Books on the topic 'US Indian Policy'

This chapter shows how India’s scientists played an important role in policy-making. As science evolved to play a prominent role in the functioning of the modern state, its practitioners also gained importance, particularly those involved in defence research. India’s independence and modernization overlapped with the growth of international technocracy, shaping the relations between politics, the laboratory, and international law. Indian scientists grappled with the nuclear Janus as much as their Western counterparts, and their leaders had to balance the use of science for development and to make weapons of war. The importance of technology to the nation-building project as well as the bitter memories of colonialism informed Indian policy on issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and missile development that remain with us today. In fact, it has become impossible to separate science from its policy implications in the modern state.

India Turns East tells the story of India’s long and difficult journey to reclaim its status in a rapidly changed environment increasingly shaped by the US-China rivalry and the uncertainties of US commitment to Asia’s security. The so-called Look East Policy initially aimed at reconnecting India with Asia’s economic globalization. As China becomes more assertive, Look East has rapidly evolved into a comprehensive strategy with political and military dimensions which, together with favourable circumstances, have gradually allowed for a closer relationship with the United States. But the book argues that despite this rapprochement, the congruence of Indian and US objectives regarding China is not absolute. The two countries share similar concerns, but differ about the role China should play in the emerging regional architecture. Moreover, though bilateral US policies are usually perceived positively in New Delhi, paradoxically, the multilateral dimension of the US Rebalance to Asia policy sometimes pushes New Delhi closer to Beijing’s positions than to Washington’s. The asymmetry of power between the United States and India and their geographic separation make the persistence of significant divergences inevitable. The challenge for India is to reinvent the concept of strategic autonomy — defined as a position allowing India to leverage US capacities while avoiding being drawn into a zero-sum game between the US and China — but it will ultimately be able to do so only if it does make itself more attractive. Economic reforms are a key to India relationships with both the US and China.

The convergence of interests between India and the United States extend to most major regional issues. Both countries intend to pursue regional cooperation and develop an inclusive regional security architecture. Yet significant perception gaps persist between the two countries linked to their asymmetry of power as well as geographical locations. India does not want to be caught in a zero-sum game between China and the United States and remains uncertain about the willingness of the United States to act as a security provider. The relationship is ultimately based on a quid pro quo that takes into account US interests and India’s own constraints. A strong but autonomous India contributes to United States interests in the region.

India’s attempt to join the process of regional integration was marked by ambivalence. India did bypass its own region to seek integration in the adjacent one, ignoring SAARC to seek membership in some of the ASEAN led institutions. Operating by consensus through non-binding agreements, ASEAN-centered regionalism suited India’s needs for recognition and protected it against the negative repercussions of regional tensions while preventing the rise of potential regional hegemonys. Through its participation in a regional security architecture led by ASEAN rules, India established a normative buffer while being able to influence decisions. However, ASEAN’s centrality (i.e.; consensus based and a unanimous position reflecting common strategic vision) is gradually being eroded by US-China proxy struggle for influence, eroding the foundation of India’s relations with ASEAN, as it may draw New Delhi into the zero-sum game situation it has so far tried to avoid.

India’s relationship with the United States remains crucial to its own objectives, but is also ambiguous. The asymmetry of power between the two countries is such that the relationship, if potentially useful, is not necessary for the United States while potentially risky for India. Moreover, the shift of the political centre of gravity of Asia — resulting from the growing rivalry between China and the US — is eroding the foundations of India’s policy in Asia, while prospects for greater economic interaction is limited by India’s slow pace of reforms. The future of India-US relations lies in their capacity to evolve a new quid pro quo in which the US will formulate its expectations in more realistic terms while India would assume a larger share of the burden of Asia’ security.

Studies about the estrangement between India and the United States during the Cold War are written from the Western perspective of a bipolar world and relegate policies toward India and South Asia to a regional derivative of the struggle between the superpowers. A deeper understanding of India as a subject in world affairs is revealed in this work, the first able to draw upon the Nehru Papers, 1947–64, which span the period when the guiding principles of India’s foreign policy, nonalignment and Asianism, were formulated. Nehru’s certainty of India’s great power destiny and claim to be spokesman of Asia collided with the US role as leader of the free world, especially in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, viewed as India’s area of influence. Nehru’s “area of peace” excluding US-led collective security alliances brought the national interests of both countries into direct conflict. Nehru’s assumption that India’s friendly approach to China would result in a peaceful solution of their border dispute and allow the two countries to operate informally as protection against American interference in Asia proved to be a miscalculation of historic importance. The 1962 India-China war toppled the foundations of Asianism and nonalignment.

Realist Cold War foreign policy approaches emphasize the importance of aggregate measures and metrics of material and military capabilities in the international system. Realists argue that shifts in capabilities and changes in the distribution of power are dangerous and that aggregate power is fungible. These approaches have been carried forward into the post-Cold War period to forecast trends for a declining United States and a rising China or some combination of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). The chapter accepts the general logic of balance of power and power transition theories or aggregate power realism (APR) that shifts in capabilities and changes in power are dangerous.1 However, these approaches miss how state leaders assess power trends, the fungibility or usefulness of material capabilities, and that states rarely balance against concentrations of power. This chapter advances components of power theory that recast APR approaches.

The Green Revolution resulted in spectacular advancements in Indian agriculture. Having achieved food security for its citizens, the country has now become a net exporter of different agricultural commodities. But sadly, this does not reflect the real state of the Indian agricultural sector. In truth, our farmers are plagued by crop failures, poor income, and indebtedness. Such is their misery that they are of late driven to commit suicide. In this book, the author identifies poor returns from crop cultivation as the root cause of farmers’ problems. Using vast temporal and spatial data, the author explores further and attempts to address some very pertinent questions facing Indian agriculture today: What is the current trend in farm income? Are the returns from irrigated crops better than un-irrigated crops? Does increased productivity guarantee increased income? Has the agricultural price policy benefitted farmers? To what extent does rural infrastructure development help in increasing farm income? Has the rural employment guarantee scheme affected farm profitability? The answers will help us determine if we can double farm income by 2022–3, a target set by the present union government.

This chapter examines how judges are influenced not only by formal rules of how the court is to arrive at decisions, but also by norms of decision-making. It discusses the existence and strength of norms of consensus on different courts. Courts vary to a surprising extent in the size and causes of disagreement amongst judges. The two most extreme cases in our sample are the US Supreme Court, with over half of the cases having at least one dissent, and the Indian Supreme Court where only about 5 percent of cases involve a dissent. We find evidence that, depending on the country, a judge is influenced in whether she dissents by policy differences with other judges and her own workload. However, a judge’s decision to dissent also appears related to the background norms of whether it is acceptable to dissent, and the leadership of the chief justice or president of the court.

This chapter shows how identity contestation theory extends to state and non-state actors outside of Turkey, aiding understanding of how identity struggles spill over into foreign policy. It focuses on (1) the Israeli Likud Party’s efforts to shore up hardline, anti-Iran support in the US Congress; (2) India’s foreign policy shifts under the Hindu nationalist BJP; (3) Iranian moderates’ use of the nuclear deal as Western engagement to advance their position back home; and (4) anti-apartheid activists’ normative suasion tactics to force the United States to discontinue support of South Africa’s apartheid regime. The chapter demonstrates how these groups can also use foreign policy as an arena via institutions, diaspora groups, and transnational civil society to circumvent identity-based obstacles back home. These cases include the ongoing diplomacy of Turkey’s Kurdish movement with EU institutions and the Gülen movement’s efforts to spread Turkish Calvinism through its vast institutional network abroad.

In 1960–62, a large number of white autochthonous parents in Southall became very concerned that the sudden influx of largely non-Anglophone Indian immigrant children in local schools would hold back their children’s education. It was primarily to placate such fears that ‘dispersal’ (or ‘bussing’) was introduced in areas such as Southall and Bradford, as well as to promote the integration of mostly Asian children. It consisted in sending busloads of immigrant children to predominantly white suburban schools, in an effort to ‘spread the burden’. This form of social engineering went on until the early 1980s. This book, by mobilising local and national archival material as well as interviews with formerly bussed pupils in the 1960s and 1970s, reveals the extent to which dispersal was a flawed policy, mostly because thousands of Asian pupils were faced with racist bullying on the playgrounds of Ealing, Bradford, etc. It also investigates the debate around dispersal and the integration of immigrant children, e.g. by analysing the way some Local Education Authorities (Birmingham, London) refused to introduce bussing. It studies the various forms that dispersal took in the dozen or so LEAs where it operated. Finally, it studies local mobilisations against dispersal by ethnic associations and individuals. It provides an analysis of debates around ‘ghetto schools’, ‘integration’, ‘separation’, ‘segregation’ where quite often the US serves as a cognitive map to make sense of the English situation.

Despite social and economic advances around the world, poverty and disease persist, exacerbated by the mounting challenges of climate change, natural disasters, political conflict, mass migration, and economic inequality. While governments commit to addressing these challenges, traditional public and philanthropic dollars are not enough. Here, innovative finance has shown a way forward: by borrowing techniques from the world of finance, we can raise capital for social investments today. Innovative finance has provided polio vaccines to children in the DRC, crop insurance to farmers in India, pay-as-you-go solar electricity to Kenyans, and affordable housing and transportation to New Yorkers. It has helped governmental, commercial, and philanthropic resources meet the needs of the poor and underserved and build a more sustainable and inclusive prosperity. Capital and the Common Good shows how market failure in one context can be solved with market solutions from another: an expert in securitization bundles future development aid into bonds to pay for vaccines today; an entrepreneur turns a mobile phone into an array of financial services for the unbanked; and policy makers adapt pay-for-success models from the world of infrastructure to human services like early childhood education, maternal health, and job training. Revisiting the successes and missteps of these efforts, Georgia Levenson Keohane argues that innovative finance is as much about incentives and sound decision-making as it is about money. When it works, innovative finance gives us the tools, motivation, and security to invest in our shared future.

Violence against women and girls (VAWG) is a longstanding problem that has increasingly come to the forefront of international and national policy debates and news: from the US reauthorization of the Violence against Women Act and a United Nations declaration to end sexual violence in war, to coverage of gang rapes in India, cyberstalking and "revenge porn", honor killings, female genital mutilation, and international trafficking. Yet, while we frequently read or learn about particular experiences or incidents of VAWG, we are often unaware of the full picture. Jacqui True, an internationally renowned scholar of globalization and gender, provides an expansive frame for understanding VAWG in this book. Among the questions she addresses include: What are we talking about when we discuss VAWG? What kinds of violence does it encompass? Who does it affect most and why? What are the risk factors for victims and perpetrators? Does VAWG occur at the same level in all societies? Are there cultural explanations for it? What types of legal redress do victims have? How reliable are the statistics that we have? Are men and boys victims of gender-based violence? What is the role of the media in exacerbating VAWG? And, what sorts of policy and advocacy routes exist to end VAWG? This volume addresses the current state of knowledge and research on these questions. True surveys our best understanding of the causes and consequences of violence against women in the home, local community, workplace, public, and transnationally. In so doing, she brings together multidisciplinary perspectives on the problem of violence against women and girls, and sets out the most promising policy and advocacy frameworks to end this violence.

This chapter addresses a persistent tension in current debates over food security, with illustrative data from India. The case allows us to disaggregate concepts in food policy that are often lumped together, so as to better understand what is at stake in rapidly changing economies more generally. Despite rising incomes, there has been sustained decline in per capita nutrient intake in India in recent years. The assertion by Deaton and Dreze (2009) that poverty and undernutrition are unrelated is critically examined. A demand-based model in which food prices and expenditure played significant roles proved robust, while allowing for lower calorie “requirements” due to less strenuous activity patterns, life-style changes, and improvements in the epidemiological environment. This analysis provides reasons for not delinking nutrition and poverty; it confirms the existence of poverty-nutrition traps in which undernutrition perpetuates poverty. A new measure of child undernutrition that allows for multiple anthropometric failures (e.g., wasting, underweight, and stunting) points to much higher levels of undernutrition than conventional ones. Dietary changes over time, and their nutritional implications, have welfare implications at both ends of the income and social-status pyramids. Since poverty is multidimensional, money-metric indicators such as minimum income or expenditure are not reliable, because these cannot adequately capture all the dimensions. The emergent shift of the disease burden toward predominately food-related noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) poses an additional challenge. Finally, the complexity of normative issues in food policy is explored. Current approaches to food security have veered toward a “right-to-food” approach. There are, however, considerable problems with creating appropriate mechanisms for effectuating that right; these are explored briefly. Cash transfers touted to avoid administrative costs and corruption involved in rural employment guarantee and targeted food-distribution programs are likely to be much less effective if the objective is to enable large segments of the rural population to break out of nutrition-poverty traps. The chapter ends by exploring an alternative model, based on the same normative principle: a “right to policies,” or a “right to a right.”

Frontiers of Science takes American scientific thought and discoveries away from the learned societies, museums, and teaching halls of the Northeast and puts the production of knowledge about the natural world in the context of competing empires and an expanding republic in the Gulf South. People often dismissed by starched northeasterners as nonintellectuals--Indian sages, African slaves, Spanish officials, Irishmen on the make, clearers of land and drivers of men--were also scientific observers, gatherers, organizers, and reporters. Skulls and stems, birds and bugs, rocks and maps, tall tales and fertile hypotheses came from them. They collected, described, and sent the objects that scientists gazed on and interpreted in polite Philadelphia. They made knowledge. This book offers a new framework for approaching American intellectual history, one that transcends political and cultural boundaries and reveals persistence across the colonial and national eras. The pursuit of knowledge in the United States did not cohere around democratic politics or the influence of liberty. It was, as in other empires, divided by multiple loyalties and identities, organized through contested hierarchies of ethnicity and place, and reliant on violence. By discovering the lost intellectual history of one region, Strang shows us how to recover a continent for science.

Historically, strategic restraint was the dominant approach among nations active in outer space, all of whom understood that continued access to and use of space required holding back on threats or activities which might jeopardize the status quo of peace in space. However, recently there has been a discernible shift in international rhetoric toward a more offensive approach to defense in space. The US move toward establishing a “Space Force” has been echoed by similar announcements in France and Japan. India launched an antisatellite weapon test and announced proudly that it thereby joined the elite group of China, Russia, and the United States, who have all demonstrated this capability in the past. As technologies in space advance, along with our terrestrial dependence on space-based systems for our peaceful civilian lives and for support of terrestrial warfare, the political stability of this vulnerable environment comes under threat. These factors, combined with a lack of transparency about actual capabilities and intentions on the part of all major players in space, creates a cyclical escalation which has led some commentators to describe this as a return to a Cold War–type arms race and to the foreseeability of a space-based conflict. Due to many unique characteristics of the space domain, an armed conflict in space would be catastrophic for all players, including neutral States, commercial actors, and international civil society. Due to the specificity of the space domain, specialized expertise must be provided to decision makers, and interdisciplinary opinions must be sought from a multitude of stakeholders. To that end, this volume provides a wide spectrum of perspectives from experts who have engaged together at a conference hosted by the Center for Ethics in the Rule of Law to discuss these issues. Ethical, legal, and policy solutions are offered here by those with experience in the space sector, including academia, legal practitioners, military lawyers and operators, diplomats, and policy advisers.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.