Academic literature on the topic 'Ventur capital'
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Journal articles on the topic "Ventur capital"
Siregar, Melly Moraito Trianita. "Investasi Modal Ventura Asing Kepada Start-Up Company (Perusahaan Rintisan) di Indonesia." Jurist-Diction 4, no. 4 (July 1, 2021): 1567. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/jd.v4i4.28487.
Full textBaum, Joel A. C., and Brian S. Silverman. "Corrigendum to “Picking winners or building them? Alliance, intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria in venture financing and performance of biotechnology startups” [J. Bus. Ventur. 19 (2004) 411–436]." Journal of Business Venturing 30, no. 2 (March 2015): 355. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2014.12.001.
Full textHadi, Nasrullah Hadi, Ibnu Al Saudi, and Abdul Syahid. "PENGARUH PENYERTAAN MODAL VENTURA TERHADAP PENDAPATAN PPU DI PALANGKA RAYA DITINJAU DARI PERSPEKTIF EKONOMI SYARIAH." Finansha- Journal of Sharia Financial Management 1, no. 2 (January 27, 2021): 13–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.15575/fsfm.v1i2.10683.
Full textNadhif, Fernanda. "Kepailitan Perusahaan Pasangan Usaha Berbentuk Perseroan Terbatas Terkait Penyertaan Modal oleh Perusahaan Modal Ventura." Jurist-Diction 5, no. 6 (November 30, 2022): 2193–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/jd.v5i6.40123.
Full textHidajat, Rachmat. "Venture Capital Financing on MSMEs in PT Sarana Ventura Yogyakarta: A Maslahah Perspective." AL-FALAH : Journal of Islamic Economics 4, no. 2 (December 16, 2019): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.29240/alfalah.v4i2.929.
Full textKasim, Anita Ahmad, and Raziyan Dwi Pathan. "Sistem Pendukung Keputusan Kelayakan Penerimaan Nasabah Menggunakan Metode Profile Matching." CESS (Journal of Computer Engineering, System and Science) 5, no. 1 (January 31, 2020): 98. http://dx.doi.org/10.24114/cess.v5i1.14520.
Full textMaune, Alexander. "Developing competitive advantage through startups and venture capital in emerging markets: A view from Israel." Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and Institutions 7, no. 3 (2017): 85–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/rgcv7i3p9.
Full textZhang, Ruijun, and Lina Zheng. "Monitoring and Analysis of Venture Capital and Corporate Fraud Based on Deep Learning." Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience 2022 (May 31, 2022): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/4589593.
Full textDr.V. Santhi, Dr V. Santhi, and S. Revathy S. Revathy. "Venture Capital Practices in India." International Journal of Scientific Research 1, no. 7 (June 1, 2012): 103–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/22778179/dec2012/40.
Full textCheesman, D. "Nothing venture... [venture capital]." IEE Review 48, no. 2 (March 1, 2002): 21–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/ir:20020203.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Ventur capital"
Ulu, Fatma. "VENTURE CAPITAL - Important factors for venture capital investment decisions." Thesis, Halmstad University, School of Business and Engineering (SET), 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-1890.
Full textThe decision process of venture capitalists has received much attention from researchers and it is a complex and unclear process. There are plenty of factors that affect venture capitalists´ investment decisions. The purpose of this study is to find out the important factors in the due diligence process for the venture capital firms and venture capitalists during their investments. The authors find it interesting to find out factors that influence venture capitalists during their investment decisions according to due diligence process. Qualitative method was seen suitable for this study. Three phone interviews were conducted with three venture capital firms in Turkey named Is Private Equity, Ilab Ventures and Bosphorous Group. The authors find out management, market, location, product, industry and financial factors are important factors for venture capitalists to decide whether to invest or not.
Verma, Sanjeev. "Corporate venture capital." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/10500.
Full textLang, Nils Konstantin. "Venture Capital Contracting in the Context of Young Venture Governance." Thesis, Lyon, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020LYSE3049.
Full textEntrepreneurial finance provides the capital for launch, early development and growth of ventures,. It acts as an enabler for innovation and advancement of an economy. Institutional venture capital investors (VCs) account for the largest capital contribution. The two main pillars for venture success are represented by the entrepreneurial team and the investors. It is due to their effort, joint engagement and alignment that initial prospectus business ideas turn into viable companies with high upscaling opportunities and strong return on investments. Entrepreneurs and investors face conflicts of interest. Young venture governance, defined and shaped in form of venture capital investment contracts, provides a finely adapted corporate governance structure which is vital to unleash the full potential by mitigating agency conflicts. Comprising of three publications, this dissertation provides novel insights on the evolution of young venture governance over time, on the initial start of a formalization of the governance structure, and on the impact of motivating governance and contract terms on future venture performance
Pries, Fred. "Distinguishing successful from unsuccessful venture capital investments in technology-based new ventures: How investment decision criteria relate to deal performance." Thesis, University of Waterloo, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/821.
Full textNathusius, Eva. "Syndizierte Venture-Capital-Finanzierung /." Sternenfels : Verl. Wiss. und Praxis, 2005. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2637520&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
Full textSinghs, Shikhir. "Structuring Venture Capital Deals." Thesis, Cass Business School, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/71540.
Full textGallucci, Netto Humberto. "Ensaios sobre venture capital." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/20684.
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This thesis analyzes the differences between venture capital (VC) funds managed by banks and funds managed by independent institutions. Banks as VC fund managers (or bank affiliates funds) contact companies that commonly require banking services such as loans, underwriting and M & A advisory. Fang et al. (2013) and Hellman et al. (2008) explore the possibility that bank affiliates seek to invest in companies that may in the future be clients of the bank to which they are associated. In this case, banks sponsor VC funds to strengthen their commercial area. In addition, bank affiliates have access to the same flow of opportunities as independent funds. This thesis explores another possibility: independent funds seek co-investment with bank affiliates to facilitate the access of their investees to advantages such as greater capital volume and obtaining credit. In this case, the flow of opportunities of bank affiliates is differentiated because they are easier to participate in co-investments. Thus, the first objective of this thesis is to seek evidence that bank affiliates have a different flow of opportunities and that they are easier to co-invest. The second objective is to investigate whether the reinterpretation of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (or GSA) that occurred in 1989 affected the structuring of the investments of affiliated funds of banks. The GSA has in many ways limited the performance of commercial banks. Section 20 prohibited commercial banks and their subsidiaries from being the underwriters in corporate bond issues. Over the years, there have been some attempts by Congress to soften or remove the GSA, but with little success. Regulators and banks were able to effectively soften the GSA through successive reinterpretations of their content. In 1989, the Federal Reserve (Fed) allowed some financial institutions to underwrite corporate assets (including IPOs). This permission created, exogenously, two groups of financial institutions: those that could and could not do underwriting (we call the commercial banks that obtained this authorization as subsidiaries Section 20 or SS20). This constituted an exogenous shock that affected only a portion of commercial banks and thus allows us to identify whether underwriting activity affects the behavior of banks as VC fund managers. A change in the investment style after 1989 that occurs only for the SS20 would be indicative that bank affiliates adjust their investment style in function of the activities and interests of the holding company. This also suggests the conflict of interest between these two activities. Regarding the first objective, we find that the model of VC investment of affiliates of commercial banks is dependent on the round of entry into the company. When they invest in the first round, commercial bank affiliates enter rounds up to four times larger in investments with fewer co-investors and investment rounds than independent funds. Investments of bank affiliates in companies in the first round of financing are made in sectors other than the investments of independent funds and 35% of the companies invested by banks acquire a bank loan. Co-investment in companies that have passed the first round of investment represents most of investments for VC funds. Bank affiliates make 63% of the investments in this modality (55% for independents) and invest companies 400 miles away. Bank affiliates coincide with a larger number of funds, even with lower ratio numbers. Despite some differences, the sectors invested between affiliated funds and banks are similar. Investment in VC increases the likelihood of selling other banking products such as loans, underwriting and M & A advisory. Finally, companies invested in the first round by bank affiliates seeking loans from the VC bank have a spread of 90 basis points higher than companies seeking loans from other banks. In relation to our second objective, we identified a change in the investment model of funds affiliated with banks that have SS20 as compared to the VC funds of banks without such subsidiaries. There was a drop in the percentage of investments made in the first round of the company's VC by approximately 15%, and the main reason for this decline is the 19% decrease in first-round investments made alone. Early-stage investments fell by approximately 10%, while the co-investment percentage increased by 19%. There was a decrease, both in the percentage of rounds that the bank invested and, in the total, invested in the company by 20%. The distance between bank and company has decreased by 400 miles. These changes in the investment style impacted the percentage of companies that went through IPO by more than 10%. The results suggest a change in the investment model of commercial banks SS20 after 1989. The subsidiaries invested in more mature and closer companies, co-investing in more investments. One possible explanation is the search for more mature companies that can issue debentures, shares or use the new services that SS20 have been authorized.
Esta tese analisa diferenças entre fundos de venture capital (VC) geridos por bancos e os geridos por instituições independentes. Bancos enquanto gestores de fundos de VC (denominamos por afiliados de bancos os fundos geridos por bancos) entram em contato com empresas que comumente necessitam de serviços bancários tais como empréstimos, underwriting e assessoramento em M&A. Fang et al. (2013) e Hellman et al. (2008) exploram a possibilidade que afiliadas de bancos procurem investir em empresas que possam no futuro ser clientes do banco ao qual estão associadas. Nesse caso, os bancos patrocinam fundos de VC para fortalecer sua área comercial. Além do mais, as afiliadas de bancos têm acesso ao mesmo fluxo de oportunidades que os fundos independentes. Essa tese explora outra possibilidade: que fundos independentes busquem o coinvestimento com afiliadas de banco para facilitar o acesso de suas investidas a vantagens tais como maior volume de capital e obtenção de crédito. Nesse caso, o fluxo de oportunidades das afiliadas de bancos é diferenciado porque estas possuem maior facilidade para participar de coinvestimentos. Assim, o primeiro objetivo dessa tese é buscar evidências de que afiliadas de bancos têm um fluxo de oportunidades diferenciado e que têm maior facilidade para coinvestir. O segundo objetivo é investigar se a reinterpretação da Seção 20 do Glass-Steagall Act de 1933 (ou GSA) que ocorreu em 1989 afetou a estruturação dos investimentos de fundos afiliados de bancos. O GSA limitou de vários modos a atuação dos bancos comerciais. Em particular, a Seção 20 proibiu que bancos comerciais e suas subsidiárias e depositárias fossem os underwriters em emissões de títulos corporativos. Ao longo dos anos, houve algumas tentativas do Congresso para amenizar ou remover o GSA, mas com pouco sucesso. Os reguladores e bancos conseguiram amenizar efetivamente o GSA por meio de sucessivas reinterpretações de seu conteúdo. De especial interesse para o nosso tópico, em 1989 o Federal Reserve (FED) permitiu que algumas instituições financeiras fizessem o underwriting de ativos corporativos (inclusive IPOs). Essa permissão criou, de maneira exógena, dois grupos de instituições financeiras: as que podiam e as que não podiam fazer underwriting (denominamos os bancos comerciais que conseguiram esta autorização como subsidiárias Seção 20 ou SS20). Isso constituiu um choque exógeno que afetou apenas uma parcela dos bancos comerciais e, portanto, permite identificar se a atividade de underwrinting afeta o comportamento dos bancos enquanto gestores de fundos de VC. Uma mudança no estilo de investimento após 1989 que ocorra somente para as SS20 seria indicativa de que afiliadas de bancos ajustam seu estilo de investimento em função das atividades e interesses da holding. Isso também sugere o conflito de interesse entre essas duas atividades. Com relação ao primeiro objetivo, encontramos que o modelo de investimento em VC das afiliadas de bancos comerciais é dependente do round de entrada na empresa. Quando investem no primeiro round as afiliadas de bancos comerciais entram em rounds até quatro vezes maiores, em investimentos com menor número de coinvestidores e rounds de investimento do que os fundos independentes. Os investimentos de afiliadas de bancos em empresas no primeiro round de financiamento são feitos em setores distintos aos investimentos de fundos independentes e 35% das empresas investidas por bancos adquirem um empréstimo bancário. O coinvestimento em empresas que passaram do primeiro round de investimento representa a maioria dos investimentos para os fundos de VC. Afiliadas de bancos fazem 63% dos investimentos nesta modalidade (55% para independentes) e investem empresas 400 milhas mais distantes. As afiliadas de bancos coinvestem com um maior número de fundos, mesmo com índices de número de relacionamento mais baixos. Apesar de algumas diferenças, os setores investidos entre fundos afiliados e bancos são similares. O investimento em VC aumenta a probabilidade da venda de outros produtos bancários como: empréstimos, underwriting e assessoramento em M&A. Por fim, empresas investidas no primeiro round por afiliadas de bancos que buscam empréstimo junto ao banco investidor de VC tem um spread de 90 pontos base maior do que as empresas que buscam empréstimo em outros bancos. Com relação ao nosso segundo objetivo, identificamos uma mudança no modelo de investimento dos fundos afiliados a bancos que possuem SS20, quando comparado com os fundos de VC de bancos sem tais subsidiárias. Houve uma queda na porcentagem de investimentos feitos no primeiro round de VC da empresa em aproximadamente 15%, e o principal motivo desta queda é a diminuição em 19% dos investimentos em primeiro round realizados sozinhos. Os investimentos em early-stage caíram aproximadamente 10%, enquanto a porcentagem de coinvestimento aumentou 19%. Houve uma queda, tanto na porcentagem de rounds que o banco investiu quanto no total investido na empresa em 20%. A distância entre a sede do banco e da empresa diminuiu em 400 milhas. Estas mudanças no estilo de investimento impactaram na porcentagem de empresas que saíram por IPO em mais de 10%. Os resultados sugerem uma mudança no modelo de investimento dos bancos comerciais SS20 após 1989. As subsidiárias investiram em empresas mais maduras e mais próximas, coinvestindo em mais investimentos. Uma possível explicação é a busca por empresas mais maduras que podem emitir debêntures, ações ou utilizar os novos serviços que as SS20 foram autorizadas.
Hellqvist, Ulf, and Maija Kraljevic. "Venture Capital : What factors lie at the basis for Venture Capital investment decisions?" Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Business Administration, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-365.
Full textIntroduction:
Venture capital investment process is complex and different firms vary greatly in their investment practices. This has resulted in authors given several different factors that could be imperative for venture firms investment decisions. There is thus no consensus in the field of venture investing.
Purpose:
The purpose of this thesis is to list which factors are important for venture capital firms investment decisions in start-up firms.
Method:
The authors conducted structured phone interviews with seven venture capital firms in Sweden.
Conclusion:
The authors found the following factors to be important for venture firms investment decisions in start-up firms; Busienss plans that demonstrated the thinkings of the entrepreneur, communicate ideas, visions, product, market, competition, growth potential as well as the planned intentions with the recived funds. They also desired realistic, concreate, simple plans that explained the implementation process of the start-up firm. The second factor that was important was markets where large markets, market growth, market share, market entry and global markets were mentioned. The third factor of importance was product, in which uniqueness, simplicity, patents and time-to-market were listed. Management was the fourth factor of importance, in which sensibility, competence, technical skills, entrepreurial spirit, attitude, humbelness, determination, openness, drive, chemistry and confidence were included. The fifth factor of importamce financial embraced ROI, economioes of scale, valuation and the size of the investment. The last two important factors that the authors found to be important for the venture firms in the study were location and industry.
Yip, Ying-chi Benjamin. "Venture capital in Hong Kong : a perspective study and recommendations /." [Hong Kong] : University of Hong Kong, 1993. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B13731129.
Full textGarvi, Miriam. "Venture Capital for the Future : Implications of Founding Visions in the Venture Capital Setting." Doctoral thesis, Jönköping : Jönköping International Business School, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-794.
Full textBooks on the topic "Ventur capital"
1952-, Wright Mike, Sapienza Harry J. 1949-, and Busenitz Lowell W. 1952-, eds. Venture capital. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar, 2003.
Find full textCanada. Industry, Science and Technology Canada. Venture capital. Ottawa: Industry, Science and Technology Canada, 1991.
Find full textSolarz, Jan Krzysztof. Venture capital. Warszawa: Centrum Informacji Menedżera, 1993.
Find full textHahn, Christopher, ed. Venture Capital. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33700-1.
Full textWright, Mike, and Ken Robbie. Venture Capital. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315235110.
Full textCaselli, Stefano, and Stefano Gatti, eds. Venture Capital. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3.
Full textCumming, Douglas J. Venture Capital. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118266908.
Full textGompers, Paul A. The determinants of corporate venture capital success: Organizational structure, incentives, and complementarities. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998.
Find full textMacIntosh, Jeffrey G. Venture capital financing. Toronto]: Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 2009.
Find full textVenture Capital Funding. London: Kogan Page Publishers, 2008.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Ventur capital"
Tudini, Edmondo. "An Introduction to the Investment in New Ventures." In Venture Capital, 3–25. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_1.
Full textMaddaloni, Marina, and Maria Pierdicchi. "Opportunities in the Quotation of Private Equity Companies." In Venture Capital, 261–84. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_10.
Full textSpotorno, Lucia. "The Venture Capital Industry in Europe: Trends and Figures." In Venture Capital, 285–315. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_11.
Full textGiuiusa, Anna. "Regulations and Supervision: The Role of Central Bank." In Venture Capital, 319–37. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_12.
Full textCapizzi, Vincenzo. "The Constitution of a Venture Capital Company." In Venture Capital, 339–67. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_13.
Full textSchiavello, Enzo, and Jonathan de Lance Holmes. "Legal Issues for Italian Venture Capital Investment Schemes." In Venture Capital, 369–406. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_14.
Full textGiovannini, Renato. "A Broad Vision of the Investment Process in Venture Capital." In Venture Capital, 27–51. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_2.
Full textGeranio, Manuela. "Funding Processes." In Venture Capital, 53–80. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_3.
Full textGatti, Stefano. "The Valuation of the Target Company." In Venture Capital, 81–121. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_4.
Full textGandolfi, Gino. "Specialties in Managing Closed-End Funds." In Venture Capital, 123–47. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24829-3_5.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Ventur capital"
Hauser, H. "A fully electronic stock interchange." In IEE Half day Colloquium on Venture Capital. IEE, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/ic:19950137.
Full textBainbridge, A. F. "Securing venture capital: effective approaches and appropriate sources." In IEE Half day Colloquium on Venture Capital. IEE, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/ic:19950138.
Full textCooke, P. "Putting the deal together and a case study." In IEE Half day Colloquium on Venture Capital. IEE, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/ic:19950139.
Full textĆirić, Zoran, Stojan Ivanišević, and Otilija Sedlak. "CROWDFUNDING GETS CONQUERED BY VENTURE CAPITAL." In 2nd International Scientific Conference. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/itema.2018.399.
Full textZhao, Xiaoxue, Weinan Zhang, and Jun Wang. "Risk-Hedged Venture Capital Investment Recommendation." In RecSys '15: Ninth ACM Conference on Recommender Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2792838.2800181.
Full textWidyasthana, G. N. Sandhy, Jann Hidajat Tjakraatmadja, Dermawan Wibisono, and Mustika Sufiati Purwanegara. "Organization Behavior On Corporate Venture Capital." In 3rd International Seminar and Conference on Learning Organization. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/isclo-15.2016.19.
Full textFriedlmaier, Maximilian, Andranik Tumasjan, and Isabell M. Welpe. "Disrupting Industries with Blockchain: The Industry, Venture Capital Funding, and Regional Distribution of Blockchain Ventures." In Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24251/hicss.2018.445.
Full textNarayan Panda, Satya, and Arun Kumar Gopalaswamy. "New Venture Valuation and Venture Capital Perspective: An Industry Level Analysis." In 5th International Conference on New Ideas in Management, Economics and Accounting. Acavent, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.33422/5imea.2018.02.52.
Full textXi, Jifeng, Ni Xue, and Lihong Guo. "The Tripartite Game of Venture Capital Operations." In 2010 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciii.2010.105.
Full textLiang, Peng, and Yu Huang. "Investing Activities of Venture Capital in Japan." In 2010 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2010.5576463.
Full textReports on the topic "Ventur capital"
Ewens, Michael, Alexander Gorbenko, and Arthur Korteweg. Venture Capital Contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26115.
Full textPoterba, James. Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2832.
Full textPuri, Manju, and Rebecca Zarutskie. On the Lifecycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital- and Non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14250.
Full textKortum, Samuel, and Josh Lerner. Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6846.
Full textGompers, Paul, and Josh Lerner. What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6906.
Full textKaplan, Steven, and Josh Lerner. Venture Capital Data: Opportunities and Challenges. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22500.
Full textGornall, William, and Ilya Strebulaev. Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23895.
Full textDa Rin, Marco, Thomas Hellmann, and Manju Puri. A survey of venture capital research. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17523.
Full textKeuschnigg, Christian, and Soren Bo Nielsen. Tax Policy, Venture Capital, and Entrepreneurship. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w7976.
Full textNanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24517.
Full text