Journal articles on the topic 'United states - espionage'
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Arindiya, Ghina, and Dewi Triwahyuni. "CHINESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES MILITARY INDUSTRY." Proceeding of International Conference on Business, Economics, Social Sciences, and Humanities 7, no. 1 (July 1, 2024): 1108–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.34010/icobest.v7i.624.
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This research aims to analyze China's espionage activities against the United States, especially in the military industry. In analyzing the case the author uses the concepts of the Action-Reaction Model and Information War. The espionage conflict between the US and China is influenced by the proximity and complexity of political, technological and strategic factors. The collection technique was carried out through literature study and then analyzed using qualitative methods. The results of this research show that espionage has a major influence on the complexity of cyber security. Final conclusions about Chinese espionage against America will depend largely on the actual evidence available, and these assessments are often carried out in great secrecy. However, espionage conflict is a serious problem that requires a coordinated and strategic response from the government and related institutions
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Clarke, Duncan L. "Israel's Economic Espionage in the United States." Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 4 (1998): 20–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538128.
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Israel has conducted an aggressive campaign of economic espionage in the United States since 1948. This campaign has been critical to sustaining and modernizing Israel's nuclear weapons program and an array of its most advanced conventional weapons even while it has caused American firms to lose valuable proprietary information and unfairly advantaged Israeli companies in the international arms market. While other countries conduct economic espionage against the United States, Israel is the only major recipient of U.S. foreign aid to do so.
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Clarke, Duncan L. "Israel's Economic Espionage in the United States." Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 4 (July 1998): 20–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.1998.27.4.00p00037.
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Klehr, Harvey. "REFLECTIONS ON ESPIONAGE." Social Philosophy and Policy 21, no. 1 (January 2004): 141–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052504211074.
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In 1995 the United States National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) made public the story of a forty-year American intelligence operation code-named Venona. Shortly after the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, American military intelligence had ordered companies that were sending and receiving coded cables overseas, such as Western Union, to turn over copies to the U.S. government. Hundreds of thousands of cables were sent or received by Soviet government bodies. Beginning in 1943, spurred by rumors and concerns that Stalin might conclude a separate peace with Hitler, the U.S. Army's cryptographic section began work trying to read these Russian cables. It had very limited success until 1946, by which time the Cold War was already underway. Some twenty-nine hundred cables dealing with Russian intelligence activities from 1942 to 1946 eventually were decrypted successfully in whole or in part as a result of Soviet technical errors in constructing and using “one-time pads” that American code-breakers were able to exploit. These cables implicated more than three hundred Americans as having been involved with Soviet intelligence services during World War II, a time when the United States and the USSR were allies.
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Smith, Michael M. "The Mexican Secret Service in the United States, 1910-1920." Americas 59, no. 1 (July 2002): 65–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tam.2002.0091.
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Throughout the era of the Mexican Revolution, the United States provided sanctuary for thousands of political exiles who opposed the regimes of Porfirio Díaz, Francisco Madero, Victoriano Huerta, and Venustiano Carranza. Persecuted enemies of Don Porfirio and losers in the bloody war of factions that followed the ouster of the old regime continued their struggle for power from bases of operation north of the international boundary in such places as San Francisco, Los Angeles, El Paso, San Antonio, New Orleans, and New York. As a consequence, Mexican regimes were compelled not only to combat their enemies on domestic battlefields but also to wage more subtle campaigns against their adversaries north of the Río Bravo. The weapons in this shadowy war included general intelligence gathering, surveillance, espionage, counter-espionage, and propaganda; the agency most responsible for these activities was the Mexican Secret Service.
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Terry, Patrick C. R. "“Don't Do as I Do”—The US Response to Russian and Chinese Cyber Espionage and Public International Law." German Law Journal 19, no. 3 (June 1, 2018): 613–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s207183220002280x.
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The Russian government is accused of hacking emails circulating among senior members of Hilary Clinton's campaign team to support President Trump's election in 2016. This was not the first time the United States was the target of massive cyber espionage: The Chinese government is believed to have gained sensitive information on 22.1 million US government employees through “cyber intrusions” in 2014. This Article will examine whether cyber espionage of this kind is unlawful under public international law and will conclude that it is. Specifically, such espionage can result in a violation of territorial sovereignty and will likely violate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Yet, based on the controversial “clean-hands-doctrine,” past US actions in the realms of cyber espionage and intervention may well invalidate any claims it asserts against Russia or China.
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Smith, Lieutenant Commander Ursula, and Colonel Daniel J. Lecce. "Litigating National Security Cases under The United States Uniform Code of Military Justice." Journal of International Peacekeeping 20, no. 3-4 (August 17, 2016): 250–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18754112-02003007.
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This paper will discuss classified litigation procedures in United States Military Courts-Martial, governed by Military Rule of Evidence 505 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The differences between United States Federal Court procedures and United States Military Commissions, governed by the Classified Information Privilege Act (cipa) and Military Commissions Rule of Evidence 505, are also discussed. Finally, best practices and selected military cases regarding espionage are presented.
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Amusan, Lere, and Siphiwe Mchunu. "Adventure into Peacetime Intra-Alliance Espionage: Assessment of the America-Germany Saga." Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 33, no. 1 (December 1, 2015): 64–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/lfpr-2016-0010.
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Abstract Peacetime espionage is often employed by states as a means of acquiring information about competitor states in the international system. However the practice is not limited to competitor states. In a world where security concerns are an ever-present consideration for state action, acts of espionage normally reserved for use against enemies are also used against ally states. The basic premise is that while alliances are able to foster mutual trust and cooperation, they do not conclude that an ally will always be trust-worthy and faithful, most especially, when it involves issues of national interest. The international system and a need to safeguard one’s own interests and population mean that espionage, even against an ally, will remain a necessary state function and all states should therefore remain vigilant against attempts at infiltration of their state secrets. The question of peacetime intra-alliance espionage and the consequences thereof has yet to be answered and it is the purpose of this research to fill that intellectual gap. This research will look at traditionally allied countries, with a long record of cooperation, and not competing states. To achieve this, the case from 2013 of two North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, Germany and the United States (US), are our main focus. Lessons worth drawing from this, by NATO small states members, shall be discussed.
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WRÓBLEWSKA, Angelika. "SELECTED ADVANCED CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS." Cybersecurity & Cybercrime 1, no. 1 (March 31, 2021): 149–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0053.8016.
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The article presents examples of highly advanced cyber espionage operations aimed atthe structures of states and non-state entities with high impact on the economic activity.The attacks took place between 2003 and 2017. The article presents the steps ofOperation Titan Rain and Operation Gh0stNet and also one of the longest espionageoperations revealed to the public, which is Operation The Night Dragon. Anotheroperation is a series of cyber attacks identified by McAfee - Operation Shady RAT. Theyears 2009-2010 belong to Operation Aurora, whose victims were dozens oforganizations, including Google. One of the described attacks is Operation Nitro,targeting entities mostly located in the United States, Bangladesh and Great Britain. Thecourse of Project Raven was based on a Reuters investigation. The spy campaigntargeting various victims around the world, monitored by a team of BlackBerryResearch and Intelligence specialists, was named as CostaRicto.
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Terry, Patrick C. R. "“ABSOLUTE FRIENDS”: UNITED STATES ESPIONAGE AGAINST GERMANY AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW." Revue québécoise de droit international 28, no. 2 (2015): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1067720ar.
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Avery, Donald. "Secrets Between Different Kinds of Friends: Canada’s Wartime Exchange of Scientific Military Information with the United States and the USSR, 1940‑1945." Historical Papers 21, no. 1 (April 26, 2006): 225–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/030955ar.
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Abstract The outbreak of the Second World War, with the emphasis on new weapons and defence technology, brought about dramatic changes in the role of the scientist in Britain, the United States, and Canada. In many ways, Canadian scientists were most affected by these changes. Now, through the National Research Council and various defence agencies, they were able to gain access to highly confidential scientific data through the medium of joint British and Canadian research projects. Equally important was the extent that the British connection made it possible for Canadian scientists to become involved in sophisticated American military projects. Canada was also indirectly affected by the complex negotiations between Britain, the United States and the USSR on applied science exchanges during World War II. In addition, there were a variety of bilateral arrangements between Canada and the Soviet Union which had important implications for the exchange of military technology. But even more important were the revelations in September 1945 that the Soviet Union had been operating an extensive espionage system in Canada which had obtained considerable “Top Secret” scientific military information. The subsequent report of the Royal Commission on Espionage had major national and international ramifications.
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Fedoniuk, Serhii, and Serhii Maghdysiuk. "US-China Confrontation in Cyber Security." Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу, no. 45 (June 27, 2022): 113–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2022.45.113-127.
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This study presents the research results of the activities of the United States and China as the major global competitors in the field of cybersecurity. We have established the nature and trends of the confrontation, explored the goals and means of cyber influences in the confrontation between two states in this area, and identified directions for the development of the competition between the United States and China in the field of cybersecurity. Today, the United States and China are the world leaders in cyberspace and the information (cyber) security sector. The United States remains the undisputed world leader in cybersecurity, but China is rapidly closing the gap, relying on the strong potential of human and economic resources in cyberspace. From the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century. countries have been accusing each other of cyberattacks for economic purposes and cyber espionage. The United States has pointed to the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) leading role in organizing cyberattacks, and China has made similar allegations against the US intelligence. Despite attempts to reconcile policies in this area, tensions between the United States and China over cyber-building are growing. And since the beginning of the 2020s, politically motivated influences on information systems have become the target of cyberattacks. The United States notes a change in China's cyberattack strategy from regular cyber espionage to prosecuting political and security goals. Additionally, systematic control over the sources of cyber threats has been transferred from the PLA to the security structures of China. China also accuses the United States of using cyber influences to increase world hegemony and using cyber threats in the arms race. Beijing makes these statements from the standpoint of its own “multipolar” world strategy, which is threatened by the activities of the Joe Biden administration, aimed at consolidating Western countries in the face of cyber threats from China. The field of cybersecurity in US-China relations is becoming increasingly important in terms of the security strategies of these two world leaders. Each of them uses cyber tools as a tool of cyber influence, as well as a tool for strategic communication at the level of relations with strategic partners. Therefore, these issues will become increasingly important in terms of research interests, in particular the implementation of foreign policy interests in relations with these countries.
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Setzekorn, Eric. "The Contemporary Utility of 1930s Counterintelligence Prosecution Under the United States Espionage Act." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29, no. 3 (April 6, 2016): 545–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2016.1121050.
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Adzanas, Adrian, and Bambang Ipto. "EDWARD SNOWDEN"S COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AGAINST INFORMATION DOMINATION GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES." dia 20, no. 01 (March 20, 2022): 121–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.30996/dia.v20i01.6295.
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This research explains how Edward Snowden disseminates data from the National Security Agency (NSA) secret program. As a result of Edward Snowden’s espionage action, Snowden received sanction from the United States Department of Justice to file criminal charges against Snowden. In its implementation, the results of the leakage have an important on distrust between the allies and the United States government. Allied countries and the international public are asking the United States government to reform the NSA to be more transparent. This research focuses on qualitative research methods. Data analysis in the form of data reduction, data display, drawing conclusions, and verification. The results showed Edward Snowden’s communication strategy against the dominance of information by the United States government was to join the board of the nonprofit organization Freedom of the Press Foundation. The media that includes the disclosure of crime leaked by Edward Snowden are known as The Intercept, which means the media focuses on the disclosure of crime by the state based on documents leaked by Edward Snowden.
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SIBLEY, KATHERINE A. S. "Soviet Military-Industrial Espionage in the United States and the Emergence of an Espionage Paradigm in US-Soviet Relations, 1941-45." American Communist History 2, no. 1 (June 2003): 21–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1474389032000112582.
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Haynes, John Earl. "The Cold War Debate Continues: A Traditionalist View of Historical Writing on Domestic Communism and Anti-Communism." Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 1 (January 2000): 76–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/15203970051032381.
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This article reviews the huge Cold War-era and post-Cold War literature on American Communism and anti-Communism in the United States. These issues have long been the subject of heated scholarly debate. The recent opening of archives in Russia and other former Communist countries and the release of translated Venona documents in the United States have shed new light on key aspects of the American Communist Party that were previously unknown or undocumented. The new evidence has underscored the Soviet Union's tight control of the party and the crucial role that American Communists played in Soviet espionage. The release of all this documentation has been an unwelcome development for scholars who have long been sympathetic to the Communist movement.
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Jonghaeng Yoon. "Recent Trends of Court's Decisions and Legislation on Economic Espionage in the United States." kangwon Law Review 44, no. ll (February 2015): 477–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.18215/kwlr.2015.44..477.
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House, Jonathan M. "American Spies: Espionage against the United States from the Cold War to the Present." History: Reviews of New Books 42, no. 4 (July 22, 2014): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2014.903784.
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Segal, Adam. "The code not taken: China, the United States, and the future of cyber espionage." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (September 2013): 38–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0096340213501344.
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Arredondo, Ricardo. "DIPLOMACIA, ESPIONAJE Y ORDEN MUNDIAL: EL CIERRE DE CONSULADOS DE CHINA Y ESTADOS UNIDOS." Revista española de derecho internacional 73, no. 1 (January 25, 2021): 35–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.17103/redi.73.1.2021.1.01.
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This paper analyzes the political and legal context of the closure of the Chinese consulates in Houston and the American one in Chengdu in the framework of international law in general and, specifically, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) and the Chinese Consular Convention - United States (1980). In the first part, a brief description is made of the status of bilateral relations between China and the United States, and then it particularly considers aspects related to: a) the decision of both countries to close the aforementioned consular offices; b) the alleged conduct performed by Chinese officials, in particular, allegations of espionage and theft of intellectual property; c) the immunities of consular officials and the possibility of criminal prosecution, and d) issues related to the inviolability of consular premises. The paper concludes with some final thoughts.
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Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey Klehr. "Alexander Vassiliev's Notebooks and the Documentation of Soviet Intelligence Activities in the United States during the Stalin Era." Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 3 (July 2009): 6–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.3.6.
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Alexander Vassiliev's notebooks with 1,115 pages of handwritten transcriptions, excerpts, and summaries from Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) archival files provide the most detailed documentation available of Soviet espionage in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s. This article discusses the provenance of the notebooks and how they fit with previously available Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) files, KGB cables decrypted by the Venona project, Communist International records, court proceedings, and congressional investigations. As an example of the richness of the material, the essay reviews the notebooks' documentation of Soviet spy William Weisband's success in alerting the Soviet Union to the U.S. decryption project that tracked Soviet military logistic communications, allowing the USSR to implement a more secure encryption system and blinding the United States to preparations for the invasion of South Korea in 1950.
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Klehr, Harvey, and John Earl Haynes. "The First U.S.-Based Soviet Nuclear Spy: The Saga of Clarence Hiskey and Arthur Adams." Journal of Cold War Studies 25, no. 4 (2023): 53–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01170.
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Abstract Years before anything was publicly disclosed about the nuclear espionage of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Klaus Fuchs, and Theodore Hall, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Army Intelligence identified Clarence Hiskey, a Manhattan Project scientist, as a Soviet spy helping to provide highly sensitive nuclear weapons information. The two agencies kept watch on a Soviet intelligence officer, Arthur Adams, who was living illegally in the United States and serving as Hiskey's control officer. Despite an extensive investigation, neither Hiskey nor Adams was ever arrested. Although Adams was named in a sensational tabloid newspaper article shortly after the end of World War II and closely shadowed by the FBI, he was able to flee to the Soviet Union. Hiskey was never indicted for espionage. Based on material released from declassified Russian archives and FBI files made available under the Freedom of Information Act, the article tells the story of the first U.S.-based nuclear spy and how he got away with it.
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Herken, Gregg. "Target Enormoz: Soviet Nuclear Espionage on the West Coast of the United States, 1942–1950." Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 3 (July 2009): 68–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.3.68.
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Alexander Vassiliev's notebooks fill in long-standing gaps in historians' understanding of Soviet nuclear espionage in the western United States during the Second World War and Cold War. Scholars are, in effect, finally able to see some of the most notorious spy cases in modern history from the Soviet side. The notebooks exonerate some individuals who were accused of spying—and whose careers were ruined as a result—while confirming the guilt of others. These revelations include an arguably definitive answer to a question that has been the centerpiece of Cold War controversy for more than half a century: whether the renowned American physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer was, as alleged at the time, “an agent of the Soviet Union.” The new evidence indicates that he was not a spy.
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Xiaofeng, Wang. "China’s Alternative Roles in Countering International Economic Cyber Espionage." China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 02, no. 04 (January 2016): 549–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2377740016500251.
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This article examines China’s respective roles as a suspect, victim, and stakeholder in countering international economic cyber espionage (ECE) activities. Refuting the widespread evidence and cases that have misguided those with interests or concerns in cyber security issues, the author underscores the cognitive defects and logical fallacies in the prevailing suspicion and accusations against China. Not only is China among the victims of ECE activities, it will face even more ECE threats in the future. With growing cyber capacity, however, China has been determined to develop into a strong cyber power while playing a more active role as a key stakeholder in containing ECE activities. To maintain a secure and favorable cyberspace, the international community must join hands in working out a common code of conduct in cyberspace, acknowledging China’s strenuous efforts and indispensable role in international cyberspace governance. The United States, in particular, needs to adopt a legal approach in seeking to settle ECE disputes with China while making more commitments to their bilateral cooperation against economic cybercrime.
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Rovner, Joshua, and Tyler Moore. "Does the Internet Need a Hegemon?" Journal of Global Security Studies 2, no. 3 (July 1, 2017): 184–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogx008.
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Abstract Hegemonic stability theory holds that a dominant power can produce international cooperation by providing public goods and resolving collective action dilemmas. Successful hegemons also resist the temptation to exploit their advantages in order to reduce other states’ fear of domination. This article asks whether or not the internet needs the United States to play a similar role. If so, Washington should pursue policies designed to strengthen internet security while eschewing espionage and cyberattacks that rely on some degree of internet insecurity. If not, it can go on the offensive without fear of undermining the system as a whole. We examine the technical and political fallout from revealed offensive cyberoperations to assess the relative fragility of the internet. Our findings suggest that it is relatively resilient.
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Tuluș, Arthur. "The Condition of National Minorities in Eastern Europe in a Secret Cia Report From 1965." Eminak, no. 2(34) (July 1, 2021): 210–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.33782/eminak2021.2(34).529.
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In the context of the Cold War, detailed knowledge of the opponent and espionage were fundamental elements in the security policies of the two antagonistic sides. The CIA, the United States’ foreign intelligence service, identified the condition of ethnic minorities as one of the possible vulnerabilities of the Eastern Camp, judging from the perspective of the restrictive policies that Communist states held regarding rights and freedoms. Our study is based on the analysis of a document prepared by the CIA in 1965, a memorandum that took data from the latest official censuses in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and recorded the effects of assimilation policies on national minorities within the Eastern Communist states. The document is all the more interesting as the issue of national minorities rights’ in the Communist world was taboo.
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Selyanin, Yaroslav. "The US confrontation with China through the prism of cyberspace." Russia and America in the 21st Century, no. 3 (2023): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207054760026344-5.
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U.S National Security Strategy 2022 calls People Republic of China as the main enemy for decades. In the United States' point of view cyberspace is the one of key spaces for confronting against China, where America is preparing to deter its “aggression”. Washington blames Beijing in using cyber for espionage and influence operation and also in having technical ability to attacking American infrastructure, including critical. How have U.S. strategic documents assessment of Chinese activities evolved from the NSS 2006? Which threats from PRC does the U.S. see for themselves in cyber? Which approaches for countering them is Washington adopting? These question answers are considered in this article.
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Pawlikowicz, Leszek. "Wykorzystanie radzieckich emigrantów doby détente w praktyce działań 1. Zarządu Głównego KGB i współczesne reminiscencje tego zjawiska. Casus Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki." Polityka i Społeczeństwo 20, no. 4 (2022): 233–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.15584/polispol.2022.4.16.
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The article – on the basis of American official and court documents (relating to four documented cases of espionage between 1975 and 1991) and using empirical, quantitative and comparative methods – for the first time comprehensively analyses the activities carried out for the benefit of the KGB foreign intelligence service by emigrants from the USSR who arrived in the United States between 1971 and 1984. In addition to describing the scale and peculiarities of the aforementioned migration wave, the four main directions of their operational work are presented, as well as the development of new forms of interaction between Russian emigrants and the new Russian intelligence services after 1991.
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Gul, Noman, Fareed Ullah, and Azmat Ali Shah. "Sino-US Global Competitive Dynamics Post 9/11 and its Impacts on Pakistan's Security." Global Strategic & Securities Studies Review VI, no. II (June 30, 2021): 162–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2021(vi-ii).16.
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In this paper we examine the security implications for Pakistan after the engagement of two powerful states, China and United States. After the incident of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and their security impacts in the capacity of Pakistan's domestic and peripheral front. Their rivalry in the 21st century at the geo strategic, geopolitical and geo-economic level have been explained on the basis of realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence philosophies of international relations. The drastic political and strategic change in the status of Kashmir propelled Pakistan and China to review their foreign policies in future. In response, China wants Pakistan a strategic partner to closely look onto Afghanistan's political crisis during and after the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan. However, the strategic relationship nuclear partnership between America and India has allowed the Sino-Pak strategic and nuclear partnership to level the magnitude of the United States' influence in South Asia. The issue of cross border terrorism, infiltration from Afghanistan and Indian espionage policy further sabotaged peace and security calculus in Pakistan's internal and external levels. India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership has further deteriorated Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan.
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Olmsted, Kathryn. "British and US Anticommunism Between the World Wars." Journal of Contemporary History 53, no. 1 (October 27, 2016): 89–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009416653458.
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This article examines the espionage and propaganda networks established by former professional spies and other anticommunist activists in the interwar period in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. In both countries, conservatives responded to the growing power of labor in politics by creating and funding private groups to coordinate spying operations on union activists and political radicals. These British and US spies drew upon the resources of the government while evading democratic controls. The anti-labor groups also spread anti-radical propaganda, but the counter-subversive texts in the UK tended to highlight the economic threats posed by radicalism, while those in the USA appealed to more visceral fears. The leaders of these anti-labur networks established a transnational alliance with their fellow anticommunists across the Atlantic decades before the beginning of the Cold War.
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Trasciatti, Mary Anne. "Kairos, Free Speech, and the Material Conditions of State Power in the United States: The Case of World War I." Journal for the History of Rhetoric 18, no. 2 (July 2015): 216–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jhistrhetoric.18.2.0216.
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ABSTRACT This article considers versions of kairos within the context of World War I and the 1917 Espionage Act, a U.S. law that significantly narrowed parameters for free speech to protect the national interest. Many political activists and pacifists who perceived the war as an opportune moment for a critique of state power and corporate interests suffered material consequences for making such a critique—or remained silent for fear of consequences. While affirming the materiality of kairos and the centrality of body performance, I suggest an expanded version embodying the principle that freedom to respond to kairotic moments is always a product of struggle.
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Usdin, Steven. "The Face of Soviet Espionage in the United States during the Stalin Era: Vladimir Pravdin, “Man of Truth”." Journal of Cold War Studies 26, no. 2 (2024): 78–122. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01211.
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Abstract Vladimir Pravdin was a senior Soviet intelligence officer in New York and Washington, DC, during World War II. He oversaw some of the most important Soviet agents of the era, including Harry Dexter White, a senior official at the U.S. Treasury Department; Lauchlin Currie, the chief economic adviser to U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt; and Judith Coplon, a U.S. Justice Department employee who provided intelligence on the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Pravdin's cover in the United States was as an editor and then director of U.S. operations for the TASS news agency. In his capacity as a TASS executive, he developed relationships with numerous U.S. journalists, including Walter Lippmann. Pravdin was born in 1905 in London, and his real name was Roland Abbiate. His unusually adventurous life included serving a two-year sentence in the Atlanta penitentiary prior to his recruitment by Soviet intelligence, surveilling Leon Trotsky in Norway and Mexico, participating in the Spanish Civil War, and leading the assassination of Ignace Poretsky. His story illuminates the triumphs of Soviet intelligence in the United States during World War II, the failures of U.S. counterintelligence, and the unraveling of Soviet espionage in North America following the defections of Igor Gouzenko and Elizabeth Bentley.
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Acton, James M. "Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War." International Security 43, no. 1 (August 2018): 56–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320.
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Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict. This form of “entanglement” between nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities creates the potential for Chinese or Russian nonnuclear strikes against the United States or U.S. strikes against either China or Russia to spark inadvertent nuclear escalation. Escalation pressures could be generated through crisis instability or through one of two newly identified mechanisms: “misinterpreted warning” or the “damage-limitation window.” The vulnerability of dual-use U.S. early-warning assets provides a concrete demonstration of the risks. These risks would be serious for two reasons. First, in a conventional conflict against the United States, China or Russia would have strong incentives to launch kinetic strikes on U.S. early-warning assets. Second, even limited strikes could undermine the United States' ability to monitor nuclear attacks by the adversary. Moreover, cyber interference with dual-use early-warning assets would create the additional danger of the target's misinterpreting cyber espionage as a destructive attack. Today, the only feasible starting point for efforts to reduce the escalation risks created by entanglement would be unilateral measures—in particular, organizational reform to ensure that those risks received adequate consideration in war planning, acquisition decisions, and crisis decisionmaking. Over the longer term, unilateral measures might pave the way for more challenging cooperative measures, such as agreed restrictions on threatening behavior.
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Li, Wei. "The Security Service for Chinese Central Leaders." China Quarterly 143 (September 1995): 814–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100001506x.
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National leaders need security protection against political assassinations, espionage, terrorism and many other dangers, and therefore almost every country has a specialized organization to provide such protection. In the United States, the President is protected by the Secret Service of the Treasury Department, and in the Soviet Union, the Kremlin denizens were guarded by the Ninth Directorate of the KGB. The Chinese security system for the top leadership, consisting mainly of the Central Security Bureau in Zhongnanhai, is however distinctive in several respects. Institutionally it has a peculiarly complex set of arrangements which result in some puzzling divisions of responsibilities. It also relies heavily on a military detachment, Unit 8341. Above all, the Chinese central security apparatus can, and does, play a more active and indispensable political role than is common in other countries.
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Goodman, Michael S. "Who Is Trying to Keep What Secret from Whom and Why? MI5-FBI Relations and the Klaus Fuchs Case." Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 3 (June 2005): 124–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/1520397054377160.
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Klaus Fuchs was one of the most infamous spies of the Cold War, whose espionage feats altered the nature of the early postwar period. Drawing on newly released archival documents and witness testimony, this article considers the events surrounding his arrest and conviction. These sources reveal that even before Fuchs was arrested, he was used as a pawn.Because of his supreme importance to the British nuclear weapons program, some British of ficials initially believed that he should remain in his position, despite his admission of guilt. Until the matter was resolved, Fuchs was used unwittingly as a wedge between the British and U.S. intelligence services.Moreover, when the United States criticized British security standards, the Fuchs case was used by MI5 to cajole and mislead Parliament and the public.
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Neagu, Florentina Stefania, and Anca Savu. "The costs of cyberterrorism for the national economy: United States of America vs Egypt." Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence 13, no. 1 (May 1, 2019): 983–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2019-0086.
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Abstract In recent years cyber terrorism has become increasingly used with the globalization of technology and people’s access to high-speed internet. It takes place exclusively in the online environment, the advantage being that it offers an increased level of anonymity to users. Terrorist groups are targeting the misappropriation of social media accounts, focused on Distributed Denial of Service activities, exploiting communications services and banking services for fraudulent misappropriation of financial accounts. Cyberterrorism generates very high costs for the national economy, such as the involvement of specialists for detecting and correcting intrusion, declining productivity and income, costs of information theft, regaining the reputation of an institution or company, the costs relating to the resumption of production and the provision of services, the loss of information concerning intellectual property, financial manipulation using stolen information, the cost of securing computer networks and assuring them in the event of intrusion, costs generated by the time spent on recovering stolen data. In 2018 both the US and Egypt took action on these activities, the US modified its national cyber strategy and Egypt adopted the new law project to combat cybercrime. The main cyber threats they face are: threats of intrusion and sabotage of IT infrastructures, cyberterrorism and cyberwar, threats to digital identity and theft of private data, malware programs. The targets of the attacks were public sector entities, financial organizations, health care organizations, retail and accommodation. The reasons for why hackers attack these organizations are money-related, malware infected by emails, commercial and industrial espionage.
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DYACHKOV, Ilya Vladimirovich. "UN SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DPRK: AN ASSESSMENT OF EFFICIENCY." Tambov University Review. Series: Humanities, no. 177 (2018): 173–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/1810-0201-2018-23-177-173-179.
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The last decade and a half we saw the gradual forming of a sanctions regime against the DPRK in connection with Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. United Nations Security Council resolutions have disconnected North Korea from the global financial system, cut all foreign military ties with the country, introduced considerable sectoral sanctions on imports and exports, blocked major channels Pyongyang used to acquire foreign currency. Besides, the United States, South Korea and Japan have simultaneously enforced unilateral restrictions. Early 2018 offers an opportunity to solve the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem, and now is the time to assess the sanctions’ efficiency. We analyze the problems with their implementation and describe the means North Korea employs to circumvent the regime. Such measures include building an autarkic economy, ignoring the directives of the United Nations Security Council, deceiving international partners, exploiting the global market and engaging in espionage and diplomacy. These strategies allow the DPRK to support and develop the economy, as well as missile and nuclear programs. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations may be, it is already evident that sanctions cannot efficiently solve the nuclear issue and must give way to dialogue.
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Bessonova, Maryna. "Canada and the Beginning of the Cold War: Modern Interpretations." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 8 (2019): 47–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2019.08.05.
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The most widespread plots interpreted as the beginning of the Cold War are the events that took place in 1946: February 9 – J. Stalin’s speech to the electorate in Moscow; February 22 – the American charge d’Affaires in the Soviet Union G. Kennan’s “long telegram”; March 5 – W. Churchill’s speech in Fulton (the USA); September 27 – the Soviet Ambassador in the United States N. Novikov’s “long telegram”. But there was an earlier event, so called “Gouzenko affair”, which is almost unknown for the Ukrainian historiography. On September 5, 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk of the Soviet embassy to Canada, defected to the Canadian side with more than a hundred secret documents that proved the USSR’s espionage activities in the countries of North America. Information about the network of Soviet agents caused a real panic in the West and was perceived as a real start of the Cold War. In the article, there is made an attempt to review the main events related to the Gouzenko affair and to identify the dominant interpretations of this case in contemporary historical writings. One can find different interpretations of the reasons and the consequences of Gouzenko’s defection which dramatically affected the history of the world. One of the main vivid results was an anti-communist hysteria in the West which was caused by the investigation that Canadian, American and British public officials and eminent scientists were recruited by the Soviet Union as agents for the atomic espionage. For Canada, the Gouzenko affair had an unprecedented affect because on the one hand it led to the closer relations with the United States in the sphere of security and defense, and on the other hand Canada was involved into the international scandal and used this case as a moment to start more activities on the international arena. It has been also found that the Canadian and American studies about Gouzenko affair are focused on the fact that the Allies on the anti-Hitler coalition need to take a fresh look at security and further cooperation with the USSR, while the overwhelming majority of Russian publications is focused on the very fact of betrayal of Igor Gouzenko.
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Gilli, Andrea, and Mauro Gilli. "Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage." International Security 43, no. 3 (February 2019): 141–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00337.
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Can countries easily imitate the United States' advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that rising states benefit from the “advantage of backwardness.” That is, by free riding on the research and technology of the most advanced countries, less developed states can allegedly close the military-technological gap with their rivals relatively easily and quickly. More recent works maintain that globalization, the emergence of dual-use components, and advances in communications have facilitated this process. This literature is built on shaky theoretical foundations, however, and its claims lack empirical support. In particular, it largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution: the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. This increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder—so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. An examination of the British-German naval rivalry (1890–1915) and China's efforts to imitate U.S. stealth fighters supports these findings.
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Leaf, Jeffrey. "Bug Off." Mechanical Engineering 125, no. 10 (October 1, 2003): 56–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/1.2003-oct-4.
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This article focuses on innovations done by engineers for spying. If there has been espionage, engineers have been a part of it. In World War II, infiltrators and downed pilots had to be able to find their way behind enemy lines. Compasses were hidden in cufflinks, pencil clips, and buttons. Maps were printed on rice paper so they wouldn't rustle when opened. British pilots wore special flying boots with cutaway tops that, when removed, left normal-looking shoes. Bugging is another method of the spy. The purpose of a bug is to detect sound vibrations in air or in other materials, such as wood, plaster, or metal. A good bug must reject unwanted noise, be easily concealed, and be energy efficient. The United States had an entire listening kit in the 1950s and 1960s with an assortment of accessories like a tie clip and wristwatch microphones.
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Ehrenman, Gayle. "Not a Drop to Drink." Mechanical Engineering 125, no. 09 (September 1, 2003): 46–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/1.2003-sep-1.
Full textAbstract:
This article focuses on innovations done by engineers for spying. If there has been espionage, engineers have been a part of it. In World War II, infiltrators and downed pilots had to be able to find their way behind enemy lines. Compasses were hidden in cufflinks, pencil clips, and buttons. Maps were printed on rice paper so they wouldn't rustle when opened. British pilots wore special flying boots with cutaway tops that, when removed, left normal-looking shoes. Bugging is another method of the spy. The purpose of a bug is to detect sound vibrations in air or in other materials, such as wood, plaster, or metal. A good bug must reject unwanted noise, be easily concealed, and be energy efficient. The United States had an entire listening kit in the 1950s and 1960s with an assortment of accessories like a tie clip and wristwatch microphones.
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Chen, Ping-Hsun. "Trade Secret Protection of Genetically Engineered Rice Through the Economic Espionage Act: A Lesson from United States v. Weiqiang Zhang." Biotechnology Law Report 37, no. 4 (August 2018): 205–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/blr.2018.29075.sz.
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Manchester, Margaret Murányi. "The Corporate Dimension of the Cold War in Hungary: ITT and the Vogeler/Sanders Case Reconsidered." Journal of Cold War Studies 23, no. 2 (2021): 41–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00983.
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Abstract In 1949, two executives at the Hungarian subsidiary of the U.S. conglomerate International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT), Robert Vogeler of the United States and Edgar Sanders of Great Britain, along with five Hungarian nationals, were arrested, tortured, given peremptory trials, and imprisoned for espionage and economic sabotage. This article reexamines the case in light of the diplomatic efforts to secure their release. The case needs to be understood in the context of U.S. intelligence agencies’ policies during the early Cold War. Numerous organizations that were not necessarily well coordinated embarked on intelligence-gathering and a variety of covert operations, some of which were undertaken with the cooperation of multinational corporations such as ITT. Vogeler and Sanders were indeed guilty of many of the charges leveled against them, and their ordeal was significant because it revealed the ineffectiveness of Cold War policies to influence behavior behind the Iron Curtain during the Stalin era.
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Khoday, Amar. "Seen in Its True Light: Desertion as a Pure Political Crime." Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees 30, no. 2 (November 19, 2014): 93–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.39614.
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Individuals from democratic states who flee state prosecution and seek refugee status in Canada face significant challenges in obtaining asylum. There is a strong presumption that the legal system of their country of nationality will provide adequate procedural safeguards. This presumption extends to US military deserters who refused to serve in Iraq. The consequence is that numerous claimants have been denied over the past decade.
This article contends that where the feared prosecution relates to a political crime, there should not be a presumption of state protection. Furthermore, the article posits and discusses why desertion should constitute a pure political crime much like treason, sedition, or espionage. Lastly, the article argues, pursuant to United Nations policies, that such deserters should be able to obtain refugee status only where their desertion constitutes a refusal to be associated with military actions that are internationally condemned as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct.
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Rosenfeldt, Niels Erik, and Julie Birkedal Riisbro. "En spionsag i 1930rnes København." Fund og Forskning i Det Kongelige Biblioteks Samlinger 55 (March 3, 2016): 317. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/fof.v55i0.118919.
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Niels Erik Rosenfeldt & Julie Birkedal Riisbro: Espionage in Copenhagen in the 1930s
Based on comprehensive source material from Denmark, Germany and the UK in particular, this article sheds new light on a major spy case which was disclosed in 1935 in Copenhagen. The police got on the track of the case in mid-February of that year, when one of the ringleaders, the American communist George Mink, assaulted a young Danish woman in his flat at Elbagade 14 on Amager, where the spies had one of their main bases. In the weeks that followed, a number of foreigners and Danes suspected of involvement in communist espionage on Danish soil but largely directed at Nazi Germany were arrested. Most of them though were released a few months later. However, in July 1935, George Mink and his closest accomplice, the Soviet military intelligence service’s ‘illegal resident’ in Copenhagen, Aleksandr Ulanovskij, otherwise known as Nicholas Sherman, were sentenced by the High Court to a prison term of 18 months, first and foremost for espionage conducted on behalf of a foreign power. The article starts with a brief description of the various and not always fully reliable versions of the story which have previously been in circulation, and then presents the picture that now begins to emerge of what initially happened that February. To further clarify the spy affair, the backgrounds of the principal characters are described. This raises the question: How much was really known at the time? In other words: What became public knowledge based on the more or less rumour-like information which made it into the newspaper columns? And how much concrete information did the Danish authorities manage to gather back then about the identities and activities of the agents? The following sections take stock of how much we know today about the breadth and fields of contact of the espionage affair. They look, among other things, at the connections to Soviet espionage in Finland, France, the UK and the United States. However, on the basis of a previously unused source, special attention is given to the contacts with and the reaction in the key country Germany. Finally, it is pointed out how the Danish police – without knowing whom they had got hold of – in fact detained three leading representatives of the Soviet military intelligence service in addition to the convicted persons. All three, whom the police only knew by their cover names, had been or were still ‘illegal residents’ in Germany. The police action therefore caused considerable consternation in Moscow, and the matter was quickly brought to Stalin’s attention. Shortly afterwards, the head of the Soviet military intelligence service, Jan Berzin, was dismissed from his post as a direct result of the affair in Denmark. All this only became known more than half a century later, but serves to underline the international scope of the Copenhagen spy affair.
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Khalid, Dr Mohammed. "Emerging Challenges to India’s National Security: a Domestic Dimension." Scholars Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences 9, no. 11 (November 18, 2021): 600–603. http://dx.doi.org/10.36347/sjahss.2021.v09i11.006.
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National security is the primary objective of the state to survive and grow. It can be achieved through the use of economic power, diplomacy, military power projection and political power. The concern for national security is post-World War-II phenomena developed mostly in the United States, initially focusing on military might, and later including other non-military dimensions. In order to ensure national security, a state needs to possess economic, energy, and environmental security etc. Most important challenges which a nation may face include, political instability, threats to territorial integrity, economic weakness, ecological imbalance, socio-cultural disunity etc. Main internal challenges to national security also come from violent groups active within the country; organized crime, drug paddling, extortions, underworld mafias’ etc. These challenges are met through the use of diplomacy to isolate threats; marshal economic power to facilitate or compel cooperation; maintain effective armed forces, implement civil defense and emergency preparedness measures; use intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and espionage, and to protect classified information; strengthen cybersecurity; and use counterintelligence services. India faces many domestic challenges to its national security such as rising intolerance between the casts and religious communities, dwindling economic development, right and left-wing militancy, rising scarcity of water resources, increasing unemployment, drug and narcotic smuggling, corruption, riots between religious communities etc. India’s poor education and health sectors can pose grave threat to its national security. Other emerging threats include the cyber-crimes such as hacking and online attacks, financial fraud, data theft, espionage etc. This paper focuses on the new emerging domestic challenges to national security and their possible remedy.
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Bernstein, Seth. "Burying the Alliance: Interment, Repatriation and the Politics of the Sacred in Occupied Germany." Journal of Contemporary History 52, no. 3 (July 27, 2016): 710–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009416644665.
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In 1945 Europe was a vast graveyard. The diaspora of the dead was perhaps most prominent in Germany, where the dead of the four occupying forces were spread across the country. As the allies worked through the postwar settlement with Germany, they considered another pressing question: How to treat the dead? The case of occupied Germany highlights different approaches to commemoration. Soviet officials commemorated the war dead as symbols of the collective sacrifice of the USSR in Eastern Europe, while the western allies desired to identify and rebury fallen soldiers to meet the expectations of their domestic audiences. Despite these differences, the politics of the sacred surrounding the dead necessitated that the allies engage one another. As the occupation regimes of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America embarked on their mission to retrieve their dead from the Soviet zone, USSR officials reacted with skepticism and hostility. But rather than rejecting what they viewed as attempts at espionage, Soviet officers traded the western dead for their own sacred mission – the chance to return living Soviet repatriates from the western zones of occupation. Even as animosity grew in the emerging Cold War, occupation officials made uneasy compromises across the iron curtain.
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Kim, Ga-Bin, and Hyun-Goo Kang. "Studying Trends in Domestic and International News Reports on Industrial Espionage through Big Data Analysis: Focusing on Comparison with the United States." Korean Journal of Industry Security 14 (January 2, 2024): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.33388/kais.2024.14.s.001.
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CASIS. "Canadian Supercomputer Threat Assessment and Potential Responses." Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 2, no. 1 (May 17, 2019): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.21810/jicw.v2i1.955.
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Four key events are addressed in this briefing note. Key event one is the announcement in April and May of 2017 with the launch of two supercomputers in Canada (Graham at University of Waterloo; Cedar at Simon Fraser University) and a third (Niagara at The University of Toronto) using Compute Canada’s Resources Allocation (Compute Canada, 2018a). Key event two is the announcement that Huawei Canada is building Graham’s operating system (Feldman, 2017). Key event three entails CSIS being warned by the US Senators (Rep. Sen Marco Rubio and Dem. Sen Mark Warner) about the possibility of China and Russia spying on Canada. Key event four, the United States has reportedly banned sales of Huawei products on US military bases (Bronskill, 2018; Collins, 2018).
This briefing note is particularly relevant as Compute Canada is now preparing for 2019 resource allocation; there may be a raised/elevated security risk of economic espionage intellectual property theft and abusing education access privileges which need to be considered (SFU Innovates Staff, 2018).
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Ефремов, Андрей, and Andrey Efremov. "THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE USA LEGISLATION ON THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001." Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law 3, no. 3 (July 10, 2017): 86–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/article_593fc343c391e2.71878517.
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The article is devoted to development of the USA legislation on the fight against terrorism. The author considered the objectives and tasks of the state in a particular historical period; analyzed the laws passed by the USA Congress aimed at combating home and international terrorism; identifies the main directions of the state policy of the USA in the field of counter-terrorism. The article covers the events after 11 September 2001 to the present. The author gives a brief overview of the events of 11 September 2001, discusses the Patriot Act and other laws, aimed at combating terrorism. The Patriot Act allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation to intercept telephone, verbally and electronic communications relating to terrorism, computer and mail fraud; introduces special measures to combat money-laundering; expands immigration rules, in particular, mandatory requirement of detention of persons suspected of terrorism appeared; reveals the procedure of multilateral cooperation to combat terrorism, strengthening measures to investigate terrorist crimes; established rewards for information on terrorism; introduces the procedure of identification of DNA of persons charged for committing terrorist crimes or any violent crime; introduced the concept of domestic terrorism and Federal crimes of terrorism, the prohibition on harboring terrorists and material support; there is a new crime — terrorist and other acts of violence against public transportation systems. The law abolished for the statute of limitations for crimes of terrorist orientation. In 2002 5 laws wer adopted: “Homeland Security Act of 2002”, “Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002”, “Aviation and Transportation Security Act“, “Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002”, “Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002”. The Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act was adopted in 2006. This law restricted the financial assistance to the Palestinian national authority; Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2012 included the Haqqani Network in the list of international terrorist organizations; the political act of refusal of admission to the United States representative to the United Nations, because he was accused of the occupation of the espionage or terrorist activities against the United States and poses a threat to the national security interests of the United States.