Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Unione economica e monetaria'

2007/2008
La trattazione prende le mosse, nel cap. 1, da un inquadramento generale delle relazioni economiche e finanziarie a livello globale. Viene delineato anzitutto il quadro storico di riferimento, con particolare attenzione al periodo seguente al secondo conflitto mondiale e ai decenni successivi. Tali cenni storici sono utili alla ricostruzione del sistema così come esso si presenta oggi, con riferimento tanto al settore economico inteso in senso lato, quanto in particolare al mondo delle relazioni in campo monetario. Al §§ 1.5 si presenta il sistema complessivo delle norme giuridiche che nell’ordinamento internazionale sovrintendono a questo particolare tipo di relazioni: il diritto internazionale dell’economia e, come settore specifico di questo, il diritto internazionale monetario. Si procede ad enuclearne le specificità – in particolare rispetto al complessivo corpus del diritto internazionale – con riguardo al problema delle erosioni alla sovranità subite dagli Stati in queste materie, alla vigenza anche in questo settore del principio dell’eguaglianza sovrana degli Stati (messa in discussione da un parte della dottrina), alla funzione di accertamento del diritto e della risoluzione delle controversie. Viene posto anche il problema della vigenza di alcune particolari norme consuetudinarie in questa materia, concernenti soprattutto i doveri di collaborazione degli Stati. Viene quindi enucleato il concetto di sovranità monetaria e le eventuali limitazioni cui questa è sottoposta. Infine si prendono in considerazione le pratiche di currency board e currency substitution, fornendone una valutazione dal punto di vista del diritto internazionale monetario e si definiscono i concetti di area monetaria, sistema monetario e gli altri messi a punto dalla dottrina per classificare i diversi gradi di integrazione monetaria realizzabili tra Paesi. Al § 1.6 viene presentato il concetto di Ordine economico internazionale e viene ricordato il tentativo di instaurazione di un Nuovo Ordine Economico Internazionale (NOEI). Infine si presentano le ultime evoluzioni dei caratteri del governo dell’economia internazionale, il quale, anche a detta di diverse voci dottrinali, può essere meglio qualificato come governance. L’esposizione di cui al cap. 1 è utile poiché l’Unione europea (UE) – sulla cui azione è concentrata l’attenzione in questo studio – si pone come attore delle relazioni economiche e monetarie globali e si ritrova ad agire nell’ambiente che si è presentato, restando quindi sottoposta alle norme che lo reggono. Nel cap. 2 si analizza il versante interno del governo dell’economia, cioè l’apparato normativo e istituzionale che l’Unione si è data per l’esercizio delle competenze acquisite in materia economica e monetaria. Dopo aver ripercorso le principali tappe storiche che hanno segnato il conferimento da parte degli Stati membri di competenze alla Comunità prima e all’Unione poi in materia – con riferimenti alla situazione più generale, così come presentata nel cap. 1 – vengono presentati gli obiettivi, previsti in particolare dal Trattato istitutivo della Comunità Europea (TCE), per la Politica economica e la Politica monetaria (§ 2.2); si rileva già in prima battuta come non sia possibile ridurle facilmente ad unità dal punto di vista del livello di integrazione accettato dagli Stati e degli strumenti messi a disposizione delle Istituzioni comunitarie. I termini monetario, e soprattutto economico, si intendono in tutto il lavoro come riferiti a quelle due Politiche, e ai limiti di oggetto e di strumenti da cui esse sono caratterizzate nel sistema del TCE. Si fa riferimento alla possibilità di paralare di una Costituzione economica dell’Unione europea (§ 2.2.1) e si procede quindi a presentare più analiticamente l’apparato di norme poste dal TCE per le due citate Politiche, segnatamente nel suo Titolo VII (§§ da 2.3 a 2.4.2). Si delinea il profilo degli organi specialmente preposti al perseguimento di quelle politiche, con particolare attenzione all’assetto del Sistema Europeo di Banche centrali (SEBC) e allo status della Banca Centrale europea (BCE), così come essi sono delineati dal TCE e come è stato possibile meglio inquadrare grazie ai contributi della dottrina e della giurisprudenza (§§ da 2.5 a 2.5.3). Al § 2.5 si presentano le novità che si avranno qualora dovesse entrare in vigore il Trattato di Lisbona, la maggiore delle quali è l’attribuzione dello status di Istituzione dell’Unione alla BCE. Nel cap. 3 iniziano ad affrontarsi gli aspetti generali dell’azione esterna dell’UE in campo economico e monetario. Essa si pone come uno degli attori di quelle relazioni, così come presentate al cap. 1, di cui sono ordinariamente protagonisti gli Stati, altre Organizzazioni internazionali, nonché altri soggetti anche non dotati di soggettività propria nell’ambito dell’ordinamento internazionale (come le banche centrali nazionali, che quindi agiscono ordinariamente come organi degli Stati). Al § 3.1 viene presentato il problema generale della soggettività nel diritto internazionale di enti diversi dagli Stati sovrani. Al § 3.1.1 si procede ad analizzare la situazione dell’Unione europea, giungendo alla conclusione che essa è ormai da considerarsi un soggetto autonomo di diritto internazionale, ricomprendente anche le sue articolazioni interne, come la stessa Comunità europea. Lo stesso è da dirsi per la BCE, alla quale non va quindi riconosciuta soggettività autonoma, come pure vorrebbe una parte della dottrina (§ 3.1.2). Nei §§ successivi si affrontano i problemi riguardanti il sistema che l’UE si è data per la gestione delle sue relazioni esterne in generale. In esso infatti rientra anche l’intrattenimento di rapporti in materia economica e monetaria, il quale è quindi sottoposto – in linea generale – ai medesimi principi generali. In particolare, si ha attenzione alle regole stabilite in questo campo con riguardo alla CE; infatti, pur essendo l’UE nel suo complesso il soggetto in capo al quale va riconosciuta la titolarità dei rapporti e delle conseguenti situazioni soggettive, va tenuto presente che essa la suo interno prevede regole diverse per la gestione delle relazioni esterne. Si prendono in considerazione in particolare tre profili: l’esistenza di competenze esterne, oggetto di una risalente ed elaborata giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee (§§ da 3.2.1 a 3.3.1; al § 3.3.2 si analizzano anche le novità in argomento presenti nel Trattato di Lisbona), il procedimento previsto – in generale – per la negoziazione e la conclusione di accordi con Stati terzi o altre Organizzazioni internazionali (§ 3.4) e la prassi di rapporti con altre Organizzazioni internazionali (§ 3.5). Nei cap. 4 e 5 si affronta lo studio delle relazioni esterne in materia economica e monetaria, utilizzando le conclusioni cui si è giunti nei cap. precedenti. Innanzitutto si affronta il problema – che in prima approssimazione si presenta di più semplice soluzione – della competenza esterna in campo economico (§ 4.1.1). Riguardo ad essa il principio del parallelismo delle competenze esterne con quelle interne e gli altri messi a punto dalla giurisprudenza portano a possibilità di azione esterna dell’Unione piuttosto limitate. E’ da ritenersi che alcune possibilità di azione anche in campo economico, possano essere attratte nella sfera dell’UE nell’ambito dei rapporti con altre Organizzazioni internazionali (e il riscontro di questa possibilità viene cercato nel cap. 5, dedicato alla materia – v. infra). Si analizza quindi l’art. 111, disposizione speciale dettata dal TCE per ciò che riguarda la materia monetaria (§§ da 4.2 a 4.2.8). In un’ampia analisi vengono affrontati tutti i nodi problematici che caratterizzano la disposizione, in particolare quei par. di essa che disciplinano la politica di cambio e la conclusione di accordi in materia monetaria (a loro volta rientranti tra gli strumenti di politica di cambio, o anche di diverso tipo); vengono inoltre affrontate le questioni relative alla competenza (e alle eventuali residue competenze statali), agli effetti degli accordi e alle possibilità di controllo giurisdizionale e, infine ai rapporti con alcune disposizioni dello Statuto del SEBC, contenute in un Protocollo allegato al TCE (e condividenti con questo il medesimo rango). Nel § 4.3 viene presentato il nuovo testo che disciplinerà queste materie nel Trattato di Lisbona, rilevandone la scarsa portata innovativa rispetto all’attuale. Più articolata sarebbe invece nel nuovo Trattato l’individuazione degli obiettivi e dei principi ispiratori della complessiva azione esterna dell’UE, con riferimenti più chiari di cui si gioverebbe anche la gestione dei rapporti in campo economico e monetario. In conclusione del cap. 4, vengono passate in rassegna le prime applicazioni pratiche delle disposizioni dell’art. 111 TCE che sono state analizzate (§§ da 4.4 a 4.4.6). Infine, nel cap. 5 sono oggetto di studio le relazioni dell’UE con altre Organizzazioni internazionali, nonché consessi informali (come ad es. il G-7/8). Disposizione di riferimento è il par. 4 dell’art. 111 TCE; alla sua analisi testuale e allo studio delle implicazioni di carattere sistematico legate all’opzione tra le diverse possibilità interpretative si dedica ampio spazio (§§ da 5.1 a 5.2.1). Esso disciplina la procedura per l’adozione di posizioni della Comunità (dell’UE) su questioni “di particolare importanza per l’unione economica e monetaria” e per la decisione dei modi in cui essa debba essere rappresentata nei fori internazionali rilevanti nel settore; la formulazione ha fatto supporre a più di un autore la possibilità di estendere l’operatività della disposizione anche a questioni non esclusivamente monetarie (benché l’art. 111 sia inserito nel capo 2, relativo alla sola politica monetaria). Ma è stato il Consiglio europeo nel 1997, al di fuori della procedura prevista dall’art. 111 TCE, a dare le prime soluzioni “pragmatiche” (secondo un’espressione utilizzata in dottrina) per la rappresentanza dell’UE nei più importanti di questi fori; tali soluzioni erano esplicitamente tese a provocare cambiamenti il meno profondi possibili nei modi di rappresentanza e quindi negli assetti dei fori internazionali coinvolti. Vengono quindi passati in rassegna i rapporti dell’UE con le principali Organizzazioni internazionali e i consessi informali operanti nel settore. Particolare importanza rivestono le relazioni col Fondo monetario internazionale (FMI), cui è dedicato ampio spazio (§ 5.3.1). Di esso possono far parte solo “Stati”, ma gran parte dei suoi ambiti di attività rientrano ormai nella sfera delle competenze dell’Unione. All’interno di essa tuttavia, vi sono – come visto nel cap. 2 – diverse Istituzioni e organi con compiti e prerogative proprie che operano nell’ambito delle Politiche economica e monetaria. Di qui la necessità di dar vita ad un complicato intreccio di sedi e metodi di coordinamento per esprimere la posizione dell’UE. Ciò è reso ancora più difficile dal modo in cui è organizzato il processo decisionale nel FMI e dai criteri di voto utilizzati. Vengono quindi presentati i rapporti dell’UE con la Banca Mondiale (§ 5.3.2), con la Banca dei Regolamenti internazionali (in cui è in effetti presente la BCE, § 5.3.3), con l’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo Economico (§ 5.3.4), nonché col G-7/8 (§ 5.3.5) e con altri consessi informali (§ 5.3.6). Infine, al § 5.4 viene analizzato il nuovo testo che disciplinerà l’assunzione di decisioni sulla rappresentanza e l’assunzione di posizioni nel Trattato di Lisbona. Tale nuova disposizione offre alcuni spunti innovativi, che potrebbero prestarsi a diverse letture; la prassi mostrerà quale verrà privilegiata dalle Istituzioni.
XXI Ciclo
1976

Lo scopo della ricerca è l'analisi comparativa delle politiche monetarie di Giappone e Unione Europea a partire dal 2013, ovvero rispettivamente dall'insediamento del governo Abe e di Mario Draghi come governatore della Banca Centrale Europea. L'analisi è finalizzata alla ricerca di somiglianze e differenze nell'implementazione della politica monetaria tra due sistemi economici diversi per struttura, ma simili per quanto riguarda i sintomi di malessere economico. La ricerca tenterà appunto di comprendere se e fino a che punto la politica monetaria possa risolvere i problemi dei due sistemi economici. Il lavoro è diviso in tre parti. Nella prima parte, puramente teorica, si farà una panoramica delle scuole di pensiero economico che hanno esercitato un'influenza sulla conduzione della politica monetaria in generale. Si analizzeranno poi il ruolo della Banca Centrale e i meccanismi di trasmissione della politica monetaria. La seconda parte invece è puramente empirica e consiste nell'elaborazione e analisi delle politiche monetarie dei due paesi anno per anno a partire dal 2013. La terza parte funge da conclusione: si opererà un confronto tra i due sistemi e tra i risultati ottenuti nella seconda parte e il quadro teorico di riferimento analizzato nella prima.Fatto ciò si risponderà alla domanda posta all'inizio dell'elaborato: può, e se sì fino a che punto, la politica monetaria risolvere i problemi di Giappone ed Unione Europea?

La tesi intende fornire un’analisi critica dello sviluppo dell’Unione Economica e Monetaria (UEM) alla luce della crisi del debito sovrano. A partire dal 2009 sono state progressivamente attuate diverse riforme che hanno limitato l’autonomia degli Stati Membri nell’esercizio delle loro prerogative sovrane ed hanno fornito alle istituzione europee nuovi poteri nell’ambito di diverse politiche. La ricerca investiga i trasferimenti di sovranità in corso dal livello nazionale a quello europeo focalizzandosi sulle trasformazioni sia dell’Unione Economica che di quella Monetaria. Nel primo capitolo la tesi analizza i carattere originali dell’UEM dalla sua creazione fino alla ratifica del trattato di Lisbona. Il secondo capitolo considera la creazione dei meccanismi di stabilizzazione introdotti per salvare i paesi a rischio default e garantire la stabilità finanziaria della zona euro nel suo complesso. Il terzo capitolo studia gli interventi della Banca Centrale Europea durante la crisi, analizzando in che modo la necessità di proteggere la moneta unica abbia sviluppato il ruolo della BCE ed esteso il suo mandato. Il quarto capitolo studia la riforma della governance economica tramite il rafforzamento della disciplina fiscale degli Stati Membri. Il quinto capitolo analizza la riforma della governance bancaria e la creazione dell’Unione Bancaria, che è stata finalmente introdotta per interrompere il circolo vizioso tra crisi del debito e crisi bancaria. Nello sviluppo della tesi le diverse riforme verranno analizzate dal punto di visto della loro legalità, efficacia e legittimità democratica.
The thesis aims to provide a critical analysis of the development of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the light of the sovereign debt crisis. Since 2009 a number of measures have been progressively implemented, which have limited the autonomy of Member States in exercising their sovereign prerogatives and have granted EU institutions new powers in key policy areas. The research will investigate the ongoing transfers of sovereignty from national to European level focusing on the transformation of both the Economic and the Monetary Union. In the first chapter, it will consider the original features of the EMU, from its introduction at the intergovernmental conference of Maastricht until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The second chapter will focus on the creation of rescue and stabilization mechanisms put in place to save Member States from imminent default and to ensure the financial stability of the Eurozone as a whole. The third chapter will study the interventions of the European Central Bank during the crisis considering how the necessity to protect the single currency has developed its role and extended its mandate. The fourth chapter will focus on the reform of the economic governance through the fiscal discipline of Member States. The fifth chapter will take into consideration the reform of the banking governance and the establishment of the European Banking Union, which was finally introduced to stop the vicious cycle between the debt and banking crisis. By developing the thesis, the analysis will consider each reform from the point of view of its legality, effectiveness and democratic legitimacy.

La tesi intende fornire un’analisi critica dello sviluppo dell’Unione Economica e Monetaria (UEM) alla luce della crisi del debito sovrano. A partire dal 2009 sono state progressivamente attuate diverse riforme che hanno limitato l’autonomia degli Stati Membri nell’esercizio delle loro prerogative sovrane ed hanno fornito alle istituzione europee nuovi poteri nell’ambito di diverse politiche. La ricerca investiga i trasferimenti di sovranità in corso dal livello nazionale a quello europeo focalizzandosi sulle trasformazioni sia dell’Unione Economica che di quella Monetaria. Nel primo capitolo la tesi analizza i carattere originali dell’UEM dalla sua creazione fino alla ratifica del trattato di Lisbona. Il secondo capitolo considera la creazione dei meccanismi di stabilizzazione introdotti per salvare i paesi a rischio default e garantire la stabilità finanziaria della zona euro nel suo complesso. Il terzo capitolo studia gli interventi della Banca Centrale Europea durante la crisi, analizzando in che modo la necessità di proteggere la moneta unica abbia sviluppato il ruolo della BCE ed esteso il suo mandato. Il quarto capitolo studia la riforma della governance economica tramite il rafforzamento della disciplina fiscale degli Stati Membri. Il quinto capitolo analizza la riforma della governance bancaria e la creazione dell’Unione Bancaria, che è stata finalmente introdotta per interrompere il circolo vizioso tra crisi del debito e crisi bancaria. Nello sviluppo della tesi le diverse riforme verranno analizzate dal punto di visto della loro legalità, efficacia e legittimità democratica.
The thesis aims to provide a critical analysis of the development of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the light of the sovereign debt crisis. Since 2009 a number of measures have been progressively implemented, which have limited the autonomy of Member States in exercising their sovereign prerogatives and have granted EU institutions new powers in key policy areas. The research will investigate the ongoing transfers of sovereignty from national to European level focusing on the transformation of both the Economic and the Monetary Union. In the first chapter, it will consider the original features of the EMU, from its introduction at the intergovernmental conference of Maastricht until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The second chapter will focus on the creation of rescue and stabilization mechanisms put in place to save Member States from imminent default and to ensure the financial stability of the Eurozone as a whole. The third chapter will study the interventions of the European Central Bank during the crisis considering how the necessity to protect the single currency has developed its role and extended its mandate. The fourth chapter will focus on the reform of the economic governance through the fiscal discipline of Member States. The fifth chapter will take into consideration the reform of the banking governance and the establishment of the European Banking Union, which was finally introduced to stop the vicious cycle between the debt and banking crisis. By developing the thesis, the analysis will consider each reform from the point of view of its legality, effectiveness and democratic legitimacy.

La seguente tesi e’ costituita da tre diversi elaborati, il primo e’ l’estensione di un modello di equilibrio generale a due regioni (Benigno JIE 2004) con l’intento di calcolare i pesi ottimali per l’inflazione dell’area euro utilizzando micro dati sull’eterogeneità delle rigidità dei prezzi in Europa. Il secondo e il terzo elaborato si focalizzano invece sulle crisi d’insolvenza con l’obiettivo di selezionare le variabili che forniscono maggiori informazioni per la previsione della crisi. La metodologia utilizzata e’ l’analisi della transvariazione. Mentre il secondo ‘essay’ si concentra sulla versione univariata, il terzo estende la metodologia al caso multivariato. Il primo analizza le crisi d’insolvenza più severe degli anni ’90, la seconda utilizza invece gli episodi di crisi analizzati da Frankel e Rose (1996).
The present work is made of three different essays, the first is an extension of a two region general equilibrium model (Benigno JIE 2004), with the intent of calculating optimal weights for EU inflation using micro data on the level of price rigidities, the second and the third have as main focus financial and currency country crises, with the task of selecting the most important variables in terms of crisis prediction by means of a descriptive statistics methodology called transvariation analysis. While the second essay focuses on univariate transvariation, the third extends the methodology to a multivariate framework. The last two essays are based on two different datasets. The first studies the most recent deep financial crises of the 1990s and the source is IMF, International Financial Statistics, the second uses a vast sample of currency crisis episodes taken from Frankel and Rose (1996) dataset made of annual data on more than one hundred developed countries from 1971 through 1992 and defining currency crash as a large change of nominal exchange rate that is also a substantial increase in the rate of change of nominal depreciation. The source in this case is World Bank, World Development Indicators.

La seguente tesi e’ costituita da tre diversi elaborati, il primo e’ l’estensione di un modello di equilibrio generale a due regioni (Benigno JIE 2004) con l’intento di calcolare i pesi ottimali per l’inflazione dell’area euro utilizzando micro dati sull’eterogeneità delle rigidità dei prezzi in Europa. Il secondo e il terzo elaborato si focalizzano invece sulle crisi d’insolvenza con l’obiettivo di selezionare le variabili che forniscono maggiori informazioni per la previsione della crisi. La metodologia utilizzata e’ l’analisi della transvariazione. Mentre il secondo ‘essay’ si concentra sulla versione univariata, il terzo estende la metodologia al caso multivariato. Il primo analizza le crisi d’insolvenza più severe degli anni ’90, la seconda utilizza invece gli episodi di crisi analizzati da Frankel e Rose (1996).
The present work is made of three different essays, the first is an extension of a two region general equilibrium model (Benigno JIE 2004), with the intent of calculating optimal weights for EU inflation using micro data on the level of price rigidities, the second and the third have as main focus financial and currency country crises, with the task of selecting the most important variables in terms of crisis prediction by means of a descriptive statistics methodology called transvariation analysis. While the second essay focuses on univariate transvariation, the third extends the methodology to a multivariate framework. The last two essays are based on two different datasets. The first studies the most recent deep financial crises of the 1990s and the source is IMF, International Financial Statistics, the second uses a vast sample of currency crisis episodes taken from Frankel and Rose (1996) dataset made of annual data on more than one hundred developed countries from 1971 through 1992 and defining currency crash as a large change of nominal exchange rate that is also a substantial increase in the rate of change of nominal depreciation. The source in this case is World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Economia
Doctoral Programme in Economics
As interacções entre as políticas monetária e orçamental numa união monetária podem ser condicionadas, de forma crucial, pela existência de países com diferentes dimensões. Pequenos E grandes países geram desiguais externalidades e podem possuir distintos poderes de negociação no jogo político da estabilização macroeconómica. As interacções estratégicas resultantes de diferentes objectivos de política e de comportamentos não cooperativos podem desempenhar um papel fundamental na política económica levada a cabo numa união monetária com países de dimensão assimétrica. Neste contexto, analisamos as políticas de estabilização óptimas, cooperativas e não cooperativas, através de um modelo Novo-Keynesiano com fundamentos microeconómicos e que modeliza uma união monetária constituída por dois países, sob dois cenários de política diferentes. Um cenário em que os instrumentos de política orçamental e monetária exercem ambos o seu papel de estabilização exclusivamente através do lado da procura, sem qualquer consequência na acumulação de dívida pública; e um outro cenário onde a política orçamental afecta a procura e a oferta mas em que os impostos lump sum são insuficientes para assegurar o equilíbrio orçamental. Em cada um dos cenários, deriva-se a combinação óptima de políticas estratégicas avaliando, igualmente, os efeitos de alguns arranjos institucionais (cooperação, regras orçamentais e a opção por um banco central conservador) e do nível de endividamento público sobre a eficácia das políticas de estabilização. Constata-se que a dimensão assimétrica dos países qualifica significativamente as interacções estratégicas da política orçamental e monetária. Um pequeno país, suportando maiores externalidades e beneficiando menos da estabilização promovida pela política monetária comum, terá de realizar uma política orçamental mais activa e, como seria de esperar, enfrenta maiores custos de estabilização do que um grande país. Além do mais, a avaliação do bem-estar social obtido sob jogos de política alternativos releva que um país grande obtém uma melhor estabilização quando a política orçamental lidera e que, portanto, pode oferecer resistência à cooperação. Também se verifica que grandes e pequenos níveis de endividamento público determinam especializações diferentes dos instrumentos de política na realização da estabilização económica. Tendo em conta apenas os custos de estabilização macroeconómica, observa-se que, numa união monetária com elevado nível de dívida pública, o país grande tem incentivos a aumentar o seu endividamento enquanto o pequeno pode desejar ser mais disciplinado. Numa união monetária em que o nível médio de dívida pública é pequeno, podem ocorrer incentivos contrários: o pequeno país pode sentir-se estimulado a aumentar a dívida pública permanentemente.
Country-size asymmetry may crucially shape the monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. Small and large countries cause different cross-border effects and may have different bargaining power in a stabilization policy game. Strategic interactions arising from different policy objectives and non-cooperative policies might play a significant role in the actual policymaking of a country-size asymmetric monetary union. We analyze cooperative and non cooperative optimizing stabilization policies in a micro-founded New-Keynesian two-country monetary union model, under two policy scenarios. One, where monetary and fiscal policy instruments exert their stabilization roles exclusively through the demand channel without any consequence on debt sustainability; other, where fiscal policy has both demand and supply-side effects but where lump-sum taxes are not enough to ensure fiscal policy solvency. We derive optimal strategic policy mix within an asymmetric country-size monetary union, and assess the effects of some institutional arrangements (cooperation, fiscal constraints, weight-conservative central bank) and of public debt on the effectiveness of policy stabilization. We found that country-size asymmetry within a monetary union qualifies meaningfully monetary and fiscal policy strategic interactions. A small country, suffering larger externality effects and benefiting less from a common monetary policy for stabilization purposes, has to optimally rely on a more active fiscal policy and, as expected, it experiences more welfare costs than a larger country. Furthermore, welfare evaluation of the alternative policy games shows that a large country achieves a better stabilization performance under fiscal leadership and that it may resist to a policy cooperation arrangement. We also found out that large and small debt levels condition the stabilization assignments of the different policy instruments. Moreover, in a large-debt monetary union, and focusing exclusively on stabilization costs, the large country may face incentives to raise public debt while the small country may prefer to be more disciplined. In a small-debt monetary union, reverse incentives can occur: a small country may face incentives to raise debt permanently.

Economia
Doctoral Programme in Economics
As interacções entre as políticas monetária e orçamental numa união monetária podem ser condicionadas, de forma crucial, pela existência de países com diferentes dimensões. Pequenos E grandes países geram desiguais externalidades e podem possuir distintos poderes de negociação no jogo político da estabilização macroeconómica. As interacções estratégicas resultantes de diferentes objectivos de política e de comportamentos não cooperativos podem desempenhar um papel fundamental na política económica levada a cabo numa união monetária com países de dimensão assimétrica. Neste contexto, analisamos as políticas de estabilização óptimas, cooperativas e não cooperativas, através de um modelo Novo-Keynesiano com fundamentos microeconómicos e que modeliza uma união monetária constituída por dois países, sob dois cenários de política diferentes. Um cenário em que os instrumentos de política orçamental e monetária exercem ambos o seu papel de estabilização exclusivamente através do lado da procura, sem qualquer consequência na acumulação de dívida pública; e um outro cenário onde a política orçamental afecta a procura e a oferta mas em que os impostos lump sum são insuficientes para assegurar o equilíbrio orçamental. Em cada um dos cenários, deriva-se a combinação óptima de políticas estratégicas avaliando, igualmente, os efeitos de alguns arranjos institucionais (cooperação, regras orçamentais e a opção por um banco central conservador) e do nível de endividamento público sobre a eficácia das políticas de estabilização. Constata-se que a dimensão assimétrica dos países qualifica significativamente as interacções estratégicas da política orçamental e monetária. Um pequeno país, suportando maiores externalidades e beneficiando menos da estabilização promovida pela política monetária comum, terá de realizar uma política orçamental mais activa e, como seria de esperar, enfrenta maiores custos de estabilização do que um grande país. Além do mais, a avaliação do bem-estar social obtido sob jogos de política alternativos releva que um país grande obtém uma melhor estabilização quando a política orçamental lidera e que, portanto, pode oferecer resistência à cooperação. Também se verifica que grandes e pequenos níveis de endividamento público determinam especializações diferentes dos instrumentos de política na realização da estabilização económica. Tendo em conta apenas os custos de estabilização macroeconómica, observa-se que, numa união monetária com elevado nível de dívida pública, o país grande tem incentivos a aumentar o seu endividamento enquanto o pequeno pode desejar ser mais disciplinado. Numa união monetária em que o nível médio de dívida pública é pequeno, podem ocorrer incentivos contrários: o pequeno país pode sentir-se estimulado a aumentar a dívida pública permanentemente.
Country-size asymmetry may crucially shape the monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. Small and large countries cause different cross-border effects and may have different bargaining power in a stabilization policy game. Strategic interactions arising from different policy objectives and non-cooperative policies might play a significant role in the actual policymaking of a country-size asymmetric monetary union. We analyze cooperative and non cooperative optimizing stabilization policies in a micro-founded New-Keynesian two-country monetary union model, under two policy scenarios. One, where monetary and fiscal policy instruments exert their stabilization roles exclusively through the demand channel without any consequence on debt sustainability; other, where fiscal policy has both demand and supply-side effects but where lump-sum taxes are not enough to ensure fiscal policy solvency. We derive optimal strategic policy mix within an asymmetric country-size monetary union, and assess the effects of some institutional arrangements (cooperation, fiscal constraints, weight-conservative central bank) and of public debt on the effectiveness of policy stabilization. We found that country-size asymmetry within a monetary union qualifies meaningfully monetary and fiscal policy strategic interactions. A small country, suffering larger externality effects and benefiting less from a common monetary policy for stabilization purposes, has to optimally rely on a more active fiscal policy and, as expected, it experiences more welfare costs than a larger country. Furthermore, welfare evaluation of the alternative policy games shows that a large country achieves a better stabilization performance under fiscal leadership and that it may resist to a policy cooperation arrangement. We also found out that large and small debt levels condition the stabilization assignments of the different policy instruments. Moreover, in a large-debt monetary union, and focusing exclusively on stabilization costs, the large country may face incentives to raise public debt while the small country may prefer to be more disciplined. In a small-debt monetary union, reverse incentives can occur: a small country may face incentives to raise debt permanently.

As interacções entre as políticas monetária e orçamental numa união monetária podem ser condicionadas, de forma crucial, pela existência de países com diferentes dimensões.Pequenos E grandes países geram desiguais externalidades e podem possuir distintos poderes de negociação no jogo político da estabilização macroeconómica. As interacções estratégicas resultantes de diferentes objectivos de política e de comportamentos não cooperativos podem desempenhar um papel fundamental na política económica levada a cabo numa união monetária com países de dimensão assimétrica.Neste contexto, analisamos as políticas de estabilização óptimas, cooperativas e não cooperativas, através de um modelo Novo-Keynesiano com fundamentos microeconómicos e que modeliza uma união monetária constituída por dois países, sob dois cenários de política diferentes. Um cenário em que os instrumentos de política orçamental e monetária exercem ambos o seu papel de estabilização exclusivamente através do lado da procura, sem qualquer consequência na acumulação de dívida pública; e um outro cenário onde a política orçamental afecta a procura e a oferta mas em que os impostos lump sum são insuficientes para assegurar o equilíbrio orçamental. Em cada um dos cenários, deriva-se a combinação óptima de políticas estratégicas avaliando, igualmente, os efeitos de alguns arranjos institucionais (cooperação, regras orçamentais e a opção por um banco central conservador) e do nível de endividamento público sobre a eficácia das políticas de estabilização.Constata-se que a dimensão assimétrica dos países qualifica significativamente as interacções estratégicas da política orçamental e monetária. Um pequeno país, suportando maiores externalidades e beneficiando menos da estabilização promovida pela política monetária comum, terá de realizar uma política orçamental mais activa e, como seria de esperar, enfrenta maiores custos de estabilização do que um grande país. Além do mais, a avaliação do bem-estar social obtido sob jogos de política alternativos releva que um país grande obtém uma melhor estabilização quando a política orçamental lidera e que, portanto, pode oferecer resistência à cooperação. Também se verifica que grandes e pequenos níveis de endividamento público determinam especializações diferentes dos instrumentos de política na realização da estabilização económica. Tendo em conta apenas os custos de estabilização macroeconómica, observa-se que, numa união monetária com elevado nível de dívida pública, o país grande tem incentivos a aumentar o seu endividamento enquanto o pequeno pode desejar ser mais disciplinado. Numa união monetária em que o nível médio de dívida pública é pequeno, podem ocorrer incentivos contrários: o pequeno país pode sentir-se estimulado a aumentar a dívida pública permanentemente.

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This research analyzes the development of the financial integration in the euro area, a decisive process for the consolidation of the new common currency and the European Union itself. Since the beginning of the monetary union process, it was assigned to the financial integration the fundamental role for the countries to extract the maximum benefits from the monetary union with the least cost possible. Given the low labor mobility and lack of fiscal coordination within the euro zone, the financial integration received special attention as a mechanism to soften macroeconomic asymmetric shocks via reallocation of resources among segments and companies in the financial markets. Moreover, financial integration allows a more efficient transmission of monetary policies and also allows risk sharing within the monetary union. As a result, new members to the European Union do not necessarily need to wait to have symmetric business cycles before joining the euro. This research presents a selective review of main studies about measuring of financial integration and its current situation in the various segments of the financial markets in the euro area. We conclude that material improvements in the financial integration have been achieved after 10 years of the euro however further challenges are still present mainly in the stock market and retail banking sectors. The recent financial turmoil, which was originated in the U.S. during mid 2007, has resulted in inflexion of the trend in some financial integration indicators but it is still premature to affirm whether this is a trend reversal or a temporary movement
A dissertação analisa o desenvolvimento da integração financeira na área do euro, processo decisivo para a consolidação da nova moeda e da própria União Européia. Prevista desde o início do processo de unificação monetária, foi atribuído à integração financeira papel fundamental para que os países do bloco consigam obter o,máximo de benefícios da união monetária, com o menor custo possível. Diante da baixa mobilidade do mercado de trabalho e das dificuldades para a coordenação políticas fiscais na Europa do euro, a integração financeira ganhou destaque como um caminho para atenuar e suavizar os choques macroeconômicos assimétricos, por meio da realocação de recursos entre setores e empresas nos mercados financeiros. Além disso, a integração do mercado financeiro possibilita a transmissão mais eficiente da política monetária única e permite a diversificação de risco dentro de área monetária. Uma decorrência importante é que novos países da comunidade européia não precisariam esperar necessariamente por uma maior simetria dos ciclos de negócios para se unirem ao euro. A dissertação apresenta uma revisão dos principais referenciais sobre mensuração da integração financeira e seu atual estágio nos diversos segmentos dos mercados da área do euro. Conclui-se que houve avanços importantes na integração financeira em vários mercados ao longo de dez anos, maiores dificuldades para o avanço da integração em alguns deles, em especial o mercado de ações e o mercado bancário de varejo. A recente crise financeira mundial, que se originou nos Estados Unidos em meados de 2007, reverteu a tendência de alguns indicadores de integração financeira, mas é prematuro afirmar se a reversão de tendência se manterá ou se há apenas uma retração temporária

Seminario de Título INGENIERO COMERCIAL, Mención Economía
La teoría del OCA impulsada por Robert Mundell y Ronald Mckinnon hacia principios de los sesenta, es la base para pensar en la instauración de una moneda común. En el presente trabajo nos abocamos a descubrir si es que en Sudamérica se cumplen los criterios para la formación de un área monetaria óptima. También tocaremos el tema de los fondos de cooperación regional como una forma de acercamiento Intra-Regional. La importancia que vemos en estos, proviene de la estabilidad que entregan en términos macro al disminuir la volatilidad de los flujos de capital, los problemas de liquidez y un posible de riesgo de contagio. En ellos vemos la gran oportunidad de Sudamérica. Por esta última razón es que se entregan algunas ideas de política económica que ayuden a sentar las bases de una integración regional, siendo la más importante el potenciar el Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas.

Il lavoro stima il costo del capitale delle banche italiane alla luce di due antitetici comportamenti di investimento: diversificazione internazionale di portafoglio e concentrazione proprietaria volta alla detenzione di pacchetti azionari rilevanti. L'integrazione dei mercati finanziari e l'adozione della moneta unica determinano la necessità di allargare all'area valutaria il correlato empirico al portafoglio di mercato indicato dal CAPM. La verifica condotta su un campione di banche italiane evidenzia la riduzione dei Beta e del costo del capitale proprio a causa del limitato contributo fornito al rischio sistematico del portafoglio riferito all'area valutaria da parte del mercato azionario nazionale e delle banche italiane. La detenzione del potere decisionale consente agli azionisti rilevanti di ottenere, in termini di private benefits, un sovra-rendimento che giustifica strategie volte alla concentrazione di ricchezza. Questo genera per le banche italiane un incremento del costo del capitale.
This work analyses the techniques to assess the cost of equity of Italian banks in the light of two antithetical investment policies: international portfolio diversification and ownership concentration directed to hold large blocks of shares. Financial market integration and European Monetary Union involve using a broader index, referred to the Euro area, as the proxy for the market portfolio pointed out by CAPM. The analysis carried out on a sample of Italian banks shows this change brings about a reduction of both the estimated Beta and the cost of equity. This is due to the limited contribution that domestic market index makes to the systematic risk of the Euro portfolio. The control of the decision-making process enables the holders of large blocks of shares to extract private benefits and to obtain extra returns compared with other investors. This can explain an investment policy directed to wealth concentration. That causes a higher equity cost of equity.

Il lavoro stima il costo del capitale delle banche italiane alla luce di due antitetici comportamenti di investimento: diversificazione internazionale di portafoglio e concentrazione proprietaria volta alla detenzione di pacchetti azionari rilevanti. L'integrazione dei mercati finanziari e l'adozione della moneta unica determinano la necessità di allargare all'area valutaria il correlato empirico al portafoglio di mercato indicato dal CAPM. La verifica condotta su un campione di banche italiane evidenzia la riduzione dei Beta e del costo del capitale proprio a causa del limitato contributo fornito al rischio sistematico del portafoglio riferito all'area valutaria da parte del mercato azionario nazionale e delle banche italiane. La detenzione del potere decisionale consente agli azionisti rilevanti di ottenere, in termini di private benefits, un sovra-rendimento che giustifica strategie volte alla concentrazione di ricchezza. Questo genera per le banche italiane un incremento del costo del capitale.
This work analyses the techniques to assess the cost of equity of Italian banks in the light of two antithetical investment policies: international portfolio diversification and ownership concentration directed to hold large blocks of shares. Financial market integration and European Monetary Union involve using a broader index, referred to the Euro area, as the proxy for the market portfolio pointed out by CAPM. The analysis carried out on a sample of Italian banks shows this change brings about a reduction of both the estimated Beta and the cost of equity. This is due to the limited contribution that domestic market index makes to the systematic risk of the Euro portfolio. The control of the decision-making process enables the holders of large blocks of shares to extract private benefits and to obtain extra returns compared with other investors. This can explain an investment policy directed to wealth concentration. That causes a higher equity cost of equity.

La formation d'une union monétaire prive les États membres de l'utilisation unilatérale de l'outil monétaire. Dès lors, une orientation efficace des politiques économiques s'impose à travers (i) une hiérarchisation des cibles macroéconomiques, (ii) une identification des instruments appropriés et (iii) une mise en œuvre adaptée. Cette thèse fournit des réponses à cette orientation afin d'assurer une plus grande efficacité des politiques économiques à travers une analyse théorique et empirique appliquée au cas de l'UEMOA qui constitue un laboratoire exemplaire d'analyse des problématiques économiques en union monétaire
The creation of a monetary union deprives the member States of the unilateral use of the monetary instrument. Therefore, an effective orientation of economic policies is required through (i) a hierarchy of macroeconomic targets, (ii) identification of appropriate instruments, and (iii) appropriate implementation. This PhD thesis provides answers to this orientation in order to ensure greater effectiveness of economic policies through a theoretical and empirical analysis applied to the case of the WAEMU which constitutes a singular analytical laboratory through which to study the economic policy of a monetary union

This paper considers two major issues in the evolution of the European Union, the Single Market and the Single Currency. The first chapter deals with the projected effects of the 1992 Programme, and the second chapter deals with the collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System and examines the prospects for European Monetary Union given this collapse. The third chapter revolves around the concept of Central Banking under Monetary Union and focuses on the European Monetary Institute and the European System of Central Banks. Chapter four presents data regarding the progress of the European Union towards the target of the Single Currency, as well as other macroeconomic indicators.

This research aims to investigate possible consequences of the adoption of a single monetary policy for five European housing markets. It brings together comparative housing research and research on optimum currency areas. The research addresses two issues. First, it assesses whether real house price cycles will become synchronised following the convergence in nominal interest rates. Secondly, it explores the implications of stability in nominal interest rates and low inflation in the Euro-zone for the stability of real house prices in the member-countries. The existing members of the European Union are grouped according to characteristics of the transmission mechanism by which changes in interest rates translate into changes in house prices. These elements comprise monetary policy developments (i.e. the level and volatility of interest rates), type (i.e. fixed or variable) of mortgage rates, house price movements (i.e. volatility of house price cycles) and the degree of countries’ involvement in such exchange rate arrangements as the “snake in the tunnel” and ERM. One the basis of these criteria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and Spain are selected as case studies and time period covers 1972 (when the “snake” was established) up to and including 1999 (the year in which EMU was launched). The approach adopted in the research allows for consideration of the transmission mechanism in the context of structural changes in systems and policies that determine housing demand and supply. Therefore, the thesis investigates macro-level trends drawing on secondary sources, statistics as well as interviews with informed commentators and key actors. The analysis is conducted in the following order: first, for each case study country, the importance of monetary policy for house price changes is examined, and secondly, the possible impact of a single monetary policy on economic convergence and synchronisation of house price cycles across the countries is investigated. The research suggests that the adoption of the single monetary policy per se is unlikely to lead to significant synchronisation of real house price cycles because the relationship between changes in interest rates and changes in real house prices is likely to continue to differ across the countries. The pursuit of a single monetary policy might not ensure economic convergence between the countries either, and in this case differnces in GDP fluctuations would lead to the divergence of real house price cycles. The study also demonstrates that recent developments in the systems and policies that determine housing demand and supply might lead to an increase in house price volatility in all countries bar Germany. It concludes that countries need to manage their housing markets using non-monetary instruments regardless of whether or not they are within EMU. These measures might help reduce the likelihood of asymmetry in economic developments in EMU arising from the importance of changes in the housing markets to economic developments.

I develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the European Union (EU) and use this model throughout the chapters of my dissertation. The model incorporates some realistic features of the European Union members. I calibrate the model and it matches the dvnamics of the data well. In the first chapter I study the need for fiscal policy cooperation between the new EU members (a small country) and the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (a large country). I find that both countries are better off when they do not cooperate their fiscal policies. This result depends on the assumption about the presence of foreign ownership in the smaller country. When there is no foreign ownership in the smaller country, the large economy is indifferent between cooperating and not cooperating but the smaller country still prefers not to cooperate its fiscal policy with the EMU. The new EU members are expected to join the monetary union. In the second chapter I analyze the welfare consequences of different monetary arrangements for the new EU members and investigate whether their participation in the EMU is welfare-improving. Based on households' utility the results show that a flexible exchange rate regime is preferred to a monetary union and a monetary union is preferred to a fixed exchange rate regime. In the third chapter I investigate whether there are welfare gains from fiscal policy cooperation in the EMU. I assume that the EMU consists of countries that are currently its members as well as the countries that will join the EMU in the near future. I find that the incumbent EMU members are better off under fiscal policy cooperation and the new members are as well of under fiscal cooperation as they are in a non-cooperative equilibrium. Under fiscal policy cooperation in my model, all policymakers have the same objective by construction. Therefore, the results in my study differ from some previous findings in the literature
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2005
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics

This thesis consists of four self-contained but related papers trying to uncover different aspects of banking and sovereign risk in the member countries of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). From a methodological point of view, they all have in common the contingent claims model from the theory of finance, which is used to value call options on a stock. The first paper, “Bank risk behavior and connectedness in EMU countries”, studies the structural differences in banking sector and financial regulations at country level to measure and analyze the banking sector risk behavior. Deviating from the current view, which in our opinion is excessively focused on Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), we introduce a micro approach to emphasize the role of smaller financial institutions in build-up of risk. The paper starts with a discussion of the reasons that are needed to consider this choice. Contingent claims analysis model is employed to calculate the risk of individual banks which is then aggregated at country level. The remaining of the paper tries to highlight the information content of country level banking risk indices. It is shown that if banking sector risk is calculated at country level using a bigger sample of banks, it can provide a simple, convenient and intuitive forward looking risk measure. The risk measures differentiate countries based on the structural differences in their financial sectors and show strong correlations with national and regional market sentiment indicators. They outperform the regulatory risk measures based at the European level and the causal linkages run from them to the latter indicators, suggesting better information content. And even though they have high correlations, causality and connectedness tests reveal no systemic component. The second paper, “Sovereigns and banks in the euro area: a tale of two crises”, attempts to quantify the directional intensity of sovereign-bank linkages in the euro area countries. To this end, we borrow the indicator of banking sector risk in each country from the first paper, and use a traditional measure of sovereign risk (10-year government yield spreads over Germany). The paper starts with the review of channels via which banks and sovereigns are linked in a vicious cycle. We apply a dynamic approach to testing for Granger causality between the two measures of risk in each country, allowing us to check for episodes of significant and abrupt increase in short-run causal linkages. The empirical results indicate that episodes of causality intensification vary considerably in both directions over time and across the different EMU countries. The directionality suggests the presence of causality intensification, mainly from banks to sovereigns, in the crisis periods. Our findings also present empirical evidence about the existence of an adverse feedback loop between sovereigns and banks in some euro-area countries. The third paper, “Incorporating creditors' seniority into contingent claim models: Application to peripheral euro area countries”, develops and uses a seniority structure of sovereign's creditors to analyze the impact of sectoral distribution of debt on the sovereign credit risk. Specifically, this paper highlights the role of multilateral creditors (i.e., the ECB, IMF, ESM etc.) and their preferred creditor status in explaining the sovereign default risk of peripheral euro area (EA) countries. Incorporating lessons from sovereign debt crises in general, and from the Greek debt restructuring in particular, we define the priority structure of sovereigns' creditors that is most relevant for peripheral EA countries in severe crisis episodes. This new priority structure of creditors, together with the contingent claims methodology, is then used to derive a set of sovereign credit risk indicators. In particular, the sovereign distance-to-default indicator, proposed in this paper (which includes both accounting metrics and market-based measures) aims to isolate sovereign credit risk by using information from the public sector balance sheets to build it up. Analyzing and comparing it with traditional market-based measures of sovereign risk suggests that the measurement and predictive ability of credit risk measures can be vastly improved if we account for the changing composition of sovereigns' balance sheet risk based on creditors' seniority. In the last paper, “Revisiting the sovereign-bank linkages: Evidence from contingent claims analysis”, we reconsider the sovereign-bank nexus as discussed in the second paper to check the robustness of our findings. Using the banking sector risk indicator developed in our first paper, together with the sovereign risk index build in the third paper we re-inspect the bank-sovereign linkages. We use three different statistical measures of interconnection based on principal components analysis, Granger causality network and Diebold-Yilmaz's connectedness index. We also compare our results with alternative specifications using existing market-based indicators of banking and sovereign risk. Our results suggest strong connectedness and co-movement between country-level banking and sovereign risk indicators. We also find evidence of an increasing role of idiosyncratic risk factors driving the evolution of all risk indices in the post-crisis period, thus supporting the “wake-up call hypothesis” that the sensitivity of financial market participants to fundamental differences increased during the crisis. Country-wise analysis of time-varying bi-directional linkages using dynamic Granger-causality suggests the development of a bank-sovereign doom loop in Spain corroborating for this country the findings of our second paper. Connectedness analysis also suggest that increasingly the risk is being driven away from market-based uncertainty to the idiosyncratic risk factors, which are better captured by the contingent claim based indices.

This thesis looks at the constitutional implications of the Euro crisis for the European Union and its Member States, which entails consideration of comparative public law as well as EU law. It focuses on political and legal accountability in Economic and Monetary Union, and examines three sets of issues: the revised EU economic governance framework and its bearing on national economic and fiscal policy; the respective roles of the EU and national institutions within this multi-level system of economic governance; and judicial review of economic and monetary policy measures at national and EU level. The new EU economic rules could potentially have a great impact on fundamental rights, the horizontal and vertical division of power in the EU, and the welfare state. It is hoped that the policy proposals put forward in this thesis will, if implemented, serve to strengthen political and legal accountability and bolster legitimacy in this pluralistic landscape.

Der Zweck dieser Arbeit ist es, die Beziehung zwischen die Größe des Landes und das Wachstum auf internationaler Ebene und vergleichsweise in der Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion zu untersuchen und erarbeiten ihre Folgen für das Verhalten der wachstumsorientierte Finanzpolitik. Um ein globales Verständnis des Zusammenhangs zwischen Größe des Landes und das Wachstum in der EWU weiter verfolgen wir einen interdisziplinären Ansatz, einschließlich der makroökonomischen Modellierung (DSGE), Ökonometrie und Analyse der politischen Ökonomie. Die Kombination dieser Untersuchungen schließen wir, dass die Größe des Landes einen Einfluss auf die wirtschaftlichen Strukturen der Nationen, die Auswirkungen ihrer Politik und damit auf ihre Wachstumsdynamik hat. Aus diesem Grund ist es notwendig, die Bedeutung der Größe des Landes und ihre Folgen für die WWU wieder.
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between country size and growth at the international level and comparatively in the Economic and Monetary Union, and to draw up its consequences for the conduct of growth-orientated fiscal policies. To further a global understanding of the link between country size and growth in the EMU, we follow an interdisciplinary approach, including macro-economic modelling (DSGE), econometrics and political economy analysis. Combining these analyses, we conclude that country size has an incidence on the economic structures of nations, the effects of their policies and therefore on their pace of growth. For this reason there is a need to reinstate the importance of country size and its consequences for the EMU.

This thesis empirically investigates two important aspects of the benefits of currency (monetary) union - the beneficial impact of eliminating exchange rate volatility on trade and the possibility of consequent economic growth - in the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Researchers on the GCC monetary union have mostly been busy in analyzing the viability of the proposed GCC monetary union and they focus on convergence criteria. In contrast to those studies, empirical estimates obtained in this study would provide valuable information to the policy makers who have been working towards the realization of the GCC monetary union. As such this study provides significant contribution to the literature of the GCC monetary union. Chapter 2 thoroughly reviews the optimum currency areas (OCA) literature (both theoretical and empirical) starting with the theories advocated by the pioneers of the OCA. Literature on the European Monetary Union (EMU), monetary unions and integration from African, Latin America, Asian and the prospects from the GCC countries are also reviewed. Chapter 3 empirically investigates convergence criteria and shock synchronization of the GCC countries. Results show positive correlation of the structural shocks (synchronized shocks) among the countries except Qatar. Chapter 4 estimates the impact of exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade between the GCC countries. Results obtained using the panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator indicates that the bilateral trade among the GCC countries will increase about 6.2 - 8.7 percent (depending on the volatility measure used) with the elimination of the exchange rate volatility. In the second part of the chapter 4 discusses the role of trade on economic growth (income) of a country and estimates the impact of trade on per capita growth rates of the GCC countries. Results based on the preferred sample period and using the panel GMM estimator indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in the trade (or openness) ratio would increase the growth rate per capita on impact by 2 - 3%. Based on these results we may conclude that the monetary union of the GCC countries would enhance trade which in turn would promote economic growth of the region.

The main principle of the thesis is to address issues concerning structural problems of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and assess economical impact of its potential break up. This in turn implies the need to discuss certain issues. Firstly, since the EMU is based on the concept of Optimal Currency Area (OCA); I start my research with the test whether EMU in its current structure fits the definition of OCA. Secondly, I provide the extensive study on the reasons of current crisis in order to understand the root causes. Thirdly, I assess the potential implications of different ways out of the current sovereign debt crisis.

Economics
Ph.D.
This thesis asks the question, is there economic justification for two CARICOM countries forming a currency union? There is a theoretical component consisting of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, and an empirical component utilizing vector autoregressions and cointegration analyses. More specifically, the reactions of two, small, open economies, to symmetric and asymmetric shocks, with and without a currency union, are investigated. Secondly, the demand and supply shocks between country pairs are examined to determine whether positive correlations exist. Thirdly, the thesis looks at the issue of economic convergence, especially given the coordinated efforts of CARICOM member states towards an environment conducive for a currency union. The theoretical results support the traditional view that countries with symmetric shocks are better candidates for a currency union, while those with asymmetric shocks are not. The empirical work supports the formation of currency unions for the following country pairs, Grenada-St. Kitts, Grenada-St. Vincent, Trinidad-Grenada, and Trinidad-St. Vincent.
Temple University--Theses

La structure de la zone euro a évolué dans le temps et ce avant la mise en circulation de la monnaie unique. Depuis le début de la crise, l'hétérogénéité de la zone euro est plus que jamais mise en avant. En effet, les économies de la zone euro convergent et divergent en fonction de la conjoncture. La crise a placé le comportement et le rôle de l'euro au cœur dudébat économique. La déconnexion entre l'évolution de son taux de change et celle de ses déterminants ainsi que son impact sur les exportations sont démontrés dans la thèse. Nos résultats suggèrent que même si le taux de change reste un déterminant important des exportations, le rôle de la compétitivité structurelle est de plus en plus important
The Eurozone pattern has evolved over time and that before the experience of the unique money. Since the beginning of the crisis, the heterogenity of the Eurozone is more than ever highlighted. Actually, the Eurozone economies converge and diverge according to the conjuncture. The crisis placed the euro behavior and role at the core of the economic debate.The disconnection between the evolution of its exchange rate and those of its determinants is showed in the thesis as well as its impact on exports. Our findings suggest that even the exchange rate is an important determinant of exports, the role of structural competitiveness is increasingly important

The purpose of the following work is to look into the new regulatory framework for the banking system proposed by the European Commission and assess its potential (macroeconomic) monetary implications. This new initiative integrates the conventional and unconventional monetary measures launched by the European Central Bank since 2011. The main aim of the so – called Banking Union is to deal with financial instability as well as to ensure the soundness of the financial system by addressing the issue of money creation in a two-tier monetary system wherein the European Central Bank provides the common monetary policy while the members' national central banks (NCBs) retain the supervision on the actual credit policy of domestic commercial banks. Modifying the current regulatory framework and the existing European two-tier banking system to increase system’s soundness constitutes a major challenge for the European Union. In order to describe and evaluate the issue of successfully implementing a Banking Union within a Monetary Union, we will analyse some of the major topics likely to be affected by this innovation. To be more precise, the following thesis will highlight the role of money, monetary policy, central banks’ operations as well as the transmission mechanisms.

Master of Arts
Department of Economics
Steven P. Cassou
In this report, I investigate the possibility of a monetary unification among the Arab States. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that include Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Oman are coming together on the basis of common ethnicity, religion, culture, traditions, and monetary issues. This research will discuss different factors upon which the monetary unification and the birth of a new currency depend. For comparison to the Euro, I closely examined different factors such as inflation rates, exchange rates, trade, etc. over the past decade. As stated, this examination was done to see how these factors compare with those of the Euro region to determine if a similar monetary unification among the GCC states is possible. The target date for launching the new GCC currency was January 1, 2010; however that date has long passed. Although the above mentioned factors are favorable to currency unification of the GCC states, ample time is necessary to achieve such a herculean feat. After all, the Europeans did not achieve the unification of the Euro in one night. One hurdle to unification is that the GCC states still need to control the inflation rates in their own economies. Other economic factors, such as trade, have been favorable for all the GCC states, and all the states have been doing well in terms of the U.S. dollar (USD). Although unification may not have met the January 1, 2010 goal, the GCC will still be observing the economic factors and considering other possible scenarios. All the GCC countries vow to achieve this unification.

This thesis examines determinacy and E-stability of economic policy in monetary union models. Monetary policy takes the form of either a contemporaneous or a forecast based interest rate rule, while fiscal policy follows a contemporaneous government spending rule. In the absence of asymmetries, the results from the closed economy literature on learning are retained. However, when introducing asymmetries into monetary union frameworks, the determinacy and E-stability conditions for economic policy differ from both the closed and open economy cases. We find that a monetary union with heterogeneous price rigidities is more likely to be determinate and E-stable. Specifically, the Taylor principle, a key stability condition for the closed economy, is now relaxed. Furthermore, an interest rate rule that stabilizes the terms of trade in addition to output and inflation, is more likely to induce determinacy and local stability under RLS learning. If monetary policy is sufficiently aggressive in stabilizing the terms of trade, then determinacy and E-stability of the union economy can be achieved without direct stabilization of output and inflation. A fiscal policy rule that supports demand for domestic goods following a shock to competitiveness, can destabilize the union economy regardless of the interest rate rule employed by the union central bank. In this case, determinacy and E-stability conditions have to be simultaneously and independently met by both fiscal and monetary policy for the union economy to be stable. When fiscal policy instead stabilizes domestic output gaps while monetary policy stabilizes union output and inflation, fiscal policy directly affects the stability of monetary policy. A contemporaneous monetary policy rule has to be more aggressive to satisfy the Taylor principle, the more aggressive fiscal policy is. On the other hand, when monetary policy is forward looking, an aggressive fiscal policy rule can help induce determinacy.

In the study we explore the context of the Economic and Monetary Union under a theoretical agenda of sociological institutionalism. We reconstruct the EMU dynamics in three papers that reflect three levels of institutional analysis. The first paper takes a bird's eye view of the EMU and explores its macro-level dynamics. Treating the Eurosystem as a field, we take literally the EU motto ‘united in diversity’ and inquire into the dynamics of the field’s plurality in the last 20 years. We show how the uniformity and diversity coexist in the accounts of the European central banks. In the second paper we explore the microfoundations of the EMU transformation in the banking union. Analyzing two sequential enactments of the key role of the EMU, President of the European Central Bank, we show how the previous embeddedness of the second president affects his role enactment and forms his intention for a particular direction of the EMU development. The third paper studies institutional evolution at the meso-level. Exploring the identity dynamics of the central organization of the EMU, the European Central Bank, we show that it evolves along with the social context around it. With time the organization comes to be defined as accountable and active in words of its leaders and changes its identity from managing to governing.

The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 stopped the recovery (growth) phase in most Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. As a result, the problem of the cycle regulation of economic processes became relevant. We analyzed the actual level of compliance regimes of monetary policies implemented by central banks in the major economies of the CIS at the peak phase and the recovery phase. We used an integrated approach, which provided retrospective analysis of the main instruments of monetary policy: interest rates, required reserves, foreign exchange interventions to support liquidity.

Could the European Union (EU) be more like other federations where monetary integration works together with fiscal federalism? Assuming that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) strongly reinforces economic integration, and since national governments were deprived of adjustment mechanisms to accommodate economic shocks, the question seems plausible. Is the Euro-zone economy, and national economies in particular, still shielded against these shocks? The dissertation's purpose is to provide a political-economic answer to these questions, addressing the feasibility of conventional fiscal federalism in the EU. 'Conventional fiscal federalism' refers to systemic aspects of federations, where a constitutional division of powers between different tiers of government is organised as far as fiscal powers are concerned. This division of powers involves a centralisation bias. Recognising that monetarism shadows EMU everywhere, important consequences are found when the prospect of 'conventional fiscal federalism' is at stake. The monetarist influence reflects the prominence devoted to supranational monetary policy for stabilisation purposes. It is implied that fiscal policy has a minor role in providing stabilisation for the Euro-zone. At best, fiscal policy is valuable for each member state adjusting domestic economies to specific developments, as an expression of the diversity that characterises the EU. The discussion about 'conventional fiscal federalism' and the EU brings out the important question of equity being at the mercy of centralisation, to emulate other federations' picture. Nonetheless I find important evidence that centralisation of the redistribution function is not feasible in the EU context. National governments' lack of political willingness to significantly increase EU budget resources, and the clearly absent solidarity among EU member states both prevent the implementation of such centralisation impetus. The dissertation concludes ruling out the feasibility of 'conventional fiscal federalism' in the EU. However this is not the same as rejecting fiscal federalism at all. Considering the existence of different tiers of government endowed with fiscal competences, and a clear assignment of powers between them, this is sufficient to conclude that a different, decentralised, low profile modality of fiscal federalism already exists in the EU

This thesis analyses twenty years of fiscal policy coordination under Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – its genesis, implementation courses and changes. It does so by resorting to the construct of learning as an ontological trait of policy making and employing modes of policy learning (intended as distinct causal mechanisms) to operationalise this ontology for the sake of empirical investigation. To this end, a “policy learning measuring instrument” has been constructed allowing for the categorisation of each case study in terms of their prevalent mode of learning and then for the testing of mode-specific expected implications. From a methodological point of view, the thesis relies on theory-testing process tracing and evidentiary eclecticism to verify mode-specific observable implications. Throughout its history, the supranational coordination of fiscal policies under EMU has been characterised by three distinct regimes. The first one was substantiated by the fiscal criteria of Stage II of EMU (in force during the period of 1994-1998). The prevalent mode of learning under this regime was hierarchical. In terms of outcomes, that mode led to instrumental learning that sustained the process of convergence. The launch of the euro and the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) substantiated a new fiscal policy coordination regime that lasted until 2010. Under the SGP, learning took place as a by-product of bargaining and reinforced strategic and opportunistic implementation. The financial crisis of 2007/2008 led to a de facto abeyance of the SGP and to its overhaul from 2010. Within this episode of policy change two case studies were distilled, one of emergency-driven, intracrisis management and one of long term, institutional change. While the first case was explained through a mechanism of contingent learning, the second one was crucially found to be driven by epistemic forces. The findings arising out of this study are conversant with different strands of the literature and, in particular, seek to contribute to the political economy of the E(M)U and to integration theories at large.

The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the monetary policy in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), in terms of a Taylor rule based approach to their use of their interest rate. The evaluation of the different rules was based on both in-sample and out-of-sample forecast errors. Few significant or consistent influences from the variables proposed by the rules can be established, which might suggest that the bank operates primarily under a discretionary framework rather than a rule. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the European Central Bank interest rate (ECB-rate) does not exclusively drive the Central Bank of West African States interest rate (BCEAO-rate), which suggests that they indeed do retain some independence of monetary policy to respond to domestic variables as proposed by earlier research, despite having a fixed exchange rate. These results put into question the credibility of the BCEAO in attaining their stated primary goal of price stability, as there seems to be no significant or consistent response to it in the setting of their interest rate, despite a suggested ability to react to it. This can be the cause of the current high volatility of inflation in the area and give rise to future volatility and instability as well.

La stabilite et la credibilite des politiques economiques dans une zone monetaire ont longtemps ete abordees, dans la theorie economique, par le biais d'instruments reputationnels appliques a la structure ou au comportement de la banque centrale. Meme si ces approches se revelent necessaires, nous montrons qu'elles ne sont pas suffisantes pour garantir la credibilite economique europeenne. L'analyse de meca♭ nismes institutionnels alternatifs portant, en particulier, sur les decisions des gou♭ vernements n'apportent pas, non plus, les reponses escomptees. Il ressort de notre analyse, que la coordination de la politique monetaire et des politiques budgetaires europeennes doit s'appuyer sur des bases economiques saines. Les ajustements face aux chocs asymetriques sont, en effet, la clef de voute de la coherence economique de l'union. La mise en place d'un federalisme budgetaire, ou tout au moins de mecanismes de transferts ou d'assurance mutuelle, sont les solutions envisageablesafin de lisser les disparites conjoncturelles des etats membres. Des verifications empiriques fondent nos resultats theoriques.

In conformity with the goal of the African Union to build a monetary union for the entire African continent, one of the goals of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the formation of a monetary union with a single central bank. Towards this end certain macroeconomic convergence criteria, which are closely aligned with those used by the European Union (EU), have been set. While empirical research on whether or not SADC would benefit from the formation of a currency union has focused on the optimum currency area criteria, no reference to these criteria is made in the SADC programme. Instead, the SADC approach has been governed by a set of macroeconomic convergence criteria synonymous with those pursued by the European Monetary Union (EMU) prior to its formation. Doubts regarding the future of the EU have recently been raised as a result of debt crises in certain member states, implicitly raising questions about the adequacy of the convergence criteria that were adopted. Accordingly, this study considers the feasibility of establishing a currency union in the SADC region. The proposed convergence criteria are assessed against the theory of optimum currency areas as well as in terms of their adequacy in the light of recent EU experience. In addition, the paper provides a preliminary assessment of the fiscal sustainability of the SADC region by conducting Engle-Granger cointegration tests on the public debt and revenue series for the SADC countries under analysis. It was observed that SADC has made considerable progress towards meeting its macroeconomic convergence criteria in recent years. However, in light of the regions' heavy dependence on commodity exports coupled with recent price fluctuations in this regard, the sustainability of this progress is questioned. Furthermore, a review of the EMU experience to date highlights numerous flaws in its approach and the potential challenges the SADC region should consider in moving forward with its agenda. In essence, the study suggests that almost all the SADC member states are fiscally unprepared for monetary union formation and the recent EMU debt crisis has highlighted the importance of acquiring a state of fiscal sustainability prior to union formation. In addition, it is imperative that the SADC members continue to address issues of product diversification, intraregional trade and political unification, all of which should be governed by a centralised fiscal authoriry.

The dissertation assesses the suitability of countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa region for a monetary union. Using VAR techniques the symmetry of the underlying structural shocks is analyzed. The results indicate that supply and demand shocks are generally asymmetric, which does not lend strong support for forming a region-wide currency union at the moment. Although economic shocks are not highly correlated across the entire region, we tentatively identify three sub-regional clusters of countries that may benefit from a currency union. We find some tentative evidence that some, though not all, sub-regions may benefit from a link to the Euro. However, the speed and magnitude of adjustment to shocks is similar across the countries. Therefore, further integration of the economies might lead to more favorable conditions for a monetary union. Using a Barro-Gordon type model, it is shown that forming a monetary union yields net benefits if output shocks are similar across member countries and if one or more countries in the union can serve as anchors. In addition it is shown that the opportunistic objectives of one country’s policymakers are kept in check at the union level by other members with disparate objectives. Hence monetary union can improve the monetary policy for its members if the pressures on the individual central banks are dissimilar. Calibrating the model to evaluate the proposed monetary union in the East African Community, it is found that central bank uncertainty would be a significant aspect in the net welfare effect of monetary union. An examination of the EAC countries also shows a fair degree of linkages. Intra-regional trade is substantial. The benefits from reduced transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty would be substantial and growing. Though symmetry of shocks is still low, implementation of a protocol on factor mobility under discussion would help improve labor mobility. However though some progress has been made there is still need for more convergence before monetary union could be implemented.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro Sócio-Econômico. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia
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The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate if smaller countries that have joined the ‘European Monetary Union’ outperform their larger partners in terms of higher growth and lower inflation. This is something suggested by the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA). Three smaller countries, Austria, Finland and Ireland, were selected for analysis. Their growth and inflation were compared to the weighted growth and inflation of France, Germany and Italy and against a control-group of advanced countries.

A simple form of regression analysis along with some graphical analysis was used and the results to some extent support that the small countries have outperformed their larger partners in term of growth. On the other hand they seem to experience a relatively higher inflation, which is contradicting the OCA theory. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that higher growth is often associated with higher inflation in more advanced countries.

Given the growing effect that globalisation and integration has had upon economies and regions, the process of monetary union has become an increasingly topical issue in economic policy debates. This has been driven in part by the experience and successes of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which is widely perceived as beneficial to member countries. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an example of a group of countries that has realised that there are benefits that may arise from economic integration. This paper makes use of an interest-rate pass through model to investigate whether the pass-through of monetary policy transmission in ten SADC countries has become more similar between January 1990 and December 2007 using monthly interest rate data. This is done to determine the extent of macroeconomic convergence that prevails within SADC, and consequently establish whether the formation of a regional monetary union is feasible. The results of the empirical pass-through model were robust and show that there are certain countries that have a more efficient and similar monetary transmission process than others. In particular, the countries that form the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) tend to show evidence of convergence in monetary policy transmission, especially since 2000. In addition, from analysis of the long-run pass-through, the results reveal that there is evidence that Malawi and Zambia have shown signs of convergence toward the countries that form the CMA and SACU, in terms of monetary policy transmission. The study concludes that a SADC wide monetary union is currently not feasible based on the evidence provided from the results of the pass-through analysis. Despite this, it can be tentatively suggested that the CMA may be expanded to include Botswana, Malawi and Zambia.

La tesi è organizzata in tre parti. Ognuna delle quali tratta un aspetto cruciale per la trasmissione della politica monetaria. Nella prima parte si impiega un modello Neo Keynesiano per adattarlo all’economia Italiana. A tal fine, Si stimano le risposte dinamiche, sia simulando il modello e sia utilizzando le serie storiche, impiegando la metodologia SMM. Nella seconda parte sono riportate le nuove evidenze sulla persistenza dell’inflazione, attraverso l’utilizzo di una nuova tecnica di identificazione di un modello “Bayesian VAR”; con l’obiettivo di analizzare gli effetti di vari shock di policy sulle variabili macroeconomiche. La terza parte si propone di fornire le evidenze microeconomiche sull’eterogeneità nelle strategie di determinazione dei prezzi tra le imprese italiane sulla base di un nuovo database longitudinale predisposto dalla Banca d’Italia. L’analisi così articolata si propone di identificare le eterogeneità a livello settoriale e/o territoriale tra le imprese, per trarne importanti implicazioni di policy per l’autorità monetaria.
The thesis is structured in three parts. Each part deals with a crucial aspect for monetary policy transmission. In the first one, I set up a New Keynesian model with to Italian economy. To this end, I estimate the dynamic responses both for the theoretical model and for the data using the SMM technique. Chapter 2 presents new evidence about inflation persistence through a novel technique to identify a Bayesian VAR model, and it analyzes the effects of several policy shocks on the macroeconomic variables. Chapter 3 provides the new micro-evidence on price setting and heterogeneity among Italian companies by using a new longitudinal data provided by the Bank of Italy. This allowed an analysis that captures the regional and sectoral disparities among firms’ price setting. This micro-evidence has a very important policy implication for the monetary authority.