Academic literature on the topic 'United States – Foreign relations – Public opinion'
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Journal articles on the topic "United States – Foreign relations – Public opinion"
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TOMZ, MICHAEL, and JESSICA L. P. WEEKS. "Public Opinion and Foreign Electoral Intervention." American Political Science Review 114, no. 3 (April 14, 2020): 856–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000064.
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Foreign electoral intervention is an increasingly important tool for influencing politics in other countries, yet we know little about when citizens would tolerate or condemn foreign efforts to sway elections. In this article, we use experiments to study American public reactions to revelations of foreign electoral intervention. We find that even modest forms of intervention polarize the public along partisan lines. Americans are more likely to condemn foreign involvement, lose faith in democracy, and seek retaliation when a foreign power sides with the opposition, than when a foreign power aids their own party. At the same time, Americans reject military responses to electoral attacks on the United States, even when their own political party is targeted. Our findings suggest that electoral interference can divide and weaken an adversary without provoking the level of public demand for retaliation typically triggered by conventional military attacks.
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JOHNSTONE, ANDREW. "Spinning War and Peace: Foreign Relations and Public Relations on the Eve of World War II." Journal of American Studies 53, no. 1 (August 15, 2017): 223–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875817001293.
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The eve of World War II saw the development of direct connections between public relations experts and issues of foreign affairs in the United States. Public relations professionals assisted both internationalists and noninterventionists to spread their arguments across the nation, helping them to hone their messages, to organize, and to raise money. All of the main citizens’ organizations created during this period sought public relations assistance in the face of growing popular awareness of global events, and with an awareness of the need for public relations counsel in the face of an increasingly measurable concept of public opinion.
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Goldsmith, Benjamin E., and Yusaku Horiuchi. "In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for US Foreign Policy?" World Politics 64, no. 3 (June 27, 2012): 555–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887112000123.
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Does “soft power” matter in international relations? Specifically, when the United States seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about US foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? The authors examine this question using multinational surveys covering fifty-eight countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the US. They draw their basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who uses various indicators of opinion about the US to assess US soft power. But the authors argue that his theory lacks the specificity needed for falsifiable testing. They refine it by focusing on foreign public opinion about US foreign policy, an underemphasized element of Nye's approach. Their regression analysis shows that foreign public opinion has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policies toward the International Criminal Court and on voting decisions in the UN General Assembly. These results support the authors' refined theoretical argument about soft power: public opinion about US foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies toward the US, but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics.
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TURES, JOHN. "The Democracy-Promotion Gap in American Public Opinion." Journal of American Studies 41, no. 3 (October 24, 2007): 557–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875807003994.
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United States foreign-policymakers have enthusiastically backed policies of promoting democracy abroad. But do the American people support these plans? Evidence from polls reveals that while people generally like the idea of exporting freedom, they do not view it as a top priority. Other concepts such as political and economic security are valued more by the American public. Backing for democracy promotion also seems to be waning in recent years. I examine these issues and offer possible reasons for this “gap” in response to democracy promotion among American people. I also explain the implications of these findings for America's foreign policy, including the types of government the US appears to support in the wake of military operations. I conclude with an examination of why the policy of democracy promotion has not been more popular with the American people, evaluating competing arguments that the policy is flawed, as opposed to simply a case of poor public relations.
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Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010534.
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The paper discusses the role of public opinion in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, public opinion matters. However, the impact of public opinion is determined not so much by the specific issues involved or by the particular pattern of public attitudes as by the domestic structure and the coalition-building processes among the elites in the respective country. The paper analyzes the public impact on the foreign policy-making process in four liberal democracies with distinct domestic structures: the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan. Under the same international conditions and despite similar patterns of public attitudes, variances in foreign policy outcomes nevertheless occur; these have to be explained by differences in political institutions, policy networks, and societal structures. Thus, the four countries responded differently to Soviet policies during the 1980s despite more or less comparable trends in mass public opinion.
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Chapman, Terrence L. "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." International Organization 63, no. 4 (October 2009): 733–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309990154.
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AbstractRecent work suggests that multilateral security institutions, such as the UN Security Council, can influence foreign policy through public opinion. According to this view, authorization can increase public support for foreign policy, freeing domestic constraints. Governments that feel constrained by public opinion may thus alter their foreign policies to garner external authorization. These claims challenge traditional realist views about the role of international organizations in security affairs, which tend to focus on direct enforcement mechanisms and neglect indirect channels of influence. To examine these claims, this article investigates the first link in this causal chain—the effect of institutional statements on public opinion. Strategic information arguments, as opposed to arguments about the symbolic legitimacy of specific organizations or the procedural importance of consultation, posit that the effect of institutional statements on public opinion is conditional on public perceptions of member states' interests. This article tests this conditional relationship in the context of changes in presidential approval surrounding military disputes, using a measure of preference distance between the United States and veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council. Findings indicate that short-term changes in presidential approval surrounding the onset of military disputes in the United States between 1946 and 2001 have been significantly larger when accompanied by a positive resolution for a Security Council that is more distant in terms of foreign policy preferences. The article also discusses polling data during the 1990s and 2000s that support the strategic information perspective.
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Leep, Matthew, and Jeremy Pressman. "Foreign cues and public views on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 21, no. 1 (November 21, 2018): 169–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148118809807.
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As foreign sources in the news might help the public assess their home country’s foreign policies, scholars have recently turned attention to the effects of foreign source cues on domestic public opinion. Using original survey experiments, we explore the effects of domestic (United States) and foreign (Israeli, British, and Palestinian) criticism of Israel’s military actions and settlements on US attitudes towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. We find that foreign cues by government officials and non-governmental organisations have modest effects, and are generally not more influential than domestic cues. We also show that individuals might discount foreign criticism of Israel in the context of US bipartisan support for Israel. While our experiments reveal some heterogeneous effects related to partisanship, we are sceptical of significant movement in opinion in response to foreign cues. These findings provide insights into foreign source cue effects beyond the context of the use of military force.
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SHIRK, SUSAN L. "Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China." Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (March 14, 2007): 43–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109907002472.
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China has undergone a media revolution that has transformed the domestic context for making foreign policy as well as domestic policy. The commercialization of the mass media has changed the way leaders and publics interact in the process of making foreign policy. As they compete with one another, the new media naturally try to appeal to the tastes of their potential audiences. Editors make choices about which stories to cover based on their judgments about which ones will resonate best with audiences. In China today, that means a lot of stories about Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, the topics that are the objects of Chinese popular nationalism. The publicity given these topics makes them domestic political issues because they are potential focal points for elite dis-agreement and mass collective action, and thereby constrains the way China' leaders and diplomats deal with them. Even relatively minor events involving China' relations with Japan, Taiwan, or the United States become big news, and therefore relations with these three governments must be carefully handled by the politicians in the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee. Because of the Internet, it is impossible for Party censors to screen out news from Japan, Taiwan or the United States that might upset the public. Common knowledge of such news forces officials to react to every slight, no matter how small. Foreign policy makers feel especially constrained by nationalist public opinion when it comes to its diplomacy with Japan. Media marketization and the Internet have helped make Japan China' most emotionally charged international relationship.
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Chow, Wilfred M., Enze Han, and Xiaojun Li. "Brexit identities and British public opinion on China." International Affairs 95, no. 6 (November 1, 2019): 1369–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz191.
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Abstract Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision-making, especially when it comes to the UK's relations with the United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on public opinion about British foreign policy towards other major players in the international system, such as emerging powers like China. We have addressed this knowledge gap by conducting a public opinion survey in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Our research findings indicate that the British public at large finds China's rise disconcerting, but is also pragmatic in its understanding of how the ensuing bilateral relations should be managed. More importantly, our results show that views on China are clearly split between the two opposing Brexit identities. Those who subscribe strongly to the Leave identity, measured by their aversion to the EU and antipathy towards immigration, are also more likely to hold negative perceptions of Chinese global leadership and be more suspicious of China as a military threat. In contrast, those who espouse a Remain identity—that is, believe that Britain would be better served within the EU and with more immigrants—are more likely to prefer closer engagement with China and to have a more positive outlook overall on China's place within the global community.
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Kitagawa, Risa, and Jonathan A. Chu. "The Impact of Political Apologies on Public Opinion." World Politics 73, no. 3 (June 9, 2021): 441–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887121000083.
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ABSTRACTApology diplomacy promises to assuage historical grievances held by foreign publics, yet in practice appears to ignite domestic backlash, raising questions about its efficacy. This article develops a theory of how political apologies affect public approval of an apologizing government across domestic and foreign contexts. The authors test its implications using large-scale survey experiments in Japan and the United States. In the surveys, the authors present vignettes about World War II grievances and randomize the nature of a government apology. They find that apology-making, both as statements acknowledging wrongdoing and as expressions of remorse, boosts approval in the recipient state. But in the apologizing state, backlash is likely among individuals with strong hierarchical group dispositions—manifested as nationalism, social-dominance orientation, and conservatism—and among those who do not consider the recipient a strategically important partner. This microlevel evidence reveals how leaders face a crucial trade-off between improving support abroad and risking backlash at home, with implications for the study of diplomatic communication and transitional justice.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "United States – Foreign relations – Public opinion"
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Thompson, John Mortimer. "The impact of public opinion on Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/265509.
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Theodore Roosevelt is considered by many historians to have been one of the most skilled practitioners of foreign policy in American history. But while he continues to draw � considerable interest from scholars, one facet of his diplomacy continues to be poorly understood: the impact of public opinion. There was a discernable evolution in his relationship with public opinion over the course of his tenure, even if many core ideas and practices were already present when he took office. The President was often discouraged by the state of public opinion. In his view, Congress was often a poor partner in conducting foreign policy; sensationalist newspapers had considerable influence; the ideas and policy preferences of many Eastern elites were usually ill-conceived; and the broader public's ignorance and apathy about international affairs were troublesome. But these concerns were balanced by other factors. He had a better working relationship with the Senate than he was willing to admit. He had more success in gaining favourable newspaper coverage than all but . a few Presidents. And he believed strongly in the American system of governance and had faith in the common sense of most of his countiymen. Given these multifaceted ideas about the nature of American opinion, it is not surprising that Roosevelt placed considerable importance upon shaping and educating it. This was both a means to facilitating his foreign policy goals and a way to build and maintain political supp01t. In fact, the two were closely linked. While he enjoyed considerable success in shaping opinion, he also suffered notable setbacks. In the final analysis, public opinion played a key role in Roosevelt's conduct of foreign policy, though its degree of influence in his decision-making process varied according to circumstances. Three main variables seemed to have shaped his behaviour: the impo11ance of a policy to Roosevelt, his perception about the intensity and sources of opposition to it and the level of suppo11 among the broader public.
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Kohn, Edward P. (Edward Parliament) 1968. "This kindred people : Canadian-American relations and North American Anglo-Saxonism during the Anglo-American rapprochement, 1895-1903." Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=36625.
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At the end of the nineteenth century, English-Canadians and Americans faced each other across the border with old animosities. Many Canadians adhered to familiar ideas of Loyalism, imperialism and anti-Americanism to differentiate the Dominion from the republic. In the United States, on the other hand, lingering notions of anglophobia and "Manifest Destiny" caused Americans to look upon the British colony to the north as a dangerous and unnatural entity. America's rise to world power status and the Anglo-American rapprochement, however, forced Americans and Canadians to adapt to the new international reality. Emphasizing their shared language, civilization, and forms of government, many English-speaking North Americans drew upon Anglo-Saxonism to find common ground. Indeed, Americans and Canadians often referred to each other as members of the same "family" sharing the same "blood," thus differentiating themselves from other races. As many of the events of the rapprochement had a North American context, Americans and English-Canadians often drew upon the common lexicon of Anglo-Saxon rhetoric to undermine the old rivalries and underscore their shared interests. Though the predominance of Anglo-Saxonism at the turn of the century proved short-lived, it left a legacy of Canadian-American goodwill, as both nations accepted their shared destiny on the continent and Canada as a key link in the North Atlantic Triangle.
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Bélanger, Damien-Claude 1976. "Pride and prejudice : Canadian intellectuals confront the United States, 1891-1945." Thesis, McGill University, 2005. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=100320.
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This study compares how English and French Canadian intellectuals viewed American society from 1891 to 1945. During the period under study, the Dominion experienced accelerated industrialization and urbanization, massive immigration, technological change, and the rise of mass culture. To the nation's intellectuals, many of these changes found their source and their very embodiment in the United States. America, it was argued, was the quintessence of modernity, having embraced, among other things, secularism, democracy, mass culture, and industrial capitalism.In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Canadian hostility to the United States and continental integration was expressed in two conservative discourses: that of English Canadian imperialism and French Canadian nationalism. Despite their fundamental divergence on the national question; both imperialists and nationalistes shared an essentially antimodern outlook, and anti-Americanism was their logical point of convergence.
By contrast, the most passionate Canadian defenders of American society could be found among liberal and socialist intellectuals like F. R. Scott and Jean-Charles Harvey. They saw continental integration and Canadian-American convergence as both inevitable and desirable. Intellectual continentalism reached its summit of influence during the 1930s and 1940s.
The present study is based on the analysis of some 520 texts found essentially in the era's periodical literature. Each, at least in part, explores some aspect of American life or of the relationship between Canada and the United States. Unlike most previous scholarship, which has tended to view anti-American sentiment merely as an expression of Canadian nationalism, this study is more concerned with Canadian intellectuals as thinkers on the left, the right, and the centre.
The comparative, pan-Canadian nature of this study reveals that English and French Canadian intellectuals shared common preoccupations with respect to the United States. However, the tone and emphasis of their commentary often differed. In English Canada, where political institutions and the imperial bond were viewed as the mainstays of Canadian distinctiveness, writing on the United States tended to deal primarily with political and diplomatic issues, in Quebec, where political institutions were not generally viewed as vital elements of national distinctiveness, social and cultural affairs dominated writing on the United States.
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Agboaye, Ehikioya. "Media Agenda-Building Effect: Analysis of American Public Apartheid Activities, Congressional and Presidential Policies on South Africa, 1976-1988." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1989. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc331332/.
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The mass media's role in informing the American public is critical to public support for government policies. The media are said to set the national agenda. This view is based on the assumption of selective coverage they give to news items. Media coverage also influences the salience the public attaches to issues.
However, media agenda effect has been challenged by Lang and Lang (1983). These scholars, in their media agenda-building theory, argued that the success of media effect on national agenda is dependent on group support.
In order to test this theory, time-related data on South Africa crises, media coverage"of South Africa, American public reactions, congressional, and presidential apartheid-related activities, between 1976 and 1988, were analyzed. Congressional anti-apartheid policies were the dependent and others, the independent variables. The theory made analysis of the data amenable to the additive adopted to test for the significance of the interactive variables, indicated that these variables were negatively related to congressional anti-apartheid policies. The additive model was subsequently analyzed. The time series multiple regression analysis was used in analyzing the relationships. Given autocorrelation and multicollinearity problems associated with time series analysis, the Arima (p, d, q) model was used to model the relationships. This model was used to indicate support, or nonsupport, for the time series regression analysis.
The result of the additive model indicated that South African political crises were negatively related to congressional anti-apartheid actions. It also showed that the relationship between the American public reactions and congressional anti-apartheid policies was greater in comparison to all other independent variables. The presidential actions taken against South Africa were negatively related to Congress' anti-apartheid actions. Television had the greatest relationship with congressional anti-apartheid actions compared to newspapers and magazines.
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Lu, Xiao. "American policy and the downfall of the Nationalist China : a survey of major American historical literature of China's civil war." Thesis, Canberra, ACT : The Australian National University, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/112040.
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As a so-called Old China Hand, I would suggest to the
new administration that it study with great sincerity of
purpose the idea that we "lost" China. It has been a phony
idea all along peddled by the China Lobby. Let's drop it.
Then and only then can the administration ... begin to evolve
and pursue an objective and, we hope, effective policy
regarding China.
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Young, Kelly M. "Nukespeak and psychic numbing metaphors in the academic texts of defense intellectuals." Virtual Press, 1997. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/1048397.
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This study analyzed defense intellectuals' metaphors to determine if the metaphors minimize or ignore the negative effects of nuclear war. The study specifically analyzed 30 texts from Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy with the metaphorical criticism method. Once the texts were analyzed, the findings suggested that defense intellectuals' metaphors describe nuclear war as ordinary and non-threatening, as a game or relationship. In addition, the study found that the defense intellectuals used metaphors that deflected responsibility for building and using nuclear weapons away from world leaders. The findings also suggested that the defense intellectuals are not numb to the effects of nuclear war, as others claim. Instead, the defense intellectuals' metaphors acted as cognitive blinders that prevented them from discussing the effects of nuclear war. Finally, the study found that each journal's metaphors were aligned with a particular world view of international relations; Foreign Affairs belonged to the realist school of thought, while Foreign Policy belonged to the neo-liberal institutionalist school of thought.Department of Speech Communication
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Botes, Marina. "The public diplomacy of the United States of America in the war on terror." Diss., Pretoria : [s.n.], 2007. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-11192007-141127.
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Gagle, Michael Todd. "A Bridge Across the Pacific: A Study of the Shifting Relationship Between Portland and the Far East." PDXScholar, 2016. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/2655.
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After Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, both Japan and China sought the support of America. There has been a historical assumption that, starting with the hostilities in 1931, the Japanese were maligned in American public opinion. Consequently, the assumption has been made that Americans supported the Chinese without reserve during their conflict with Japan in the 1930s.
The aim of this study is to question the accuracy of that assumption in the case of Portland, Oregon. An analysis of newspapers and print material specifically focusing on Japan and China from before the conflict reveal that the general American opinion of Japan by 1931 had shifted from admiration to suspicion and fear. The American view of China, meanwhile, had shifted from contempt to pity. When Japan invaded China, both countries lobbied for support via books, articles, and public speakers. By analyzing the speeches and publications available, this study finds that the Japanese argued for security and economic benefit, while the Chinese argued for liberty and justice.
In Portland, the public opinion was strongly supportive of Japan before the 1930s, and Japan's hostilities toward China did not immediately change the opinion. Instead, an analysis of The Oregonian, the Portland City Club, and a student summit at Reed college reveal that the opinion in Portland was far more forgiving of Japan than the general American outlook. Portlanders focused on how to ease the tensions between Japan and America, even supporting Japanese calls for an Asian League of Nations headed by Japan.
Further complicating the discourse in Portland was the issue of communism. Portland -- and the Pacific Northwest in general -- had been very involved with socialism in the period before the First World War. After the war, support for socialism had diverged into support for communism, for those who remained radicals, and vehement distrust of communism, for those who did not. The tension between these two groups led to outbursts of violence that left a mark on the memories of the people of the Northwest. Those who supported communism remembered the slights, which would lead them to support the Bolsheviks in the 1930s. Those who distrusted communism remembered the real threat that communism represented.
When the Japanese began their propaganda against China, one of their strongest claims was that the Chinese could not hold back the tide of communism, and that only Japan was properly prepared to do so in East Asia. This claim brought up old fears in the Portland populace, most of whom did not support communism. Thus, Japanese claims of working to prevent the communist threat, coupled with the assertion of an economic boon, helped maintain a more favorable view of Japan in Portland. Following the 1937 attack on Nanking, however, Japanese action was deemed reprehensible and Portland began to turn against Japan.
By profiling the public opinion of Portland toward Japan in the 1930s, this study adds to the growing body of research on the complexities of the relationship between America and Japan during the twentieth century.
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Richardson, Erin L. "SANE and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 mobilizing public opinion to shape U.S. foreign policy /." Ohio : Ohio University, 2009. http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/view.cgi?ohiou1257556741.
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Feinman, David Eric. "Divided government and congressional foreign policy a case study of the post-World War II era in American government." Master's thesis, University of Central Florida, 2011. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/4891.
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The purpose of this research is to analyze the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of American federal government, during periods within which these two branches are led by different political parties, to discover whether the legislative branch attempts to independently legislate and enact foreign policy by using "the power of the purse" to either appropriate in support of or refuse to appropriate in opposition to military engagement abroad. The methodology for this research includes the analysis and comparison of certain variables, including public opinion, budgetary constraints, and the relative majority of the party that holds power in one or both chambers, and the ways these variables may impact the behavior of the legislative branch in this regard. It also includes the analysis of appropriations requests made by the legislative branch for funding military engagement in rejection of requests from the executive branch for all military engagements that occurred during periods of divided government from 1946 through 2009.ID: 029809199; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Thesis (M.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2011.; Includes bibliographical references (p. 110-112).
M.A.
Masters
Political Science
Sciences
Books on the topic "United States – Foreign relations – Public opinion"
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Public opinion and American foreign policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.
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Public opinion and American foreign policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
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Asmus, Ronald D. German perceptions of the United States at unification. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991.
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Faces of internationalism: Public opinion and American foreign policy. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.
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Ming, Zhang. The shifting Chinese public image of the United States. [Washington, D.C.?]: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996.
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1949-, Seib Philip M., ed. Toward a new public diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. foreign policy. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009.
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Counting the public in: Presidents, public opinion, and foreign policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
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Wallach, John. Fidel Castro and the United States press. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Inc., 1987.
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Wallach, John. Fidel Castro and the United States press. Washington, D.C. (1000 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W., Washington 20007): Cuban American National Foundation, 1987.
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Irogbe, Kema. The roots of United States foreign policy toward apartheid South Africa, 1969-1985. Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1997.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "United States – Foreign relations – Public opinion"
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Chubb, Danielle, and Ian McAllister. "The Alliance with the United States." In Australian Public Opinion, Defence and Foreign Policy, 43–76. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7397-2_3.
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Damm, Jens. "China and Germany After the 2021 Election: Between Continuity and Increasing Confrontation." In China-US Competition, 159–90. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15389-1_7.
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AbstractThis chapter presents and analyses various official statements, 2021 election programmes and party manifestos, media reports as well as public hearings with regard to the changing view of China in the German public discourse. While the importance of economic interests is still the overarching topic in German-Chinese relations (China has been Germany`s most important trading partner since 2015), there has been a shift towards a more critical stance with regard to human rights issues in recent years. Germany was also the driving force behind the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China, which the EU signed in December 2020 under Germany’s presidency of the EU Council but so far never ratified.After the formation of a new SPD led government under chancellor Olaf Scholz, the two smaller coalition partners, the Alliance 90/The Greens, and the FDP, are said to have a much more critical view of China’s human rights issues. In particular, the new German foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock has publicly vowed to change Germany’s China policy. While Germany has remained within the hedging zone a shift from “economic pragmatism” to “soft balancing” can be observed, most noticeably in political terms: in particular, the new foreign minister Annalena Baerbock stresses the necessity for a closer cooperation both with the United States, but also a common policy of the EU towards China. Thus Germany, and the EU in general, seems to have shifted from “economic pragmatism” to “dominance denial” since the new government came into power, and the war in Ukraine has led to an even closer alliance of Germany, with the EU and the United States.
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Menon, Anand, and Luigi Scazzieri. "11. The United Kingdom: Towards a Parting of the Ways." In The Member States of the European Union, 257–79. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198737391.003.0011.
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This chapter examines the history of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European integration process. The chapter dissects the long-term trends in public opinion and the more contingent, short-term factors that led to the referendum vote to leave the European Union. The UK was a late joiner and therefore unable to shape the early institutional development of the EEC. British political parties and public opinion were always ambiguous about membership and increasingly Eurosceptic from the early 1990s. Yet the UK had a significant impact on the EU’s development, in the development of the single market programme and eastward enlargement. If Brexit goes through, Britain will nevertheless maintain relations with the EU in all policy areas from agriculture to energy and foreign policy. Europeanization will remain a useful theoretical tool to analyse EU–UK relations even if the UK leaves the Union.
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Bookman, Pamela K. "Toward the Fifth Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law." In The Restatement and Beyond, 335–58. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197533154.003.0016.
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This chapter discusses the debate that the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States has sparked regarding the status of adjudicative jurisdiction under public international law. The Fourth Restatement has received considerable attention for its conclusion that adjudicative jurisdiction is not a concern of public international law. But exercises of adjudicative jurisdiction around the world are not static. Innovations and expansions of international adjudication in courts around the world are in process and looming on the horizon. This chapter surveys these developments and considers whether they could lead the next Restatement to alter its position on adjudicative jurisdiction. It also evaluates how these developments could translate into state practice and expressions of opinio juris that might affect the international law status of adjudicative jurisdiction.
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"Introduction. The New International History Meets The New Cultural History: Public Diplomacy And U.S. Foreign Relations." In The United States and Public Diplomacy, 1–25. Brill | Nijhoff, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004176911.i-380.6.
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"Chapter Seven. Foreign Relations As Domestic Affairs:The Role Of The "Public" In The Origins Of U.S. Public Diplomacy." In The United States and Public Diplomacy, 193–223. Brill | Nijhoff, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004176911.i-380.52.
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Johnston, Alastair lain. "12. The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion Toward the United States, I998-2004." In New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy, 340–78. Stanford University Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781503625808-016.
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Sandoval, Alejandro Monjaraz. "Outline of Border Relations Between Mexico and the United States." In Advances in Public Policy and Administration, 193–215. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-5205-6.ch008.
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This chapter bases its premise on the fact that US foreign policy becomes a reality with certain areas of opportunity, dictated from the presidency, as it promotes unilateral policies focusing on migration from Mexico, securitization and militarization of the border, and the development of an economic strategy. Unfortunately, this defense of interests unilaterally has caused border states and municipalities to set their own objectives, development plans, and border and binational diplomacy and policy decisions and strategies.
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Lucas, Scott. "When Public Opinion Does Not Shape Foreign Policy." In US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy, 105–27. University Press of Kentucky, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813169057.003.0006.
Full textAbstract:
President Eisenhower easily swept to victory in 1956, defeating Adlai Stevenson, whom he had also beaten in 1952, despite crises and wars that had suddenly flared in Hungary and Egypt. When the events of 1956 are examined through public and private records, the president’s response to these crises appears to confirm his claim that he would not allow policy making to be hostage to the wishes of the public. Instead, he made clear time and again that he would proceed with what he thought was the “right” course for US interests, irrespective of the American public’s reaction to the policy or to his reelection campaign. At the same time, he was ready to invoke public opinion in the United States and throughout the world to try and bend other statesmen to his will.
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Feinstein, Yuval. "The Rally Phenomenon in Light of Competing Approaches to Public Opinion." In Rally 'round the Flag, 23–37. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197629710.003.0002.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter examines the rally phenomenon in light of four prominent theoretical approaches to public opinion in the United States during wars. First, the rational public approach suggests a rally-round-the-flag effect may emerge in response to war if people think that the US military policy is likely to succeed and that the cost is low. Second, the elite consensus thesis proposes that rally periods emerge when the political elite feeds the public information biased in favor of the president and his foreign policy. A third approach, which the author titles the security-concerned public approach, suggests that events become rally points if they evoke a feeling of security threat in the public. Relatedly, a fourth, the manipulation of threat argument, highlights how the political elite propagate security threats to mobilize popular support for actions that they claim address those security threats.
Conference papers on the topic "United States – Foreign relations – Public opinion"
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Karatalov, Omurbek. "Open Economy and Economic Integration within the Framework of Eurasia." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c04.00633.
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The Kyrgyz Republic economy openness is studied within the framework of the Eurasia. Insufficient level of the financial and economic standing of Kyrgyzstan is clarified. Reasons for Governmental regulating use in the area of monetary, tax and budget policy in USA have been set up. Conditions of the development of industrial countries economy are under consideration. The necessity of financialisation of all capital of country is defined. Kyrgyzstan public budget’s permanent deficiency formation reasons are studied. A necessity of integration economic relations development within the framework of Eurasia is offered. A necessity of sustainable economic relations establishment as well as finding solution for external debt between Kyrgyzstan and Russia have been justified. It is recommended to strengthen effective fight against a scale corruption, «shadow» economy and criminalization of economy and finances. The increase of efficiency and responsibility of top managers of the public administration level have been offered. The necessity of the independent mastering of own gold-mining fields is justified. The need to attract the foreign direct investments to the area of mining and processing industry have been offered. Within the framework of acceleration of economic integration. Needs for the development of exploring and processing of hydrocarbons as well as building of large economic entities especially the hydroelectric power stations, namely Kambar-Ata-1 Hydro-Power Plants have been suggested. By this it is also suggested to Russia to develop this as strategic partner of Kyrgyzstan. Creation of integral customs system and energy cooperation suggested. It should be supported by establishment of unique equivalent among Eurasia states. By this it is to be possible to find acceptable solutions in finance and economy and to form a united economic cooperation considering a sovereignty of each state. It is necessary to develop the identical financial reporting of point-of-sale and payment balances, balance of international investments, compliable national republics and on the whole on Eurasia. To walk away from the calculation and actual use of dollar of the USA in finance and economic operations. Based on econometric prognosis of gross internal product and the public budget of Kyrgyzstan is made calculating on the per to 2025 year.
Reports on the topic "United States – Foreign relations – Public opinion"
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Romero, Antonio. The Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement and relations between European Union and Cuba. Fundación Carolina, February 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.33960/issn-e.1885-9119.dtff01en.
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This document makes an assessment of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between Cuba and the European Union (EU) in its four years of validity, and of the evolution of political and economic relations between both parties. The analysis is structured in five headings that address the background, determinants and significance of the PDCA between Cuba and the EU; the main elements discussed in the political dialogue —and in thematic dialogue— between the two parties since 2018, and the central aspects of trade, investment and cooperation relations between Cuba and the EU. The report concludes that, unlike the United States, the EU is able to support the complex process of economic and institutional transformations underway in Cuba, in four fundamental areas: i) technical assistance and advice for the design and implementation of public policies, macroeconomic management, decentralisation and local development; ii) cooperation to fight climate change and transform Cuba’s productive and technological structure; iii) the promotion and encouragement of foreign investment flows from Europe, targeting key productive sectors; and iv) the exploration of financial opportunities for Cuba through the European Investment Bank (EIB) under the current PDCA.