Relevant bibliographies by topics / Vertical fiscal imbalance

Academic literature on the topic 'Vertical fiscal imbalance'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Vertical fiscal imbalance"

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Zhang, Simin, and Zhikai Wang. "Effects of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance on Fiscal Health Expenditure Efficiency—Evidence from China." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 20, no. 3 (January 23, 2023): 2060. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20032060.

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Improving fiscal health expenditure efficiency is an inherent requirement of the strategy of “healthy China” and “high-quality development”. The outbreak of COVID-19 has highlighted the importance of efficient health system. First, this paper systematically sorts out the multiple theoretical mechanisms of the positive and negative relationship between vertical fiscal imbalance and fiscal health expenditure efficiency. Secondly, a comprehensive index system, including the quantity and quality of medical services, is constructed, and the super-efficiency DEA model is used to measure fiscal health expenditure efficiency. There are obvious differences between eastern and western regions. Finally, the fixed effect model is constructed to carry out empirical research and it is found that the vertical fiscal imbalance in China has an overall positive and significant impact on the fiscal health expenditure efficiency, which is mainly achieved by optimizing the resources allocation between primary medical institutions and hospitals. Heterogeneity analysis shows that transfer payment scale has a corrective effect on the vertical fiscal imbalance’s effect. The result of quantile regression shows that the impact of vertical fiscal imbalance is not constant, and it gradually turns from positive to negative along with the improvement of fiscal health expenditure efficiency.
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Meloni, Osvaldo. "Electoral Opportunism and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance." Journal of Applied Economics 19, no. 1 (May 2016): 145–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1514-0326(16)30006-x.

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Bouton, Laurent, Marjorie Gassner, and Vincenzo Verardi. "Redistributing income under fiscal vertical imbalance." European Journal of Political Economy 24, no. 2 (June 2008): 317–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.01.003.

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Qin, Fengqin. "Fiscal Expenditure Structure, Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Environmental Pollution." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 13 (July 1, 2022): 8106. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19138106.

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Based on China’s provincial panel data from 2007 to 2019, the authors of this paper conducted an empirical test on the direct effect of China’s fiscal expenditure structure on the reduction in environmental pollution with the use of a fixed effect model. We also creatively added an interaction item comprising vertical fiscal imbalance and the expenditure structure to further study the impact of vertical fiscal imbalance on reducing environmental pollution and its effect on the fiscal expenditure structure. The study results show that a structure in favor of expenditure on people’s welfare noticeably reduces environmental pollution. However, after the introduction of the vertical fiscal imbalance indicator, the pollution reduction effect decreases. That is, the vertical fiscal imbalance weakens and distorts the impact of the fiscal expenditure structure on the reduction in environmental pollution. Therefore, it is possible to further motivate local governments with incentive measures, such as fiscal decentralization and the centralization of administrative responsibilities, and regulate the environmental pollution of local governments through use of restrictive measures, such as the “green GDP” evaluation mechanism to further improve the fiscal expenditure structure of local governments, enhance the environmental pollution reduction capability of fiscal expenditure.
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Alekhin, B. I. "Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Regional Economic Growth." Financial Journal 12, no. 6 (2020): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.31107/2075-1990-2020-6-39-53.

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This study examines the impact of fiscal decentralization on regional economic growth using panel data for 82 subjects of the Russian Federation for the period 2005-2018. General theoretical framework was drawn from the second-generation theory of fiscal federalism, and panel data econometrics suggested the appropriate empirical model and estimation method. The pooled mean group method was used to estimate an autoregressive distributed lags model based on Solow-Swan theory of economic growth. The results indicate that vertical fiscal gap has a negative and significant long-term impact on regional economic growth while vertical fiscal imbalance has a positive and significant long-term effect. The study is consistent with the modern theory of fiscal federalism, W.E. Oates’ matching hypothesis and previous empirical work using Russian data. The study also found evidence of conditional convergence of regional economies.
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Kowalik, Paweł. "Measurement of vertical fiscal imbalance in Germany." Argumenta Oeconomica 2, no. 37 (2016): 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.15611/aoe.2016.2.05.

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Savchenko, Y. M. "The Fiscal Imbalances and Methodological Approaches to Their Assessment." Business Inform 6, no. 521 (2021): 219–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2021-6-219-228.

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This article generalizes and systematizes approaches to determining the essence of fiscal imbalances and their types, in particular, taking into account and without taking into account the aspect of possible problems in the sphere of fiscal policy. It is also emphasized that when determining the essence of fiscal imbalances, it is important to realize the difference between accounting and financial terms, since analytics in this terminology is also based on different methods of assessing fiscal imbalance. Such deterministic factors of fiscal imbalances as internal tax competition, tax transfer and tax imbalance in general are analyzed. The conception of marginal expenditures of public funds as a central concept in determining fiscal imbalances is characterized. In addition to the traditional types of fiscal imbalances (vertical and horizontal), there is also an imbalance of justice (according to the research of scientist Dolozina I. L.), which is manifested, in particular, in tax evasion, avoidance of taxation (including aggressive tax planning) and income inequality. The generalized classification of types of fiscal imbalances with the characterizations of causes and manifestations of their occurrence is provided. The results of researches of approaches to assessing fiscal imbalances and indicators used are systematized. It is emphasized that the researchers use most of the indicators to assess fiscal imbalances specified in this article to conduct a panel analysis in order to identify the impact of equalization instruments on different territories and groups of taxpayers.
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Kowalik, Paweł. "Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance In The United States." Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia 14, no. 2 (December 1, 2014): 140–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/foli-2015-0013.

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Abstract Regional inequalities are currently a challenge for the majority of countries, in particular large ones, certain of which are federations. The federal state system is more complex than the unitary system. This results in specific problems. One of them is the issue of differing level of economic development of individual territorial units, whereby the problem of income redistribution emerges. The difference between income and expenses results in the formation of fiscal gaps, both horizontal and vertical ones. The aim of the paper is to present the measures applied for measuring the horizontal fiscal imbalance. It is also the starting point for conducting measurements of those imbalances in the USA based on the presented measures. The paper presents the measures applied in the literature for the purposes of measuring horizontal fiscal imbalance. In addition, the measurement of those imbalances in the USA are presented.
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Guo, Gang. "Vertical Imbalance and Local Fiscal Discipline in China." Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 1 (April 2008): 61–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800005099.

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This article examines local fiscal behavior in contemporary China against the backdrop of decentralized spending responsibilities and recentralized revenues. Vertical imbalance after the 1994 tax-sharing system reform, coupled with other features of the fiscal institutions, is not conducive to conservative local fiscal behavior. Moreover, a main driving force behind the expansion of local governments is the politically motivated intergovernmental transfer scheme. The center in effect “buys” political stability in sensitive areas while holding local leaders accountable for their tax efforts. A dynamic panel analysis of Chinese counties reveals that a million-yuan increase in general transfer payment and salary raise subsidies would add, respectively, fifteen and sixteen employees to the county government payroll, other things being equal. At the same time, increased subsidies from upper-level governments do not “crowd out” or significantly affect local tax effort. Additional dynamic panel data analysis at the provincial level produced similar findings.
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Mikhaylova, A. A., and E. N. Timushev. "Concept of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in the Analysis of Fiscal Sustainability at the Regional Level." Financial Journal 13, no. 6 (2021): 98–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.31107/2075-1990-2021-6-98-116.

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The paper analyzes the concept and indicator of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) and its capability in assessing the creditworthiness (debt sustainability) of Russian regions. It is found that VFI does not replace other indicators of debt and broader fiscal sustainability, but complements them by providing diagnostics of the balance of incoming and outgoing intergovernmental transfers in addition to the balance of expenditures and revenues (budget deficit). Vertical fiscal imbalance has a close inverse pair correlation with the share of own (tax and non-tax) revenues and fiscal capacity, and can therefore reflect creditworthiness (along with the amount of debt and capital expenditures). Technically, it is advisable to carry out an analysis using VFI with a recalculation accounting for subventions. It is concluded that vertical fiscal imbalance is an important element of the methodology of diagnosing fiscal sustainability. Further study of features of the concept, as well as the use of VFI in the analysis and regulation of intergovernmental relations, suggests a promising outlook.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Vertical fiscal imbalance"

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Bouton, Laurent. "Essays in game theory applied to political and market institutions." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210325.

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My thesis contains essays on voting theory, market structures and fiscal federalism: (i) One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation, (ii) Runoff Elections and the Condorcet Loser, (iii) On the Influence of Rankings when Product Quality Depends on Buyer Characteristics, and (iv) Redistributing Income under Fiscal Vertical Imbalance.

(i) One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation (joint with Micael Castanheira)

In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.

(ii) Runoff Elections and the Condorcet Loser

A crucial component of Runoff electoral systems is the threshold fraction of votes above which a candidate wins outright in the first round. I analyze the influence of this threshold on the voting equilibria in three-candidate Runoff elections. I demonstrate the existence of an Ortega Effect which may unduly favor dominated candidates and thus lead to the election of the Condorcet Loser in equilibrium. The reason is that, contrarily to commonly held beliefs, lowering the threshold for first-round victory may actually induce voters to express their preferences excessively. I also extend Duverger's Law to Runoff elections with any threshold below, equal or above 50%. Therefore, Runoff elections are plagued with inferior equilibria that induce either too high or too low expression of preferences.

(iii) On the Influence of Rankings when Product Quality Depends on Buyer Characteristics

Information on product quality is crucial for buyers to make sound choices. For "experience products", this information is not available at the time of the purchase: it is only acquired through consumption. For much experience products, there exist institutions that provide buyers with information about quality. It is commonly believed that such institutions help consumers to make better choices and are thus welfare improving.

The quality of various experience products depends on the characteristics of buyers. For instance, conversely to the quality of cars, business school quality depends on buyers (i.e. students) characteristics. Indeed, one of the main inputs of a business school is enrolled students. The choice of buyers for such products has then some features of a coordination problem: ceteris paribus, a buyer prefers to buy a product consumed by buyers with "good" characteristics. This coordination dimension leads to inefficiencies when buyers coordinate on products of lower "intrinsic" quality. When the quality of products depends on buyer characteristics, information about product quality can reinforce such a coordination problem. Indeed, even though information of high quality need not mean high intrinsic quality, rational buyers pay attention to this information because they prefer high quality products, no matter the reason of the high quality. Information about product quality may then induce buyers to coordinate on products of low intrinsic quality.

In this paper, I show that, for experience products which quality depends on the characteristics of buyers, more information is not necessarily better. More precisely, I prove that more information about product quality may lead to a Pareto deterioration, i.e. all buyers may be worse off due.

(iv) Redistributing Income under Fiscal Vertical Imbalance (joint with Marjorie Gassner and Vincenzo Verardi)

From the literature on decentralization, it appears that the fiscal vertical imbalance (i.e. the dependence of subnational governments on national government revenues to support their expenditures) is somehow inherent to multi-level governments. Using a stylized model we show that this leads to a reduction of the extent of redistributive fiscal policies if the maximal size of government has been reached. To test for this empirically, we use some high quality data from the LIS dataset on individual incomes. The results are highly significant and point in the direction of our theoretical predictions.


Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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Fadliya, Fadliya. "Fiscal aspects of decentralisation in Indonesia." Phd thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/104304.

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In 1999 Indonesia embarked on a radical program of decentralisation intended to create a much stronger role for subnational governments, thus ensuring that power would be dispersed over three levels of government rather than concentrated at the centre. Once the key decisions had been made on the fiscal roles and authorities assigned to each level of government, and on the appropriate level of total fiscal transfers from central to subnational governments, it was necessary to design a set of rules for allocating this total among the latter. The laws on ‘fiscal balance’ do precisely this, but in a highly convoluted manner that leads to outcomes that appear to be at odds with economic rationality. Comparing transfers across jurisdictions reveals that the highest and lowest per capita amounts differ by a factor of the order of 100. No conceivable difference in the economic circumstances of individual jurisdictions could justify such pronounced departures from equal treatment of Indonesia’s citizens. It is recognised that the current transfer system needs modification, but its complexity is such that further revisions of the law on ‘balancing funds’ had been under consideration—without resolution—for about a decade at the time of writing. Previous attempts to improve the system focused on small, seemingly important matters of detail, whereas what is needed is a much more fundamental rethinking of the entire design. The unnecessary complexity of the current system is evident in its separation of total transfers into three components: a revenue sharing component, a general funds allocation and a special funds allocation. The first two components are untied, and so it is only their total amount that actually matters to recipient governments. Indeed, the existence of the revenue sharing component necessarily conflicts with the objectives of the general funds allocation component. The third component is tied to central government priorities, and has been expanding relative to the others as well as in sectoral scope—seemingly in conflict with the original intention to bring government closer to the people. An unfortunate consequence of the current system is that it has created a strong financial incentive for the splitting of jurisdictions, which has been a conspicuous feature of decentralisation; for the same reason, it has created a financial disincentive to amalgamation of jurisdictions. The transfer system should not distort important choices about the configuration of regional government boundaries in this manner. The extraordinarily wide variation in levels of per capita transfers is quite at odds with government policy in the fields of education and health, a key emphasis of which is equal access of all children and citizens. High per capita transfers are found to be associated with small populations, so small-population jurisdictions have the potential to provide much better access to education and health care—although by no means all small-population local governments use their relatively large funding entitlements to expand delivery of these services.
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Pelton, Nicole Sheree. "Challenges for Integrated Coastal Management in the Australian Federation: Understanding Intergovernmental Tension: A Case Study of South Australia." Thesis, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2440/119189.

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Prudent management of the coastal zone is of major importance given that competition for coastal resource use is being intensified by increasing population pressure and the impending impacts of climate change. Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) is internationally regarded as the best-practice approach for the planning and management of coastal resource use. ICM espouses effective integration between governing bodies. However, numerous Australian government inquiries and academic literature on coastal zone management have concluded that ICM has been difficult to implement in Australia, with intergovernmental integration particularly elusive. Whilst Australia’s federal system of government has been implicated in this, studies have not explicitly addressed the nature of the relationship between Australian federalism and intergovernmental integration between the local, state and federal spheres. Thus, the aim of this study was to generate a theory as to why ICM, particularly intergovernmental integration, has been so difficult to implement in Australia. The study, employing elements of grounded theory and comparative case study methodology, was designed to explore the relationship between federalism and intergovernmental integration based on the experiences of coastal managers and decision-makers responsible for coastal management ‘on-the-ground’. Three natural resource management (NRM) case study regions in South Australia were selected: Eyre Peninsula, South East, and Adelaide & Mount Lofty Ranges. The nature of Australia’s federal system of government and the functions and capacity of the three spheres – local, state and federal – were also explored via literature review and document analysis. Primary data collection was accomplished via thirty three in-depth, semi-structured interviews with local government staff and elected representatives, NRM Board staff and SA government ‘Department for Environment’ staff with responsibilities for coastal management and/or decision-making. Interview questions revolved around interviewees’ perceptions of the roles and responsibilities of each sphere of government; financial arrangements for funding coastal management; and the level of intergovernmental integration. Constant comparative analysis elicited themes from interview transcripts. Triangulation of interview data with secondary data obtained via literature review and document analysis verified interview data and scaffolded theory development. Two prominent themes emerged from the analysis of participants’ perceptions regarding the roles and responsibilities of the three spheres of government: disempowerment and intergovernmental tension. Synthesis of interview data with secondary data revealed two fundamental issues underpinning these themes at both the local and state level: 1) asymmetries in responsibility relative to capacity and 2) a lack of autonomy. Understanding of these issues was enhanced by examining the evolving role of the federal government within the Australian federation, whereby Australia’s practice of fiscal federalism has resulted in fiscal centralisation characterised by a large vertical fiscal imbalance between the federal and state spheres and a comparative lack of fiscal autonomy at the state government level. Fiscal centralisation poses a significant barrier to the operation of effective cooperative federalism in Australia. Thus, this thesis theorises that fiscal centralisation is a significant barrier to meaningful integration between the spheres of government involved in coastal management in Australia.
Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Social Sciences, 2017
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DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Zdeňka. "Intraregionální rozdíly ve fiskální pozici obcí." Master's thesis, 2007. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-79936.

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The topic of this diploma thesis is Intraregional differences in fiscal positions of communities. The goal of the thesis was to analyze incomes and expences of communities of the chosen region, to find differences in these incomes and expences, and to specify the cause of their origin. The introductory part cosists of the theory of fiscal federalism, decentralization and position, incomes and expences of communities and horizontal and vertical imbalances. The main part talks about fiscal capacity and fiscal need of individual communities and factors that cause differences in fiscal positions..
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Books on the topic "Vertical fiscal imbalance"

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McLure, Charles E. Vertical fiscal imbalance and the assignment of taxing powers in Australia. Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1993.

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Canada, Conference Board of. Vertical fiscal imbalance July 2002: Fiscal prospects for the federal and provincial/territorial governments : economic performance and trends. Ottawa, Ont: The Board, 2002.

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K, Srivastava D., and Madras School of Economics, eds. Reforming India's fiscal transfer system: Resolving vertical and horizontal imbalances. Chennai: Madras School of Economics, 2008.

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Rangarajan, C. Reforming India's fiscal transfer system: Resolving vertical and horizontal imbalances. Chennai: Madras School of Economics, 2008.

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Kops, Manfred. Local revenues in Malaysia: The correction of its vertical and horizontal imbalances by intergovernmental transfers. Köln: Finanzwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut an der Universität zu Köln, 1989.

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Canada, Conference Board of, ed. Vertical fiscal imbalance July 2000: Fiscal prospects for the federal and provincial/territorial governments. Ottawa, Ont: Conference Board of Canada, 2002.

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McClure, Charles E. Jr. Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and the Assignment of Taxing Powers in Australia (Essays in public policy). Hoover Inst Pr, 1993.

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Karpowicz, Izabela. Narrowing Vertical Fiscal Imbalances in Four European Countries. International Monetary Fund, 2012.

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Cevik, Serhan. Fragmentation and Vertical Fiscal Imbalances Lessons from Moldova. International Monetary Fund, 2014.

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Cevik, Serhan. Fragmentation and Vertical Fiscal Imbalances Lessons from Moldova. International Monetary Fund, 2014.

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Book chapters on the topic "Vertical fiscal imbalance"

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Brezovnik, Boštjan, Mateja Finžgar, and Žan Jan Oplotnik. "Slovenia: Vertical Imbalance in Local Government Financing." In Fiscal Decentralisation, Local Government and Policy Reversals in Southeastern Europe, 21–52. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96092-0_2.

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Koley, Madhurima, and Kumarjit Mandal. "Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and Its Impact on Fiscal Performance: A Case for Indian States." In Opportunities and Challenges in Development, 243–82. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9981-7_12.

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"Vertical Imbalance and Fiscal Behavior in a Welfare State." In Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints. The MIT Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3021.003.0008.

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Woźniakowski, Tomasz P. "Comparative Analysis and Implications for the EU." In Fiscal Unions, 135–54. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192858436.003.0006.

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Abstract The sixth chapter of Fiscal Unions provides a comparative analysis and conclusions. It discusses how both the USA and the EU experienced a shift of power in fiscal matters to the higher level of government as a result of an internal threat, albeit in different forms. While in the USA an internal threat emerging from the debt crisis triggered the process of fiscalization of the federal government, the EU, on the other hand, responded to a threat by strengthening its authority to regulate the fiscal policies of the member states. Fiscalization has been ruled out. The lesson that the EU could perhaps learn from the US experience in forging a federal fiscal union is twofold. First, an internal threat is the necessary condition to trigger the process of fiscalization of the central government and consequently lead to the creation of a federal fiscal union. Second, the lack of a federal power to tax, and thus the existence of a vertical fiscal imbalance, so that central government is financially dependent on the contributions from the states, may trigger a chain of events leading to popular protests that can threaten the very existence of the Union. One solution to such a crisis is the creation of a more ‘energetic’ federal government with the power to tax as its most important competence. I elaborate more on these lessons in the concluding section of this chapter.
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Mekonnen, Getachew Alebachew, and Walelign Awoke Kassie. "Fiscal Decentralization at Local Government of Ethiopia." In Civic Engagement Frameworks and Strategic Leadership Practices for Organization Development, 171–97. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-2372-8.ch008.

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In the last quarter century, many countries have engaged in the process of decentralization by transferring the responsibilities of the state to lower tiers of government. The major purpose of this study was to explore the practice of fiscal decentralization at the local government of governments of Ethiopia, with a special emphasis on the Awi Nationality Administration Zone in light of legal frameworks and some theories of fiscal decentralization. The study mainly employed a qualitative research approach to illustrate the theory and the practice of fiscal decentralization in the sub-regional level of governments in ANRS with special emphasis on the Awi Nationality Administration Zone. The finding showed that both the legal frameworks and practice indicate that the means of revenue-raising power is relatively decentralized in the city administration as well as woredas level. Another finding showed that aggregate revenue-raising capacity of different levels of government in the zone fails to match their expenditure responsibilities which result in vertical fiscal imbalance.
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Spahn, Paul B. "The German model of addressing vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances." In Intergovernmental Transfers in Federations, 64–85. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781789900859.00013.

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Rao, M. Govinda. "Intergovernmental Transfers in India." In Studies in Indian Public Finance, 175–220. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192849601.003.0008.

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The Constitution enables the appointment of the Finance Commission every 5 years by the President of India to recommend devolution of Union taxes and grants in aid to the States to offset vertical and horizontal imbalances. The Commission has the mandate to recommend measures to supplement the resources of local bodies as well. While the Commission recommends mostly unconditional transfers, the Union government gives conditional grants for centrally sponsored schemes. There are 29 umbrella centrally sponsored schemes and within each there are several sub-schemes, forcing thin distribution of resources. However, there are a number of problems associated with both transfers. The Finance Commission’s transfer system is a work in progress; it is not fully incentive compatible and does not fully offset the fiscal disabilities of low-income States. The specific purpose transfers are too many, ill targeted, each with several conditionalities and with a number of design flaws.
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Reports on the topic "Vertical fiscal imbalance"

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Ter-Minassian, Teresa, and Andrés Muñoz Miranda. Options for a Reform of the Mexican Intergovernmental Transfer System in Light of International Experiences. Inter-American Development Bank, April 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004217.

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This paper focuses on the design of intergovernmental transfers to reduce vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances and improve the performance of subnational governments. It provides an overview of international experiences, especially of large federations, with a view to devising viable options for reform of the transfer system in Mexico. While there is no one-size-fits-all ideal model of design and implementation of intergovernmental transfer systems, this analysis points to some lessons that can inform reforms, including the need to view intergovernmental transfers as an integral part of the overall system of intergovernmental fiscal relations; the use of different types of intergovernmental transfers that are best suited to fulfill different objectives; and the incorporation of equalization schemes to address regional disparities. In the light of these experiences, we find that the current Mexican transfer system is too fragmented, is linked to volatile oil revenues, involves substantial discretion in the allocation of a significant portion of the transfers, and lacks sufficient equalizing power. This paper presents and discusses possible reform options and demonstrates that it is altogether possible to reduce transfer dependence to promote effort and fiscal responsibility; simplify the system to increase predictability and ease its administration; eliminate discretion to increase transparency and establish stronger subnational budget constraints; and improve fiscal equalization to promote equity in subnational service delivery. Careful consideration of political economy dynamics is given in the simulations of possible reforms, with a view to minimizing short-term gains and losses as well as political opposition.
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