Journal articles on the topic 'United States. Government Technical Oil Mission'

The smallest of the nation's uniformed armed services, the United States Coast Guard's basic missions relate to maritime safety, mobility, and security; national defense, and natural resources protection. It is responsible for enforcement of maritime laws and marine environmental pollution response. The Coast Guard offers many career opportunities for enlisted personnel, including Marine Science Technician (MST). MSTs conduct marine-safety activities such as investigating pollution incidents and monitoring pollution clean-ups. Possible scientific duties include responding to oil and hazardous-materials spills, observing and forecasting weather. An increasing number of civilian employers are becoming more aware of the unique strengths former military personnel can bring with them to a consultant position. A consultant is someone who has expertise in a specific area or areas and offers unbiased opinions and advice for a fee. There are many reasons why the private and public sector need consultants for problem solving. One very important reason; Government regulatory compliance. Government regulations at all levels are constantly changing, and companies are frequently not prepared or trained to comply. Consultants may be retained to provide expertise to assist a company in complying economically, efficiently, and with the least amount of trauma to the organization. They can also be hired to provide in-house training to keep staff informed of new management and supervisory techniques or technical knowledge and to improve employee safety. Successful consultants often possess certain attributes. They can be identified with good physical and mental health, professional etiquette and courtesy, stability of behavior and self-confident. In addition to these skills, here are two military-related attributes that most companies find attractive and will help any organization simplify the task at hand. Loyalty to the Team. Military personnel bring with them an intrinsic understanding of how loyalty adds to team proficiency and builds trust in a work environment. For business leaders looking to make an improvement in their company, military personnel often outperform other candidates as proven team players, as demonstrated by hard work, motivation, and dedication. Reliable Work Ethic. Knowing the importance of adhering to a schedule and consistently performing well at work demonstrates professional maturity. One of the most difficult challenges to hiring professionals is being able to accurately judge candidates in these areas. Through service, training, and lifestyle, former military personnel will typically have the work ethic that any business owner would be thrilled to replicate in all of the organization's employees.

The Environmental Studies Program (ESP) at the United States Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) is funded by the United States Congress to support BOEM’s mission, which is to use the best available science to responsibly manage the development of the Nation’s offshore energy and mineral resources. Since its inception in 1973, the ESP has funded over $1 billion of multidisciplinary research across four main regions of the United States Outer Continental Shelf: Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic, Alaska, and Pacific. Understanding the dynamics of oil spills and their potential effects on the environment has been one of the primary goals of BOEM’s funding efforts. To this end, BOEM’s ESP continues to support research that improves oil spill modeling by advancing our understanding and the application of meteorological and oceanographic processes to improve oil spill modeling. Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, BOEM has invested approximately $28 million on relevant projects resulting in 73 peer-reviewed journal articles and 42 technical reports. This study describes the findings of these projects, along with the lessons learned and research information needs identified. Additionally, this paper presents a path forward for BOEM’s oil spill modeling and physical oceanographic research.

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.

AbstractDefense Secretary Robert Gates approved the creation of a unified cyber command under the Obama Administration that was focused on cyber operations. This organization was to oversee the protection of government networks against cyber threats known and unknown. Coupled with growing attacks on national infrastructure, digital theft of intellectual property, and election meddling has the United States government actively working to develop cybersecurity talent. Some of the changes that have come as a result are more specialized degree program accreditation, technical frameworks, and policies to help usher this realization of the need to address the shortage of talent for today’s mission.

Early in 1982 CSR Limited established an Oil and Gas Division. By 1983 this Division had recruited twenty-six overseas technical personnel mainly from Canada and the United Kingdom. The Company needed to recruit overseas because the skills required were not available in Australia.During 1983 a review of the recruitment and settlement of these personnel and their families was undertaken. The objectives of this review were to:improve the Company performance in the recruitment, induction and settlement of overseas recruits and their families;increase the likely "length of stay" in Australia of overseas recruits and their families;to address specific problems faced by recruits and their families in settlement in Australia.In depth interviews were conducted with twenty-one of the twenty-six recruits and their families using a structured interview format.The analysis of the interviews results revealed that:on average it took longer for those recruited in the United Kingdom to obtain immigration "approvals" and to physically relocate than those recruited in Canada;families with previous experience in relocating adapted and coped better with the physical move and resettlement than families without previous experience.The detailed results showed further that:While there was sufficient information provided about the job and department, there was dissatisfaction with the lack of detailed information about aspects of living in Australia, particularly: taxation; housing; bank mortgage arrangements; cost of living data and medical insurance.There were gaps in the expectations that many- recruits and their families had about living in Australia, such as climate, lifestyle and housing. This was attributed to an "oversell" through glossy brochures and "word pictures".The attention given to staff and their families on arrival was seen as a positive introduction to Australia and CSR's Oil and Gas Division.The provision of initial temporary accommodation in a single apartment complex for all overseas recruits and families in Adelaide assisted greatly in the induction and settlement process. It provided a high level of support especially for wives with young children. The "welcome waggon" group together with the assistance provided by the wives of senior executives were also positive influences in the settlement process.The most positive features seen in the move to Australia were career and lifestyle opportunities. On the other hand loss of disposable income was seen as a significant negative.From the results and analysis a detailed set of recommendations and actions were developed to improve company performance in recruitment and settlement. These recommendations were implementated prior to the 1984 recruiting mission to Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.The preliminary results from the 1984 recruiting mission have resulted in:a reduction in recruiting lead time;quicker and more informed decision making by candidates and their families in accepting job offers;more professional preparation of both the recruiting teams and the company's agents overseas.

ABSTRACT The organization that is most critical to the preparedness of a port is the Area Committee (AC). The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) mandated the establishment of ACs in every port area in the United States and charged them with oversight of the preparedness of their ports through preparation of Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) to specify how spill responses would be carried out. ACs were formed across the United States, and initial ACPs were drafted. Since the AC is an ad hoc voluntary group in each port, its resources and time available to accomplish its functions are often limited. Over time some ACs flourished and initiated many worthwhile projects advancing their mission of port preparedness. Others, through a lack of focus and resources, failed to achieve their full potential. A recent study for the U.S. Coast Guard investigated the interaction of the AC and the Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) government-led area exercises to develop a vision for a more effective interaction. This paper highlights recommendations made during that study, which are believed to strengthen the AC process. The paper includes the characteristics of an effective AC based on interviews conducted by the authors with ACs across the United States. Some of the recommendations discussed in the paper include:A national AC model to serve as a guide for the organization and functioning of an effective ACFunctions that all ACs should accomplishNationally promulgated standards of port preparednessPerformance measures to objectively diagnose a port's preparednessA more aggressive role for ACs in the PREP area exercise programA national database to provide information to ACs and others involved with preparedness and response

This paper focuses on the development of marginal fields in Nigeria, the challenges, economic viability, and the role of the government in implementing the contributions of marginal fields to the national oil production output. Also, the previously reported marginal field development and management practices in the Niger Delta oilfield are x-rayed. Following the definition of the marginal field is an overview of different types of marginal field development in the Niger Delta region. Also, the United Kingdom Oil and Gas Recovery Regulatory Commission, the United States Security Exchange Commission, and the Nigerian government's categorization of what compose of a marginal field are included. In addition, the participation of the Nigerian federal government and contributions to the development of marginal fields in the bidding of marginal assets to the development of infrastructure are presented. Particular attention is paid to the factors that affect the development and choice of production strategies in the marginal fields of the Niger Delta. These factors discussed in detail in the document include environmental, technical, social, political, and economic factors. Again, different management and development strategies used by some marginal fields of the Niger Delta are x-rayed and presented with a particular focus on three of those strategies. The three common approaches in the Niger Delta marginal field development strategy are water flooding, infill drilling, and infrastructure sharing. These approaches have made marginal fields in Nigeria operational, competitive, and economically viable to date.

The need for skilled and semi-skilled indigenous manpower in the gulf states (e.g., Kuwait. Qatar, United Arab Emirates) is highly noted in the related literature. Technical and vocational education is considered as a dual type of education system that allow students to transfer what they have learned in classrooms, workshops, and laboratories into real work environment. It is the ultimate solution, particularly for the gulf states, to overcome and/or reduce the rate of dependance on expatriates especially in essential sectors in their economy (e.g., oil, electricity and water, health sector). The governments of the gulf states have realized the urgent need to forge technical and vocational colleges and institutions hoping to close the gap with industries and business. Technical and vocational education is completely different from formal education and thus requires a careful design, planning, and monitoring to ensure meeting industrial and business current and future requirements. However, the success of technical and vocational education would depend, to great extent, on the type of management since it requires a specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes that are distinguished technical and vocational education from any other types of education. The Higher Institute of Communications and Navigation, HIC&N, was forged by the Kuwaiti Government with the aim to equipped local manpower with the know-how and know-why that are mostly needed by local industries. The research is focus on measuring the perception of a sample of heads of departments at the Ministry of Communications towards the quality of HIC&N graduates. The research is based on extensive field work that encompasses a review of the related literature, interviews with a sample of heads of departments at the Ministry Communications to assess the quality of field training program and the standard of the HIC&N graduates. Finally, the research will argue that unless the HIC&N recognize and appreciate the value of building a strong linkage with local industries, its contribution in tackling the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled indigenous in essential sectors on the economy will be below the government expectations, thus continuing relaying on expatriates for years ahead.

The essentiality of the universities’ roles in enhancing economies and transforming societies is a global mantra. However, when it comes to wealthy and oil-dependent states such as Texas in the United States and Qatar in the Middle East, the impact of universities on sustainable economic development is questionable. This article discusses the transformational efforts within engineering colleges at two public universities in Texas and in Qatar to support their states’ visions in moving toward innovative and knowledge-based economies. The study examined the innovation capacity building of both institutions through measuring the transformational leadership styles in engineering colleges and its impact on the faculty’s innovative production of technical articles, patents, and sustainable development-related courses. The cultural impact of the two contexts on the leader–follower relationship was addressed in the discussion using Hofstede’s cultural dimension framework. The results showed that leaders in both colleges possess a transformational leadership style, albeit lower than the norm. This study disclosed that, in the high-power distance contexts, the idealized image of the leader contributed positively toward higher satisfaction of the followers with their leaders and current governance systems, while acknowledgment and rewards were the sources of satisfaction in low-power distance societies. Followers in a low uncertainty avoidance, individualistic, and short-term-oriented context achieved higher technical production. Both public universities expressed the need for government involvement in supporting the culture of innovation.

ABSTRACT The terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought an urgent, necessary call to protect the safety and security of the nations Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR). Most of these efforts have been to deter/prevent a terrorist attack through vulnerability assessment and increased physical security (e.g. “gates, guns and guards”). Just as the federal government was getting on solid ground with increased homeland security against the terrorist threat, the devastation of the 2005 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought to light the need for a true “All Hazards” approach to response. Added to this is the growing awareness that environmental incidents could significantly impact regional stability, and even threaten national security. Simply stated: “Yesterday'S major oil spill could be tomorrow'S national security incident.” The November 2007 allision (and resulting serious oil spill) of the tank ship COSCO BUSAN with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, provided a glimpse into these concerns and brought increased attention back upon this long standing marine safety mission. Ironically the 2006 “Safe Seas” exercise tested almost the very scenario of the COSCO BUSAN one year ago to the day of the spill. “Safe Seas” and other major drills (like “TOPOFF,” etc.) are tremendous tools for government and private sector stakeholders to enhance preparedness to response and test existing security and infrastructure protection systems. Given the above, traditional Oil Spill Response (OSR) is now part of a broader, more complicated systems-approach to domestic Incident Management (IM). The United States Coast Guard'S Marine Environmental Protection (MEP) mission has required the unique military I regulatory service to forge a collaborative relationship with the oil and gas industry - or “sector” (as defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan NIPP). This government-to-industry partnership was born out of decades of marine safety prevention/response efforts most visible following the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). Many involved in the field of emergency management; as well as their security counterparts recognize it is difficult to understand both IM and IP, despite the myriad of new and developing federal plans and doctrine as we pass the half way point of the first decade in the Post 9/11 “new normalcy.” Due to dynamic and synergistic partnership between the U.S. Coast Guard and the American Petroleum Institute (API) a coordination and communication opportunity was identified that resulted in a concept of simplifying the landscape via a” 3 R+” concept. The focus areas of this paper are:To bring increased clarity to the current and emerging state of interoperability between the government and the private industry sector.Provide a simplified “Big Picture” view of what private sector professionals (middle to upper management in the emergency response/safety & health fields) need to know regarding the framework of the national system for our critical infrastructure and first line response, using the oil & gas sector as an example; Note: Although the target audience for this papen/presentation are private sector professionals, primarily in the response and security fields, the plans highlighted and information outlined could apply to those working IM or IP in any industry or government sector.

ABSTRACT This paper examines oil pollution response during disaster situations when the Stafford Act is invoked by the President and the National Response Framework provides funding under ESF-10. The interrelationship between the National Contingency Plan (NCP), created by various pollution statues (Clean Water Act/CWA, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability/CERCLA, Oil Pollution Act/OPA) and the National Response Framework (NRF), created to deal with declared disasters under the Stafford Act, is becoming more fractious as time passes and the financial scope of disasters grows. The paradigm that existed when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005 was not in evidence when Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy made landfall in the fall of 2012. The NCP envisions oil and chemical spill response in the context of a single spill, ideally with a known responsible party (RP), who takes action to respond to the spill. That RP is liable for costs and damages resulting from the spill. Action commences when the spill occurs and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) determines that federal action is required. If the federal funds (Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund/OSLTF, CERCLA/SUPERFUND) are used, the federal government seeks cost recovery afterwards. The NRF envisions the federal government acting like a “no-fault insurance” regime, providing federal resources/funds to states when their capabilities are overwhelmed and their citizens require immediate succor. FEMA action commences when the State requests and the President approves aid. The states agree to a cost share – not to exceed 25% of Federal funding. There is no private party liability when actions are complete. The Homeland Security Act established the NRF, and operationally subsumes the NCP under it. However, the Homeland Security Act does not address what fund (Stafford or the pollution funds) will be used when a declared disaster occurs. Furthermore, the Stafford Act structure (State requests, Presidential approvals, Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Coordinating Officer (FEMA FCO) appointment, area surveys, mission assignments) becomes sclerotic in a large incident when compared to the much more nimble NCP process (spill, FOSC decision, immediate funding). The effect for Coast Guard (CG) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) field responders is to lean forward with NCP processes to protect the public. FEMA, faced with dwindling resources, observes this tendency and declines to provide disaster funding when the other federal funds “can be used”. The paper proposes a new paradigm for the “Makris-Suiter” Agreement of 1998 between EPA and FEMA. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.

ABSTRACT There is growing interest in the United States for using the full mix of environmentally appropriate countermeasures during spill response to achieve the highest level of environmental protection and recovery possible. Determining the right mix of technologies, including mechanical recovery, shoreline cleanup, dispersants, and monitoring (no active response), is particularly challenging in sensitive and valuable estuaries through which high volumes of bulk oil shipment transit. This paper summarizes an ecological risk assessment (ERA) project to consider the potential effectiveness and effects of using dispersants, in addition to conventional countermeasures, to mitigate the impacts of oil spilled into the marine and nearshore environments and to facilitate preparedness efforts at the federal, state, local, and industry level. Sponsored by industry and federal and state agencies, the primary goal was to bring technical and resource experts together to use their collective knowledge and experience in methodically comparing the trade-offs associated with the use of various countermeasures in Puget Sound, Washington. The ERA process used for Washington State waters was the first ERA that specifically addressed oil spill response options in U.S. coastal estuaries. It occurred as a follow-up to several other preparedness activities jointly sponsored by government and industry. The project team learned several important lessons, which were used to refine the process as it subsequently was applied in California and Texas in 1999.

There is a common perception that technical and vocational education is the ultimate solution for providing industries and business with skilled and semi-skilled manpower. It is considered as a dual type of education system that would allow students to transfer what they have learned in their schools and colleges into real work environment. It is a combination of education that encompasses theory and practice where students spend a certain time in industrial and business premises to acquire the needed knowledge, skills and attitudes. Due to the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled indigenous manpower, the gulf states (e.g., Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates) have forged technical and vocational education colleges and institutions with the aim to supply essential sectors of their economy (e.g., oil, electricity and water, health sector, infrastructure), with qualified national manpower able to manage, maintain, and adapt the imported technology to suite local environments. However, the success of technical and vocational institution in achieving an acceptable outcome would, to great extent, depend on the quality of the management of technical and vocational institutions. The fact is managing technical and vocational education is completely different from managing a formal education (e.g., formal colleges and universities). This research paper examines how successful is the management of technical and vocational colleges and institutions in providing local industries with indigenous skilled and semi-skilled qualified manpower. The research is based on extensive field work that encompasses a review of the related literature, interviews with sample of heads of supervisors/heads of departments at the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Electricity and Water, and the oil sector in order to assess the quality of graduates from technical and vocational colleges and institutions. Finally, the research will argue that unless the management of technical and vocational colleges and institutions recognize and appreciate the value of building a strong linkage with local industries, its contribution in tackling the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled indigenous in essential sectors on the economy will be below the government expectations, thus continuing relaying on expatriates for years ahead.

Technical and vocational education would significantly serve the need of developing countries in terms of lower the rate of poverty, reducing the number of people/youth unemployment, ensuring a stable economy, reducing rate of crimes, higher earning, and increasing self-development. It is also essential for the gulf states such as: Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, where the lack of skilled and semi-skilled indigenous manpower is notable in essential sectors of their economy (e.g., electricity and water, health care, oil sector, infrastructure). Technical and vocational education is a dual type of educational system that would facilitate the transmission of students into work place. It is considered as a ‘golden” opportunity particularly for youth to be easily employed by industries and business. The success of technical and vocational education would depend, to great extent, on the efficiency of apprenticeship where students spend certain time at industrial premises to gain the required skills. It allows students to experience the real work environment and to interact with machine, devices, and tools applied in industrial production site. This paper examines how successful is the field training program offered by the selected colleges and institutions at the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training, PAAE&T, in providing local industries with indigenous skilled and semi-skilled qualified manpower. The research is based on extensive field work that encompasses a review of the related literature, interviews with sample of heads of supervisors/heads of departments at the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Electricity and Water, and the oil sector in order to assess the quality of field training program. Finally, the research will argue that unless the management of technical and vocational colleges and institutions recognize and appreciate the value of enhancing the quality of field training program with local industries, its contribution in tackling the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled indigenous in essential sectors on the economy will be below the government expectations, thus continuing relaying on expatriates for years ahead.

Total pulses area in Uttar Pradesh, contributes of pulses through the Bundelkhand region, more than half but the productivity is low because lack of technological approaches for pulse growing area. This review paper assessed the cultivation of pulses production, productivity and area, of Bundelkhand and in India also. The technologies and infrastructure need to be accepted pulses cultivation and accurate policies for the farmers through government. Pulses are next to cereals regarding their nutritional and economic significance to human health. The pulses crop highly water sensitive like chickpea, lentil, mung bean and black gram are dominant in drought prone areas and improve soil fertility by fixing atmospheric nitrogen. Rainfed Agriculture has emerged as an opportunity in raising pulse production which is depend on amount and distribution of rainfall growing area. The cropping system of pulses cultivation year-after-year has observed that incidence of disease, insect-pests and weeds increase in Bundelkhand region. In pigeon pea, chickpea and lentil crops, important biotic agent for affecting production. United Nations declared 2016 ' "International Year of Pulses" was to increase production and consumption of pulses 10% by 2025 and raise public awareness towards health through social media. The many initiatives schemes govern by government of India for increase the pulses growing area and production such as ISOPOM (Integrated Scheme of Oilseeds, Pulses, Oil palm and Maize) (2004-05 to 2009-10), NFSM Pulses (National Food Security Mission, 2007-08), for Technology demonstration. The Bundelkhand regions as 5 lakhs farmers of 14 districts of two states of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh should be linked with Rani Lakshmi Bai Central Agricultural University (RLBCAU) and benefited from this university to produce pulses.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela faces a deep political and economic crisis that is exacerbated by severe restrictive measures imposed against it by the United States and their allies. In these circumstances, the availability of external economic support becomes particularly important. In recent years, Russia has become one of the key donors for Venezuela with a wide range of economic diplomacy tools at its disposal. Drawing upon official data, as well as recent findings of Russian and foreign researchers, the present paper examines the evolution of Russian economic diplomacy towards Venezuela during the presidency of H. Chavez (1999–2013) and N. Maduro (2013 — present). The author emphasizes that bilateral economic cooperation was already institutionalized under H. Chavez. The most intense interaction took place in the energy and military-technical fields. The mechanisms of Russian economic diplomacy included primarily public and private loans, investments, and payments for the permission to develop Venezuelan oil deposits. The election N. Maduro was accompanied by a dramatic deterioration of political and economic situation in the country. The crisis was further aggravated by economic sanctions imposed by the US. The latter also affected Russian projects in the republic. However, Russia continued to provide significant support to Venezuela, both through already proven mechanisms of economic diplomacy and a number of new ones, including sovereign debt restructuring and advance delivery of goods. At the same time, the author notes that this assistance remains rather isolated and limited, it affects only specific areas, mainly oil and gas and military-technical cooperation, and its volume is insufficient to effectively address the economic crisis in Venezuela. In this context, the domestic economic policy of the Venezuelan government is of particular importance. Indeed, liberal economic reforms carried out since 2018 were helpful for recovery from the economic crisis. In this connection, the author provides a list of measures and mechanisms Russia could implement in the framework of economic diplomacy to ensure this positive trend.

The surfaces of most metals immersed in electrolytes feature a several nanometer-thick oxide/hydroxide layer in aqueous electrolytes. This leads to the existence of both a metal/oxide and an oxide/liquid electrotlyte interface. The resulting complexity, and the uncertainty about the structure of and the charges on the surface films, make it challenging to predict from first principles the potential-of-zero-charge (PZC) which has been correlated to the pitting potential [1]. In this work, we use large-scale Density Functional Theory and ab initio molecular dynamics to calculate the PZC of a Al(111)|gamma-Al(2)O(3)|water model within the context of aluminum corrosion. By partitioning the multiple, complex interfaces involved into binary components with additive contributions to the overall work function and voltage, we calculate the PZC in liquid water for this model. Simultaneously, we calculate the orbital energy levels of defects like oxygen vacancies in gamma-Al(2)O(3), which are critical parameters in theories associated with pitting corrosion onset. Our predictions align the Fermi level at PZC with oxygen vacancy impurity defect levels, and estimate the voltage needed to generate charged oxygen vacancies in the flat band approximation. The similarities and differences in results and assumptions used between our model calculations and experiments will be discussed. [1] J.~O'M. Bockris and Y.~Kang, J. Solid Electrochem. 1:17 (1997). Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. This paper describes objective technical results and analysis. Any subjective views or opinions that might be expressed in the document do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy or the United States Government. Figure 1

Oxidative instability of the liquid electrolyte at or near battery cathode oxide surfaces has significant detrimental effects on batteries. Organic solvent molecules are often the fuel and precurors of such degradation processes, releasing electrons and protons that react with cathode oxides and electrolyte anions. These reactions contribute to cathode electrolyte interphase (CEI) film formation, transition metal ion dissolution, and phase transformation of the surface regions of the cathode. Here we apply Density Functional Theory calculations to examine four criteria of oxidative stability (oxidation potential, hydrogen removal energies, and initial reactivity on two types of oxide facets) using four different solvent/additive molecules (ethylene carbonate, fluoroethylene carbonate, 1,3-dioxolane, and dimethyl ether). The ranking of molecular stability differs with each criterion. Surprisingly, the all-oxygen terminated basal planes of layered oxides exhibit lower reaction barriers than spinel surface facets with exposed transition metal cations, especially for ether solvents; the calculations also suggest basal planes contribute to the dissolution of transition metal ions. The structure-degradation relation complexity underscores the challenge of understanding the function of the CEI, but also offers a guide to future degradation-mitigation strategies including facet-engineering. Our predictions and models help establish a framework for future studies relevant to high voltage conditions. Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. This paper describes objective technical results and analysis. Any subjective views or opinions that might be expressed in the document do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy or the United States Government.

he sub-optimal performance of state-owned refineries in Nigeria has led to a significant gap in the supply of refined petroleum products (RPPs) in the country. More so, the growing demand for these products has further widened the gap to the range of 500,000 –600,000 barrels per day (bpd). Consequently, most of the imports for RPPs in Nigeria are being filled from the United States and North-Western Europe at the expense of the Nigerian economy. However, given the abundance of petroleum resources in Nigeria and its long history in the production of oil, it is unfortunate that the local refineries are hardly maintained to meet the needs of the local population. In addition, the inability of the Nigerian state to build additional refining capacity to cushion its domestic supply gap for RPPs has become a major concern. With more than 40 licenses issued to private companies since 2002, only two companies (Niger Delta Petroleum Resources Refinery and Dangote Oil Refinery) have made noticeable progress in new refinery construction.This paper is focused on investigating the current challenges of refinery construction in Nigeria. This is done with a view of comparing the drivers and enablers of productivity in construction in this sector during the period of 1965 –1989 and how they differ from the current period of 2000 -2019 in Nigeria.A systematic literature review within the academic journals, source documents from the industry, relevant interviews from published news media and consulting organisations were used to identify and categorise these challenges. The findings of this study were validated by interviews from experts across key industries in this sector.The study reveals that change of ownership structures from the government sector to the private sector between the two eras, present additional challenges. These challenges cut across availability of capital, inconsistent government priorities and access to land for construction. Others include cronyism and corruption, weak political will, unstructured refinery licensing scheme, security challenges and economic factors regarding the regulated downstream market inNigeria. Key recommendations proffered to help solve these problems include a private sector-led partnership with the government in the form of public private partnerships (PPPs), a review of existing methods for licensing refineries for private organisations, the development of local manpower with relevant technical skills to help lower the cost of expatriate labour and the establishment of more designated clusters as free trade zones within the oil-producing Niger Delta. These recommendations will help lower the entry barriers for private organisations in this sector

There is a need for high energy density long duration energy storage that utilizes earth abundant elements, such as Al and Fe. Energy storage devices that utilize molten salt electrolytes can take advantage of these earth abundant materials and promise to deliver high energy densities. Continued development and in-depth investigation of these fully inorganic, molten salt electrolytes is necessary for the continued progress of low-cost battery technologies. We have been exploring the properties of a new molten salt system which utilizes Al and Fe components and can feasibly be operated as an electrochemically active medium for long duration energy storage. Ternary molten salt compositions of AlCl3-FeCl3-NaCl and AlCl3-FeCl2-NaCl were evaluated for their phase behavior and electrochemical performance at intermediate temperatures (~160 - 210 °C). We found that certain compositions of AlCl3-FeCl3-NaCl were fully or nearly fully molten at 160 °C and that more AlCl3 was needed in the melt to facilitate the FeCl2 dissolution. The electrochemistry of these salts was probed and found that the Fe species will cycle between the Fe3+/Fe2+ oxidation states (as FeCl3/FeCl2) but that at lower temperatures, the FeCl2 will precipitate out of the melt and block the electrode. By increasing the test temperatures, the produced FeCl2 dissolves into the melt allowing the un-blocked electrode to sustain large reduction currents. Future work will investigate ways to increase FeCl2 concentration in the melt and to facilitate its oxidation in order to optimize the molten salt catholyte electrochemical behavior and demonstrate it in a working battery. This work was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity through the Energy Storage Research Program, managed by Dr. Imre Gyuk. Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. This paper describes objective technical results and analysis. Any subjective views or opinions that might be expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy or the United States Government. SAND2022-16623 A

AbstractWhy would Russia, a major power, be thwarted for fourteen years in its attempt to join the World Trade Organization (WTO)? Through a detailed examination of Russia's WTO accession negotiations, the diplomatic processes of the WTO's accession procedures are uncovered, showing that this diplomacy is best understood as a complex process where state-level factors and international regime-level factors, such as the rules and conditions of accession, interact. In the Russian case, the dialogue's length partly reflects technical difficulties in specific elements of the negotiations and partly a degree of ambivalence in the Russian government's attitudes towards accession. The Russian economy's high degree of dependence on oil and gas exports has taken the short-run urgency out of the negotiations from the Russian point of view, while reinforcing the medium-term case for accession within the context of a diversification policy. Russia's new President Dmitry Medvedev and new Minister for the Economy Elvira Nabiullina are strongly committed to WTO accession as a basis for developing the Russian economy as an innovation-based economy. Meanwhile, Russia's former President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is sympathetic to that idea, but is inconsistent in his pronouncements. At the regime level, the key obstacles to accession in the past have been Russia's insistence on the freedom to maintain government agricultural subsidies and the reluctance of other WTO members to compromise on this issue. Since the Georgian crisis of August 2008, the United States has tended increasingly to use WTO accession as an instrument of political leverage vis-à-vis Russia. It must be assumed that Georgia will veto any Russian application for membership unless a satisfactory solution to the Abkhazia/South Ossetia issue can be found.

Currently, in accordance with the processes of globalization and global economic and environmental trends, the Russian government is focusing economic entities on the innovative development of the Russian economy. For the timber industry of the Russian Federation, which ranks first in the world in terms of timber reserves, a transition to innovative development is inevitable. This transition is due to the resource potential of the industry, global environmental trends of the "green economy", the prevailing market relations between the economic entities of the industry, the presence of a bank of scientific and technical and experimental development in the field of timber industry. The analysis of Russia's share in the global forestry market is carried out: the Russian Federation is the world leader in timber reserves, it has 1/5 of the world's forest reserves and, therefore, takes first place; Brazil ranks second in timber reserves, Canada is third and the United States is fourth. The structure of Russia's exports by product groups is examined: the country's most profitable budget item is the export of fuel and energy products, accounting for 64% of the total export structure, and only 3% of the export structure is the export of timber and paper products. Given the development trends of world oil markets and the geopolitical tensions of countries, it can be assumed that in the next 5 years, the total revenue of the Russian Federation from the export of fuel and energy products will significantly decrease and will cease to be the most profitable budget item in the country. Due to the fact that the Russian Federation is a world leader in timber reserves, we believe that the innovative development of the timber industry should be one of the leading areas in the industry development strategy of the Russian Federation, and accordingly in the export strategy of the Russian Federation. The main directions of the innovative development of the timber industry of the Russian Federation in the following sectors are identified: forestry, woodworking industry, pulp and paper industry, chemical production, logging, wooden housing construction.

The advanced in situ detection of gaseous pollutants, such as NOx or SOx, is of great interest in many applications, such as the automotive and coal industries. We will discuss the continued advancement of our low power sensors for these pollutants, leveraging the previous successful development of impedance spectroscopy-based sensors for the detection of gaseous I2.1-3 The sensors, composed of Pt interdigitated electrodes (IDEs) with a nanoporous adsorbent layer, can be tuned to selectively adsorb gases of interest through judicious material selection, and the electrical response directly correlated to gas concentration. The current work is focused on exploring these nanoporous phases (metal-organic frameworks (MOFs), zeolites, etc.) for the real-time detection of NOx. The sensors have been successfully demonstrated for detection of trace NO2 (0.5 – 5 ppm),4 and experimental results, collected at relatively low temperature (25-50°C), will be discussed. Other recent work exploring the direct growth of crystalline MOF membranes, through the chemical functionalization of the surface of interdigitated electrodes will also be discussed.5 Direct growth of thin MOF films on surface functionalized IDEs has been shown to result in increased sensor sensitivity and a faster response time. Lastly, we will present initial results for the use of the sensors in the selective detection of NO2 in complex environments (e.g. presence of H2O, CO2, etc.).6 Acknowledgements Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. This paper describes objective technical results and analysis. Any subjective views or opinions that might be expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy or the United States Government. References Small, L.J and Nenoff, T.M., ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces, 2017, 9 (51), 44649. Small, L.J.; Krumhansl, J.L.; Rademacher, D.X.; Nenoff, T.M. Meso. Mater., 2019, 280, 82. Small, L.J.; Hill, R. C.; Krumhansl, J. L.; Schindelholz, M. E.; Chen, Z.; Chapman, K.W.; Zhang, X.; Yang, S.; Schroder, M.; Nenoff, T.M., ACS Applied Materials and Interfaces, 2019, 11 (31), 27982. Small, L.J.; Henkelis, S.E; Rademacher, D.X.; Schindelholz, M. E.; Krumhansl, J. L.; Vogel, D.J.; Nenoff, T.M, Advanced Functional Materials, 2020, 30 (50), 2006598. Henkelis, S.E; Percival, S.J.; Small, L.J; Rademacher, D.X.; Nenoff, T.M, Membranes, 2021, 11 (3), 176. Percival, S.J.; Henkelis, S.E; Li, M.; Schindelholz, M.E.; Krumhansl, J. L.; Small, L.J.; Lobo, R.F.; Nenoff, T.M., I Eng. Chem. Res., 2021, 60 (40), 14371.

As the energy density of systems of lithium-ion batteries increases, and as they are employed in larger-scale energy storage systems, greater attention must be paid to the safety of these systems. Failure of a single cell can trigger thermal runaway processes that cascade through the system, endangering first responders and nearby structures. This cascading failure is driven by heat transfer through the system to vulnerable cells and other combustible materials. To understand how to mitigate thermal runaway, the most important heat transfer pathways must be characterized in terms of their magnitude and time scale. Heat must be removed from cells that have gone into thermal runaway without leading vulnerable cells into thermal runaway. The onset of thermal runaway typically occurs around 200oC and depends on the heating time (i.e. cells heated slowly in an oven will begin thermal runaway around 150oC). The objective then becomes avoiding these thermal runaway temperatures for surrounding cells while dissipating any heat released from an initial thermal runaway event. While there are many individual parameters that describe the cells and system, in this work it will be seen that the thermal analysis can be reduced to a collection of non-dimensional parameters. These parameters describe heat conduction within the cell, heat capacity of a cell, total heat released by a cell in thermal runaway, conductive heat transfer to adjacent cells and surroundings, and convective heat transfer to surrounding gases. Figure 1 depicts a notional module of cells packed together where cascading thermal runaway has begun propagating through the cells. Heat is dissipated by conduction away from the thermal runaway front through adjacent cells and to the surroundings through convection. The relative time scales of these rates determine the propagation speed and ultimately the point at which cascading thermal runaway is mitigated. Figure 1 Caption: Heat transfer pathways in a module of tightly packed cells. A simple cell-to-cell propagation scenario is constructed to separately investigate the heat transfer parameter space. In this model scenario, an “initiating” cell is assumed to have just completed thermal runaway and exhausted all its reactants. This heats that cell to a high temperature that depends on the cell chemistry and state of charge. Adjacent to this “initiating” cell is the “target” cell. We use canonical heat transfer problems to identify a set of parameters that determine the temperature of the “target” cell. The parameters consider the thermal resistance between cells and the heat capacity of the involved materials as well as convective heat losses to the ambient surroundings. The thermal parameter space is interrogated by solving the transient heat transfer problem with a combination of analytical techniques and the finite volume software LIM1TR. The maximum temperature reached by the edge of the target cell is recorded and used as the criteria for the boundary between propagation and mitigation. The scaling relationships developed through this analysis can provide thermal engineers and system designers with a framework for predicting the safety of battery pack designs in the context of cascading thermal runaway. Acknowledgment: Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC., a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA-0003525. This paper describes objective technical results and analysis. Any subjective views or opinions that might be expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy or the United States Government. SAND2021-15938 A Figure 1

Wide-bandgap semiconductors have a significant advantage over conventional Si-based electronics by leveraging materials properties to achieve higher breakdown voltage, lower on-resistance, and high-frequency operation. For electric vehicle drivetrains, this translates to higher efficiency and power density, resulting in more miles driven per charge. This move towards wide-bandgap power electronics is necessary to achieve the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) power electronics density target of 100 kW/L. Vertical gallium nitride-based power devices are expected to exceed Si and even SiC-based systems with the promise of increased performance and power density. Compared to lateral GaN devices, a vertical topology promotes more efficient scaling towards high-power applications, where both high voltage and high current are necessary. This talk describes our team’s effort towards developing vertical GaN MOSFETs. The results of Sandia’s first-generation device demonstrator serve as a milestone in the path of producing devices rated for 1200-V and 100-A operation. The vertical GaN trench MOSFET is unique compared to Si- or SiC-alternatives in that the doped layers comprising the source and body regions are grown by epitaxy rather than formed by ion implantation. Challenges with selective-area doping in GaN add additional complexity to the design of a trench MOSFET. In addition, the lack of a high-quality native oxide in GaN means that the gate dielectric must be deposited rather than thermally grown. The devices produced at Sandia rely on atomic-layer-deposited thin films for the gate dielectric (primarily Al2O3 or SiO2). First-generation results demonstrate devices capable of 400 mA/mm drain current, 108 on/off ratio, and a positive threshold voltage near 8 V. More recently, devices capable of blocking 500 V in the off-state have been demonstrated. Device failure in the off-state results from high fields in the gate dielectric, which can be minimized by reducing the trench etch depth or by increasing the voltage rating of the drift region. However, further shielding of the gate dielectric to achieve substantially higher off-state voltages requires significant changes to the device architecture which are reliant on selective-area doping. In addition, device-killing defects either from the starting substrate, the epitaxy, or defects introduced during processing limit yield for large-area devices and present a substantial obstacle to scale devices for high-current operation. Hence, methods for reducing cell pitch and increasing packing density are highly valued. In this talk, we will discuss the path forward for achieving higher breakdown voltages and high-current operation using GaN-specific strategies to achieve better performing devices, as well as some of the challenges for vertical GaN development. This work provides a foundational platform for developing next-generation power electronics that employ wide bandgap, gallium nitride semiconductors. This work was supported by the Electric Drivetrain Consortium managed by Susan Rogers of DOE’s Vehicle Technologies Office. Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. This paper describes objective technical results and analysis. Any subjective views or opinions that might be expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy or the United States Government. Figure 1

Wide-bandgap semiconductors have a significant advantage over conventional Si-based electronics by leveraging materials properties to achieve higher breakdown voltage, lower on-resistance, and high-frequency operation. Gallium nitride (GaN) is of interest for vertical device architectures but directly competes with the already established silicon carbide (SiC) power devices. In the case of vertical GaN rectifiers which are unipolar figure-of-merit limited, the materials advantage of GaN provides a modest gain in terms of critical electric field and very slight gains in bulk mobility and saturation velocity, while being at a disadvantage in terms of thermal conductivity compared to SiC. However, despite still being a very immature technology, vertical GaN MOSFETs have demonstrated channel mobilities upwards of 200 cm2/V·s, over three times that of SiC-based MOSFETs. For 1200V-class devices, channel mobility directly contributes to a significant portion of device on-resistance, and it is therefore expected that vertical GaN MOSFETs would offer a substantial performance advantage compared to SiC MOSFETs. Despite this, the development of vertical GaN devices that demonstrate this theoretical potential faces many challenges. Several fundamental limitations exist within the manufacturing process that prohibit GaN devices from directly mirroring the design rules for similar SiC devices. In this talk, we will discuss several key design concepts recently developed for vertical GaN MOSFETs which serve to address several critical issues for GaN. Limitations in selective-area doping for GaN provide an additional challenge in designing edge termination structures, advanced features that protect the gate dielectric during the blocking state, and provides restrictions on minimizing cell pitch. Proper edge termination design is required to reach an avalanche voltage near the theoretical limit and avoid early breakdown. We present an optimized design point for the edge termination with a good match between theoretical and experimental data using a step-etched junction termination extension. Despite a well-designed edge termination, early breakdown will occur in the gate dielectric at the bottom of the gate trench due to field crowding in the dielectric at high blocking voltages. We propose a new method for protecting the gate dielectric by means of a buried field shield formed by an etch-and-regrowth process. Experimental data shows this gate dielectric failure can occur as early as 1/3rd of the designed blocking voltage. The field shield design is shown in simulation to sufficiently reduce the electric field in the gate dielectric to below 4 MV/cm with minimal or no derating of the device depending on geometry of the shield. Additional methods will be presented on new techniques to minimize cell pitch, a critical factor necessary to compete against SiC. Cell pitch minimization not only reduces on-resistance and gate-charge trade-offs, but it is also a driving factor to reduce cost and increase die density on wafer. Finally, techniques have been developed for advanced metal contact designs specific to the trench MOSFET, which further aid in reducing cell pitch. This work was supported by the Electric Drivetrain Consortium managed by Susan Rogers of DOE’s Vehicle Technologies Office. Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. This paper describes objective technical results and analysis. Any subjective views or opinions that might be expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy or the United States Government.

ContentsGreen Chemistry in the International ContextThe Concept of green ChemistryDefinition of green chemistry | Green chemistry: Why now? | The historical context of green chemistry | The emergence of green chemistryThe Content of Green ChemistryAreas of green chemistry | Preliminary remarks | Alternative feedstocks | Benign reagents/synthetic pathways | Synthetic transformations | Solvents/reaction conditionsGreen Chemistry in the International ContextIt has come to be recognized in recent years, that the science of chemistry is central to addressing the problems facing the environment. Through the utilization of the various subdisciplines of chemistry and the molecular sciences, there is an increasing appreciation that the emerging area of green chemistry1is needed in the design and attainment of sustainable development. A central driving force in this increasing awareness is that green chemistry accomplishes both economic and environmental goals simultaneously through the use of sound, fundamental scientific principles. Recently, a basic strategy has been proposed for implementing the relationships between industry and academia, and hence, funding of the research that constitutes the engine of economic advancement; it is what many schools of economics call the "triple bottom line" philosophy, meaning that an enterprise will be economically sustainable if the objectives of environmental protection, societal benefit, and market advantage are all satisfied2. Triple bottom line is a strong idea for evaluating the success of environmental technologies. It is clear that the best environmentally friendly technology or discovery will not impact on the market if it is not economically advantageous; in the same way, the market that ignores environmental needs and human involvement will not prosper. This is the challenge for the future of the chemical industry, its development being strongly linked to the extent to which environmental and human needs can be reconciled with new ideas in fundamental research. On the other hand, it should be easy to foresee that the success of environmentally friendly reactions, products, and processes will improve competitiveness within the chemical industry. If companies are able to meet the needs of society, people will influence their own governments to foster those industries attempting such environmental initiatives. Of course, fundamental research will play a central role in achieving these worthy objectives. What we call green chemistry may in fact embody some of the most advanced perspectives and opportunities in chemical sciences.It is for these reasons that the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) has a central role to play in advancing and promoting the continuing emergence and impact of green chemistry. When we think about how IUPAC furthers chemistry throughout the world, it is useful to refer to IUPAC's Strategic Plan. This plan demonstrates the direct relevance of the mission of IUPAC to green chemistry, and explains why there is growing enthusiasm for the pursuit of this new area as an appropriate activity of a scientific Union. The IUPAC Strategic Plan outlines among other goals:IUPAC will serve as a scientific, international, nongovernmental body in objectively addressing global issues involving the chemical sciences. Where appropriate, IUPAC will represent the interests of chemistry in governmental and nongovernmental forums.IUPAC will provide tools (e.g., standardized nomenclature and methods) and forums to help advance international research in the chemical sciences.IUPAC will assist chemistry-related industry in its contributions to sustainable development, wealth creation, and improvement in the quality of life.IUPAC will facilitate the development of effective channels of communication in the international chemistry community.IUPAC will promote the service of chemistry to society in both developed and developing countries.IUPAC will utilize its global perspective to contribute toward the enhancement of education in chemistry and to advance the public understanding of chemistry and the scientific method.IUPAC will make special efforts to encourage the career development of young chemists.IUPAC will broaden the geographical base of the Union and ensure that its human capital is drawn from all segments of the world chemistry community.IUPAC will encourage worldwide dissemination of information about the activities of the Union.IUPAC will assure sound management of its resources to provide maximum value for the funds invested in the Union.Through the vehicle of green chemistry, IUPAC can engage and is engaging the international community in issues of global importance to the environment and to industry, through education of young and established scientists, the provision of technical tools, governmental engagement, communication to the public and scientific communities, and the pursuit of sustainable development. By virtue of its status as a leading and internationally representative scientific body, IUPAC is able to collaborate closely in furthering individual national efforts as well as those of multinational entities.An important example of such collaboration in the area of green chemistry is that of IUPAC with the Organization for the Economical Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the project on "Sustainable Chemistry", aimed at promoting increased awareness of the subject in the member countries. During a meeting of the Environment Directorate (Paris, 6 June 1999), it was proposed that United States and Italy co-lead the activity, and that implementation of five recommendations to the member countries be accorded the highest priority, namely:research and developmentawards and recognition for work on sustainable chemistryexchange of technical information related to sustainable chemistryguidance on activities and tools to support sustainable chemistry programssustainable chemistry educationThese recommendations were perceived to have socio-economic implications for worldwide implementation of sustainable chemistry. How IUPAC and, in particular, its Divisions can contribute to this effort is under discussion. IUPAC is recognized for its ability to act as the scientific counterpart to OECD for all recommendations and activities. Although the initiatives being developed by the OECD are aimed primarily at determining the role that national institutions can play in facilitating the implementation and impact of green chemistry, it is recognized that each of these initiatives also has an important scientific component. Whether it is developing criteria or providing technical assessment for awards and recognition, identifying appropriate scientific areas for educational incorporation, or providing scientific insight into the areas of need for fundamental research and development, IUPAC can play and is beginning to play an important role as an international scientific authority on green chemistry.Other multinational organizations including, among others, the United Nations, the European Union, and the Asian Pacific Economic Community, are now beginning to assess the role that they can play in promoting the implementation of green chemistry to meet environmental and economic goals simultaneously. As an alternative to the traditional regulatory framework often implemented as a unilateral strategy, multinational governmental organizations are discovering that green chemistry as a nonregulatory, science-based approach, provides opportunities for innovation and economic development that are compatible with sustainable development. In addition, individual nations have been extremely active in green chemistry and provide plentiful examples of the successful utilization of green chemistry technologies. There are rapidly growing activities in government, industry, and academia in the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Japan, China, and many other countries in Europe and Asia, that testify to the importance of green chemistry to the future of the central science of chemistry around the world.Organizations and Commissions currently involved in programs in green chemistry at the national or international level include, for example:U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with the "Green Chemistry Program" which involves, among others, the National Science Foundation, the American Chemical Society, and the Green Chemistry Institute;European Directorate for R&D (DG Research), which included the goals of sustainable chemistry in the actions and research of the European Fifth Framework Programme;Interuniversity Consortium "Chemistry for the Environment", which groups about 30 Italian universities interested in environmentally benign chemistry and funds their research groups;UK Royal Society of Chemistry, which promotes the concept of green chemistry through a "UK Green Chemistry Network" and the scientific journal Green Chemistry;UNIDO-ICS (International Centre for Science and High Technology of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization) which is developing a global program on sustainable chemistry focusing on catalysis and cleaner technologies with particular attention to developing and emerging countries (the program is also connected with UNIDO network of centers for cleaner production); andMonash University, which is the first organization in Australia to undertake a green chemistry program.Footnotes:1. The terminology "green chemistry" or "sustainable chemistry" is the subject of debate. The expressions are intended to convey the same or very similar meanings, but each has its supporters and detractors, since "green" is vividly evocative but may assume an unintended political connotation, whereas "sustainable" can be paraphrased as "chemistry for a sustainable environment", and may be perceived as a less focused and less incisive description of the discipline. Other terms have been proposed, such as "chemistry for the environment" but this juxtaposition of keywords already embraces many diversified fields involving the environment, and does not capture the economic and social implications of sustainability. The Working Party decided to adopt the term green chemistry for the purpose of this overview. This decision does not imply official IUPAC endorsement for the choice. In fact, the IUPAC Committee on Chemistry and Industry (COCI) favors, and will continue to use sustainable chemistry to describe the discipline.2. J. Elkington, < http://www.sustainability.co.uk/sustainability.htm

Vertical gallium nitride (GaN) power devices continue to garner interest in multiple power conversion applications requiring a medium-voltage (1.2 – 20 kV) capability. Currently, silicon carbide (SiC) is addressing this voltage range, however, with a comparable critical electric field and superior mobility, GaN is expected to offer advantages in applications where fast switching and avalanche breakdown response times are desired. While uses in electric vehicles, solid-state transformers, and renewable energy conversion are being actively explored, the potential of a vertical GaN device for electric grid protection in the form of an electromagnetic pulse arrestor is a unique proposition that requires very fast transient capabilities (<1 µs pulse widths with rise-times on the order of 10 ns). However, vertical GaN devices are significantly less mature than present SiC offerings. Specifically, low-doped, thick epitaxial growth of GaN via metal-organic chemical vapor deposition (MOCVD) still presents many challenges, and advancements in processing, manufacturability, and failure analysis are needed. In this work, we describe our efforts to address the above issues and advance the state-of-the-art in vertical GaN PN diode development. We have successfully demonstrated an MOCVD-grown, 50 µm thick, low-doped (<1015 cm-3) drift region on a GaN substrate that was processed into relatively large-area (1 mm2) PN diodes capable of achieving a 6.7 kV breakdown. Temperature-dependent breakdown was observed, consistent with the avalanche process. The devices consisted of a 4-zone step-etched junction termination extension (JTE), where the breakdown region was visualized via electroluminescence (EL) imaging. Ongoing work aims to scale the current capability of the medium-voltage diodes through a parallel interconnect design that negates defective or poor performing diodes. Further investigation of edge termination structures was explored using a bevel approach, where we studied the relationship between the bevel angle and p-doping. It was found that a very shallow angle of only 5° accompanied by a 500 nm p-region consisting of 3×1017 cm-3 Mg concentration resulted in a consistent 1.2 kV breakdown for an 8 µm thick, 1.6×1016 cm-3 doped drift region. EL imaging confirmed uniform breakdown, and temperature dependence was demonstrated. The bevel approach was then implemented on a diode structure with a 20 µm thick drift region capable of 3.3 kV breakdown, where an unclamped inductive switching (UIS) test was performed to evaluate the impact of a field plate design on avalanche uniformity and ruggedness. A parallel effort to establish a foundry process for vertical GaN devices has been underway. Initially, this focus was on comprehensive studies of GaN wafer metrology using capacitance-voltage (C-V) mapping, optical profilometry, and x-ray diffraction (XRD) mapping. A machine learning algorithm was implemented to identify defective regions and produce a yield prediction for each GaN wafer prior to processing. A hybrid edge termination structure consisting of implanted guard rings (GR) and JTEs was developed in coordination with a controlled experiment that varied the anode thickness, and therefore the remaining p-GaN after implantation. It was observed that thinner p-GaN regions under the JTE/GR region resulted in a significant (>100x) reduction in leakage current under reverse-bias conditions. This process has resulted in 1.2-kV-class devices with up to 18 A forward current for a 1 mm2 device with a specific on-resistance of 1.2 mOhm-cm2. The foundry effort has since been extended to 3.3-kV-class devices that utilize 25 µm thick drift layers with ~2-4×1015 cm-3 doping. These devices have demonstrated up to 3.8 kV breakdown with leakage currents <1 nA up to 3 kV. More than 40 wafers have been processed to date, resulting in >20,000 devices. Statistical variations in I-V and C-V characteristics will be discussed. Packaging process development and analysis are underway to develop electrical stress procedures and identify fundamental failure mechanisms. Finally, a pulse arrested spark discharge (PASD) setup, capable of up to 15 kV pulsed operation in 100 V steps, was implemented to quantify the time response of avalanche breakdown. Initial results on a packaged 800 V device showed a ~1 ns response time during breakdown, which reinforces the potential EMP grid protection applicability. This work was supported by the ARPA-E OPEN+ Kilovolt Devices Cohort directed by Dr.Isik Kizilyalli. Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. This paper describes objective technical results and analysis. Any subjective views or opinions that might be expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy of the United States Government.

e Romanian Convention of Armistice, signed in Moscow on 12 – 13 September 1944, provided to the Soviet Union the right to represent all interests of the United Nations by ruling the Allied Control Commission on Romania, to which the United States and the United Kingdom represensatives were attached. British documents on microches, studied at the Romanian National Archives, provided a clear insight on the Romanian a$airs approached by the Big ree Powers in the autumn of 1944.One could easily notice the fact that not only did the Soviets interfere in Romanian a$airs from the beginning but they also a$ected the rights, mainly economic, in Romania of all other states of the United Nations, the Great Britain and the United States especially. After Churchill-Stalin’s “Percentages Agreement”, the Soviets, using false arguments, increased their purely unilateral activities, in disregard even of the 10% percent British, by removing British and American-owned oil concerns’ equipment although His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government made serious unsuccessful protests.e United Kingdom succeeded in having the Oce of Political Representatives, through which the Foreign Oce was made known about the political developments with Romanian Government and Romanian patriots’ help, who sincerely believed in the generous principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations.

“In summary, the problem of the peaking of conventional world oil production is unlike any yet faced by modern industrial society. The challenges and uncertainties need to be much better understood. Technologies exist to mitigate the problem. Timely, aggressive risk management will be essential.” This quotation is from the executive summary of a major report issued in February 2005 on the peaking of world oil production. That in itself is unremarkable, but the document – which has come to be known as “The Hirsch Report” – was sponsored by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). There are all the usual disclaimers about the policy of the United States Government. Nevertheless, as early as 2003, DOE clearly decided that a sound technical analysis of the issues raised by the approach of “Peak Oil” was a job which would be worth the investment of time and money.

System Engineering (SE) solves the most complex problems by bringing together societal issues, theoretical engineering, and the transformation of theory into products and services to better mankind and reduce suffering. The research of this paper utilizes transdisciplinary engineering to develop a SE methodology for the concept stage permitting proposal generation accuracy and expediency to provide solutions to counter regional aggressive threats. Today’s world stage is witnessing superpower dominance over neighboring less military-capable nations. The societal impact goes beyond the borders of conflict and affects the world’s global market. In the deterrence of dominance, the United States’ posture is providing weapon systems to the victim in our increasingly unstable geopolitical environment. The US has many reasons to make this technology available to other nations; just as it has many reasons to constrain proliferation. The United States Government is energizing the U.S. defense industry to provide the needed weapon systems following US prescribed acquisition methods. The sale of US weapon systems to International Customers is through a US defense contractor implementing a specialized acquisition model specific for international customers acquiring exportable defense articles. These constraints in the form of export regulations, critical to this paper, are essential to account for early in the concept development. The added complexity to concept development in international defense is that in addition to the usual, “what capabilities does the customer need to accomplish their mission?” and “what are the alternative solutions?” questions, we need to address the fact that US contracts may be required to limit capabilities and/or the technical solution space in opposition to the international customer’s desires. Whereas we normally turn to systems engineering processes to address such complex problems, we have found that the current SE methodology for the concept stage does not address the complexities associated with international sales. The international customers’ need for complex solutions in an expedited time frame emphasizes the prime contractor’s complex and inadequate proposal concept stage. Under U.S. government procurement, the prime contractor shifts a portion of the design phase into the concept phase. This modality requires significant time and funding to fully develop the technical baseline, meanwhile, the international customer requires a solution to react to an immediate threat to their country’s safety. The main objective of this research is to develop a system engineering methodology for the concept stage to effectively understand the technical baseline maturity for proposals specific to International Customers.

CHIEF EDITOR Ahmad Faris Ismail, IIUM, Malaysia EXECUTIVE EDITOR AHM Zahirul Alam, IIUM, Malaysia ASSOCIATE EDITOR Anis Nurashikin Nordin, IIUM, Malaysia LANGUAGE EDITOR Lynn Mason, Malaysia COPY EDITOR Hamzah Mohd. Salleh, IIUM, Malaysia EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS Abdullah Al-Mamun, IIUM, Malaysia Abdumalik Rakhimov, IIUM, Malaysia Amir Akramin Shafie, IIUM, Malaysia Erry Yulian Triblas Adesta, IIUM, Malaysia Erwin Sulaeman, IIUM, Malaysia Hanafy Omar, Saudi Arabia Hazleen Anuar, IIUM, Malaysia Konstantin Khanin, University of Toronto, Canada Ma'an Al-Khatib, IIUM, Malaysia Md Zahangir Alam, IIUM, Malaysia Meftah Hrairi, IIUM, Malaysia Mohamed B. Trabia, United States Mohammad S. Alam, Texas A&M University-Kingsville, United States Muataz Hazza Faizi Al Hazza, IIUM, Malaysia Mustafizur Rahman, National University Singapore, Singapore Nor Farahidah Binti Za'bah, IIUM, Malaysia Ossama Abdulkhalik, Michigan Technological University, United States Rosminazuin AB. Rahim, IIUM, Malaysia Waqar Asrar, IIUM, Malaysia INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE Anwar, United States Abdul Latif Bin Ahmad, Malaysia Farzad Ismail, USM, Pulau Pinang, Malaysia Hanafy Omar, Saudi Arabia Hany Ammar, United States Idris Mohammed Bugaje, Nigeria K.B. Ramachandran, India Kunzu Abdella, Canada Luis Le Moyne, ISAT, University of Burgundy, France M Mujtaba, United Kingdom Mohamed AI-Rubei, Ireland Mohamed B Trabia, United States Mohammad S. Alam, Texas A&M University-Kingsville, United States Nazmul Karim Ossama Abdulkhalik, Michigan Technological University, United States Razi Nalim, IUPUI, Indianapolis, Indiana, United States Syed Kamrul Islam, United States Tibor Czigany, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary Yiu-Wing Mai, The University of Sydney, Australia. AIMS & SCOPE OF IIUMENGINEERING JOURNAL The IIUM Engineering Journal, published biannually, is a carefully refereed international publication of International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Contributions of high technical merit within the span of engineering disciplines; covering the main areas of engineering: Electrical and Computer Engineering; Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering; Automation and Mechatronics Engineering; Material and Chemical Engineering; Environmental and Civil Engineering; Biotechnology and Bioengineering; Engineering Mathematics and Physics; and Computer Science and Information Technology are considered for publication in this journal. Contributions from other areas of Engineering and Applied Science are also welcomed. The IIUM Engineering Journal publishes contributions under Regular papers, Invited review papers, Short communications, Technical notes, and Letters to the editor (with publication charge). REFEREES’ NETWORK All papers submitted to IIUM Engineering Journal will be subjected to a rigorous reviewing process through a worldwide network of specialized and competent referees. Each accepted paper should have at least two positive referees’ assessments. SUBMISSION OF A MANUSCRIPT A manuscript should be submitted online to the IIUM-Engineering Journal website: https://journals.iium.edu.my/ejournal. Further correspondence on the status of the paper could be done through the journal website and the e-mail addresses of the Executive Editor: zahirulalam@iium.edu.my Faculty of Engineering, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Jan Gombak, 53100, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Phone: (603) 6196 4529, Fax:(603) 6196 4488. Published by International Islamic University Malaysia Jalan Gombak, 53100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Phone (+603) 6196-5018, Fax: (+603) 6196-6298 Website: http://www.iium.edu.my/office/iiumpress Whilst every effort is made by the publisher and editorial board to see that no inaccurate or misleading data, opinion or statement appears in this Journal, they wish to make it clear that the data and opinions appearing in the articles and advertisement herein are the responsibility of the contributor or advertiser concerned. Accordingly, the publisher and the editorial committee accept no liability whatsoever for the consequence of any such inaccurate or misleading data, opinion or statement. IIUM ENGINEERING JOURNAL ISSN: 1511-788X E-ISSN: 2289-7860 Volume 20, Issue 1, June 2019 Table of Content Editorial Page COVER PAGE CHEMICAL AND BIOTECHNOLOGY ENGINEERING COMPARATIVE METAGENOMICS ANALYSIS OF PALM OIL MILL EFFLUENT (POME) USING THREE DIFFERENT BIOINFORMATICS PIPELINES Adibah parmen, MOHD NOOR MAT ISA, FARAH FADWA BENBELGACEM, Hamzah Mohd Salleh, Ibrahim Ali Noorbatcha 1 - 11 PDF LIPASE IMMOBILIZATION ON FIBERS GRAFTED WITH POLYGLYCIDYL METHACHRYLATE Maan Alkhatib, Nik Adlin Bahrudin, HAMZAH M. SALLEH, Teo M. Ting 12 - 23 PDF COLONY COMPOSITION AND BIOMASS OF MACROTERMES GILVUS HAGEN (BLATTODEA: TERMITIDAE) IN INDONESIA NIKEN SUBEKTI, Priyantini Widiyaningrum, Dodi Nandika, Dedy Duryadi Solihin 24 - 28 PDF CIVIL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING A SURVEY OF MATLAB EFFICIENCY IN DAMAGE DETECTION OF CONCRETE GRAVITY IN CONCRETE GRAVITY DAMS Sajad Esmaielzadeh, Hassan Ahmadi, Seyed Abbas Hosseini 29 - 48 PDF IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT ASSET MANAGEMENT USING TERRESTRIAL LASER SCANNER (TLS) AS PART OF BUILDING INFORMATION MODELLING (BIM) Asep Yusup Saptari, S. Hendriatiningsih, Dony Bagaskara, Levana Apriani 49 - 69 PDF THE ANALYSIS OF LIQUEFACTION PHENOMENON OF THE FLEXIBLE PAVEMENT USING SEISMIC MONITORING EQUIPMENT RINI KUSUMAWARDANI, Untoro Nugroho, Sri Handayani, Mareta Aspirilia Fananda 70 - 78 PDF ELECTRICAL, COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING PSG DYNAMIC CHANGES IN METHAMPHETAMINE ABUSE USING RECURRENCE QUANTIFICATION ANALYSIS Sayyed Majid Mazinani, GHASEM SADEGHI BAJESTANI 79 - 89 PDF FINITE ELEMENT SIMULATION OF MEMS PIEZOELECTRIC ENERGY SCAVENGER BASED ON PZT THIN FILM Aliza Aini Md Ralib, Nur Wafa Asyiqin Zulfakher, Rosminazuin Ab Rahim, Nor Farahidah Za'bah, Noor Hazrin Hany Mohamad Hanif 90 - 99 PDF Evaluation on the Effectiveness of Visual Learning Environment on Programming Course From Students’ Perspectives Nasa Zata Dina, Eto Wuryanto, Rachman Sinatriya Marjianto 100 - 107 PDF TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT TRAFFIC CONGESTION PREDICTION METHOD BASED ON NEURAL NETWORKS AND BIG GPS DATA Wiam Elleuch, Ali Wali, Adel M. Alimi 108 - 118 PDF AUGMENTATIVE AND ALTERNATIVE COMMUNICATION METHOD BASED ON TONGUE CLICKING FOR MUTE DISABILITIES NIK NUR WAHIDAH NIK HASHIM, MUHAMMAD AMIRUL AMIN AZMI, HAZLINA MD. YUSOF 119 - 128 PDF A COMBINED DEEP LEARNING MODEL FOR PERSIAN SENTIMENT ANALYSIS Zahra Bokaee Nezhad, Mohammad Ali Deihimi 129 - 139 PDF MODIFIED CAPACITOR ASSISTED EXTENDED BOOST QUASI Z-SOURCE INVERTER FOR THE GRID-CONNECTED PV SYSTEM N Hemalatha, Seyezhai Ramalingam 140 - 157 PDF A NOVEL USER PROFILE-BASED FUZZY APPROACH FOR EVALUATING TRUST IN SEMANTIC WEB SOMAYEH ASHTARI, MALIHE DANESH, hossein shirgahi 158 - 176 PDF PLL-BASED 3?; INVERTER CIRCUIT FOR MICROGRID SYSTEM OPERATED BY ELECTROSTATIC GENERATOR S.M.A Motakabber, Tawfikur Rahman, Muhammad I. Ibrahimy, A. H. M. Zahirul Alam 177 - 193 PDF INTELLIGENT CONTROL SYSTEM OF A WHEELCHAIR FOR PEOPLE WITH QUADRIPLEGIA PARALYSIS hayder Fadhil; Saif Hussam; Yasseen Sadoon 194 - 201 PDF MATERIALS AND MANUFACTURING ENGINEERING Adsorptive removal of Pb (II) using exfoliated graphite adsorbent:influence of experimental conditions and magnetic CoFe2O4 decoration Thi Thuong Nguyen, Thi Ngoc Thu Nguyen, Long Giang Bach, Duy Trinh Nguyen, Thi Phuong Quynh Bui 202 - 215 PDF Grease Quality Issues on Middle Voltage Switchgear: Corrosivity, Resistivity, Safety and Ageing Mohd Sabri Mahmud, Sanuri Ishak, Mohd Najib Razali, Mohd Aizudin Abdul Aziz, Musfafikri Musa 216 - 228 PDF MECHANICAL AND AEROSPACE ENGINEERING A RANS K-? SIMULATION OF 2D TURBULENT NATURAL CONVECTION IN AN ENCLOSURE WITH HEATING SOURCES mehdi ahmadi, Seyed Ali Agha Mirjalily, Seyed Amir Abbas Oloomi 240 - 255 PDF MECHATRONICS AND AUTOMATION ENGINEERING MAGNETICALLY INDUCED PIEZOELECTRIC ENERGY HARVESTER VIA HYBRID KINETIC MOTION Huda Azam, Noor Hazrin Hany Mohamad Hanif, Aliza Aini Md Ralib 256 - 268 PDF

This report covers calendar 1991. Since 1983 the Forest Research Advisory Council of Canada (FRACC) has advised Forestry Canada on forestry research priorities and policies. In 1987 the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers (CCFM) agreed to establish forest research advisory groups in each jurisdiction, and requested FRACC to coordinate an annual countrywide review of forestry research priorities and concerns. Since then, and with the assistance and cooperation of the provincial and territorial research advisory bodies, FRACC has prepared an annual overview of forestry research priorities for CCFM; this report has subsequently been published in The Forestry Chronicle.Forestry Canada made its first annual report to Parliament in 1991. Council considers it a good beginning for a process that will be valuable in alerting Members of Parliament and the public to forestry issues and the importance of forestry research. During the year Forestry Canada made good progress in preparing mission statements for its establishments. Not only are these statements important in explaining the Department's role, but also the process of preparing them is equally important in building support and esprit de corps. FRACC is pleased to see Forestry Canada taking positive initiatives in other areas, namely, the inclusion of major research components in the new forestry agreements with the provinces; the Green Plan with its elements of forestry research and model forests; the progress made in biotechnology; and the development of the strategic research partnerships program with involvement of the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council and industry.Council makes the following recommendations:1. To better define the perceived scarcity of forestry scientists, Forestry Canada should promptly undertake or sponsor a study of the supply and demand for scientists in the various disciplines that make up forestry research.2. To foster a greater appreciation of the possibilities of a research career and to aid in establishing young scientists, Forestry Canada should provide more employment opportunities for undergraduate students through summer employment, participate fully with the universities in cooperative programs for graduate and undergraduate students, and enhance its "apprentice" type of programs for recent Ph.D. s such as post-doctorate fellowships both in-house and at the universities.3. Forestry Canada should expand the useful initiative of setting aside a relatively small portion of its budget in a fund to be used for following up quickly on promising new research approaches.4. To help ensure the sustainability of Canadian forest management, Forestry Canada should expand its in-house and cooperative research programs directed at a better understanding of the way forest ecosystems function.5. To expand research on integrated forest management, particularly the policy and socio-economic aspects, Forestry Canada should consult widely and explore the possibility of mounting cooperative research programs at national and regional levels involving its own forces, universities, provinces, industry, and non-government bodies such as the Institute for Research on Public Policy.6. Council strongly supports Forestry Canada's current effort to improve its technology transfer program to promote the application of research results; however, to meet the growing public demand for technical information on forestry and environmental matters, Forestry Canada should increase its emphasis on this aspect of technical information.7. To encourage scientists to work toward the application of their results, Forestry Canada should evaluate and modify, where possible, the scientists' rewards system so that it gives full recognition to technology transfer work including the preparation of effective "how-to" publications.8. Forestry Canada should ensure that research advisory bodies are in place for all its establishments, and should broaden the range of forest stakeholders who participate in these research advisory bodies and in those at the regional, provincial, and national levels.9. Forestry Canada should continue its emphasis on promoting high staff morale through participatory management, and should provide strong support to inter-establishment travel and dialogue, and for attendance at significant scientific conferences and workshops.10. To help prevent stagnation and encourage greater research productivity, Forestry Canada should increase opportunities for working sabbaticals and retraining of scientists and technical staff.11. To foster more long-range forestry research at universities in Canada, Forestry Canada should explore every avenue for implementing a program similar to the McIntyre-Stennis program in the United States.12. Forestry Canada should develop a method for bringing economic and social criteria to bear on selection of research projects and should incorporate this into its research planning process.Council will hold three meetings in 1992 and will give attention to the updating of the Forestry Research Inventory initiated in 1987 by Dr. A.J. Kayll; research execution, mechanisms, structures, and funding as distinct from planning processes; the document Sustainable Forests, A Canadian Commitment, with emphasis on the research aspects; further conclusions that might be drawn from the meetng with young scientists; means to encourage, support, and strengthen provincial and territorial research advisory bodies; further steps to strengthen technology transfer; Forestry Canada's headquarters forest economics program; forest workers' attitudes and training vis-à-vis environmental considerations in their daily work planning and execution; visiting a forest company's woodlands operations to learn their perceptions of research needs and views on research priority setting and management of research and technology transfer; and the major trends affecting the future of forestry and the implications for forestry research.

To sin by silence, when we should protest,Makes cowards out of men.— Ella Wheeler WilcoxProtest is culturally entwined in historical and juro-political realities and is a fundamental element of the exercise of individual and collective rights. As our title notes, while there are currently many ‘protests in progress’ around the world, there is also a great deal of ‘progress in protest’ in terms of what protests look like, their scale and number, how they are formed and conducted, their goals, how they can be studied, as well as the varying responses formed in relation to protest. The etymology of protest associates two important dynamics pertaining to the topic. Firstly, a protest is something that is put forward, forth, or toward the front (from the Latin pro); essentially, it is in one manner or another, made publically. Secondly, it suggests that a person or persons have beared witness (testis) and instead of remaining silent, have made a declaration or assertion (testari). In other words, someone has made public their disapproval or objection. The nine articles that comprise this issue of M/C Journal on ‘protest’ reminds us of these salient elements of protest. Each, in their own way, highlight the importance of not remaining silent when faced with an injustice or in order to promote social change. As Bill McKibben (7) outlines in his foreword to an excellent collection of protest documents, ‘voices of protest ... are often precisely what propels human civilisation forward and allows it to become unstuck’. However, not all forms of contemporary protest shares ideological or progressive aims. Here, we might consider the emergence of contentious formations such as the alt-right and antifa, what is considered ‘fake’ or ‘real’, and ongoing conflicts between notions of individual and collective rights and state sovereignty.This modest but insightful collection demonstrates the broad scope of this field of inquiry. This issue explores the intersections among social justice, identity and communications technology, as well as the convergences and divergences in the form, function and substance of protest. Through an analysis of protest’s relationship to media, the author’s highlight the possibilities of protest to effect social change. The issue begins with Lakota screenwriter and activist Floris White Bull’s (Floris Ptesáŋ Huŋká) discussion of the documentary AWAKE, a Dream from Standing Rock (2017) and the #NODAPL protest. The film, split into three parts, takes a poignant and quite personal look at the native-led peaceful resistance at the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota in 2016. This protest involved tens of thousands of activists from all over the world who opposed the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) which was to transport fracked oil directly underneath the Missouri River and through sovereign Lakota land (see Image 1). However, the events at Standing Rock were not a single-issue protest and brought activists together over a range of interrelated issues including environmental protection, human rights, water security, community health and Native American sovereignty. The Water Protectors were also forced to contest racist and disparaging media representations. As such, Standing Rock remains a site of cultural exchange and learning. These protests are not historical, but instead, are an ongoing struggle. The film AWAKE is important as testimony to the injustices at Standing Rock. A short description of the film is first provided in order to provide some additional context to perspectives addressed in the film. From there, White Bull has been invited to respond to questions posed by the editors regarding the Standing Rock Protests and documentary films such as AWAKE. As an Indigenous person fighting for justice, White Bull reminds readers that ‘[t]he path forward is the same as it has always been – holding on to our goals, values and dignity with resilience’.Image 1: Dakota Access Pipeline Protesters, 2016. Photo credit: Indigenous Environmental Network.Cat Pausé and Sandra Grey use an example of fat shaming to investigate how media impacts body politics and determines who is enfranchised to voice public dissent. Media becomes a mechanism for policing and governing bodily norms and gendered identities. As well as outlining a brief history of feminist body activism, the authors draw on personal experience and interview material with activists to reflect on fat embodiment and politics. Also informed by intersectional approaches, their work alerts us to the diverse vectors by which injustice and oppression fall on some bodies differently as well as the diverse bodies assembled in any crowd.Greg Watson suggests that “[c]ontemporary societies are increasingly becoming sites in which it is more difficult for people to respectfully negotiate disagreements about human diversity”. Drawing on his experiences organising Human Libraries throughout Australia, Watson argues these spaces create opportunities for engaging with difference. In this sense Human Libraries can be considered sites which protest the micropublics’ “codes of civility” which produce everyday marginalisations of difference.Micropolitics and creative forms of protest are also central to Ella Cutler, Jacqueline Gothe, and Alexandra Crosby’s article. The author’s consider three design projects which seek to facilitate ethical communication with diverse communities. Drawing on Guy Julier’s tactics for activist design, each project demonstrates the value of slowing down in order to pay attention to experience. In this way, research through design offers a reflexive means for engaging social change.Research practices are also central to making visible community resistance. Anthony McCosker and Timothy Graham consider the role of social networking in urban protests through the campaign to save the iconic Melbourne music venue The Palace (see Image 2). Their article considers the value of social media data and analytics in relation to the court proceedings and trial processes. Given the centrality of social media to activist campaigns their reflections provide a timely evaluation of how data publics are constituted and their ongoing legacy.Image 2: Melbourne’s Palace Theatre before demolition. Photo Credit: Melbourne Heritage Action.For Marcelina Piotrowski pleasure is central to understanding data production and protest. She draws on a Deleuze and Guattarian framework in order to consider protests against oil pipelines in British Columbia. Importantly, through this theoretical framework of ‘data desires’, pleasure is not something owned by the individual subject but rather holds the potential to construct generative social collectivities. This is traced through three different practices: deliberation in online forums; citizen science and social media campaigns. This has important implications for understanding environmental issues and our own enfolding within them. Nadine Kozak takes a look at how Online Service Providers (OSPs) have historically used internet ‘blackouts’ in order to protest United States government regulations. Kozak points to protests against the Communications Decency Act (1996) which sought to regulate online pornographic material and the Stop Online Piracy Act (2011) which proposed increased federal government power to take action against online copyright infringement. Recently, the United States Congress recently passed the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) and the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA), which hold OSPs liable for third-party content including advertising for prostitution. However, despite condemnation from the Department of Justice and trafficking victims, OSPs did not utilise blackouts as a means to protest these new measures. Kozak concludes that the decision to whether or not to utilise blackout protests is dependent on the interests of technology companies and large OSPs. It is evident that most especially since Donald Trump popularised the term, ‘fake news’ has taken a centre stage in discussions concerning media. In fact, the lines between what is fake and what is official have become blurred. Most recently, QAnon proponents have been attending Trump rallies and speeches giving further visibility to various conspiracy narratives stemming from online message boards (see Image 3). Marc Tuters, Emilija Jokubauskaitė, and Daniel Bach establishe a clear timeline of events in order to trace the origins of ‘#Pizzagate’; a 2016 conspiracy theory that falsely claimed that several U.S. restaurants and high-ranking officials of the Democratic Party were connected with human trafficking and an alleged child-sex ring. The authors investigate the affordances of 4chan to unpack how the site’s anonymity, rapid temporality and user collectivisation were instrumental in creating ‘bullshit’; a usage which the authors suggest is a “technical term for persuasive speech unconcerned with veracity”. This provides an understanding of how alt-right communities are assembled and motivated in a post-truth society. Image 3: QAnon proponents at Trump rally in Tampa, 31 July 2018. Photo credit: Kirby Wilson, Tampa Bay Times.Finally, Colin Salter analyses protests for animal rights as a lens to critique notions of national identity and belonging. Protests on whaling in the Southern Ocean (see Image 4) and live export trade from Australia continue to be highly contested political issues. Salter reflects on the ABC’s 2011 exposé into Australian live animal exports to Indonesia and the 2014 hearings at the International Court of Justice into Japanese whaling. Salter then traces the common elements between animal rights campaigns in order to demonstrate the manner in which the physical bodies of animals, their treatment, and the debate surrounding that treatment become sites for mapping cultural identity, nationhood, and sovereignty. Here, Salter suggests that such inquiry is useful for promoting broader consideration of efficacious approaches to animal advocacy and social change.Image 4: The ship Bob Barker, rammed by the Japanese whaling vessel Nishin Maru. Photo credit: Sea Shepherd Facebook Page. As indicated in the opening paragraphs, it is crucial for people committed to social justice to publically raise their voices in protest. As such, we would like to thank each of the authors for their important contributions to this issue on ‘protest’. In its own way, each contribution serves doubly as a form of protest and a means to understand the topic more clearly. There is solidarity evidenced in this issue. Taken as a whole, these articles attest to the importance of understanding protest and social change.ReferencesMcKibben, B. "Foreword." Voices of Protest: Documents of Courage and Dissent. Eds. Frank Lowenstein, Sheryl Lechner, and Erik Bruun. New York: Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers, 2007. 7-8.Wilcox, E.W. "Protest." Poems of Problems. Chicago: W.B. Conkey Company, 1914.

Photograph by Gonzalo Echeverria (2010)Declaring War Soon after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration described its new grand strategy: the “Global War on Terror”. This underpinned the subsequent counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and the United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Media pundits quickly applied the Global War on Terror label to the Madrid, Bali and London bombings, to convey how Al Qaeda’s terrorism had gone transnational. Meanwhile, international relations scholars debated the extent to which September 11 had changed the international system (Brenner; Mann 303). American intellectuals adopted several variations of the Global War on Terror in what initially felt like a transitional period of US foreign policy (Burns). Walter Laqueur suggested Al Qaeda was engaged in a “cosmological” and perpetual war. Paul Berman likened Al Qaeda and militant Islam to the past ideological battles against communism and fascism (Heilbrunn 248). In a widely cited article, neoconservative thinker Norman Podhoretz suggested the United States faced “World War IV”, which had three interlocking drivers: Al Qaeda and trans-national terrorism; political Islam as the West’s existential enemy; and nuclear proliferation to ‘rogue’ countries and non-state actors (Friedman 3). Podhoretz’s tone reflected a revival of his earlier Cold War politics and critique of the New Left (Friedman 148-149; Halper and Clarke 56; Heilbrunn 210). These stances attracted widespread support. For instance, the United States Marine Corp recalibrated its mission to fight a long war against “World War IV-like” enemies. Yet these stances left the United States unprepared as the combat situations in Afghanistan and Iraq worsened (Ricks; Ferguson; Filkins). Neoconservative ideals for Iraq “regime change” to transform the Middle East failed to deal with other security problems such as Pakistan’s Musharraf regime (Dorrien 110; Halper and Clarke 210-211; Friedman 121, 223; Heilbrunn 252). The Manichean and open-ended framing became a self-fulfilling prophecy for insurgents, jihadists, and militias. The Bush Administration quietly abandoned the Global War on Terror in July 2005. Widespread support had given way to policymaker doubt. Why did so many intellectuals and strategists embrace the Global War on Terror as the best possible “grand strategy” perspective of a post-September 11 world? Why was there so little doubt of this worldview? This is a debate with roots as old as the Sceptics versus the Sophists. Explanations usually focus on the Bush Administration’s “Vulcans” war cabinet: Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who later became Secretary of State (Mann xv-xvi). The “Vulcans” were named after the Roman god Vulcan because Rice’s hometown Birmingham, Alabama, had “a mammoth fifty-six foot statue . . . [in] homage to the city’s steel industry” (Mann x) and the name stuck. Alternatively, explanations focus on how neoconservative thinkers shaped the intellectual climate after September 11, in a receptive media climate. Biographers suggest that “neoconservatism had become an echo chamber” (Heilbrunn 242) with its own media outlets, pundits, and think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and Project for a New America. Neoconservatism briefly flourished in Washington DC until Iraq’s sectarian violence discredited the “Vulcans” and neoconservative strategists like Paul Wolfowitz (Friedman; Ferguson). The neoconservatives' combination of September 11’s aftermath with strongly argued historical analogies was initially convincing. They conferred with scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington and Victor Davis Hanson to construct classicist historical narratives and to explain cultural differences. However, the history of the decade after September 11 also contains mis-steps and mistakes which make it a series of contingent decisions (Ferguson; Bergen). One way to analyse these contingent decisions is to pose “what if?” counterfactuals, or feasible alternatives to historical events (Lebow). For instance, what if September 11 had been a chemical and biological weapons attack? (Mann 317). Appendix 1 includes a range of alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events which occurred. Collectively, these counterfactuals suggest the role of agency, chance, luck, and the juxtaposition of better and worse outcomes. They pose challenges to the classicist interpretation adopted soon after September 11 to justify “World War IV” (Podhoretz). A ‘Two-Track’ Process for ‘World War IV’ After the September 11 attacks, I think an overlapping two-track process occurred with the “Vulcans” cabinet, neoconservative advisers, and two “echo chambers”: neoconservative think-tanks and the post-September 11 media. Crucially, Bush’s “Vulcans” war cabinet succeeded in gaining civilian control of the United States war decision process. Although successful in initiating the 2003 Iraq War this civilian control created a deeper crisis in US civil-military relations (Stevenson; Morgan). The “Vulcans” relied on “politicised” intelligence such as a United Kingdom intelligence report on Iraq’s weapons development program. The report enabled “a climate of undifferentiated fear to arise” because its public version did not distinguish between chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (Halper and Clarke, 210). The cautious 2003 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) report on Iraq was only released in a strongly edited form. For instance, the US Department of Energy had expressed doubts about claims that Iraq had approached Niger for uranium, and was using aluminium tubes for biological and chemical weapons development. Meanwhile, the post-September 11 media had become a second “echo chamber” (Halper and Clarke 194-196) which amplified neoconservative arguments. Berman, Laqueur, Podhoretz and others who framed the intellectual climate were “risk entrepreneurs” (Mueller 41-43) that supported the “World War IV” vision. The media also engaged in aggressive “flak” campaigns (Herman and Chomsky 26-28; Mueller 39-42) designed to limit debate and to stress foreign policy stances and themes which supported the Bush Administration. When former Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey’s claimed that Al Qaeda had close connections to Iraqi intelligence, this was promoted in several books, including Michael Ledeen’s War Against The Terror Masters, Stephen Hayes’ The Connection, and Laurie Mylroie’s Bush v. The Beltway; and in partisan media such as Fox News, NewsMax, and The Weekly Standard who each attacked the US State Department and the CIA (Dorrien 183; Hayes; Ledeen; Mylroie; Heilbrunn 237, 243-244; Mann 310). This was the media “echo chamber” at work. The group Accuracy in Media also campaigned successfully to ensure that US cable providers did not give Al Jazeera English access to US audiences (Barker). Cosmopolitan ideals seemed incompatible with what the “flak” groups desired. The two-track process converged on two now infamous speeches. US President Bush’s State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, and US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations on 5 February 2003. Bush’s speech included a line from neoconservative David Frumm about North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an “Axis of Evil” (Dorrien 158; Halper and Clarke 139-140; Mann 242, 317-321). Powell’s presentation to the United Nations included now-debunked threat assessments. In fact, Powell had altered the speech’s original draft by I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, who was Cheney’s chief of staff (Dorrien 183-184). Powell claimed that Iraq had mobile biological weapons facilities, linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Mohamed El-Baradei, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Institute for Science and International Security all strongly doubted this claim, as did international observers (Dorrien 184; Halper and Clarke 212-213; Mann 353-354). Yet this information was suppressed: attacked by “flak” or given little visible media coverage. Powell’s agenda included trying to rebuild an international coalition and to head off weather changes that would affect military operations in the Middle East (Mann 351). Both speeches used politicised variants of “weapons of mass destruction”, taken from the counterterrorism literature (Stern; Laqueur). Bush’s speech created an inflated geopolitical threat whilst Powell relied on flawed intelligence and scientific visuals to communicate a non-existent threat (Vogel). However, they had the intended effect on decision makers. US Under-Secretary of Defense, the neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz, later revealed to Vanity Fair that “weapons of mass destruction” was selected as an issue that all potential stakeholders could agree on (Wilkie 69). Perhaps the only remaining outlet was satire: Armando Iannucci’s 2009 film In The Loop parodied the diplomatic politics surrounding Powell’s speech and the civil-military tensions on the Iraq War’s eve. In the short term the two track process worked in heading off doubt. The “Vulcans” blocked important information on pre-war Iraq intelligence from reaching the media and the general public (Prados). Alternatively, they ignored area specialists and other experts, such as when Coalition Provisional Authority’s L. Paul Bremer ignored the US State Department’s fifteen volume ‘Future of Iraq’ project (Ferguson). Public “flak” and “risk entrepreneurs” mobilised a range of motivations from grief and revenge to historical memory and identity politics. This combination of private and public processes meant that although doubts were expressed, they could be contained through the dual echo chambers of neoconservative policymaking and the post-September 11 media. These factors enabled the “Vulcans” to proceed with their “regime change” plans despite strong public opposition from anti-war protestors. Expressing DoubtsMany experts and institutions expressed doubt about specific claims the Bush Administration made to support the 2003 Iraq War. This doubt came from three different and sometimes overlapping groups. Subject matter experts such as the IAEA’s Mohamed El-Baradei and weapons development scientists countered the UK intelligence report and Powell’s UN speech. However, they did not get the media coverage warranted due to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics. Others could challenge misleading historical analogies between insurgent Iraq and Nazi Germany, and yet not change the broader outcomes (Benjamin). Independent journalists one group who gained new information during the 1990-91 Gulf War: some entered Iraq from Kuwait and documented a more humanitarian side of the war to journalists embedded with US military units (Uyarra). Finally, there were dissenters from bureaucratic and institutional processes. In some cases, all three overlapped. In their separate analyses of the post-September 11 debate on intelligence “failure”, Zegart and Jervis point to a range of analytic misperceptions and institutional problems. However, the intelligence community is separated from policymakers such as the “Vulcans”. Compartmentalisation due to the “need to know” principle also means that doubting analysts can be blocked from releasing information. Andrew Wilkie discovered this when he resigned from Australia’s Office for National Assessments (ONA) as a transnational issues analyst. Wilkie questioned the pre-war assessments in Powell’s United Nations speech that were used to justify the 2003 Iraq War. Wilkie was then attacked publicly by Australian Prime Minister John Howard. This overshadowed a more important fact: both Howard and Wilkie knew that due to Australian legislation, Wilkie could not publicly comment on ONA intelligence, despite the invitation to do so. This barrier also prevented other intelligence analysts from responding to the “Vulcans”, and to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics in the media and neoconservative think-tanks. Many analysts knew that the excerpts released from the 2003 NIE on Iraq was highly edited (Prados). For example, Australian agencies such as the ONA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Defence knew this (Wilkie 98). However, analysts are trained not to interfere with policymakers, even when there are significant civil-military irregularities. Military officials who spoke out about pre-war planning against the “Vulcans” and their neoconservative supporters were silenced (Ricks; Ferguson). Greenlight Capital’s hedge fund manager David Einhorn illustrates in a different context what might happen if analysts did comment. Einhorn gave a speech to the Ira Sohn Conference on 15 May 2002 debunking the management of Allied Capital. Einhorn’s “short-selling” led to retaliation from Allied Capital, a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, and growing evidence of potential fraud. If analysts adopted Einhorn’s tactics—combining rigorous analysis with targeted, public denunciation that is widely reported—then this may have short-circuited the “flak” and “echo chamber” effects prior to the 2003 Iraq War. The intelligence community usually tries to pre-empt such outcomes via contestation exercises and similar processes. This was the goal of the 2003 NIE on Iraq, despite the fact that the US Department of Energy which had the expertise was overruled by other agencies who expressed opinions not necessarily based on rigorous scientific and technical analysis (Prados; Vogel). In counterterrorism circles, similar disinformation arose about Aum Shinrikyo’s biological weapons research after its sarin gas attack on Tokyo’s subway system on 20 March 1995 (Leitenberg). Disinformation also arose regarding nuclear weapons proliferation to non-state actors in the 1990s (Stern). Interestingly, several of the “Vulcans” and neoconservatives had been involved in an earlier controversial contestation exercise: Team B in 1976. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assembled three Team B groups in order to evaluate and forecast Soviet military capabilities. One group headed by historian Richard Pipes gave highly “alarmist” forecasts and then attacked a CIA NIE about the Soviets (Dorrien 50-56; Mueller 81). The neoconservatives adopted these same tactics to reframe the 2003 NIE from its position of caution, expressed by several intelligence agencies and experts, to belief that Iraq possessed a current, covert program to develop weapons of mass destruction (Prados). Alternatively, information may be leaked to the media to express doubt. “Non-attributable” background interviews to establishment journalists like Seymour Hersh and Bob Woodward achieved this. Wikileaks publisher Julian Assange has recently achieved notoriety due to US diplomatic cables from the SIPRNet network released from 28 November 2010 onwards. Supporters have favourably compared Assange to Daniel Ellsberg, the RAND researcher who leaked the Pentagon Papers (Ellsberg; Ehrlich and Goldsmith). Whilst Elsberg succeeded because a network of US national papers continued to print excerpts from the Pentagon Papers despite lawsuit threats, Assange relied in part on favourable coverage from the UK’s Guardian newspaper. However, suspected sources such as US Army soldier Bradley Manning are not protected whilst media outlets are relatively free to publish their scoops (Walt, ‘Woodward’). Assange’s publication of SIPRNet’s diplomatic cables will also likely mean greater restrictions on diplomatic and military intelligence (Walt, ‘Don’t Write’). Beyond ‘Doubt’ Iraq’s worsening security discredited many of the factors that had given the neoconservatives credibility. The post-September 11 media became increasingly more critical of the US military in Iraq (Ferguson) and cautious about the “echo chamber” of think-tanks and media outlets. Internet sites for Al Jazeera English, Al-Arabiya and other networks have enabled people to bypass “flak” and directly access these different viewpoints. Most damagingly, the non-discovery of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction discredited both the 2003 NIE on Iraq and Colin Powell’s United Nations presentation (Wilkie 104). Likewise, “risk entrepreneurs” who foresaw “World War IV” in 2002 and 2003 have now distanced themselves from these apocalyptic forecasts due to a series of mis-steps and mistakes by the Bush Administration and Al Qaeda’s over-calculation (Bergen). The emergence of sites such as Wikileaks, and networks like Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya, are a response to the politics of the past decade. They attempt to short-circuit past “echo chambers” through providing access to different sources and leaked data. The Global War on Terror framed the Bush Administration’s response to September 11 as a war (Kirk; Mueller 59). Whilst this prematurely closed off other possibilities, it has also unleashed a series of dynamics which have undermined the neoconservative agenda. The “classicist” history and historical analogies constructed to justify the “World War IV” scenario are just one of several potential frameworks. “Flak” organisations and media “echo chambers” are now challenged by well-financed and strategic alternatives such as Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya. Doubt is one defence against “risk entrepreneurs” who seek to promote a particular idea: doubt guards against uncritical adoption. Perhaps the enduring lesson of the post-September 11 debates, though, is that doubt alone is not enough. What is needed are individuals and institutions that understand the strategies which the neoconservatives and others have used, and who also have the soft power skills during crises to influence critical decision-makers to choose alternatives. Appendix 1: Counterfactuals Richard Ned Lebow uses “what if?” counterfactuals to examine alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events that occurred. The following counterfactuals suggest that the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror could have evolved very differently . . . or not occurred at all. Fact: The 2003 Iraq War and 2001 Afghanistan counterinsurgency shaped the Bush Administration’s post-September 11 grand strategy. Counterfactual #1: Al Gore decisively wins the 2000 U.S. election. Bush v. Gore never occurs. After the September 11 attacks, Gore focuses on international alliance-building and gains widespread diplomatic support rather than a neoconservative agenda. He authorises Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and works closely with the Musharraf regime in Pakistan to target Al Qaeda’s muhajideen. He ‘contains’ Saddam Hussein’s Iraq through measurement and signature, technical intelligence, and more stringent monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Minimal Rewrite: United 93 crashes in Washington DC, killing senior members of the Gore Administration. Fact: U.S. Special Operations Forces failed to kill Osama bin Laden in late November and early December 2001 at Tora Bora. Counterfactual #2: U.S. Special Operations Forces kill Osama bin Laden in early December 2001 during skirmishes at Tora Bora. Ayman al-Zawahiri is critically wounded, captured, and imprisoned. The rest of Al Qaeda is scattered. Minimal Rewrite: Osama bin Laden’s death turns him into a self-mythologised hero for decades. Fact: The UK Blair Government supplied a 50-page intelligence dossier on Iraq’s weapons development program which the Bush Administration used to support its pre-war planning. Counterfactual #3: Rogue intelligence analysts debunk the UK Blair Government’s claims through a series of ‘targeted’ leaks to establishment news sources. Minimal Rewrite: The 50-page intelligence dossier is later discovered to be correct about Iraq’s weapons development program. Fact: The Bush Administration used the 2003 National Intelligence Estimate to “build its case” for “regime change” in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Counterfactual #4: A joint investigation by The New York Times and The Washington Post rebuts U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United National Security Council, delivered on 5 February 2003. Minimal Rewrite: The Central Intelligence Agency’s whitepaper “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” (October 2002) more accurately reflects the 2003 NIE’s cautious assessments. Fact: The Bush Administration relied on Ahmed Chalabi for its postwar estimates about Iraq’s reconstruction. Counterfactual #5: The Bush Administration ignores Chalabi’s advice and relies instead on the U.S. State Department’s 15 volume report “The Future of Iraq”. Minimal Rewrite: The Coalition Provisional Authority appoints Ahmed Chalabi to head an interim Iraqi government. Fact: L. Paul Bremer signed orders to disband Iraq’s Army and to De-Ba’athify Iraq’s new government. Counterfactual #6: Bremer keeps Iraq’s Army intact and uses it to impose security in Baghdad to prevent looting and to thwart insurgents. Rather than a De-Ba’athification policy, Bremer uses former Baath Party members to gather situational intelligence. Minimal Rewrite: Iraq’s Army refuses to disband and the De-Ba’athification policy uncovers several conspiracies to undermine the Coalition Provisional Authority. AcknowledgmentsThanks to Stephen McGrail for advice on science and technology analysis.References Barker, Greg. “War of Ideas”. PBS Frontline. Boston, MA: 2007. ‹http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/newswar/video1.html› Benjamin, Daniel. “Condi’s Phony History.” Slate 29 Aug. 2003. ‹http://www.slate.com/id/2087768/pagenum/all/›. Bergen, Peter L. The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al Qaeda. New York: The Free Press, 2011. Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism. 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No End in Sight, New York: Representational Pictures, 2007. Filkins, Dexter. The Forever War. New York: Vintage Books, 2008. Friedman, Murray. The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. Halper, Stefan, and Jonathan Clarke. America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order. New York: Cambridge UP, 2004. Hayes, Stephen F. The Connection: How Al Qaeda’s Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. Heilbrunn, Jacob. They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons. New York: Doubleday, 2008. Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. Rev. ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 2002. Iannucci, Armando. In The Loop. London: BBC Films, 2009. Jervis, Robert. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca NY: Cornell UP, 2010. Kirk, Michael. “The War behind Closed Doors.” PBS Frontline. Boston, MA: 2003. ‹http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/›. Laqueur, Walter. No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Continuum, 2003. Lebow, Richard Ned. Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations. Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 2010. Ledeen, Michael. The War against The Terror Masters. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2003. Leitenberg, Milton. “Aum Shinrikyo's Efforts to Produce Biological Weapons: A Case Study in the Serial Propagation of Misinformation.” Terrorism and Political Violence 11.4 (1999): 149-158. Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York: Viking Penguin, 2004. Morgan, Matthew J. The American Military after 9/11: Society, State, and Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Mueller, John. Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: The Free Press, 2009. Mylroie, Laurie. Bush v The Beltway: The Inside Battle over War in Iraq. New York: Regan Books, 2003. Nutt, Paul C. Why Decisions Fail. San Francisco: Berrett-Koelher, 2002. Podhoretz, Norman. “How to Win World War IV”. Commentary 113.2 (2002): 19-29. Prados, John. Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War. New York: The New Press, 2004. Ricks, Thomas. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006. Stern, Jessica. The Ultimate Terrorists. Boston, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Stevenson, Charles A. Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress. New York: Routledge, 2006. Walt, Stephen M. “Should Bob Woodward Be Arrested?” Foreign Policy 10 Dec. 2010. ‹http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/10/more_wikileaks_double_standards›. 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During World War II, the Soviet Union’s food supply was in a state of crisis. Hitler’s army had occupied the agricultural heartlands of Ukraine and Southern Russia in 1941 and, as a result, agricultural production for the entire nation had plummeted. Soldiers in Red Army, who easily ate the best rations in the country, subsisted on a daily allowance of just under a kilogram of bread, supplemented with meat, tea, sugar and butter when and if these items were available. The hunger of the Red Army and its effect on the morale and strength of Europe’s eastern warfront were causes for concern for the Soviet government and its European and American allies. The one country with a food surplus decided to do something to help, and in 1942 the United States agreed to send thousands of pounds of meat, cheese and butter overseas to help feed the Red Army. After receiving several shipments of the all-American spiced canned meat SPAM, the Red Army’s quartermaster put in a request for a more familiar canned pork product, Russian tushonka. Pound for pound, America sent more pigs overseas than soldiers during World War II, in part because pork was in oversupply in the America of the early 1940s. Shipping meat to hungry soldiers and civilians in war torn countries was a practical way to build business for the U.S. meat industry, which had been in decline throughout the 1930s. As per a Soviet-supplied recipe, the first cans of Lend-Lease tushonka were made in the heart of the American Midwest, at meatpacking plants in Iowa and Ohio (Stettinus 6-7). Government contracts in the meat packing industry helped fuel economic recovery, and meatpackers were in a position to take special request orders like the one for tushonka that came through the lines. Unlike SPAM, which was something of a novelty item during the war, tushonka was a food with a past. The original recipe was based on a recipe for preserved meat that had been a traditional product of the Ural Mountains, preserved in jars with salt and fat rather than by pressure and heat. Thus tushonka was requested—and was mass-produced—not simply as a convenience but also as a traditional and familiar food—a taste of home cooking that soldiers could carry with them into the field. Nikita Khrushchev later claimed that the arrival of tushonka was instrumental in helping the Red Army push back against the Nazi invasion (178). Unlike SPAM and other wartime rations, tushonka did not fade away after the war. Instead, it was distributed to the Soviet civilian population, appearing in charity donations and on the shelves of state shops. Often it was the only meat product available on a regular basis. Salty, fatty, and slightly grey-toned, tushonka was an unlikely hero of the postwar-era, but during this period tushonka rose from obscurity to become an emblem of socialist modernity. Because it was shelf stable and could be made from a variety of different cuts of meat, it proved an ideal product for the socialist production lines where supplies and the pace of production were infinitely variable. Unusual in a socialist system of supply, this product shaped production and distribution lines, and even influenced the layout of meatpacking factories and the genetic stocks of the animals that were to be eaten. Tushonka’s initial ubiquity in the postwar Soviet Union had little to do with the USSR’s own hog industry. Pig populations as well as their processing facilities had been decimated in the war, and pigs that did survive the Axis invasion had been evacuated East with human populations. Instead, the early presence of tushonka in the pig-scarce postwar Soviet Union had everything to do with Harry Truman’s unexpected September 1945 decision to end all “economically useful” Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union (Martel). By the end of September, canned meat was practically the only product still being shipped as part of Lend-Lease (NARA RG 59). Although the United Nations was supposed to distribute these supplies to needy civilians free of cost, travelers to the Soviet Union in 1946 spotted cans of American tushonka for sale in state shops (Skeoch 231). After American tushonka “donations” disappeared from store shelves, the Soviet Union’s meat syndicates decided to continue producing the product. Between its first appearance during the war in 1943, and the 1957 announcement by Nikita Khrushchev that Soviet policy would restructure all state animal farms to support the mass production of one or several processed meat products, tushonka helped to drive the evolution of the Soviet Union’s meat packing industry. Its popularity with both planners and the public gave it the power to reach into food commodity chains. It is this backward reach and the longer-term impacts of these policies that make tushonka an unusual byproduct of the Cold War era. State planners loved tushonka: it was cheap to make, the logistics of preparing it were not complicated, it was easy to transport, and most importantly, it served as tangible evidence that the state was accomplishing a long-standing goal to get more meat to its citizenry and improving the diet of the average Soviet worker. Tushonka became a highly visible product in the Soviet Union’s much vaunted push to establish a modern food regime intended to rival that of the United States. Because it was shelf-stable, wartime tushonka had served as a practical food for soldiers, but after the war tushonka became an ideal food for workers who had neither the time nor the space to prepare a home-cooked meal with fresh meat. The Soviet state started to produce its own tushonka because it was such an excellent fit for the needs and abilities of the Soviet state—consumer demand was rarely considered by planners in this era. Not only did tushonka fit the look and taste of a modern processed meat product (that is, it was standard in texture and flavor from can to can, and was an obviously industrially processed product), it was also an excellent way to make the most of the predominant kind of meat the Soviet Union had the in the 1950s: small scraps low-grade pork and beef, trimmings leftover from butchering practices that focused on harvesting as much animal fat, rather than muscle, from the carcass in question. Just like tushonka, pork sausages and frozen pelmeny, a meat-filled pasta dumpling, also became winning postwar foods thanks to a happy synergy of increased animal production, better butchering and new food processing machines. As postwar pigs recovered their populations, the Soviet processed meat industry followed suit. One official source listed twenty-six different kinds of meat products being issued in 1964, although not all of these were pork (Danilov). An instructional manual distributed by the meat and milk syndicate demonstrated how meat shops should wrap and display sausages, and listed 24 different kinds of sausages that all needed a special style of tying up. Because of packaging shortages, the string that bound the sausage was wrapped in a different way for every type of sausage, and shop assistants were expected to be able to identify sausages based on the pattern of their binding. Pelmeny were produced at every meat factory that processed pork. These were “made from start to finish in a special, automated machine, human hands do not touch them. Which makes them a higher quality and better (prevoskhodnogo) product” (Book of Healthy and Delicious Food). These were foods that became possible to produce economically because of a co-occurring increase in pigs, the new standardized practice of equipping meatpacking plants with large-capacity grinders, and freezers or coolers and the enforcement of a system of grading meat. As the state began to rebuild Soviet agriculture from its near-collapse during the war, the Soviet Union looked to the United States for inspiration. Surprisingly, Soviet planners found some of the United States’ more outdated techniques to be quite valuable for new Soviet hog operations. The most striking of these was the adoption of competing phenotypes in the Soviet hog industry. Most major swine varieties had been developed and described in the 19th century in Germany and Great Britain. Breeds had a tendency to split into two phenotypically distinct groups, and in early 20th Century American pig farms, there was strong disagreement as to which style of pig was better suited to industrial conditions of production. Some pigs were “hot-blooded” (in other words, fast maturing and prolific reproducers) while others were a slower “big type” pig (a self-explanatory descriptor). Breeds rarely excelled at both traits and it was a matter of opinion whether speed or size was the most desirable trait to augment. The over-emphasis of either set of qualities damaged survival rates. At their largest, big type pigs resembled small hippopotamuses, and sows were so corpulent they unwittingly crushed their tiny piglets. But the sleeker hot-blooded pigs had a similarly lethal relationship with their young. Sows often produced litters of upwards of a dozen piglets and the stress of tending such a large brood led overwhelmed sows to devour their own offspring (Long). American pig breeders had been forced to navigate between these two undesirable extremes, but by the 1930s, big type pigs were fading in popularity mainly because butter and newly developed plant oils were replacing lard as the cooking fat of preference in American kitchens. The remarkable propensity of the big type to pack on pounds of extra fat was more of a liability than a benefit in this period, as the price that lard and salt pork plummeted in this decade. By the time U.S. meat packers were shipping cans of tushonka to their Soviet allies across the seas, US hog operations had already developed a strong preference for hot-blooded breeds and research had shifted to building and maintaining lean muscle on these swiftly maturing animals. When Soviet industrial planners hoping to learn how to make more tushonka entered the scene however, their interpretation of american efficiency was hardly predictable: scientifically nourished big type pigs may have been advantageous to the United States at midcentury, but the Soviet Union’s farms and hungry citizens had a very different list of needs and wants. At midcentury, Soviet pigs were still handicapped by old-fashioned variables such as cold weather, long winters, poor farm organisation and impoverished feed regimens. The look of the average Soviet hog operation was hardly industrial. In 1955 the typical Soviet pig was petite, shaggy, and slow to reproduce. In the absence of robust dairy or vegetable oil industries, Soviet pigs had always been valued for their fat rather than their meat, and tushonka had been a byproduct of an industry focused mainly on supplying the country with fat and lard. Until the mid 1950s, the most valuable pig on many Soviet state and collective farms was the nondescript but very rotund “lard and bacon” pig, an inefficient eater that could take upwards of two years to reach full maturity. In searching for a way to serve up more tushonka, Soviet planners became aware that their entire industry needed to be revamped. When the Soviet Union looked to the United States, planners were inspired by the earlier competition between hot-blooded and big type pigs, which Soviet planners thought, ambitiously, they could combine into one splendid pig. The Soviet Union imported new pigs from Poland, Lithuania, East Germany and Denmark, trying valiantly to create hybrid pigs that would exhibit both hot blood and big type. Soviet planners were especially interested in inspiring the Poland-China, an especially rotund specimen, to speed up its life cycle during them mid 1950s. Hybrdizing and cross breeding a Soviet super-pig, no matter how closely laid out on paper, was probably always a socialist pipe dream. However, when the Soviets decided to try to outbreed American hog breeders, they created an infrastructure for pigs and pig breeding that had a dramatic positive impact of hog populations across the country, and the 1950s were marked by a large increase in the number of pigs in the Soviet union, as well as dramatic increases in the numbers of purebred and scientific hybrids the country developed, all in the name of tushonka. It was not just the genetic stock that received a makeover in the postwar drive to can more tushonka; a revolution in the barnyard also took place and in less than 10 years, pigs were living in new housing stock and eating new feed sources. The most obvious postwar change was in farm layout and the use of building space. In the early 1950s, many collective farms had been consolidated. In 1940 there were a quarter of a million kolkhozii, by 1951 fewer than half that many remained (NARA RG166). Farm consolidation movements most often combined two, three or four collective farms into one economic unit, thus scaling up the average size and productivity of each collective farm and simplifying their administration. While there were originally ambitious plans to re-center farms around new “agro-city” bases with new, modern farm buildings, these projects were ultimately abandoned. Instead, existing buildings were repurposed and the several clusters of farm buildings that had once been the heart of separate villages acquired different uses. For animals this meant new barns and new daily routines. Barns were redesigned and compartmentalized around ideas of gender and age segregation—weaned baby pigs in one area, farrowing sows in another—as well as maximising growth and health. Pigs spent less outside time and more time at the trough. Pigs that were wanted for different purposes (breeding, meat and lard) were kept in different areas, isolated from each other to minimize the spread of disease as well as improve the efficiency of production. Much like postwar housing for humans, the new and improved pig barn was a crowded and often chaotic place where the electricity, heat and water functioned only sporadically. New barns were supposed to be mechanised. In some places, mechanisation had helped speed things along, but as one American official viewing a new mechanised pig farm in 1955 noted, “it did not appear to be a highly efficient organisation. The mechanised or automated operations, such as the preparation of hog feed, were eclipsed by the amount of hand labor which both preceded and followed the mechanised portion” (NARA RG166 1961). The American official estimated that by mechanizing, Soviet farms had actually increased the amount of human labor needed for farming operations. The other major environmental change took place away from the barnyard, in new crops the Soviet Union began to grow for fodder. The heart and soul of this project was establishing field corn as a major new fodder crop. Originally intended as a feed for cows that would replace hay, corn quickly became the feed of choice for raising pigs. After a visit by a United States delegation to Iowa and other U.S. farms over the summer of 1955, corn became the centerpiece of Khrushchev’s efforts to raise meat and milk productivity. These efforts were what earned Khrushchev his nickname of kukuruznik, or “corn fanatic.” Since so little of the Soviet Union looks or feels much like the plains and hills of Iowa, adopting corn might seem quixotic, but raising corn was a potentially practical move for a cold country. Unlike the other major fodder crops of turnips and potatoes, corn could be harvested early, while still green but already possessing a high level of protein. Corn provided a “gap month” of green feed during July and August, when grazing animals had eaten the first spring green growth but these same plants had not recovered their biomass. What corn remained in the fields in late summer was harvested and made into silage, and corn made the best silage that had been historically available in the Soviet Union. The high protein content of even silage made from green mass and unripe corn ears prevented them from losing weight in the winter. Thus the desire to put more meat on Soviet tables—a desire first prompted by American food donations of surplus pork from Iowa farmers adapting to agro-industrial reordering in their own country—pushed back into the commodity supply network of the Soviet Union. World War II rations that were well adapted to the uncertainty and poor infrastructure not just of war but also of peacetime were a source of inspiration for Soviet planners striving to improve the diets of citizens. To do this, they purchased and bred more and better animals, inventing breeds and paying attention, for the first time, to the efficiency and speed with which these animals were ready to become meat. Reinventing Soviet pigs pushed even back farther, and inspired agricultural economists and state planners to embrace new farm organizational structures. Pigs meant for the tushonka can spent more time inside eating, and led their lives in a rigid compartmentalization that mimicked emerging trends in human urban society. Beyond the barnyard, a new concern with feed-to weight conversions led agriculturalists to seek new crops; crops like corn that were costly to grow but were a perfect food for a pig destined for a tushonka tin. Thus in Soviet industrialization, pigs evolved. No longer simply recyclers of human waste, socialist pigs were consumers in their own right, their newly crafted genetic compositions demanded ever more technical feed sources in order to maximize their own productivity. Food is transformative, and in this case study the prosaic substance of canned meat proved to be unusually transformative for the history of the Soviet Union. In its early history it kept soldiers alive long enough to win an important war, later the requirements for its manufacture re-prioritized muscle tissue over fat tissue in the disassembly of carcasses. This transformative influence reached backwards into the supply lines and farms of the Soviet Union, revolutionizing the scale and goals of farming and meat packing for the Soviet food industry, as well as the relationship between the pig and the consumer. References Bentley, Amy. Eating for Victory: Food Rationing and the Politics of Domesticity. Where: University of Illinois Press, 1998. The Book of Healthy and Delicious Food, Kniga O Vkusnoi I Zdorovoi Pishche. Moscow: AMN Izd., 1952. 161. Danilov, M. M. Tovaravedenie Prodovol’stvennykh Tovarov: Miaso I Miasnye Tovarye. Moscow: Iz. Ekonomika, 1964. Khrushchev, Nikita. Khrushchev Remembers. New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1970. 178. Long, James. The Book of the Pig. London: Upcott Gill, 1886. 102. Lush, Jay & A.L. Anderson, “A Genetic History of Poland-China Swine: I—Early Breed History: The ‘Hot Blood’ versus the ‘Big Type’” Journal of Heredity 30.4 (1939): 149-56. Martel, Leon. Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the Implementation of Foreign Policy. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979. 35. National Archive and Records Administration (NARA). RG 59, General Records of the Department of State. Office of Soviet Union affairs, Box 6. “Records relating to Lend Lease with the USSR 1941-1952”. National Archive and Records Administration (NARA). RG166, Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service. Narrative reports 1940-1954. USSR Cotton-USSR Foreign trade. Box 64, Folder “farm management”. Report written by David V Kelly, 6 Apr. 1951. National Archive and Records Administration (NARA). RG 166, Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service. Narrative Reports 1955-1961. Folder: “Agriculture” “Visits to Soviet agricultural installations,” 15 Nov. 1961. Skeoch, L.A. Food Prices and Ration Scale in the Ukraine, 1946 The Review of Economics and Statistics 35.3 (Aug. 1953), 229-35. State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). Fond R-7021. The Report of Extraordinary Special State Commission on Wartime Losses Resulting from the German-Fascist Occupation cites the following losses in the German takeover. 1948. Stettinus, Edward R. Jr. Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory. Penguin Books, 1944.

On the morning of Thursday, 4 May 2006, the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held an open hearing entitled “Terrorist Use of the Internet.” The Intelligence committee meeting was scheduled to take place in Room 1302 of the Longworth Office Building, a Depression-era structure with a neoclassical façade. Because of a dysfunctional elevator, some of the congressional representatives were late to the meeting. During the testimony about the newest political applications for cutting-edge digital technology, the microphones periodically malfunctioned, and witnesses complained of “technical problems” several times. By the end of the day it seemed that what was to be remembered about the hearing was the shocking revelation that terrorists were using videogames to recruit young jihadists. The Associated Press wrote a short, restrained article about the hearing that only mentioned “computer games and recruitment videos” in passing. Eager to have their version of the news item picked up, Reuters made videogames the focus of their coverage with a headline that announced, “Islamists Using US Videogames in Youth Appeal.” Like a game of telephone, as the Reuters videogame story was quickly re-run by several Internet news services, each iteration of the title seemed less true to the exact language of the original. One Internet news service changed the headline to “Islamic militants recruit using U.S. video games.” Fox News re-titled the story again to emphasise that this alert about technological manipulation was coming from recognised specialists in the anti-terrorism surveillance field: “Experts: Islamic Militants Customizing Violent Video Games.” As the story circulated, the body of the article remained largely unchanged, in which the Reuters reporter described the digital materials from Islamic extremists that were shown at the congressional hearing. During the segment that apparently most captured the attention of the wire service reporters, eerie music played as an English-speaking narrator condemned the “infidel” and declared that he had “put a jihad” on them, as aerial shots moved over 3D computer-generated images of flaming oil facilities and mosques covered with geometric designs. Suddenly, this menacing voice-over was interrupted by an explosion, as a virtual rocket was launched into a simulated military helicopter. The Reuters reporter shared this dystopian vision from cyberspace with Western audiences by quoting directly from the chilling commentary and describing a dissonant montage of images and remixed sound. “I was just a boy when the infidels came to my village in Blackhawk helicopters,” a narrator’s voice said as the screen flashed between images of street-level gunfights, explosions and helicopter assaults. Then came a recording of President George W. Bush’s September 16, 2001, statement: “This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while.” It was edited to repeat the word “crusade,” which Muslims often define as an attack on Islam by Christianity. According to the news reports, the key piece of evidence before Congress seemed to be a film by “SonicJihad” of recorded videogame play, which – according to the experts – was widely distributed online. Much of the clip takes place from the point of view of a first-person shooter, seen as if through the eyes of an armed insurgent, but the viewer also periodically sees third-person action in which the player appears as a running figure wearing a red-and-white checked keffiyeh, who dashes toward the screen with a rocket launcher balanced on his shoulder. Significantly, another of the player’s hand-held weapons is a detonator that triggers remote blasts. As jaunty music plays, helicopters, tanks, and armoured vehicles burst into smoke and flame. Finally, at the triumphant ending of the video, a green and white flag bearing a crescent is hoisted aloft into the sky to signify victory by Islamic forces. To explain the existence of this digital alternative history in which jihadists could be conquerors, the Reuters story described the deviousness of the country’s terrorist opponents, who were now apparently modifying popular videogames through their wizardry and inserting anti-American, pro-insurgency content into U.S.-made consumer technology. One of the latest video games modified by militants is the popular “Battlefield 2” from leading video game publisher, Electronic Arts Inc of Redwood City, California. Jeff Brown, a spokesman for Electronic Arts, said enthusiasts often write software modifications, known as “mods,” to video games. “Millions of people create mods on games around the world,” he said. “We have absolutely no control over them. It’s like drawing a mustache on a picture.” Although the Electronic Arts executive dismissed the activities of modders as a “mustache on a picture” that could only be considered little more than childish vandalism of their off-the-shelf corporate product, others saw a more serious form of criminality at work. Testifying experts and the legislators listening on the committee used the video to call for greater Internet surveillance efforts and electronic counter-measures. Within twenty-four hours of the sensationalistic news breaking, however, a group of Battlefield 2 fans was crowing about the idiocy of reporters. The game play footage wasn’t from a high-tech modification of the software by Islamic extremists; it had been posted on a Planet Battlefield forum the previous December of 2005 by a game fan who had cut together regular game play with a Bush remix and a parody snippet of the soundtrack from the 2004 hit comedy film Team America. The voice describing the Black Hawk helicopters was the voice of Trey Parker of South Park cartoon fame, and – much to Parker’s amusement – even the mention of “goats screaming” did not clue spectators in to the fact of a comic source. Ironically, the moment in the movie from which the sound clip is excerpted is one about intelligence gathering. As an agent of Team America, a fictional elite U.S. commando squad, the hero of the film’s all-puppet cast, Gary Johnston, is impersonating a jihadist radical inside a hostile Egyptian tavern that is modelled on the cantina scene from Star Wars. Additional laughs come from the fact that agent Johnston is accepted by the menacing terrorist cell as “Hakmed,” despite the fact that he utters a series of improbable clichés made up of incoherent stereotypes about life in the Middle East while dressed up in a disguise made up of shoe polish and a turban from a bathroom towel. The man behind the “SonicJihad” pseudonym turned out to be a twenty-five-year-old hospital administrator named Samir, and what reporters and representatives saw was nothing more exotic than game play from an add-on expansion pack of Battlefield 2, which – like other versions of the game – allows first-person shooter play from the position of the opponent as a standard feature. While SonicJihad initially joined his fellow gamers in ridiculing the mainstream media, he also expressed astonishment and outrage about a larger politics of reception. In one interview he argued that the media illiteracy of Reuters potentially enabled a whole series of category errors, in which harmless gamers could be demonised as terrorists. It wasn’t intended for the purpose what it was portrayed to be by the media. So no I don’t regret making a funny video . . . why should I? The only thing I regret is thinking that news from Reuters was objective and always right. The least they could do is some online research before publishing this. If they label me al-Qaeda just for making this silly video, that makes you think, what is this al-Qaeda? And is everything al-Qaeda? Although Sonic Jihad dismissed his own work as “silly” or “funny,” he expected considerably more from a credible news agency like Reuters: “objective” reporting, “online research,” and fact-checking before “publishing.” Within the week, almost all of the salient details in the Reuters story were revealed to be incorrect. SonicJihad’s film was not made by terrorists or for terrorists: it was not created by “Islamic militants” for “Muslim youths.” The videogame it depicted had not been modified by a “tech-savvy militant” with advanced programming skills. Of course, what is most extraordinary about this story isn’t just that Reuters merely got its facts wrong; it is that a self-identified “parody” video was shown to the august House Intelligence Committee by a team of well-paid “experts” from the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a major contractor with the federal government, as key evidence of terrorist recruitment techniques and abuse of digital networks. Moreover, this story of media illiteracy unfolded in the context of a fundamental Constitutional debate about domestic surveillance via communications technology and the further regulation of digital content by lawmakers. Furthermore, the transcripts of the actual hearing showed that much more than simple gullibility or technological ignorance was in play. Based on their exchanges in the public record, elected representatives and government experts appear to be keenly aware that the digital discourses of an emerging information culture might be challenging their authority and that of the longstanding institutions of knowledge and power with which they are affiliated. These hearings can be seen as representative of a larger historical moment in which emphatic declarations about prohibiting specific practices in digital culture have come to occupy a prominent place at the podium, news desk, or official Web portal. This environment of cultural reaction can be used to explain why policy makers’ reaction to terrorists’ use of networked communication and digital media actually tells us more about our own American ideologies about technology and rhetoric in a contemporary information environment. When the experts come forward at the Sonic Jihad hearing to “walk us through the media and some of the products,” they present digital artefacts of an information economy that mirrors many of the features of our own consumption of objects of electronic discourse, which seem dangerously easy to copy and distribute and thus also create confusion about their intended meanings, audiences, and purposes. From this one hearing we can see how the reception of many new digital genres plays out in the public sphere of legislative discourse. Web pages, videogames, and Weblogs are mentioned specifically in the transcript. The main architecture of the witnesses’ presentation to the committee is organised according to the rhetorical conventions of a PowerPoint presentation. Moreover, the arguments made by expert witnesses about the relationship of orality to literacy or of public to private communications in new media are highly relevant to how we might understand other important digital genres, such as electronic mail or text messaging. The hearing also invites consideration of privacy, intellectual property, and digital “rights,” because moral values about freedom and ownership are alluded to by many of the elected representatives present, albeit often through the looking glass of user behaviours imagined as radically Other. For example, terrorists are described as “modders” and “hackers” who subvert those who properly create, own, legitimate, and regulate intellectual property. To explain embarrassing leaks of infinitely replicable digital files, witness Ron Roughead says, “We’re not even sure that they don’t even hack into the kinds of spaces that hold photographs in order to get pictures that our forces have taken.” Another witness, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and International Affairs, Peter Rodman claims that “any video game that comes out, as soon as the code is released, they will modify it and change the game for their needs.” Thus, the implication of these witnesses’ testimony is that the release of code into the public domain can contribute to political subversion, much as covert intrusion into computer networks by stealthy hackers can. However, the witnesses from the Pentagon and from the government contractor SAIC often present a contradictory image of the supposed terrorists in the hearing transcripts. Sometimes the enemy is depicted as an organisation of technological masterminds, capable of manipulating the computer code of unwitting Americans and snatching their rightful intellectual property away; sometimes those from the opposing forces are depicted as pre-modern and even sub-literate political innocents. In contrast, the congressional representatives seem to focus on similarities when comparing the work of “terrorists” to the everyday digital practices of their constituents and even of themselves. According to the transcripts of this open hearing, legislators on both sides of the aisle express anxiety about domestic patterns of Internet reception. Even the legislators’ own Web pages are potentially disruptive electronic artefacts, particularly when the demands of digital labour interfere with their duties as lawmakers. Although the subject of the hearing is ostensibly terrorist Websites, Representative Anna Eshoo (D-California) bemoans the difficulty of maintaining her own official congressional site. As she observes, “So we are – as members, I think we’re very sensitive about what’s on our Website, and if I retained what I had on my Website three years ago, I’d be out of business. So we know that they have to be renewed. They go up, they go down, they’re rebuilt, they’re – you know, the message is targeted to the future.” In their questions, lawmakers identify Weblogs (blogs) as a particular area of concern as a destabilising alternative to authoritative print sources of information from established institutions. Representative Alcee Hastings (D-Florida) compares the polluting power of insurgent bloggers to that of influential online muckrakers from the American political Right. Hastings complains of “garbage on our regular mainstream news that comes from blog sites.” Representative Heather Wilson (R-New Mexico) attempts to project a media-savvy persona by bringing up the “phenomenon of blogging” in conjunction with her questions about jihadist Websites in which she notes how Internet traffic can be magnified by cooperative ventures among groups of ideologically like-minded content-providers: “These Websites, and particularly the most active ones, are they cross-linked? And do they have kind of hot links to your other favorite sites on them?” At one point Representative Wilson asks witness Rodman if he knows “of your 100 hottest sites where the Webmasters are educated? What nationality they are? Where they’re getting their money from?” In her questions, Wilson implicitly acknowledges that Web work reflects influences from pedagogical communities, economic networks of the exchange of capital, and even potentially the specific ideologies of nation-states. It is perhaps indicative of the government contractors’ anachronistic worldview that the witness is unable to answer Wilson’s question. He explains that his agency focuses on the physical location of the server or ISP rather than the social backgrounds of the individuals who might be manufacturing objectionable digital texts. The premise behind the contractors’ working method – surveilling the technical apparatus not the social network – may be related to other beliefs expressed by government witnesses, such as the supposition that jihadist Websites are collectively produced and spontaneously emerge from the indigenous, traditional, tribal culture, instead of assuming that Iraqi insurgents have analogous beliefs, practices, and technological awareness to those in first-world countries. The residual subtexts in the witnesses’ conjectures about competing cultures of orality and literacy may tell us something about a reactionary rhetoric around videogames and digital culture more generally. According to the experts before Congress, the Middle Eastern audience for these videogames and Websites is limited by its membership in a pre-literate society that is only capable of abortive cultural production without access to knowledge that is archived in printed codices. Sometimes the witnesses before Congress seem to be unintentionally channelling the ideas of the late literacy theorist Walter Ong about the “secondary orality” associated with talky electronic media such as television, radio, audio recording, or telephone communication. Later followers of Ong extend this concept of secondary orality to hypertext, hypermedia, e-mail, and blogs, because they similarly share features of both speech and written discourse. Although Ong’s disciples celebrate this vibrant reconnection to a mythic, communal past of what Kathleen Welch calls “electric rhetoric,” the defence industry consultants express their profound state of alarm at the potentially dangerous and subversive character of this hybrid form of communication. The concept of an “oral tradition” is first introduced by the expert witnesses in the context of modern marketing and product distribution: “The Internet is used for a variety of things – command and control,” one witness states. “One of the things that’s missed frequently is how and – how effective the adversary is at using the Internet to distribute product. They’re using that distribution network as a modern form of oral tradition, if you will.” Thus, although the Internet can be deployed for hierarchical “command and control” activities, it also functions as a highly efficient peer-to-peer distributed network for disseminating the commodity of information. Throughout the hearings, the witnesses imply that unregulated lateral communication among social actors who are not authorised to speak for nation-states or to produce legitimated expert discourses is potentially destabilising to political order. Witness Eric Michael describes the “oral tradition” and the conventions of communal life in the Middle East to emphasise the primacy of speech in the collective discursive practices of this alien population: “I’d like to point your attention to the media types and the fact that the oral tradition is listed as most important. The other media listed support that. And the significance of the oral tradition is more than just – it’s the medium by which, once it comes off the Internet, it is transferred.” The experts go on to claim that this “oral tradition” can contaminate other media because it functions as “rumor,” the traditional bane of the stately discourse of military leaders since the classical era. The oral tradition now also has an aspect of rumor. A[n] event takes place. There is an explosion in a city. Rumor is that the United States Air Force dropped a bomb and is doing indiscriminate killing. This ends up being discussed on the street. It ends up showing up in a Friday sermon in a mosque or in another religious institution. It then gets recycled into written materials. Media picks up the story and broadcasts it, at which point it’s now a fact. In this particular case that we were telling you about, it showed up on a network television, and their propaganda continues to go back to this false initial report on network television and continue to reiterate that it’s a fact, even though the United States government has proven that it was not a fact, even though the network has since recanted the broadcast. In this example, many-to-many discussion on the “street” is formalised into a one-to many “sermon” and then further stylised using technology in a one-to-many broadcast on “network television” in which “propaganda” that is “false” can no longer be disputed. This “oral tradition” is like digital media, because elements of discourse can be infinitely copied or “recycled,” and it is designed to “reiterate” content. In this hearing, the word “rhetoric” is associated with destructive counter-cultural forces by the witnesses who reiterate cultural truisms dating back to Plato and the Gorgias. For example, witness Eric Michael initially presents “rhetoric” as the use of culturally specific and hence untranslatable figures of speech, but he quickly moves to an outright castigation of the entire communicative mode. “Rhetoric,” he tells us, is designed to “distort the truth,” because it is a “selective” assembly or a “distortion.” Rhetoric is also at odds with reason, because it appeals to “emotion” and a romanticised Weltanschauung oriented around discourses of “struggle.” The film by SonicJihad is chosen as the final clip by the witnesses before Congress, because it allegedly combines many different types of emotional appeal, and thus it conveniently ties together all of the themes that the witnesses present to the legislators about unreliable oral or rhetorical sources in the Middle East: And there you see how all these products are linked together. And you can see where the games are set to psychologically condition you to go kill coalition forces. You can see how they use humor. You can see how the entire campaign is carefully crafted to first evoke an emotion and then to evoke a response and to direct that response in the direction that they want. Jihadist digital products, especially videogames, are effective means of manipulation, the witnesses argue, because they employ multiple channels of persuasion and carefully sequenced and integrated subliminal messages. To understand the larger cultural conversation of the hearing, it is important to keep in mind that the related argument that “games” can “psychologically condition” players to be predisposed to violence is one that was important in other congressional hearings of the period, as well one that played a role in bills and resolutions that were passed by the full body of the legislative branch. In the witness’s testimony an appeal to anti-game sympathies at home is combined with a critique of a closed anti-democratic system abroad in which the circuits of rhetorical production and their composite metonymic chains are described as those that command specific, unvarying, robotic responses. This sharp criticism of the artful use of a presentation style that is “crafted” is ironic, given that the witnesses’ “compilation” of jihadist digital material is staged in the form of a carefully structured PowerPoint presentation, one that is paced to a well-rehearsed rhythm of “slide, please” or “next slide” in the transcript. The transcript also reveals that the members of the House Intelligence Committee were not the original audience for the witnesses’ PowerPoint presentation. Rather, when it was first created by SAIC, this “expert” presentation was designed for training purposes for the troops on the ground, who would be facing the challenges of deployment in hostile terrain. According to the witnesses, having the slide show showcased before Congress was something of an afterthought. Nonetheless, Congressman Tiahrt (R-KN) is so impressed with the rhetorical mastery of the consultants that he tries to appropriate it. As Tiarht puts it, “I’d like to get a copy of that slide sometime.” From the hearing we also learn that the terrorists’ Websites are threatening precisely because they manifest a polymorphously perverse geometry of expansion. For example, one SAIC witness before the House Committee compares the replication and elaboration of digital material online to a “spiderweb.” Like Representative Eshoo’s site, he also notes that the terrorists’ sites go “up” and “down,” but the consultant is left to speculate about whether or not there is any “central coordination” to serve as an organising principle and to explain the persistence and consistency of messages despite the apparent lack of a single authorial ethos to offer a stable, humanised, point of reference. In the hearing, the oft-cited solution to the problem created by the hybridity and iterability of digital rhetoric appears to be “public diplomacy.” Both consultants and lawmakers seem to agree that the damaging messages of the insurgents must be countered with U.S. sanctioned information, and thus the phrase “public diplomacy” appears in the hearing seven times. However, witness Roughhead complains that the protean “oral tradition” and what Henry Jenkins has called the “transmedia” character of digital culture, which often crosses several platforms of traditional print, projection, or broadcast media, stymies their best rhetorical efforts: “I think the point that we’ve tried to make in the briefing is that wherever there’s Internet availability at all, they can then download these – these programs and put them onto compact discs, DVDs, or post them into posters, and provide them to a greater range of people in the oral tradition that they’ve grown up in. And so they only need a few Internet sites in order to distribute and disseminate the message.” Of course, to maintain their share of the government market, the Science Applications International Corporation also employs practices of publicity and promotion through the Internet and digital media. They use HTML Web pages for these purposes, as well as PowerPoint presentations and online video. The rhetoric of the Website of SAIC emphasises their motto “From Science to Solutions.” After a short Flash film about how SAIC scientists and engineers solve “complex technical problems,” the visitor is taken to the home page of the firm that re-emphasises their central message about expertise. The maps, uniforms, and specialised tools and equipment that are depicted in these opening Web pages reinforce an ethos of professional specialisation that is able to respond to multiple threats posed by the “global war on terror.” By 26 June 2006, the incident finally was being described as a “Pentagon Snafu” by ABC News. From the opening of reporter Jake Tapper’s investigative Webcast, established government institutions were put on the spot: “So, how much does the Pentagon know about videogames? Well, when it came to a recent appearance before Congress, apparently not enough.” Indeed, the very language about “experts” that was highlighted in the earlier coverage is repeated by Tapper in mockery, with the significant exception of “independent expert” Ian Bogost of the Georgia Institute of Technology. If the Pentagon and SAIC deride the legitimacy of rhetoric as a cultural practice, Bogost occupies himself with its defence. In his recent book Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames, Bogost draws upon the authority of the “2,500 year history of rhetoric” to argue that videogames represent a significant development in that cultural narrative. Given that Bogost and his Watercooler Games Weblog co-editor Gonzalo Frasca were actively involved in the detective work that exposed the depth of professional incompetence involved in the government’s line-up of witnesses, it is appropriate that Bogost is given the final words in the ABC exposé. As Bogost says, “We should be deeply bothered by this. We should really be questioning the kind of advice that Congress is getting.” Bogost may be right that Congress received terrible counsel on that day, but a close reading of the transcript reveals that elected officials were much more than passive listeners: in fact they were lively participants in a cultural conversation about regulating digital media. After looking at the actual language of these exchanges, it seems that the persuasiveness of the misinformation from the Pentagon and SAIC had as much to do with lawmakers’ preconceived anxieties about practices of computer-mediated communication close to home as it did with the contradictory stereotypes that were presented to them about Internet practices abroad. In other words, lawmakers found themselves looking into a fun house mirror that distorted what should have been familiar artefacts of American popular culture because it was precisely what they wanted to see. References ABC News. “Terrorist Videogame?” Nightline Online. 21 June 2006. 22 June 2006 http://abcnews.go.com/Video/playerIndex?id=2105341>. Bogost, Ian. Persuasive Games: Videogames and Procedural Rhetoric. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. Game Politics. “Was Congress Misled by ‘Terrorist’ Game Video? We Talk to Gamer Who Created the Footage.” 11 May 2006. http://gamepolitics.livejournal.com/285129.html#cutid1>. Jenkins, Henry. Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. New York: New York UP, 2006. julieb. “David Morgan Is a Horrible Writer and Should Be Fired.” Online posting. 5 May 2006. Dvorak Uncensored Cage Match Forums. http://cagematch.dvorak.org/index.php/topic,130.0.html>. Mahmood. “Terrorists Don’t Recruit with Battlefield 2.” GGL Global Gaming. 16 May 2006 http://www.ggl.com/news.php?NewsId=3090>. Morgan, David. “Islamists Using U.S. Video Games in Youth Appeal.” Reuters online news service. 4 May 2006 http://today.reuters.com/news/ArticleNews.aspx?type=topNews &storyID=2006-05-04T215543Z_01_N04305973_RTRUKOC_0_US-SECURITY- VIDEOGAMES.xml&pageNumber=0&imageid=&cap=&sz=13&WTModLoc= NewsArt-C1-ArticlePage2>. Ong, Walter J. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London/New York: Methuen, 1982. Parker, Trey. Online posting. 7 May 2006. 9 May 2006 http://www.treyparker.com>. Plato. “Gorgias.” Plato: Collected Dialogues. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961. Shrader, Katherine. “Pentagon Surfing Thousands of Jihad Sites.” Associated Press 4 May 2006. SonicJihad. “SonicJihad: A Day in the Life of a Resistance Fighter.” Online posting. 26 Dec. 2005. Planet Battlefield Forums. 9 May 2006 http://www.forumplanet.com/planetbattlefield/topic.asp?fid=13670&tid=1806909&p=1>. Tapper, Jake, and Audery Taylor. “Terrorist Video Game or Pentagon Snafu?” ABC News Nightline 21 June 2006. 30 June 2006 http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/Technology/story?id=2105128&page=1>. U.S. Congressional Record. Panel I of the Hearing of the House Select Intelligence Committee, Subject: “Terrorist Use of the Internet for Communications.” Federal News Service. 4 May 2006. Welch, Kathleen E. Electric Rhetoric: Classical Rhetoric, Oralism, and the New Literacy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Losh, Elizabeth. "Artificial Intelligence: Media Illiteracy and the SonicJihad Debacle in Congress." M/C Journal 10.5 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0710/08-losh.php>. APA Style Losh, E. (Oct. 2007) "Artificial Intelligence: Media Illiteracy and the SonicJihad Debacle in Congress," M/C Journal, 10(5). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0710/08-losh.php>.

Al Gore brought climate change into … our living rooms. … The 2008 oil price hikes [and the global financial crisis] awakened the world to potential economic hardship in a rapidly urbanising world where the petrol-driven automobile is still king. (Mouritz 47) Six hundred million cars (Urry, “Climate Change” 265) traverse the world’s roads, or sit idly in garages and clogging city streets. The West’s economic progress has been built in part around the success of the automotive industry, where the private car rules the spaces and rhythms of daily life. The problem of “automobile dependence” (Newman and Kenworthy) is often cited as one of the biggest challenges facing countries attempting to combat anthropogenic climate change. Sociologist John Urry has claimed that automobility is an “entire culture” that has re-defined movement in the contemporary world (Urry Mobilities 133). As such, it is the single most significant environmental challenge “because of the intensity of resource use, the production of pollutants and the dominant culture which sustains the major discourses of what constitutes the good life” (Urry Sociology 57-8). Climate change has forced a re-thinking of not only how we produce and dispose of cars, but also how we use them. What might a society not dominated by the private, petrol-driven car look like? Some of the pre-eminent writers on climate change futures, such as Gwynne Dyer, James Lovelock and John Urry, discuss one possibility that might emerge when oil becomes scarce: societies will descend into civil chaos, “a Hobbesian war of all against all” where “regional warlordism” and the most brutish, barbaric aspects of human nature come to the fore (Urry, “Climate Change” 261). Discussing a post-car society, John Urry also proffers another scenario in his “sociologies of the future:” an Orwellian “digital panopticon” in which other modes of transport, far more suited to a networked society, might emerge on a large scale and, in the long run, “might tip the system” into post-car one before it is too late (Urry, “Climate Change” 261). Amongst the many options he discusses is car sharing. Since its introduction in Germany more than 30 years ago, most of the critical literature has been devoted to the planning, environmental and business innovation aspects of car sharing; however very little has been written on its cultural dimensions. This paper analyses this small but developing trend in many Western countries, but more specifically its emergence in Sydney. The convergence of climate change discourse with that of the global financial crisis has resulted in a focus in the mainstream media, over the last few months, on technologies and practices that might save us money and also help the environment. For instance, a Channel 10 News story in May 2009 focused on the boom in car sharing in Sydney (see: http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=EPTT8vYVXro). Car sharing is an adaptive technology that doesn’t do away with the car altogether, but rather transforms the ways in which cars are used, thought about and promoted. I argue that car sharing provides a challenge to the dominant consumerist model of the privately owned car that has sustained capitalist structures for at least the last 50 years. In addition, through looking at some marketing and promotion tactics of car sharing in Australia, I examine some emerging car sharing subjectivities that both extend and subvert the long-established discourses of the automobile’s flexibility and autonomy to tempt monogamous car buyers into becoming philandering car sharers. Much literature has emerged over the last decade devoted to the ubiquitous phenomenon of automobility. “The car is the literal ‘iron cage’ of modernity, motorised, moving and domestic,” claims Urry (“Connections” 28). Over the course of twentieth century, automobility became “the dominant form of daily movement over much of the planet (dominating even those who do not move by cars)” (Paterson 132). Underpinning Urry’s prolific production of literature is his concept of automobility. This he defines as a complex system of “intersecting assemblages” that is not only about driving cars but the nexus between “production, consumption, machinic complexes, mobility, culture and environmental resource use” (Urry, “Connections” 28). In addition, Matthew Paterson, in his Automobile Politics, asserts that “automobility” should be viewed as everything that makes driving around in a car possible: highways, parking structures and traffic rules (87). While the private car seems an inevitable outcome of a capitalistic, individualistic modern society, much work has gone into the process of naturalising a dominant notion of automobility on drivers’ horizons. Through art, literature, popular music and brand advertising, the car has long been associated with seductive forms of identity, and societies have been built around a hegemonic culture of car ownership and driving as the pre-eminent, modern mode of self-expression. And more than 50 years of a popular Hollywood film genre—road movies—has been devoted to glorifying the car as total freedom, or in its more nihilistic version, “freedom on the road to nowhere” (Corrigan). As Paterson claims, “autonomous mobility of car driving is socially produced … by a range of interventions that have made it possible” (18). One of the main reasons automobility has been so successful, he claims, is through its ability to reproduce capitalist society. It provided a commodity around which a whole set of symbols, images and discourses could be constructed which served to effectively legitimise capitalist society. (30) Once the process is locked-in, it then becomes difficult to reverse as billions of agents have adapted to it and built their lives around “automobility’s strange mixture of co-ercion and flexibility” (Urry, “Climate Change” 266). The Decline of the Car Globally, the greatest recent rupture in the automobile’s meta-narrative of success came about in October 2008 when three CEOs from the major US car firms (General Motors, Ford and Chrysler) begged the United States Senate for emergency loan funds to avoid going bankrupt. To put the economic significance of this into context, Emma Rothschild notes “when the listing of the ‘Fortune 500’ began in 1955, General Motors was the largest American corporation, and it was one of the three largest, measured in revenues, every year until 2007” (Rothschilds, “Can we transform”). Curiously, instead of focusing on the death of the car (industry), as we know it, that this scenario might inevitably herald, much of the media attention focused on the hypocrisy and environmental hubris of the fact that all the CEOs had flown in private luxury jets to Washington. “Couldn’t they have at least jet-pooled?” complained one Democrat Senator (Wutkowski). In their next visit to Washington, most of them drove up in experimental vehicles still in pre-production, including plug-in hybrids. Up until that point no other manufacturing industry had been bailed out in the current financial crisis. Of course it’s not the first time the automobile industries have been given government assistance. The Australian automotive industry has received on-going government subsidies since the 1980s. Most recently, PM Kevin Rudd granted a 6.2 billion dollar ‘green car’ package to Australian automotive manufacturers. His justification to the growing chorus of doubts about the economic legitimacy of such a move was: “Some might say it's not worth trying to have a car industry, that is not my view, it is not the view of the Australian government and it never will be the view of any government which I lead” (The Australian). Amongst the many reasons for the government support of these industries must include the extraordinary interweaving of discourses of nationhood and progress with the success of the car industry. As the last few months reveal, evidently the mantra still prevails of “what’s good for the country is good for GM and vice versa”, as the former CEO of General Motors, Charles “Engine” Wilson, argued back in 1952 (Hirsch). In post-industrial societies like Australia it’s not only the economic aspects of the automotive industries that are criticised. Cars seem to be slowly losing their grip on identity-formation that they managed to maintain throughout “the century of the car” (Gilroy). They are no longer unproblematically associated with progress, freedom, youthfulness and absolute autonomy. The decline and eventual death of the automobile as we know it will be long, arduous and drawn-out. But there are some signs of a post-automobile society emerging, perhaps where cars will still be used but they will not dominate our society, urban space and culture in quite the same way that they have over the last 50 years. Urry discusses six transformations that might ‘tip’ the hegemonic system of automobility into a post-car one. He mentions new fuel systems, new materials for car construction, the de-privatisation of cars, development of communications technologies and integration of networked public transport through smart card technology and systems (Urry, Mobilities 281-284). As Paterson and others have argued, computers and mobile phones have somehow become “more genuine symbols of mobility and in turn progress” than the car (157). As a result, much automobile advertising now intertwines communications technologies with brand to valorise mobility. Car sharing goes some way in not only de-privatising cars but also using smart card technology and networked systems enabling an association with mobility futures. In Automobile Politics Paterson asks, “Is the car fundamentally unsustainable? Can it be greened? Has the car been so naturalised on our mobile horizons that we can’t imagine a society without it?” (27). From a sustainability perspective, one of the biggest problems with cars is still the amount of space devoted to them; highways, garages, car parks. About one-quarter of the land in London and nearly one-half of that in Los Angeles is devoted to car-only environments (Urry, “Connections” 29). In Sydney, it is more like a quarter. We have to reduce the numbers of cars on our roads to make our societies livable (Newman and Kenworthy). Car sharing provokes a re-thinking of urban space. If one quarter of Sydney’s population car shared and we converted this space into green use or local market gardens, then we’d have a radically transformed city. Car sharing, not to be confused with ‘ride sharing’ or ‘car pooling,’ involves a number of people using cars that are parked centrally in dedicated car bays around the inner city. After becoming a member (much like a 6 or 12 monthly gym membership), the cars can be booked (and extended) by the hour via the web or phone. They can then be accessed via a smart card. In Sydney there are 3 car sharing organisations operating: Flexicar (http://www.flexicar.com.au/), CharterDrive (http://www.charterdrive.com.au/) and GoGet (http://www.goget.com.au/).[1] The largest of these, GoGet, has been operating for 6 years and has over 5000 members and 200 cars located predominantly in the inner city suburbs. Anecdotally, GoGet claims its membership is primarily drawn from professionals living in the inner-urban ring. Their motivation for joining is, firstly, the convenience that car sharing provides in a congested, public transport-challenged city like Sydney; secondly, the financial savings derived; and thirdly, members consider the environmental and social benefits axiomatic. [2] The promotion tactics of car sharing seems to reflect this by barely mentioning the environment but focusing on those aspects which link car sharing to futuristic and flexible subjectivities which I outline in the next section. Unlike traditional car rental, the vehicles in car sharing are scattered through local streets in a network allowing local residents and businesses access to the vehicles mostly on foot. One car share vehicle is used by 22-24 members and gets about seven cars off the street (Mehlman 22). With lots of different makes and models of vehicles in each of their fleets, Flexicar’s website claims, “around the corner, around the clock” “Flexicar offers you the freedom of driving your own car without the costs and hassles of owning one,” while GoGet asserts, “like owning a car only better.” Due to the initial lack of interest from government, all the car sharing organisations in Australia are privately owned. This is very different to the situation in Europe where governments grant considerable financial assistance and have often integrated car sharing into pre-existing public transport networks. Urry discusses the spread of car sharing across the Western world: Six hundred plus cities across Europe have developed car-sharing schemes involving 50,000 people (Cervero, 2001). Prototype examples are found such as Liselec in La Rochelle, and in northern California, Berlin and Japan (Motavalli, 2000: 233). In Deptford there is an on-site car pooling service organized by Avis attached to a new housing development, while in Jersey electric hire cars have been introduced by Toyota. (Urry, “Connections” 34) ‘Collaborative Consumption’ and Flexible, Philandering Subjectivities Car sharing shifts the dominant conception of a car from being a ‘commodity’, which people purchase and subsequently identify with, to a ‘service’ or network of vehicles that are collectively used. It does this through breaking down the one car = one person (or one family) ratio with one car instead servicing 20 or more people. One of Paterson’s biggest criticisms concerns car driving as “a form of social exclusion” (44). Car sharing goes some way in subverting the model of hyper-individualism that supports both hegemonic automobility and capitalist structures, whereby the private motorcar produces a “separation of individuals from one another driving in their own private universes with no account for anyone else” (Paterson 90). As a car sharer, the driver has to acknowledge that this is not their private domain, and the car no longer becomes an extension of their living room or bedroom, as is noted in much literature around car cultures (Morris, Sheller, Simpson). There are a community of people using the car, so the driver needs to be attentive to things like keeping the car clean and bringing it back on time so another person can use it. So while car sharing may change the affective relationship and self-identification with the vehicle itself, it doesn’t necessarily change the phenomenological dimensions of car driving, such as the nostalgic pleasure of driving on the open road, or perhaps more realistically in Sydney, the frustration of being caught in a traffic jam. However, the fact the driver doesn’t own the vehicle does alter their relationship to the space and the commodity in a literal as well as a figurative way. Like car ownership, evidently car sharing also produces its own set of limitations on freedom and convenience. That mobility and car ownership equals freedom—the ‘freedom to drive’—is one imaginary which car firms were able to successfully manipulate and perpetuate throughout the twentieth century. However, car sharing also attaches itself to the same discourses of freedom and pervasive individualism and then thwarts them. For instance, GoGet in Sydney have run numerous marketing campaigns that attempt to contest several ‘self-evident truths’ about automobility. One is flexibility. Flexibility (and associated convenience) was one thing that ownership of a car in the late twentieth century was firmly able to affiliate itself with. However, car ownership is now more often associated with being expensive, a hassle and a long-term commitment, through things like buying, licensing, service and maintenance, cleaning, fuelling, parking permits, etc. Cars have also long been linked with sexuality. When in the 1970s financial challenges to the car were coming as a result of the oil shocks, Chair of General Motors, James Roche stated that, “America’s romance with the car is not over. Instead it has blossomed into a marriage” (Rothschilds, Paradise Lost). In one marketing campaign GoGet asked, ‘Why buy a car when all you need is a one night stand?’, implying that owning a car is much like a monogamous relationship that engenders particular commitments and responsibilities, whereas car sharing can just be a ‘flirtation’ or a ‘one night stand’ and you don’t have to come back if you find it a hassle. Car sharing produces a philandering subjectivity that gives individuals the freedom to have lots of different types of cars, and therefore relationships with each of them: I can be a Mini Cooper driver one day and a Falcon driver the next. This disrupts the whole kind of identification with one type of car that ownership encourages. It also breaks down a stalwart of capitalism—brand loyalty to a particular make of car with models changing throughout a person’s lifetime. Car sharing engenders far more fluid types of subjectivities as opposed to those rigid identities associated with ownership of one car. Car sharing can also be regarded as part of an emerging phenomenon of what Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers have called “collaborative consumption”—when a community gets together “through organized sharing, swapping, bartering, trading, gifting and renting to get the same pleasures of ownership with reduced personal cost and burden, and lower environmental impact” (www.collaborativeconsumption.com). As Urry has stated, these developments indicate a gradual transformation in current economic structures from ownership to access, as shown more generally by many services offered and accessed via the web (Urry Mobilities 283). Rogers and Botsman maintain that this has come about through the “convergence of online social networks increasing cost consciousness and environmental necessity." In the future we could predict an increasing shift to payment to ‘access’ for mobility services, rather than the outright private ownerships of vehicles (Urry, “Connections”). Networked-Subjectivities or a ‘Digital Panopticon’? Cars, no longer able on their own to signify progress in either technical or social terms, attain their symbolic value through their connection to other, now more prevalently ‘progressive’ technologies. (Paterson 155) The term ‘digital panopticon’ has often been used to describe a dystopian world of virtual surveillance through such things as web-enabled social networking sites where much information is public, or alternatively, for example, the traffic surveillance system in London whereby the public can be constantly scrutinised through the centrally monitored cameras that track people’s/vehicle’s movements on city streets. In his “sociologies of the future,” Urry maintains that one thing which might save us from descending into post-car civil chaos is a system governed by a “digital panopticon” mobility system. This would be governed by a nexus system “that orders, regulates, tracks and relatively soon would ‘drive’ each vehicle and monitor each driver/passenger” (Urry, “Connections” 33). The transformation of mobile technologies over the last decade has made car sharing, as a viable business model, possible. Through car sharing’s exploitation of an online booking system, and cars that can be tracked, monitored and traced, the seeds of a mobile “networked-subjectivity” are emerging. But it’s not just the technology people are embracing; a cultural shift is occurring in the way that people understand mobility, their own subjectivity, and more importantly, the role of cars. NETT Magazine did a feature on car sharing, and advertised it on their front cover as “GoGet’s web and mobile challenge to car owners” (May 2009). Car sharing seems to be able to tap into more contemporary understandings of what mobility and flexibility might mean in the twenty-first century. In their marketing and promotion tactics, car sharing organisations often discursively exploit science fiction terminology and generate a subjectivity much more dependent on networks and accessibility (158). In the suburbs people park their cars in garages. In car sharing, the vehicles are parked not in car bays or car parks, but in publically accessible ‘pods’, which promotes a futuristic, sci-fi experience. Even the phenomenological dimensions of swiping a smart card over the front of the windscreen to open the car engender a transformation in access to the car, instead of through a key. This is service-technology of the future while those stuck in car ownership are from the old economy and the “century of the car” (Gilroy). The connections between car sharing and the mobile phone and other communications technologies are part of the notion of a networked, accessible vehicle. However, the more problematic side to this is the car under surveillance. Nic Lowe, of his car sharing organisation GoGet says, “Because you’re tagged on and we know it’s you, you are able to drive the car… every event you do is logged, so we know what time you turned the key, what time you turned it off and we know how far you drove … if a car is lost we can sound the horn to disable it remotely to prevent theft. We can track how fast you were going and even how fast you accelerated … track the kilometres for billing purposes and even find out when people are using the car when they shouldn’t be” (Mehlman 27). The possibility with the GPS technology installed in the car is being able to monitor speeds at which people drive, thereby fining then every minute spent going over the speed limit. While this conjures up the notion of the car under surveillance, it is also a much less bleaker scenario than “a Hobbesian war of all against all”. Conclusion: “Hundreds of Cars, No Garage” The prospect of climate change is provoking innovation at a whole range of levels, as well as providing a re-thinking of how we use taken-for-granted technologies. Sometime this century the one tonne, privately owned, petrol-driven car will become an artefact, much like Sydney trams did last century. At this point in time, car sharing can be regarded as an emerging transitional technology to a post-car society that provides a challenge to hegemonic automobile culture. It is evidently not a radical departure from the car’s vast machinic complex and still remains a part of what Urry calls the “system of automobility”. From a pro-car perspective, its networked surveillance places constraints on the free agency of the car, while for those of the deep green variety it is, no doubt, a compromise. Nevertheless, it provides a starting point for re-thinking the foundations of the privately-owned car. While Urry makes an important point in relation to a society moving from ownership to access, he doesn’t take into account the cultural shifts occurring that are enabling car sharing to be attractive to prospective members: the notion of networked subjectivities, the discursive constructs used to establish car sharing as a thing of the future with pods and smart cards instead of garages and keys. If car sharing became mainstream it could have radical environmental impacts on things like urban space and pollution, as well as the dominant culture of “automobile dependence” (Newman and Kenworthy), as Australia attempts to move to a low carbon economy. Notes [1] My partner Bruce Jeffreys, together with Nic Lowe, founded Newtown Car Share in 2002, which is now called GoGet. [2] Several layers down in the ‘About Us’ link on GoGet’s website is the following information about the environmental benefits of car sharing: “GoGet's aim is to provide a reliable, convenient and affordable transport service that: allows people to live car-free, decreases car usage, improves local air quality, removes private cars from local streets, increases patronage for public transport, allows people to lead more active lives” (http://www.goget.com.au/about-us.html). References The Australian. “Kevin Rudd Throws $6.2bn Lifeline to Car Industry.” 10 Nov. 2008. < http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/ 0,28124,24628026-5018011,00.html >.Corrigan, Tim. “Genre, Gender, and Hysteria: The Road Movie in Outer Space.” A Cinema Without Walls: Movies, Culture after Vietnam. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1991. Dwyer, Gwynne. Climate Wars. North Carlton: Scribe, 2008. 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Introduction“From every kind of man obedience I expect; I’m the Emperor of Japan.” (“Miyasama,” from Gilbert and Sullivan’s musical The Mikado, 1885)This commentary is facilitated by—surprisingly resilient—oriental stereotypes of an imagined Japan (think of Oscar Wilde’s assertion, in 1889, that Japan was a European invention). During the Victorian era, in Britain, there was a craze for all things oriental, particularly ceramics and “there was a craze for all things Japanese and no middle class drawing room was without its Japanese fan or teapot.“ (V&A Victorian). These pastoral depictions of the ‘oriental life’ included the figures of men and women in oriental garb, with fans, stilt shoes, kimono-like robes, and appropriate headdresses, engaging in garden-based activities, especially tea ceremony variations (Landow). In fact, tea itself, and the idea of a ceremony of serving it, had taken up a central role, even an obsession in middle- and upper-class Victorian life. Similarly, landscapes with wild seas, rugged rocks and stunted pines, wizened monks, pagodas and temples, and particular fauna and flora (cranes and other birds flying through clouds of peonies, cherry blossoms and chrysanthemums) were very popular motifs (see Martin and Koda). Rather than authenticity, these designs heightened the Western-based romantic stereotypes associated with a stylised form of Japanese life, conducted sedately under rule of the Japanese Imperial Court. In reality, prior to the Meiji period (1868–1912), the Emperor was largely removed from everyday concerns, residing as an isolated, holy figure in Kyoto, the traditional capital of Japan. Japan was instead ruled from Edo (modern day Tokyo) led by the Shogun and his generals, according to a strict Confucian influenced code (see Keene). In Japan, as elsewhere, the presence of feudal-style governance includes policies that determine much of everyday life, including restrictions on clothing (Rall 169). The Samurai code was no different, and included a series of protocols that restricted rank, movement, behaviour, and clothing. As Vincent has noted in the case of the ‘lace tax’ in Great Britain, these restrictions were designed to punish those who seek to penetrate the upper classes through their costume (28-30). In Japan, pre-Meiji sumptuary laws, for example, restricted the use of gold, and prohibited the use of a certain shade of red by merchant classes (V&A Kimono).Therefore, in the governance of pre-globalised societies, the importance of clothing and textile is evident; as Jones and Stallybrass comment: We need to understand the antimatedness of clothes, their ability to “pick up” subjects, to mould and shape them both physically and socially—to constitute subjects through their power as material memories […] Clothing is a worn world: a world of social relations put upon the wearer’s body. (2-3, emphasis added)The significant re-imagining of Japanese cultural and national identities are explored here through the cataclysmic impact of Western ideologies on Japanese cultural traditions. There are many ways to examine how indigenous cultures respond to European, British, or American (hereafter Western) influences, particularly in times of conflict (Wilk). Western ideology arrived in Japan after a long period of isolation (during which time Japan’s only contact was with Dutch traders) through the threat of military hostility and war. It is after this outside threat was realised that Japan’s adoption of military and industrial practices begins. The re-imagining of their national identity took many forms, and the inclusion of a Western-style military costuming as a schoolboy uniform became a highly visible indicator of Japan’s mission to protect its sovereign integrity. A brief history of Japan’s rise from a collection of isolated feudal states to a unified military power, in not only the Asian Pacific region but globally, demonstrates the speed at which they adopted the Western mode of warfare. Gunboats on Japan’s ShorelinesJapan was forcefully opened to the West in the 1850s by America under threat of First Name Perry’s ‘gunboat diplomacy’ (Hillsborough 7-8). Following this, Japan underwent a rapid period of modernisation, and an upsurge in nationalism and military expansion that was driven by a desire to catch up to the European powers present in the Pacific. Noted by Ian Ferguson in Civilization: The West and the Rest, Unsure, the Japanese decided […] to copy everything […] Japanese institutions were refashioned on Western models. The army drilled like Germans; the navy sailed like Britons. An American-style system of state elementary and middle schools was also introduced. (221, emphasis added)This was nothing short of a wide-scale reorganisation of Japan’s entire social structure and governance. Under the Emperor Meiji, who wrested power from the Shogunate and reclaimed it for the Imperial head, Japan steamed into an industrial revolution, achieving in a matter of years what had taken Europe over a century.Japan quickly became a major player-elect on the world stage. However, as an island nation, Japan lacked the essentials of both coal and iron with which to fashion not only industrial machinery but also military equipment, the machinery of war. In 1875 Japan forced Korea to open itself to foreign (read: Japanese) trade. In the same treaty, Korea was recognised as a sovereign nation, separate from Qing China (Tucker 1461). The necessity for raw materials then led to the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), a conflict between Japan and China that marked the emergence of Japan as a major world power. The Korean Peninsula had long been China’s most important client state, but its strategic location adjacent to the Japanese archipelago, and its natural resources of coal and iron, attracted Japan’s interest. Later, the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), allowed a victorious Japan to force Russia to abandon its expansionist policy in the Far East, becoming the first Asian power in modern times to defeat a European power. The Russo-Japanese War developed out of the rivalry between Russia and Japan for dominance in Korea and Manchuria, again in the struggle for natural resources (Tucker 1534-46).Japan’s victories, together with the county’s drive for resources, meant that Japan could now determine its role within the Asia-Pacific sphere of influence. As Japan’s military, and their adoption of Westernised combat, proved effective in maintaining national integrity, other social institutions also looked to the West (Ferguson 221). In an ironic twist—while Victorian and Continental fashion was busy adopting the exotic, oriental look (Martin and Koda)—the kimono, along with other essentials of Japanese fashions, were rapidly altered (both literally and figuratively) to suit new, warlike ideology. It should be noted that kimono literally means ‘things that you wear’ and which, prior to exposure to Western fashions, signified all worn clothing (Dalby 65-119). “Wearing Things” in Westernised JapanAs Japan modernised during the late 1800s the kimono was positioned as symbolising barbaric, pre-modern, ‘oriental’ Japan. Indeed, on 17 January 1887 the Meiji Empress issued a memorandum on the subject of women’s clothing in Japan: “She [the Empress] believed that western clothes were in fact closer to the dress of women in ancient Japan than the kimonos currently worn and urged that they be adopted as the standard clothes of the reign” (Keene 404). The resemblance between Western skirts and blouses and the simple skirt and separate top that had been worn in ancient times by a people descended from the sun goddess, Amaterasu wo mikami, was used to give authority and cultural authenticity to Japan’s modernisation projects. The Imperial Court, with its newly ennobled European style aristocrats, exchanged kimono silks for Victorian finery, and samurai armour for military pomp and splendour (Figure 1).Figure 1: The Meiji Emperor, Empress and Crown Prince resplendent in European fashions on an outing to Asukayama Park. Illustration: Toyohara Chikanobu, circa 1890.It is argued here that the function of a uniform is to prepare the body for service. Maids and butlers, nurses and courtesans, doctors, policemen, and soldiers are all distinguished by their garb. Prudence Black states: “as a technology, uniforms shape and code the body so they become a unit that belongs to a collective whole” (93). The requirement to discipline bodies through clothing, particularly through uniforms, is well documented (see Craik, Peoples, and Foucault). The need to distinguish enemies from allies on the battlefield requires adherence to a set of defined protocols, as referenced in military fashion compendiums (see Molloy). While the postcolonial adoption of Western-based clothing reflects a new form of subservience (Rall, Kuechler and Miller), in Japan, the indigenous garments were clearly designed in the interests of ideological allegiance. To understand the Japanese sartorial traditions, the kimono itself must be read as providing a strong disciplinary element. The traditional garment is designed to represent an upright and unbending column—where two meters of under bindings are used to discipline the body into shape are then topped with a further four meters of a stiffened silk obi wrapped around the waist and lower chest. To dress formally in such a garment requires helpers (see Dalby). The kimono both constructs and confines the women who wear it, and presses them into their roles as dutiful, upper-class daughters (see Craik). From the 1890s through to the 1930s, when Japan again enters a period of militarism, the myth of the kimono again changes as it is integrated into the build-up towards World War II.Decades later, when Japan re-established itself as a global economic power in the 1970s and 1980s, the kimono was re-authenticated as Japan’s ‘traditional’ garment. This time it was not the myth of a people descended from solar deities that was on display, but that of samurai strength and propriety for men, alongside an exaggerated femininity for women, invoking a powerful vision of Japanese sartorial tradition. This reworking of the kimono was only possible as the garment was already contained within the framework of Confucian family duty. However, in the lead up to World War II, Japanese military advancement demanded of its people soldiers that could win European-style wars. The quickest solution was to copy the military acumen and strategies of global warfare, and the costumes of the soldiery and seamen of Europe, including Great Britain (Ferguson). It was also acknowledged that soldiers were ‘made not born’ so the Japanese educational system was re-vamped to emulate those of its military rivals (McVeigh). It was in the uptake of schoolboy uniforms that this re-imagining of Japanese imperial strength took place.The Japanese Schoolboy UniformCentral to their rapid modernisation, Japan adopted a constitutional system of education that borrowed from American and French models (Tipton 68-69). The government viewed education as a “primary means of developing a sense of nation,” and at its core, was the imperial authorities’ obsession with defining “Japan and Japaneseness” (Tipton 68-69). Numerous reforms eventually saw, after an abolition of fees, nearly 100% attendance by both boys and girls, despite a lingering mind-set that educating women was “a waste of time” (Tipton 68-69). A boys’ uniform based on the French and Prussian military uniforms of the 1860s and 1870s respectively (Kinsella 217), was adopted in 1879 (McVeigh 47). This jacket, initially with Prussian cape and cap, consists of a square body, standing mandarin style collar and a buttoned front. It was through these education reforms, as visually symbolised by the adoption of military style school uniforms, that citizen making, education, and military training became interrelated aspects of Meiji modernisation (Kinsella 217). Known as the gakuran (gaku: to study; ran: meaning both orchid, and a pun on Horanda, meaning Holland, the only Western country with trading relations in pre-Meiji Japan), these jackets were a symbol of education, indicating European knowledge, power and influence and came to reflect all things European in Meiji Japan. By adopting these jackets two objectives were realised:through the magical power of imitation, Japan would, by adopting the clothing of the West, naturally rise in military power; and boys were uniformed to become not only educated as quasi-Europeans, but as fighting soldiers and sons (suns) of the nation.The gakuran jacket was first popularised by state-run schools, however, in the century and a half that the garment has been in use it has come to symbolise young Japanese masculinity as showcased in campus films, anime, manga, computer games, and as fashion is the preeminent garment for boybands and Japanese hipsters.While the gakuran is central to the rise of global militarism in Japan (McVeigh 51-53), the jacket would go on to form the basis of the Sun Yat Sen and Mao Suits as symbols of revolutionary China (see McVeigh). Supposedly, Sun Yat Sen saw the schoolboy jacket in Japan as a utilitarian garment and adopted it with a turn down collar (Cumming et al.). For Sun Yat Sen, the gakuran was the perfect mix of civilian (school boy) and military (the garment’s Prussian heritage) allowing him to walk a middle path between the demands of both. Furthermore, the garment allowed Sun to navigate between Western style suits and old-fashioned Qing dynasty styles (Gerth 116); one was associated with the imperialism of the National Products Movement, while the other represented the corruption of the old dynasty. In this way, the gakuran was further politicised from a national (Japanese) symbol to a global one. While military uniforms have always been political garments, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, as the world was rocked by revolutions and war, civilian clothing also became a means of expressing political ideals (McVeigh 48-49). Note that Mahatma Ghandi’s clothing choices also evolved from wholly Western styles to traditional and emphasised domestic products (Gerth 116).Mao adopted this style circa 1927, further defining the style when he came to power by adding elements from the trousers, tunics, and black cotton shoes worn by peasants. The suit was further codified during the 1960s, reaching its height in the Cultural Revolution. While the gakuran has always been a scholarly black (see Figure 2), subtle differences in the colour palette differentiated the Chinese population—peasants and workers donned indigo blue Mao jackets, while the People’s Liberation Army Soldiers donned khaki green. This limited colour scheme somewhat paradoxically ensured that subtle hierarchical differences were maintained even whilst advocating egalitarian ideals (Davis 522). Both the Sun Yat Sen suit and the Mao jacket represented the rejection of bourgeois (Western) norms that objectified the female form in favour of a uniform society. Neo-Maoism and Mao fever of the early 1990s saw the Mao suit emerge again as a desirable piece of iconic/ironic youth fashion. Figure 2: An example of Gakuran uniform next to the girl’s equivalent on display at Ichikawa Gakuen School (Japan). Photo: Emerald King, 2015.There is a clear and vital link between the influence of the Prussian style Japanese schoolboy uniform on the later creation of the Mao jacket—that of the uniform as an integral piece of worn propaganda (Atkins).For Japan, the rapid deployment of new military and industrial technologies, as well as a sartorial need to present her leaders as modern (read: Western) demanded the adoption of European-style uniforms. The Imperial family had always been removed from Samurai battlefields, so the adoption of Western military costume allowed Japan’s rulers to present a uniform face to other global powers. When Japan found itself in conflict in the Asia Pacific Region, without an organised military, the first requirement was to completely reorganise their system of warfare from a feudal base and to train up national servicemen. Within an American-style compulsory education system, the European-based curriculum included training in mathematics, engineering and military history, as young Britons had for generations begun their education in Greek and Latin, with the study of Ancient Greek and Roman wars (Bantock). It is only in the classroom that ideological change on a mass scale can take place (Reference Please), a lesson not missed by later leaders such as Mao Zedong.ConclusionIn the 1880s, the Japanese leaders established their position in global politics by adopting clothing and practices from the West (Europeans, Britons, and Americans) in order to quickly re-shape their country’s educational system and military establishment. The prevailing military costume from foreign cultures not only disciplined their adopted European bodies, they enforced a new regime through dress (Rall 157-174). For boys, the gakuran symbolised the unity of education and militarism as central to Japanese masculinity. Wearing a uniform, as many authors suggest, furthers compliance (Craik, Nagasawa Kaiser and Hutton, and McVeigh). As conscription became a part of Japanese reality in World War II, the schoolboys just swapped their military-inspired school uniforms for genuine military garments.Re-imagining a Japanese schoolboy uniform from a European military costume might suit ideological purposes (Atkins), but there is more. The gakuran, as a uniform based on a close, but not fitted jacket, was the product of a process of advanced industrialisation in the garment-making industry also taking place in the 1800s:Between 1810 and 1830, technical calibrations invented by tailors working at the very highest level of the craft [in Britain] eventually made it possible for hundreds of suits to be cut up and made in advance [...] and the ready-to-wear idea was put into practice for men’s clothes […] originally for uniforms for the War of 1812. (Hollander 31) In this way, industrialisation became a means to mass production, which furthered militarisation, “the uniform is thus the clothing of the modern disciplinary society” (Black 102). There is a perfect resonance between Japan’s appetite for a modern military and their rise to an industrialised society, and their conquests in Asia Pacific supplied the necessary material resources that made such a rapid deployment possible. The Japanese schoolboy uniform was an integral part of the process of both industrialisation and militarisation, which instilled in the wearer a social role required by modern Japanese society in its rise for global power. Garments are never just clothing, but offer a “world of social relations put upon the wearer’s body” (Jones and Stallybrass 3-4).Today, both the Japanese kimono and the Japanese schoolboy uniform continue to interact with, and interrogate, global fashions as contemporary designers continue to call on the tropes of ‘military chic’ (Tonchi) and Japanese-inspired clothing (Kawamura). References Atkins, Jaqueline. Wearing Propaganda: Textiles on the Home Front in Japan, Britain, and the United States. Princeton: Yale UP, 2005.Bantock, Geoffrey Herman. Culture, Industrialisation and Education. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1968.Black, Prudence. “The Discipline of Appearance: Military Style and Australian Flight Hostess Uniforms 1930–1964.” Fashion & War in Popular Culture. Ed. Denise N. Rall. Bristol: Intellect/U Chicago P, 2014. 91-106.Craik, Jenifer. Uniforms Exposed: From Conformity to Transgression. 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