Academic literature on the topic 'Trusts and trustees – taxation – united states'

In general, there are grantor, trustee, and beneficiaries in a trust. And the grantor transfer grantor’s property to the trustee to grant profits to the beneficiary. However, trust can be established in accordance with a ‘contract between the grantor and the trustee’. So, the existence of a beneficiary is not essential in the establishment of the trust. In terms of the tax law, if there is a beneficiary fixed by the grantor when establishing the trust, the beneficiary will be deemed to have received profits from the grantor and bear the tax obligation. However, if there is no beneficiary, only grantor and trustee exist as trust parties. At this time, the grantor transferred and disposed of own property to the trustee, so grantor will no longer have a tax obligation with respect to the property. From the trustee’s point of view, the trust property is in trustee’s name, but trustee will argue that paying the beneficiary the profits generated through the management and operation of the trust property is the main task and only receiving remuneration. In other words, the trustee will argue that the trust property is formally in trustee name, but the trustee is not a real owner who can use, profit, or dispose of the trust property like own property, so there is no tax obligation. This paper review trust without beneficiary in Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act. First, it will review the problems of the current regulations related to the judgment of the taxpayer. And this paper presents its own views through comparative legal review with foreign legal systems. First, in consideration of the relationship between the Trust Act and the Tax Act, it is necessary to prepare provisions on the duration of a trust without beneficiary to prevent unnecessary tax delays and difficulties in evaluating trust property. Second, in the trust without beneficiaries under Article 33 (2) of the current Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act, taxation on grantor did not reflect the Substance over form. In addition, since double taxation problems may arise in this regard, it is not logically reasonable for the grantor to give to the grantor, which should be solved by income tax. In addition, taxation based on Substance over form taxation should be promoted by referring to foreign concepts such as trust taxation in the United States. Third, if a beneficiary occurs after the trustee’s heir pays the tax, it is necessary to more clearly define. In this case, it is considered logically to give gifts from the grantor’s heir to a new beneficiary, not the grantor, and it is necessary to refer to Japanese legislation. Fourth, there is a need for taxation on trustees in a trust withot beneficiary. In terms of grantor taxation, it can also be seen in foreign legislation that grantor taxation can be recognized even if the grantor does not enjoy economic benefits. It is necessary to discuss trustee taxation in trust for the existence of beneficiaries by more actively referring to these thinking methods or criteria. It is expected that the above discussions will contribute to discussions on the literary interpretation and taxation method of the provisions on taxation in the trust without beneficiaries under the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act in the future.

Tesi L’approccio fiscale rigido nei confronti dei trust necessita di una continua vigilanza per prevenire una potenziale doppia imposizione e per monitorare l’evoluzione della giurisprudenza. È consigliabile che i redditi e le distribuzioni patrimoniali dei trust siano rispettivamente soggetti all’imposta sul reddito e all’imposta sulle donazioni e successioni, per evitare una doppia tassazione. Se un beneficiario prevede un trasferimento in Germania, potrebbe essere utile considerare l’uscita anticipata dal trust americano. Le recenti sentenze del Tribunale federale tedesco e del Tribunale tributario di Münster hanno fornito importanti chiarimenti sulla tassazione dei dividendi dei trust, suggerendo che il rimborso dei “depositi” non è tassabile e che gli incrementi di valore del patrimonio del trust dovrebbero essere tassati in caso di liquidazione. Quest’ultima questione solleva ulteriori interrogativi riguardo al diritto di tassazione della Germania secondo il trattato per evitare la doppia imposizione con gli Stati Uniti. Infine, è fondamentale adattare le pratiche in attesa di una risoluzione definitiva, ad esempio vendendo prima della liquidazione del trust. The author´s view The stringent tax approach towards trusts calls for unwavering scrutiny to forestall any potential double taxation and to closely monitor the evolving jurisprudence. It is prudent to subject trust-generated income and capital distributions to income tax and gift and estate tax respectively, thus preventing dual taxation. If a beneficiary envisages a relocation to Germany, contemplating an early exit from the American trust could prove beneficial. The recent rulings of the German Federal Court and the Münster Tax Court have provided pivotal clarifications on trust dividend taxation, indicating that the reimbursement of “deposits” is non-taxable and that increments in the trust’s wealth should be taxed upon liquidation. This latter point raises further questions about Germany’s taxing rights as per the double taxation treaty with the United States. Finally, it is crucial to adapt practices while awaiting definitive resolution, such as proceeding with sales before trust liquidation.

The concept ‘place of effective management’ (POEM) is used in many States around the world. Yet the meaning of this concept remains somewhat ambiguous. It is important to establish where an entity is effectively managed, since many States still use The POEM as one of the criteria to determine residence in terms of their domestic legislation. Furthermore, The POEM is still relevant in several double taxation treaties (DTTs), even after the changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention and the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. This article critically analyses significant judgments from the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada and Australia. From these judgments, a set of guidelines to determine an entity’s POEM is compiled. These guidelines may assist both taxpayers and tax administrators in the application of the concept of the POEM to a new set of facts. Place of effective management, Central management and control, Residence, Taxation. Company, Board of directors, Trust, Trustees

Abstract Variation of a trust deed in any of the States and Territories of Australia by extending its period of operation does not cause the instrument of change to be exigible to ad valorem stamp duty, even if the instrument in question is a resettlement. Likewise, it is also not a resettlement for capital gains tax purposes and, in this respect, it is submitted that the same statements of principle apply in the United Kingdom. Australian law owes much to the laws of the United Kingdom as is made abundantly clear in such Australian texts as Hill on the Duties Act and Jacobs Law of Trusts, Ford & Lee on Trusts, Dal Pont on Trusts and Ong on Trusts. The English texts such as Lewin on Trusts, Underhill & Hayton Law of Trusts and Trustees, and Thomas & Hudson on Trusts are equally helpful to persons seeking knowledge, as also remains the respective 3rd and 4th editions of Scott on Trusts and Scott & Ascher on Trusts. This paper seeks to establish its themes with the aid of extracts from both Australian and United Kingdom decisions. If some seem lengthy, then, in this commentator’s opinion, that length is justified.

Public trusts for natural resources incorporate both limits and duties on governments in their stewardship of those natural resources. They exist in every state in the United States—in constitutional provisions, statutes, and in common law. Yet the law recognizing public trusts for natural resources may contain only the most basic provisions—often just a sentence or two. The purpose and terms of these public trusts certainly answer some questions about the limits and duties of trustees, but they do not answer all questions. When questions arise that the body of law creating or recognizing a public trust for natural resources does not fully answer, trustees, lawyers, and courts often look to trust law for help. In fact, they have been doing so for more than a century, including in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 1892 public trust decision, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v Illinois. In this sense, trust law provides a set of background or underlying principles for interpreting and applying public trusts. Using cases from around the country, this Article sets out a four-step methodology for determining when and how to use trust law principles to help interpret public trusts. This methodology can be applied in any case involving the use of specific trust principles to help interpret any particular public trust. This Article also explains that the relevant trust law should not be limited to private trust law, but rather it should include general trust principles, charitable trust law principles, and private (or noncharitable) trust law principles. This Article uses a 2019 Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decision, Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, as a case study. The case applies article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which requires that public natural resources be conserved and maintained for the benefit of present and future generations. In that case, the court used an interpretation of private trust law to decide that the state could spend some bonus and rental payment money from oil and gas leasing on state forest and park land, which is constitutional public trust property, for non-trust purposes. This Article applies the four-part methodology to the case, explains general trust law and charitable trust law principles that the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania did not address, and argues that the use of these principles better fits the constitutional public trust. It concludes that the money from bonus and rental payments should be spent entirely for the purposes of the trust. This Article draws attention to both the potential value of trust law principles and also to their potential danger in the interpretation and application of public trust laws for natural resources. Trust law has the potential to enhance the protectiveness of public trusts by imposing various fiduciary duties on trustees. It also has the potential to undermine public trusts, particularly through rules requiring or encouraging that trust assets be financially productive. To vindicate public trusts for natural resources, environmental and natural resources lawyers need to become better trust lawyers.

The origins of leveraged leasing are the trust arrangements used in the 1870's in the United States of America by railroad companies to finance the acquisition of rolling stock (Fritch, 1977, p. 98). A trust was established to purchase the equipment. The trustee issued trust certificates to investors who provided the funds for the equipment acquisition. The trust certificates provided for the repayment of principal and interest at specified dates. The trust then leased the equipment to the railroad company and the rental paid by the railroad company was used to repay the trust certificates as they fell due. These arrangements were in reality conditional sale agreements and not leveraged leases. Leveraged leasing as we know it today was introduced in the U.S.A in 1963 after the Comptroller of the Currency permitted national and state chartered banks to own and lease personal property (Weston, 1983, p. 271). The arrangement was used initially by railroad and airline companies to finance the acquisition of large items of capital equipment. Companies within capital intensive industries could not absorb the tax benefits of ownership whereas the banks could. Leveraged leasing meant that the banks owned the equipment and claimed depreciation and other tax deductions associated with ownership. These benefits were passed onto the railroad companies through lower rentals which reflected the value of these taxation benefits.

This article argues, as others have before, that the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (or “FIRPTA”), or at least the provisions of FIRPTA relating to “United States real property holding corporations,” should be repealed. Their enactment in 1980 was misguided and in any event changes in the Internal Revenue Code since then have made the provisions obsolete. But if FIRPTA is repealed, in whole or in part, the article argues that the lack of parity between foreign investment in real property that is made directly or through a partnership, on the one hand, and foreign investment in a real estate investment trust (or a regulated investment company that invests in shares of real estate investment trusts) should be dealt with. Otherwise, repeal will exacerbate existing distortions (which were already pushed further by FIRPTA) resulting from the choice of the entity used to make an investment in US real property. The article also suggests that repeal of FIRPTA would provide an opportunity to look at the taxation of foreign investment in the United States more broadly and in particular the rules that tax income from U.S. real property. The tax treatment of inward investment is a generally neglected subject.The article concludes by arguing against legislation that would keepthe FIRPTA rules and simply expand provisions of present law that favor foreign investment through real estate investment trusts, such as the Real Estate Jobs and Investment Act of 2011.

Introduction This article explores the changing relational quality of “the shadow of hierarchy”, in the context of the merging of platforms with infrastructure as the source of the shadow of hierarchy. In governance and regulatory studies, the shadow of hierarchy (or variations thereof), describes the space of influence that hierarchal organisations and infrastructures have (Héritier and Lehmkuhl; Lance et al.). A shift in who/what casts the shadow of hierarchy will necessarily result in changes to the attendant relational values, logics, and (techno)socialities that constitute the shadow, and a new arrangement of shadow that presents new challenges and opportunities. This article reflects on relevant literature to consider two different ways the shadow of hierarchy has qualitatively changed as platforms, rather than infrastructures, come to cast the shadow of hierarchy – an increase in scalability; and new socio-technical arrangements of (non)participation – and the opportunities and challenges therein. The article concludes that more concerted efforts are needed to design the shadow, given a seemingly directionless desire to enact data-driven solutions. The Shadow of Hierarchy, Infrastructures, and Platforms The shadow of hierarchy refers to how institutional, infrastructural, and organisational hierarchies create a relational zone of influence over a particular space. This commonly refers to executive decisions and legislation created by nation states, which are cast over private and non-governmental actors (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2). Lance et al. (252–53) argue that the shadow of hierarchy is a productive and desirable thing. Exploring the shadow of hierarchy in the context of how geospatial data agencies govern their data, Lance et al. find that the shadow of hierarchy enables the networked governance approaches that agencies adopt. This is because operating in the shadow of institutions provides authority, confers bureaucratic legitimacy and top-down power, and offers financial support. The darkness of the shadow is thus less a moral or ethicopolitical statement (such as that suggested by Fisher and Bolter, who use the idea of darkness to unpack the morality of tourism involving death and human suffering), and instead a relationality; an expression of differing values, logics, and (techno)socialities internal and external to those infrastructures and institutions that cast it (Gehl and McKelvey). The shadow of hierarchy might therefore be thought of as a field of relational influences and power that a social body casts over society, by virtue of a privileged position vis-a-vis society. It modulates society’s “light”; the resources (Bourdieu) and power relationships (Foucault) that run through social life, as parsed through a certain institutional and infrastructural worldview (the thing that blocks the light to create the shadow). In this way the shadow of hierarchy is not a field of absolute blackness that obscures, but instead a gradient of light and dark that creates certain effects. The shadow of hierarchy is now, however, also being cast by decentralised, privately held, and non-hierarchal platforms that are replacing or merging with public infrastructure, creating new social effects. Platforms are digital, socio-technical systems that create relationships between different entities. They are most commonly built around a relatively fixed core function (such as a social media service like Facebook), that then interacts with a peripheral set of complementors (advertising companies and app developers in the case of social media; Baldwin and Woodard), to create new relationships, forms of value, and other interactions (van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity). In creating these relationships, platforms become inherently political (Gillespie), shaping relationships and content on the platform (Suzor) and in embodied life (Ajunwa; Eubanks). While platforms are often associated with optional consumer platforms (such as streaming services like Spotify), they have increasingly come to occupy the place of public infrastructure, and act as a powerful enabler to different socio-technical, economic, and political relationships (van Dijck, Governing Digital Societies). For instance, Plantin et al. argue that platforms have merged with infrastructures, and that once publicly held and funded institutions and essential services now share many characteristics with for-profit, privately held platforms. For example, Australia has had a long history of outsourcing employment services (Webster and Harding), and nearly privatised its entire visa processing data infrastructure (Jenkins). Platforms therefore have a greater role in casting the shadow of hierarchy than before. In doing so, they cast a shadow that is qualitatively different, modulated through a different set of relational values and (techno)socialities. Scalability A key difference and selling point of platforms is their scalability; since they can rapidly and easily up- and down-scale their functionalities in a way that traditional infrastructure cannot (Plantin et al.). The ability to respond “on-demand” to infrastructural requirements has made platforms the go-to service delivery option in the neo-liberalised public infrastructure environment (van Dijck, Governing Digital Societies). For instance, services providers like Amazon Web Services or Microsoft Azure provide on demand computing capacity for many nations’ most valuable services, including their intelligence and security capabilities (Amoore, Cloud Ethics; Konkel). The value of such platforms to government lies in the reduced cost and risk that comes with using rented capabilities, and the enhanced flexibility to increase or decrease their usage as required, without any of the economic sunk costs attached to owning the infrastructure. Scalability is, however, not just about on-demand technical capability, but about how platforms can change the scale of socio-technical relationships and services that are mediated through the platform. This changes the relational quality of the shadow of hierarchy, as activities and services occurring within the shadow are now connected into a larger and rapidly modulating scale. Scalability allows the shadow of hierarchy to extend from those in proximity to institutions to the broader population in general. For example, individual citizens can more easily “reach up” into governmental services and agencies as a part of completing their everyday business through platform such as MyGov in Australia (Services Australia). Using a smartphone application, citizens are afforded a more personalised and adaptive experience of the welfare state, as engaging with welfare services is no-longer tied to specific “brick-and-mortar” locations, but constantly available through a smartphone app and web portal. Multiple government services including healthcare and taxation are also connected to this platform, allowing users to reach across multiple government service domains to complete their personal business, seeking information and services that would have once required separate communications with different branches of government. The individual’s capacities to engage with the state have therefore upscaled with this change in the shadow, retaining a productivity and capacity enhancing quality that is reminiscent of older infrastructures and institutions, as the individual and their lived context is brought closer to the institutions themselves. Scale, however, comes with complications. The fundamental driver for scalability and its adaptive qualities is datafication. This means individuals and organisations are inflecting their operational and relational logics with the logic of datafication: a need to capture all data, at all times (van Dijck, Datafication; Fourcade and Healy). Platforms, especially privately held platforms, benefit significantly from this, as they rely on data to drive and refine their algorithmic tools, and ultimately create actionable intelligence that benefits their operations. Thus, scalability allows platforms to better “reach down” into individual lives and different social domains to fuel their operations. For example, as public transport services become increasingly datafied into mobility-as-a-service (MAAS) systems, ride sharing and on-demand transportation platforms like Uber and Lyft become incorporated into the public transport ecosystem (Lyons et al.). These platforms capture geospatial, behavioural, and reputational data from users and drivers during their interactions with the platform (Rosenblat and Stark; Attoh et al.). This generates additional value, and profits, for the platform itself with limited value returned to the user or the broader public it supports, outside of the transport service. It also places the platform in a position to gain wider access to the population and their data, by virtue of operating as a part of a public service. In this way the shadow of hierarchy may exacerbate inequity. The (dis)benefits of the shadow of hierarchy become unevenly spread amongst actors within its field, a function of an increased scalability that connects individuals into much broader assemblages of datafication. For Eubank, this can entrench existing economic and social inequalities by forcing those in need to engage with digitally mediated welfare systems that rely on distant and opaque computational judgements. Local services are subject to increased digital surveillance, a removal of agency from frontline advocates, and algorithmic judgement at scale. More fortunate citizens are also still at risk, with Nardi and Ekbia arguing that many digitally scaled relationships are examples of “heteromation”, whereby platforms convince actors in the platform to labour for free, such as through providing ratings which establish a platform’s reputational economy. Such labour fuels the operation of the platform through exploiting users, who become both a product/resource (as a source of data for third party advertisers) and a performer of unrewarded digital labour, such as through providing user reviews that help guide a platform’s algorithm(s). Both these examples represent a particularly disconcerting outcome for the shadow of hierarchy, which has its roots in public sector institutions who operate for a common good through shared and publicly held infrastructure. In shifting towards platforms, especially privately held platforms, value is transmitted to private corporations and not the public or the commons, as was the case with traditional infrastructure. The public also comes to own the risks attached to platforms if they become tied to public services, placing a further burden on the public if the platform fails, while reaping none of the profit and value generated through datafication. This is a poor bargain at best. (Non)Participation Scalability forms the basis for a further predicament: a changing socio-technical dynamic of (non)participation between individuals and services. According to Star (118), infrastructures are defined through their relationships to a given context. These relationships, which often exist as boundary objects between different communities, are “loosely structured in common use, and become tightly bound in particular locations” (Star, 118). While platforms are certainly boundary objects and relationally defined, the affordances of cloud computing have enabled a decoupling from physical location, and the operation of platforms across time and space through distributed digital nodes (smartphones, computers, and other localised hardware) and powerful algorithms that sort and process requests for service. This does not mean location is not important for the cloud (see Amoore, Cloud Geographies), but platforms are less likely to have a physically co-located presence in the same way traditional infrastructures had. Without the same institutional and infrastructural footprint, the modality for participating in and with the shadow of hierarchy that platforms cast becomes qualitatively different and predicated on digital intermediaries. Replacing a physical and human footprint with algorithmically supported and decentralised computing power allows scalability and some efficiency improvements, but it also removes taken-for-granted touchpoints for contestation and recourse. For example, ride-sharing platform Uber operates globally, and has expressed interest in operating in complement to (and perhaps in competition with) public transport services in some cities (Hall et al.; Conger). Given that Uber would come to operate as a part of the shadow of hierarchy that transport authorities cast over said cities, it would not be unreasonable to expect Uber to be subject to comparable advocacy, adjudication, transparency, and complaint-handling requirements. Unfortunately, it is unclear if this would be the case, with examples suggesting that Uber would use the scalability of its platform to avoid these mechanisms. This is revealed by ongoing legal action launched by concerned Uber drivers in the United Kingdom, who have sought access to the profiling data that Uber uses to manage and monitor its drivers (Sawers). The challenge has relied on transnational law (the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation), with UK-based drivers lodging claims in Amsterdam to initiate the challenge. Such costly and complex actions are beyond the means of many, but demonstrate how reasonable participation in socio-technical and governance relationships (like contestations) might become limited, depending on how the shadow of hierarchy changes with the incorporation of platforms. Even if legal challenges for transparency are successful, they may not produce meaningful change. For instance, O’Neil links algorithmic bias to mathematical shortcomings in the variables used to measure the world; in the creation of irritational feedback loops based on incorrect data; and in the use of unsound data analysis techniques. These three factors contribute to inequitable digital metrics like predictive policing algorithms that disproportionately target racial minorities. Large amounts of selective data on minorities create myopic algorithms that direct police to target minorities, creating more selective data that reinforces the spurious model. These biases, however, are persistently inaccessible, and even when visible are often unintelligible to experts (Ananny and Crawford). The visibility of the technical “installed base” that support institutions and public services is therefore not a panacea, especially when the installed base (un)intentionally obfuscates participation in meaningful engagement like complaints handling. A negative outcome is, however, also not an inevitable thing. It is entirely possible to design platforms to allow individual users to scale up and have opportunities for enhanced participation. For instance, eGovernance and mobile governance literature have explored how citizens engage with state services at scale (Thomas and Streib; Foth et al.), and the open government movement has demonstrated the effectiveness of open data in understanding government operations (Barns; Janssen et al.), although these both have their challenges (Chadwick; Dawes). It is not a fantasy to imagine alternative configurations of the shadow of hierarchy that allow more participatory relationships. Open data could facilitate the governance of platforms at scale (Box et al.), where users are enfranchised into a platform by some form of membership right and given access to financial and governance records, in the same way that corporate shareholders are enfranchised, facilitated by the same app that provides a service. This could also be extended to decision making through voting and polling functions. Such a governance form would require radically different legal, business, and institutional structures to create and enforce this arrangement. Delacoix and Lawrence, for instance, suggest that data trusts, where a trustee is assigned legal and fiduciary responsibility to achieve maximum benefit for a specific group’s data, can be used to negotiate legal and governance relationships that meaningfully benefit the users of the trust. Trustees can be instructed to only share data to services whose algorithms are regularly audited for bias and provide datasets that are accurate representations of their users, for instance, avoiding erroneous proxies that disrupt algorithmic models. While these developments are in their infancy, it is not unreasonable to reflect on such endeavours now, as the technologies to achieve these are already in use. Conclusions There is a persistent myth that data will yield better, faster, more complete results in whatever field it is applied (Lee and Cook; Fourcade and Healy; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier; Kitchin). This myth has led to data-driven assemblages, including artificial intelligence, platforms, surveillance, and other data-technologies, being deployed throughout social life. The public sector is no exception to this, but the deployment of any technological solution within the traditional institutions of the shadow of hierarchy is fraught with challenges, and often results in failure or unintended consequences (Henman). The complexity of these systems combined with time, budgetary, and political pressures can create a contested environment. It is this environment that moulds societies' light and resources to cast the shadow of hierarchy. Relationality within a shadow of hierarchy that reflects the complicated and competing interests of platforms is likely to present a range of unintended social consequences that are inherently emergent because they are entering into a complex system – society – that is extremely hard to model. The relational qualities of the shadow of hierarchy are therefore now more multidimensional and emergent, and experiences relating to socio-technical features like scale, and as a follow-on (non)participation, are evidence of this. Yet by being emergent, they are also directionless, a product of complex systems rather than designed and strategic intent. This is not an inherently bad thing, but given the potential for data-system and platforms to have negative or unintended consequences, it is worth considering whether remaining directionless is the best outcome. There are many examples of data-driven systems in healthcare (Obermeyer et al.), welfare (Eubanks; Henman and Marston), and economics (MacKenzie), having unintended and negative social consequences. Appropriately guiding the design and deployment of theses system also represents a growing body of knowledge and practical endeavour (Jirotka et al.; Stilgoe et al.). Armed with the knowledge of these social implications, constructing an appropriate social architecture (Box and Lemon; Box et al.) around the platforms and data systems that form the shadow of hierarchy should be encouraged. This social architecture should account for the affordances and emergent potentials of a complex social, institutional, economic, political, and technical environment, and should assist in guiding the shadow of hierarchy away from egregious challenges and towards meaningful opportunities. To be directionless is an opportunity to take a new direction. The intersection of platforms with public institutions and infrastructures has moulded society’s light into an evolving and emergent shadow of hierarchy over many domains. With the scale of the shadow changing, and shaping participation, who benefits and who loses out in the shadow of hierarchy is also changing. Equipped with insights into this change, we should not hesitate to shape this change, creating or preserving relationalities that offer the best outcomes. Defining, understanding, and practically implementing what the “best” outcome(s) are would be a valuable next step in this endeavour, and should prompt considerable discussion. 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Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)
This research explores what roles nonprofits play in political representation by applying the concept of the representational role to nonprofits. The representational role consists of representational focus and style. Representational focus shows those whom nonprofits aim to serve: members, constituents, or the general public. Representational style denotes the ways nonprofits advocate for their focal groups: the delegation, trusteeship, and educational styles. The survey and regression analysis results demonstrate that nonprofits serving their members are most likely to convey their members’ voices directly to policy makers: the delegation style. In contrast, nonprofits advocating for their constituents are likely to pursue what they independently identify as the interests of their constituents: the trusteeship style. Finally, nonprofits speaking for the general public are most likely to work toward educating the general public: the educational style. These results suggest that nonprofits play different roles in political representation, depending on the types of their focal groups.

This thesis explores how capital flows are linked to economic development and proposes an alternative pathway to enhancing livelihoods in the marginal spaces of the global economy, drawing on examples from North America and the Pacific. Mainstream theories of development are largely based on European and North American examples, and argue for a progression of developmental stages from agriculture to industry to services, based on a flow of capital from core to periphery. Such theories are not place-specific, and do not reflect the particular conditions of remote and marginal places. In the peripheral spaces of the global economy, investment opportunities may be limited. An alternative practice is to invest outside the region of capital generation, through the mechanism of a trust fund. I argue that local development can be achieved through investing in global financial markets, in core countries, rather than at the site of capital generation. In this way, local development is not limited to the marginal place where the benefits are to be felt; peripheral capital instead flows into the core to seek out the best investment opportunities. The local development process becomes differently spatialized by engaging global financial markets. Capital generated in the periphery often comes in temporary streams, or windfalls, and benefits decline when the resource is depleted. Such non-renewable resources can be transformed into renewable fiscal ones when capital generated from resource extraction is invested in financial markets through a trust fund. To make non-renewable resources renewable, they can be converted from a physical form into a financial form, thus extending the benefits of capital into perpetuity. This thesis suggests that trust funds may serve as an alternative development mechanism in certain peripheral spaces of the global economy. Trust funds receive a share of resource revenues and increase them through investment. States can establish trust funds as an instrument of government policy, with all citizens as beneficiaries. Trust funds allow for re-spatializing the nature of investment as well as for sustaining it over time. My analysis is based on the examination of six case studies. Two of these are peripheral economies in North America: the state of Alaska in the United States, and the province of Alberta in Canada. Both Alaska and Alberta established trust funds to manage their petroleum revenues. The four remaining cases are independent Pacific island nations: Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Each of these island nations established a trust fund to manage windfall resource revenues. The performance of these six trust funds has varied, largely reflecting policy choices. I develop a set of six criteria for the management of a successful fund. In this thesis, I ask development practitioners to reimagine the economic spaces of marginal economies and the relationship between core and periphery. I argue for a separation of the sites of capital generation and capital investment, and for transforming non-renewable windfall resources into renewable fiscal ones.

This chapter addresses the laws of the State of New York (including its transfer tax laws) and the federal taxation of gratuitous transfers. Many of the New York laws are codified in the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) and the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA). The chapter begins with discussing the amendment, revocation, and revival of wills. It argues that a will must be in writing, signed at the end by the testator/trix and signed by two witnesses who also write their addresses. Any material written after the testator/trix’s signature is not valid. This chapter then displays the order of intestate succession wherein the deceased leaves no valid will. It also reviews the freedom of testation under the State of New York laws, highlighting that the surviving spouse of a decedent is entitled to an elective share from the estate equal to the greater of one-third of the net estate. Ultimately, the chapter considers a provision by which a spouse or children can claim maintenance from a deceased’s estate.

Distrust of the Bank of England, the stock market, and the large companies engaged in overseas trade reached a peak in the South Sea Bubble of 1720. Distrust of national banks later became a recurrent source of distrust in the United States, which led to the failure of the first two such banks and prevented a third from being established until 1913. Distrust of the system of taxation in Britain focused mainly on excise taxes, which the government was in large part successful in managing by the middle of the eighteenth century, whereas excise taxes, direct taxes, and customs duties levied on American colonists became a major source of colonial distrust of the British government in the 1760s and 1770s. This chapter also deals with the formation of legal trusts, which are transfers of property from one party to another, who holds the property “in trust” for a beneficiary. The main source of distrust of this system in early modern England came from the royal government itself when landed families used trusts to avoid paying taxes in the 1530s.

Abstract Electronic commerce (e-commerce) presents unique tax problems under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) but traditional tax laws can be applied to e-commerce transactions in most cases. Tax issues, as well as tax compliance issues, include Some form of verifiable digital identification (ID) must be presented when the identity of a party to a transaction is required. One ID system uses trusted intermediaries to issue verified digital IDs. The intermediary identifies the identity of the person seeking the digital ID, and, once verified, the digital ID is issued in a form that can be independently verified and is not subject to tampering. The U.S. Treasury anticipates the use of digital IDs that will permit tax returns to be filed electronically. Congress passed a law requiring the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to develop such a system.