Academic literature on the topic 'Transnational fundamental norm'

The problematic of humanism in many countries resulted in a phenomenon of transnational refugee migration. Indonesia is one of a country which has received a massif influx of refugee waves aimed to obtain asylum. This study discussed the policy of handling refugees in Indonesia from the maqasid sharia as perspective. Maqasid sharia, as one of the Islamic law methodological approaches, helped of understanding social phenomena which positioned the interest (maslaha) as the core treatise. This study aimed to explain that the interaction between maqasid sharia as perspective and the development of national regulation, included the regulation in handling refugees, resulted in three models of policy (instructive, integrative, and adaptive). The instructive policy implemented through taqnin model, which is issued by the state authority as a positive norm. An integrative policy implemented through the eclectic model adopted the finest part from both national law and Islamic law. The adaptive policy implemented when important elements of Islamic law affirmed national policy which contained fundamental principles of universal humanism as part of sharia.

AbstractAccording to the agency paradigm enshrined by the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, private conducts are attributed to a state when they are carried out on the state's behalf or under its tight control. On closer look, this legal framework proves to be unable to deal with state involvement in human-rights violations perpetrated by powerful non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or transnational corporations. These wrongs, indeed, are often put in place with the fundamental contribution of – but not on behalf of (or under the control of) – a state, with the consequence that, under the traditional paradigm, they could not be attributed to the latter. Against this backdrop, the present paper argues that a new secondary norm has been developing that provides that private wrongs are to be imputed to a state if the latter knowingly facilitated (or otherwise co-operated in) their commission. Although international practice will be duly taken into account, the analysis will be focused mainly on US case law concerning corporate liability for international human-rights violations.

Bogor Message is constituting the transnationalism of Islam and reviving the importance of diplomacy based on religious consultation or even multilateralism, that concluded by prominent Islamic scholars (ulama) in the world through High-Level Constitution of World Muslim Scholars in 2018. Thus, Bogor Message is considered a form of ijma’ ulama (consensus among Islamic scholars) which will be useful for Muslim ummah (Islamic society) as a common ground depicting universal norm in regulating the attitude toward international relations (IR). Wasatiyyat Islam summed up in the Bogor Message, is the embodiment of Islamic tradition in the multi-track diplomacy where interactions between state-actors and non-state actors and utilization of tracks in diplomacy resulted in an understanding to solve ummah fundamental problems in Islamicate world through the normative religious approach. The Bogor Message is rendezvous point and unified the differences of Wasatiyyat Islam conception aimed to unite ummah in the framework of transnational Islam, taken from Al-Qur’an and Sunnah. This research article examines the principle of Wasatiyyat Islam inside Bogor Message and its functionality as soft power by using diplomacy theories. The lack of concern from ummah in other countries due to the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic hampered the progress of Wasatiyyat Islam dissemination and remained exclusive for certain bastions of ‘moderate Islam’ countries. Though the potencies for developing and globalizing Wasatiyyat Islam could gain momentum in the post-COVID-19 world.

A comparison of liberalism and neoliberalism shows that conceptual contradictions of liberal ideas arise in the liberal hypostatization of various forms of social being. Therefore, the political liberalism will contradict the cultural one, and the legal liberalism will contradict the economic one. However, there are no fundamental differences between liberalism and neoliberalism: both are based on the same values and differ only in the sphere of their application. Liberalism, as a political practice, is intended mainly for the domestic use, while neoliberalism rather for the external use. In other words, neoliberalism, being an integral part of liberalism, presents the foreign-policy dimension of liberal concepts. Foreign policy is inherently aggressive: a number of French revolutionary governments should be recognized as the earliest forerunners of modern neoliberals. For instance, the foreign policy of the Convent clearly outgrew the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment and was aimed at enforcing liberalization on the European scale. The essence of liberalism is manifested in ousting the previous, partly traditional social, political and economic practices and in replacing them with the unified ones that should become the norm for the humankind. Neoliberals prefer to push their influence through the institutional pressure by using international non-governmental organizations, transnational companies, and the associated leaders of a number of countries of different levels of development. These organizations recruit personnel for management all around the world and constantly shuffle them, move from one country to another to create a new management culture intended for the neoliberal model of the global scale. The goal of neoliberals is almost the same as the goals of liberals (one can argue only about the means) and presents their foreign-policy version: neoliberals aim at reformatting the social space on the global scale by the abolition of the old states and introduction of a new social-political system, which is obviously manifested in the European Union, where the former states are gradually replaced by the regions, and the social policy aims at developing a new-European identity.

The article conceives international (or global) constitutionalism as a legal argument which recommends and strengthens efforts (legal and political) to compensate for ongoing de-constitutionalization on the domestic level. Although the notions ‘international constitution’ and ‘international constitutionalism’ have in recent years served as buzzwords in various discourses, the many meanings of those concepts have not yet been fully explored and disentangled. This paper suggests a specific understanding of those concepts. It highlights various aspects and elements of micro- and macro-constitutionalization in international law, and identifies anti-constitutionalist trends. On this basis, the paper finds that, although no international constitution in a formal sense exists, fundamental norms in the international legal order do fulfil constitutional functions. Because those norms can reasonably be qualified as having a constitutional quality, they may not be summarily discarded in the event of a conflict with domestic constitutional law. Because the relevant norms form a transnational constitutional network, and cannot be aligned in an abstract hierarchy, conflict resolution requires a balancing of interests in concrete cases. Finally, because constitutionalism historically and prescriptively means asking for a legitimate constitution, a constitutionalist reading of the international legal order provokes the question of its legitimacy. This question is pressing, because state sovereignty and consent are – on good grounds – no longer accepted as the sole source of legitimacy of international law. International constitutionalism – as understood in this paper – does not ask for state-like forms of legitimacy of a world government, but stimulates the search for new mechanisms to strengthen the legitimacy of global governance.

The problem of harmonization of legal norms with the needs of police investigations with the use of high-tech data search tools has been analyzed. It has been determined that the transition of police structures from a reactive to a proactive paradigm is unalterable in the modern high-tech turbulent world. The problem’s structuring has been accomplished. It has been determined that the ways of its solution lie both in the legal plane and in the technical one, where the legal aspect of the problem has two components – international and national. The experience of world practice in the field of the researched problem has been analyzed. The authors have accomplished the analysis of international legal norms in the field of personal data protection, as well as the analysis of the most typical national regulations – starting from the approach of solving the problem in democracies, which for centuries strictly adhere to the doctrine of privacy and private property, to the most radical approach in China. The ways of its solution have been outlined. Technical mechanisms of the solution have been suggested. It has been determined that the settlement of any of the aspects does not mean the solution of the problem in the whole. The matter of its fundamental solution lies in the legal plane, and since organized crime in the context of global digitalization of the world community is becoming increasingly transnational in nature, it is primarily a field of international law. It has been determined that the complete solution of the problem has a complex character and should contain a number of normative and legal acts at the level of international and national law, as well as certain technical measures that ensure the legality of personal data collection procedures used by police in the most modern high-tech, tool-making, analytical systems.

The release in 2004 of Gurinder Chadha’s Bride and Prejudice marked yet another contribution to celluloid’s Austen mania that began in the 1990s and is still going strong. Released almost simultaneously on three different continents (in the UK, US, and India), and in two different languages (English and Hindi), Bride and Prejudice, however, is definitely not another Anglo-American period costume drama. Described by one reviewer as “East meets West”, Chadha’s film “marries a characteristically English saga [Austen’s Pride and Prejudice] with classic Bollywood format “transforming corsets to saris, … the Bennetts to the Bakshis and … pianos to bhangra beats” (Adarsh). Bride and Prejudice, thus, clearly belongs to the upcoming genre of South Asian cross-over cinema in its diasporic incarnation. Such cross-over cinema self-consciously acts as a bridge between at least two distinct cinematic traditions—Hollywood and Bollywood (Indian Hindi cinema). By taking Austen’s Pride and Prejudice as her source text, Chadha has added another dimension to the intertextuality of such cross-over cinema, creating a complex hybrid that does not fit neatly into binary hyphenated categories such as “Asian-American cinema” that film critics such as Mandal invoke to characterise diaspora productions. An embodiment of contemporary globalised (post?)coloniality in its narrative scope, embracing not just Amritsar and LA, but also Goa and London, Bride and Prejudice refuses to fit into a neat East versus West cross-cultural model. How, then, are we to classify this film? Is this problem of identity indicative of postmodern indeterminacy of meaning or can the film be seen to occupy a “third” space, to act as a postcolonial hybrid that successfully undermines (neo)colonial hegemony (Sangari, 1-2)? To answer this question, I will examine Bride and Prejudice as a mimic text, focusing specifically on its complex relationship with Bollywood conventions. According to Gurinder Chadha, Bride and Prejudice is a “complete Hindi movie” in which she has paid “homage to Hindi cinema” through “deliberate references to the cinema of Manoj Kumar, Raj Kapoor, Yash Chopra and Karan Johar” (Jha). This list of film makers is associated with a specific Bollywood sub-genre: the patriotic family romance. Combining aspects of two popular Bollywood genres, the “social” (Prasad, 83) and the “romance” (Virdi, 178), this sub-genre enacts the story of young lovers caught within complex familial politics against the backdrop of a nationalist celebration of Indian identity. Using a cinematic language that is characterised by the spectacular in both its aural and visual aspects, the patriotic family romance follows a typical “masala” narrative pattern that brings together “a little action and some romance with a touch of comedy, drama, tragedy, music, and dance” (Jaikumar). Bride and Prejudice’s successful mimicry of this language and narrative pattern is evident in film reviews consistently pointing to its being very “Bollywoodish”: “the songs and some sequences look straight out of a Hindi film” says one reviewer (Adarsh), while another wonders “why this talented director has reduced Jane Austen’s creation to a Bollywood masala film” (Bhaskaran). Setting aside, for the moment, these reviewers’ condemnation of such Bollywood associations, it is worthwhile to explore the implications of yoking together a canonical British text with Indian popular culture. According to Chadha, this combination is made possible since “the themes of Jane Austen’s novels are a ‘perfect fit’ for a Bollywood style film” (Wray). Ostensibly, such a comment may be seen to reinforce the authority of the colonial canonical text by affirming its transnational/transhistorical relevance. From this perspective, the Bollywood adaptation not only becomes a “native” tribute to the colonial “master” text, but also, implicitly, marks the necessary belatedness of Bollywood as a “native” cultural formation that can only mimic the “English book”. Again, Chadha herself seems to subscribe to this view: “I chose Pride and Prejudice because I feel 200 years ago, England was no different than Amritsar today” (Jha). The ease with which the basic plot premise of Pride and Prejudice—a mother with grown-up daughters obsessed with their marriage—transfers to a contemporary Indian setting does seem to substantiate this idea of belatedness. The spatio-temporal contours of the narrative require changes to accommodate the transference from eighteenth-century English countryside to twenty-first-century India, but in terms of themes, character types, and even plot elements, Bride and Prejudice is able to “mimic” its master text faithfully. While the Bennets, Bingleys and Darcy negotiate the relationship between marriage, money and social status in an England transformed by the rise of industrial capitalism, the Bakshis, Balraj and, yes, Will Darcy, undertake the same tasks in an India transformed by corporate globalisation. Differences in class are here overlaid with those in culture as a middle-class Indian family interacts with wealthy non-resident British Indians and American owners of multinational enterprises, mingling the problems created by pride in social status with prejudices rooted in cultural insularity. However, the underlying conflicts between social and individual identity, between relationships based on material expediency and romantic love, remain the same, clearly indicating India’s belated transition from tradition to modernity. It is not surprising, then, that Chadha can claim that “the transposition [of Austen to India] did not offend the purists in England at all” (Jha). But if the purity of the “master” text is not contaminated by such native mimicry, then how does one explain the Indian anglophile rejection of Bride and Prejudice? The problem, according to the Indian reviewers, lies not in the idea of an Indian adaptation, but in the choice of genre, in the devaluation of the “master” text’s cultural currency by associating it with the populist “masala” formula of Bollywood. The patriotic family romance, characterised by spectacular melodrama with little heed paid to psychological complexity, is certainly a far cry from the restrained Austenian narrative that achieves its dramatic effect exclusively through verbal sparring and epistolary revelations. When Elizabeth and Darcy’s quiet walk through Pemberley becomes Lalita and Darcy singing and dancing through public fountains, and the private economic transaction that rescues Lydia from infamy is translated into fisticuff between Darcy and Wickham in front of an applauding cinema audience, mimicry does smack too much of mockery to be taken as a tribute. It is no wonder then that “the news that [Chadha] was making Bride and Prejudice was welcomed with broad grins by everyone [in Britain] because it’s such a cheeky thing to do” (Jha). This cheekiness is evident throughout the film, which provides a splendid over-the-top cinematic translation of Pride and Prejudice that deliberately undermines the seriousness accorded to the Austen text, not just by the literary establishment, but also by cinematic counterparts that attempt to preserve its cultural value through carefully constructed period pieces. Chadha’s Bride and Prejudice, on the other hand, marries British high culture to Indian popular culture, creating a mimic text that is, in Homi Bhabha’s terms, “almost the same, but not quite” (86), thus undermining the authority, the primacy, of the so-called “master” text. This postcolonial subversion is enacted in Chadha’s film at the level of both style and content. If the adaptation of fiction into film is seen as an activity of translation, of a semiotic shift from one language to another (Boyum, 21), then Bride and Prejudice can be seen to enact this translation at two levels: the obvious translation of the language of novel into the language of film, and the more complex translation of Western high culture idiom into the idiom of Indian popular culture. The very choice of target language in the latter case clearly indicates that “authenticity” is not the intended goal here. Instead of attempting to render the target language transparent, making it a non-intrusive medium that derives all its meaning from the source text, Bride and Prejudice foregrounds the conventions of Bollywood masala films, forcing its audience to grapple with this “new” language on its own terms. The film thus becomes a classic instance of the colony “talking back” to the metropolis, of Caliban speaking to Prospero, not in the language Prospero has taught him, but in his own native tongue. The burden of responsibility is shifted; it is Prospero/audiences in the West that have the responsibility to understand the language of Bollywood without dismissing it as gibberish or attempting to domesticate it, to reduce it to the familiar. The presence in Bride and Prejudice of song and dance sequences, for example, does not make it a Hollywood musical, just as the focus on couples in love does not make it a Hollywood-style romantic comedy. Neither The Sound of Music (Robert Wise, 1965) nor You’ve Got Mail (Nora Ephron, 1998) corresponds to the Bollywood patriotic family romance that combines various elements from distinct Hollywood genres into one coherent narrative pattern. Instead, it is Bollywood hits like Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge (Aditya Chopra, 1995) and Pardes (Subhash Ghai, 1997) that constitute the cinema tradition to which Bride and Prejudice belongs, and against which backdrop it needs to be seen. This is made clear in the film itself where the climactic fight between Darcy and Wickham is shot against a screening of Manoj Kumar’s Purab Aur Paschim (East and West) (1970), establishing Darcy, unequivocally, as the Bollywood hero, the rescuer of the damsel in distress, who deserves, and gets, the audience’s full support, denoted by enthusiastic applause. Through such intertextuality, Bride and Prejudice enacts a postcolonial reversal whereby the usual hierarchy governing the relationship between the colony and the metropolis is inverted. By privileging through style and explicit reference the Indian Bollywood framework in Bride and Prejudice, Chadha implicitly minimises the importance of Austen’s text, reducing it to just one among several intertextual invocations without any claim to primacy. It is, in fact, perfectly possible to view Bride and Prejudice without any knowledge of Austen; its characters and narrative pattern are fully comprehensible within a well-established Bollywood tradition that is certainly more familiar to a larger number of Indians than is Austen. An Indian audience, thus, enjoys a home court advantage with this film, not the least of which is the presence of Aishwarya Rai, the Bollywood superstar who is undoubtedly the central focus of Chadha’s film. But star power apart, the film consolidates the Indian advantage through careful re-visioning of specific plot elements of Austen’s text in ways that clearly reverse the colonial power dynamics between Britain and India. The re-casting of Bingley as the British Indian Balraj re-presents Britain in terms of its immigrant identity. White British identity, on the other hand, is reduced to a single character—Johnny Wickham—which associates it with a callous duplicity and devious exploitation that provide the only instance in this film of Bollywood-style villainy. This re-visioning of British identity is evident even at the level of the film’s visuals where England is identified first by a panning shot that covers everything from Big Ben to a mosque, and later by a snapshot of Buckingham Palace through a window: a combination of its present multicultural reality juxtaposed against its continued self-representation in terms of an imperial tradition embodied by the monarchy. This reductionist re-visioning of white Britain’s imperial identity is foregrounded in the film by the re-casting of Darcy as an American entrepreneur, which effectively shifts the narratorial focus from Britain to the US. Clearly, with respect to India, it is now the US which is the imperial power, with London being nothing more than a stop-over on the way from Amritsar to LA. This shift, however, does not in itself challenge the more fundamental West-East power hierarchy; it merely indicates a shift of the imperial centre without any perceptible change in the contours of colonial discourse. The continuing operation of the latter is evident in the American Darcy’s stereotypical and dismissive attitude towards Indian culture as he makes snide comments about arranged marriages and describes Bhangra as an “easy dance” that looks like “screwing in a light bulb with one hand and patting a dog with the other.” Within the film, this cultural snobbery of the West is effectively challenged by Lalita, the Indian Elizabeth, whose “liveliness of mind” is exhibited here chiefly through her cutting comebacks to such disparaging remarks, making her the film’s chief spokesperson for India. When Darcy’s mother, for example, dismisses the need to go to India since yoga and Deepak Chopra are now available in the US, Lalita asks her if going to Italy has become redundant because Pizza Hut has opened around the corner? Similarly, she undermines Darcy’s stereotyping of India as the backward Other where arranged marriages are still the norm, by pointing out the eerie similarity between so-called arranged marriages in India and the attempts of Darcy’s own mother to find a wife for him. Lalita’s strategy, thus, is not to invert the hierarchy by proving the superiority of the East over the West; instead, she blurs the distinction between the two, while simultaneously introducing the West (as represented by Darcy and his mother) to the “real India”. The latter is achieved not only through direct conversational confrontations with Darcy, but also indirectly through her own behaviour and deportment. Through her easy camaraderie with local Goan kids, whom she joins in an impromptu game of cricket, and her free-spirited guitar-playing with a group of backpacking tourists, Lalita clearly shows Darcy (and the audience in the West) that so-called “Hicksville, India” is no different from the so-called cosmopolitan sophistication of LA. Lalita is definitely not the stereotypical shy retiring Indian woman; this jean-clad, tractor-riding gal is as comfortable dancing the garbha at an Indian wedding as she is sipping marguerites in an LA restaurant. Interestingly, this East-West union in Aishwarya Rai’s portrayal of Lalita as a modern Indian woman de-stabilises the stereotypes generated not only by colonial discourse but also by Bollywood’s brand of conservative nationalism. As Chadha astutely points out, “Bride and Prejudice is not a Hindi film in the true sense. That rikshawallah in the front row in Patna is going to say, ‘Yeh kya hua? Aishwarya ko kya kiya?’ [What did you do to Aishwarya?]” (Jha). This disgruntlement of the average Indian Hindi-film audience, which resulted in the film being a commercial flop in India, is a result of Chadha’s departures from the conventions of her chosen Bollywood genre at both the cinematic and the thematic levels. The perceived problem with Aishwarya Rai, as articulated by the plaintive question of the imagined Indian viewer, is precisely her presentation as a modern (read Westernised) Indian heroine, which is pretty much an oxymoron within Bollywood conventions. In all her mainstream Hindi films, Aishwarya Rai has conformed to these conventions, playing the demure, sari-clad, conventional Indian heroine who is untouched by any “anti-national” western influence in dress, behaviour or ideas (Gangoli,158). Her transformation in Chadha’s film challenges this conventional notion of a “pure” Indian identity that informs the Bollywood “masala” film. Such re-visioning of Bollywood’s thematic conventions is paralleled, in Bride and Prejudice, with a playfully subversive mimicry of its cinematic conventions. This is most obvious in the song-and-dance sequences in the film. While their inclusion places the film within the Bollywood tradition, their actual picturisation creates an audio-visual pastiche that freely mingles Bollywood conventions with those of Hollywood musicals as well as contemporary music videos from both sides of the globe. A song, for example, that begins conventionally enough (in Bollywood terms) with three friends singing about one of them getting married and moving away, soon transforms into a parody of Hollywood musicals as random individuals from the marketplace join in, not just as chorus, but as developers of the main theme, almost reducing the three friends to a chorus. And while the camera alternates between mid and long shots in conventional Bollywood fashion, the frame violates the conventions of stylised choreography by including a chaotic spill-over that self-consciously creates a postmodern montage very different from the controlled spectacle created by conventional Bollywood song sequences. Bride and Prejudice, thus, has an “almost the same, but not quite” relationship not just with Austen’s text but also with Bollywood. Such dual-edged mimicry, which foregrounds Chadha’s “outsider” status with respect to both traditions, eschews all notions of “authenticity” and thus seems to become a perfect embodiment of postcolonial hybridity. Does this mean that postmodern pastiche can fulfill the political agenda of postcolonial resistance to the forces of globalised (neo)imperialism? As discussed above, Bride and Prejudice does provide a postcolonial critique of (neo)colonial discourse through the character of Lalita, while at the same time escaping the trap of Bollywood’s explicitly articulated brand of nationalism by foregrounding Lalita’s (Westernised) modernity. And yet, ironically, the film unselfconsciously remains faithful to contemporary Bollywood’s implicit ideological framework. As most analyses of Bollywood blockbusters in the post-liberalisation (post-1990) era have pointed out, the contemporary patriotic family romance is distinct from its earlier counterparts in its unquestioning embrace of neo-conservative consumerist ideology (Deshpande, 187; Virdi, 203). This enthusiastic celebration of globalisation in its most recent neo-imperial avatar is, interestingly, not seen to conflict with Bollywood’s explicit nationalist agenda; the two are reconciled through a discourse of cultural nationalism that happily co-exists with a globalisation-sponsored rampant consumerism, while studiously ignoring the latter’s neo-colonial implications. Bride and Prejudice, while self-consciously redefining certain elements of this cultural nationalism and, in the process, providing a token recognition of neo-imperial configurations, does not fundamentally question this implicit neo-conservative consumerism of the Bollywood patriotic family romance. This is most obvious in the film’s gender politics where it blindly mimics Bollywood conventions in embodying the nation as a woman (Lalita) who, however independent she may appear, not only requires male protection (Darcy is needed to physically rescue Lakhi from Wickham) but also remains an object of exchange between competing systems of capitalist patriarchy (Uberoi, 207). At the film’s climax, Lalita walks away from her family towards Darcy. But before Darcy embraces the very willing Lalita, his eyes seek out and receive permission from Mr Bakshi. Patriarchal authority is thus granted due recognition, and Lalita’s seemingly bold “independent” decision remains caught within the politics of patriarchal exchange. This particular configuration of gender politics is very much a part of Bollywood’s neo-conservative consumerist ideology wherein the Indian woman/nation is given enough agency to make choices, to act as a “voluntary” consumer, within a globalised marketplace that is, however, controlled by the interests of capitalist patriarchy. The narrative of Bride and Prejudice perfectly aligns this framework with Lalita’s project of cultural nationalism, which functions purely at the personal/familial level, but which is framed at both ends of the film by a visual conjoining of marriage and the marketplace, both of which are ultimately outside Lalita’s control. Chadha’s attempt to appropriate and transform British “Pride” through subversive postcolonial mimicry, thus, ultimately results only in replacing it with an Indian “Bride,” with a “star” product (Aishwarya Rai / Bride and Prejudice / India as Bollywood) in a splendid package, ready for exchange and consumption within the global marketplace. All glittering surface and little substance, Bride and Prejudice proves, once again, that postmodern pastiche cannot automatically double as politically enabling postcolonial hybridity (Sangari, 23-4). References Adarsh, Taran. “Balle Balle! From Amritsar to L.A.” IndiaFM Movie Review 8 Oct. 2004. 19 Feb. 2007 http://indiafm.com/movies/review/7211/index.html>. Austen, Jane. Pride and Prejudice. 1813. New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 1999. Bhabha, Homi. “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” The Location of Culture. Routledge: New York, 1994. 85-92. Bhaskaran, Gautam. “Classic Made Trivial.” The Hindu 15 Oct. 2004. 19 Feb. 2007 http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/fr/2004/10/15/stories/ 2004101502220100.htm>. Boyum, Joy Gould. Double Exposure: Fiction into Film. Calcutta: Seagull Books, 1989. Bride and Prejudice. Dir. Gurinder Chadha. Perf. Aishwarya Ray and Martin Henderson. Miramax, 2004. Deshpande, Sudhanva. “The Consumable Hero of Globalized India.” Bollyworld: Popular Indian Cinema through a Transnational Lens. Eds. Raminder Kaur and Ajay J. Sinha. New Delhi: Sage, 2005. 186-203. Gangoli, Geetanjali. “Sexuality, Sensuality and Belonging: Representations of the ‘Anglo-Indian’ and the ‘Western’ Woman in Hindi Cinema.” Bollyworld: Popular Indian Cinema through a Transnational Lens. Eds. Raminder Kaur and Ajay J. Sinha. New Delhi: Sage, 2005. 143-162. Jaikumar, Priya. “Bollywood Spectaculars.” World Literature Today 77.3/4 (2003): n. pag. Jha, Subhash K. “Bride and Prejudice is not a K3G.” The Rediff Interview 30 Aug. 2004. 19 Feb. 2007 http://in.rediff.com/movies/2004/aug/30finter.htm>. Mandal, Somdatta. Film and Fiction: Word into Image. New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2005. Prasad, M. Madhava. Ideology of the Hindi Film: A Historical Construction. New Delhi: Oxford UP, 1998. Sangari, Kumkum. Politics of the Possible: Essays on Gender, History, Narratives, Colonial English. New Delhi: Tulika, 1999. Uberoi, Patricia. Freedom and Destiny: Gender, Family, and Popular Culture in India. New Delhi: Oxford UP, 2006. Virdi, Jyotika. The Cinematic Imagination: Indian Popular Films as Social History. Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003. Wray, James. “Gurinder Chadha Talks Bride and Prejudice.” Movie News 7 Feb. 2005. 19 Feb. http://movies.monstersandcritics.com/news/article_4163.php/ Gurinder_Chadha_Talks_Bride_and_Prejudice>. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Mathur, Suchitra. "From British “Pride” to Indian “Bride”: Mapping the Contours of a Globalised (Post?)Colonialism." M/C Journal 10.2 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0705/06-mathur.php>. APA Style Mathur, S. (May 2007) "From British “Pride” to Indian “Bride”: Mapping the Contours of a Globalised (Post?)Colonialism," M/C Journal, 10(2). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0705/06-mathur.php>.

La thèse forme une proposition normative sur les rapports de système entre les ordres juridiques des Etats membres et celui de l’Union. Elle analyse ces rapports à la lumière de l’objectif de protection effective des droits et de(s) l’identité(s) transnationale(s) de l’Union. Des jurisprudences européennes et nationales et des éléments théoriques tracent les conditions d’une protection systématisée. La thèse s’intéresse à l’identité du système pour exclure la rivalité inhérente entre les ordres juridiques des Etats membres et celui de l’Union. La démarche aboutit grâce au déplacement du curseur des rapports entre ordres juridiques vers leur fonction pour les acteurs du système juridique de l’Union et grâce à l’analyse du fonctionnement dudit système sur la base d’échelles de concrétisation du principe transnational de loyauté. La thèse s’intéresse d’abord à la systématisation de la protection dans l’Union avant d’aborder des techniques spécifiques de protection. Tant du point de vue théorique que procédural ressort une dualité de l’identité juridique de l’Union : formelle – relative à la perpétuation du système – et matérielle – relative à ses valeurs fondamentales
The thesis normatively assesses the relationship between the legal orders of the Member States and the one of the European Union. That relationship is assessed in the light of a main objective, the effective protection of rights, and of the transnational identity(ies) of the Union. National and European case-law together with theoretical analyses delineate the conditions of a systematized protection. By discussing the identity of the system, the thesis rejects any inherent rivalry between the national and the Union legal orders. Such a rejection stems, first, from moving from the relationship among legal orders towards its function for the actors of the system, and second, from the analysis of the functioning of that system with regard to a process of concretization of the transnational principle of loyalty. The thesis discusses the systematization of the protection of rights within the Union before introducing specific techniques of protection. From both a theoretical and a procedural standpoint the legal identity of the Union appears to be bifold: formal – related to the perpetuation of the system – and substantive – related to its fundamental values

As this book details, militias and paramilitary groups wield greater power than national governments in many countries, while in some war zones private contractors perform missions previously reserved for uniformed troops. Most ominously, terrorist organizations with global reach have come to define the security landscape for even the most powerful nations. Across the first decades of the twenty-first century, we have witnessed a dramatic rise in the use of military force by these nonstate actors in ways that have impacted the international system, leading to the author of this book to undertake this assessment of the state of play at this critical moment. To understand the spread of nonstate violence, the author focuses on the crucial role played by an epochal transformation in international norms. Since the eighteenth century, the Westphalian model of sovereignty has reserved the legitimate use of force to states. The book argues that normative changes in the decades after World War II produced a “crisis of coherence” for formal and informal rules against nonstate violence. In detailed case studies of nonstate militias, transnational terrorist networks, and private military contractors, the book explains how forces contesting state prerogatives exploited this crisis, which in turn reshaped international understandings of who could legitimately use force. By considering for the first time all three purveyors of nonstate violence as aspects of the same phenomenon, the book explains this fundamental shift in the norm that for centuries gave states the monopoly on military force.

Geopolitical shifts, increasing demands for accountability, and growing competition have been driving the need for change within the transnational nongovernmental organization (TNGO) sector. Additionally, TNGOs have been embracing more transformative strategies aimed at the root causes, not just the symptoms, of societal problems. As the world has changed and TNGOs’ ambitions have expanded, the roles of TNGOs have begun to shift and their work has become more complex. To remain effective, legitimate, and relevant in the future necessitates organizational changes and investments in new capabilities. However, many organizations have been slow to adapt. As a result, for many TNGOs’ the rhetoric of sustainable impact and transformative change has far outpaced the reality of their limited abilities to deliver on their promises. This book frankly explores why this gap between rhetoric and reality exists and what TNGOs can do individually and collectively to close it. In short, TNGOs need to change the fundamental conditions under which they themselves operate by bringing their own “forms and norms” into better alignment with their contemporary ambitions and strategies. This book offers accessible future-oriented analyses and lessons-learned to assist readers in formulating and implementing organizational changes to adapt TNGOs for the future. The book draws upon a variety of disciplines and perspectives, including hundreds of interviews with TNGO leaders, firsthand involvement in major organizational change processes in leading TNGOs, and numerous workshops, training institutes, consultancies, and research projects.

The 2016 edition updates readers on the important work of long-standing international tribunals and introduces readers to more novel topics in international law. The Yearbook has established itself as an authoritative resource for research and guidance on the jurisprudence of UN-based tribunals and regional courts. The 2016 edition continues to provide expert coverage of the EU Court of Justice and diverse tribunals from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to economically based tribunals such as ICSID and the WTO Dispute Resolution panel, to human rights courts such as ECtHR and IACtHR. This edition contains original research articles on the development and analysis of the concept of global law and the views of the global law theorists, such as the Editorial focusing on a new remedy for the violation of the jus cogens principle concerning the imprescriptibility of torture. This edition also includes expert introductory essays by prominent scholars in the realm of international law, on topics as diverse and current as the role of the WTO’s Appellate Body in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement and an examination of the EU Court of Justice data protection framework in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Researchers will find detailed guidance on a rich diversity of legal topics, from an examination of the processes under which transnational criminal law norms have been adopted and the process under which these norms have been globally implemented, to the impact post-conviction DNA testing has had on the criminal justice system in the United States. This edition also provides students, scholars, and practitioners a valuable combination of expert discussion and direct quotes from the court opinions to which that discussion relates, as well as an annual overview of the process of cross-fertilization between international courts and tribunals and a section focusing on the thought of leading international law scholars on the subject of the globalization.

Abstract The article examines the institutional history of the ILO in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in particular how the ILO has transformed itself into a global actor in terms of labour governance through coining the normative concept of fundamental labour rights in the 1990s, as well as the ongoing struggle in which the ILO has engaged to promote greater coherence of labour standards in the post-national era. The proliferation of transnational labour standards and decentralized standard-setting is a recognizable trend in international labour protection today. International regulation of labour has become a crowded field, as labour standards are increasingly set and enforced outside the ILO framework. The mushrooming of transnational labour standards also leads to fragmentation, conflicts and competition between norms, values and visions. In the face of proliferating labour standards, the ILO has to endeavour to reinstate itself as the central institution for innovative economic and social theories as well as for labour standards. The ILO needs to exercise its leadership not just in defending normative coherence but also in advancing a humanitarian vision of the economy and society.

This chapter lays the conceptual groundwork for the following chapters, and is written in a both philosophical and jurisprudential ink. It starts with a critical analysis of international criminal law as both concept, discipline and placeholder for an anti-impunity agenda. Certain types of crimes are separated into core crimes on the one hand and treaty-based/transnational crimes and supranational crimes on the other hand. The chapter then proceeds along the lines of the jurisprudential foundations of crime, criminal law and punishment. The author advocates for an autonomous punitive power of the international community as the basis of an autonomous international criminal law. Criminalization is based on the protection of fundamental legal interests or the prevention of serious harm. Punishment has an expressive, norm-stabilizing purpose and is intertwined with more general goals of International Criminal Justice. International Criminal Law’s sources range from customary international law over international treaty law to general principles. The DNA of the chapter is thus an amalgamation of comparative legal concepts with the peculiarities of a ius puniendi that lies at the hear of enterprise of international criminal law.

This chapter discusses the key drivers and risks of private transnational governance. It shows that private governance rarely seems to stay purely private. When it fails to consider wider societal interests and concerns, private governance will draw unwanted attention from governments, potentially leading to oversight and regulation or public-private partnerships — what is referred to as ‘joint or hybrid’ governance. A trend towards hybrid governance appears to be detectable both in the cases of privatization of global regulation and the rise of transnational private justice. In the former case, states have taken steps to improve procedural transparency and broaden the range of partners involved in transnational rule-making. In the latter case, the constitutionalization of international arbitration governance promises to integrate and safeguard fundamental public policy norms in private judicial processes. Future research on global governance will have to carefully examine the significance and effectiveness of ‘joint or hybrid’ governance.

Abstract Theorizing the firm in economic geography is fundamental to understand how local economies and communities function and evolve in a globalizing economic environment. Firms, we would contend, are at the very heart of modern-day life. They come in a seemingly infinite variety— from transnationals to small firms, corporations to branch plants, to subsidiaries and joint ventures, subcontractors to franchisees, sole proprietorships to partnerships, and manufacturers to service providers and retailers. For the most part we view them as the creators, destroyers, and repositories of jobs—the creators and destroyers of people’s livelihoods, lives and dreams. But, deciding just what a firm is, is neither a simple nor a straightforward task.

This introductory chapter lays out the stakes of the book. It starts by discussing the case of ISIS and various ontological claims that have been made to make sense of it. To render a picture that is more holistic and dynamic, the chapter then introduces the category of the ‘hybrid revolutionary’ who seeks to overthrow, rather than capture, the dominant political order by means of transnational revolutionary practices, and enact a political utopia radically different from it. Yet, at the same time, this ‘hybrid revolutionary’ recodes rather than rejects the ideas and practices of the constitutive norms of this order – from sovereignty to the neoliberal fundaments of global economy – while also appropriating and repurposing more mundane practices for the everyday management of the revolution. The chapter ends by outlining the following chapters.

Abstract The jus in bello is perhaps the most stable branch of public international law. Yet multiple contemporary forces have placed even this relatively sturdy body of law under considerable strain. These forces include: (1) the rise of nonstate armed groups, in particular the proliferation of transnational terrorist organizations; (2) the increased use of military and security contractors; (3) the emergence of new military technologies; and (4) rapid urbanization, such as the proliferation of megacities. This chapter argues that the fact that the jus in bello has already weathered some of these challenges indicates that it may well survive the others. Fundamentally, most states remain committed to the core values that undergird this body of law. It therefore appears less likely that the jus in bello will unravel than that gaps and fissures will emerge as states seek to translate the underlying values and norms to meet new challenges. Moreover, these gaps and fissures may expand, enabling states and others to adopt competing, often self-serving, interpretations. In short, the risk is one of long-term dilution rather than rapid disintegration.

Abstract The findings in the previous chapter suggest the regime dynamics of the classical gold standard were fundamentally founded on neither cooperation between national governments nor cooperation among central banks. If the gold standard was not, in terms of origin and stability, a cooperative or negotiated regime, was it an imposed or hegemonic regime (as, in fact, much of the economic historiography on the period says it was)? The idea that international regimes are founded on the efforts of very powerful nations, usually referred to as hegemons, has become a fairly common one in the study of international political economy. The vision is very strongly state-centric in its orientation, in that national governments (rather than subnational actors) are seen as being mobilized in pursuit of goals that conform to some observable national interest. Less commonly, such efforts may emanate from very powerful subnational (e.g., central banks) or transnational (e.g., churches) actors which are attempting to influence international relations in a way that achieves some benevolent or particularistic objectives. Specifically with respect to explaining the origin and perpetuation of the international gold standard, these two visions have fixed upon the British state and the Bank of England as the leaders or managers of the regime. This chapter will assess the extent of hegemony undertaken by the British state, while the next chapter will consider hegemony on the part of the Bank.

Abstract A structural, Marxist, Gramscian approach brings a historical materialist understanding to polycentric governing. It highlights the class character of social relations, of the state, and of governing more generally, all within the context of capital accumulation on a world scale. The chapter argues that polycentric governing is historically specific, closely (albeit not exclusively) associated with the countries of advanced capitalism. Moreover, polycentric governing affects some issue areas more than others. Polycentric governing is primarily defined by its social purpose to promote maximum freedom of movement for capital. Polycentric governing has not always had its current prominence, nor will it remain so forever. From a historical-materialist perspective, power is the most fundamental of the three issues highlighted in this volume: the art of governing is the art of reproducing class power. If done skilfully, most people see the resulting social order as legitimate, which following Gramsci entails hegemony. Techniques refers to how polycentric governing is done concretely; and how the ruling class arranges its hegemony. The organization of hegemony enables specific class coalitions to pursue their interests as if they constitute the ‘general interest’. The chapter identifies three exemplary ‘techniques’ class influence over state policy; the role of the (largely corporatized) media (both old and new); and the disciplinary power that control over finance (in particular through debt) allows the ruling class to reproduce its class power. The chapter illustrates how these insights apply in the context of both the national state and the transnational level of the global political economy.

The contemporary conjuncture of widespread ecological and social crises summons critical thinking about significant cultural changes in digital media design. The selection and classification practices that marked the history of slavery and colonization now rely on all types of nanotechnologies. On behalf of the future, bodies became expanded territory to sovereign intervention, where the role of contemporary powers enable extraction and mining of material, plumbed from the most intimate sphere of the self. This logic requires the state of exception to become the norm, so that the crisis is the digital media’s critical difference: they cut through the constant stream of information, differentiating the temporally valuable from the mundane, offering users a taste of real-time responsibility and empowerment. Thereby, this research aims to explore the dynamic transformations of the mediatic environment and their impacts on the fundamental relationships of human beings with the world, the self, and objects. It unfolds concerns around neocolonial assaults on human agency and autonomy that resonate from structuring patterns emerging from the digital infrastructure of neoliberalism and the relationships of human beings with the world. It disputes the imaginaries, representational regimes, and the possibilities of reality perceptions with universal, patriarchal, and extractive representations. This research also seeks alternative forms of media education and political resistance through its collaborative practice, pursuing an attentive and open-ended inquiry into the possibilities latent for designing new communication and information tools within lived material contexts: How might we represent invisible media infrastructures? How to produce knowledge about this space and present it publicly? How can these representations be politically mobilized as ecological and social arguments to establish a public debate? How can artistic sensibilities, aesthetics and the visual field influence what is thought of this frontier space? Finally, how can art, play and research intervene and participate? For this, the project involves participatory methods to create spaces for dialogue between different epistemologies, questioning the forms of ethical and creative reasoning in the planetary media and communication systems; for fostering the techno-politics imagination through playful, participatory futures and transition design frameworks as an ethical praxis of world-making; and for a reconceptualization of autonomy as an expression of radical interdependence between body, spaces, and materiality. The research aims to provide a framework for designing media tools, which incorporates core design principles and guidelines of agency and collective autonomy. It also engages with the transnational conversation on design, a contribution that stems from recent Latin American epistemic and political experiences and struggles, and the wider debate around alternative forms of restoring communal bonds, conquering public discussion spaces, and techno-political resistances through collaborative research practices and participatory methods.