Academic literature on the topic 'Vietnam War (1961-1975) fast'

the paper analyses the failure of the basic prevailing thinking adopted by the US military during the war of aggression in Viet Nam, specifically: - The over-estimate of US military capability, and its reliance on modern weapon technology - The US failure to obtain a trategic position of strength - The US failure to resolve conflicting military tactics between fighting fast and long standing fighting, between diffusion and concentration, between defensive and offensive... when facing the Vietnam people's war.

In 1961-1975, the government of the United States performs an aggressive environmental war against Vietnam. Herbicides containing dioxins ("Orange agent", etc.) were used. The natural landscape of Vietnam was severely damaged. The flora and fauna of South Vietnam suffered greatly, and in some places were completely destroyed. The victims were many civil inhabitants. War veterans from the United States and Vietnam were injured, became disabled, and acquired chronic diseases. The reckless foreign policy of the United States led to the deterioration of the environmental situation on the Indochina Peninsula for many decades. Even today, the consequences of that war have not been completely overcome.

The Communist Party's propaganda plays an important role and holds a special position for the development paths of the people's war. In the Southern revolutionary war, the Propaganda Unit of the Central Office for South Vietnam or the Southern Propaganda Unit is the specialized agency of the Central Office for South Vietnam, responsible for giving advise and assisting the Central Office for South Vietnam in directing political, ideological and cultural activities for the implementation of the political, ideological, cultural arts and education in the war against America in the south of Vietnam from 1961 to 1975 to implement the goal of liberating the Southern Vietnam to unify the country. This paper presents the organizational system of the Propaganda Unit through the development stages of the resistance war against America. Thereby, the paper highlights the process of formation, changes and development of the Propaganda Unit through different stages; at the same time, evaluating the important roles of the propaganda in the leadership of the Central Office for the South Vietnam in the resistance war against America.

It is a sobering fact that the average age of the surviving veterans of the Second World War is now close to 80 years. The available information indicates that the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in all Second World War veterans is slightly higher than the 15% lifetime prevalence found in Vietnam War veterans, although there are few reliable studies on which to base this conclusion. It is, however, consistent with the finding that combat stress, based on casualty rates, during periods of the Vietnam War was equivalent to the severity of combat stress in the Second World War. There are several epidemiological studies (Beebe, 1975; Tennant et al, 1986) of more specific Second World War veteran groups such as Far East prisoners of war and, predictably, they show higher PTSD prevalence rates, ranging between 30 and 50%.

ImportanceThere are persistent questions about suicide deaths among US veterans who served in the Vietnam War. It has been believed that Vietnam War veterans may be at an increased risk for suicide.ObjectiveTo determine whether military service in the Vietnam War was associated with an increased risk of suicide, and to enumerate the number of suicides and analyze patterns in suicides among Vietnam War theater veterans compared with the US population.Design, Setting, and ParticipantsThis cohort study compiled a roster of all Vietnam War–era veterans and Vietnam War theater veterans who served between February 28, 1961, and May 7, 1975. The 2 cohorts included theater veterans, defined as those who were deployed to the Vietnam War, and nontheater veterans, defined as those who served during the Vietnam War era but were not deployed to the Vietnam War. Mortality in these 2 cohorts was monitored from 1979 (beginning of follow-up) through 2019 (end of follow-up). Data analysis was performed between January 2022 and July 2023.Main Outcomes and MeasuresThe outcome of interest was death by suicide occurring between January 1, 1979, and December 31, 2019. Suicide mortality was ascertained from the National Death Index. Hazard ratios (HRs) that reflected adjusted associations between suicide risk and theater status were estimated with Cox proportional hazards regression models. Standardized mortality rates (SMRs) were calculated to compare the number of suicides among theater and nontheater veterans with the expected number of suicides among the US population.ResultsThis study identified 2 465 343 theater veterans (2 450 025 males [99.4%]; mean [SD] age at year of entry, 33.8 [6.7] years) and 7 122 976 nontheater veterans (6 874 606 males [96.5%]; mean [SD] age at year of entry, 33.3 [8.2] years). There were 22 736 suicides (24.1%) among theater veterans and 71 761 (75.9%) among nontheater veterans. After adjustments for covariates, Vietnam War deployment was not associated with an increased risk of suicide (HR, 0.94; 95% CI, 0.93-0.96). There was no increased risk of suicide among either theater (SMR, 0.97; 95% CI, 0.96-0.99) or nontheater (SMR, 0.97; 95% CI, 0.97-0.98) veterans compared with the US population.Conclusions and RelevanceThis cohort study found no association between Vietnam War–era military service and increased risk of suicide between 1979 and 2019. Nonetheless, the 94 497 suicides among all Vietnam War–era veterans during this period are noteworthy and merit the ongoing attention of health policymakers and mental health professionals.

Although located in a region having close historical-cultural relations with the area of Southeast Asia, Australia always considers itself and is considered a special outpost of the West in Asia-Pacific. Since World War II up to now, the strategic alliance between Australia and the US has been developed comprehensively and deeply. Particularly, with the purpose of getting the protection in terms of security from the US towards the Near-North region, it's obvious that Australia had to accept the fact that the number of killed and wounded soldiers, advisories, and military workers during the period of the Vietnam war was equivalent to that of the killed and wounded ones of the two World Wars when Australia participated along with the British troops. To illustrate the aforementioned content, this article focuses on analyzing some objective factors including the development of the movement of national liberation, the founding and rising of Chinese socialism, and the policies of Southeast Asia of the US during the period of post-World War II, along with some subjective factors influencing the founding and development of the strategic alliance between Australia and the US such as the national interest and the role of Australia during the Vietnam war, the economiccultural- political platforms of the US-Australia relations, and three-key factors expressing the depth of these relations including military, politics and diplomacy, culture and education, science and technology.

The article presents an analysis of the results of Vietnam's economic development in 2023. There was found its weaknesses, the decline in growth dynamics to critically low level, vulnerability to negative phenomena in the global economy. This is regarded as evidence of increased external dependence, negative consequences of orientation to the West, following the neoliberal paradigm of reforming the transitional economy. Western sanctions against Russia, underestimation of their destructive impact on the world economy was recognized as a factor of negative development additional to the difficulties of the post-Covid recovery. It is noted that in the party-state documents and scholarly practice of Vietnam, these phenomena are covered sparingly, the propaganda of successes and achievements is flourishing, which relies on the support of Western media and governments. Vietnam is presented by them as a new "Asian tiger", a vivid example of the achievements of the neoliberal model of development, a model of capitalist progress propelled by the United States. In fact, Washington repeats the experiment of creating a showcase of prosperity in Southeast Asia in the face of Vietnam, which collapsed with the defeat of the United States in this country (in the war of 1964-1975). In order to minimize the consequences of this experiment and the loss of an important strategic partner like the SRV, Russia should recognize the objective situation and make serious efforts to change it in its favor.

This study investigates the problem of the Vietnam War. In March 1965, a full-scale interference of the United States (The US) in the military conflict in Vietnam began. It is stressed that the whole world was aghast at the tragedy that took place in Vietnam. It caused numerous discussions not only through the intergovernmental dialogue, but also within religious and interreligious communities. The authors draw attention to the fact that one of the most prominent inter-Christian organizations in the 1960s was the World Council of Churches (WCC), which actually directed the ecumeni-cal movement. At the WCC meetings in 1965-1975, the Vietnam War became one of the most sensitive matters. The latter was also complicated by the fact that the WCC member churches geographically belonged to opposite sides of the ideological confrontation. The Orthodox WCC members also took notice of the mentioned issue. It is especially noted that the Russian Orthodox Church showed the greatest interest in Vietnamese matters, consistently criticizing the role and military intervention of the United States in the conflict and largely shaping the World Council of Churches opinion on the Vietnamese question. A mention should be made that the research was carried out with the financial support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research within the framework of scientific project №21-011-44111; Acknowledgments: The reported study was funded by RFBR, project number 21-011-44111.

Abstract Mental health and its correlates were examined in U.S. Vietnam War veterans approximately fifty years after the War. The 2016-2017 VE-HEROeS (Vietnam Era Health Retrospective Observational Study) was a mail survey of the health of U.S. Vietnam War veterans who served between February 28, 1961 and May 7, 1975 and matched US non-veteran controls. ‘Veteran status’ represented wartime experience for three cohorts: ‘theater’ veterans with service in Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos, non-theater veterans with service elsewhere, and non-veterans with no military service. Veterans and non-veterans, aged 58-99 years, were randomly selected from a veteran sampling frame (n=9.87 million) derived from the Department of Veterans Affairs’ USVETS dataset and a commercial address database, respectively. Questionnaires were mailed to 42,393 veterans and 6,885 non-veterans; the response rate for veterans was 45% (n=18,866) and 67% (n=4,530) for non-veterans. Weighted bivariate and multivariable analyses were conducted to examine poor overall mental health, via the SF-8TM Mental Health Component Summary score (MCS), and other mental health measures by veteran status and socioeconomic, health, and other military characteristics. Nearly 50% of all theater veterans reported poor overall mental health (MCS<50). Prevalence of mental health measures was greatest for theater veterans and successively decreased for non-theater veterans and non-veterans. Key correlates significantly (P< 0.02) associated with poor MCS included veteran status, race/ethnicity, income, physical health, health perception, trauma, distress, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (Primary Care DSM-5 PTSD screen), and drug use. Results indicate a high burden of poor mental health among those who served in-theater.

This study surveyed the traumatic impacts of Tran Mong Tu in her poem, “The Gift in Wartime”. The poem is related to the Vietnam War (1954-1975) survivors and Tu’s trauma. As Tu’s husband’s death traumatized her and she expressed her frustration and tension in the poem, several other war victims were traumatized. Her trauma represented the Vietnam War survivors. This research attempted to find out the cathartic release of war veterans' traumatic impacts. She behaved like an abnormal person. She offered her husband roses and tears on his grave. The findings of the study showed that one of the best therapies or cathartic release of traumatic impacts was to forget it, compromise it and purge it. Transformation and purgation are the best ways to release the trauma. The study focuses on realizing the fact and being satisfied by adjusting to the situation. Trauma has not been studied yet from this angle. Crying might be the most common ways of outlet of cathartic release. Releasing the trauma depends on the individual’s tackling and compromise. Writing is the best way of releasing the trauma although listening to music also lessens it. Tu attempted to release her traumatic pain through her poems. She suffered psychologically from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This study employed the trauma theory to analyze the poem.

Durant la guerre dite « d’Indochine » (1945-1954), plus de 20 000 combattants français, légionnaires et africains, sont portés « prisonniers et disparus ». Pour la majorité prisonniers de guerre (PG) de la République démocratique du Vietnam (RDV), ils sont soumis à un régime alimentaire et sanitaire qui, s’il est proche de celui des Vietnamiens, fait des ravages dans leurs rangs. Mais le rythme terrible des morts n’est pas le seul choc qui les attend en captivité, où ils se voient imposer une éducation politique visant à leur ouvrir les yeux sur la condition du prolétariat militaire qu’ils forment ainsi que sur celle du peuple vietnamien exploité par le colonialisme français. Désorientés par ces conditions de captivité, les PG voient leurs repères sociaux et moraux singulièrement mis à l’épreuve. Les PG se voient en effet contraints, pour survivre, de « jouer le jeu » de la propagande de leurs geôliers, enfreignant de ce fait leur devoir de soldat. Dans chaque camp, des microsociétés de captifs s’agrègent et se désagrègent, occasionnant entre eux d’importants clivages – encore sensibles aujourd’hui. Tous ensemble, ces éléments contribuent à assoir dès les années 1950 une analyse à charge de la captivité : les PG auraient été « exterminés » par leurs geôliers, fortement « soupçonnés » par leur hiérarchie après leur libération, et immédiatement « oubliés » de leurs compatriotes. Cette triple lecture – ici sensiblement nuancée – forge ainsi, pour les décennies à venir, les conditions de possibilité pour les anciens PG de la RDV de s’ériger en victimes.Mais l’expérience n’est pas également douloureuse chez tous les PG : au contact des Vietnamiens, ils deviennent également les sujets d’une expérience inter-nationale hors normes ; certains estiment même avoir retiré de cette expérience « une certaine vision enrichissante », à tout le moins font-ils part de leur soif de comprendre l’extraordinaire expérience qu’ils viennent de vivre. Pour les cadres militaires notamment, cette expérience est porteuse d’un premier « devoir de mémoire ». Plus jamais pareille défaite réclament ainsi nombre d’« anciens d’Indochine » basculant dans la « Guerre d’Algérie », modélisant « l’action psychologique » subie en captivité dans la perspective d’une « contre-insurrection » à la française. « Plus jamais ça ! » clament également nombre d’anciens PG, munis de la légitimité d’un anticommunisme empirique, pour condamner en France le mouvement de mai 1968, l’Union de la Gauche, ou les massacres commis au nom du marxisme ailleurs dans le monde. Pour certains, l’expérience de la captivité est même sublimée en une forme d’éthique pratique qui contribuera à conduire certains d’entre eux jusqu’aux plus hautes sphères, d’où ils participeront à initier le combat qui prendra son essor à partir des années 1980 pour la reconnaissance et la réparation des traumatismes subis par les PG de la RDV.Dans l’air du temps de la fin du XXe siècle, les témoins vont en effet mobiliser le traumatisme comme ressource pour la mobilisation initiée au nom de la mémoire de leur expérience. Le témoignage devient alors, tout à la fois, un matériau d’expertise historique avec la thèse de l’ancien PG R. Bonnafous en 1985, d’expertise médicolégale après l’adoption en 1989 du « statut de prisonnier du Viet-Minh », et d’expertise judiciaire lors de l’« affaire Boudarel ». La chute du bloc soviétique, l’affaissement du tiers-mondisme et de l’anticolonialisme et l’avènement de « l’ère de la victime », autorisent en effet les anciens PG de la RDV, dont le collectif s’institutionnalise et s’élargit avec la création en 1985 de l’ANAPI, à se reconnaître en tant que victimes et à travailler à être reconnus comme tels. Cette lecture victimaire de la captivité de guerre en Indochine offre au final la clé d’une patrimonialisation relative de leur expérience sur le mode paradigmatique de la mémoire des crimes et génocides nazis… le tout sur fond de réhabilitation de la colonisation française
During the Indochina war (1945-1954), more than 20,000 French combatants, legionnaires and Africans, are listed "prisoners and missing". Prisoners of war (POW) of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) for the majority, they are subjected to a food and health regime that, if it is close to that of the Vietnamese, wreaks havoc in their ranks. But the terrible rhythm of the dead is not the only shock awaiting them in captivity, where they are forced to undergo a political education aimed at opening their eyes to the condition of the military proletariat they form, as well as to that of the Vietnamese people exploited by the French colonialism. Disorientated by these conditions of captivity, the POWs find their social and moral landmarks singularly put to the test. In order to survive, the POWs are forced to "play the game" of their jailers' propaganda, thereby violating their duty as soldiers. In each camp, captive micro-groups aggregate and disintegrate, causing important cleavages, still sensitive today, between them. This triple reading - here considered with nuance - thus forges, for decades to come, the conditions for the possibility of the former POWs of the DRVN becoming victims.But the experience is not as painful for all the POWs: when they come into contact with the Vietnamese, they also become subjects of an extraordinary international experience; some feel that they have even gained "a certain enriching vision" from this experience, at least they express their wish to understand the extraordinary experience they have just had. For officers in particular, this experience take the form of a first "duty to remember". Never again such defeats claim many Indochina veterans who fall into the "Algerian War", modeling "psychological action" suffered in captivity with the prospect of a French-style "counter-insurgency". "Never again!", claim many former POWs with the legitimacy of an empirical anti-communism, condemning, in France, the May 1968 movement, the "Union de la Gauche", or the massacres committed in the name of Marxism elsewhere in the world. For some, the experience of captivity is even sublimated into a form of practical ethics that will help to lead some of them to the highest political level, from where they will participate in initiating the fight that will take off from the 1980s onwards for the recognition and repair of the traumatisms suffered by the DRVN's POWs.In the spirit of the late twentieth century, witnesses mobilize trauma as a resource for mobilization initiated in the name of the memory of their experience. The testimony then becomes, at the same time, a material of historical expertise with the thesis of the former POW R. Bonnafous in 1985, of medico-legal expertise after the adoption in 1989 of the "prisoner of Viet Minh" status, and of judicial expertise during the "Boudarel affair". The fall of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Third World and the anti-colonialism, and the advent of the "era of the victim", indeed, allow the former POWs of the DRVN, whose collective is institutionalised with the creation of the ANAPI in 1985, to recognize themselves as victims and to work to be recognized as such. This victimized reading of the war captivity in Indochina ultimately offers the key to a relative patrimonialization of their experience on the paradigmatic mode of memory of Nazi crimes and genocides... all against a background of the rehabilitation of the French colonization

Thesis (M.F.A.)--George Mason University, 2009.
Vita: p. 72. Thesis director: Tom Ashcraft. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Fine Arts in Art and Visual Technology. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Oct. 11, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 70-71). Also issued in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009.
Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 7, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-100).

Abstract This chapter considers the strategies and tactics used by Vietnamese communist leaders to defeat the United States and its allies in the Vietnam War. It demonstrates that the guerrilla that has come to define the war in the West was in fact only one aspect of a highly sophisticated campaign to ‘liberate’ the Southern half of the country and bring about national reunification under communist aegis. To prevail in the contest with the Americans and the rival regime in Saigon, Hanoi waged a multifaceted war that rallied not only fighters but also partisans at home and abroad to support them materially and morally. In the final analysis, the United States lost the Vietnam War owing less to its own shortcomings than to the experience, resourcefulness, and ingenuity of its adversaries.

Abstract The Cold War deepened and expanded during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. While the superpower stalemate was maintained in Europe, the rearmament of West Germany, the Hungarian Revolution, and the status of Berlin were among the issues that aggravated Cold War tensions on that continent during the Eisenhower years. Although Eisenhower kept his promise to end the Korean War, Sino-American relations remained frigid, and, in fact, were aggravated during two crises in the Tai¬ wan Strait. During the Eisenhower years, the United States also became more deeply involved in Indochina and took the first steps down the slippery slope to the Vietnam quagmire. The Cold War also intensified in the Middle East, as a result

Abstract By 1974, AMERICA WAS IN A FULL-BLOWN RECESSION. The Dow-Jones average, after plunging 45 percent in less than two years amid the worst economic climate the country had experienced since the Great Depression, bottomed out. Inflation, unemployment, and oil shortages continued to rise. New York City, the financial capital of the country, was on the verge of going broke, and American industry appeared to be in an irreversible decline. There were predictions that the oil-producing countries, or perhaps the Japanese, would soon be able to buy America. The country finally extricated itself from the Vietnam morass, only to have its citizens’ faith in the government shaken to the core by the Watergate scandal. In turn, America did what it usually did in the face of hard times: It danced in the face of its troubles. Given the bleak domestic climate and the fact that America was due for a dance fad (they usually occurred about every ten years; the last one involved the twist), disco was a phenomenon waiting to happen. Stressful times for the American people necessitated active physical releases such as athletics and sex. Disco dancing offered tens of millions of people a sublime blend of the two. As a result, dance clubs called discotheques became extremely popular.

Abstract Criteria for judging the effectiveness of strategies vary, but Eisenhower’s were clear enough: his goal was to achieve the maximum possible deterrence of communism at the minimum possible cost. In retrospect, the “New Look” strategy appears to have met these objectives. Despite the fact that his administration refrained from large-scale overseas military activity after the Korean armistice, the only countries “lost” to communism during its term were North Vietnam, already largely under Ho Chi Minh’s control when Eisenhower entered the White House, and Cuba, whose communist orientation did not become clear until he was about to leave it. Expenditures for national defense remained remarkably stable, ranging from a low of $42.5 billion in fiscal 1956 to a high of $49.6 billion in fiscal 1961. More revealing are military expenditures as a percentage of the total budget—these figures actually declined, from 69.5 percent in 1954 to 50.8 percent in 1961. Defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product also went down, from 13.1 percent in 1954 to 9.4 percent in 1961.1 And yet, despite appearances to the contrary, these cuts produced no net reduction in American military strength relative to that of the S viet Union—if anything, the United States was in a stronger posture vis-àvis its major competitor at the end of Eisenhower’s term than it was at the beginning.

Abstract Planning and directing the Mayaguez operation fell to the closest U.S. military headquarters, the U.S. Support Activities Group/7AF (USSAG) in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. Technically a joint command, it included representatives from the four services. In fact, it was predominantly an Air Force command, headed by an Air Force officer, Lieutenant General John J. Burns. In the three years prior to the capture of the Mayaguez, USSAG’s main mission had been to provide air and logistical support to the South Vietnamese and Cambodian allies of the United States. In April 1975, USSAG had been heavily involved in the successful largescale evacuation of Americans from Cambodia and from South Vietnam as the two countries fell to Communist forces. Now USSAG faced a new challenge. Almost overnight, it was to organize the disparate U.S. units at hand into an integrated force and conduct one of the most difficult military operations of all: a combat rescue mission.

In April 1974, Admiral was absorbed into Rockwell International’s growing empire. The Vietnam War contractor was, according to the New York Times, on a “debt-financed acquisition binge that lasted almost a decade” as it spread its reach into aircraft, defense, aerospace, electronics, and appliances. Admiral, meanwhile, was still churning out televisions, radios, and home appliances at factories across the Midwest. Productive as it was, the little company couldn’t afford the massive capital outlays required to modernize, market, and survive in the increasingly brutal electronics and appliance businesses. Accustomed to the massive revenues and fat profits of big government contracts, Rockwell International trimmed employment at the plant, investing $25 million to automate the chest-freezer line. In 1975 Rockwell added a 60,000-square-foot microwave oven facility, and in 1978 it spent $12 million to retool the top-mount refrigerator line and erect the “Blue Goose,” a massive machine the length of a football field that spat out finished metal cabinets. In earlier times, investment meant more jobs. Under Rockwell’s rigorous ethic of scientific management, it usually meant fewer. Admiral accounted for about an eighth of Rockwell’s revenues. “We weren’t even peanuts to Rockwell,” Michael Patrick said. It was a new era for Appliance City. One afternoon in the mid-1970s, Dave Bevard was let out of work an hour and a half early. Production workers were instructed to gather in the vast parking lot across the street from the factory. Under a circus tent, a Rockwell representative and the Admiral plant manager told workers about the importance of the B-1 bomber to the nation’s defense, to Rockwell’s future, and, consequently, to Galesburg jobs. By this time Rockwell had production of the B-1 in over forty states, making itself the model practitioner of militaryindustrial growth. The plan was to use its nonmilitary production facilities in a lobbying campaign to maintain one of the most lucrative military contracts in history—around $10 billion at the time. Workers signed premade postcards for their congressman and went home early that day.