Academic literature on the topic 'Unsolicited rating'

Previous studies show that the unsolicited ratings of S&P and Fitch are lower than the solicited ratings assigned by these two agencies. The unsolicited ratings of S&P and Fitch are based on publicly available information for a firm. However, no previous study has examined the unsolicited ratings of Moody's because Moody's does not disclose whether its ratings are solicited or unsolicited. Using Moody's solicited and unsolicited ratings collected from a survey of Japanese firms, we find that unsolicited credit ratings are still lower than solicited ratings even though firms with unsolicited ratings provide Moody's with some degree of inside information. We also compare the unsolicited ratings of S&P with those of Moody's and find that Moody's ratings are no different than those assigned by S&P although S&P's unsolicited ratings are based on public information. Therefore, we conclude that, regardless of the rating agency, unsolicited ratings are lower than solicited ratings because firms with unsolicited ratings provide incomplete private information to rating agencies.

This paper analyzes the extent to which selection explains the observed discrepancy between solicited and unsolicited ratings. I propose a model of selection with truth telling rating agencies and borrowers with the ability to veto the revelation of the rating. The observed difference between the two categories of ratings in different sectors is in line with the prediction of the model. In the sovereign market there is a positive selection of borrowers into unsolicited ratings whereas other sectors have, on the contrary, lower unsolicited rating grades than those solicited.

Background Regional population management (PM) health initiatives require insight into experienced quality of care at the regional level. Unsolicited online provider ratings have shown potential for this use. This study explored the addition of comments accompanying unsolicited online ratings to regional analyses. Objective The goal was to create additional insight for each PM initiative as well as overall comparisons between these initiatives by attempting to determine the reasoning and rationale behind a rating. Methods The Dutch Zorgkaart database provided the unsolicited ratings from 2008 to 2017 for the analyses. All ratings included both quantitative ratings as well as qualitative text comments. Nine PM regions were used to aggregate ratings geographically. Sentiment analyses were performed by categorizing ratings into negative, neutral, and positive ratings. Per category, as well as per PM initiative, word frequencies (ie, unigrams and bigrams) were explored. Machine learning—naïve Bayes and random forest models—was applied to identify the most important predictors for rating overall sentiment and for identifying PM initiatives. Results A total of 449,263 unsolicited ratings were available in the Zorgkaart database: 303,930 positive ratings, 97,739 neutral ratings, and 47,592 negative ratings. Bigrams illustrated that feeling like not being “taken seriously” was the dominant bigram in negative ratings, while bigrams in positive ratings were mostly related to listening, explaining, and perceived knowledge. Comparing bigrams between PM initiatives showed a lot of overlap but several differences were identified. Machine learning was able to predict sentiments of comments but was unable to distinguish between specific PM initiatives. Conclusions Adding information from text comments that accompany online ratings to regional evaluations provides insight for PM initiatives into the underlying reasons for ratings. Text comments provide useful overarching information for health care policy makers but due to a lot of overlap, they add little region-specific information. Specific outliers for some PM initiatives are insightful.

PurposeThe basic assumption is that there is a symmetric relationship between review valence and rating, but what if review valence and rating were linked asymmetrically? There are few studies which have investigated the situations in which positive and negative online reviews exert different influences on ratings. This study considers brand strength as having an important moderating role because the average rating of existing reviews for a particular product is a heuristic cue for decision makers. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to argue that an asymmetric relationship between review content valence and numerical rating will depend on brand strength.Design/methodology/approachThe authors have conducted a sentiment analysis via text mining, using self-developed computer programs to retrieve a data set from the TripAdvisor website.FindingsThis study finds there is an asymmetric relationship between review valence (verbal) and numerical rating. The authors further find brand strength to have an important moderating role. For a stronger brand, negative review content will have a greater impact on numerical ratings than positive review content, while for a weaker brand, positive review content will have a greater impact on numerical ratings than negative review content.Practical implicationsMarketers could adopt sentiment analysis via text mining of online reviews as a valid measure or predictor of consumer satisfaction or numerical ratings. Strong brands should direct more attention to negative reviews, because in such reviews the negative impact transcends the positive. In contrast, weak brands should aim to exploit as many positive reviews as possible to minimize the impact of any negative reviews.Originality/valueThis study finds there is an asymmetric relationship between review valence (verbal) and numerical rating and considers brand strength to play an important moderating role. The authors have used real data from the TripAdvisor website, which allow people to express themselves in an unsolicited manner, and linked these with the results from the sentiment analysis.

The Ombudsman Office at a large academic medical center created a standardized approach to manage and measure unsolicited patient complaints, including methods to identify longitudinal improvements, accounting for volume variances, as well as incident severity to prioritize response needs. Data on patient complaints and grievances are collected and categorized by type of issue, unit location, severity, and individual employee involved. In addition to granular data, results are collated into meaningful monthly leadership reports to identify opportunities for improvement. An overall benchmark for improvement is also applied based on the number of complaints and grievances received for every 1000 patient encounters. Results are utilized in conjunction with satisfaction survey results to drive patient experience strategies. By applying benchmarks to patient grievances, targets can be created based on historical performance. The utilization of grievance and complaint benchmarking helps prioritize resources to improve patient experiences.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the dimensions of interpersonal trust which would affect the buyer-salesperson relationship in a direct selling situation. It also investigates consumers’ perceived risk and advantages of direct selling. Design/methodology/approach A questionnaire survey of consumers (and also non-consumers) of direct selling companies in Hong Kong was performed by means of mall-intercept interview. The major measurements were perceived risk, perceived advantages, trust dimensions, and repurchase intention. Findings The results show that there are six dimensions of interpersonal trust in the buyer-seller relationship in direct selling, but only one dimension (i.e. honesty) has a significant relationship with repurchase intention. The ability to shop at home is found to have the highest advantage rating of direct selling. In addition, direct selling is perceived to have a lower level of risk than unsolicited telephone call such as telemarketing. Originality/value This is the first study to investigate the effects of different dimensions of interpersonal trust on consumer buying behavior under a direct selling situation in Asia. The study also serves as a foundation for studying the applicability and usefulness of all trust measures in other western or non-western cultures/nations.

2007/2008
Intermediari creditizi ed agenzie di credit rating svolgono un ruolo decisivo nell’attenuare gli effetti distorsivi della distribuzione asimmetrica delle informazioni cui sono intrinsecamente soggette le transazioni che si pongono in essere tra datori e prenditori di fondi, i quali soli hanno piena conoscenza del proprio, effettivo, merito di credito. In particolare, nel mercato creditizio, le banche, interponendosi tra soggetti in surplus e soggetti in deficit, si sostituiscono agli investitori nel selezionare le alternative di finanziamento, svolgendo per essi il processo di raccolta, di analisi, e di elaborazione delle informazioni relative alla capacità di credito delle possibili controparti, favorendo in ultimo la riduzione dei costi di transazione e di gestione delle informazioni. Analogamente, nel mercato obbligazionario, ove unità in surplus ed unità in deficit si interfacciano in modo diretto, le agenzie di rating si interpongono tra investitori ed emittenti di strumenti di debito, assumendo tuttavia il differente ruolo di “brokers informativi”, ovvero di operatori specializzati nella raccolta e nell’elaborazione delle informazioni circa lo standing creditizio dell’emittente, e nella successiva sintesi e divulgazione delle stesse attraverso un giudizio espresso da un simbolo alfabetico, il credit rating, in grado di comunicare in modo semplice ed immediato agli investitori l’opinione dell’agenzia circa l’idoneità dell’emittente di provvedere in modo esatto e puntuale sia al rimborso del capitale, sia al pagamento degli interessi relativi ad una o più emissioni di debito. Invero, a nostro avviso, è ragionevole ritenere che la reale portata del ruolo assolto da intermediari creditizi ed agenzie di rating nel contrastare le asimmetrie informative tra datori e prenditori di fondi, e l’effettiva efficacia del loro intervento nel promuovere l’efficienza del mercato creditizio ed obbligazionario possano dipendere dalla natura delle informazioni che tali soggetti scelgono di porre a fondamento delle valutazioni relative al merito di credito dei potenziali soggetti finanziati. A tal riguardo è possibile operare una distinzione, seppur non strettamente dicotomica, tra elementi informativi di natura “hard”- i quali tipicamente si presentano in forma quantitativa, e prestandosi a facile codificazione, consentono di essere raccolti in modo impersonale ed interpretati in modo oggettivo ed univoco - ed informazioni di tipo “soft” - che, al contrario, presentandosi in forma prettamente qualitativa/descrittiva ed essendo subordinate ad interpretazione soggettiva da parte del valutatore, sono connotate da un’intrinseca difficoltà di codificazione, e impongono modalità di acquisizione di tipo personale e diretto. Alla luce dei descritti aspetti di differenziazione, il prevalente ricorso ad informazioni di natura hard, se da un lato determina significativi vantaggi in termini di costo di acquisizione ed elaborazione dell’informazione stessa, dall’altro comporta l’inevitabile perdita del patrimonio informativo che solo input di tipo soft sono in grado di veicolare. In tale quadro si inserisce il presente lavoro, finalizzato ad analizzare la variegata morfologia dell’informazione e ad esaminare nello specifico in quale forma (hard o soft) predominante si presentino le informazioni poste alla base dei processi di analisi del merito di credito svolti da intermediari creditizi e agenzie di rating. Ciò equivale ad indagare come tali soggetti scelgano di posizionarsi rispetto al trade-off esistente tra i costi connessi al trattamento dell’informazione - i quali risultano minimizzati in funzione di un crescente utilizzo di hard information - ed il grado di completezza dell’informazione stessa - che si accresce in funzione dell’inclusione di soft information nella base informativa a disposizione del valutatore - dal quale, come anticipato, riteniamo possa dipendere l’efficace riduzione delle asimmetrie informative esistenti tra datori e prenditori di fondi. A tale proposito si osserva come l’utilizzo più o meno intenso di informazioni di natura soft rispetto ad informazioni di carattere hard nell’ambito dei procedimenti valutativi condotti rispettivamente dalle banche e dalle agenzie di rating sia legato al contesto in cui tali processi di analisi sono originati. In particolare, con riferimento alle istituzioni bancarie, è possibile istituire un raffronto tra analisi del merito creditizio condotte nell’ambito di approcci al credito basati alternativamente sulla relazione (relationship lending) o sulla transazione (transactional lending), mentre, per quanto concerne le agenzie di rating, si individua una distinzione tra valutazioni svolte nell’ambito del processo di attribuzione del rating alternativamente sollecitato (solicited) o non sollecitato (unsolicited). La relazione che si instaura tra il soggetto valutatore e l’impresa oggetto di analisi nell’ambito del relationship lending - nel caso della banca - o nell’ambito del processo di attribuzione del rating sollecitato - nel caso dell’agenzia di rating - determina infatti un significativo arricchimento del set di input informativi disponibili per la valutazione, in quanto, oltre a consentire l’acquisizione di un complesso di elementi che, pur essendo codificabili e prestandosi ad interpretazione oggettiva (e, dunque, pur presentando carattere hard), non risultano desumibili da fonti pubbliche per questioni di riservatezza o di opacità informativa dell’impresa, permette di raccogliere una serie di informazioni impossibili da acquisire in forma impersonale alla luce della loro natura prettamente soft, che le rende non codificabili e misurabili esclusivamente attraverso il giudizio e la percezione individuale del medesimo soggetto preposto alla raccolta delle stesse. In ciò risiede, a nostro avviso, il valore aggiunto del contributo offerto da intermediari creditizi ed agenzie di rating alla riduzione delle asimmetrie informative tra datori e prenditori di fondi: anche prescindendo dalle condizioni di maggiore o minore trasparenza della controparte oggetto di analisi, l’inclusione della soft information alla base delle valutazioni condotte da tali soggetti - che risulta preclusa nel contesto tanto del rapporto di finanziamento transaction-based posto in essere dalla banca, quanto dell’attribuzione di un giudizio di rating non sollecitato da parte dell’agenzia - costituisce la determinante ultima dell’effettiva efficacia del loro intervento nel promuovere l’efficienza del mercato. Alla luce di tali considerazioni, la trattazione viene completata attraverso l’esame dell’impianto di analisi e valutazione delle informazioni qualitative sviluppato ed implementato presso un’agenzia di rating italiana, al fine di comprendere con quali strumenti, nel concreto, una credit rating agency possa affrontare il problema dell’elaborazione di informazioni soft - che si presenta con massima intensità nell’ambito del processo di assegnazione del rating di tipo solicited - pervenendo ad un bilanciamento ottimale del trade-off tra il costo di trattamento dell’informazione ed il grado di completezza della stessa.
XXI Ciclo
1979

This thesis consists of four independent chapters on bank capital regulation and the issue of unsolicited ratings.

The first chapter is introductory and reviews the motivation for regulating banks and credit rating agencies while providing a detailed overview of the thesis.

The second chapter uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze how banks from six G10 countries adjusted their capital to assets ratios and risk-weighted assets to assets ratio between 1988 and 1995, i.e. just after passage of the 1988 Basel Accord. The results suggest that regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards had little effect on both ratios for weakly capitalized banks, except in the US. In addition, the relation between the capital to assets ratios and the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio appears to depend not only on the level of capitalization of banks, but also on the countries or groups of countries considered.

The third chapter provides Monte Carlo estimates of the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks must hold for their corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures both under Basel I and the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II. In the latter case, Monte Carlo estimates are presented for different combinations of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) that banks may choose to risk weight their exposures. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different ECAIs leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, these differences never exceed, on average, 10% of EMU banks’ capital requirements for corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures. Second, the standardized approach to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk weight their exposures. Third, the minimum capital requirements for the corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures of EMU banks will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the standardized approach to credit risk is limited.

The fourth and final chapter analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings, I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information.

Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

碩士
國立東華大學
財務金融學系
101
After the financial crisis, public has brought renewed attention to conflicts of interest in credit rating agencies (CRAs). This paper examines the credit ratings of payment relationship between CRAs and issuers whether affects the bank’s leverage levels decisions in the ex-ante and ex-post. I found that unsolicited banks near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt than solicited banks in the ex-ante results. However, I found that both two types of bank credit rating have opposite of result in the ex-post. The subsequent leverage decisions of unsolicited (solicited) banks would less (more) issue debt when they were downgraded (upgraded) in previous year.