Journal articles on the topic 'Utilitarian moral reasoning'

Abstract:This article challenges recent calls for moral bioenhancement—the use of biomedical means, including pharmacological and genetic methods, to increase the moral value of our actions or characters. It responds to those who take a practical interest in moral bioenhancement. I argue that moral bioenhancement is unlikely to be a good response to the extinction threats of climate change and weapons of mass destruction. Rather than alleviating those problems, it is likely to aggravate them. We should expect biomedical means to generate piecemeal enhancements of human morality. These predictably strengthen some contributors to moral judgment while leaving others comparatively unaffected. This unbalanced enhancement differs from the manner of improvement that typically results from sustained reflection. It is likely to make its subjects worse rather than better at moral reasoning.

The ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) has been implicated as a critical neural substrate mediating the influence of emotion on moral reasoning. It has been shown that the vmPFC is especially important for making moral judgments about “high-conflict” moral dilemmas involving direct personal actions, that is, scenarios that pit compelling utilitarian considerations of aggregate welfare against the highly emotionally aversive act of directly causing harm to others [Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911, 2007]. The current study was designed to elucidate further the role of the vmPFC in high-conflict moral judgments, including those that involve indirect personal actions, such as indirectly causing harm to one's kin to save a group of strangers. We found that patients with vmPFC lesions were more likely than brain-damaged and healthy comparison participants to endorse utilitarian outcomes on high-conflict dilemmas regardless of whether the dilemmas (1) entailed direct versus indirect personal harms and (2) were presented from the Self versus Other perspective. In addition, all groups were more likely to endorse utilitarian outcomes in the Other perspective as compared with the Self perspective. These results provide important extensions of previous work, and the findings align with the proposal that the vmPFC is critical for reasoning about moral dilemmas in which anticipating the social-emotional consequences of an action (e.g., guilt or remorse) is crucial for normal moral judgments [Greene, J. D. Why are VMPFC patients more utilitarian?: A dual-process theory of moral judgment explains. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 322–323, 2007; Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911, 2007].

The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate why AI researchers’ attempts at developing projects of moral machines are a cause for concern regarding the way in which such machines can reach a certain level of morality. By comparing and contrasting Howard and Muntean’s model of a virtuous Artificial Autonomous Moral Agent (AAMA) (2017) and Bauer’s model of a two-level utilitarian Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) (2020), I draw the conclusion that both models raise, although in a different manner, some crucial issues. The latter are recognized as deriving from the complex relationships between human cognition and moral reasoning, as refracted through the lens of the idea of moral AI. In this context, special attention is paid to the complications which are triggered by the analogical thinking regarding the processes of replication of human morality in the field of machine ethics.

Making morally sensitive decisions and evaluations pervade many human everyday activities. Philosophers, economists, psychologists and behavioural scientists researching such decision-making typically explore the principles, processes and predictors that constitute human moral decision-making. Crucially, very little research has explored the theoretical and methodological development (supported by empirical evidence) of utilitarian theories of moral decision-making. Accordingly, in this critical review article, we invite the reader on a moral journey from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism to the veil of ignorance reasoning, via a recent theoretical proposal emphasising utilitarian moral behaviour—perspective-taking accessibility (PT accessibility). PT accessibility research revealed that providing participants with access to all situational perspectives in moral scenarios, eliminates (previously reported in the literature) inconsistency between their moral judgements and choices. Moreover, in contrast to any previous theoretical and methodological accounts, moral scenarios/tasks with full PT accessibility provide the participants with unbiased even odds (neither risk averse nor risk seeking) and impartiality. We conclude that the proposed by Martin et al. PT Accessibility (a new type of veil of ignorance with even odds that do not trigger self-interest, risk related preferences or decision biases) is necessary in order to measure humans’ prosocial utilitarian behaviour and promote its societal benefits.

Objective. Moral judgments are based on decisions that take into account the representation of norms and law, values, functionality and situations themselves. Morality has been studied with “hypothetic moral dilemmas”, in order to identify the type of outcome and the process behind moral reasoning. But judgments by themselves are not enough to establish differences in the type of resolution or the relationship with other cognitive processes. The present paper aimed to compare performance in tasks of utility maximization, cognitive control, and moral judgments, taking into account sex and other sociodemographic variables. Method. Seventy-three university students participated (50 women, 20 men and 3 with unreported gender, the average age was 19.53 years (SD = 1.68 years). The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was used to identify behaviors of utility maximization. In addition, we used the switch costs and the web application of moral machine tasks. Results. A difference between variables of the IGT, but no differences in the switch costs task were found. Conclusion. Regarding moral judgment, males gave more value to respect norms than females. Some variables of the IGT task support outcomes related to differences between sexes. Results are congruent with differences shown in existing literature.

The author displays and reexamines Hare?s "two-level theory" of normative moral thinking ("intuitive" level and "critical" level), including goals that are intended by its establishing. Given Hare?s holism, the met ethical level, considered as fundamental or the "third" level, has notable effect on process of normative reasoning, especially if it is taken as one of the determinant of the critical moral thin king. Central part of the analysis is examination of utilitarian character of the theory.

The “veil of ignorance” is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision making by denying decision makers access to potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here, we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning in a more focused way to specific moral dilemmas, all of which involve a tension between the greater good and competing moral concerns. Across 7 experiments (n = 6,261), 4 preregistered, we find that veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good. Participants first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning about a specific dilemma, asking themselves what they would want if they did not know who among those affected they would be. Participants then responded to a more conventional version of the same dilemma with a moral judgment, a policy preference, or an economic choice. Participants who first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning subsequently made more utilitarian choices in response to a classic philosophical dilemma, a medical dilemma, a real donation decision between a more vs. less effective charity, and a policy decision concerning the social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. These effects depend on the impartial thinking induced by veil-of-ignorance reasoning and cannot be explained by anchoring, probabilistic reasoning, or generic perspective taking. These studies indicate that veil-of-ignorance reasoning may be a useful tool for decision makers who wish to make more impartial and/or socially beneficial choices.

The deficit of theory of mind (ToM) is considered by a number of authors as one of the risk factors for involvement in criminal activity for individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (for example because of difficulties in understanding other people’s intentions). The relationship between the deficit of ToM and moral judgments is discussed. The methods of test diagnostics (“Moral dilemmas”, A-ToM) and the method of content analysis of answers to open questions on moral dilemmas were used. It is shown that individuals with ASD are less likely to give utilitarian answers to impersonal dilemmas, but regardless of the intact of ToM, there is a tendency to reduce the degree of utilitarianism from impersonal to personal dilemmas. It is also shown that individuals with ASD do not rely on the intentions of actors when reasoning about moral dilemmas, but not only individuals with ASD rely on conse-quences in such reasoning.

IntroductionIssues in public policy have been challenging and remaking moral theory for two centuries. Such issues force us to question fundamental principles of ethics while they cast doubt on our ability to generalize from traditional intuitions. No issue poses more remarkable difficulties for moral theory than nuclear weapons policy. Because the consequences of their deployment and therefore possible use could be grievous beyond those of any previously conceivable human action, these weapons frame the conflict between outcome-based, especially utilitarian, and action-based deontological moral theories more acutely than perhaps any other we have faced. Just because nuclear weapons may bring about the most grievous outcome imaginable, they elevate concern with outcomes over concern with actions. More generally, they wreak havoc with the focus on the morality of individual choices and actions, set limits to the notion of intention and the doctrine of double effect, call into question the so-called just-war theory, and overwhelm the intuitionist basis of much of ethical reasoning.

AbstractPrevious studies have found that the proportions of people who endorsed utilitarian decisions varied across different variants of the trolley dilemma. In this paper, we explored whether moral choices were associated with beliefs about outcome probabilities in different moral dilemmas. Results of two experiments showed that participants’ perceptions of outcome probabilities were different between two dilemmas that were similar to the classical switch case and footbridge case. Participants’ judgments of the outcome probabilities were associated with their moral choices. The results suggested that participants might not accept task instructions and thus did not perceive the outcomes in the dilemmas as certain. We argued that researchers who endorse descriptive tasks in moral reasoning research should be cautious about the findings and should take participants’ beliefs in the outcomes into account.

In analyzing complex products, this study selected the company Goldman Sachs and one of its product offerings, the synthetic collateralized debt obligation (synthetic CDO). The study later analyzed the ethical implications of providing such a complex product to customers. A review of the literature indicates that researchers identified this product and other associated derivatives of the mortgage backed securities as the main causes of the 2008 financial crisis in the United States of America. As such, Goldman Sachs’ offering of the product posed ethical and moral issues. An analysis of the company and its offering was done under the lenses of various ethical theories such as Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning, the Kantian ethics, the utilitarian perspective, Friedman’s shareholder theory, the stakeholder theory, the market approach to consumer protection, and the contract view of consumer protection. Besides Friedman’s shareholder theory, all other theories judged the product offering morally wrong and unethical. At the end of the study, the author suggested a contribution to knowledge regarding Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning in its application to organizations. The author also suggested further research to validate the outcome of Friedman’s shareholder theory regarding this case.

Not a day passes but we find ourselves indignant about something or other. When is our indignation justified, and when does it count as moral indignation rather than a legitimate but non-moral gripe? You might think that we should turn to moral theories – to the varieties of utilitarian, Kantian, virtue theories, etc – to answer this question. I shall try to convince you that this is a mistake, that moral theory – as it is ordinarily presently conceived and studied – does not have a specific subject matter, a specific aim, scope or boundaries. You might think that the difference between echt moral indignation and other forms of disapproval is their relative strength or the importance of their target; but moral indignation can be quite faint, directed to a relatively minor transgression and a strongly felt gripe may be directed to a serious but presumptively non-moral infraction. I shall try to persuade you that morality does not constitute an important and distinctive domain with a distinctive set of over-riding norms or a privileged mode of reasoning: morality is everywhere or nowhere in particular. Radical as this claim may sound, I am not a complete Luddite about the matter. Traditional moral theories nevertheless have important functions. But rather than being competing ‘winner takes all’ explanatory and normative theories, OldSpeak moral systems function heuristically. They offer a heterogeneous set of reminders, questions, advice, ideals, warnings, considerations for deliberation. While we try to integrate and systematize them, there is no single overarching organizational plan.

During the coronavirus pandemic, communities have faced shortages of important healthcare resources such as COVID-19 vaccines, medical staff, ICU beds and ventilators. Public health officials in the U.S. have had to make decisions about two major issues: which infected patients should be treated first (triage), and which people who are at risk of infection should be inoculated first (vaccine distribution). Following Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism, adopted guidelines have tended to value both whole lives (survival to discharge) and life-years (survival for years past discharge). This process of collective moral reasoning has revealed our common commitment to both Kantian and utilitarian principles. For Kant, respecting people’s rights entails that we ought to value whole lives equally. Therefore we ought to allocate resources so as to maximise the number of patients who survive to discharge. By contrast, the principle of utility has us maximise life-years so that people can satisfy more of their considered preferences. Although people are treated impartially in the utilitarian calculus, it does not recognise their equal worth. Subjecting Kantian ethics and utilitarianism to the process of reflective equilibrium lends support to the idea that we need a pluralistic approach that would accommodate our moral intuitions regarding both the equal value of whole lives and the additive value of life-years.

The author re-examines Hare's multiple ways of connecting his metaethical with his normative doctrine, which is in formal sense determined as "Kantian utilitarianism", and in substantive sense as "preference-utilitarianism". Critical references to both dimensions of utilitarian doctrine aim at indication on scopes and limits of Hare's ambitious redefinition of the doctrine. Further on he discusses about so-called "necessary ingredient" of moral reasoning under the name of "sympathetic imagination", which Hare grasps in his developed theory not only as a normative demand but also as a logical thesis. Finally, he considers kinds of preferences that can or cannot be recognized (with help of established set of criteria) as morally relevant.

AbstractThe COVID-19 crisis has forced healthcare professionals to make tragic decisions concerning which patients to save. Furthermore, The COVID-19 crisis has foregrounded the influence of self-serving bias in debates on how to allocate scarce resources. A utilitarian principle favors allocating scarce resources such as ventilators toward younger patients, as this is expected to save more years of life. Some view this as ageist, instead favoring age-neutral principles, such as “first come, first served”. Which approach is fairer? The “veil of ignorance” is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision-making by reducing decision-makers’ use of potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning to the COVID-19 ventilator dilemma, asking participants which policy they would prefer if they did not know whether they were younger or older. Two studies (pre-registered; online samples; Study 1, N=414; Study 2 replication, N=1,276) show that veil-of-ignorance reasoning shifts preferences toward saving younger patients. The effect on older participants is dramatic, reversing their opposition toward favoring the young, thereby eliminating self-serving bias. These findings provide guidance on how to remove self-serving biases to healthcare policymakers and frontline personnel charged with allocating scarce medical resources during times of crisis.

AbstractThis article surveys four approaches towards moral obligation to non-Muslims found in Islamic legal thought. I refer to the first three approaches as the "revelatory-deontological," the "contractualist-constructivist" and the "consequentialist-utilitarian." The main argument is that present in many contemporary works on the "jurisprudence of Muslim minorities" (fiqh al-aqalliyyāt) is an attempt to provide an Islamic foundation for a relatively thick and rich relationship of moral obligation and solidarity with non-Muslims. This attempt takes the form of a fourth "comprehensive-qualitative" approach to political ethics that appeals not to juridical reasoning of the type "is x permissible and in which conditions?" but rather to Islamic ideals of what it means to live a good life, of what believing, normatively-committed Muslims want to pursue in this world. This meta-ethical approach builds on and goes beyond the first three. This fourth "comprehensive-qualitative" approach to moral obligation to non-Muslims is novel, emergent and not found in the writings of outright reformers but in those of conservative, "neo-classical," sharī'a-minded—even Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated—Muslim scholars. What adds to the force of this argument is that the other meta-ethical discourses, particularly of contract and utility (maslaha), already get these scholars quite far towards a doctrine of "loyal resident alienage" in non-Muslim societies. That even orthodox Muslim scholars go further shows that they have some interest in giving a theological or principled foundation to a much thicker and richer form of moral obligation to non-Muslims, a relationship which involves recognizing non-Muslims qua non-Muslims and contributing to their well-being.

The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner's argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively and institutionally. Substantiality, he argues for balancing based on a consequential moral theory that rejects the ideas of deontological rights and particularly absolute or very weighty deontological rights. More specifically, it seems that Posner assumes a utilitarian theory that also rejects intrinsic concern for distributive justice. Institutionally, Posner argues that this method of reasoning should be adopted by judges when interpreting the Constitution. These substantive and institutional background assumptions are of course controversial, but I do not dispute them in this Article. My critique concerns Posner's conclusions based on these assumptions. Posner's main claim is that given the magnitude of the danger of modern terrorism, even a small probability that an act of terror may occur justifies extreme anti-terror measures.

An increasing number of people around the world communicate in more than one language, resulting in them having to make decisions in a foreign language on a daily basis. Interestingly, a burgeoning body of literature suggests that people’s decision-making is affected by whether they are reasoning in their native language (NL) or their foreign language (FL). According to the foreign language effect (FLe), people are less susceptible to bias in many decision-making tasks and more likely to display utilitarian cost-benefit analysis in moral decision-making when reasoning in a FL. While these differences have often been attributed to a reduced emotionality in the FL, an emerging body of literature has started to test the extent to which these could be attributable to increased deliberation in the FL. The present study tests whether increased deliberation leads to a FLe on cognitive reflection in a population of older adults (Mage = 65.1), from the successful aging project in Umeå, Sweden. We explored whether performance on a 6-item version of the cognitive reflection test (CRT) adapted to Swedish would differ between participants for whom Swedish was their NL and those for whom Swedish was their FL. The CRT is a task designed to elicit an incorrect, intuitive answer. In order to override the intuitive answer, one requires engaging in deliberative, analytical thinking to determine the correct answer. Therefore, we hypothesized that if thinking in a FL increases deliberation, then those performing the task in their FL would exhibit higher accuracy rates than those performing in their NL. Our results showed that age and level of education predicted performance on the task but performance on the CRT did not differ between the NL and the FL groups. In addition, in the FL group, proficiency in the FL was not related to performance in the CRT. Our results, therefore, do not provide evidence that thinking in a FL increases deliberation in a group of older adults performing a logical reasoning task that is not typically associated with an emotional connotation.

The popular in the modern timespragmatic approach, creates in teaching instrumental attitude to professional tasks execution. It means that reaching goals, on utilitarian level,leads to more effective actions. The positive social sciencestake another approach, basing on the usual human inner drive to be happy. Such being takes place when a person realizes well-being for others and for oneself, following hope, which direction is pointed out by freedom, dignity and human responsibility. The main purpose of the article is to reveal the evidence that create pedeutology of the XXI century as a science of strong teaching profession: its values, meaningfulness and beauty. It has been pointed out to agathological and arthrological aspect of pedeutology. The first one refers to doing good deeds. It is represented by optimal pupil development, which therefore should become a priority in teacher’s professional actions. In reference to the above, the instrumental and vocational teaching context has been characterized. The second aspect refers to the teacher’s moral capabilities, called the virtues. A virtue is a central knowledgeable category of positive social sciences. According to this issue, the utility of the virtue theory has been presented in for the pedeutological thought. The extraordinary attention has been put upon the virtue of hope, reasoning its inevitability in the process of upbringing in the XXI century.

Abstract All of metaethical positions today can be replaced by a universal architecture of moral philosophy, all but one: moral realism. Here, I use the term “metaethics” to refer to any theory of ethics concerning the groundwork of ethics, on the one hand, and the inquiry of the use of philosophical words, concepts or methods on the other. In this article, I will present my hypothesis that in moral philosophy, we do not need any specialized metaethics at all. Metaethics as a discipline of philosophy is only required by the work of moral realists, who try to show us a realm of values and norms that exist (per se) naturally, non-naturally or supernaturally. How can they know? The effort of metaethical realists cannot be proven either in ontology or in the philosophy of language or in cognitive science or in any meta-science that works en plus to ethics, because even in every additional discipline, we have to accept the presupposition of a validity of judgments. So, let us try it the other way around; we have to find a way to found ethics by following its structures, and that means, based on David Velleman’s concepts: a) We have to search for a ubiquitous point of ethical theory in its foundation – here, no kind of value or norm can be found that is not based on a universal formal structure of normativity. b) We have to start an empirical inquiry to collect norms and values in actual use. MFT, moral psychology and moral sociology are in charge here. The combination of such an abstract groundwork with mere empirical study has to be legitimized again. Hence, I am going to try to sum up the main ideas of such a project to show the relevance of a new architecture of moral philosophy today. There is a line of reasoning that addresses the possibility of a transcendental critique in practical philosophy; therefore, it has to look into the different notions of “intuition” in moral methods like it was used by Sidgwick (Rashdall, Green, Ross, Brentano, McTaggart) and Moore on the one hand and Brentano and Bergson on the other. In my view, there is a way to combine these perspectives using the two-level-model of Hare, Singer, Greene, where “intuition” is used to categorize habits and customs of the common sense morality in general while a critical reflection uses act-utilitarian calculus to provide a universal decision – in the sense of “concrete reason” – for any possible actor in a singular situation (Hegel, Peirce, Bloch etc.). The change between these levels may be explained by means of a pragmatistic kind of continuum of research with an ideal summum bonum in the long run and a concept of common sense morality as can be found in every group or society.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.本文從儒家倫理學與西方效益論、美務論、德行論等三種倫理學理論中，抽繹出自我保存、自我發展、自由意志、能力卓越、關係和諧等五項倫理判準，用以考量複製人的倫理問題。基本上，本文主張「自我保存」是支持複製人的最有力論證，雖然此一論證仍有其缺陷。若以自我保存作為唯一的論據，仍有所不足，但它仍然是一個最低要求（minimum requirement）的論證。若就發展而言，可分就多樣化和性質優化兩種發展來考量。複製人基本上是一相反多樣化、差異化的研究方案，不過它仍可因為保存瀕臨滅亡的家庭、種族等而間接有助於多樣化。至於性質優化則需經由自由意志的努力方能成為道德的。此外，自由意志、卓越化和和諧化等判準看來，複製人仍存在看許多倫理問題，將在本文中一一分析。The new ethical situation created by new discoveries in bio-engineering needs the establishment of ethical criteria in order to judge the morality or immorality of a specific act in, for example, human cloning. But, in Chinese ethical tradition, especially in the Confucian one, much attention has been paid to normalize sexual behavior and no ethical consideration was done on reproduction outside human sexuality. Even this is the case, the general ethical principles established by Confucianism and other ethical traditions are still valid when applied to the newly emerging technological ethical issues. Therefore, in this paper, I would first derive from Confucian ethics and Western utilitarian ethics, obligation ethics and virtue ethics, five ethical criteria, restructured in a hierarchical order, for judging the ethical issues of human cloning. These criteria are: the criterion of conservation, the criterion of development, the criterion of free will, the criterion of excellence, the criterion of harmony.Basically, the author of this paper sustain the position that only the criterion of conservation gives us the most supportive argument for doing human cloning, even if this argument is still defective. This means that we can clone a member of family or race in order to conserve it from total perishing or extermination. The criterion of conservation, articulated in Modern Western philosophy and also in Chinese culture, if not morally perfect in itself, serves the technical act of human cloning as the minimum requirement.The criterion of development could be considered in two ways: differential variability and qualitative betterment. Considered from the side of differential variability, the technique of human cloning could be considered as a project of anti-differentiation or anti-variation. Still it could contribute to development only through conservation, of the otherwise perishing races or families for example. As to the qualitative betterment, it should be always achieved through volitional effort and not merely through biological genetic engineering.All human action should be mediated by free will in order to become moral. This should be taken into account also in the human cloning experimentation. But this does not mean, if supported by conservation argument and motivated by altruistic reasons, human cloning cannot be performed without the consent of the future cloning, unable to give consent because of inexistence for the time being. In this case, cloning could be ethically done, taking into account the moral example of donation of organs of the dead in accident, donation agreed by his/her parents rather than by the accident-victim. But this reasoning does not apply in the case of cloning motivated by commercial interest. But even if this kind of experimentation could be morally accepted, there is still a complementary condition: that there is no pre-visible danger, pain or discomfort caused by the experimentation.Up from the criterion of free will, we enter into the domain properly human and moral. It is on this level, and also on the levels of arguments from excellence and harmony, that we find most of the ethical difficulties of human cloning. For example, in the case of criterion of excellence, all moral excellence are morally valuable when resulted from the decision of human free will and volitional effort. No one could be morally legitimate to conduct human cloning by reason of producing a human being with better human qualities. All human qualities are social and historically determined. One quality considered as good in one time could become bad in another. The biological experimentation conducted under the pretext of producing better human race could be just a sign of tyranny, as in the case of Hitler.As I see it, many actual arguments against human cloning are based upon a social interpretation of the criterion of harmony. For example, that human cloning might be subversive to actual human sexual relationship, parenthood and family system. In my view,although ethical relationship is surely to be disturbed by human cloning, still this is not a sufficient argument against doing it. Because, for example, the argument of conservation could be more urgent and stronger. For me the most important consideration here is the interest of the child. It is of higher interest for the child that he/she be born with the love and care of his parents rather than becoming an object of human technological adventure.Argument of conservation, being supportive of human cloning, could be realized and concretized through an ethical committee authorized by relevant laws to decide in which case and under what condition a particular case of human cloning could be interpreted as suitable for the criterion of conservation. But this enters the domain of legal institution and exceeds our ethical concern in this paper.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 56 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.

AbstractA potential underlying mechanism associated with the difficulties in social interactions in Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) concerns the abnormal development of moral reasoning. The present study examined utilitarian and deontological judgments in impersonal and personal moral dilemmas, comparing 66 individuals with ASD and 61 typically developing (TD) individuals between 6 and 18 years. Utilitarian judgments decreased with age. This decline was much more gradual for personal dilemmas in the ASD than in the TD group. ASD individuals rated utilitarian judgments as more appropriate but felt less calm, consistent with the Empathy Imbalance hypothesis. Utilitarian judgments were associated with social interaction difficulties in ASD. These findings identify possible social therapeutic targets for more efficient coping strategies in individuals with ASD.

Different analyses of two-wrongs reasoning are presented and provide relief for the Groarke, Tindale, and Fisher analysis which is suggestive of the origin of this type of reasoning in Bentham and Mill. Aquinas's doctrine of double effect is entertained as a possible counterexample (which it is not). Two-wrongs reasoning can be either acceptable (reasonable) or unacceptable, and there are conditions that can be laid down for both situations in discourse. A negative version of the utilitarian principle assists us in understanding two-wrongs reasoning in moral contexts.

In the trolley problem, a well-known moral dilemma, the intuitive process is believed to increase deontological judgments, while deliberative reasoning is thought to promote utilitarian decisions. Therefore, based on the dual-process model, there seems to be an attempt to save several lives at the expense of a few others in a deliberative manner. This study examines the validity of this argument. To this end, we manipulate decision-making time in the standard trolley dilemma to compare differences among 119 Japanese female undergraduates under three conditions: intuitive judgment, deliberative judgment, and judgment after a group discussion. The current results demonstrate that utilitarian judgments decreased from 52.9% in the intuition condition to 43.7% in the deliberation condition and 37.0% after the discussion. Additional analysis suggests that the decrease in utilitarian judgments may be related to psychological unwillingness to assume responsibility for the lives of others rather than to an increase in deontological judgments. Finally, these results are discussed from an adaptationist perspective.

The process dissociation procedure (PDP) for moral cognition was created to separately measure two dispositions of moral judgment based on the dual-process theory of moral reasoning: deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In this paper we raise some concerns from a psychometrics perspective regarding the structure, reliability, and validity of the moral PDP as a measure of individual differences. Using two simulation studies as well as a real sample of N = 1,010, we investigate the psychometric properties of the moral PDP. We present novel evidence showing that (1) some correlations between PDP parameters are mathematical artifacts, and as such cannot be taken as evidence in support of a theory, (2) there are severe response inconsistencies within dilemma batteries, and (3) reliability estimates for these scores seem to be far below the accepted standards. We discuss some potential theoretical and content-related reasons for these statistical issues and their implications. We conclude that in their current form, PDP measures of utilitarian and deontological tendencies are sub-optimal for assessing individual differences.

Moral judgment can be highly affected by the action and intention factors on a behavior level. Previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the intention factor can modulate both the affective and cognitive processing of moral judgment. The present event-related potentials (ERP) study examined how the action factor modulated the neural dynamics of moral judgment under a newly developed moral dilemma paradigm including three different conditions: harm caused by action (i.e., doing harm), harm caused by omission (i.e., allowing harm), and no harm. Behavior data showed that participants preferred utilitarian judgments and spent less time on the allowing harm condition than for the doing harm condition. ERP results revealed that, compared with the doing harm and no harm dilemmas, the allowing harm dilemmas elicited an enhanced N450 response associated with cognitive control and/or cognitive effort processes, but attenuated a late positive potentials (LPP) response associated with top-down control of attention and cognitive “rational” control processes. Such LPP amplitude differences were positively correlated with the C-score of the moral competence test which indexed the cognitive aspect of moral judgment competency. These findings suggested that people have a strong omission bias, and such an action factor modulates the conscious reasoning process during moral judgment, including the cognitive control and/or cognitive effort, and attentional allocation processes.

AbstractThe present article investigates how economic experts and laypersons deal with issues of fairness in the economic area. Most economic experts follow an ethic that can be described as both, deductive and utilitarian. The ethical judgment of an economic system as a whole or a specific economic measure follows its economic consequences. Measures that increase economic wealth are also judged as fair. The putative motives of individuals or institutions are neglected. To the contrary, laypeople follow an ethic that is both, deontic and intuitive. Ethical judgments are heavily influenced by the motives of the acting individuals and institutions. Questions of efficiency are rather neglected. Laypeople tend to accept those measures which are perceived as fair. Using a number of empirical examples we show how these differences in moral reasoning can explain the huge gap between experts and laypeople in their acceptance of different economic policies.

Objective Autonomous cars (ACs) controlled by artificial intelligence are expected to play a significant role in transportation in the near future. This study investigated determinants of trust in ACs. Background Trust in ACs influences different variables, including the intention to adopt AC technology. Several studies on risk perception have verified that shared value determines trust in risk managers. Previous research has confirmed the effect of value similarity on trust in artificial intelligence. We focused on moral beliefs, specifically utilitarianism (belief in promoting a greater good) and deontology (belief in condemning deliberate harm), and tested the effects of shared moral beliefs on trust in ACs. Method We conducted three experiments ( N = 128, 71, and 196, for each), adopting a thought experiment similar to the well-known trolley problem. We manipulated shared moral beliefs (shared vs. unshared) and driver (AC vs. human), providing participants with different moral dilemma scenarios. Trust in ACs was measured through a questionnaire. Results The results of Experiment 1 showed that shared utilitarian belief strongly influenced trust in ACs. In Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, however, we did not find statistical evidence that shared deontological belief had an effect on trust in ACs. Conclusion The results of the three experiments suggest that the effect of shared moral beliefs on trust varies depending on the values that ACs share with humans. Application To promote AC implementation, policymakers and developers need to understand which values are shared between ACs and humans to enhance trust in ACs.

Many of us routinely employ moral reasoning when making daily judgments. When questioned about why we feel we have a moral responsibility to execute specific behaviors, we frequently cite the pleasure or the avoidance of pain. Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, providing the most effective approach for determining ethically correct behavior in every given circumstance. In Jeremy Bentham's writings, he believed that the most promising method to achieving such an agreement was to choose the policy that would provide the most significant net benefits to society once the harms were considered. (1) The author will examine utilitarianism's definition, application, and issues in this work. (2) consequentialism, whose central tenet is that an act's ethical position depends on its consequences' value; (3) The difference between utilitarian rule and action. Both agree that actions should be judged based on their results, but the former interprets "actions" as classes of actions while the latter as particular actions. Moreover, (4) conclude the arguments against utilitarianism. It is asserted that utilitarianism cannot accommodate the magnitude of our commitments to others, the presence of moral and political rights, and the requirements of distributive justice. In a time that has been called by some the "time of self-interest," utilitarianism serves as a compelling reminder that morality demands us to look beyond the self for the sake of all.

Speciesism, a term coined by English philosopher Richard Ryder and disseminated by Peter Singer with his book Animal Liberation (1976), expresses the discrimination which is basically caused by being a member of a certain species. However, in his approach Singer primarily defies the bias which claims that mankind has higher moral worth than animals, and as such he asserts that human beings owe moral obligations to animals. Instead of focalising such cognitive differences as faculty of reasoning or discourse between mankind and animals, Singer brings the similarities between these two species to the fore. Thus, enunciating a utilitarian view, he argues that as animals have the ability to feel pain or suffering, they should be given equal consideration. Similarly, in his book Elizabeth Costello, J.M. Coetzee explores the lives of animals and opposes to the discrimination that animals are made live through due to their species. The protagonist of the novel, Elizabeth Costello who is also an author, is against all form of maltreatment and exploitation of animals. In this context, by grounding on Singer’s notion of speciesism, Costello, who is invited to give lectures at Appleton College, subverts the principles of speciesism by voicing against the use of animals as food, test subjects, or as in the form of any goods. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore how Costello undermines the basic notion of speciesism through her lectures in which she attempts to examine different perspectives and approaches on animals from Aristotle and Descartes to modern era.

Photo by Evgeni Tcherkasski on Unsplash ABSTRACT Public health ethics has been contingent on a political landscape leading to several operational hurdles, especially during global health emergencies. Several scholars have pointed out that liberal decision-making has prevented public health institutions from achieving their goals. Thus, the need for a substantive outlook on public health has never been stronger. First, this article highlights the ethical tension and limitations of a presumptive approach to public health that a vaccination policy might produce in a liberal political landscape. Second, influenced by the works of Angus Dawson, this article emphasizes the importance of a substantive approach to public health, especially in a post-COVID era. Last, it looks at how TM Scanlon’s theory of contractualism aids in framing a substantive approach to health policy design and the added advantages of the theory. INTRODUCTION A public health intervention like a vaccination program for COVID-19, let alone a mandatory one, faces difficulties in implementation as it presents a clash between the role of the government and liberty of its citizens.[1] The clash stems from public health operating in a liberal political landscape that accords great regard for individual liberty. The government, in good conscience, is right in feeling morally obligated to act in ways that serve to prevent the pandemic from escalating. To represent the citizens, governments and policymakers prioritize achieving and maintaining herd immunity. The tension of the state versus individual liberty questions the extent to which governments can go to implement a vaccination policy. In trying to balance the considerations of individual liberty and the scope of the state to impose an intervention, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics came up with a design known as the ‘intervention ladder.’[2] The takeaway from the intervention ladder is that the state has the burden of proof in justifying reasons for implementing a particular policy.[3] Such justified trade-offs envisioned from the intervention ladder have guided policymakers in their attempt to design and shape interventions. However, public health ethics and even the intervention ladder view public health through a presumptive or a moderate liberal lens.[4] In a presumptive approach or a moderate-liberal approach to public health, policymakers regard values like liberty or autonomy as more prominent when weighed against values like creation of public goods and their maintenance.[5] A libertarian approach favors liberty and autonomy even more strongly. The substantive view of public health holds that values, such as liberty and autonomy, do not automatically hold precedence over community-oriented values such as public goods creation.[6] Some have critiqued the intervention ladder endorsed by the Nuffield Council of Bioethics. Angus Dawson remarks that the intervention ladder as a metaphor prevents the act of climbing. He claims the ladder assumes that liberty is the only guiding principle in policymaking. Such a view neglects any responsibility the citizens have in achieving public goods and maintaining them.[7] The emphasis on the drawbacks of a presumptive approach, especially in a situation like the COVID-19 pandemic, leads us to question should public health undergo a redefinition? The approach in public health focusing on non-interference stems from traditional clinical bioethics.[8] However, I argue that public health ethics in a pandemic should accord less emphasis to individual liberty and evaluate every ethical value on a level playing field. Individual liberty provides less platform for action in situations where the community has not established herd immunity. Accountability for the harm principle and maintenance of public goods override concerns surrounding liberty.[9] Angus Dawson argues that with more participation in a vaccination program, protection of public goods from disease can be created faster.[10] Characterizing public health as an antagonist to individual liberty undermines the confidence in public health institutions and interventions for which public trust is vital. Although the government may propose a mandatory vaccination policy when voluntary measures fail to meet public health requirements, clear scientific evidence and accountability for public welfare should be the guiding principle. Thus, resetting the parameters gauging a public health intervention is the starting point to prepare for future pandemics. In Resetting the Parameters, Angus Dawson suggests that utilitarianism or contractualism could serve as philosophical frameworks that may aid in framing a substantive approach to public health.[11] Evaluating utilitarianism and contractualism according to the COVID-19 facts would help clarify which is better suited to framing a substantive public health approach. l. Is Utilitarianism Substantive? Under utilitarianism, the morbid circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic urge us to act in ways that translate to maximizing the overall good. Utilitarianism is a philosophical theory that prides itself on maximizing the best of outcomes for the maximum number of people. In an ideal utilitarian framework, a morally right act does good for all. Utilitarians consider utility the single determining variable that should guide actions.[12] The actionable aspect of a utilitarian framework is its ability to quantify thresholds or markers that mostly dwell in the abstract. In Utilitarianism and the Pandemic, Savulescu et al. outline certain determinants as aids in applying utilitarianism.[13] Looking at the aids in the context of a mandatory vaccination policy in light of COVID-19, shows some pitfalls of utilitarianism. The first utilitarian aid is to save the maximum number of lives.[14] Rightly so, an intuitive starting point in a pandemic with striking mortality rates is attempting to save the most lives. However, implementing and justifying a policy with the aim of saving the highest number of lives is complex. While a high number of deaths is a concern, it is reductionist to concentrate only on the end goal and not the means through which such a goal is attained. The second utilitarian aid is the length of life.[15] The length of benefit gained from an outcome is crucial for utilitarians. The duration of a benefit determines the quantity of good produced. As an extension, younger people should then, theoretically, count for more than older individuals in prioritizing benefits. Such prioritization has been a matter of concern during the COVID-19 pandemic. While it is true that younger people might tend to benefit more, the pathology of COVID-19 goes against such logic. Elderly populations have experienced disproportionately more severe cases. Therefore, prioritizing youth when the elderly are suffering more of the harm would be ethically contentious.[16] The third utilitarian aid is the quality-of-life post-intervention.[17] Through measures such as QALYs and DALYs,[18] utilitarians have attempted to quantify each individual's quality after an intervention. This quantification can result in connecting an individual’s quality of life to their social worth. From a utilitarian viewpoint, a person's ability to produce relevance in society becomes a key determinant in shaping public policy. By extension, people born with disabilities such as mental illness or late-stage dementia can be overlooked merely because they lack "social value.”[19] And yet, “taboo trade-offs occur when we are forced to put a finite monetary value on these sacred values [life, health, ability], when we acknowledge that there is a maximum ‘price’ that we want to pay to uphold values that should be of ‘infinite’ value.” [20]. As such, it is unethical to place a value on someone's life based on the duration or quality of life they may have after an intervention. Besides creating difficulty in assessing the quality of life, measures such as QALYs do not address the nuances in providing healthcare. In Economic Evaluation of Mental Health Interventions, Luyten et al. discuss several operational changes that account for these nuances.[21] Utilitarians believe in a moral indifference between actions and omissions as the fourth aid.[22] It does not matter how a result is achieved as long as it benefits the common good. Putting forward a bad policy is the same as not putting forward a policy. In the ever-changing and unpredictable dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic, actions and omissions have different moral implications. Equating them often places an unfair burden on lawmakers, leaving them emotionally and morally exhausted as they weigh the advantages and risks of various outcomes. Actively avoiding social biases, feelings, intuitions, and heuristics is the fifth aid.[23] The pandemic elicits strong feelings and aggressively tests beliefs. During the pandemic, some profoundly troubling ethical dilemmas stemmed from bias. In a utilitarian system, a mandatory vaccination policy aimed at crossing the threshold for herd immunity may overlook groups of people who are vulnerable due to a lack of access to the social determinants of health. Attempting to avoid feelings and intuitions all the time does not always result in the creation of a fair policy. Anti-vaccination activists use emotion to further their cause, hence it is critical that politicians consider the feelings at stake for the general public when enacting a mandatory vaccination policy. While utilitarianism has benefits such as developing simple operationalizable concepts, providing a quantitative check, and a balance sheet of risks and benefits, it is based on an ethical dystopia. Utilitarian policies can treat people as a means to an end by focusing solely on outcomes. Utilitarianism rests on a presumptive outlook toward public health by replacing liberty with utility. It ignores fair and just distribution and allocation of resources. Utilitarianism is not the most ethical approach to pandemic vaccination policy. ll. Is Contractualism Substantive? The libertarian and utilitarian frameworks assume positive and negative connotations to different actions. They hold that certain acts are right and certain acts are wrong. A libertarian might hold that unnecessary infringement of individual liberty is not acceptable, while a utilitarian might be of the opinion that actions that contribute to disutility are unfavorable for the promotion of the greatest happiness principle.[24] Contractualism is a philosophy that values the social contract. A contractualist approach begins its discourse by arguing that actions have inherent neutrality.[25] By saying that, “being valuable is not always a matter of being ‘to be promoted’”[26], Scanlon does not neglect the value of certain actions but urges us to respond to value through other means, as well as to find value in plurality. In What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon finds morality through the ability to reason while attributing inherent neutrality to our actions. A discourse in contractualism does not begin by presuming that values such as liberty or autonomy hold precedence among other ethical values, i.e., it is not presumptive in its approach. Instead, he locates morality in the ability to reason and find justifications for certain actions. Thus, compared to utilitarianism, contractualism allows for a substantive approach by holding all the relevant ethical values in a level playing field. Liberty would gain precedence when justifications for safeguarding it are strong and cannot be reasonably rejected. The same goes for other values, such as promoting public goods. In short, an action is termed wrong when “the principle that allows for it, can be reasonably rejected.”[27] For Scanlon, justifiability to others is the normative determinant of right or wrong.[28] He proceeds to say that the value of justifiability is the underlying premise of our duties. Additionally, Verweij argues that treating people rationally occurs by treating them in “ways they cannot reasonably reject.”[29] By disregarding any a priori assumptions about the importance of different values, people can find and construct values that cannot be reasonably rejected as they would be justified. Scanlon believes that this can be attained if we reflect on what we owe to each other. lll. The Inherent Moral Neutrality Allows for a Substantive Approach A contractualist approach has implications for framing a substantive approach to public health. These values have been adapted from Scanlon and Verweij, and the elaboration has been framed in the context of COVID-19. The inherent neutrality of principles that contractualism holds becomes crucial while devising a public health intervention. The COVID-19 pandemic presents a situation where otherwise acceptable ethical principles require scrutiny. A blank state where there are no a priori principles that suggest which acts are morally justified and which are not helps us navigate the operational principles involved in a vaccination policy. Thus, values such as liberty, utility, and autonomy are viewed on the same level as the creation of public goods, fairness in contribution, and avoiding collective harm. a. Arriving at Principles Starting with the inherent neutrality, the state, policymakers, and the public can identify ethical principles that would form a part of the vaccination policy smorgasbord. In a public health framework where negotiation is a crucial aspect in its implementation, it is important that all the stakeholders aim to find principles that are acceptable for everyone. This would culminate with principles of action that would produce the least number of complaints by all the parties involved. If an individual has very strong reservations against a principle, these cannot be outweighed by weaker reservations held by others.[30] b. Reasonable Rejection as a Marker of Deliberation A mandatory vaccination policy in a contractualist framework would then have to incorporate reasonable rejection. A framework based on reasonable rejection includes a variety of moral considerations that shape well-being and provide a basis for fairness, choice, and responsibility. Scanlon makes an important remark in the thesis of What We Owe to Each Other: the acceptability of a principle depends on a one-by-one assessment of the strength of individuals' reasons for rejecting the principles compared to any existing alternatives. In other words, for Scanlon, what is foundational for contractualism is not minimizing what is undesirable but constructing principles no one can reasonably reject. In the context of COVID-19, a person should be able to justify the level of precaution he takes to anyone who would bear the risk of exposure. Each individual would then have strong reasons for contributing to herd immunity with regard to their duty to protect the vulnerable. The justification to forego vaccination would need to be strong.[31] The difference in a contractualist approach is that it provides a platform for valid concerns from the public. This allows more room for dialogue and for individual liberty, which seems to form a significant part of the critique. A plan of action that allows for individual concerns such as safety, efficacy, and strong medical reasons to forego vaccination encourages inclusivity in policymaking. Another public concern is that public health institutions have alienated themselves from society in general.[32]A dialogue between the stakeholders would remedy such a notion and help redefine public health according to how Dawson and Verweij view “public”– as a social entity/target as well as a mode of intervention (requiring collective action).[33] Contractualism, like the rest of the ethical frameworks, has its own set of critiques. In Obligatory Precautions Against Infection, Marcel Verweij argues that a contractualist theory inadvertently ends up asking for excessive precautions. The first claim that contractualism asks for excessive precautions arises from the fact that a contractualist approach does not consider the consequences of individual actions.[34] He believes that since consequences are not weighted, one individual’s wish to forego precautionary measures does not justify another’s non-compliance towards precaution, culminating in the other having to take excessive precautions. He also criticizes the contractualist deliberation for its failure to focus on the consequences of individual acts but on creating universalizable principles.[35] While this may seem true, such a conclusion rests on the fact that the consequences of individual acts are not weighted. However, an excerpt from Verweij’s paper offers evidence that contractualism does weigh individual acts: Suppose that we both aim to find moral principles that regulate our interaction and that can be accepted by both of us. If you then propose a principle that imposes many risks on me but none for you, then it would be reasonable if I were to reject it (especially if there are alternative principles that would yield much lower risks).[36] Both a consequentialist approach and a contractualist approach share the language of risks and burdens. For the utilitarian, risks and burdens are consequences of an action, whereas, for the contractualist, they are consequences of accepting or rejecting a principle. In the excerpt above, when an individual assesses the risks imposed, a consequentialist way of thinking is incorporated in contractualism and consequences to individuals do matter and are weighed. Verweij’s contention that a contractualist approach does not focus on individual consequences is not supported, and, as a logical extension, the argument of excessive precautions begins to fade. Being vaccinated would absolve us of having to take excessive precautions. Upon crossing the threshold of herd immunity, excessive precautions such as masks, social distancing, rigorous testing pre- as well as post-travel, and obsessively checking our phones for exposure can be done away with. The COVID-19 pandemic has immersed us in routines of excessive precautionary measures that it has become normalized for most of us. Thus, being vaccinated and covering society with a blanket of herd immunity removes the need for excessive precautions. lV. Bridging What “Is” and What “Ought” To Be Although contractualism presents a perspective that best suits a substantive approach to public health, it appears desirable only in theory. There exists a distinct reality outside of academia – politics, societal engagement, and governance reflect a different picture. This can be thought of as the gap between the is and the ought. We could envision and claim that a mandatory vaccination policy ought to be implemented in a certain manner, however, it might not be. In her paper, Realizing Bioethics’ Goals in Practice: Ten Ways “Is” Can Help “Ought,” Mildred Z. Solomon provides several reasons for this disconnect.[37] The general theme is the importance of empirical research – the need to find a balance between normative assumptions and empirical evidence – and how policymakers can, in turn, use such evidence to fine-tune the policy design process. Contractualism can prove especially useful to bridge the divide between is and ought. Theories of libertarian philosophy and utilitarianism rest on a design based on a normative approach that values liberty and utility and should guide the policymaking process. However, contractualism separates itself from these theories since constructing principles justifiable for all, and the idea of reasonable rejection must rely on empirical evidence. Engagement between various stakeholders and recognizing the plurality in values helps bridge the disconnect between the is and the ought. This is more important in the context of a mandatory vaccination policy since its requirement arises only if voluntary vaccination policies fail. Knowing why vaccination rates are low and how better to reach herd immunity will be important empirical evidence that can fine-tune the policy. In Re-enchanting Democracy as a Mode of Governance, Patsy Healey acknowledges that a struggle for political change often focuses on installing new policy designs.[38] Healey provides a list of qualities to keep in mind when designing a more people-centered policy initiative. The first quality is recognizing a shared, diverse, and conflictual political community where distributive justice is vital. The second is to foster is respect for different arguments, positions, and feelings— considering groups with conflicting values as adversaries but not enemies. The third quality is that of an ‘intelligent’ and multi-sided discussion of issues and reasoning ‘in public.’ The fourth is the fostering of respect for the role of the government while simultaneously recognizing the complexities of interactions. The fifth, and a key value in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, is fostering respect for people who perform public services. Liberalism and utilitarianism create combative ethical discourse around those qualities, while contractualism could elevate shared public values. While liberal democracies arguably have the makings of those qualities, public engagement must be fostered at an intellectual level to promote cohesion. Another important aspect to consider is the question of what a framework should aim to answer. In Building an Ethical Framework for COVID-19 Resource Allocation: The How and Why, Angus Dawson addresses the goal of a framework, especially at the time of a pandemic.[39] He stresses the importance of context in constructing a framework and urges to engage with a diverse group of people. Value-laden normative approaches such as the libertarian and utilitarian frameworks provide less opportunity for different stakeholder claims. Dawson then argues that explicit discussions provide more clarity and help policy makers better understand the role of context in shaping a framework. Dawson asserts that a frame chosen sympathetically can help the public better appreciate the moral content involved in deliberation, whereas aiming for goals such as liberty and utility is a distraction from the workings of reality. In evaluating stakeholders, those with lower incomes often are unable to work remotely. They face a greater risk of COVID-19 due to workplace exposure as well as commutes and living conditions.[40] Although a mandatory vaccination policy has the clearly defined goal of achieving herd immunity, ensuring distributive and procedural justice should not be viewed as being mutually exclusive. CONCLUSION Societal change relies on justifiable goals, policies, and a multitude of viewpoints. As such, a contractualist approach best accommodates a multitude of views of what we owe each other. Moving forward, if pandemic-type circumstances do disseminate within the constructs of our society, public policy should further consider contractualist approaches as a healthy, inclusive means. - [1] Luyten, Jeroen. "Mutual Moral Obligations in the Prevention of Infectious Diseases." In Justice, Luck & Responsibility in Health Care, pp. 85-100. Springer, Dordrecht, 2013. [2] Council, Nuffield Bioethics. "Public Health: Ethical Issues." Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2007) [3] Dawson, Angus J. "Snakes and Ladders: State Interventions and the Place of Liberty in Public Health Policy." Journal of Medical Ethics 42, no. 8 (2016): 510-513. [4] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [5] Dawson, Angus. "Resetting the Parameters." Public Health Ethics (2011): 1-19. [6] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [7] Dawson, Angus J. "Snakes and Ladders: State Interventions and the Place of Liberty in Public Health Policy." Journal Of Medical Ethics 42, no. 8 (2016): 510-513. [8] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [9] Savulescu, Julian. "Good Reasons to Vaccinate: Mandatory or Payment for Risk?." Journal of Medical Ethics 47, no. 2 (2021): 78-85. [10] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [11] Dawson, Angus. "Resetting the Parameters." Public Health Ethics (2011): 1-19. [12] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [13] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [14] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [15] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [16] Luyten, Jeroen, and Yvonne Denier. "Explicit Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds in Health Care: A Kaleidoscope." Social Justice Research 32, no. 2 (2019): 155-171. [17] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [18] Luyten, Jeroen, Huseyin Naci, and Martin Knapp. "Economic Evaluation of Mental Health Interventions: An Introduction to Cost-Utility Analysis." Evidence-Based Mental Health 19, no. 2 (2016): 49-53. [19] Luyten, Jeroen, and Yvonne Denier. "Explicit Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds in Health Care: A Kaleidoscope." Social Justice Research 32, no. 2 (2019): 155-171. [20] (Luyten and Denier, 2019, p.10) [21] Luyten, Jeroen, Huseyin Naci, and Martin Knapp. "Economic Evaluation of Mental Health Interventions: An Introduction to Cost-Utility Analysis." Evidence-Based Mental Health 19, no. 2 (2016): 49-53. [22] Savulescu, Julian, Ingmar Persson, and Dominic Wilkinson. "Utilitarianism and the Pandemic." Bioethics 34, no. 6 (2020): 620-632. [23] Savulescu, et al. [24] Mill, John Stuart. "Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher." (2001). [25] Scanlon, Thomas M. "Précis of" What We Owe to Each Other"." (2003): 159-161. [26] Scanlon 2003 p.159) [27] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory precautions against infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [28] Scanlon, Thomas M. "Précis of" What We Owe to Each Other"." (2003): 159-161. [29] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory precautions against infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [30] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory precautions against infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [31] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory precautions against infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [32] Financial Times, 2021, “Covid is the Enemy, Not the Government” Sunil Jain April 26 Accessed 14 May 2021 https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/covid-is-the-enemy-not-the-government/2240340/ [33] Dawson, Angus, ed. Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [34] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory Precautions Against Infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [35] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory Precautions Against Infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [36] Verweij, Marcel. "Obligatory Precautions Against Infection." Bioethics 19, no. 4 (2005): 323-335. [37] Solomon, Mildred Z. "Realizing Bioethics' Goals in Practice: Ten Ways “Is” Can Help “Ought”." Hastings Center Report 35, no. 4 (2005): 40-47. [38] Healey, Patsy. "Re-enchanting Democracy as a Mode of Governance." In Connections, pp. 61-78. Routledge, 2017. [39] Dawson, Angus. "Building an Ethics Framework for COVID-19 Resource Allocation: The How and the Why." Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (2020): 757-760. [40] Schmidt, Harald, Lawrence O. Gostin, and Michelle A. Williams. "Is it Lawful and Ethical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?." Jama 324, no. 20 (2020): 2023-2024.

Introduction The term monster might have its roots in the Latin word monere (to warn), but it has since evolved to have various symbolic meanings, from a terrifying mythical creature to a person of extreme cruelty. No matter the flexibility in use, the term is mostly meant to be derogatory (Asma). As Gilmore puts it, monsters “embody all that is dangerous and horrible in the human imagination” (1). However, it may be argued that monsters sometimes perform the much-needed work of defining and policing our norms (Mittman and Hensel). Since their archetype is predisposed to transgressing boundaries of human integrity (Gilmore), they help establish deviation between human and in-human. Their cognition and action are considered ‘other’ (Kearney) and a means with which people can understand what is right and wrong, and what is divergent from appropriate ways of being. The term monster need not even refer to the werewolves, ogres, vampires, zombies and the like that strike fear in audiences through their ‘immoral, heinous or unjust’ appearance or behaviours. Rather, the term monster can be, and has been, readily applied as a metaphor to describe the unthinkable, unethical, and brutal actions of human beings (Beville 5). Inadvertently, “through their bodies, words, and deeds, monsters show us ourselves” (Mittman and Hensel 2), or what we consider monstrous about ourselves. Therefore, humans acting in ways that deviate from societal norms and standards can be viewed as monstrous. This is evident in the representations of public relations practitioners in media offerings. In the practice of public relations, ethical standards are advocated as the norm, and deviating from them considered unprofessional (Fawkes), and as we contend: monstrous. However, the practice has long suffered a negative stereotypical perception of being deceptive, and with public relations roles receiving less screen time than shows and films about lawyers, accountants, teachers and the like, these few derogatory depictions can distort how audiences view the occupation (Johnston). Depictions of professions (lawyers, cops, journalists, etc.) tend to be cliché, but our contention is that fewer depictions of public relations practitioners on screen further limit the possibility for diverse depictions. The media can have a socialising impact and can influence audiences to view the content they consume as a reflection of the real world around them (Chandler). Television, in particular, with its capacity to prompt heuristic processing in audiences (Shurm), has messages that can be easily decoded by people of various literacies as they become immersed in the viewing experiences (Gerbner and Gross). These messages gain potency because, despite being set in fictional worlds, they can be understood as reflective of the world and audiences’ experiences of it (Gerbner and Gross). Tsetsura, Bentley, and Newcomb add that popular stories recounted in the media have authoritative power and can offer patterns of meaning that shape individual perceptions. Admittedly, as Stuart Hall suggests, media offerings can be encoded with ideologies and representations that are considered appropriate according to the dominant elite, but these may not necessarily be decoded as preferred meanings. In other words, those exposed to stories of monstrous public relations practitioners can agree with such a position, oppose this viewpoint, or remain neutral, but this is dependent on individual experiences. Without other frames of reference, it could be that viewers of negative portrayals of public relations accept the encoded representation that inevitably does a disservice to the profession. When the representations of the field of public relations suggest, inaccurately, that the industry is dominated by men (Johnston), and women practitioners are shown as slick dressers who control and care little about ethics (Dennison), the distortions can adversely impact on the identities of public relations practitioners and on how they are collectively viewed (Tsetsura et al.). Public relations practitioners view this portrayal as the ‘other’ and tend to distance the ideal self from it, continuing to be stuck in the dichotomy of saints and sinners (Fawkes). Our observation of television offerings such as Scandal, Flack, Call My Agent!, Absolutely Fabulous, Sex and the City, You’re the Worst, and Emily in Paris reveals how television programmes continue to perpetuate the negative stereotypes about public relations practice, where practitioners are anything but ethical—therefore monstrous. The characters, mostly well-groomed women, are shown as debased, liars and cheaters who will subvert ethical standards for personal and professional gain. Portrayals of Public Relations Practitioners in Television and Media According to Miller, the eight archetypical traits identified in media representations of public relations practitioners are: ditzy, obsequious, cynical, manipulative, money-minded, isolated, accomplished, or unfulfilled. In later research, Yoon and Black found that television representations of public relations tended to suggest that people in these roles were heartless, manipulative bullies, while Lambert and White contend that the depiction of the profession has improved to be more positive, but nonetheless continues to do a disservice to the practice by presenting female workers, especially, as “shallow but loveable” (18). We too find that public relations practitioners continue to be portrayed as morally ambiguous characters who are willing to break ethical codes of conduct to suit the needs of their clients. We discuss three themes prevalent as popular tropes in television programmes that characterise public relations practitioners as monstrous. To Be or Not to Be a Slick and Skilful Liar? Most television programmes present public relations practitioners as slick and skilful liars, who are shown as well-groomed and authoritative, convinced that they are lying only to protect their clients. In fact, in most cases the characters are shown to not only believe but also advocate to their juniors that ‘a little bit of lying’ is almost necessary to maintain client relationships and ensure campaign success. For example, in the British drama Flack, the main character of Robyn (played by Anna Paquin) is heard advising her prodigy “just assume we are lying to everyone”. The programmes also feature characters who are in dilemma about the monstrous expectations from their roles, struggling to accept that that they engage in deception as part of their jobs. However, most of them are presented as somewhat of an ugly duckling or the modest character in the programme, who is not always rational or in an explicit position of power. For example, Emily from Emily in Paris (played by Lily Collins), while working as a social media manager, regularly questions the approaches taken by the firm she works for. Her boss Sylvie Grateux (played by Philippine Leroy-Beaulieu), who embodies the status quo, is constantly disapproving of Emily’s lack of sophisticated self-presentation, among other aspects. In the episode ‘Faux Amis’, Sylvie quips “it’s not you personally. It’s everything you stand for. You’re the enemy of luxury because luxury is defined by sophistication and taste, not emilyinparis”. Similarly, in the first episode of Call My Agent!, Samuel Kerr (played by Alain Rimoux), the head of a film publicity firm, solves the conundrum faced by his anxious junior Gabriel (played by Grégory Montel) by suggesting that he lie to his client about the real reason why she lost the film. When a modestly dressed Gabriel questions how he can lie to someone he cares for, Samuel, towering over him in an impeccable suit and a confident demeanour, advises “who said anything about lying? Don’t lie. Simply don’t tell her the truth”. However, the subtext here is that the lie is to protect the client from unnecessary hurt and in doing so nurtures the client relationship. So, it lets the audience decide the morality of lying here. It may be argued that moral ambiguity may not necessarily be monstrous. Such grey characters are often crafted because they allow audiences to relate more readily to themselves by encouraging what Hawkins refers to as mental play. Audiences are less interested in the black and white of morality and veer towards shows such as Call My Agent! where storylines hone in on the need to do bad for the greater good. In these ways, public relations practitioners still transgress moral standards but are less likely to be considered monstrous because the impact and effect on others is utilitarian in nature. It is also interesting to note that in these programmes physical appearance is made to play a crucial role in showcasing the power and prestige of the senior public relations practitioner. This focus on attire can tend to further perpetuate unfavourable stereotypes about public relations practitioners being high income earners (Grandien) who are styled with branded apparel but lacking in substance and morals (Fröhlich and Peters). Promiscuous Women The urge to attract audiences to a female character can also lead to developing and cementing unfavourable stereotypes of public relations practitioners as uninhibited women who live on blurred lines between personal and professional. These characters are not portrayed as inherently bad, but instead are found to indulge in lives of excess. In her definition of the monstrous, Arumugam suggests that excess and insatiable appetites direct the monster’s behaviour, and Kearney outlines that this uncontainable excess is what signals the difference between humans and others. Such excess is readily identifiable in the character of Patsy Stone (played by Joanna Lumley) in Absolutely Fabulous. She is an alcoholic, regularly uses recreational drugs, is highly promiscuous, and chain-smokes throughout the series. She is depicted as prone to acting deceptively to maintain her vices. In Flack, Robyn is shown as regularly snorting cocaine and having sex with her clients. Those reviewing the show highlight how it will attract those interested in “its dark, acidic sense of humour” (Greene) while others condemn it because it emphasises the “depraved publicist” trope (Knibbs) and call it “one of the worst TV shows ever made” even though it is trying to highlight concerns raised in the MeToo movement about how men need to respect women (McGurk). Female characters such as Robyn, with her willingness to question why a client has not tried to sleep with her, appear to undermine the empowerment of the movement rather than support it, and continue to maintain the archetypes that those working in the field of public relations abhor. Similarly, Samantha Jones (played by Kim Cattrell) of Sex and the City is portrayed as sexually liberated, and in one episode another character describes Samantha’s vagina as “the hottest spot in town: it’s always open”. In many ways Samantha’s sexual behaviour reflects a post-feminist narrative of empowerment, agency, and choice, but it could also be read as a product of being a public relations practitioner frequenting parties and bars as she rubs shoulders with clients, celebrities, and high-profile businesspeople. To this end, Patsy, Samantha, and Robyn glamourise public relations and paint it as simply an extension of their liberated and promiscuous selves, with little care for any expectation of professionalism or work ethic. This is also in stark contrast to the reality, where women often tend to occupy technical roles that see much of their time spent in doing the hard yards of publicity and promotion (Krugler). Making Others Err Public relations practitioners are not just shown as being morally ambiguous themselves, but often quite adept at making others do deceitful acts on their behalf, thus nonchalantly oppressing others to get their way. For example, although lauded for elevating an African-American woman to the lead role despite the show maintaining misrepresentations of race (Lambert), the main character of Olivia Pope (played by Kerry Washington) in the television programme Scandal regularly subverts the law for her clients despite considering herself one of the “good guys” and wearing a “white hat”. Over the course of seven seasons, Olivia Pope is found to rig elections, plant listening devices in political figures’ offices, bribe, threaten, and conduct an affair with the President. In some cases, she calls on the services of her colleague Huck to literally, and figuratively, get rid of the barriers in the way of protecting her clients. For example, in season one’s episode Crash and Burn she asks Huck to torture a suspect for information about a dead client. Her willingness to request such actions of her friend and colleague, regardless of perceived good motivations, reinforces Mittman’s categorisation that monsters are identified by their effect and impact on others. Here, the impact includes the torturing of a suspect and the revisiting of psychological trauma by Huck’s character. Huck struggles to overcome his past as a killer and spends much of the show trying to curb his monstrous tendencies which are often brought on by PR woman Olivia’s requests. Although she is sometimes striving for justice, Olivia’s desire for results can lead her to act monstrously, which inadvertently contributes to the racist and sexist ideologies that have long been associated with monsters and perceptions of the Other. Across time and space, certain ethnic groups, such as those of African descent, have been associated with the demonic (Cohen). Similarly, all that is feminine often needs to be discarded as the monster to conform to the patriarchal order of society (Creed). Therefore, Olivia Pope’s monstrous behaviour not only does a disservice to representations of public relations practitioners, but also inadvertently perpetuates negative and inaccurate stereotypes about women of African American descent. Striving to be Ethical The majority of public relations practitioners are encouraged, and in some cases expected, to conform to ethical guidelines to practice and gain respect, admiration, and in-group status. In New Zealand, those who opt to become members of the Public Relations Institute of New Zealand (PRINZ) are required to abide by the association’s code of ethics. The code stipulates that members are bound to act in ways that serve public interests by ensuring they are honest, disclose conflict of interests, follow the law, act with professionalism, ensure openness and privacy are maintained, and uphold values of loyalty, fairness, and independence (PRINZ). Similarly, the Global Alliance of Public Relations and Communication Management that binds practitioners together identifies nine guiding principles that are to be adhered to to be recognised as acting ethically. These include obeying laws, working in the public’s interest, ensuring freedom of speech and assembly, acting with integrity, and upholding privacy in sensitive matters (to name a few). These governing principles are designed to maintain ethical practice in the field. Of course, the trouble is that not all who claim to practice public relations become members of the local or global governing bodies. This implies that professional associations like PRINZ are not able to enforce ethics across the board. In New Zealand alone, public relations consultants have had to offer financial reparations for acting in defamatory ways online (Fisher), or have been alleged to have bribed an assault victim to prevent the person giving evidence in a court case (Hurley). Some academics have accused the industry of being engaged in organised lying (Peacock), but these are not common, nor are these moral transgressors accepted into ethical bodies that afford practitioners authenticity and legitimacy. In most cases, public relations practitioners view their role as acting as the moral conscience of the organisations they support (Schauster, Neill, Ferrucci, and Tandoc). Furthermore, they rated better than the average adult when it came to solving ethical dilemmas through moral reasoning (Schuaster et al.). Additionally, training of practitioners through guidance of mentors has continued to contribute to the improved ethical ratings of public relations. What these findings suggest is that the monsters of public relations portrayed on our television screens are exaggerations that are not reflective of most of the practice. Women of Substance, But Not Necessarily Power Exploring the role of women in public relations, Topic, Cunha, Reigstad, Jele-Sanchez, and Moreno found that female practitioners were subordinated to their male counterparts but were found to be more inclined to practice two-way communication, offer balanced perspectives, opt to negotiate, and build relationships through cooperation. The competitiveness, independence, and status identified in popular media portrayals were found to be exhibited more by male practitioners, despite there being more women in the public relations industry than men. As Fitch argues, popular culture continues to suggest that men dominate public relations, and their preferred characteristics end up being those elements that permeate the media messages, regardless of instances where the lead character is a woman or the fact that feminist values of “loyalty, ethics, morality, [and] fairness” are advocated by female practitioners in real life (Vardeman-Winter and Place 333). Additionally, even though public relations is a feminised field, female practitioners struggle to break the glass ceiling, with male practitioners dominating executive positions and out-earning women (Pompper). Interestingly, in public relations, power is not just limited due to gender but also area of practice. In her ethnographic study of the New Zealand practice, Sissons found that practitioners who worked in consultancies were relatively powerless vis-à-vis their clients, and often this asymmetry negatively affected the practitioner’s decision-making. This implies that in stark contrast to the immoral, glamourous, and authoritative depiction of public relations women in television programmes, in reality they are mired by the struggles of a gendered occupation. Accordingly, they are not in fact in a position to have monstrous power over and impact on others. Therefore, one of the only elements the shows seem to capture and emphasise is that public relations is an occupation that specialises in image management; but what these shows contribute to is an ideology that women are expected to look and carry themselves in particular ways, ultimately constructing aesthetic standards that can diminish women’s power and self-esteem. Conclusion Miller’s archetypes may be over twenty years old, but the trend towards obsequious, manipulative, and cynical television characters remains. Although there have been identifiable shifts to loveable, yet shallow, public relations practitioners, such as Alexis Rose on Schitt’s Creek, the appeal of monstrous public relations practitioners remains. As Cohen puts it, monsters reveal to audiences “what a member of that society can become when those same dictates are rejected, when the authority of leaders or customs disintegrates and the subordination of individual to hierarchy is lost” (68). In other words, audiences enjoy watching the stories of metaphorical monsters because they exhibit the behaviours that are expected to be repressed in human beings; they depict what happens when the social norms of society are disturbed (Levina and Bui). At the very least, these media representations can act, much as monster narratives do, as a cautionary tale on how not to think and act to remain accepted as part of the in-group rather than being perceived as the Other. As Mittman and Hensel argue, society can learn much from monsters because monsters exist within human beings. According to Cohen, they offer meaning about the world and can teach audiences so they can learn, in this case, how to be better. Although the representations of public relations in television can offer insights into roles that are usually most effective when they are invisible (Chorazy and Harrington), the continued negative stereotypes of public relations practitioners can adversely impact on the industry if people are unaware of the practices of the occupation, because lacking a reference point limits audiences’ opportunities to critically evaluate the media representations. This will certainly harm the occupation by perpetuating existing negative stereotypes of charming and immoral practitioners, and perhaps add to its struggles with gendered identity and professional legitimacy. References Absolutely Fabulous. Created by Jennifer Saunders and Dawn French. 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Dennison, Mikela. An Analysis of Public Relations Discourse and Its Representations in Popular Culture. Masters Thesis. Auckland: Auckland University of Technology, 2012. Emily in Paris. Created by Darren Starr. Darren Starr Productions, 2020-present. Fawkes, Johanna. “A Jungian Conscience: Self-Awareness for Public Relations Practice.” Public Relations Review 41.5 (2015): 726-33. Fisher, David. “’Hit’ Jobs Case: PR Consultant Apologises and Promises Cash to Settle Defamation Case That Came from Dirty Politics”. New Zealand Herald, 3 Mar. 2021. 7 July 2021 <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/hit-jobs-case-pr-consultant-apologises-and-promises-cash-to-settle-defamation-case-that-came-from-dirty-politics/C4KN5H42UUOCSXD7OFXGZ6YCEA/>. Fiske, John. Television Culture. Routledge, 2010. Fitch, Kate. “Promoting the Vampire Rights Amendment: Public Relations, Postfeminism and True Blood”. Public Relations Review 41.5 (2015): 607-14. Flack. Created by Oliver Lansley. 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Lambert, Cheryl Ann. “Post-Racial Public Relations on Primetime Television: How Scandal Represents Olivia Pope.” Public Relations Review 43.4 (2017): 750-54. Lambert, Cheryl Ann, and Candace White. “Feminization of the film? Occupational Roles of Public Relations Characters in Movies.” Public Relations Journal 6.4 (2012): 1-24. Levina, Marina, and Diem-My Bui. “Introduction”. In Monster Culture in the 21st Century. Eds. Marina Levina and Diem-My Bui. Bloomsbury, 2013. 1-13. McGurk, Stuart. “PR Drama Flack Might Be One of the Worst TV Shows Ever Made.” GQ Magazine 19 Feb. 2019. 7 July 2021 <https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/flack-tv-show-review>. Miller, Karen S. “Public Relations in Film and Fiction: 1930 to 1995.” Journal of Public Relations Research 11.1 (1999): 3-28. Mittman, Asa Simon. “Introduction: The Impact of Monsters and Monster Studies.” The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous. Eds. Asa Simon Mittman and Peter Dendle. London: Ashgate, 2012. 1-14. 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Photo by Towfiqu barbhuiya on Unsplash INTRODUCTION Bioethics does not have an explicitly stated and agreed upon means of resolving conflicts between normative theories. As such, bioethics lacks an essential feature – action guidance ― an effective translation from theory to practice. While the normative approaches and historical precedents of bioethics may discourage overtly egregious acts, the bioethical discipline does not offer decisive guidance in situations with multiple competing normative approaches. For example, Utilitarians and Kantians offer diametrically opposed guidance in emblematic cases like the trolley problem in which saving a greater number of people conflicts with the imperative to treat persons as ends-in-themselves rather than a means to an end. The predominant framework in bioethics, principlism, also suffers from a lack of action guidance.[1] The consequences of a ‘toothless’ bioethics impeded by misaligned principles and conflicting normative theories are disastrous – not only in death count but also in moral injury and societal fracture. This paper argues that while there is no ‘one theory to rule them all,’ a virtue-based approach to bioethics can ameliorate the adjudication problem. Bioethics ought to embody moral strength but has often provided indecisive guidance due to its awkward theoretical architecture. In defence of bioethics, many actors control societal level decision making. Thus, the onus does not rest entirely on bioethicists but also leaders in government and healthcare. This paper critiques principlism as internally incongruous, as it is composed of elements from multiple ethical theories. Understanding this, it is seen that the entirety of theoretical bioethics, as composed of conflicting normative approaches, also suffers from this action-guidance problem.[2] l. The Birth of Bioethics Amid Tragedy Bioethics was born out of tragedy. During the Nuremberg Trials of 1946-47, a cohort of French, American, British, and Soviet judges forced the Nazi doctors and architects of the Holocaust to stand trial for their egregious actions and feel the firm hand of justice. In an example of ex post facto law, the global community identified unethical action and indicted Germans for breaking natural law.[3] As a result, the Nuremberg Code arose to prevent crimes against human research subjects. It outlines the parameters of ethical research and is a foundational document of modern bioethics.[4] Early bioethics pronounced immorality and offered decisive guidance, laying the groundwork for an internationally unified theory of negative morality – that which is never permissible. Tuskegee was another foundational tragedy in the history of bioethical discipline. In 1932, the US Public Health Service recruited six hundred African American men from Macon County, Alabama for a study on the effects of untreated syphilis.[5] The researchers failed to obtain informed consent and intentionally withheld information regarding the disease or the nature of the study. The researchers did not offer any men the cure, penicillin, which was discovered midway through the experiment. Many men died during the study. The perpetrators evaded justice until 1972. Tuskegee sparked a new paradigm of bioethics, including the US federal policies, the establishment of ethics review boards, and informed consent as a core tenet of biomedical practice.[6] The National Research Act of 1974 and the Belmont Report of 1978 laid new ground for research ethics and set the tone for the contemporary practice of bioethics. ll. The Rise of Principlism These two cases demonstrate the nature of the early days of bioethics. It largely lacked high-level theory and appealed more to generally agreed upon moral facts and common-sense morality. However, as medicine advanced, increasingly complex biomedical issues created problems that required greater appeals to theory.[7] The “heroic” phase of bioethics saw “theorists aspire to construct symmetrical cathedrals of normative thought.”[8] In the wake of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress helped draft the Belmont Report, a bulwark intended to prevent future atrocities in human research trials. The document aimed to curtail the utilitarianism implicit in medical research and add essential considerations of the subjects themselves, including respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.[9] It also served as the bedrock of the theoretical architecture of principlism. In 1979, Beauchamp and Childress’ published Principles of Biomedical Ethics, which is arguably the most influential text in bioethics scholarship. It attempts to incorporate some main theoretical approaches to ethics in a unified moral theory: autonomy reflects the work of Kant; beneficence aligns with utilitarianism; non-maleficence is reminiscent of Hippocrates; and justice borrows heavily from Rawls.[10] These four principles have become canonical in academic bioethics. However, doubts remain as to their effectiveness in guiding action toward ethical aims given how scholars contend that “ethical expertise cannot be codified in principles.”[11] lll. A Critique of Principlism Clouser & Gert say: At best, ‘principles’ operate primarily as checklists naming issues worth remembering when considering a biomedical moral issue. At worst ‘principles’ obscure and confuse moral reasoning by their failure to be guidelines and by their eclectic and unsystematic use of moral theory.[12] To this point, principlism is no more than a flashlight – a tool to illuminate the ethical landscape. Viewing cases through the lens of moral principles can reveal the salient moral features, but it ultimately provides no guidance for adjudication, hereby referred to as the adjudication problem. Consequently, the doctor’s moral intuition has de facto weight, and the principles are merely a post hoc justification for any given action they choose. Using the four principles to decide the right course of moral action is “tantamount to using two, three, or four conflicting moral theories to decide a case.”[13] Principlism attempts to reap the benefit of multiple ethical theories, each with unambiguous goals. When blended, the result is discordant directives. These conflicting principles “provide no systematic guidance” for real world dilemmas.[14] Other ethical theories have faults too. Kantians leave no room for exceptions for exigency, and utilitarianism ‘crosses the line’ far too often. At least these theories decisively guide action and provide unambiguous justification for doing so. Utilitarianism is quite measurable: “Provide the greatest good for the greatest number” – sure! Done. Kant’s ethical imperative has a clear rule: “Never treat humans as a mere means to an end” – certainly, will do. Principlism merely provides “a check list of considerations” that doctors can cross off one by one before going about their originally intended course of action.[15] Worse, the internally disharmonious nature of principlism allows doctors to justify ethically dubious decisions. An important goal of bioethics is avoiding the following scenario: a doctor faces with a moral dilemma. He can choose Option A or Option B. Let’s say B is morally preferrable on a consensus view. However, his moral intuition guides him toward Option A. Having completed his required course on biomedical ethics in medical school, he recalls a few theories which are relevant to his case. He considers the four principles but autonomy conflicts with beneficence, which does not yield a straightforward, practical directive, so he disregards principlism for the case at hand. Kantian ethics disagrees with his intuition, but utilitarianism may support it. He goes ahead with Option A, claiming utilitarianism supported his actions. He, therefore, provides post hoc justification for Option A, using whichever theory agrees with his judgment. Reliance on intuition when the principles conflict is an intractable problem “unless one is willing to grant privileged epistemological status to the moral judgments (calling them "intuitions") or to the moral principles (calling them "self-evident" or otherwise a priori”).[16] Neither deserves a privileged epistemological status. Moral intuitions can possess prejudice or ignorance, and moral principles can demonstrably conflict, offering no guidance. Realistically, most people “pay little attention to theories when they make moral decisions,” and when they do, post hoc rationalization often follows. When discipline is used as an afterthought, it provides justifications for potentially unethical actions. lV. Virtue Ethics: A Provisional Solution Virtue ethics may provide a workaround. It emphasizes the disposition and character of the moral agent instead of abstract theories, making it a practical choice. As Jacobson writes, “ethical dictates cannot be codified in general rules applicable to particular situations by someone who lacks virtue.”[17] Ethical theories can still highlight moral lapses and dilemmas, but since they do not decisively guide action, bioethics must focus on moral agents’ decision-making abilities. Aristotelian virtue as a provisional solution to the adjudication problem also accounts for the “multiple and heterogeneous” particularities which other theories often neglect.[18] Aristotle said that "phronesis [practical wisdom] deals with the ultimate particular and this is done by perception (aisthesis) rather than science (episteme).”[19] Scientific knowledge in the case of bioethics may appropriately refer to medical facts. Perception refers to the moral intuition of an individual agent as applied to a given scenario. Jonsen goes further, however, interpreting this perception as “the appreciative sight of a constellation of ideas, arguments, and facts about the case, seen as a whole.”[20] Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is the cardinal virtue of Aristotelian virtue ethics. It enables the agent to consider the relevant facts and act in the most prudent, courageous, or tempered manner. This paper proposes that in the face of intractable theoretical disagreements, the only way forward for bioethics is to educate bioethics practitioners and students in this tradition. V. Counterargument So far, this paper has argued that bioethics is relatively toothless and needs to give clear guidance due to theoretical disagreements and the intractable differences between normative approaches. And yet, some may object to the notion that bioethics ought to have these proverbial teeth. In this view, bioethics merely acts as a sounding board for those in executive roles (doctors, lawyers, politicians) to better understand the moral landscape of the problem. To them, bioethics’ failure to decisively guide action is acceptable because it should not. If this is the case, then bioethics need not speak with one voice and should cherish the long-standing, obstinate disagreements between different theoretical camps. But this paper contends the opposite. If bioethics continues to offer conflicting imperatives and fails to demonstrably guide individuals, hospitals, and society toward clear ethical aims and outcomes, it has failed as a discipline. One might argue that virtue theory is not an ideal framework to replace principlism because individuals approach ethical problems in many ways based on features of their character and background. Injecting one’s character into moral decisions can lead to bias. As Carl Elliot writes, “how a moral problem is described will turn on an array of variables: the role and degree of involvement in the case of the person who is describing it, the person’s particular profession or discipline, her religious and cultural inheritance-indeed, with all of the intangibles that have contributed to her character.”[21] Self-awareness may counteract personal biases in moral decision making. Vl. Limitation Virtue ethics is only a provisional solution to the adjudication problem for two reasons. One, not everyone is inherently virtuous, and two, theoretical differences may be resolved. If deontology and consequentialism can be incorporated into a unified theory for bioethics, then virtue ethics may not be necessary. On a certain view, it would be ideal for ethics to be computational – plug in the relevant variables and receive the morally correct answer. Arguably, principlism was an attempt at such a matrix, but it ultimately failed as a unified theory. Rather than waiting for a perfect unified theory, we must count on the genuine virtue of the moral agents who make ethically important decisions from policy to bedside. If practical wisdom is not a characteristic of these agents, then their decisions will not be as ethical as they ought to be, and no theory is the panacea to such a problem. CONCLUSION Bioethics emerged out of unified responses to clear cases of moral depravity, like the Holocaust and Tuskegee, and perhaps bioethics is most appropriate for such cases which are conducive to moral certitude. At minimum, bioethics offers meaningful guidance in cases where the relevant duties align with beneficent consequences. For example, in both the Nuremberg and Tuskegee cases, abrogating fundamental duties to humanity led to grievous consequences. The principles developed in the wake of such problems led to a conflict between autonomy and beneficence, which perhaps mirror the conflict between Kantian deontology and utilitarianism. 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