Journal articles on the topic 'United States – Foreign relations – Public opinion'
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1
TOMZ, MICHAEL, and JESSICA L. P. WEEKS. "Public Opinion and Foreign Electoral Intervention." American Political Science Review 114, no. 3 (April 14, 2020): 856–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000064.
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Foreign electoral intervention is an increasingly important tool for influencing politics in other countries, yet we know little about when citizens would tolerate or condemn foreign efforts to sway elections. In this article, we use experiments to study American public reactions to revelations of foreign electoral intervention. We find that even modest forms of intervention polarize the public along partisan lines. Americans are more likely to condemn foreign involvement, lose faith in democracy, and seek retaliation when a foreign power sides with the opposition, than when a foreign power aids their own party. At the same time, Americans reject military responses to electoral attacks on the United States, even when their own political party is targeted. Our findings suggest that electoral interference can divide and weaken an adversary without provoking the level of public demand for retaliation typically triggered by conventional military attacks.
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JOHNSTONE, ANDREW. "Spinning War and Peace: Foreign Relations and Public Relations on the Eve of World War II." Journal of American Studies 53, no. 1 (August 15, 2017): 223–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875817001293.
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The eve of World War II saw the development of direct connections between public relations experts and issues of foreign affairs in the United States. Public relations professionals assisted both internationalists and noninterventionists to spread their arguments across the nation, helping them to hone their messages, to organize, and to raise money. All of the main citizens’ organizations created during this period sought public relations assistance in the face of growing popular awareness of global events, and with an awareness of the need for public relations counsel in the face of an increasingly measurable concept of public opinion.
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Goldsmith, Benjamin E., and Yusaku Horiuchi. "In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for US Foreign Policy?" World Politics 64, no. 3 (June 27, 2012): 555–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887112000123.
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Does “soft power” matter in international relations? Specifically, when the United States seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about US foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? The authors examine this question using multinational surveys covering fifty-eight countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the US. They draw their basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who uses various indicators of opinion about the US to assess US soft power. But the authors argue that his theory lacks the specificity needed for falsifiable testing. They refine it by focusing on foreign public opinion about US foreign policy, an underemphasized element of Nye's approach. Their regression analysis shows that foreign public opinion has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policies toward the International Criminal Court and on voting decisions in the UN General Assembly. These results support the authors' refined theoretical argument about soft power: public opinion about US foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies toward the US, but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics.
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TURES, JOHN. "The Democracy-Promotion Gap in American Public Opinion." Journal of American Studies 41, no. 3 (October 24, 2007): 557–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875807003994.
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United States foreign-policymakers have enthusiastically backed policies of promoting democracy abroad. But do the American people support these plans? Evidence from polls reveals that while people generally like the idea of exporting freedom, they do not view it as a top priority. Other concepts such as political and economic security are valued more by the American public. Backing for democracy promotion also seems to be waning in recent years. I examine these issues and offer possible reasons for this “gap” in response to democracy promotion among American people. I also explain the implications of these findings for America's foreign policy, including the types of government the US appears to support in the wake of military operations. I conclude with an examination of why the policy of democracy promotion has not been more popular with the American people, evaluating competing arguments that the policy is flawed, as opposed to simply a case of poor public relations.
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Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010534.
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The paper discusses the role of public opinion in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, public opinion matters. However, the impact of public opinion is determined not so much by the specific issues involved or by the particular pattern of public attitudes as by the domestic structure and the coalition-building processes among the elites in the respective country. The paper analyzes the public impact on the foreign policy-making process in four liberal democracies with distinct domestic structures: the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan. Under the same international conditions and despite similar patterns of public attitudes, variances in foreign policy outcomes nevertheless occur; these have to be explained by differences in political institutions, policy networks, and societal structures. Thus, the four countries responded differently to Soviet policies during the 1980s despite more or less comparable trends in mass public opinion.
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Chapman, Terrence L. "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." International Organization 63, no. 4 (October 2009): 733–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309990154.
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AbstractRecent work suggests that multilateral security institutions, such as the UN Security Council, can influence foreign policy through public opinion. According to this view, authorization can increase public support for foreign policy, freeing domestic constraints. Governments that feel constrained by public opinion may thus alter their foreign policies to garner external authorization. These claims challenge traditional realist views about the role of international organizations in security affairs, which tend to focus on direct enforcement mechanisms and neglect indirect channels of influence. To examine these claims, this article investigates the first link in this causal chain—the effect of institutional statements on public opinion. Strategic information arguments, as opposed to arguments about the symbolic legitimacy of specific organizations or the procedural importance of consultation, posit that the effect of institutional statements on public opinion is conditional on public perceptions of member states' interests. This article tests this conditional relationship in the context of changes in presidential approval surrounding military disputes, using a measure of preference distance between the United States and veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council. Findings indicate that short-term changes in presidential approval surrounding the onset of military disputes in the United States between 1946 and 2001 have been significantly larger when accompanied by a positive resolution for a Security Council that is more distant in terms of foreign policy preferences. The article also discusses polling data during the 1990s and 2000s that support the strategic information perspective.
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Leep, Matthew, and Jeremy Pressman. "Foreign cues and public views on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 21, no. 1 (November 21, 2018): 169–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148118809807.
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As foreign sources in the news might help the public assess their home country’s foreign policies, scholars have recently turned attention to the effects of foreign source cues on domestic public opinion. Using original survey experiments, we explore the effects of domestic (United States) and foreign (Israeli, British, and Palestinian) criticism of Israel’s military actions and settlements on US attitudes towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. We find that foreign cues by government officials and non-governmental organisations have modest effects, and are generally not more influential than domestic cues. We also show that individuals might discount foreign criticism of Israel in the context of US bipartisan support for Israel. While our experiments reveal some heterogeneous effects related to partisanship, we are sceptical of significant movement in opinion in response to foreign cues. These findings provide insights into foreign source cue effects beyond the context of the use of military force.
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SHIRK, SUSAN L. "Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China." Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (March 14, 2007): 43–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109907002472.
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China has undergone a media revolution that has transformed the domestic context for making foreign policy as well as domestic policy. The commercialization of the mass media has changed the way leaders and publics interact in the process of making foreign policy. As they compete with one another, the new media naturally try to appeal to the tastes of their potential audiences. Editors make choices about which stories to cover based on their judgments about which ones will resonate best with audiences. In China today, that means a lot of stories about Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, the topics that are the objects of Chinese popular nationalism. The publicity given these topics makes them domestic political issues because they are potential focal points for elite dis-agreement and mass collective action, and thereby constrains the way China' leaders and diplomats deal with them. Even relatively minor events involving China' relations with Japan, Taiwan, or the United States become big news, and therefore relations with these three governments must be carefully handled by the politicians in the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee. Because of the Internet, it is impossible for Party censors to screen out news from Japan, Taiwan or the United States that might upset the public. Common knowledge of such news forces officials to react to every slight, no matter how small. Foreign policy makers feel especially constrained by nationalist public opinion when it comes to its diplomacy with Japan. Media marketization and the Internet have helped make Japan China' most emotionally charged international relationship.
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Chow, Wilfred M., Enze Han, and Xiaojun Li. "Brexit identities and British public opinion on China." International Affairs 95, no. 6 (November 1, 2019): 1369–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz191.
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Abstract Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision-making, especially when it comes to the UK's relations with the United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on public opinion about British foreign policy towards other major players in the international system, such as emerging powers like China. We have addressed this knowledge gap by conducting a public opinion survey in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Our research findings indicate that the British public at large finds China's rise disconcerting, but is also pragmatic in its understanding of how the ensuing bilateral relations should be managed. More importantly, our results show that views on China are clearly split between the two opposing Brexit identities. Those who subscribe strongly to the Leave identity, measured by their aversion to the EU and antipathy towards immigration, are also more likely to hold negative perceptions of Chinese global leadership and be more suspicious of China as a military threat. In contrast, those who espouse a Remain identity—that is, believe that Britain would be better served within the EU and with more immigrants—are more likely to prefer closer engagement with China and to have a more positive outlook overall on China's place within the global community.
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Kitagawa, Risa, and Jonathan A. Chu. "The Impact of Political Apologies on Public Opinion." World Politics 73, no. 3 (June 9, 2021): 441–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887121000083.
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ABSTRACTApology diplomacy promises to assuage historical grievances held by foreign publics, yet in practice appears to ignite domestic backlash, raising questions about its efficacy. This article develops a theory of how political apologies affect public approval of an apologizing government across domestic and foreign contexts. The authors test its implications using large-scale survey experiments in Japan and the United States. In the surveys, the authors present vignettes about World War II grievances and randomize the nature of a government apology. They find that apology-making, both as statements acknowledging wrongdoing and as expressions of remorse, boosts approval in the recipient state. But in the apologizing state, backlash is likely among individuals with strong hierarchical group dispositions—manifested as nationalism, social-dominance orientation, and conservatism—and among those who do not consider the recipient a strategically important partner. This microlevel evidence reveals how leaders face a crucial trade-off between improving support abroad and risking backlash at home, with implications for the study of diplomatic communication and transitional justice.
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Allen, David. "Realism and Malarkey: Henry Kissinger's State Department, Détente, and Domestic Consensus." Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 3 (July 2015): 184–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00548.
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This article uses recently declassified archival documents to reassess public opinion in the United States regarding East-West détente. When Henry Kissinger was U.S. secretary of state during the Nixon and Ford administrations, he made dozens of speeches intended to educate the public in what he considered the proper methods of diplomacy. By analyzing those “heartland” speeches using recently released documents, the article shows that Kissinger and the State Department tried much harder to create a foreign policy consensus behind détente and realism than previously understood. Despite these efforts, Kissinger's message was lost on the public. The article provides the first extended analysis of a series of fact-finding “town meetings” held by the State Department in five locations across the United States—meetings that revealed how badly Kissinger had failed. By February 1976, all those involved in U.S. foreign policymaking—Kissinger's opponents, his advisers, and the wider public—desired a greater role for moral values in foreign policy.
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Clinton, David. "The Distinction between Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in American International Thought and Practice." Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6, no. 3-4 (March 21, 2011): 261–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187119111x583950.
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Throughout his writings, Harold Nicolson advocates a distinction between ‘policy’ (to be subject to democratic control) and ‘negotiation’ (to remain the province of professional diplomatists), preferring to separate these two quite different activities, rather than lumping them together under the general term ‘diplomacy’ (an intermingling that he found conceptually muddled and politically impossible to sustain once general public opinion becomes politically mobilized). Nicholas Murray Butler and George Kennan, who may be taken as representing idealist and realist American opinion in the twentieth century, found themselves at one in rejecting Nicolson’s distinction. Butler believed that the progressive enlightenment of public opinion, resulting in the attainment of the ‘international mind’, would improve both the formulation of policy and the conduct of negotiations; Kennan deprecated public opinion, at least in the United States, as irredeemably clumsy and ill-informed, and was convinced that this domestic political force would not be satisfied with directing policy, but would insist on interfering with negotiation as well. Across the board, American opinion seems to be hostile to Nicolson’s differentiation. This rejection of Nicolson’s view illustrates a more general influence of distinctively American thinking about international relations on American attitudes towards, and expectations of, diplomacy.
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PANG, YANG HUEI. "Helpful Allies, Interfering Neighbours: World opinion and China in the 1950s." Modern Asian Studies 49, no. 1 (September 17, 2014): 204–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x13000395.
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AbstractIn the aftermath of the Korean War, the People's Republic of China was effectively an international pariah. Accounts of this period in Chinese textbooks emphasize how the Chinese turned this around, either during the Geneva Conference or the Bandung Conference, through deft planning and enterprise. Yet few pay any attention to how such manipulation of world opinion became increasingly difficult for Beijing after that initial success. One outcome of China's public relations campaign meant friendly Afro-Asia leaders voiced their opinions, in alarming numbers, to their Chinese counterparts regarding issues such as Asian security, mainland China's economic development, and the Taiwan problem. Indeed, recently declassified Chinese Foreign Affairs archive documents demonstrate that China tried to marshal such non-Soviet bloc opinions to its advantage during the first Taiwan Strait crisis (1955). Chinese efforts were successful in that there was no lack of volunteers to air dissent with American foreign policy. But these new allies also wished to mediate between the United States and the Republic of China, on the one side, and mainland China on the other. Moreover, such efforts were often at variance with China's domestic and strategic outlook in the region. China thus had to embark upon an active ‘management’ of disparate world opinions, which was an entirely new endeavour. Although China tried to provide a sanitized ‘script’ for its new friends, most had their own ideas. By the time of the second Taiwan Strait crisis (1958), the volume of third party interference had grown. Overwhelmed by such international attention, China responded by openly rejecting unwelcome mediation efforts and demanded outright condemnation of the United States. Thus, ironically, with its growing prominence on the international stage, China found itself unbearably weighted down by the burden of world opinion, a position previously occupied by the United States.
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PARMARA, INDERJEET. "Engineering consent: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the mobilization of American public opinion, 1939–1945." Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (January 2000): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500000358.
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The role of private organizations and think tanks in the United States have been well documented. The Council on Foreign Relations in particular has been much discussed—less so, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article seeks to fill that gap by exploring its influence on American public opinion during World War II. Based upon archival research, the essay examines the background of the key members of the Endowment, their outlook and the impact their work had in shaping US attitudes. Using Gramsci's notion of an ‘historic bloc’ wedded to the insights of the ‘corporatist’ school of American foreign relations, the conclusion reached is that the organization—along with other key bodies situated at the interface between the private and public spheres—played a not inconsiderable part in educating Americans for internationalism before the end of the war and the onset of the Cold War two years later.
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Lemco, Jonathan. "Canadian Foreign Policy Interests in Central America: Some Current Issues." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 2 (1986): 119–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/165776.
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Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney is faced with a number of difficult choices concerning Canada's foreign policy in Central America. These choices are particularly problematic because their repercussions may have an important impact on Canada- US relations. On the one hand, the Prime Minister must heed public opinion in Canada which favors increased government concern about human rights and economic development in Central America. On the other hand, he must consider American security interests and not irritate or embarrass the United States and President Reagan in particular.Canada's middle power status puts it in a difficult quandary, for it seeks to retain an independent role in Central America, while it finds its influence circumscribed by its proximity to the US superpower. Its ability to wield tangible authority is thus severely attenuated. Canada's asymmetrical relationship with the United States allows it a certain degree of latitude in formulating foreign policy but imposes important constraints as well.
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Rehman, Javaid, and Saptarshi Ghosh. "International Law, US Foreign Policy and Post-9/11 Islamic Fundamentalism: The Legal Status of the 'War on Terror'." Nordic Journal of International Law 77, no. 1-2 (2008): 87–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/090273508x290708.
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AbstractThe days immediately after 11 September 2001 saw considerable tension, anger and anxiety. These politically charged days witnessed significant activity within the United Nations and various agencies of international law. The world community rightly condemned the 9/11 attacks as cowardly actions and an unforgivable crime against humanity. The entire global public opinion expressed sympathy for the victims of 9/11 and empathised with the people of the United States. The show of human solidarity as well as the Resolutions within the United Nations were the responses from the international community and international law to the terrorist attacks on the United States. It becomes, therefore, quite ironic that the enormity of the 9/11 human tragedy was used by the United States government to undermine the established norms, practices, principles and framework of international law. Over the past six years, the United States foreign policy has continued to violate international law and brutalise human dignity. This paper critically examines the systematic violation of international norms under the banner of 'war on terror'. It takes the view that the 'war on terror' has had exactly the effect which it proclaimed to prevent-namely the growth of radicalisation, terrorism and Islamic extremism.
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Bush, Sarah Sunn, and Lauren Prather. "Foreign Meddling and Mass Attitudes Toward International Economic Engagement." International Organization 74, no. 3 (2020): 584–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818320000156.
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AbstractWhat explains variation in individual preferences for foreign economic engagement? Although a large and growing literature addresses that question, little research examines how partner countries affect public opinion on policies such as trade, foreign aid, and investment. We construct a new theory arguing that political side-taking by outside powers shapes individuals’ support for engaging economically with those countries. We test the theory using original surveys in the United States and Tunisia. In both cases, the potential partner country's side-taking in the partisan politics of the respondents’ country dramatically shapes support for foreign economic relations. As the rise of new aid donors, investors, and trade partners creates new choices in economic partners, our theory and findings are critical to understanding mass preferences about open economic engagement.
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Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen V. Milner, and Dustin H. Tingley. "The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives." International Security 35, no. 1 (July 2010): 75–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00003.
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Recent research, including an article by Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz in this journal, has argued that the United States' long-standing foreign policy orientation of liberal internationalism has been in serious decline because of rising domestic partisan divisions. A reanalysis of the theoretical logic driving these arguments and the empirical evidence used to support them suggests a different conclusion. Extant evidence on congressional roll call voting and public opinion surveys, which is often used to support the claim that liberal internationalism has declined, as well as new evidence about partisan divisions in Congress using policy gridlock and cosponsorship data from other studies of American politics do not demonstrate the decline in bipartisanship in foreign policy that conventional wisdom suggests. The data also do not show evidence of a Vietnam War or a post–Cold War effect on domestic partisan divisions on foreign policy. Contrary to the claims of recent literature, the data show that growing domestic political divisions over foreign policy have not made liberal internationalism impossible. It persists as a possible grand strategy for the United States in part because of globalization pressures.
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Bangarth, Stephanie. "Bringing China In: The New Democratic Party, China, and Multilateralism, 1949-68." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 20, no. 2-3 (2013): 203–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02003016.
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This article explores the history of Canadian foreign relations with China via the perspective of F. Andrew Brewin, a longtime New Democratic Party (NDP) politician. Brewin was an ardent champion of multilateralism in the 1960s and this approach was reflected in his views on China. These thoughts are most eloquently expressed in the debates in the House of Commons on the recognition and the admission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the United Nations between 1963 and 1970. The NDP was the first political party to recommend the recognition of the PRC and by the 1960s public opinion had warmed sufficiently to the idea. Brewin’s concerns over the general silence on the part of Lester B. Pearson’s Liberal government on this issue reflected his wider concerns about the degree to which Canadian foreign policy was tied to the United States and nuclear proliferation. For Brewin, ending the PRC’s isolation was vital to achieving peace in his time.
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BIBERMAN, YELENA. "How We Know What We Know about Pakistan: New York Times news production, 1954–71." Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 5 (September 2017): 1598–625. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x16000901.
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AbstractThis article explores public knowledge creation by examining how the New York Times produced Pakistan news between 1954 and 1971, the formative period of United States of America (USA)–Pakistan relations. These years encapsulate not only the heyday of cooperation between the two governments, but also the American public's first major introduction to the South Asian country by the increasingly intrepid news media. A leader in shaping that introduction was the New York Times. While most studies of the American media focus on measuring the effect of news exposure and content on public opinion, this article focuses on the theoretically underexplored aspect of news production: foreign news gathering. With a lens on South Asia, it shows that foreign news gathering involves the straddling of on-the-ground political and logistical constraints that generate an atmosphere of high uncertainty. By exploring the limitations on news gathering faced by America's leading newspaper's foreign correspondents in Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, this article identifies an important historical source of the ambiguity characterizing USA–Pakistan relations. The findings are based on recently released archival material that offers rare insight into the news-production process.
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Muir-Harmony, Teasel. "The Limits of U.S. Science Diplomacy in the Space Age." Pacific Historical Review 88, no. 4 (2019): 590–618. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/phr.2019.88.4.590.
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A moon rock, resting on a pedestal in the American Pavilion at the 1970 Osaka World Exposition, became the latest trophy for the United States in its fierce space race with the Soviet Union. The exhibit was part of a broader approach to U.S. diplomacy in this period, where science and technology, or in this case a scientific specimen, were deployed to spread Western democratic values, win over international public opinion, and counter anti-American sentiment. But the moon rock’s physical resemblance to earth rocks prompted a broader discussion among Japanese audiences at the Expo about the aims of U.S. scientific and technological progress, and the practicality and applicability of American cultural norms to Japanese visions of modernity. By considering what happens when a scientific specimen travels outside of the laboratory context, outside the world of scientists, and into the world of foreign relations, this article investigates the complicated dynamics of science, material culture, and power during this critical juncture in the United States’ engagement with Japan.
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Zvobgo, Kelebogile. "Human Rights versus National Interests: Shifting US Public Attitudes on the International Criminal Court." International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 4 (August 13, 2019): 1065–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz056.
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Abstract The United States—an architect of international criminal tribunals in the twentieth century—has since moderated its involvement in international justice. Striking to many observers is the United States’ failure to join the International Criminal Court—the institutional successor to the tribunals the nation helped install in Germany, Japan, the Balkans, and Rwanda. Interestingly, the US public’s support of the ICC increases yearly despite the government’s ambivalence about, and even hostility toward, the Court. Drawing on the US foreign policy public opinion literature, I theorize that human rights frames increase support for joining the ICC among Americans, whereas national interest frames decrease support. I administer an online survey experiment to evaluate these expectations and find consistent support. I additionally test hypotheses from the framing literature in American politics regarding the effect of exposure to two competing frames. I find that participants exposed to competing frames hold more moderate positions than participants exposed to a single frame but differ appreciably from the control group. Crucially, I find that participants’ beliefs about international organizations’ effectiveness and impartiality are equally, if not more, salient than the treatments. Thus, the ICC may be able to mobilize support and pressure policy change by demonstrating effectiveness and impartiality.
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Kupchan, Charles A., and Peter L. Trubowitz. "The Illusion of Liberal Internationalism's Revival." International Security 35, no. 1 (July 2010): 95–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00004.
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Over the past two decades, political polarization has shaken the domestic foundations of U.S. grand strategy, sorely testing bipartisan support for liberal internationalism. Stephen Chaudoin, Helen Milner, and Dustin Tingley take issue with this interpretation, contending that liberal internationalism in the United States is alive and well. Their arguments, however, do not stand up to careful scrutiny. Their analysis of congressional voting and public opinion fails to demonstrate the persistence of bipartisanship on foreign policy. Indeed, the partisan gap that widened during George W. Bush's administration has continued during the presidency of Barack Obama, confirming that a structural change has taken place in the domestic bases of U.S. foreign policy. President Obama now faces the unenviable challenge of conducting U.S. statecraft during an era when consensus will be as elusive at home as it is globally.
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Ferreira Alves, Gustavo Jordan. "Opinião Pública e Política Externa: Do Consenso de Almond-Lippmann às Redes Sociais l Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: From The Almond-Lippmann Consensus to Social Media." Revista Neiba, Cadernos Argentina Brasil 10, no. 1 (November 19, 2021): e58702. http://dx.doi.org/10.12957/neiba.2021.58702.
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Neste artigo apresento uma linha cronológica que debate a relação entre opinião pública e temas de política externa ao longo das décadas. Demonstro as teorizações que trabalham com o consenso de Almond-Lippmann até as mais recentes teorias sobre opinião pública na era das redes sociais. Utilizando metodologias quantitativas e qualitativas, principalmente através de uma revisão da literatura já consolidada, apresento a conclusão de que em tal cronologia prevalece a perspectiva de que os eleitores de democracias como os Estados Unidos ou Brasil são majoritariamente desatentos a temas internacionais, mas não necessariamente irracionais em tais assuntos. Nesse sentido, no atual quadro de polarização política, em que mandatários como Donald Trump (2017-2021) e Jair Bolsonaro (2019-) utilizam massivamente redes sociais, surgem novos questionamentos nesse debate, desafiando o papel da mídia tradicional, especialmente depois da popularização dessas novas ferramentas de comunicação.Palavras-chave: Opinião Pública; Política Externa; Mídia.ABSTRACTIn this paper, it is presented a chronology that debates the relation between public opinion and foreign affairs subjects throughout the decades. I demonstrate theories starting from the Almond-Lippmann consensus until more recent ones discussing public opinion on the social media age. By using quantitative and qualitative methodologies, specially through reviewing the literature about public opinion and foreign policy that along the decades became reference in this realm, it is possible conclude that prevails the perspective that voters from democracies such as the United States and Brazil are mostly inattentive in international matters, however, they are not necessarily irrational. In this sense, the recent process of polarization in politics, where leaders such as Donald Trump (2017-2021) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-) are constantly using social media, brings new questionings to this debate, challenging the role of the traditional media, especially after the popularization of those new communication tools.Keywords: Public Opinion; Foreign Policy; Media. Recebido em: 27/03/2021 | Aceito em: 17/08/2021.
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LAI, HONGYI. "Soft Power Determinants in the World and Implications for China." Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 37, no. 1 (January 7, 2020): 8–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v37i1.5904.
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Statistical tests are here conducted on two explanations of soft power. One is Joseph Nye's argument that political values, foreign policy and cultural appeals shape soft power, and the other is the positive peace argument which suggests a significant influence of the Global Peace Index (GPI) on soft power.Two measures of soft power are employed – the favourability of major powers in global public opinion polls and the Soft Power 30 Index. The latter gauges the magnitude of soft power. When the former measure, which indicates the positiveness of soft power, is adopted the three soft power resources provide less explanatory power than per capita GDP and especially the GPI. When the Soft Power 30 Index is used, only foreign policy independent of the United States contributes positively to soft power. The GPI and non-soft power-relatedcultural exports (NSPCE) then take on a negative role because a number of nations in the index achieve very high rankings with a relatively poor GPI or small NSPCE. As far as China is concerned, its ranking in 2018 in the Soft Power 30 Index declined due to impressive improvement among other ranked nations and global public scepticism towards its foreign policy and its cultural exports.
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Valentino, Benjamin. "Moral Character or Character of War? American Public Opinion on the Targeting of Civilians in Times of War." Daedalus 145, no. 4 (September 2016): 127–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00417.
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Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States has refrained from the widespread, intentional targeting of civilian populations in times of war. Public opinion polls seem to reflect a marked decline in American support for targeting foreign civilians since that time. Drawing on original public opinion surveys, as well as other historical material, this essay explores several explanations for these changes. Although there is some evidence that the public's views about the morality of civilian targeting have shifted, I argue that two other explanations also play an important role in the changes in the conduct of American wars. First, a mounting skepticism, especially within the U.S. military, about the efficacy of killing civilians, has undercut the primary motivation to even consider such tactics. Indeed, many U.S. military leaders now perceive that killing adversary civilians in large numbers – intentionally or unintentionally – usually backfires, making the adversary fight harder or driving more civilians to join or support the adversary's forces. Second, due to the lower stakes, and especially the dramatically lower fatality rates suffered by American troops in recent wars, the temptation to attempt to end wars quickly with a “death blow” against adversary cities has become less potent. Under certain conditions, however, a majority of Americans would still support today the kind of population bombing last practiced during World War II.
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Streltsov, D. V. "Russian-Japanese Relations: Long-Term Development Factors." MGIMO Review of International Relations 13, no. 3 (July 8, 2020): 68–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-3-72-68-85.
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The article analyzes long-term external and internal factors determining the course of development of Russian-Japanese relations in 2019-2020. On the one hand, the anti-Russian component in Tokyo's foreign policy is shaped by its membership in the Security Treaty with the United States and its solidarity with the sanctions policy of the Group of Seven towards Russia. On the other hand, Japan and Russia are both interested interest in political cooperation in creating multilateral dialog mechanisms of international security in East Asia, resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, and easing tensions around territorial disputes in the East China and South China seas. Among the economic factors, the author focuses on the significant place of Russia in the context of Japan's task of diversifying sources of external energy supplies, as well as on Russia's desire to avoid unilateral dependence on the Chinese market while reorienting the system of foreign economic relations from the West to the East. Personal diplomacy of political leaders plays a significant role in relations between Russia and Japan, and, above all, close personal relationships and frequent meetings between Prime Minister Abe and President Putin, which make it possible to partially compensate the unfavorable image of the partner country in the public opinion of both Russia and Japan. Against the background of a deadlock in the Peace Treaty talks which emerged in 2019, the search for a way out of the diplomatic impasse is on the agenda. In the author's opinion, it would be appropriate at the first stage to proceed to the conclusion of a basic agreement on the basis bilateral relations, which would be "untied" from the Peace Treaty. In addition, Russia could stop criticizing Japan for its security policy and show greater understanding of the Japanese initiative in the field of quality infrastructure. In turn, Japan could take a number of strategic decisions on cooperation with Russia and announce them in the Prime Minister's keynote speech. In addition, Tokyo could stop positioning the issue of the peace Treaty as the main issue in relations with Russia, which would allow our countries to "untie" bilateral relations from the problem of border demarcation and focus on their positive agenda.
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Zahra, Iman Mohamed. "Religious Social Media Activism: A Qualitative Review of Pro-Islam Hashtags." Journal of Arts and Social Sciences [JASS] 11, no. 1 (November 3, 2020): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jass.vol11iss1pp15-29.
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There have been so many acts of terrorism connected to radical Muslims that it's not surprising Islam has a public relations problem. Pollsters, historians and other experts say that the West's collective instincts toward Islam have been shaped over decades by a patchwork of factors. These include demographic trends, psychology, terrorism events, foreign policy, domestic politics, media coverage and the Internet. Therefore, it is not surprising that Muslims are the most negatively viewed faith community in some countries as the United States. The objective of the current research is to review qualitatively the social media platforms of the hashtag #Notinmyname, initiated by renowned Muslim British Community namely Active Change Foundation as a successful model of social media activism combatting the worsening image of Islam. The major conclusion of this study is that hashtags launched by Muslim activists derive from the social media platforms exacerbating and unprecedented power to stir political and social movements especially, regarding controversial and stagnant matters. Posts, comments and shares on different social media platforms go viral, stir discussions and trigger public opinion. These #hashtags were not a launching base for a pro-Islam campaign only, as much as being an outlet breather for all pro and anti-opinions regarding Islam. Social media are now the pathway to mobilize the crowd online to take an action in the real world.
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Jackson, Galen. "The Showdown That Wasn't: U.S.-Israeli Relations and American Domestic Politics, 1973–75." International Security 39, no. 4 (April 2015): 130–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00201.
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How influential are domestic politics on U.S. foreign affairs? With regard to Middle East policy, how important a role do ethnic lobbies, Congress, and public opinion play in influencing U.S. strategy? Answering these questions requires the use of archival records and other primary documents, which provide an undistorted view of U.S. policymakers' motivations. The Ford administration's 1975 reassessment of its approach to Arab-Israeli statecraft offers an excellent case for the examination of these issues in light of this type of historical evidence. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger decided, in large part because of the looming 1976 presidential election, to avoid a confrontation with Israel in the spring and summer of 1975 by choosing to negotiate a second disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel rather than a comprehensive settlement. Nevertheless, domestic constraints on the White House's freedom of action were not insurmountable and, had they had no other option, Ford and Kissinger would have been willing to engage in a showdown with Israel over the Middle East conflict's most fundamental aspects. The administration's concern that a major clash with Israel might stoke an outbreak of anti-Semitism in the United States likely contributed to its decision to back down.
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Yi, Guolin. "The “Propaganda State” and Sino-American Rapprochement: Preparing the Chinese Public for Nixon’s Visit." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 20, no. 1 (2013): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02001005.
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Studies of Sino-American rapprochement in 1972 have not sufficiently explored how the Chinese public, which had been taught to hate the American “imperialists,” learned (or was instructed) about the dramatic change. By analyzing Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) and Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), an internal (neibu) newspaper circulated only among Chinese Communist Party cadres, this article examines how the Chinese government prepared the party and its people for rapprochement from 1969 through 1971. Reference News kept cadres posted about Washington’s overtures, Nixon’s expressed wish to visit China, and Mao’s willingness to receive him, among other items not shared with the wider public. Before official exchanges were agreed, the Chinese government conducted “people-to-people diplomacy” by inviting American “friends” and displaying them to the Chinese public through banquets, receptions, and ceremonies. People’s Daily, which offered intensive coverage to these visitors, was particularly important in promoting the atmosphere of friendship. Party leaders did not need the approval of the public and party workers, but they did take their response into account in making foreign policy, especially on dramatic changes. By evaluating the Chinese communication system and its handling of public opinion on relations with the United States, this article presents a more nuanced picture of the “propaganda state.”
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CUMINGS, BRUCE. "Still the American Century." Review of International Studies 25, no. 5 (December 1999): 271–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210599002715.
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At the inception of the twenty-first century—not to mention the next millennium—books on ‘the American Century’ proliferate monthly, if not daily. We now have The American Century Dictionary, The American Century Thesaurus, and even The American Century Cookbook; perhaps the American Century baseball cap or cologne is not far behind. With one or two exceptions, the authors celebrate the unipolar pre-eminence and comprehensive economic advantage that the United States now enjoys. Surveys of public opinion show that most people agree: the American wave appears to be surging just as the year 2000 beckons. Unemployment and inflation are both at twenty-year lows, sending economists (who say you can't get lows for both at the same time) back to the drawing board. The stock market roars past the magic 10,000 mark, and the monster federal budget deficit of a decade ago miraculously metamorphoses into a surplus that may soon reach upwards of $1 trillion. Meanwhile President William Jefferson Clinton, not long after a humiliating impeachment, is rated in 1999 as the best of all postwar presidents in conducting foreign policy (a dizzying ascent from eighth place in 1994), according to a nationwide poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. This surprising result might also, of course, bespeak inattention: when asked to name the two or three most important foreign policy issues facing the US, fully 21 per cent of the public couldn't think of one (they answered ‘don't know’), and a mere seven per cent thought foreign policy issues were important to the nation. But who cares, when all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds?
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Menshikov, Petr, and Aida Neymatova. "Current Issues of Information Support of Russian Foreign Policy in the New Political Environment." Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, no. 3 (July 2020): 161–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2020.3.14.
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Introduction. In the context of growing anti-Russian information wars, intensive and sharp ideological confrontation active information support of Russia’s foreign policy becomes more and more crucial. Methods. Authors use mainly the methods of expert evaluation and trends, opinion polls to prove that the US has long been waging information wars against Russia first using the term (“information war”) back in 1992. Moreover, with time the United States makes the methods of struggle more and more sophisticated and has already attracted the EU and NATO as associates. In addition, the methods of comparative analysis of research results of leading domestic and foreign experts in the field of information and ideological component of modern international relations and issues of information support of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, as well as general scientific and special methods of knowledge of legal phenomena and processes made as the object of the research: the method of systematic and structural analysis, comparative legal and formal-logical methods have been used. Analysis. Along with the tools of public diplomacy our state takes all the needed measures to defend its information sovereignty at all levels. Despite the fact that the Russian state strategy has consistently created a system of detecting, preventing and eliminating threats to its information security, still it is necessary to deal with ever growing amount of antiRussian false information in the global media space. Results. Being one of the instruments of public diplomacy and foreign policy of any sovereign state, soft power takes into account the objective conditions of international relations and world politics and proceeds from the requirements of the national interests of the state as the main actor of the entire system of modern international relations. In the world practice of implementing the policy of soft power, starting with the creation of the Westphalian system of international relations, there was no precedent, when the state regardless of the socio-political nature of building a political system or the purposes of the foreign activity would be guided by different objectives and methods of analysis of world politics, the entire system of international relations and other goal-setting action in the international arena, including defined in the last decade by the concept of soft power. In the history of international relations, there has not been any world policy free from its ideological component. The thesis of de-ideologization of international relations, which received its definite distribution in the period immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the practice of foreign policy actions of all the main actors of modern world politics has clearly proved its complete failure. Today, in the context of “hybrid wars” within the entire system of international relations, the world politics is no less ideologized than during the “cold war”. The political leadership of Russia allows the hypothetical possibility of cyberwarfare, provoked by the actions of the Republican administration of the United States. In December 2019, the White House authorized the preparation of a plan for conducting an information war with the Russian Federation by special forces of the U.S. Army, assigning the solution of this task to the above-mentioned cyber command. The policy of soft power of Russia, as well as its public diplomacy, as the whole complex of foreign policy activities of the Russian Federation in the international arena, is derived from the fundamental function of defending the national interests of Russia in the new political reality. The Russian Federation has consistently opposed the transformation of international relations into an arena of ideological confrontation with the use of tools of the so-called “information wars”. State sovereignty is unified. Information security, as a factor of ensuring information sovereignty, is a basic component of the unified state sovereignty. This is an accepted truth underlying the understanding of the nature of modern international relations, the principle underlying the foreign policy activity of any modern sovereign state, due to the objective regularity of the growth of the ideological factor of modern international relations. Moreover, in the face of targeted misinformation Russia needs to ensure its information security at both levels: political (ideological) and technical (technological) ones combining cyber as well as soft power tools. Only such a combination of these two crucial elements and continuous improvement can lead to victory in hybrid wars.
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Darnton, Christopher. "Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the Debate over U.S. Entry into World War II." International Security 42, no. 3 (January 2018): 84–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00306.
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Did Franklin Delano Roosevelt escalate confliict with Japan and Germany before Pearl Harbor, or did he attempt to avoid war? To what extent did U.S. public opinion influence these decisions? And, crucially, how do we know? Scholars offer diametrically opposed analyses of this historical case, bearing directly on international relations theories regarding the effects of democracy on war and foreign policy. In this debate and the broader security studies field, scholars increasingly employ published and archival primary sources. Because researchers lack a clear template for descriptive and causal inference with documentary evidence, though, such work is indeterminate and ultimately unpersuasive. How can political scientists approach archives and primary documents more effectively and efficiently? Above all, case studies need stronger research designs and clearer source selection strategies, not just more authoritative documents. A critical review of the sources cited in recent scholarship in the debate leading to the United States' entry into World War II, and a replication analysis of a key portion of the documentary record, underscores this need for improved research design and buttresses eight guidelines for the selection and analysis of textual evidence in case study research.
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Kelley, John Robert. "US Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Success Story?" Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2, no. 1 (2007): 53–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187119007x180476.
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AbstractThe post-'9/11' revival of interest in US public diplomacy encompasses a wide variety of opinions, all overwhelmingly critical. In view of falling global favourability towards and the foreign policy challenges of the United States during this period, the purveyors of these opinions ultimately agree that US public diplomacy efforts are flawed and ineffective. Of these critical observations, it is interesting to track a thread of logic that yearns for the restoration of public diplomacy's Cold War-era standing, which holds that the spread of liberal democracy behind the Berlin Wall owes a debt to the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, that cultural exchanges with influential members of Soviet society helped to create the groundswell that undermined the communist regime, and that public diplomats made these outcomes possible by being equipped with the necessary tools of statecraft, as well as by wielding an important measure of influence over policy-makers. The fall of the Soviet Union merely underscores their notion that public diplomacy during the Cold War was a success. It would thus seem that the problems of today could be remedied by adopting lessons from the past. This article explores the viability of this claim by reviewing the ongoing debate on how the historical memory and lessons of Cold War-era public diplomacy may be applied to the challenges of the post-'9/11' era. Of particular importance is ascertaining the degree to which the Cold War's campaigns of information, influence and engagement could be viewed as a success. By subdividing public diplomacy's activities in these ways, greater potential exists to attribute these activities to more compelling determinations of success or failure.
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Kosach, G. "Saudi Arabia and Israel: the Palestinian Context." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 1 (2021): 61–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-1-61-69.
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The article examines the issues related to the change in the Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Israel in the context of Riyadh’s approaches to solving the Palestinian problem. The author emphasizes that the positive dynamics taking place in the evolution of Saudi-Israeli interaction in recent years is determined by the intra-Saudi socio-economic and political transformation, including changes in public opinion regarding Israel, as well as significant shifts in the development of the Middle East regional situation, inter alia those proclaimed by the United Arab Emirates (as well as Bahrain) heading towards a settlement with Israel. At the same time, the emergence of a tendency to support the course towards normalizing relations with Israel in the context of the current Saudi internal political situation also marked a public demarcation in relation to initiatives to support the Crown Prince. If his supporters act, among other things, as supporters of normalization, then opponents see contacts with the Jewish state as “a betrayal of Arab national interests”. Noting that the current Saudi-Israeli rapprochement is largely determined by a joint interest in confronting Iran, the author, nevertheless, sees the most important reason for the continuing Saudi unwillingness to normalize relations with the Jewish state in the unresolved Palestinian problem on the basis of the “two states” principle. At the same time, the author believes that this principle itself is an instrument of Saudi foreign policy, thanks to which Riyadh seeks to exclude the possibility of Israeli hegemony in the future post-confrontational Middle East. This means, in particular, that the achievement of mutual understanding will become a reality only if the Israeli regional policy is adjusted so as not to pose a threat to Saudi interests.
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Schoppa, Leonard J. "Two-level games and bargaining outcomes: whygaiatsusucceeds in Japan in some cases but not others." International Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 353–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027995.
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One of the strengths of Robert Putnam's two-level bargaining game model is its ability to capture how international negotiations make it possible for negotiators to pursue synergistic strategies aimed at improving their prospects for a favorable deal by reshaping politics in both their own and their counterparts' domestic arenas. While reaffirming the utility of this approach, this article argues that Putnam describes only some of the synergistic strategies available to negotiators. In addition to “reverberation” and “synergistic linkage,” a negotiator can also reshape politics in his or her counterpart's domestic arena in two other ways: (1) by transforming decision making in ways that expand elite participation and bring the weight of public opinion to bear on policies that were previously dictated by small groups of privileged domestic actors and (2) by influencing the way in which policy alternatives are considered in the decisionmaking process. Through an examination of the Structural Impediments Initiative, a set of negotiations through which the United States applied a great deal of foreign pressure (gaiaisu) on Japan, the article makes the case for the above modifications to the Putnam model and argues that “participation expansion” strategies are most likely to be successful when involvement in decision making (before foreign intervention) is limited and latent support for foreign demands exists outside the privileged elite, while “alternative specification” is most likely to work when opportunities exist to link favored policy proposals to already recognized domestic problems.
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Bidabad, Bijan. "A declaration for international relations (based on Islamic Sufi teachings)." International Journal of Law and Management 59, no. 4 (July 10, 2017): 584–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlma-12-2015-0061.
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PurposeEstablishing peace, security and discipline for individuals, nations and states in contemporary international order is of the highest importance at the present time. Regularization should be done through approaching natural rights of individuals and also through observing humanistic characteristics and ethics. The aim of this paper is to introduce a legal base to promote international relations. Design/methodology/approachA draft for International Relation Declaration based on Islamic Sufi teachings has been compiled, and actually it is an abstract of an extended survey on the subject and opinions in relation to the current international problems. FindingsThis draft has been codified in three main topics of public international law, foreign policy and diplomacy. Research limitations/implicationsTo conclude the draft, it should be scrutinized by many scholars in different disciplines, in the next step. Practical implicationsAs the mystical characteristics of Sufism and Gnosticism of all religions (Tariqa) are all united and based upon love towards the Creator and consequently towards the creatures of God, these provisions could be agreed upon and put into practice. Social implicationsDelicateness, truthfulness and righteousness of Islamic Sufism, which is the gist of all those elites’ divine messages for thousands of years, one after another, can be of a great help to regulate international relations. Originality/valueInternational Law scholars have not looked at this subject matter from the Sufism viewpoint. This paper will shed a light on this point of view from other angles related to the international law such as politics, law and institutions.
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Sagan, Scott D., and Benjamin A. Valentino. "Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants." International Security 42, no. 1 (July 2017): 41–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00284.
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Numerous polls demonstrate that U.S. public approval of President Harry Truman's decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has declined significantly since 1945. Many scholars and political figures argue that this decline constitutes compelling evidence of the emergence of a “nuclear taboo” or that the principle of noncombatant immunity has become a deeply held norm. An original survey experiment, recreating the situation that the United States faced in 1945 using a hypothetical U.S. war with Iran today, provides little support for the nuclear taboo thesis. In addition, it suggests that the U.S. public's support for the principle of noncombatant immunity is shallow and easily overcome by the pressures of war. When considering the use of nuclear weapons, the majority of Americans prioritize protecting U.S. troops and achieving American war aims, even when doing so would result in the deliberate killing of millions of foreign noncombatants. A number of individual-level traits—Republican Party identification, older age, and approval of the death penalty for convicted murderers—significantly increase support for using nuclear weapons against Iran. Women are no less willing (and, in some scenarios, more willing) than men to support nuclear weapons use. These findings highlight the limited extent to which the U.S. public has accepted the principles of just war doctrine and suggest that public opinion is unlikely to be a serious constraint on any president contemplating the use of nuclear weapons in the crucible of war.
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Sekacheva, A. B. "Crisis Phenomena in the European Union Economy at the Present Stage of its Development." World of new economy 15, no. 1 (March 25, 2021): 91–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.26794/2220-6469-2021-15-1-91-99.
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The article reveals the main problems related to the EU economy’s state and the prospects for its further development. This topic is extremely important for Russia since the European Union is its leading foreign trade partner. The article states that the EU is the largest integration grouping globally in terms of its economic potential. Simultaneously, the lack of significant reserves of natural resources and dependence on their external supplies does not allow the EU to realize its economic opportunities fully. At the same time, the export-oriented model of the economies of its leading member countries makes them sensitive to flctuations in the conjuncture of foreign markets, and the growing public debt contributes to the development of disintegration processes. Besides, the growth of migration flws, the increase in socio-economic tensions, especially during the coronavirus period, also do not allow the EU to solve the accumulated problems. Simultaneously, excessive dependence on the United States in geopolitical and geo-economic relations hinders the development of mutually benefiial economic ties with Russia and other countries. The article presents various opinions about the future of the EU and notes that many authoritative political fiures and experts consider that due to these reasons, it cannot be preserved as a whole.
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Luzyanin, S. G. "Russian-Japanese relations and the Chinese factor: Evolution and transformation (2012–2022)." Japanese Studies in Russia, no. 4 (January 5, 2023): 75–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.55105/2500-2872-2022-4-75-89.
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The election of V.V. Putin for a new presidential term in 2012 and his further foreign policy initiatives affected the intensification of Russia’s foreign policy in general, as well as its Japanese direction. The article attempts to highlight the development of Russian-Japanese relations in the period of 2012–2022, including the phase of aggravation of relations after the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022 and Japan’s accession to the US anti-Russian sanctions, as well as the role and influence of China on the bilateral Russian-Japanese format, the East Asian region, the specifics of Chinese-American relations in the context of the “trade war” in the Japanese dimension, etc. Based on the published works of leading Russian experts, the author examines the dynamics of mutual perception of the images of Russia and Japan at the level of Russian and Japanese public opinion. Particular attention is paid to the study of the evolution of Russian-Japanese trade and economic, military-political, energy, Arctic, and humanitarian contacts. The paper traces the features of Russian, Japanese and Chinese motivations regarding regional security issues, attitudes towards the Ukrainian events, including the Russian special military operation, Moscow’s reaction to anti-Russian sanctions, towards the pressure from the United States and their allies. In general, the problem of the evolution of the notional triangle “Russia – Japan – China” at the present stage, the deformation of its key elements and the prospects for further development are formulated.The author focuses on the coverage of Russian-Japanese contacts in the areas of regional security before and after February 24, 2022, including the South Kuril options, as well as the analysis of hidden possible Japanese political motivations during the rule of Shinzō Abe regarding the problems of the deepening of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership and the projections of this partnership on the security of Japan and the Japanese-American military-political alliance. An important aspect of the work is the coverage of the dynamics of the Russian-Japanese political relations in the light of the Russian leadership designating Japan as an “unfriendly state” and the further development of bilateral Russian-Japanese and Russian-Chinese models of interaction in the Asia-Pacific region.
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Sytnik, Anna, Natalia Tsvetkova, and Ivan Tsvetkov. "U.S. Digital Diplomacy and Big Data: Lessons from the Political Crisis in Venezuela, 2018–2019." Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, no. 2 (April 2022): 192–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2022.2.16.
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Introduction. The article reveals the current U.S. digital diplomacy applying the case study referred to the political crisis in Venezuela culminated in late 2018 and early 2019, when the speaker of the National Assembly Juan Guaido declared himself the self-proclaimed acting president after the elections. Confrontation between his supporters and those of the incumbent President Nicolas Maduro reached its apogee. The aim of the research is to reveal whether the U.S. has been able to influence the development of the political situation and opinion of Venezuelan citizens through various digital diplomacy instruments and international broadcasting channels. The analytical part of the paper is divided into two sections. The first section discusses methodological issues relative to research in the field of digitalization of U.S. foreign policy and international relations in general. These methodological approaches are tested on the case study, namely the U.S. digital diplomacy in Venezuela in the second section of the paper. Methods. The methodology of the research includes the analysis of big data and social media. The primary sources are the accounts of U.S. officials, government-sponsored media, Venezuelan media, and bloggers. Twitter was surveyed to the extent that active political discussions flared up there during the crisis. At the time, Venezuela had the third highest number of Twitter users in the world. Analysis. Using the machine analytics, about 10 million tweets were retrieved, allowing us to determine the place of the U.S. governmental accounts among the influencers of public opinion in Venezuela. Results. The analysis shows that local digital media, and the activity of bloggers and politicians, including Juan Guaido and Nicolas Maduro, had more impact on the Twitter community and Venezuelans than U.S. channels of digital diplomacy or tweets of American politicians. The more active local bloggers are, the less chances were left for external players including the United States as well as Russia, China, or Europe, to change public opinions of Venezuelans. Authors’ contribution. Anna Sytnik carried out the big data analysis using Python programming language and developed the methodological foundations of the research. Natalia Tsvetkova developed the methodological foundations of the research and made the interpretations of analysis in terms of U.S. digital and data diplomacy. Ivan Tsvetkov developed the contextual frameworks of the case study.
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Nelidov, V. V. "Ukrainian crisis in Japan’s domestic political discourse." Japanese Studies in Russia, no. 4 (January 5, 2023): 108–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.55105/2500-2872-2022-4-108-122.
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The Ukrainian crisis, which came into its active phase in February 2022, led to the collapse of Russia’s relations with many countries, and Japan was no exception. The Japanese government expressed strong criticism of Russia’s actions and joined the anti-Russian sanctions with, probably, most vigor, compared to any other Asian nation. This makes the question about the reasons for such course pursued by Tokyo vis-à-vis Russia a particularly timely one. In Russia, there is a widespread opinion that such position held by Tokyo is caused mostly by pressure from the United States. Yet such view seems to be a gross simplification. This article attempts to analyze the positions of various participants of the Japanese foreign policy making process about the events unfolding in Ukraine. It shows that, even though all key parties, irrespective of their political orientation, take a critical stance towards the actions of the Russian Federation, their statements show some nuances reflecting their ideological priorities. For example, the ruling LDP emphasizes solidarity with the US; its junior coalition partner, Komeito, stresses humanitarian aspects and the role of the UN; the Japan Innovation Party criticizes the government for indecisiveness and calls for more active military policy, while the left-wing populist Reiwa Shinsengumi even refused to support the relevant Diet resolution to demonstrate its principled stance to the voters. There are indeed opinions which can arguably be called apologetic towards Russia. However, those holding such opinions are but a minority and are hardly able to alter the position of the government or the Japanese public as a whole. There is a virtual consensus about the issue, and nuances in the positions of major political forces are inconsequential. One would be justified to assume that, under any probable domestic political situation, Tokyo will not change its policy about the matter.
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Dodge, Toby. "The failure of sanctions and the evolution of international policy towards Iraq, 1990–2003*." Contemporary Arab Affairs 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 83–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550910903525952.
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The day after Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660 condemning Iraq’s aggression and demanding that it withdraw. A week later it passed Resolution 661 demanding that UN Member States prevent all trade and financial transactions with Iraq. In all of its previous history, the Security Council had only imposed sanctions to discipline errant states twice before. The precedent used for the drafting of Resolution 661 was the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia in December 1966 after it had declared independence from Britain. This signified something of an empirical vacuum where those drafting resolutions in New York deployed a set of assumptions that gave both the theory and practise of sanctions their coherence. It was assumed that a state, when faced with an on-going economic embargo, would be forced to react in predictable ways. If the application of sanctions caused enough suffering within society, then popular discontent would eventually force the ruling elite to change policy and work to lift sanctions as theoretically the state cannot escape public opinion or ignore a population whose economic well-being has been seriously damaged by the application of sanctions. In 1990–1991 the economic and political assumptions underpinning the practice of sanctions appeared to make Iraq an ideal candidate for their application given that 95% of Iraq’s foreign exchange earnings came directly from oil exports. In addition, the economy was dependent upon food imports costing US$3 billion annually. However, these assumptions along with the normative vision that gave sanctions their ideological coherence were proven wrong as the Iraqi regime manoeuvred to entrench itself further within society and actually strengthen its position.
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Shlykov, K. V. "Mikhail Gorbachev's First Visit to Britain: 30 Years on." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 2(35) (April 28, 2014): 95–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-2-35-95-101.
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The article explores the significance of Mikhail Gorbachev's first journey to the UK in December 1984 for the East-West relations. The visit was initiated by Margaret Thatcher who wanted to get acquainted with the potential Soviet leader as she hoped to become a trusted intermediary between Moscow and Washington. The revitalization of contacts with the USSR was a part of Britain's resurgence as a major world player after the Falklands victory. The discussions in London focused on the issue of strategic stability, though they could only serve to give the parties a better understanding of each other's position, as no political agreement could be reached due to the nature of the visit and the fact that any agreement on the subject had to be between the Soviet Union and the United States. The bilateral relations issues being discussed included mostly economic cooperation and such problems as human rights in the USSR and Soviet assistance to the British miners' strike. Gorbachev's speech on "new political thinking" and "a common European home", expressions first used during the visit to Uk, rang hollow to London, however Thatcher had the impression that she could deal with the Soviet politician in future. The British public opinion also saw Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife favourably. Later statements of Lady Thatcher and Gorbachev's critics on the meeting being defining for the foreign policy of the perestroika era should be seen as exaggerated, as the demise of the Communist system and the USSR were not foreseen by anyone in 1984, either in London or in Moscow.
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Kanevskiy, P. "Regulating Lobbying in International and Transnational Spheres." International Trends / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy 20, no. 2 (2022): 25–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.3.
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Lobbying is an integral part of contemporary international processes. Globalization, spread of market relations and transnational links, liberalization of national and supranational governance increased the role of interest groups in international relations. However, interest groups activities at the global level are still largely a terra incognita for international relations theory and international law which requires a more comprehensive analysis. The main goal of the article is to fill the gaps in modern IR theory as well as in theories of lobbying and interest groups by systematization of lobbying regulation experience in international and transnational spheres. Even though single approach towards formalization of international lobbying is hardly feasible, systematization of current global practices should facilitate better understanding of the nature of interest groups activity in international and transnational spheres, of potential and limits for its regulation both in sovereign states and international organizations. The article analyzes separate regulatory regimes aimed at formalizing lobbying in international and transnational spheres. There are two types of regimes: those existing on supranational level that set rules of interaction between interest groups and international organizations; those that regulate interactions of foreign interest groups and sovereign states. Analysis has demonstrated that supranational and national authorities have different approaches towards regulating their interactions with transnational interest groups. Moreover, difference exists not only between these two levels but within levels. I study supranational regulation with the cases of the European Union and the United Nations. The EU is an example of the most inclusive regulatory regime within the international organization. It technically covers all types of interest groups that wish to lobby EU officials. The UN takes a different approach – it officially regulates interactions only with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). However, real interests behind INGOs include not only public interests but also business groups. There is an unfolding discussion within the UN over what should be the right approach towards regulating business interests. Various UN bodies have varying opinions on the issue that results in existence of various sub-regimes in the organization. The analysis of foreign lobbying regulation regimes in sovereign states has demonstrated that their development is connected mainly to political motivations of national authorities who wish to limit political and information influence by foreign interest groups while leaving economic ties and interaction with foreign business groups relatively immune to such regulation.
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Ménudier, Henri. "L’antigermanisme et la campagne française pour l’élection du Parlement européen." Études internationales 11, no. 1 (April 12, 2005): 97–131. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/701019ar.
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Anti-German sentiment in France has deep roots that extend back to the middle of the 19th century. A permanent theme of French foreign policy, it manifested itself with force during the campaign for the European elections of June 10, 1979. This explosion can be explained in terms of the fear of a part of the political forces to see themselves dragged too far into a process of European integration that would contribute to submitting France to the economic forces of a Germany very dependent on the United States. The Communists were the main standard bearers of this campaign in which the Gaullists and other politicians participated. An examinationt of the themes of their public statements shows that references to the Third Reich, to trials of former Nazis and to the role that present leaders of the FRG played under Hitler predominated. Criticism of German domestic politics was primarily concerned with the threat to freedoms in the FRG and with the rise of politicians such as Franz Josef Strauss. Comparisons of the economic, commercial and industriel statistics of the Federal Republic of Germany and France fed concerns that prompted once again speculation with respect to German reunification and the association of nuclear weapons with the FRG. In attacking social-democracy the FCP attempted to further undercut Franco-German relations and to accentuate its split with the French Socialist Party. The anti-German campaign did not, in fact, have a great impact on public opinion or government policy. Nevertheless, both the range and persistence of these themes show that xenophobia in general and anti-German sentiment in particular are not on the point of disappearing in France.
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Artamonova, U. "Faceless Leadership of American Public Diplomacy: HR Crisis in the Post-Bipolar Era." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 12 (2021): 33–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-12-33-39.
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This article focuses on workforce policies trends in the American public diplomacy institutions. The author compares tendencies regarding HR policy, e. g. frequency of leadership change, length of timespans between nominations, the ratio of acting and confirmed nominees during the age of the United Stated Information Agency (USIA) and after its disbandment in 1999. Comparison demonstrates a considerable change of patterns: since 1999, persons in charge of the American public diplomacy institutions have been rotating more often, and positions themselves stayed vacant longer than they did in the 20th century. There have been many acting nominees during the past decade, whereas in the time of the USIA there has been none. In addition, the article studies characteristics of both the USIA directors and Under Secretaries of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The analysis of education, professional background, personal relationship with the U. S. President (or the lack of it) demonstrated that standards for the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs position applicants are significantly lower than the ones that were applied to candidates for the directorship of the USIA. With the results obtained, the author arrived to a conclusion that the change of HR policy in the American public diplomacy sphere indicates the lack of interest in the particular dimension of foreign policy among the political leadership of the U.S. in comparison to the age of the Cold War. This conclusion agrees with the fact that since 1990s, the American public diplomacy remains in crisis: no major reforms of institutions since 1999, unsuccessful attempts to develop a comprehensive strategic document for public diplomacy, frequent piques of anti-Americanism in the international public opinion in the 21st century. The article argues that the absence of a prominent leader in the American public diplomacy who would have stayed in the office for considerable amount of time, been a confidant of the President and thus an active participant of the formation of a national political vision, possessed outstanding professional experience, is both the consequence of the crisis in the U.S. public diplomacy and the factor that contributes to this crisis remaining unsolved.
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Lushchak, Viktor. "Soviet Union through the eyes of US vice president H.Wallace." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 6 (2018): 91–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2018.06.91-100.
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The perception of the Soviet Union in American public opinion wasn’t permanent and changed depending on a number of factors – ideological and allied, Soviet propaganda, the Red Army movement, breaking international agreements. Relations between the US and the USSR which was built within the anti-Hitler coalition was perceived by American society and liberal politicians as a model for cooperation in peacetime. Among the higher-level politicians who had a stable vision of the USSR as an ally and a partner, there was the vice-president of the United States H. Wallace. In the article, the author has attempted to identify the main causes of the distorted Wallace’s perception of the Soviet Union on the basis of which he made plans for the post-war US-Soviet cooperation. The reasons that influenced the aberration of the perception by H.Wallace of the Soviet Union include the informational isolation of the USSR, the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, and an idealistic worldview. The deep differences in the value system of the Soviet dictatorship and Western democracy were falsely perceived by H.Wallace as insignificant differences. It is worth noting that a similar image of the USSR dominated during the period of Wallace’s vice-presidency in the minds of a significant part of Americans. After the presidential election of 1944, H.Wallace was removed by political methods from the possibility of influencing US foreign policy. He remained committed to the positive image of the USSR after the death of Roosevelt in conditions of growing US-Soviet tension. The author concluded that this was one of the main reasons for the collapse of his political career and the formation of a generally negative image of H.Wallace in American political history.
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Šmigelskytė-Stukienė, Ramunė. "Politinės ir geopolitinės Augustino Midletono refleksijos (1790–1792)." XVIII amžiaus studijos T. 6: Personalijos. Idėjos. Refleksijos, T. 6 (January 2, 2020): 269–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.33918/23516968-006013.
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POLITICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL REFLECTIONS BY AUGUSTYN MIDDLETON (1790–1792) The article presents personality and activities of Augustyn Middleton, nobleman from Kaunas powiat, with the main focus on assessing this person in the light of political events in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the geopolitical situation. At the centre of this research is the period from the reinstatement of the diplomatic mission of the Commonwealth in The Hague on 14 April 1790 to the end of activities of the Four-Year Sejm. The article reveals that Augustyn Middleton, assigned by Stanislaw August to the diplomatic mission of the Commonwealth in the United Provinces of the Netherlands, was the agent of the King, who had to inform the King’s cabinet on activities of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Mihał Kleofas Ogiński and to promote the reforms by the Four-Year Sejm in the foreign press thus shaping a positive public opinion in Western Europe regarding changes in Poland and Lithuania. Due to benevolent circumstances A. Middleton was able to reach the rank of embassy resident, however the horizons of his diplomatic career were limited by available finances. Political views of A. Middleton reflected aims declared by the fraction of Stanislaw August’s court: to create a strong and prospering monarchy, hoping that the state will be able to regain its glorious past. A. Middleton promoted constitutional monarchy, inheritable throne, regulation of activities of the Sejm and the dietines (sejmiki), granting of political rights to townspeople, and economic development of the country. While supporting the idea of a centralized state, A. Middleton did not reflect on the rights of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or the topic of a binary state. In assessing economic changes in Europe A. Middleton opposed the physiocrats, emphasizing that the most powerful form of capital comes not from agriculture but from banking. However, he was not afraid to admit that his knowledge of economics was not sufficient to explain the processes of financial capital. Ideas of religious tolerance, promoted by A. Middleton, his cosmopolite view of collaboration between states and nations, active interest in political and social transformations in Europe through anonymous polemical publications in foreign press on the topics of revolution allow for bringing the nobleman from Kaunas powiat A. Middleton into the circle of yet unknown people of the Enlightenment. Keywords: reforms of the Four-Year Sejm (1788–1792), diplomatic service, international relations, diplomatic mission of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Augustyn Middleton.
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Gerber, Theodore P. "Foreign Policy and the United States in Russian Public Opinion." Problems of Post-Communism 62, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 98–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1010909.
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