Academic literature on the topic 'Tunisia – Politics and government – 2011-'

AbstractThe primacy of the Tunisian revolution and the country’s successful democratic transition (Stepan 2012, “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations.”Journal of Democracy23:89–103) make Tunisia an exemplar for analyzing legislators’ demand for advocacy by civil society organizations or CSOs. Several researchers (Cavatorta 2012, “Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society. A General Overview.”http://www.iemed.org/observatori-es/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2012/Cavatorta_en.pdf, Benoit 2011, “The Counter-Power of Civil Society and the Emergence of a New Political Imaginary in the Arab World.”Constellations: an International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory18:271–283. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675.2011.00650.x, Kubba 2000, “Arabs and Democracy: The Awakening of Civil Society.”Journal of Democracy11:84–90) have explored the role of Tunisian civil society in the democratic transition; however, no study examined legislators’ demand for CSOs’ legislative advocacy in Tunisia. By exploring factors influencing legislators and their demand and need for legislative advocacy, this study sheds light on the inner works of policy makers and ways to influence them. This study finds that, contrary to the idea that governments in developing countries do not want civil society participation in politics, Tunisian legislators are open to and eager for legislative advocacy. Based on 40 survey conducted face to face with Tunisian legislators in the National Constituent Assembly, and archival analysis of the National Constituents Assembly sessions’ minutes from 2011 until 2014, this study finds that Tunisian legislators have a high level of trust in CSOs, want their expertise, and are influenced by them when voting in parliament. These results have several potential impacts on understanding of the relationship between CSOs and government and more specifically legislature.

Over the last decade, the Arab Spring phenomenon in the Middle East and North Africa has brought significant transformation towards Tunisia’s political landscape. During the 14 days of street protest, Tunisian women have played critical roles in assisting their male counterparts in securing the ultime goal of the revolution – regime change. This article argues that after the 2011 revolution, the new Tunisian government has gradually adopted the principal idea of state feminism, which emphasizes on the role of ruling government via affirmative action in supporting the agenda of women’s rights. In so doing, this article examines the connection between state feminism and the plight of women’s struggles in Tunisia after the 2011 revolution and, looks into the impact of top down polices, and government approaches towards improving the status of women. This article concludes that women in the post revolutionary era have experienced a new trajectory in political and social freedom,the country has recorded a spike increase in the number of active female lawmakers, government executives, politicians, electoral candidates and the emergence of human right groups, gender activists and feminist movements. All these ‘women’s actors’ have directly involved in the process of drafting the new Tunisian constitution, which resulted in the acknowlegdement of women’s rights protection via article 46 in 2014 and the Nobel Peace Price Award in 2015.

Information access and open communication – through in person and mediated information and communication technology – are critical to an informed citizenry in democratic societies. The 2011 Arab Spring uprising that originated in Tunisia and resulted in the overthrow of long-time Tunisian authoritarian president Ben Ali, established a new transitional government with more democratic institutions and more open press and political expression. In this paper, we explore changes over time (2011–2019) in the use by young, educated Tunisians of different political information sources, the perceived reliability of these sources, their information sharing behavior, and sense of being politically well-informed (i.e., political information efficacy). We report here results from the third of three surveys we administered of an online questionnaire to three different but comparable opportunity samples of young, educated Tunisians. The first two surveys conducted in 2012 and 2015 have been previously reported. We compare results from the most recent survey regarding 2019 elections with findings from the two prior surveys. Our findings confirm increasing perceived reliability of government information sources during the 2014 and 2019 elections, and decreasing reliability of social media. Results also confirm that higher perceptions of information reliability along with information sharing, lead to greater political information efficacy which is an important predictor of further democratic political participation.

On January 14, 2011, after twenty‐three years in power and one month of popular protest demanding his resignation, President Ben Ali fled Tunisia. Lawyers, wearing their official robes, had marched frequently in the uprising's demonstrations. By engaging with and supporting the uprising, lawyers—both the profession in general and the bar's leadership—gained considerable symbolic influence over the post‐uprising government that replaced Ben Ali's regime. This article outlines the various forms of political lawyering undertaken by Tunisian lawyers and their professional associations from Tunisia's independence to post‐uprising transitions. We demonstrate that economic concerns, professional objectives, and civic professionalism contributed to the collective action of Tunisian lawyers before and after the uprising. Tunisian lawyers moved beyond the realm of their profession to adopt a role as overseers of the post‐uprising government.

This paper considers the important events and challenges as they per- tain to female governance in the “New Tunisia”, resulting in large part from the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) elections charged with writing a new constitution. The analysis focuses on the role women played in the election process, including women’s participation in the interim government (January 2011-November 9, 2011) and political parties. It continues with an in depth ex- amination of the debates and actions that emergedamong various factions during the first two years following the revolution, which has led to increased concern about the preservation of Tunisian women’s rights. The principal re- search question asks, “To what extend have Tunisian women been able to par- ticipate actively in shaping the new Tunisia and will this trend continue?” The study integrates several investigative approaches: historical narrative of fac- tual events, participant observation (from both researchers), interviews, and careful review of the ongoing actions and activities of women’s groups and societal challenges since October 23, 2011, which in turn, has spunconsiderable debate within Tunisian society about the status of women in the new Tunisia.

The Arab Springs is known as “a revolutionary wave of demonstrations, protests, riots, protracted civil wars and other forms of opposition (both violent and non-violent) in the Arab territories” (Elfaith. 2015, 121). Starting in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi a street vendor, set himself on fire after being harassed by municipal police officials. Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation sparked international attention, leading Tunisia into a revolution. After being in power for 23 years as Tunisia’s President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia (Bunton 2013, 16). Tunisia’s revolution led both the Arab and non-Arab world to witness “spontaneous explosions of protests, [revolutions] and popular political upheaval” in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, Lebanon, Algeria, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania (Ismael and Ismael 2013, 229). The high levels of political corruption, economic hardships and the desire for a free democratic government all inspired the citizens of these countries to take action against their governments.

The weakening of local power structures in Tunisia, whether linked to the authoritarian centralization of the country or to the erosion of the mechanisms for coopting local elites, strongly contributed to upset the political equilibrium of fallen President Ben Ali’s regime. The weakened position created conditions favorable to an ongoing negotiation over power-sharing among social groups and their access to resources. The adoption of a new Constitution in 2014 attests to this redefinition of power relations between local elites and the central State inasmuch as it established, for the first time in modern Tunisian history, the principle of an elected, decentralized ‘local power’ with financial and administrative autonomy. The aim of this article is to answer the question of whether the adoption of a new Constitution, brought in on the basis of a historical compromise between the representatives of the country’s different political tendencies, would enable an orderly changeover from authoritarian government to long-term power-sharing arrangements.

Political risk factors have been considered as important factors which impact the foreign direct investment (FDI). But, the relationship between the political risk and FDI still not highly covered as expected. In this context, it is crucial to measure the political risk factors impact on the FDI especially for the Arab Spring countries which embraced radical political change after the revolution in 2011. This article aims to investigate the relationship between political risk and the FDI in Tunisia for the case of service sectors. The research is based on aggregate variables that represent six pillars of Governance Indicators. The data was extracted from the Worldwide Governance and the Tunisian Central Bank websites, the data frequency is yearly from 2004 to 2016. The research confirms that the political factors notably the government effectiveness and voice and accountability have significant impact on the FDI and on the FDI in the services sector.

Revolutionary coalitions often break down in the aftermath of revolution, leading to the collapse of transitional governments. Fragmentation among revolutionary elites has been extensively theorized, but few works consider the origins and consequences of polarization among non-elite protesters in the revolutionary coalition. This paper examines the case of Tunisia to unpack how polarization among former revolutionaries may drive secondary waves of mobilization that imperil governing coalitions, even when elites are cooperating. Unique protest surveys of pro- and anti-government demonstrations during the Tunisian political crisis of 2013 – which catalyzed the resignation of the country’s first elected assembly – show that polarization within this coalition occurred along ideological lines concerning the role of Islam in governance but not along class lines, as some theories of transition would predict. Revolutionaries are re-mobilized in part through divergent narratives concerning which social groups participated most in the revolutionary struggle, and which groups suffered and profited most under the old regime. This paper counters the elite-centrism of predominant “transitology” approaches by highlighting how protest politics may shape institutional transitions.

Why are some dictators more successful at demobilizing protest movements than others? Repression sometimes stamps out protest movements (Bahrain in 2011) but can also cause a backlash (Egypt and Tunisia in 2011), leading to regime change. This article argues that the effectiveness of repression in quelling protests varies depending upon the income sources of authoritarian regimes. Oil-rich autocracies are well equipped to contend with domestic and international criticism, and this gives them a greater capacity to quell protests through force. Because oil-poor dictators lack such ability to deal with criticism, repression is more likely to trigger a backlash of increased protests. The argument is supported by analysis of newly available data on mass protests from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset, which covers all countries (1945–2006). This article implies that publics respond strategically to repression, and tend to demobilize when the government is capable of continually employing repression with impunity.

According to The Economist Democracy Index, Tunisia was at 2.79 during 2010 and by the end of 2011 they had climbed up to 5.53. Therefore Tunisia entered a new category, called hybrid regime. This was a step closer to a more democratic regime. Rustow Dankwart, Shain Yossi and Linz J. Juan would say that the interim government and the political actors within it had a significant impact on Tunisias increase in democracy index. Therefore the aim of this study took the shape of a theory consuming case study. The purpose of the study was to analyze the political actors and the interim government importance during the Tunisian democratic transition, with the delimitation to the year 2011. The results firstly showed us the categorization hardliners within the authoritarian coalition in combination with radicals in the oppositional coalition. During the second interim government the categorization changes from hardliners to softliners. During the third, we see a glint of moderates within the opposition. Secondly, the results showed us that there is evidence of an opposition-led, power-sharing and incumbent-led caretaker regime in Tunisia. The study discusses two conclusions about political actors during the transition. Firstly, the importance of radicals within the opposition and secondly the importance of the authoritarian coalition changing from hardliners to softliners, which allowed the country to transition. Within the categorization of the interim government we have come to the conclusion that the opposition-led government played a significant role in the Tunisian transition.

Why do revolutions happen? What role do structures, institutions, and actors play in precipitating (or preventing) them? Finally, What might compel social mobilization against a regime in the face of potentially insurmountable odds? These questions are all fundamentally about state-society (strategic) interactions, and elite and societal preference formation over time. The self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, served as a focal point upon which over twenty years of corrupt, coercive authoritarian rule were focused into a single, unified challenge to the Ben Ali regime. The regime's brutality was publicized via social media activism and satellite television, precipitating mass mobilization across Tunisia and, eventually, throughout the region and beyond. In light of the rapid and unforeseen nature of these events, scholars writing about the causes of the Arab Spring have focused their critiques on scholarship that they felt overemphasized the role of institutions and elite-level actors over 'under the radar' changes within society. This paper essentially agrees with this point of view, but is not content to simply 'throw out' institutionalism. As Timur Kuran (1991) argued in the wake of the unforeseen collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, one cannot understand revolution without understanding the 'true' preferences of social actors. In this way, the inevitability of revolutionary surprises seems a given so long as analysts continue to look from the top-down. Yet, this paper contends that institutions do still matter. They matter because different institutional arrangements incentivize and constrain regime strategies, which, in turn, inform the strategic calculations and preference orderings within society. These two societal variables are determined - in part - by the degree of regime flexibility, and they affect whether, how, and where social actors choose to vent their dissent. This paper proposes a model for the development of contentious social mobilization under authoritarianism. In order to do so, two models - one game-theoretic, and the other rooted in the contentious politics subfield of political sociology - are synthesized toward elucidating how altered societal preferences affect strategic interactions between the regime and society over time and during acute contentious episodes. The synthesized model is then illustrated through narrative case studies of two North African states that experienced divergent outcomes in the wake of the Arab Spring: Tunisia and Morocco. The limited spaces and institutions for the expression of dissent in Tunisia gradually changed societal preferences over time. In 2010, Tunisians' preferences shifted from various socioeconomic demands and other issue-specific grievances toward a galvanized demand for the fall of the regime. In Morocco, on the other hand, social actors, by and large, continued to prefer limited reforms to a complete upheaval of the political system. This paper contends that this divergence in preferences and therefore outcomes was in part determined by the variation in the two regimes' respective strategic mixes of concessions and/or coercion. To the extent that such strategies and institutions were more flexible - i.e. were more permissive of (limited) political contention and contestation - social movements were less likely to become emboldened against the regime.

Does banning opposition candidates from ballots increase the risk that they will turn to bullets instead? Globally, since the end of the Cold War, blatant election rigging tactics (such as ballot box stuffing) are being replaced by 'strategic rigging': subtler procedural manipulations aimed at winning while maintaining the guise of legitimacy in the eyes of international observers. In particular, incumbents (in regimes stuck between democracy and authoritarianism) are turning to 'electoral exclusion', neutralizing key rivals by illegitimately banning certain candidates, in turn reducing the need for cruder forms of election day rigging. I used mixed methods - combining insights from an original global dataset with extensive elite interviews conducted in five countries (Madagascar, Thailand, Tunisia, Zambia, and Côte d'Ivoire) - to establish that electoral exclusion is an attractive short-term election strategy for vulnerable incumbents that produces a much higher chance of victory but comes with high costs in the longer-term. Global probit modeling (using electoral exclusion as an independent variable and coups d'état and civil wars as separate dependent variables) suggests that, since the end of the Cold War, excluding opposition candidates from the ballot roughly doubles the risk of a coup d'état or quadruples the risk of civil war onset. In spite of these risks, incumbents fall into this 'exclusion trap' because of the shortened time horizon that frequently accompanies competitive multi-party elections. Vulnerable incumbents worry more about the short-term risk of losing an election than the long-term but ultimately unknown risk that political violence will ensue after the election. Finally, the inverse corollary of these findings is that inclusion of opposition candidates during multi-party elections can be a stabilizing factor. Though it may seem counterintuitive, fragile 'counterfeit democracies' - and so-called 'transitional' regimes - may be able to stave off existential threats to regime survival by extending an olive branch to their fiercest opponents. These findings combine to form the overarching argument of this dissertation: when opposition candidates are excluded from the ballot, they become more likely to turn to bullets by launching coups d'état and civil wars.

Partant du constat de la constitution de la promotion de la démocratie comme enjeu des relations internationales et de politique étrangère, la présente recherche s’interroge sur les politiques menées en la matière par l’Union européenne dans le cadre des relations avec ses voisins méditerranéens, particulièrement le Maroc et la Tunisie. L’analyse se concentre sur l’Instrument européen pour la démocratie et les droits de l’homme, sur la période 2007-2012.

L’objectif est de comprendre et d’expliquer les pratiques des différents groupes d’acteurs impliqués dans ces politiques, au sein de la Commission (DG Relex/SEAE, DG Devco, délégations) et du Parlement (sous-commission DROI).

La position défendue est la suivante :les pratiques européennes de promotion de la démocratie au Maroc et en Tunisie sont fonction de l’identité des groupes institutionnels qui les mettent en œuvre. Pour chaque groupe institutionnel, peuvent être mis en évidence des normes, intérêts et ressources qui contribuent à défendre et renforcer l’identité institutionnelle. Dès lors, des pratiques qui peuvent paraître incohérentes au premier abord (pourquoi agir au Maroc et pas en Tunisie ?pourquoi créer l’IEDDH et, parallèlement, évincer l’objectif de promotion de la démocratie de la coopération bilatérale avec la Tunisie ?) prennent tout leur sens lorsqu’on parvient à restituer la fonction sociale qu’elles assurent.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This dissertation explores the role of female political actors in the gendered rebuilding of Tunisia’s post-Ben Ali political infrastructure and how gender both informed and featured in the early stages of the democratic transition. Drawing on thirteen months of fieldwork and over 300 hours of interviews, it narrates a yet untold story of the transformation of female political actors from object to subject of the state. In the post-revolutionary political terrain, gender and women’s rights were imbued with broader discursive significance, becoming a vehicle through which to distinguish two broad political categories of Islamism and secularism, which showcased continuity with the historical deployment of gender in pre-independence and post-colonial authoritarian contexts. However, analysis of the development of gender parity legislation from its introduction in the interim electoral law in advance of the 2011 elections, through the constitutional and electoral law drafting processes, and its implementation in the 2014 elections, reveals the inadequacy of gender as a metaphor for broad political characterisations and the fluidity of the Tunisian political terrain as seen through a gendered lens. It was only through the collaborative work of female political actors across the ideological spectrum within the National Constituent Assembly that the foundational texts of the Second Republic were gendered, acknowledging and addressing the ways that the lived experiences of women, as socially and historically constituted subjects, can mediate access to rights. By virtue of this process, these female deputies, whose own subjectivities were transformed through interaction with male-dominated political institutions, enacted and embodied new modes of the female citizen as subject. Finally, in tracing the development of the gender parity laws through the formative years of Tunisian democracy, this dissertation illuminates the ways in which access to newly democratised political power remains gendered, mediated through the complex interplay between larger political, social, and economic structures.

With the exception of the different studies performed by Márquez Cruz, and the report about local government (Magre, 2006), there is no other research, in Spain, with the level of detail of the current one, in anything relating to the portfolio distribution among the elected Councillors, covering a period of 32 years, which makes possible to formulate, not only some hypothesis about the behaviour of the parties in coalition in terms of paybacks and gender, but also to conclude some trends and facts relating the morphology of the coalition. The study concludes that within the period under study, 1979-2011, covering the catalan municipalities with more than 10.000 inhabitants and County capitals, coalition has been the norm for the local governments. The study also highlights that there are two specific coalition patterns between parties, the one based on cooperation, as they exercise the PSC and ICV, and the one based on competition, usually performed by CIU and ERC. Under the cooperation pattern, the small party is rewarded with portfolios which are relevant for the execution of his political goals, improving his visibility and the possibilities to receive more votes in the next elections. The last part of the study is about gender issues, concluding that the legal equality is not guaranteeing the effective equality, understood as the balance between the percentage of elected councillors per gender, and the representativeness and power levels attributed to them. It is evidenced that the composition of the lists is the first constraint for women in local politics, since the first positions are mainly occupied by men. It is proved that the position of a candidate within an electoral list is less respected when assigning power and representativeness, if the candidate is a woman.
Aquest estudi té dos parts diferenciades, essent la primera la creació d’una base de dades de més de 180.000 registres extrets de fons primàries, amb informació detallada de candidats, llistes electorals, càrrecs i regidories de les que han sigut responsables, de tots els municipis de més de 10.000 habitants i capitals de Comarca de Catalunya, en relació als governs formats des de 1979 fins 2011. La segona part és resultat de l’explotació d’aquesta base de dades, inexistent fins ara. Els resultats indiquen què, durant el període estudiat, la coalició de partits ha sigut la norma als governs municipals. També s’evidencia que hi ha dos formes bàsiques de cooperació entre partits quan formen coalició, com són la cooperació i la competició. La primera és la habitual entre el PSC i ICV, mentre que la segona ho és entre CIU i ERC. Quan el patró és de cooperació, el partit petit rep regidories que li permeten executar els punts més importants del seu programa electoral, aconseguint major visibilitat i, generalment, mes vots a les següents eleccions. La base de dades també ha permès demostrar que la igualtat de gènere establerta per Llei no comporta, de forma directa, la igualtat efectiva, entesa aquesta com la resultant de la distribució de càrrecs i responsabilitats un cop es formen els governs municipals, independent que siguin en forma de partit únic o en coalició. La formació de les llistes electorals és una important restricció per les dones en política local, doncs els primers llocs tenen un clar biaix masculí. En no ocupar les primeres posicions tenen menys opcions a càrrecs importants i visibilitat pública. Es demostra que en el cas de candidats masculins, els partits respecten més la posició ocupada a les llistes a l’hora d’assignar responsabilitats, i que el PSC respecta menys el llocs ocupats per dones que no pas CIU.

This thesis examines the relationship between the Communist Party of India (Marxist)-led Left Front Government and the media in the provincial state of West Bengal, India, during the thirty four years (1977-2011) period when the party was in government. The main aim of the thesis is to investigate the relation between the CPI (M) led Left Front Government and the media in West Bengal (1977-2011), the role of the media in stabilising or destabilising the Left Front Government, the impact of neoliberalism on the Left Front Government and their relation with the media, the role of the media in communicating developmental policies of the LFG to the public and finally the role which the mainstream and the party controlled media played in the public sphere. These questions are addressed through document research of CPI (M)’s congress and conference reports, manifestos, press releases, pamphlets, leaflets, booklets; and interviews with the CPI (M) leadership and the Editors and Bureau Chiefs of the key newspapers and television channels in West Bengal. The findings are contextualised within a broader discussion of the political and historical transitions India and West Bengal have gone through in this period (chapter 4). This is the first study looking at the relationship between the media and the CPI (M) led Left Front Government over a period of thirty four years (1977-2011). The thesis finds that neoliberalism in India had considerable effects on the CPI (M), the media and their relationship. The research finds a continuous effort from the mainstream and the party-controlled media to dominate the public sphere leading debates in order to seek some form of political consensus in order to govern. The media in West Bengal were politically divided between the left and the opposition. The research finds that this generated a market for political advertisements and political news contributing to a politically polarised media market in West Bengal that assisted in generating revenue for the media. The findings also suggest that the media contributed to rather than played a determining role in destabilising the Left Front Government. Finally the research finds that the CPI (M) had an arduous relation with the media since 1977 when the party decided to participate in the parliamentary democracy. The LFG and the mainstream media entered into an antagonistic relationship post 1991 contributing to a politically polarised media market in West Bengal.

Transitional legislatures are essential institutions for entrenching democracy by providing legitimacy and by constraining the executive. This research examines the role of Myanmar{u2019}s legislature (the Hluttaw) during the country{u2019}s transition from the direct military rule. When it first met in January 2011, there was little disagreement that Myanmar{u2019}s legislature would serve as a rubber stamp because of the overwhelming majority of representatives from the ruling pro-military party and the military itself. Yet the Hluttaw emerged as a reform-minded lawmaking body as well as a forum for oversight of the executive. Lawmakers from the minor and ethnic parties actively engaged in the legislature alongside lawmakers from the ruling party, especially those who were pressured to contest the 2010 election.This research analyses the role of Myanmar{u2019}s legislature against four major transitional functions: (i) achieving legislative autonomy; (ii) a driving force in political and structural reform; (iii) realising democratic norms; and (iv) tackling transitional conflicts. Based on this conceptual framework, the dissertation asks, what role did Myanmar{u2019}s first legislature play during the transition from the military rule? And what were the determining factors? It argues that the Hluttaw provided transitional legitimacy by achieving legislative autonomy but its authoritarian form, and its political competition with the executive, stopped the Hluttaw from becoming a driving force in Myanmar{u2019}s transition. The dissertation also introduces the three major factors responsible for the shift from a rubber stamp to a robust legislature: (i) the speakers; (ii) non-partisanship; and (iii) co-opted lawmakers. The nexus between these factors explains what influenced the Hluttaw as well as how the Hluttaw became institutionally stronger.This research contributes to the scholarly understanding of transitional legislatures by developing a conceptual framework about how legislatures play a role in political transition as well as an explanation about how institutional rivalry can create authoritarian splits. This analysis is based on five months of fieldwork in the national legislature in Nay Pyi Taw, and the sub-national legislatures in Myanmar{u2019}s States and Regions, and content analysis of the records of the legislative plenary sessions (2011-2016). Keywords: Myanmar, Hluttaw, legislature, democratic transition

This study is concerned with the constructions of the Tanzanian nation in the press. It has confined its focus, first, to the coverage from 2005 to 2011 on Union Day that marks the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania and, second, to two prominent Tanzanian newspapers, namely the state-owned Daily News, and the privately-owned The Citizen on Union Day. As the Union remains a contentious issue, the relevance of this research relates to the press’s considerable power to shape understandings and influence attitudes. The study works within a broad cultural and media studies framework and is informed by a constructionist approach to representation and to culture, and to nation in particular. It also draws of journalistic theories of agenda-setting and the normative roles of the press to probe the agendas set by the press on Union Day and to interrogate how the two newspapers construct and frame the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar as nation. The research responds to the question: ‘How has the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union been represented in The Citizen and Daily News newspapers from 2005 to 2011?’ It employs quantitative and qualitative (thematic) content analysis to investigate the coverage in the editorials and feature articles of The Citizen and Daily News newspapers on Union Day (26 April) of 2005 to 2011. This study finds that the government-owned newspaper, Daily News, publishes more articles related to Union on Union Day than the privately-owned, The Citizen and collaborates more determinedly with the state in the process of constructing the nation. However, both newspapers adopt a collaborative role consistent with the development journalism tradition that endorses an informal partnership between media and the state in the process of development (Christians et al, 2009:201). Both publications tend to emphasise the hegemonic ideology pertaining to Union while giving limited attention to challenges to such constructions. While both newspapers do identify certain problems of the Union and thus exercise a monitorial role to varying extents, it is apparent that the press in Tanzania tends to be largely acritical, perhaps attributable to a long period under single party rule

ix, 99 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number.
This study examines how the news media and U.S. officials within the Bush administration utilized rhetoric and specific words over others to frame the violence and civil unrest in Iraq following the U.S. invasion. This study incorporates a mixed methods approach to framing analysis. It seeks to advance framing research into the role of the media in presenting dominant frames set forth by powerful political elites. By examining Department of Defense news briefings, this study critiques the officials' framing of the violence and unrest in Iraq. Likewise, through a content analysis of two newspapers' coverage of the Iraq War, it examines the frequency of certain key terms as it attempts to locate the emergence of dominant rhetorical frames, particularly "insurgency." Results reveal that officials framed Iraq's insurgency as part of the war on terror and the insurgency frame emerged in print during the periods of study.
Committee in charge: Prof. John Russial, Chair; Prof. Patricia A Curtin; Prof. Carl Bybee

AbstractIn 1997, the Riksdag, the Swedish Parliament, adopted Vision Zero as a new goal and strategy for road safety in Sweden (Swedish Government 1997). In the more than 20 years since the Vision Zero policy was adopted, it has spread internationally as a model of a public road safety policy (OECD/ITF 2008, 2016; World Health Organization 2017). It is not only in the transport sector that Vision Zero has attracted interest; it has also spread and continues to spread to other sectors of Swedish society such as fire safety, patient safety, occupational accidents, and suicide (Kristianssen et al. 2018). Although, road safety policies and strategies can be developed and adopted by a variety of actors at different levels in the society in a democracy, parliaments have a special position, and it establishes an exclusive legitimacy in the society. According to the Swedish Constitution (Swedish Parliament 2016), all public power proceeds from the people, and the Riksdag (the Swedish Parliament) is the foremost representative of the people. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the Swedish Parliament and the Swedish Government and how road safety, as a public policy, finds its way into public agenda in a competing political environment. The decision to adopt Vision Zero in Sweden was a rather radical change (Belin et al. 2011) of that time safety policy. This chapter examines the political decision-making process that preceded the decision by the Swedish Parliament to adopt the Vision Zero policy in 1997 (Swedish Parliament 1997) and the decision to re-evaluate Vision Zero in 2004 (Swedish Parliament 2004).

AbstractIn 1997, the Riksdag, the Swedish Parliament, adopted Vision Zero as a new goal and strategy for road safety in Sweden (Swedish Government 1997). In the more than 20 years since the Vision Zero policy was adopted, it has spread internationally as a model of a public road safety policy (OECD/ITF 2008, 2016; World Health Organization 2017). It is not only in the transport sector that Vision Zero has attracted interest; it has also spread and continues to spread to other sectors of Swedish society such as fire safety, patient safety, occupational accidents, and suicide (Kristianssen et al. 2018). Although, road safety policies and strategies can be developed and adopted by a variety of actors at different levels in the society in a democracy, parliaments have a special position, and it establishes an exclusive legitimacy in the society. According to the Swedish Constitution (Swedish Parliament 2016), all public power proceeds from the people, and the Riksdag (the Swedish Parliament) is the foremost representative of the people. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the Swedish Parliament and the Swedish Government and how road safety, as a public policy, finds its way into public agenda in a competing political environment. The decision to adopt Vision Zero in Sweden was a rather radical change (Belin et al. 2011) of that time safety policy. This chapter examines the political decision-making process that preceded the decision by the Swedish Parliament to adopt the Vision Zero policy in 1997 (Swedish Parliament 1997) and the decision to re-evaluate Vision Zero in 2004 (Swedish Parliament 2004).

AbstractThis chapter briefly traces the struggle to restore sanitation workers’ humanity in India since the early twentieth century. Sanitation labor has generally been carried out by people from the Dalit community, a group of castes formerly referred to as “untouchables.” By paying attention to M. K. Gandhi, B. R. Ambedkar, government authorities, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), this chapter examines how humanitarian interventions were made via ideological and practical approaches to address the circumstances of sanitation workers and the limitations thereof. Gandhi’s emphasis on the moral aspect of scavenging and Ambedkar’s stress on the structural inequalities in the division of sanitation labor informed the mainstream ideas in preindependence India. However, efforts after independence were committed to abolishing the specific task of manual scavenging as a sine qua non for the emancipation of sanitation workers. These endeavors primarily entailed abolishing scavengers’ customary rights, the technological invention of low-cost flush toilets, and legal actions taken against the government. However, these attempts have led to dismissing the importance of providing “adequate sanitation” to the bulk of the population (Chaplin, The politics of sanitation in India. Orient Blackswan, New Delhi, 2011: 185, 267), enhancing nonscavenging sanitation workers’ conditions, and developing a more mechanized, holistic human waste disposal system. Further, having underlined the unsanitary, inhuman, or moral dimensions of sanitation labor, these interventions did not necessarily consider the complicated context of actual sanitation workers regarding how they perceive the labor on their own terms.

Abstract This chapter analyzes the post-Islamist politics of the Tunisian Ennahda party and conceives of post-Islamism as post-ideological. Islamism in the twentieth century is a modern ideology of societal transformation, while post-Islamism is the "normalization" of such political praxis. In the Tunisian context, Ennahda succeeded in integrating state institutions and participating in building democracy after 2011. At the 2016 conference, the party declared to have overcome "Islamism" and adopted a new strategy of specialization, which led to the separation of daʿwa activities and politics. This change has transformed the party's conception of politics, whereby the priority becomes contesting elections and participating in governmental coalitions. This chapter analyzes this change from the point of view of the party's ideological transformation and its concrete political actions.

This study examines the relationship between variables thought to have an effect on foreign trade investment (FDI) including volume of trade, GDP growth rate, trade credit risk and political stability. Specifically, this study is concerned with the 1981-2012 period in the MENA region, made up of the Middle East and North African countries of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Another objective of the study is to determine whether economic factors are more impactful than political factors on the FDI flow to MENA countries. In order to investigate long-term relationships between the variables, three cointegration analyses were used including Pedroni, Kao and Johansen, and Fisher. Coefficients were interpreted using the FMOLS and the DOLS methods. The Holtz-Eakin Causality Test was also applied. As a result of the analysis, volume of trade was found to be the most important factor determining FDI. Economic factors were found to be more influential for FDI than political factors.

This chapter begins with Hamza Yusuf's concern for the Tunisian people in light of Bouazizi’s desperate act of self-immolation. Yusuf soon becomes an enthusiastic supporter of the Egyptian revolution, though not of democracy as a system of government. Yet, within months, he begins to articulate his opposition to revolutions as well as his support for monarchy over democracy as a form of government. I argue that this is more in keeping with Yusuf's pre-2011 political orientation. In contrast with Yusuf's transformation, his teacher, Abdallah bin Bayyah, evinces a wariness regarding the revolutions early on. This leads him to part ways with his erstwhile colleague in Qatar, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and join forces with the UAE's religious establishment to become the most prominent religious authority in the UAE. Part of Abdallah bin Bayyah's intellectual contributions that are touched on in this chapter are his justification of political absolutism in systematic Islamic juristic terms.

For many decades in Tunisia, there has been a robust link between natural resource management and contentious national and local politics. These disputes manifest in the form of protests, sit-ins, the disruption of production and distribution and legal suits on the one hand, and corporate and government response using coercive and concessionary measures on the other. Residents of resource-rich areas and their allies protest the inequitable distribution of their local natural wealth and the degradation of their health, land, water, soil and air. They contest a dynamic that tends to bring greater benefit to Tunisia’s coastal metropolitan areas. Natural resource exploitation is also a source of livelihoods and the contentious politics around them have, at times, led to somewhat more equitable relationships. The most important actors in these contentious politics include citizens, activists, local NGOs, local and national government, international commercial interests, international NGOs and multilateral organisations. These politics fit into wider and very longstanding patterns of wealth distribution in Tunisia and were part of the popular alienation that drove the uprising of 2011. In many ways, the dynamic of the contentious politics is fundamentally unchanged since prior to the uprising and protests have taken place within the same month of writing of this paper. Looking onto this scene, commentators use the frame of margins versus centre (‘marginalization’), and also apply the lens of labour versus capital. If this latter lens is applied, not only is there continuity from prior to 2011, there is continuity with the colonial era when natural resource extraction was first industrialised and internationalised. In these ways, the management of Tunisia’s natural wealth is a significant part of the country’s serious political and economic challenges, making it a major factor in the street politics unfolding at the time of writing.

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.