Journal articles on the topic 'Utilitarian reasoning'

Abstract:This article challenges recent calls for moral bioenhancement—the use of biomedical means, including pharmacological and genetic methods, to increase the moral value of our actions or characters. It responds to those who take a practical interest in moral bioenhancement. I argue that moral bioenhancement is unlikely to be a good response to the extinction threats of climate change and weapons of mass destruction. Rather than alleviating those problems, it is likely to aggravate them. We should expect biomedical means to generate piecemeal enhancements of human morality. These predictably strengthen some contributors to moral judgment while leaving others comparatively unaffected. This unbalanced enhancement differs from the manner of improvement that typically results from sustained reflection. It is likely to make its subjects worse rather than better at moral reasoning.

The ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) has been implicated as a critical neural substrate mediating the influence of emotion on moral reasoning. It has been shown that the vmPFC is especially important for making moral judgments about “high-conflict” moral dilemmas involving direct personal actions, that is, scenarios that pit compelling utilitarian considerations of aggregate welfare against the highly emotionally aversive act of directly causing harm to others [Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911, 2007]. The current study was designed to elucidate further the role of the vmPFC in high-conflict moral judgments, including those that involve indirect personal actions, such as indirectly causing harm to one's kin to save a group of strangers. We found that patients with vmPFC lesions were more likely than brain-damaged and healthy comparison participants to endorse utilitarian outcomes on high-conflict dilemmas regardless of whether the dilemmas (1) entailed direct versus indirect personal harms and (2) were presented from the Self versus Other perspective. In addition, all groups were more likely to endorse utilitarian outcomes in the Other perspective as compared with the Self perspective. These results provide important extensions of previous work, and the findings align with the proposal that the vmPFC is critical for reasoning about moral dilemmas in which anticipating the social-emotional consequences of an action (e.g., guilt or remorse) is crucial for normal moral judgments [Greene, J. D. Why are VMPFC patients more utilitarian?: A dual-process theory of moral judgment explains. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 322–323, 2007; Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911, 2007].

This study explored students’ mathematics-related beliefs and the relationship between the beliefs and their strategies for solving non-routine mathematical problems. The study was guided by Daskalogianni and Simpson’s 2001 belief systems categories and strategies for non-routine mathematical problems. The participants were 625 grade 11 students from five high schools in Tshwane North District, Gauteng province of South Africa. Data were collected using a mathematics beliefs questionnaire, a mathematics problem-solving test and interview. Quantitative and qualitative research techniques were used for data analysis. It was found that the students held all the three belief systems (utilitarian, systematic and exploratory) at different degrees of intensity and the belief systems and strategies for problem-solving had a weak positive linear relationship, and there were no statistically significant differences among mean scores of the students holding systematic, exploratory and utilitarian beliefs. They apply unsystematic guess, check and revise; systematic guess, check and revise; systematic listing; looking for patterns; consider a simple case; modelling; logical reasoning; no logical reasoning; trial-and-error and use a formula in solving non-routine mathematical problems. Furthermore, it was found that the systematic belief system could explain the students’ behaviour in problem-solving more than the exploratory and utilitarian belief systems.

This article examines developmental differences in children’s reasoning about secrecy and lying as well as their use of these behaviors in two studies. Study 1 explored children’s ( N = 66, 8–15 years) reasoning about the circumstances in which secrecy and lying are acceptable. Study 2 analyzed children’s ( N = 50, 8–15 years) actual reported daily frequency of secrets and lies in relation to maladaptive behavior problems. Overall, findings suggest that children’s motivations for secrecy and lying become more nuanced, and seemingly utilitarian, with age, and that children’s use of concealment may be an adaptive tool that facilitates social relationships.

The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate why AI researchers’ attempts at developing projects of moral machines are a cause for concern regarding the way in which such machines can reach a certain level of morality. By comparing and contrasting Howard and Muntean’s model of a virtuous Artificial Autonomous Moral Agent (AAMA) (2017) and Bauer’s model of a two-level utilitarian Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) (2020), I draw the conclusion that both models raise, although in a different manner, some crucial issues. The latter are recognized as deriving from the complex relationships between human cognition and moral reasoning, as refracted through the lens of the idea of moral AI. In this context, special attention is paid to the complications which are triggered by the analogical thinking regarding the processes of replication of human morality in the field of machine ethics.

The author displays and reexamines Hare?s "two-level theory" of normative moral thinking ("intuitive" level and "critical" level), including goals that are intended by its establishing. Given Hare?s holism, the met ethical level, considered as fundamental or the "third" level, has notable effect on process of normative reasoning, especially if it is taken as one of the determinant of the critical moral thin king. Central part of the analysis is examination of utilitarian character of the theory.

The “veil of ignorance” is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision making by denying decision makers access to potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here, we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning in a more focused way to specific moral dilemmas, all of which involve a tension between the greater good and competing moral concerns. Across 7 experiments (n = 6,261), 4 preregistered, we find that veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good. Participants first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning about a specific dilemma, asking themselves what they would want if they did not know who among those affected they would be. Participants then responded to a more conventional version of the same dilemma with a moral judgment, a policy preference, or an economic choice. Participants who first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning subsequently made more utilitarian choices in response to a classic philosophical dilemma, a medical dilemma, a real donation decision between a more vs. less effective charity, and a policy decision concerning the social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. These effects depend on the impartial thinking induced by veil-of-ignorance reasoning and cannot be explained by anchoring, probabilistic reasoning, or generic perspective taking. These studies indicate that veil-of-ignorance reasoning may be a useful tool for decision makers who wish to make more impartial and/or socially beneficial choices.

Objective. Moral judgments are based on decisions that take into account the representation of norms and law, values, functionality and situations themselves. Morality has been studied with “hypothetic moral dilemmas”, in order to identify the type of outcome and the process behind moral reasoning. But judgments by themselves are not enough to establish differences in the type of resolution or the relationship with other cognitive processes. The present paper aimed to compare performance in tasks of utility maximization, cognitive control, and moral judgments, taking into account sex and other sociodemographic variables. Method. Seventy-three university students participated (50 women, 20 men and 3 with unreported gender, the average age was 19.53 years (SD = 1.68 years). The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was used to identify behaviors of utility maximization. In addition, we used the switch costs and the web application of moral machine tasks. Results. A difference between variables of the IGT, but no differences in the switch costs task were found. Conclusion. Regarding moral judgment, males gave more value to respect norms than females. Some variables of the IGT task support outcomes related to differences between sexes. Results are congruent with differences shown in existing literature.

Making morally sensitive decisions and evaluations pervade many human everyday activities. Philosophers, economists, psychologists and behavioural scientists researching such decision-making typically explore the principles, processes and predictors that constitute human moral decision-making. Crucially, very little research has explored the theoretical and methodological development (supported by empirical evidence) of utilitarian theories of moral decision-making. Accordingly, in this critical review article, we invite the reader on a moral journey from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism to the veil of ignorance reasoning, via a recent theoretical proposal emphasising utilitarian moral behaviour—perspective-taking accessibility (PT accessibility). PT accessibility research revealed that providing participants with access to all situational perspectives in moral scenarios, eliminates (previously reported in the literature) inconsistency between their moral judgements and choices. Moreover, in contrast to any previous theoretical and methodological accounts, moral scenarios/tasks with full PT accessibility provide the participants with unbiased even odds (neither risk averse nor risk seeking) and impartiality. We conclude that the proposed by Martin et al. PT Accessibility (a new type of veil of ignorance with even odds that do not trigger self-interest, risk related preferences or decision biases) is necessary in order to measure humans’ prosocial utilitarian behaviour and promote its societal benefits.

The deficit of theory of mind (ToM) is considered by a number of authors as one of the risk factors for involvement in criminal activity for individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (for example because of difficulties in understanding other people’s intentions). The relationship between the deficit of ToM and moral judgments is discussed. The methods of test diagnostics (“Moral dilemmas”, A-ToM) and the method of content analysis of answers to open questions on moral dilemmas were used. It is shown that individuals with ASD are less likely to give utilitarian answers to impersonal dilemmas, but regardless of the intact of ToM, there is a tendency to reduce the degree of utilitarianism from impersonal to personal dilemmas. It is also shown that individuals with ASD do not rely on the intentions of actors when reasoning about moral dilemmas, but not only individuals with ASD rely on conse-quences in such reasoning.

AbstractThe COVID-19 crisis has forced healthcare professionals to make tragic decisions concerning which patients to save. Furthermore, The COVID-19 crisis has foregrounded the influence of self-serving bias in debates on how to allocate scarce resources. A utilitarian principle favors allocating scarce resources such as ventilators toward younger patients, as this is expected to save more years of life. Some view this as ageist, instead favoring age-neutral principles, such as “first come, first served”. Which approach is fairer? The “veil of ignorance” is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision-making by reducing decision-makers’ use of potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning to the COVID-19 ventilator dilemma, asking participants which policy they would prefer if they did not know whether they were younger or older. Two studies (pre-registered; online samples; Study 1, N=414; Study 2 replication, N=1,276) show that veil-of-ignorance reasoning shifts preferences toward saving younger patients. The effect on older participants is dramatic, reversing their opposition toward favoring the young, thereby eliminating self-serving bias. These findings provide guidance on how to remove self-serving biases to healthcare policymakers and frontline personnel charged with allocating scarce medical resources during times of crisis.

The author re-examines Hare's multiple ways of connecting his metaethical with his normative doctrine, which is in formal sense determined as "Kantian utilitarianism", and in substantive sense as "preference-utilitarianism". Critical references to both dimensions of utilitarian doctrine aim at indication on scopes and limits of Hare's ambitious redefinition of the doctrine. Further on he discusses about so-called "necessary ingredient" of moral reasoning under the name of "sympathetic imagination", which Hare grasps in his developed theory not only as a normative demand but also as a logical thesis. Finally, he considers kinds of preferences that can or cannot be recognized (with help of established set of criteria) as morally relevant.

The article is based on the dual concepts of theoretical incompleteness in systems science and theoretical incomprehensibility in philosophy previously introduced in the literature. Issues of incompleteness relate to the logical openness of complexity models in their nonequivalence and necessary non-zippable incompletable multiplicity. This concerns the quasi-ness of phenomena and the constructivist nature of models. Theoretically, incomprehensibility is considered in different ways, such as the inexhaustible multiplicity of the constructivist reality corresponding to the logical openness of both the world and of understanding itself and in reference to incomprehensibilities such as questions like the divide between species, cognitive systems, and after-death experience (if any). In conjunction with the need for non-classic, interdisciplinary approaches in science to deal with complexity, unanswerable questions need suitable scientifically updated philosophical reasoning in interdisciplinary humanistic backgrounds to allow for new social representations, understandings, and plausible social imaginary. Such approaches more properly allow for effective philosophical representations of the world. Knowing how to deal with these issues through philosophical reasoning updated to the current scientific levels and humanistic interdisciplinarity allows for higher levels of awareness and new comprehensive philosophical understanding, introducing new powerful social imaginary. Such new philosophical reasoning is expected to allow a conception of the world that is no longer just utilitarian, but theoretically necessarily, and not only concessively respectful of diversity with significant, even self-ethical effects.

During the coronavirus pandemic, communities have faced shortages of important healthcare resources such as COVID-19 vaccines, medical staff, ICU beds and ventilators. Public health officials in the U.S. have had to make decisions about two major issues: which infected patients should be treated first (triage), and which people who are at risk of infection should be inoculated first (vaccine distribution). Following Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism, adopted guidelines have tended to value both whole lives (survival to discharge) and life-years (survival for years past discharge). This process of collective moral reasoning has revealed our common commitment to both Kantian and utilitarian principles. For Kant, respecting people’s rights entails that we ought to value whole lives equally. Therefore we ought to allocate resources so as to maximise the number of patients who survive to discharge. By contrast, the principle of utility has us maximise life-years so that people can satisfy more of their considered preferences. Although people are treated impartially in the utilitarian calculus, it does not recognise their equal worth. Subjecting Kantian ethics and utilitarianism to the process of reflective equilibrium lends support to the idea that we need a pluralistic approach that would accommodate our moral intuitions regarding both the equal value of whole lives and the additive value of life-years.

This article discusses state’s rights ofterritorial sovereignty, aimed at juxtaposing both the components of material interest and symbolic value. Arguably, states are supposed to be the legitimate owner of the rights of territorial sovereignty, as comprising jurisdiction authority, the right to benefit from natural resources, and control over border. This line of reasoning is consistent with the contemporary socio-political conception expressed by, for example David Miller. Its intellectual explanationshave, at first, been rendered by the statist theory drawn upon three tendencies of utilitarian argument, Kantian and Lockean philosophy. The nationalist theory, however, comes to revise the statist one. To conclude, the article presents some research agendas significant and salient for developing theory of state’s sovereignty in the expanding international system.

AbstractPrevious studies have found that the proportions of people who endorsed utilitarian decisions varied across different variants of the trolley dilemma. In this paper, we explored whether moral choices were associated with beliefs about outcome probabilities in different moral dilemmas. Results of two experiments showed that participants’ perceptions of outcome probabilities were different between two dilemmas that were similar to the classical switch case and footbridge case. Participants’ judgments of the outcome probabilities were associated with their moral choices. The results suggested that participants might not accept task instructions and thus did not perceive the outcomes in the dilemmas as certain. We argued that researchers who endorse descriptive tasks in moral reasoning research should be cautious about the findings and should take participants’ beliefs in the outcomes into account.

The article aims to analyse and explain the relationship between ethical leadership, organisational deviance. We proposed a theoretical framework arguing a mediatory role of situational factors including psychological safety, psychological attachment, distributive justice, and Leader-Member Exchange (LMX). We also argue that utilitarian based ethical reasoning make employees more responsive towards the ethical decision by the leadership making them less deviant. Empirical validity was established by conducting a survey using a close-ended questionnaire. Data was collected from 254employees and analysed using confirmatory factor analysis and structured equation modelling. The measurement and structure model were assessed using AVE (average variance extracted), Composite Reliability (CR), Cronbach’s alpha, discriminant validity through the Fornell-Larcker Criterion, and Collinearity methods in PLS-SEM. The results suggested a significant and positive effect of ethical leadership on Leader-member-exchange, psychological attachment, distributive justice, and psychological safety. Moreover, apart from distributive justice, all other factors seem to decrease Organisational Deviance, however, their effect remained insignificant. Surprisingly, ethical leadership (EL) seems to be directly instigating Organisational Deviance (OD), as well as through the mediation of distributive justice. However, EL seems to significantly reduce deviance through including Utilitarianism ethical reasoning amongst its followers, as EL seems to positively affect utilitarianism, which in turn negatively affects deviance. Utilitarianism also seems to complement EL in reducing OD directly as the result showed significant and negative complementarities amongst EL and Utilitarianism in explaining OD. The results imply that EL and OD nexus is more affected by ethical reasoning rather than situational factors.

In analyzing complex products, this study selected the company Goldman Sachs and one of its product offerings, the synthetic collateralized debt obligation (synthetic CDO). The study later analyzed the ethical implications of providing such a complex product to customers. A review of the literature indicates that researchers identified this product and other associated derivatives of the mortgage backed securities as the main causes of the 2008 financial crisis in the United States of America. As such, Goldman Sachs’ offering of the product posed ethical and moral issues. An analysis of the company and its offering was done under the lenses of various ethical theories such as Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning, the Kantian ethics, the utilitarian perspective, Friedman’s shareholder theory, the stakeholder theory, the market approach to consumer protection, and the contract view of consumer protection. Besides Friedman’s shareholder theory, all other theories judged the product offering morally wrong and unethical. At the end of the study, the author suggested a contribution to knowledge regarding Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning in its application to organizations. The author also suggested further research to validate the outcome of Friedman’s shareholder theory regarding this case.

A partire dall’analisi della giurisprudenza costituzionale in materia di detenzione, nell’articolo si propone una teoria costituzionale dei diritti irrinunciabili della persona privata della libertà personale. Questa viene elaborata a partire dalla critica alla tradizionale teoria liberale dell'insindacabilità del governo amministrativo del carcere e alla più recente teoria del primato della rieducazione. Entrambe risultano incompatibili con il principio del primato della persona sancito dallo stato costituzionale di diritto. A partire dall’articolato reasoning della Corte, viene proposta una teoria utilitaristica dei diritti dei detenuti basata sul principio della minima sofferenza necessaria e su quello della giurisdizionalizzazione del carcere. The article presents a constitutional theory of the inalienable rights of the person deprived of personal liberty, based on the constitutional jurisprudence on detention. The theory is elaborated from the critique of the traditional liberal theory of the unquestionability of the administrative government of the prison and of the more recent theory of the primacy of re-education. Both are considered incompatible with the principles of the constitutional rule of law based on the respect of fundamental human rights. Starting from the articulated reasoning of the Court, the article proposes a utilitarian theory of the rights of prisoners based on the principles of the minimum necessary suffering and of the jurisdictionalization of the prison.

This paper examines three examples of native bird classification systems historically used by the aboriginal peoples of the Hawaiian Islands. The goal is to better understand Indigenous linguistic hierarchies in the taxonomic structure and nomenclature systems that were formerly utilized by these colonized peoples. Three specific manuscripts from two native historians and a foreign naturalist are analyzed to better ascertain how these systems may have worked, despite the dearth of data on the comprehensive knowledge of bird hunters and ritual specialists. The utilitarian basis of these systems is shown to have potential practical application for the ongoing cultural and linguistic revitalization of the native Hawaiian people. The perspectives and reasoning behind these systems could be used as a tool for reviving traditional relationships with the unique ecosystems of Hawaiʻi. Further research in the large but diffuse archives of Hawaiian language manuscripts may eventually expand our understanding of Hawaiian folk systematics.

AbstractExternalities are an important concept in economic theories of market failure, aiming to justify state regulation of the economy. This paper explores the concept of externalities from a philosophical perspective. It criticizes the utilitarian nature of economic analyses of externalities, showing how they cannot take into account values like freedom and justice. It then develops the analogy between the concept of externalities and the ‘harm principle’ in political philosophy. It argues that the harm principle points to the need for a theory of basic interests to judge when a harm is imposed. Similarly, externality analyses should use such a theory of basic interests as the basis for judgments about legitimate state intervention. This proposal is defended against objections, and illustrated with a case study of the US Supreme Court's ruling on the Affordable Care Act, which shows how the judicial reasoning implicitly interprets externalities in terms of basic interests.

There are universal Christian ethics that should be applied in economics. Christian ethics in economics stresses free will; the immense value, dignity, and unique talents of the individual; individual accountability for the use of resources, charity, and the exercise of justice; the relevance of the family and community; and a role for the state in the adjudication of economic justice, the enforcement of contracts, and the facilitation of competition and minimization of exploitation in product and resource markets. Civil authorities are to be obeyed until they set themselves in opposition to divine law, while the individual is prior to the state and the social order. Among economic systems. Christian ethics favors mvced democratic capitalism, rejecting non-democratic socialism and authoritarianism. Strictly utilitarian, consequentialist, or contractarian approaches to economic policy are unacceptable, since they reject the other-regardedness of God's law. While Christian ethics establishes certain clear economic objectives, final policy choices require a synthesis of reasoning research, and practical application.

Abstract This contribution is inspired by the thought-provoking article ‘Monopolizing War’ by Eyal Benvenisti and Doreen Lustig. My Reply argues that early 19th-century IHL codification projects in the eyes of European governments did not primarily serve domestic anti-revolutionary purposes. It also takes a somewhat sceptical stance as to the recent scholarly trend, which reduces historical explanations for the development of international law to domestic contexts in one or more powerful states involved in the respective law- and policy-making process. Building on the intriguing historical critique of early IHL’s ‘humanizing substance’ developed in ‘Monopolizing War’ and by referring to more recent IHL codification projects (small arms, nuclear weapons, aerial bombing, autonomous weapons), the second part of the contribution sketches four ‘de-humanizing’ discursive strategies, which arguably haunt international humanitarian law-making until today: (i) cynical window dressing; (ii) constructing an ontological wall; (iii) utilitarian reasoning; and (iv) excluding the periphery.

IntroductionIssues in public policy have been challenging and remaking moral theory for two centuries. Such issues force us to question fundamental principles of ethics while they cast doubt on our ability to generalize from traditional intuitions. No issue poses more remarkable difficulties for moral theory than nuclear weapons policy. Because the consequences of their deployment and therefore possible use could be grievous beyond those of any previously conceivable human action, these weapons frame the conflict between outcome-based, especially utilitarian, and action-based deontological moral theories more acutely than perhaps any other we have faced. Just because nuclear weapons may bring about the most grievous outcome imaginable, they elevate concern with outcomes over concern with actions. More generally, they wreak havoc with the focus on the morality of individual choices and actions, set limits to the notion of intention and the doctrine of double effect, call into question the so-called just-war theory, and overwhelm the intuitionist basis of much of ethical reasoning.

An increasing number of people around the world communicate in more than one language, resulting in them having to make decisions in a foreign language on a daily basis. Interestingly, a burgeoning body of literature suggests that people’s decision-making is affected by whether they are reasoning in their native language (NL) or their foreign language (FL). According to the foreign language effect (FLe), people are less susceptible to bias in many decision-making tasks and more likely to display utilitarian cost-benefit analysis in moral decision-making when reasoning in a FL. While these differences have often been attributed to a reduced emotionality in the FL, an emerging body of literature has started to test the extent to which these could be attributable to increased deliberation in the FL. The present study tests whether increased deliberation leads to a FLe on cognitive reflection in a population of older adults (Mage = 65.1), from the successful aging project in Umeå, Sweden. We explored whether performance on a 6-item version of the cognitive reflection test (CRT) adapted to Swedish would differ between participants for whom Swedish was their NL and those for whom Swedish was their FL. The CRT is a task designed to elicit an incorrect, intuitive answer. In order to override the intuitive answer, one requires engaging in deliberative, analytical thinking to determine the correct answer. Therefore, we hypothesized that if thinking in a FL increases deliberation, then those performing the task in their FL would exhibit higher accuracy rates than those performing in their NL. Our results showed that age and level of education predicted performance on the task but performance on the CRT did not differ between the NL and the FL groups. In addition, in the FL group, proficiency in the FL was not related to performance in the CRT. Our results, therefore, do not provide evidence that thinking in a FL increases deliberation in a group of older adults performing a logical reasoning task that is not typically associated with an emotional connotation.

Introduction Infodemic is a new term which refers to rapidly spreading information from both reliable and unreliable sources in the form of news and publications regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, which requires proper management strategies on its own to prevent the spread of fake news. This is especially relevant in a global state of alert where the fear of contagion is a common denominator and is reflected upon people’s behaviors within a crisis context. Van Bavel et al (2020) affirm “Emerging research is using social science to understand and counter the spread of fake news”, and furtherly emphasize on the limitations of Fact Checking as the main approach to hinder such spread Objectives Test the association between sociomoral cognition, religiousness and political identity, and belief in COVID-19 Fake News. Methods Online-based survey applied through opportunity sampling. Demographic variables political and religious orientation, RMET and B-IRI, and two dimensional utilitarian dilemmas were used and independent variables, and a selection of true and fake news in order to measure participants’ belief in the latter as a dependent variable. Results Morality (R2 = 0.08, p < 0.001), social cognition (R2 = 0.05, p < 0.05), and political and religious orientation (R2 = 0.1, p < 0.000001) predicted belief in COVID-19 fake news. On the other hand, no variables were found to predict belief in fake news unrelated to the pandemic. Conclusions Higher impartial beneficence and more years of formal education point toward an evidence-based reasoning, while religiousness and affinity with right-wing ideals has been associated with intuition-based reasoning, thus affecting judgement accuracy. Disclosure No significant relationships.

- The empirical evidences and the contemporary discussions get into question the total inadmissibility of torture which has been arranged and fixed on December 10, 1984 by the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In fact, in the present time, several US scholars and politicians argue about the possibility to use torture as an adequate instrument to face the grave threat of international terrorism. Thinkers, for their convictions and analysis, part into two opposite positions: "utilitarian" and "absolutistic". The former is based on the Schmittian theory of emergency and on the idea that torture, a wrong practice in itself, can be justifiable if useful instrument to reach a morally higher "good" or to prevent an ethical worse "evil". The latter is grounded on the Kantian imperative as a guide for human choices. By this point of view, torture is absolutely and categorically unjustifiable, also in presence of a great threat for national security. Which reasoning and purposes support the US scholars in this reconsideration of torture as a tool of democracy? Which the actual consequences of these theoretical reflections?

ABSTRACT This paper describes the implementation of a “Ponzi scheme case study” in auditing classes at the undergraduate and the Master's level. This instructional case is based on the much-publicized Madoff Ponzi scheme. The case exposes students to several auditing-related concepts, including: (1) fraud auditing; (2) ethical reasoning and utilitarian principles; (3) affinity fraud and Ponzi schemes; (4) internal control evaluation; (5) governance issues; (6) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations; (7) investment strategies and terminologies; and (8) regulation. The case provides students with an opportunity to assume the role of an external auditor and participate in some active learning exercises. About 170 accounting majors participated in this case project during a three-year period at a Midwestern university. Students who worked in groups were genuinely engaged in the learning process, and they came up with several red flags associated with the Madoff fraud and suggested many new internal controls. This case provides a hands-on learning experience to students that could be relevant for them in their future career in public accounting. Student opinion surveys conducted about the learning outcomes of this project indicate strong student engagement, active learning, and satisfaction.

States defend norms in some cases but not in others. Understanding this variation sheds light on both U.S. foreign policy and the role of normative reasoning. We report the results of four experiments embedded in a survey of U.S. elites. The experiments identified the effects of felt normative obligation (that is, the logic of what is appropriate) and concern for U.S. economic and security interests (that is, the logic of utilitarian consequence) as well as the role played by individual perceptions. We find that perceptions of another actor's motivation, of conflicts as civil or cross-border wars, and of the democratic nature of victims affect decisions to defend a prescriptive norm. This finding means that theories of international relations that feature norms as structural concepts need to consider actor-level cognition when examining the operation of norms. Moreover, we find that when U.S. economic and security interests are at stake there is a much greater inclination to defend norms than when simply normative obligation is present. Most U.S. elites appear to treat the presence or absence of U.S. material interests as a legitimate criterion for deciding whether or not to defend an international prescriptive norm.

Ethical evaluation of projects involving animal testing is mandatory within the EU and other countries. However, the evaluation process has been subject to criticism, e.g., that the committees are not balanced or democratic enough and that the utilitarian weighting of harm and benefit that is normally prescribed is difficult to carry out in practice. In this study, members of Swedish Animal Ethics Committees (AECs) completed a survey aiming to further investigate the decision-making process. We found that researchers and animal laypersons make significantly different ethical judgments, and hold disparate views on which ethical aspects are the most relevant. Researchers were significantly more content than laypersons with the functioning of the committees, indicating that the ethical model used suited their preferences better. We argue that in order to secure a democratic and proper ethical evaluation, the expectations of a scientific discourse must be acknowledged, while giving room for different viewpoints. Further, to fulfil the purpose of the project evaluations and meet public concern, the functions of the different AEC member categories need to be clarified. We suggest that one way of achieving a more thorough, balanced and inclusive ethical evaluation is to allow for more than one model of ethical reasoning.

The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner's argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively and institutionally. Substantiality, he argues for balancing based on a consequential moral theory that rejects the ideas of deontological rights and particularly absolute or very weighty deontological rights. More specifically, it seems that Posner assumes a utilitarian theory that also rejects intrinsic concern for distributive justice. Institutionally, Posner argues that this method of reasoning should be adopted by judges when interpreting the Constitution. These substantive and institutional background assumptions are of course controversial, but I do not dispute them in this Article. My critique concerns Posner's conclusions based on these assumptions. Posner's main claim is that given the magnitude of the danger of modern terrorism, even a small probability that an act of terror may occur justifies extreme anti-terror measures.

The popular in the modern timespragmatic approach, creates in teaching instrumental attitude to professional tasks execution. It means that reaching goals, on utilitarian level,leads to more effective actions. The positive social sciencestake another approach, basing on the usual human inner drive to be happy. Such being takes place when a person realizes well-being for others and for oneself, following hope, which direction is pointed out by freedom, dignity and human responsibility. The main purpose of the article is to reveal the evidence that create pedeutology of the XXI century as a science of strong teaching profession: its values, meaningfulness and beauty. It has been pointed out to agathological and arthrological aspect of pedeutology. The first one refers to doing good deeds. It is represented by optimal pupil development, which therefore should become a priority in teacher’s professional actions. In reference to the above, the instrumental and vocational teaching context has been characterized. The second aspect refers to the teacher’s moral capabilities, called the virtues. A virtue is a central knowledgeable category of positive social sciences. According to this issue, the utility of the virtue theory has been presented in for the pedeutological thought. The extraordinary attention has been put upon the virtue of hope, reasoning its inevitability in the process of upbringing in the XXI century.

In the increasingly legalized landscape in which armed conflicts are now waged, international humanitarian law has become an integral and ever more central part of military strategy. States can and do use it to gain advantage over their adversaries, but must also contend with challenges that arise when it is wielded against them. In their efforts to respond to these challenges official and unofficial advocates of State powers have advanced modes of argumentation which question the fundamental structure of international humanitarian law. This Article takes issue with one such argument that mobilizes the theologico-political principle of the “lesser-evil” to conclude that acts which are absolutely prohibited under international humanitarian law should nevertheless be deemed legally permissible when their foreseen consequences are less harmful than lawful alternatives. The Article demonstrates that this argument threatens to blur IHL's sharp boundaries and expand its zone's of elasticity thereby undermining its structural principles. More specifically, the Article maintains that the argument in question rests on exaggerated faith in the judgment of belligerent parties, that it fails on its own utilitarian logic and that it ignores deontological reasoning fundamental to international humanitarian law. The Article contends that accepting this argument would severely compromise IHL's capacity to limit violence and preserve human dignity and therefore advocates that it be rejected.

The dual tasks of this paper are to examine David Clarke’s ideas about the development of archaeology as they relate both to the era when ‘the loss of innocence’ was written and to what has happened since. In his treatment of the history of archaeology offered in that essay, Clarke subscribed to at least two of the key tenets of the behaviourist and utilitarian approaches that dominated the social sciences in the 1960s: neoevolutionism and ecological determinism.Clarke viewed the development of archaeology as following a unilinear sequence of stages from consciousness through self-consciousness to critical self-consciousness. The first stage began with archaeology defining its subject matter and what archaeologists do. As its database and the procedures required for studying it became more elaborate, self-conscious archaeology emerged as a ‘series of divergent and selfreferencing regional schools … with regionally esteemed bodies of archaeological theory and locally preferred forms of description, interpretation and explanation’ (Clarke 1973: 7). At the stage of critical self-consciousness, regionalism was replaced by a conviction that ‘archaeologists hold most of their problems in common and share large areas of general theory within a single discipline’ (1973: 7). Archaeology was now defined by ‘the characteristic forms of its reasoning, the intrinsic nature of its knowledge and information, and its competing theories of concepts and their relationships’ (1973: 7). Clarke looked forward to a fourth (and ultimate?) phase of self-critical self-consciousncss, when the new archaeology would monitor and control its own development.

Not a day passes but we find ourselves indignant about something or other. When is our indignation justified, and when does it count as moral indignation rather than a legitimate but non-moral gripe? You might think that we should turn to moral theories – to the varieties of utilitarian, Kantian, virtue theories, etc – to answer this question. I shall try to convince you that this is a mistake, that moral theory – as it is ordinarily presently conceived and studied – does not have a specific subject matter, a specific aim, scope or boundaries. You might think that the difference between echt moral indignation and other forms of disapproval is their relative strength or the importance of their target; but moral indignation can be quite faint, directed to a relatively minor transgression and a strongly felt gripe may be directed to a serious but presumptively non-moral infraction. I shall try to persuade you that morality does not constitute an important and distinctive domain with a distinctive set of over-riding norms or a privileged mode of reasoning: morality is everywhere or nowhere in particular. Radical as this claim may sound, I am not a complete Luddite about the matter. Traditional moral theories nevertheless have important functions. But rather than being competing ‘winner takes all’ explanatory and normative theories, OldSpeak moral systems function heuristically. They offer a heterogeneous set of reminders, questions, advice, ideals, warnings, considerations for deliberation. While we try to integrate and systematize them, there is no single overarching organizational plan.

The Islamic scholarship on Intellectual Property (IP) has extensively investigated its affinity to Shari’a upon a rule-based approach whereby a profound analogy and reasoning eventually generated a Fiqh rule that embraced the concept. However, a lingering discrepancy vis-à-vis the philosophical underpinning is hardly addressed. This paper undertakes an approach based on Maqasid al-Shari’a (objectives of Shari’a) to explore that underpinning as it pertains to the three key elements in the making of IP, namely, creativity, property, and policy. The major premise of the paper is that the current IP framework failed to fulfil the needs and aspirations of the Islamic countries. While its underlying objective emphasizes a strong utilitarian approach that contradicts in many ways the Islamic Shari’a. Consequently, better outcomes can be reached by adopting a holistic approach that takes into consideration the practical implication of IP system according to the benefits and interest of Muslim’s societies. Whereby, IP should be comprehensively addressed according to the sources, objectives, and principles of Islamic Shari’a. These can be employed to evaluate the current application of IP and to identify the elements required in an IP system that is congruent with Islamic Shari’a. The comparative analysis of the fundamentals of the present international intellectual property system and the Islamic perspective indicated that the core aspects of IP concerning the concept of creativity and the scope of protection are delineated differently under the Islamic framework. Moreover, the policy and regulations as can be derived from the principles and Maqasid al-Shari’a have a great potential in promoting a robust Islamic IP system that is in line with Shari’a, the needs, and orientation of the society.

AbstractThis article surveys four approaches towards moral obligation to non-Muslims found in Islamic legal thought. I refer to the first three approaches as the "revelatory-deontological," the "contractualist-constructivist" and the "consequentialist-utilitarian." The main argument is that present in many contemporary works on the "jurisprudence of Muslim minorities" (fiqh al-aqalliyyāt) is an attempt to provide an Islamic foundation for a relatively thick and rich relationship of moral obligation and solidarity with non-Muslims. This attempt takes the form of a fourth "comprehensive-qualitative" approach to political ethics that appeals not to juridical reasoning of the type "is x permissible and in which conditions?" but rather to Islamic ideals of what it means to live a good life, of what believing, normatively-committed Muslims want to pursue in this world. This meta-ethical approach builds on and goes beyond the first three. This fourth "comprehensive-qualitative" approach to moral obligation to non-Muslims is novel, emergent and not found in the writings of outright reformers but in those of conservative, "neo-classical," sharī'a-minded—even Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated—Muslim scholars. What adds to the force of this argument is that the other meta-ethical discourses, particularly of contract and utility (maslaha), already get these scholars quite far towards a doctrine of "loyal resident alienage" in non-Muslim societies. That even orthodox Muslim scholars go further shows that they have some interest in giving a theological or principled foundation to a much thicker and richer form of moral obligation to non-Muslims, a relationship which involves recognizing non-Muslims qua non-Muslims and contributing to their well-being.

Abstract All of metaethical positions today can be replaced by a universal architecture of moral philosophy, all but one: moral realism. Here, I use the term “metaethics” to refer to any theory of ethics concerning the groundwork of ethics, on the one hand, and the inquiry of the use of philosophical words, concepts or methods on the other. In this article, I will present my hypothesis that in moral philosophy, we do not need any specialized metaethics at all. Metaethics as a discipline of philosophy is only required by the work of moral realists, who try to show us a realm of values and norms that exist (per se) naturally, non-naturally or supernaturally. How can they know? The effort of metaethical realists cannot be proven either in ontology or in the philosophy of language or in cognitive science or in any meta-science that works en plus to ethics, because even in every additional discipline, we have to accept the presupposition of a validity of judgments. So, let us try it the other way around; we have to find a way to found ethics by following its structures, and that means, based on David Velleman’s concepts: a) We have to search for a ubiquitous point of ethical theory in its foundation – here, no kind of value or norm can be found that is not based on a universal formal structure of normativity. b) We have to start an empirical inquiry to collect norms and values in actual use. MFT, moral psychology and moral sociology are in charge here. The combination of such an abstract groundwork with mere empirical study has to be legitimized again. Hence, I am going to try to sum up the main ideas of such a project to show the relevance of a new architecture of moral philosophy today. There is a line of reasoning that addresses the possibility of a transcendental critique in practical philosophy; therefore, it has to look into the different notions of “intuition” in moral methods like it was used by Sidgwick (Rashdall, Green, Ross, Brentano, McTaggart) and Moore on the one hand and Brentano and Bergson on the other. In my view, there is a way to combine these perspectives using the two-level-model of Hare, Singer, Greene, where “intuition” is used to categorize habits and customs of the common sense morality in general while a critical reflection uses act-utilitarian calculus to provide a universal decision – in the sense of “concrete reason” – for any possible actor in a singular situation (Hegel, Peirce, Bloch etc.). The change between these levels may be explained by means of a pragmatistic kind of continuum of research with an ideal summum bonum in the long run and a concept of common sense morality as can be found in every group or society.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.本文從儒家倫理學與西方效益論、美務論、德行論等三種倫理學理論中，抽繹出自我保存、自我發展、自由意志、能力卓越、關係和諧等五項倫理判準，用以考量複製人的倫理問題。基本上，本文主張「自我保存」是支持複製人的最有力論證，雖然此一論證仍有其缺陷。若以自我保存作為唯一的論據，仍有所不足，但它仍然是一個最低要求（minimum requirement）的論證。若就發展而言，可分就多樣化和性質優化兩種發展來考量。複製人基本上是一相反多樣化、差異化的研究方案，不過它仍可因為保存瀕臨滅亡的家庭、種族等而間接有助於多樣化。至於性質優化則需經由自由意志的努力方能成為道德的。此外，自由意志、卓越化和和諧化等判準看來，複製人仍存在看許多倫理問題，將在本文中一一分析。The new ethical situation created by new discoveries in bio-engineering needs the establishment of ethical criteria in order to judge the morality or immorality of a specific act in, for example, human cloning. But, in Chinese ethical tradition, especially in the Confucian one, much attention has been paid to normalize sexual behavior and no ethical consideration was done on reproduction outside human sexuality. Even this is the case, the general ethical principles established by Confucianism and other ethical traditions are still valid when applied to the newly emerging technological ethical issues. Therefore, in this paper, I would first derive from Confucian ethics and Western utilitarian ethics, obligation ethics and virtue ethics, five ethical criteria, restructured in a hierarchical order, for judging the ethical issues of human cloning. These criteria are: the criterion of conservation, the criterion of development, the criterion of free will, the criterion of excellence, the criterion of harmony.Basically, the author of this paper sustain the position that only the criterion of conservation gives us the most supportive argument for doing human cloning, even if this argument is still defective. This means that we can clone a member of family or race in order to conserve it from total perishing or extermination. The criterion of conservation, articulated in Modern Western philosophy and also in Chinese culture, if not morally perfect in itself, serves the technical act of human cloning as the minimum requirement.The criterion of development could be considered in two ways: differential variability and qualitative betterment. Considered from the side of differential variability, the technique of human cloning could be considered as a project of anti-differentiation or anti-variation. Still it could contribute to development only through conservation, of the otherwise perishing races or families for example. As to the qualitative betterment, it should be always achieved through volitional effort and not merely through biological genetic engineering.All human action should be mediated by free will in order to become moral. This should be taken into account also in the human cloning experimentation. But this does not mean, if supported by conservation argument and motivated by altruistic reasons, human cloning cannot be performed without the consent of the future cloning, unable to give consent because of inexistence for the time being. In this case, cloning could be ethically done, taking into account the moral example of donation of organs of the dead in accident, donation agreed by his/her parents rather than by the accident-victim. But this reasoning does not apply in the case of cloning motivated by commercial interest. But even if this kind of experimentation could be morally accepted, there is still a complementary condition: that there is no pre-visible danger, pain or discomfort caused by the experimentation.Up from the criterion of free will, we enter into the domain properly human and moral. It is on this level, and also on the levels of arguments from excellence and harmony, that we find most of the ethical difficulties of human cloning. For example, in the case of criterion of excellence, all moral excellence are morally valuable when resulted from the decision of human free will and volitional effort. No one could be morally legitimate to conduct human cloning by reason of producing a human being with better human qualities. All human qualities are social and historically determined. One quality considered as good in one time could become bad in another. The biological experimentation conducted under the pretext of producing better human race could be just a sign of tyranny, as in the case of Hitler.As I see it, many actual arguments against human cloning are based upon a social interpretation of the criterion of harmony. For example, that human cloning might be subversive to actual human sexual relationship, parenthood and family system. In my view,although ethical relationship is surely to be disturbed by human cloning, still this is not a sufficient argument against doing it. Because, for example, the argument of conservation could be more urgent and stronger. For me the most important consideration here is the interest of the child. It is of higher interest for the child that he/she be born with the love and care of his parents rather than becoming an object of human technological adventure.Argument of conservation, being supportive of human cloning, could be realized and concretized through an ethical committee authorized by relevant laws to decide in which case and under what condition a particular case of human cloning could be interpreted as suitable for the criterion of conservation. But this enters the domain of legal institution and exceeds our ethical concern in this paper.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 56 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Full TextThe first law enacted in Canada to protect existing Aboriginal rights was section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2 The first law in Canada to recognize the rights of non-human animals as anything other than property has yet to be enacted. The first Supreme Court of Canada (hereafter referred to as the Court) case to interpret section 35 was R. v. Sparrow.3 The 1990 case confirmed an Aboriginal right of the Musqueam peoples of British Columbia to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes. Since this precedent-setting case, many similar claims have been brought before the courts by way of the fluctuating legal space created by s.35. Many of these cases have been about establishing rights to fish4, hunt5, and trap non-human animals (hereafter referred to as animals). The Court has developed, and continues to develop tests to determine the existence and scope of Aboriginal rights. These tests primarily embody cultural, political and, to a surprisingly lesser degree, legal forces. One of the principal problems with these tests is that they privilege, through the western philosophical lens, the interests of humans. Animals are, at best, the resources over which ownership is being contested. The Euro-centric legal conceptualization of animals as 'resources' over which ownership can be exerted is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the relegation of animals solely to a utilitarian role is antithetical to Indigenous-animal relationships and therefore demonstrates one of the fundamental ways the Canadian legal system is ill equipped to give adequate consideration to Indigenous law. Second, failure to consider animals' inherent value and agency in this context reproduces the human-animal and culture-nature binaries that are at the root of many of western Euro-centric society's inequities. This paper argues that Aboriginal peoples' relationships with animals are a necessary, integral and distinctive part of their cultures6 and, therefore, these relationships and the actors within them are entitled to the aegis of s.35. Through the legal protection of these relationships, animals will gain significant protection as a corollary benefit. If the Court were to protect the cultural relationships between animals and Aboriginal groups, a precondition would be acceptance of Indigenous legal systems. Thus, this paper gives a brief answer to the question, what are Indigenous legal systems and why are animals integral to them? The Anishinabe (also known Ojibwe or Chippewa) are Indigenous peoples who have historically lived in the Great Lakes region. The Bruce Peninsula on Lake Huron is home to the Cape Croker Indian Reserve, where the Chippewas of Nawash First Nation live. The people of this First Nation identify as Anishinabe. The Anishinabek case of Nanabush v. Deer is a law among these people and is used throughout the paper as an example of Indigenous-animal relationships. Making the significant assumption that s.35 has the capacity to recognize Indigenous law, the subsequent section of the paper asks why we should protect these relationships and how that protection should be achieved. Finally, the paper concludes that both the ability of s.35 to recognize Indigenous-animal relationships, and the judicial and political will to grant such recognition, are unlikely. Indigenous-animal relationships are integral to the distinctive culture of the Anishinabek, however the courts would be hesitant to allow such an uncertain and potentially far-reaching right. This is not surprising given that such a claim by both Indigenous and animal groups would challenge the foundations upon which the Canadian legal system is based. There are many sensitive issues inherent in this topic. It should be noted the author is not of Indigenous ancestry, but is making every effort to learn about and respect the Indigenous legal systems discussed. While this paper focuses on a number of Anishinabek laws; it is neither a complete analysis of these practices, nor one that can be transferred, without adaptation, to other peoples. Finally, Indigenous peoples and animal rights and Indigenous law scholars, such as Tom Regan and Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, respectively, may insist on an abolitionist approach to animal 'use' or reject the legitimacy of s.35 itself.7 These perspectives are worthy and necessary. This paper positions itself amongst these and other sources in order to reflect upon the timely and important issue of the legal status of Indigenous-animal relationships. I:WHAT ARE INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS? The Law Commission of Canada defines a legal tradition as “a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in the society and the polity, the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected and taught.”8 Indigenous legal traditions fit this description. They are living systems of beliefs and practices, and have been recognized as such by the courts.9 Indigenous practices developed into systems of law that have guided communities in their governance, and in their relationships amongst their own and other cultures and with the Earth.10 These laws have developed through stories, historical events that may be viewed as ‘cases,’ and other lived experiences. Indigenous laws are generally non-prescriptive, non-adversarial and non-punitive and aim to promote respect and consensus, as well as close connection with the land, the Creator, and the community. Indigenous laws are a means through which vital knowledge of social order within the community is transmitted, revived and retained. After European ‘settlement’ the influence of Indigenous laws waned. This was due in part to the state’s policies of assimilation, relocation and enfranchisement. 11 Despite these assaults, Indigenous legal systems have persevered; they continue to provide guidance to many communities, and are being revived and re-learned in others. For example, the Nisga’a’s legal code, Ayuuk, guides their communities and strongly informs legislation enacted under the Nisga’a Final Agreement, the first modern treaty in British Columbia.12 The land and jurisdiction claims of the Wet’suwet’en and Gitxsan Nations ultimately resulted in the Court’s decision in Delgamuukw,13 a landmark case that established the existence of Aboriginal title. The (overturned) BC Supreme Court’s statement in Delgamuukw14 reveals two of the many challenges in demonstrating the validity of Indigenous laws: “what the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en witnesses[es] describe as law is really a most uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed by the Indians [sic] themselves.” The first challenge is that many laws are not in full practice, and therefore not as visible as they could be and once were. What the courts fail to acknowledge, however, is that the ongoing colonial project has served to stifle, extinguish and alter these laws. The second challenge is that the kind of law held and practiced by Indigenous peoples is quite foreign to most non-Indigenous people. Many Indigenous laws have animals as central figures. In Anishinabek traditional law, often the animals are the lawmakers15: they develop the legal principles and have agency as law givers. For instance, the Anishinabek case Nanabush v. Deer, Wolf , as outlined by Burrows, is imbued with legal principles, lessons on conduct and community governance, as well as ‘offenses’ and penalties. It is not a case that was adjudicated by an appointed judge in a courtroom, but rather one that has developed over time as a result of peoples’ relationships with the Earth and its inhabitants. An abbreviated summary of the case hints at these legal lessons: Nanabush plays a trick on a deer and deliberately puts the deer in a vulnerable position. In that moment of vulnerability, Nanabush kills the deer and then roasts its body for dinner. While he is sleeping and waiting for the deer to be cooked, the Wolf people come by and take the deer. Nanabush wakes up hungry, and out of desperation transforms into a snake and eats the brains out of the deer head. Once full, he is stuck inside the head and transforms back into his original shape, but with the deer head still stuck on. He is then chased and nearly killed by hunters who mistake him for a real deer. This case is set within the legal context of the Anishinabek’s treaty with deer. In signing the treaty, the people were reminded to respect beings in life and death and that gifts come when beings respect each other in interrelationships.16 Nanabush violated the rights of the deer and his peoples’ treaty with the deer. He violated the laws by taking things through trickery, and by causing harm to those he owed respect. Because his actions were not in accordance with Anishinabek legal principles, he was punished: Nanabush lost the thing he was so desperately searching for, and he ended up nearly being killed. This case establishes two lessons. The first is that, like statutory and common law, with which Canadians are familiar, Indigenous law does not exist in isolation. Principles are devised based on multiple teachings, pre- vious rules and the application of these rules to facts. That there are myriad sources of Indigenous law suggests that the learning of Indigenous law would require substantial effort on the part of Canadian law-makers.17 The second is that animals hold an important place in Indigenous law, and those relationships with animals – and the whole ‘natural’ world – strongly inform the way they relate to the Earth. II: CAN CANADIAN LAW ACCEPT INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS? If there were a right recognized under s.35 concerning the Indigenous-animal relationship, what would it look like? Courts develop legal tests to which the facts of each case are applied, theoretically creating a degree of predictability as to how a matter will be judged. Introduced in Sparrow, and more fully developed in Van der Peet, a ‘test’ for how to assess a valid Aboriginal right has been set out by the Court. Summarized, the test is: “in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right.”18 There are ten, differently weighted factors that a court will consider in making this assessment. The right being ‘tested’ in this discussion is the one exemplified in Nanabush v. Deer: the ability of Indigenous peoples to recognize and practice their laws, which govern relationships, including death, with deer and other animals. The courts have agreed that a generous, large and liberal construction should be given to Indigenous rights in order to give full effect to the constitutional recognition of the distinctiveness of Aboriginal culture. Still, it is the courts that hold the power to define rights as they conceive them best aligning with Canadian society19; this is one way that the Canadian state reproduces its systems of power over Indigenous peoples.20 The application of the Aboriginal right exemplified in Nanbush v. Deer to the Sparrow and Van der Peet tests would likely conclude that the Anishinabek do have an integral and distinctive relationship with animals. However, due to the significant discretion of the Court on a number of very subjective and politically sensitive factors, it is uncertain that the Nanabush v. Deer case would ‘pass’ Van der Peet’s required ten factors.21 This is indicative of the structural restraints that s.35 imposes. 22 The questions it asks impair its ability to capture and respect the interrelationships inherent in Indigenous peoples’ interactions with animals. For example, the Court will characterize hunting or fishing as solely subsistence, perhaps with a cultural element. Shin Imai contends these activities mean much more: “To many…subsistence is a means of reaffirming Aboriginal identity by passing on traditional knowledge to future generations. Subsistence in this sense moves beyond mere economics, encompassing the cultural, social and spiritual aspects for the communities.”23 Scholar Kent McNeil concludes that: “regardless of the strengths of legal arguments in favour of Indigenous peoples, there are limits to how far the courts […] are willing to go to correct the injustices caused by colonialism and dispossession.”24 It is often not the legal principles that determine outcomes, but rather the extent to which Indigenous rights can be reconciled with the history of settlement without disturbing the current economic and political structure of the dominant culture. III:WHY PROTECT THE ANIMAL-INDIGENOUS RELATIONSHIP? Legally protecting animal-Indigenous relationships offers symbiotic, mutually respectful benefits for animals and for the scope of Aboriginal rights that can be practiced. For instance, a protected relationship would have indirect benefits for animals’ habitat and right to life: it would necessitate protecting the means necessary, such as governance of the land, for realization of the right. This could include greater conservation measures, more contiguous habitat, enforcement of endangered species laws, and, ideally, a greater awareness and appreciation by humans of animals and their needs. Critical studies scholars have developed the argument that minority groups should not be subject to culturally biased laws of the mainstream polity.24 Law professor Maneesha Deckha points out that animals, despite the central role they play in a lot of ‘cultural defences,’ have been excluded from our ethical consideration. Certainly, the role of animals has been absent in judicial consideration of Aboriginal rights.26 Including animals, Deckha argues, allows for a complete analysis of these cultural issues and avoids many of the anthropocentric attitudes inherent in Euro-centric legal traditions. In Jack and Charlie27 two Coast Salish men were charged with hunting deer out of season. They argued that they needed to kill a deer in order to have raw meat for an Aboriginal religious ceremony. The Court found that killing the deer was not part of the ceremony and that there was insufficient evidence to establish that raw meat was required. This is a case where a more nuanced consideration of the laws and relationships with animals would have resulted in a more just application of the (Canadian) law and prevented the reproduction of imperialist attitudes. A criticism that could be lodged against practicing these relationships is that they conflict with the liberty and life interests of animals.28 Theoretically, if Indigenous laws are given the legal and political room to fully operate, a balance between the liberty of animals and the cultural and legal rights of Indigenous peoples can be struck.29 Indeed, Indigenous peoples’ cultural and legal concern for Earth is at its most rudimentary a concern for the land, which is at the heart of the challenge to the Canadian colonial system. If a negotiated treaty was reached, or anti-cruelty and conservation laws were assured in the Indigenous peoples’ self government system, then Canadian anti-cruelty30 and conservation laws,31 the effectiveness of which are already questionable, could be displaced in recognition of Indigenous governance.32 Indigenous peoples in Canada were – and are, subject to imposed limitations – close to the environment in ways that can seem foreign to non-Indigenous people.33 For example, some origin stories and oral histories explain how boundaries between humans and animals are at times absent: Animal-human beings like raven, coyote and rabbit created them [humans] and other beings. People …acted with respect toward many animals in expectation of reciprocity; or expressed kinship or alliance with them in narratives, songs, poems, parables, performances, rituals, and material objects. 34 Furthering or reviving these relationships can advance the understanding of both Indigenous legal systems and animal rights theory. Some animal rights theorists struggle with how to explain the cultural construction of species difference: Indigenous relationships with animals are long standing, lived examples of a different cultural conception of how to relate to animals and also of an arguably healthy, minimally problematic way to approach the debate concerning the species divide.35 A key tenet of animal-Indigenous relationships is respect. Shepard Krech posits that Indigenous peoples are motivated to obtain the necessary resources and goals in ‘proper’ ways: many believe that animals return to the Earth to be killed, provided that hunters demonstrate proper respect.36 This demonstrates a spiritual connection, but there is also a concrete connection between Indigenous peoples and animals. In providing themselves with food and security, they ‘manage’ what Canadian law calls ‘resources.’37 Because of the physical nature of these activities, and their practical similarity with modern ‘resource management,’ offering this as ‘proof’ of physical connection with animals and their habitat may be more successful than ‘proving’ a spiritual relationship. Finally, there are health reasons that make the Indigenous-animal relationship is important. Many cultures have come to depend on the nutrients they derive from particular hunted or fished animals. For example, nutrition and physical activity transitions related to hunting cycles have had negative impacts on individual and community health.38 This shows the multidimensionality of hunting, the significance of health, and, by extension, the need for animal ‘resources’ to be protected. IV: HOW SHOULD WE PROTECT THESE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS? If the Anishinabek and the deer ‘win’ the constitutional legal test (‘against’ the state) and establish a right to protect their relationships with animals, what, other than common law remedies,39 would follow? Below are ideas for legal measures that could be taken from the human or the animal perspective, or both, where benefits accrue to both parties. If animals had greater agency and legal status, their needs as species and as individuals could have a meaningful place in Canadian common and statutory law. In Nanabush v. Deer, this would mean that the deer would be given representation and that legal tests would need to be developed to determine the animals’ rights and interests. Currently the courts support the view that animals can be treated under the law as any other inanimate item of property. Such a legal stance is inconsistent with a rational, common-sense view of animals,40 and certainly with Anishinabek legal principles discussed herein.41 There are ongoing theoretical debates that inform the practical questions of how animal equality would be achieved: none of these in isolation offers a complete solution, but combined they contribute to the long term goal. Barsh and James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson advocate an adoption of the reasoning in the Australian case Mabo v. Queensland,42 where whole Aboriginal legal systems were imported intact into the common law. Some principles that Canada should be following can also be drawn from international treaties that Canada has or should have signed on to.43 Another way to seek protection from the human perspective is through the freedom of religion and conscience section of the Charter. Professor John Borrows constructs a full argument for this, and cites its challenges, in Living Law on a Living Earth: Aboriginal Religion, Law and the Constitution.44 The strongest, but perhaps most legally improbable, way to protect the animal- Indigenous relationship is for Canada to recognize a third, Indigenous order of government (in addition to provincial and federal), where all three orders are equal and inform one another’s laws. This way, Indigenous laws would have the legal space to fully function and be revived. Endowing Indigenous peoples with the right to govern their relationships would require a great acquiescence of power by governments and a commitment to the establishment and maintenance of healthy self-government in Indigenous communities. Louise Mandell offers some reasons why Canada should treat Aboriginal people in new ways, at least one of which is salient to the third order of government argument: To mend the [E]arth, which must be done, governments must reassess the information which the dominant culture has dismissed. Some of that valuable information is located in the oral histories of Aboriginal Peoples. This knowledge will become incorporated into decisions affecting the [E]arth’s landscape when Aboriginal Peoples are equal partners in decisions affecting their territories.45 V: CONCLUSION A legal system that does not have to justify its existence or defend its worth is less vulnerable to challenges.46 While it can be concluded that s.35 has offered some legal space for Indigenous laws and practices, it is too deeply couched in Euro-centric legal traditions and the anthropocentric cultural assumptions that they carry. The most effective strategy for advancing Indigenous laws and culture, that would also endow many animals with greater agency, and relax the culture-nature, human-animal binaries, is the formal recognition of a third order of government. Lisa Chartrand explains that recognition of legal pluralism would be a mere affirmation of legal systems that exist, but which are stifled: “…this country is a multijuridical state, where the distinct laws and rules of three systems come together within the geographic boundaries of one political territory.” 47 Revitalizing Indigenous legal systems is and will be a challenging undertaking. Indigenous communities must reclaim, define and understand their own traditions: “The loss of culture and traditions caused by the historic treatment of Aboriginal communities makes this a formidable challenge for some communities. Equally significant is the challenge for the Canadian state to create political and legal space to accommodate revitalized Indigenous legal traditions and Aboriginal law-making.”48 The project of revitalizing Indigenous legal traditions requires the commitment of resources sufficient for the task, and transformative change to procedural and substantive law. The operation of these laws within, or in addition to, Canadian law would of course cause widespread, but worthwhile controversy. In Animal Bodies, Cultural Justice49 Deckha argues that an ethical relationship with the animal Other must be established in order realize cultural and animal rights. This paper explores and demonstrates the value in finding legal space where cultural pluralism and respect for animals can give rise to the practice of Indigenous laws and the revitalization of animal-Indigenous relationships. As Borrows writes: “Anishinabek law provides guidance about how to theorize, practice and order our association with the [E]arth, and could do so in a way that produces answers that are very different from those found in other sources.”50 (see PDF for references)

In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.

AbstractA potential underlying mechanism associated with the difficulties in social interactions in Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) concerns the abnormal development of moral reasoning. The present study examined utilitarian and deontological judgments in impersonal and personal moral dilemmas, comparing 66 individuals with ASD and 61 typically developing (TD) individuals between 6 and 18 years. Utilitarian judgments decreased with age. This decline was much more gradual for personal dilemmas in the ASD than in the TD group. ASD individuals rated utilitarian judgments as more appropriate but felt less calm, consistent with the Empathy Imbalance hypothesis. Utilitarian judgments were associated with social interaction difficulties in ASD. These findings identify possible social therapeutic targets for more efficient coping strategies in individuals with ASD.

Different analyses of two-wrongs reasoning are presented and provide relief for the Groarke, Tindale, and Fisher analysis which is suggestive of the origin of this type of reasoning in Bentham and Mill. Aquinas's doctrine of double effect is entertained as a possible counterexample (which it is not). Two-wrongs reasoning can be either acceptable (reasonable) or unacceptable, and there are conditions that can be laid down for both situations in discourse. A negative version of the utilitarian principle assists us in understanding two-wrongs reasoning in moral contexts.

In the trolley problem, a well-known moral dilemma, the intuitive process is believed to increase deontological judgments, while deliberative reasoning is thought to promote utilitarian decisions. Therefore, based on the dual-process model, there seems to be an attempt to save several lives at the expense of a few others in a deliberative manner. This study examines the validity of this argument. To this end, we manipulate decision-making time in the standard trolley dilemma to compare differences among 119 Japanese female undergraduates under three conditions: intuitive judgment, deliberative judgment, and judgment after a group discussion. The current results demonstrate that utilitarian judgments decreased from 52.9% in the intuition condition to 43.7% in the deliberation condition and 37.0% after the discussion. Additional analysis suggests that the decrease in utilitarian judgments may be related to psychological unwillingness to assume responsibility for the lives of others rather than to an increase in deontological judgments. Finally, these results are discussed from an adaptationist perspective.

Previous interactive marketing literature has concluded that banner attributes are key drivers of ad effectiveness and online consumer behaviors. In particular, prior advertising studies have largely defined the two most commonly used ad appeals in online settings: hedonic (i.e., visually attractive, joy-focused, and interactive) and utilitarian (i.e., informative, convenient, and functional). However, no unanimous conclusions have been drawn about their effects on online consumer behavior. Furthermore, no studies have assessed the psychological mechanisms underlying the processing of hedonic and utilitarian banner ads, which could be crucial given the unconscious, internal, and introspective nature of ad evaluation and online purchasing decisions. In this research, the authors used neuroimaging (functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]) to identify the neural mechanisms underlying the evaluation of hedonic and utilitarian banners. The results reveal that whereas hedonic layouts engage brain areas associated with reward, self-relevance, and emotion, utilitarian banner ads trigger brain networks related to object identification and recognition, reasoning, executive function, and cognitive control. This research also examines the extent to which neural data derived from processing hedonic and utilitarian banners complement the ability of self-reported banner effectiveness to predict online consumer behavior. The results reveal that neural data from banner appeals help predict between 9% and 18% of online consumer behavior beyond that indicated by the perceived ad effectiveness reported by consumers. Taken together, these results provide new insights into the connection between neuropsychological data and real-world online consumer behavior.