support, educational support, and political proxy. The purpose of the final chapter, The Virtue-Oriented Politics of Interdependence, is to follow MacIntyre's endeavor and to propose a virtue-oriented politics of interdependence as an initial solution. First, I examine the various forms of oppression facing people with disabilities in society. In order to address these forms of oppression for people with disabilities, I argue that a shift in the central component of a political framework is needed. Instead of focusing on distribution or recognition, one should focus on education in the broad sense. In conclusion of my dissertation, The Fragility of Virtue, I provide a perspective of our human condition that is a vulnerable one. In this final section, I discuss the role of our collective vulnerability and the fragility of human goodness with regard to illness and impairment. And that our interdependence is strengthened through the virtue of friendship. I finish with a proposal of the role of sacrifice as a way to reconcile the pursuit of a flourishing life in the face of our own fragility
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy

Virtue ethics is frequently considered to be a single category of ethical theory, and a rival to Kantianismand Utilitarianism. I argue that this approach is a mistake, because both Kantians and Utilitarians can, and do, have an interest in the virtues and the forrnation of character. But even if we focus on the group of ethical theorists who are most commonly called virtue theorists because they reject the guidance of both Kantianism and Utilitarianism, and derive inspiration from ancient Greek ethics, there is little unity to this group. Although there is a thin common ground that links all the group's members - a focus on the formation of character, on the nature of the passions, and on choice over the whole course of life - there are also crucial differences among them.
La ética de la virtud es frecuentemente considerada una categoría singular de la teoría ética, y una rival del kantismo y del utilitarismo. Considero que es un error, puesto que tanto kantianos como utilitaristas pueden tener, y tienen, un interés en las virtudes y en la formación del carácter. Mas, aun si focalizamos el grupo de teóricos de la ética, comúnmente llamados teóricos de la virtud, porque rechazan la dirección tanto del kantismo como del utilitarismo y se inspiran en la ética griega antigua, hay poca unidad en este grupo. Aun cuando hay un delgado territorio común que vincula a todos los miembros del grupo -una preocupación por la formación del carácter, la naturaleza de las pasiones y por la elección sobre el transcurso entero de la vida- también hay diferencias cruciales entre ellos.

My contributions to the research on epistemic value can be divided into two parts: first, I pinpoint some causes of the problems about epistemic value which have not previously been identified; and, second, I offer novel accounts of epistemic value which offer better solutions to the problems about epistemic value. First, there are two trends in the literature on epistemic value that are rarely challenged: (i) epistemologists tend to understand epistemic value in terms of intrinsic value from the epistemic point of view, and (ii) the discussion of epistemic value tends to focus only on the values of properties of belief. I argue that both trends should be rejected if we want to solve several persistent problems about epistemic value: the value problems about knowledge, the teleological account of epistemic normativity, and the triviality objection that some true beliefs (or knowledge) are too trivial to be epistemic goals. My account of epistemic value is in terms of goodness of epistemic kinds, which rejects (i). An epistemic kind is an evaluative kind—a kind that determines its own evaluative standards—whose evaluative standards are truth-directed: e.g. a belief is good qua belief if true. I argue that my account is immune from the triviality objection. Moreover, since the goodness of an epistemic kind is finally valuable, the account gives us simple solutions to the value problems of knowledge. I develop my own solutions through critically appropriating the virtue-theoretic account, according to which epistemic evaluation is a kind of performance evaluation, which rejects (ii). I argue that the value of knowledge consists of the value of epistemic success (true belief) and epistemic competence. Finally, I argue that approaches that focus on the evaluation of belief cannot explain epistemic normativity. Instead, we need an approach that focuses on the evaluation of person, which rejects (ii). I argue that conforming to epistemic norms is part of what makes us good qua person. The goodness of person qua person is an intrinsic value and able to provide pro tanto reasons for a person to be epistemically good qua person, which is the ground of epistemic normativity. Overall, there are two main differences between my account and the mainstream account: first, the purpose of epistemic evaluation is about good cognitive performances rather than good beliefs; and, second, what grounds epistemic normativity is the goodness of a person qua person rather than the goodness (or correctness) of belief qua belief. The upshot of my account is that the focus of epistemology should be on questions such as ‘What is an epistemically good person?’ and ‘What makes a person epistemically good qua person?’ Furthermore, my account shows that epistemic normativity is not distinct from ethical normativity. That is, the question ‘What is an epistemically good person?’ is part of the question ‘What is a good person?’ and a reason why we should be an epistemically good person is consequently a reason why we should be a good person.

Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.

In the Middle Ages, the virtues were usually considered in terms of categories, branches, parts, manners and degrees. They were sorted and defined in an attempt to understand their meaning and their relationship to one another. This taxonomic approach to morality, found in many philosophical and exegetical texts, has been used as a framework through which to study Chaucerian virtue. However, as I hope to demonstrate in this thesis, Chaucer approaches virtue differently. Rather than present the virtues in abstraction as conceptual ideals, he contextualizes them through narrative. Throughout his work, he challenges the possibility of abstract definitions of virtue by showing that virtues must be considered in the human contexts that form, challenge and prove them. Building on work done on individual virtues and tales, this dissertation examines in detail how Chaucer handles virtue across a range of his work. Texts to be examined include the House of Fame, the Pardoner's Tale, the Knight's Tale and the Summoner's Tale (chapter one); the Physician's Tale, the Man of Law's Tale, and the Clerk's Tale (chapter two); the Wife of Bath's Tale, the Franklin's Tale, the Squire's Tale and the Tale of Sir Thopas (chapter three); Troilus and Criseyde (chapter four); and the Parson's Tale and the Retractions. Rather than imposing any potentially limiting taxonomic framework, it prioritizes the close study of his poetry. It also takes into account the changes Chaucer made to his sources, the traditions of virtue he had at his disposal, and the wide range of discussions he drew upon for his own examination of virtue. In its approach and its findings, this thesis fits within a critical tradition that shows that ethics cannot be abstracted from human experience and that the study of literature is a way of examining the richness of that experience.

Virtue ethics is the view that virtue, happiness, flourishing, and human nature go together to constitute the core of ethics. However, this definition is far from precise. It raises questions about the foundation of virtue ethics, the logical relations between its main concepts (its "structure"), and its place in the standard taxonomy of moral theories as teleological or deontological. This work provides the analysis of the foundation, structure, and taxonomical classification of virtue ethics lacking in the contemporary literature. Such an analysis is necessary for successfully defending or attacking a modern version of virtue ethics. I argue that there are two main distinct forms which virtue ethics might take. Both are teleological, and neither is consequentialist: an analysis of virtue ethics reveals that the standard taxonomy of moral theories must be revised to allow for different sorts of non-consequentialism within a broader class of teleological theories. The foundation of the first form of virtue ethics is happiness, thus resembling standard consequentialist theories. However, it differs from such theories in three ways: first, virtue is constitutive of rather than instrumental to happiness. Second, happiness is given objective rather than subjective content. Third, it rejects reductionism, hierarchy, and completeness. The alternative also rejects reductionism, hierarchy, and completeness. However, its foundation is human nature, which need not be identified with happiness. Such a theory is unavoidably naturalistic, and its need for an account of human nature raises many problems. Virtue ethics may take either of these broadly teleological yet unique forms. The first is more similar to other teleological theories, and is most viable. Its unique structure provides many advantages as well as some unique challenges. Only careful attention to structural and foundational details in the further development of virtue ethics will determine whether its benefits outweigh its faults.

Theologians, philosophers, moralists, artists, men and women of letters of the seventeenth century were interested in the notion of "virtue" and the place it should occupy in the education of children and in the life of adults. Because of this interest, literary genres of this period, and more specifically plays, provide us with many references of the word "virtue". This concept is presented as one of the essential characteristics to be found in a hero and a heroine. However, "virtue" is not a constant concept, for its meaning is determined by the socio-political context, the author's philosophy, and the gender of the person to whom it is attributed. Thus, through the lens of the moral discourse and in a multidisciplinary and comparative perspective we will analyze the different nuances of "virtue" in three plays by Pierre Corneille: Horace, Cinna and Polyeucte. The selection of these three historical pieces was based on the attention paid to the subject of "virtue" by Pierre Corneille. Through this analysis we will highlight the various interpretations of the concept of virtue with regard to the gender of the character in question. In addition, we will identify the advances made (voluntarily or not) by Pierre Corneille regarding the virtue of the woman and its approximation to that of the man.

Despite the dearth of literature on virtues as essential for responsible leader behaviour, there remains a lack of consensus around which are ‘the’ virtues most closely associated with responsible leader behaviour. To address this, the current study focuses on a specific set of six cardinal virtues with the aim of identifying which are ‘the’ virtues most essential for responsible leader behaviour. A mono-method quantitative methodology was applied, and 139 participants responded to the survey questionnaire. A correlation analysis was used to test the hypothesis in order to understand which virtues were positively associated with responsible leader behaviour. A linear regression analysis was employed to explore predictability. Results indicated that the virtues of prudence and temperance were positively associated with responsible leader behaviour thus identifying the “Top Two” virtues essential for responsible leader behaviour. The study makes a theoretical contribution to the burgeoning literature on responsible leadership by supporting a virtue-based approach to cultivating responsible leader behaviour. At the practical level, the study contributes to the development of a leader’s capacity to do good and avoid harm as essential for promoting positive organizational outcomes.
Mini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2020.
pt2021
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
MBA
Unrestricted

Jennifer Moberly, 'The Virtue of Bonhoeffer's Ethics: A Study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics in Relation to Virtue Ethics' (PhD, 2009) This study first explores the prima facie reasons for rejecting the possibility of seeing a close relationship between Bonhoeffer's Ethics and virtue ethics. However, a closer reading of his texts, and the examination of formulations of virtue ethics by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Alasdair MacIntyre, lead to the conclusin that those grounds are insufficient for dismissing the possibility of such a relationship. Instead there is compelling evidence for the presence of virtue-ethical aspects in his treatment of justification and sanctification, his implicit anthropology and holistic conecption of human life, and especially in the theme of 'conformation' and the notion of 'simplicity'. Given the fact that there are some ways in which Bonhoeffer's Ethics appears to be positively related to virtue ethics, the study then examines how these aspects are related to elements of Barthian divine command ethics which are also present in Bonhoeffer's conception. The suggested conclusion is that the two forms of ethical thought were used throughout the writing periods in a dialectical integration within an overall vision of the agent participating (by grace) in the reality that Christ has reconciled all reality to God. Finally, the thesis considers how this understanding of Bonhoeffer's Ethics may be of use within contemporary debates, and advocates seeing it as a distinctive example of how virtue ethics may be articulated without compromising the role of grace.

ABSTRACT This essay addresses meta-ethical concerns related to educational aims and the teaching of ethics, in part, by examining the effects of societal changes on such teaching from a philosophical point of view, and in part by suggesting that the skills of critical reasoning stipulated in the curriculum are insufficient to the task of promoting civic engagement. A theory of ethical judgment based on the emotions as cognitive judgments of value and the imagination as a productive faculty that structures moral understanding in narrative form is presented. This is then related to virtue epistemology in order to show that emotions structure our knowledge about the world and are always ‘about something’, that is to say they have intentional content and constitute reasons for action. While emotions are generally regarded as belonging to a private realm this essay sees involvement of the emotions as related to participation in the public sphere. Virtues are seen as individual capacities which emerge from appropriately directed emotion. Virtue epistemology is thus agent-based rather than act based. While emotions cannot be taught, through methods of teaching that focus on aesthetics and ethics in combination virtue can be learned. The development of virtuous capacities should therefore be the aim of civic education.

To many readers, the Victorian novel is synonymous with moral insight and Victorian criticism with moral philistinism. While the novel remains celebrated for its complex treatment of decision-making and sympathy, the evaluative judgments of Victorian critics have been dismissed as thematically reductive and imprecise. However, this study argues that the virtue terms that pervade Victorian discourse--words like "natural," "manly," "lucid," and "sincere"--invest sentence-level stylistic properties with ethical value because they embody aesthetic character. Rather than focus on the novel's action, characters, or themes, these "stylistic virtues" ascribe moral significance to "literariness" itself.

This thesis first examines the compatibility of political development and Confucian traditional thought in East Asia, and South Korea in particular, and then suggests an alternative methodology for the study of political theory in regards to culture. In order to accomplish these goals, this research focuses on three concepts: legitimacy, representation, and Confucian virtue. This research proposes political legitimacy as the most fundamental basis in the study of the relationship between political development and culture. Legitimacy is essential in every government and cannot be borrowed externally. Rather, it must be established through the practices and customs of the people and thus, involves culture. From this view, Confucian traditional thought should be considered the foundation of political development in Confucian East Asia. In most cases in modern politics, representation is the only legitimate form of democratic governments. While in principle, representation seems to conflict with democracy, in the sense that not all people participate in the decision-making procedure and representatives are required to have some level of competence, in modern representative democracy, it has been accepted as reasonable by the people. This is possible through an epistemic understanding of democracy whereby democracy is regarded as a system in which people pursue better decisions. Although the concepts of representation and democracy conflict, and the linking of the two in representative democracy shows the double-sided characteristics of representation, this double-sidedness emerges from the conceptual nature of representation in politics—the representation of the people’s interest and will. While representation of will seems to be the intrinsic element in the democratic principle of equality, the epistemic understanding of modern representative democracy implies that the representation of the people’s interest is also important. Based on this view of representative democracy, this thesis argues that Confucian representative theory, that only good people make good representatives, is not in conflict with modern representative democracy. It is often alleged that Confucian virtues do not coincide with the virtues required for modern democracy, even though representative democracy also demands competence in its representatives. However, Confucian virtue is based on the theory of conditional government founded on the Mandate of Heaven. This idea of limited government requires rulers to hear and to respect the people because Heaven only speaks and hears through the people. Therefore, the concepts that are regarded as essential in representative democracy - responsibility, responsiveness, and cooperation - are also important elements in Confucian representative theory, both in principle and practice. The coherence of virtue, one of the characteristics of Confucianism, is not unique to Confucian East Asia. The concept that integrated virtue is necessary in a good representative can also be found in western tradition. Some western theorists have been interested in this topic in regards to whether the good representative in reference to virtue is relevant in modern democracy. For this reason, there seems to be no reason to deny the Confucian view of the virtue of a representative in regards to the coherence of virtue. Although this thesis mainly discusses democratic legitimacy and Confucian virtue, one of the most important implications of this research is the existing methodology used in the comparative research of political theory. This thesis suggests the concept of legitimacy as the foundation of comparative political theory study. Second, this research argues that in comparative political theory research, it is necessary to focus on practice as the accumulation of the people’s behaviours in belief-systems, rather than formal institutions. Third, this thesis proposes that there is a need to find and use more neutral concepts for comparative study, such as representation, which is common in both modern western democracy and Confucian traditional thought. In such neutral categories, an interactive understanding is conceivable in any political system. First, this thesis argues that comparative research of political theory, particularly of different cultures, should start from an understanding of the nature of political legitimacy. This suggests that there should be relative conceptions in political theory and that they should be distinguished from others. For example, while the framework of legitimacy as a belief-system may be common to every government, the contents of the belief-systems are varied, insofar as the way of life is different in different societies. In the same way, though democracy is the only legitimate system of politics, there are varied forms of electoral systems, party systems, and government systems. Second, this thesis suggests that if politics are to be understood in the relationship between legitimacy and culture at a radical level, the practice and custom of the people in each belief-system must also be examined, since legitimacy cannot directly or automatically be established through institutions, nor can it be borrowed from institutions. Although institutions can be established by cultural aliens, a procedure of legitimation created through the practices of the people themselves is necessary. Without practice, the institution cannot be a foundation of political legitimacy. If we focus on institutional aspects, especially those based on the standards of modern values, the comparison may become an unfair one since modern values must be conceptualized in the West first. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the contextual understanding of practice and custom within the belief-system. Third, existing research on different systems of political thought frequently seem to compare different theories on the basis of certain values and ideologies, such as democracy, liberal democracy, or human rights. Based on these standards, theories were compared by statistical indexes in empirical studies, or by institutional or conceptual differences in normative research. Some theorists have tried to clarify whether there is a common idea of equality, liberty, or rights. Some have been interested in institutional similarity and differences. However, since much of the concepts are conceptualized in the context of the modern West, such research easily succumbs to misunderstanding or misjudging non-western theories. Even though we must also be conscious of the prejudice of non-western concepts or ideas, the continued use of western originated standards can lead to unfair comparisons. For this reason, neutral concepts are useful for fair comparison. Along this vein, this thesis offers the concept of representation, a necessary element for legitimate government in both the West and Confucian East. In this case, the main task is to examine the ways in which each tradition is compatible with modern standards of political legitimacy, such as democracy.

In this thesis, I show that the commitments of a theological tradition are a conceptual resource which allows new and more robust responses to criticisms of virtue ethics. Until now, theological virtue ethics has not provided a distinctive response to these criticisms and has had to rely on arguments made by secular virtue ethicists. These arguments do not always address theological concerns and do not take advantage of the unique assets of theological ethics. This thesis resolves this problem by providing a chapter-by-chapter confrontation of criticisms of virtue ethics and offering a specifically theological response to each one. In so doing, it identifies the key theological commitments that enable these responses and constitute a particular strength of theological virtue ethics. I consider criticisms that attack the internal coherence or completeness of virtue ethics as well as those which associate virtue ethics with other problematic philosophical positions. In the former group, I address the claims that virtue ethics is not a complete moral theory, that it cannot explain right action, and that it relies on a flawed concept of character. In the latter, I deal with the arguments that virtue ethics must subscribe to moral particularism, moral relativism or egoism. The final part of the thesis returns to the previous chapters to draw out the concepts that are central to these responses. Theological work on the virtues has made important contributions to ethics but has so far been vulnerable to criticism. This thesis addresses this gap and highlights the advantages that theological commitments have to offer virtue ethics.

The focus of environmental philosophy has thus far heavily depended on the extension of rights to nonhuman nature. Due to inherent difficulties with this approach to environmental problems, I propose a shift from the contemporary language of rights and duties to the concept of character development. I claim that a theory of environmental virtue ethics can circumvent many of the difficulties arising from the language of rights, duties, and moral claims by emphasizing the cultivation of certain dispositions in the individual moral agent. In this thesis, I examine the advantages of virtue ethics over deontological and utilitarian theories to show the potential of developing an ecological virtue ethic. I provide a preliminary list of ecological virtues by drawing on Aristotle's account of traditional virtues as well as on contemporary formulations of environmental virtues. Then, I propose that certain types of rules (rules of thumb) are valuable for the cultivation of environmental virtues, since they affect the way the moral agent perceives a particular situation. Lastly, I offer preliminary formulations of these rules of thumb.

This thesis provides the theoretical groundwork for a 'virtue ethical' account of international political conduct. The project begins by investigating the distinct patterns of normative theorising within international scholarship, noting not only that moral philosophical foundations are unpronounced and interchangeable, but that even in this diminished capacity the influence of virtue ethical thought is limited and fragmentary relative to its competitors. Redressing this underrepresentation is thus dually motivated: developing a fresh perspective on important global issues, whilst also subjecting the theory to an atypical angle of scrutiny. Adapting virtue ethics to the international realm requires, most essentially, that we settle the level at which its concepts should be applied. Can the theory’s central focus on character be reconciled with the collective nature of global political interaction? Can we accurately ascribe virtues and vices to governments and states? These questions of group agency form the heart of thesis investigation. Beginning from abstract foundations, the possible justification for such ascriptions is sought in competing theories of joint action and attitude. The 'individualist' accounts of Searle and Bratman are ultimately rejected in favour of Gilbert's non-reductive 'plural subject' theory, and - presenting group-level accounts of intention, motivation, practical wisdom, emotion and disposition around her concept of 'joint commitment' - a general model of collective character is constructed. Allied to additional requirements of moral responsibility, this framework is then used to assess the virtue-capability of actual political bodies, considering the decision-making hierarchy of the United Kingdom as a case study for the modern state. Tracing the route of policy authorisation across cabinet, government and parliament, a sophisticated yet ultimately impermanent picture of group-virtue-ethical agency is established, in tension with the notion of enduring state liability. By shifting focus to the national level, it is argued that this fluctuating footprint of agency can nevertheless be unified, modifying Gilbert’s notion of a 'population joint commitment' to tie institutional virtue and vice to a persisting state identity. This provides a template for international character evaluation.

There are certain elements of Kant's moral philosophy that I believe no moral theory can afford to ignore. On the other hand, there are others which Kant's theory evidently would be better off without. I will be developing an account of human virtue by defending and exploiting some of Kant's most fertile and sustainable ideas, while arguing against other theses of his, a few of which have come to be regarded as definitive of Kantian Ethics.I begin by showing that we can plausibly interpret Kant's texts on "the good will" and "actions from duty" as presupposing that an agent's moral goodness consists in her aptitude for lawful conduct, that is, her aptitude for living in accord with practical principles valid for all possible agents. I build my basic account of virtue by showing that this aptitude inheres in the possession of certain traits. The cornerstone of virtue, I argue, is the moral commitment: the stable, non-instrumental aim of living lawfully. For, when this commitment prevails in determining an agent's actions, lawful conduct necessarily ensues--which cannot be said of any other commitment or aim. I identify four additional elements of virtue by searching for traits that a perfectly morally committed agent might possess, and which together would guarantee that her moral commitment prevails. These are: moral understanding, strength of will, empirical understanding, and empirical power. And I suggest that when an agent violates a moral requirement, this is always saliently attributable to a lack of one or more of the five proposed elements of virtue.I supplement the basic account of virtue by arguing that the morally committed human agent is rationally required to adopt four further, general aims: the efficient pursuit of her own happiness, the happiness of other agents and non-agents, her own moral perfection, and that of other similarly committed agents. This part of my view differs significantly from Kant's, so I will be largely concerned with critiquing the relevant arguments of his. But the result is still very much a Kantian account, and one that warrants serious consideration in contemporary debates about virtue.

When, if ever, is it rational for an agent to act morally? To fully answer such a question we must appeal to a theory of practical reason. My project is to defend one such theory by determining which features we most strongly associate with practical reason and then providing a theory which best accounts for those features. One of the chief features we associate with practical reason is that it has to do somehow with correct deliberation. Recognizing this feature leads theorists as diverse as Hobbes and Kant to accept what might be called the standard view: it is correct deliberation, and correct deliberation alone, which reveals an agent's reasons. I argue that the most prominent and plausible examples of the standard view fail to show that there is any moral requirement that is rationally required for every given agent. I then argue that the inability to connect rationality and morality in this way is a severe defect of the standard view. This is because another of the chief features we associate with practical reason is that the phrase 'what is rational' is nearly synonymous with endorsing phrases such as 'what makes sense' or 'what ought to be done'. I argue that in order to preserve this synonymy we must have a theory of rationality which is capable of saying it is always irrational to violate certain moral requirements; but, this is something the standard view cannot accommodate. I argue that the theory which best captures the various features we associate with practical reason is the virtue theory of practical reason. It says that an agent has reason to perform an action just in case there is a suitable deliberative connection between that action and some motive she would have were she to have a correct or virtuous set of motivations. I include in the dissertation a discussion of how we gain knowledge about this set of motivations. I also address various naturalistic worries that the virtue theory raises.

In this thesis I propose a solution to the problem of moral luck. It is sometimes assumed that luck has no bearing on morality. However, Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, in their papers entitled ‘Moral Luck’, show how this assumption could be erroneous. When making moral judgements it is usually thought that we abide by the ‘Control Principle’. This principle requires any moral judgements about an individual to be made only in cases where they were in control of their actions. The problem of moral luck arises because many moral judgements appear to contradict the Control Principle. My aims in this work are two-fold. First, I disambiguate concepts of luck and moral luck by conceptualising both in light of a Hybrid Account of Luck (HAL). In order to understand moral luck, the concept of luck itself needs to be understood. I begin by distinguishing luck from similar concepts and go on to defend a particular version of HAL that can be adapted to identify genuine cases of moral luck. Second, I propose a possible solution to the problem of moral luck based primarily on a critique of some of Nagel’s basic presuppositions regarding the issue in conjunction with a defence of Terence Irwin’s interpretation of Aristotle’s complex theory of moral responsibility. By giving a number of examples, I hope to establish that there is circumstantial moral luck and resultant moral luck, and that Aristotle’s conditions for moral responsibility can provide an adequate justification for praise and blame in these cases.