Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Transferability of legitimate interest'

La thèse vise à explorer les questions relatives au transfert, entre sujet privés, des autorisations et des concessions administratives, avec une attention particulière pour les activités liées aux services de santé, où il est particulièrement difficile de trouver un équilibre entre opposes intérêts, publics et privés.La modification subjective dans la relation juridique entre l’Administration Publique et le titulaire de l’acte administratif, qui est remplacé par un nouveau bénéficiaire, doit être lu comme un acte juridique ontologiquement lié au transfert contextuel, inter vivos ou mortis causa, de la situation juridique subjective qui justifie l’intérêt légitime à être titulaire de l’acte administratif favorable. En effet, le transfert d’une activité entrepreneuriale perd son sens juridique, économique et social si l’acheteur ou le successeur universel ne peut pas bénéficier de l’autorisation ou de la concession nécessaire pour exercer effectivement l’activité en question. Mais, si le sujet privé est clairement en faveur d’une libre transférabilité de l’acte administratif, on doit également prendre en considération les intérêts publics protégés par l’acte administratif, intérêts présents non seulement au moment de la délivrance de l’acte mais aussi au moment de transfert de l’activité autorisée ou concédée.Actuellement la jurisprudence administrative continue de considérer les actes administratifs unilatéraux comme strictement personnels, déclarant qu’il n’est pas possible de transférer des autorisations ou des concessions à un nouveau bénéficiaire parce qu’elles sont accordées intuitu personae, c’est-à-dire en considération de la personne du bénéficiaire. Toutefois, s’il est clair qu' on ne peut pas parler de transférabilité pur ces autorisations et concessions qui dépendent de qualités strictement individuelles, il ne semble pas y avoir d’obstacle valable au transfert d’une autorisation ou concession accordées exclusivement ou principalement en raison de l’activité objective à laquelle elles se réfèrent. La transférabilité d’un acte administratif unilatéral dans lequel le potentiel économique et la présence de prérequis techniques sont plus importantes que des qualités strictement personnelles pourrait alors être reconnu, sans menacer l’intérêt public, qui reste protégé par le fait que la cession de l’acte administratif c’est ne pas une simple commercialisation entre sujet privées, mais c’est un acte juridique qui ne peut exercer ses effets qu’après la délivrance d’une autorisation spécifique par l’administration publique compétente. Cette intervention administrative est lue par la jurisprudence comme la délivrance d’une nouvelle autorisation mais on pense qu’elle devrait être interprétée et réglementée comme un contrôle préventif du respect des seuls éléments réellement subjectifs requis par la loi, parce que s’il y a une cession contextuelle de l’entreprise, en tant qu’ensemble organisé de biens et de ressources humaines, la conformité de l’activité au regard des critères qualitatifs et quantitatifs prédéterminés par l’administration publique a déjà été appréciés au moment de l’émission de l’acte administratif et peut, tout au plus, être l’objet de contrôles périodiques ordinaire effectués par les administrations compétentes, visant à vérifier le respect effectif des conditions fixées dans l’acte administratif transféré.Les transferts des autorisations et des concessions sont des opérations comportant un risque juridique d’une importance particulière, qu’il convient de connaître et d’analyser pour mieux le gérer. Le but de la recherche est d’examiner s'il existe des critères généraux et communs qui peuvent être utilisés pour résoudre les problèmes théoriques et pratiques liés au transfert des actes administratifs tant pour les activités<br>The research aims to investigate the problems relating to the transfer of administrative acts between private subjects, especially with attention to activities related to health services, where it is difficult to find a balance between conflicting interests,The subjective change in the legal relationship between the Public Administration and the holder of the administrative act, which is replaced by a new beneficiary, must be read as a legal act ontologically linked to the contextual transfer, inter vivos or mortis causa, of the subjective legal situation that justifies the legitimate interest in being the holder of the favorable administrative act. Indeed, the transfer of a commercial activity loses its legal, economic and social significance if the buyer or the universal successor cannot benefit from the administrative act necessary to effectively carry out the activity. But, if the private subject is clearly in favor of a free transferability of the administrative act, it is also necessary to take into account the public interests protected by the administrative act, interests present both at the time of issue of the act and at the moment of the transfer of the authorized activity.Currently, administrative jurisprudence continues to consider administrative acts as strictly personal, stating that it is not possible to transfer an administrative act to a new beneficiary because it is issued in consideration of the person who benefits from it. However, if it is clear that we cannot speak of the transferability of those administrative acts that depend on strictly individual qualities, there seems to be no valid obstacle to the transfer of an act issued exclusively or mainly by reason of the objective activity to which it refers. The transferability of an administrative act in which the economic potential and the presence of technical prerequisites are more important than personal qualities could therefore be recognized, without threatening the public interest, which remains protected by the fact that the transfer of the administrative act is not a simple marketing between private subjects, but it is a legal act that can exercise its effects after issuing a specific authorization by the competent public administration. This administrative intervention is read by the jurisprudence as the issue of a new authorization but we believe that it must be interpreted and regulated as a preventive check only of the subjective elements required by law, because if there is a contextual transfer of the commercial company, such as an organization of resources, the compliance of the activity with the qualitative and quantitative criteria predetermined by the public administration has already been verified at the time of the issue of the administrative act : it would rather be necessary to subject the activity to subsequent periodic effective checks carried out by the competent administrations, aimed at verifying the compliance with the conditions set out in the transferred administrative act.Transfers of administrative acts are operations that involve significant legal risk, which should be understood and analyzed to best manage it. The aim of the research is to examine whether there are general and common criteria that can be used to solve theoretical and practical problems related to the transfer of administrative acts, with reference to private commercial activities and public service activities

The objective of the thesis is to analyse law, case law, recommendations and opinions and to some extent legal doctrine to produce commercially viable advice (in other words, a check-list) on what to think about when conducting a balancing test as of GDPR Article 6.1 (f)

Законний інтерес, з одного боку, являє собою закріплену в праві юридичну можливість, а з іншого боку, спрямований на задоволення суб’єктами трудового права власних інтересів, які не протирічать державним. Розглядаючи законний інтерес як юридичну можливість, яка закріплена в праві, можна дійти до висновку, що при реалізації норми КЗпП України, яка надає не суб’єктивне право, а законний інтерес, працівник або роботодавець набуває певні права, захист яких передбачений законом. При цитуванні документа, використовуйте посилання http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/36745

Ad oggi, il giudice amministrativo non è il giudice ordinario dei diritti “fondamentali” incisi dai pubblici poteri. Secondo l’orientamento tracciato dalla Corte di cassazione, come arbitro del riparto di giurisdizione, il giudice amministrativo può conoscere dei diritti “fondamentali” solo qualora ricadano in una materia di giurisdizione esclusiva. Ciò come eredità di una teoria elaborata dallo stesso giudice ordinario quarant’anni fa, capace di sancire l’indegradabilità come conseguenza naturale del carattere fondamentale di una posizione giuridica, in modo che essa nasca come diritto soggettivo in Costituzione e possa superare indenne il confronto coi pubblici poteri. Pertanto, i beni oggetto dei diritti “fodamentali” non potrebbero mai ricevere tutela attraverso la categoria degli interessi legittimi. Al di là delle possibili giustificazioni teoriche, tale giurisprudenza fu elaborata come risposta a un’esigenza pratica: far fronte all’inadeguatezza della protezione giurisdizionale offribile dal giudice amministrativo a tutte le situazioni giuridiche oggetto del suo sindacato, “fondamentali” o meno. Formalmente negando la sussistenza di pubblici poteri, il giudice civile ne ha vagliato il legittimo esercizio, per poi fungere da modello quanto ai mezzi che avrebbe dovuto avere a disposizione il giudice amministrativo per un’effettiva tutela delle posizioni giuridiche sottoposte al suo sindacato. Come qualsiasi soluzione emergenziale, però, essa non può considerarsi una risposta efficiente sul lungo periodo: oltre alla carenza dei fondamenti teorici, l’inefficienza consegue dall’incertezza dei limiti della categoria dei diritti “fondamentali”. Sicché, al di là dell’introduzione di un’ulteriore variabile che complica l’individuazione del giudice a cui rivolgersi, il rischio era quello di vedere attribuite due tutele differenti a fronte di situazioni giuridiche parimenti “fondamentali”, a seconda del riconoscimento o meno, da parte del giudice, di tale fondamentalità. Da ciò l’importanza di risolvere l’emergenza. Per questo motivo si è ritenuto necessario spingersi sino al cuore del diritto pubblico, alla Costituzione e ai beni ivi oggetto di riconoscimento e protezione, per argomentare l’opportunità di ricondurli alle due situazioni giuridiche soggettive previste dalla stessa Norma fondamentale, sia i diritti soggettivi che gli interessi legittimi. Ancora, il superamento dell’emergenza è permesso dal riconoscimento, in dottrina e giurisprudenza, dell’interesse legittimo come posizione sostanziale, che sorge e dialoga con il potere amministrativo in modo da consentire la piena protezione dell’interesse privato nell’ambito di un rapporto di diritto pubblico. Infine, le trasformazioni che hanno caratterizzato il giudice e il processo amministrativi, culminate con l’adozione del codice del processo amministrativo, hanno enormemente ridimensionato il senso di emergenza che conseguiva dall’inefficienza della sua tutela, dotandolo di tutti quegli strumenti che il giudice ordinario si era riconosciuto ai fini della tutela dei diritti “fondamentali” incisi dall’azione amministrativa. Da ciò, pertanto, più che la civilizzazione del giudice amministrativo, è conseguita la sua costituzionalizzazione, risultando lo stesso dotato degli strumenti necessari e idonei a garantire la protezione effettiva della posizione del privato coinvolta nell’esercizio dei poteri pubblici, sia essa “fondamentale” o meno. Ammettere come superata l’emergenza, dunque, non escluderebbe la piena salvaguardia delle posizioni giuridiche “fondamentali”, ma per di più garantirebbe il rispetto di altre previsioni costituzionali quali quelle che riconoscono nel giudice amministrato una componente irrinunciabile del nostro equilibrio istituzionale e, conseguentemente, ne garantiscono le specifiche attribuzioni.<br>Today, the administrative judge is not the judge of the “fundamental” rights affected by the administrative powers. According to the jurisprudence of the Court of cassation, pronouncing as judge of the distribution of competences between administrative and ordinary jurisdiction, the administrative judge can decide on “fundamental” rights only when they fall among the fields belonging to his exclusive jurisdiction. This theory was elaborated by the same Court almost forty years ago, when it recognized the non-degradability of a “fundamental” right, which would flow as individual right from the Constitution to the individuals and which could not become a legitimate interest even if it faces the administrative power. On the one hand, this because the legitimate interest has been considered – for a long time – a legal position unable to ensure an adequate protection to the special value of the fundamental rights. On the other hand, this theory was conceived as an answer to a practical issue: to overcome the inadequacy of the judicial protection the administrative judge could offer to all the legal positions belonging to his jurisdiction, both “fundamental” or not. Formally denying the presence of public powers in the dispute involving “fundamental” rights, the ordinary judge has been able to syndicate the legitimacy of the administrative action, becoming a model for the protection the administrative judge should have guaranteed to the legal position object of his decisions. As any emergency solution, this cannot be considered an efficient response on the long term: beyond the lack of theoretical foundations, its inefficiency descends from the uncertainty of the boundaries of the “fundamental” rights as legal positions. Beyond the introduction of an additional variable that complicates the identification of the responsible judge, the risk was that of being in presence of two different legal safeguards for equally “fundamental” legal positions, according to the recognition of this fundamentality by the judge. Thus the importance of solving this problem. Therefore, it has been necessary to go into the heart of public law: the Constitution and the values subject to its recognition and protection, to argue for the opportunity to lead them back to the two legal positions provided for by the same “Fundamental” law, both individual rights and legitimate interests. Moreover, the process of overcoming this emergency is allowed by the recognition, both in doctrine and case-law, of the legitimate interest as a concrete position that arises and has dialogue with the administrative power to allow a full protection of the private interest inside a public-law relationship. Finally, the changes the administrative judge and process have undergone, culminated in the adoption of the code of the administrative process, have enormously resized the sense of urgency derived from the inefficiency of its protection, providing it with all the instruments that the ordinary judge had adopted to protect the “fundamental” rights affected by the administrative powers. Rather than the civilization of the administrative judge, this has caused his constitutionalisation, being provided with the necessary instruments to guarantee the effective protection of the individual position involved in the exercise of official authority, both “fundamental” or not. Admitting that this emergency has been overcome would therefore not exclude the complete safeguard of the “fundamental” legal positions, but it would also guarantee the respect of other constitutional provisions, such as those which recognize the administrative judge as a fundamental element of our institutional balance and, therefore, guarantee his specific responsibilities.

Identification of a person suspected of a heinous crime before being charged risks prejudicing a fair trial. Present laws place this type of publicity outside the reach of sub judice contempt. This thesis argues there should be a change in the law of sub judice contempt making it an offence for the media to publish the fact that a person is under investigation until the person has been charged.

Identification of a person suspected of a heinous crime before being charged risks prejudicing a fair trial. Present laws place this type of publicity outside the reach of sub judice contempt. This thesis argues there should be a change in the law of sub judice contempt making it an offence for the media to publish the fact that a person is under investigation until the person has been charged.

Формування громадянського суспільства, пов’язаного з індивідуалізацією відносин та правової держави, пов’язаної із захистом суб’єктивних прав, спричиняє зростання уваги до категорії законного інтересу як реальної можливості суб’єктів суспільних відносин, що захищається законом і суспільством.

Dans notre monde actuel, les entreprises utilisent, pour se prémunir de toute atteinte et protéger au maximum leurs intérêts économiques, des techniques contractuelles élaborées par la pratique telles que les clauses de non-concurrence, les clauses de confidentialité, les clauses de non-réaffiliation et les clauses de non sollicitation.Ces clauses occupent de multiples champs de l’activité contractuelle en mêlant le droit des contrats, le droit des affaires et le droit du travail. Elles visent à interdire au cocontractant, d’exercer une activité professionnelle, de divulguer des informations secrètes, ou encore d’embaucher certains collaborateurs. Ainsi, elles viennent limiter une liberté fondamentale, plus spécialement la liberté du commerce et de l’industrie. Dès lors, il semble nécessaire d’élaborer un régime juridique commun à toutes ces clauses afin de préserver d’un coté la protection de l’activité économique des entreprises et de l’autre la sauvegarde de la liberté économique des contractants soumis à de telles clauses. L’intérêt d’un régime commun est d’anticiper les conditions de validité et de mise en œuvre des ce type de clauses. De cette façon, la prévisibilité ne ferait plus défaut aux contractants. L’élaboration de ce droit commun passe par deux étapes. La première est relative à l’identification des clauses limitatives de concurrence. Il s’agit de saisir leur autonomie par rapport aux contrats dans lesquels elles peuvent être insérées et d’en tirer les conséquences au niveau leur validité. La seconde est relative à la mise en œuvre de ces clauses. Leur application est délicate car dépendante pour une grande partie de la précision de leur contenu. En cas de non-respect, un vaste choix de remèdes est offert au contractant déçu pour venir sanctionner le manquement contractuel constaté<br>In the modern world, to guard themselves from damage and to protect at best their economical interests, companies use contractual techniques developed by usage such as non-compete clauses,confidentiality clauses, non-reaffiliation clauses and non-solicitation clauses. These clauses cover many fields of contractual legality, mixing contract law, labor law and business law. Their aim is to prohibit the co-contractor to practice a professional activity, to disclose secret information, or even to employ specific colleagues, or contributors. Thus, they are brought to restrict a fundamental freedom, specifically the freedom of trade and of industry. As a result, it appears necessary to formulate a common legal system for all these clauses so as to preserve on one side the protection of the economic activity of the companies et on the other side the safeguard of the economic freedom of the co-contractors subject to these clauses. The benefit of a common legal system is the anticipation of the conditions of validity and implementation of this type of clause. In this way, the cocontractants will not lack in foresight. The development of this common right is in two steps. This includes confirming their autonomy relative to the contracts in which they may be inserted and draw the necessary conclusions regarding their validity. The second step is relative to the implementation of these clauses. Their application is sensitive because it depends for the most part on the precision of their content. In case of a breach of contract, a large array of legal remedies is available to the aggrieved contractor to penalize the breach of contract

La tesi ha per oggetto l’autotutela amministrativa, specialmente quella c.d. decisoria “spontanea”, ovvero quell’insieme di poteri che consentono all’amministrazione di riesaminare i propri provvedimenti e di rimuoverli a vario titolo.
Di questi poteri si è indagato il fondamento dogmatico e positivo. La questione del fondamento è stata per lunghi anni affrontata dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza in termini totalmente pre-critici e non problematici: l’esistenza di questi poteri era semplicemente scontata e le riflessioni sulla loro base giuridica si esaurivano perlopiù nella constatazione della loro necessità nell’immemore consenso circa la loro ammissibilità. Negli ultimi anni, invece, una parte degli Autori ha disconosciuto la natura implicita e per così dire “originaria” di questi poteri e ne ha perciò patrocinato la stretta riconduzione al principio di legalità: in altre parole, l’annullamento e la revoca non sarebbero affatto conseguenza della c.d. inesauribilità del potere amministrativo – negata da questa dottrina – e sarebbero perciò oggi ammissibili unicamente nei casi e nei modi disciplinati dalle due norme introdotte nella legge sul procedimento nel 2005. Ciò a garanzia della certezza dei rapporti giuridici e del legittimo affidamento dei destinatari dei provvedimenti ampliativi. Secondo un filone ricostruttivo in pare contrastante con il primo, altri Autori hanno inteso valorizzare gli elementi de iure condito a favore della obbligatorietà dell’avvio del procedimento di riesame, auspicandone contemporaneamente la generalizzazione, nell’ottica di una più complessiva trasformazione dell’annullamento d’ufficio in un nuovo istituto ibrido, rispondente alla funzione di alternative dispute risolution system o, se si vuole, di ricorso gerarchico. Per le stesse ragioni, l’istituto dovrebbe perdere il carattere ampiamente discrezionale, in favore di una vincolatezza totale o parziale. Questo secondo “fronte di attacco” alla ricostruzione tradizionale intende offrire soluzione al venir meno del sistema dei controlli di legalità sull’azione amministrativa. Lo studio ha sottoposto a verifica entrambi i filoni evolutivi richiamati, discostandosi dal secondo e, pur accogliendo parte delle argomentazioni ad esso sottostanti, anche dal primo. Quanto alla teoria dell’esauribilità del potere amministrativo, oggetto della prima linea evolutiva, si è ritenuto di condividere le considerazioni circa la tutela dell’affidamento degli interessati e della stabilità dei rapporti giuridici. È parsa tuttavia meglio rispondente alle categorie generali e alle esigenze del sistema (anche sulla base di una visione del diritto amministrativo quale “diritto dei terzi”, per natura volto alla tutela dell’interesse generale e non solo dell’interesse privato particolare coinvolto dall’esercizio del potere) la conservazione della tradizionale inesauribilità del potere, seppur assai mitigata, nella pratica, con riferimento all’esercizio dei poteri di ritiro degli atti favorevoli ai privati il cui affidamento sia concretamente meritevole di tutela. La natura discrezionale dell’annullamento d’ufficio (e della revoca), sottoposta a critica dalla seconda linea evolutiva, viene difesa sia sul piano del diritto positivo e pretorio (attraverso la riconduzione dei principali casi di annullamento c.d. doveroso al modello generale), sia sul piano delle categorie generali, a partire dalla natura dei poteri coinvolti e dall’analisi delle posizioni giuridiche dei soggetti interessati dai procedimenti di secondo grado.<br>The thesis focuses on the Italian system of so called autoprotection or selfprotection. This expression refers to the powers of public administration to revoke its own acts when deemed necessary to repair a vice of legitimacy or a vice of opportunity, without being bind to resort to the courts. Given the aim of this powers – the same of first grade powers plus a semi-judicial one – they are usually meant by judges and scholars as “widely discretionary”. Furthermore, it has always been believed that the choice to activate the correspondent proceeding is totally free for public administration; consequently, a demand of interested parties does not make binding the start of the procedure, opposite to what happens with administrative appeal proceedings. In recent years ECJ, ECHR and national case law has emboldened the limits to selfredress, making clear that legitimate expectations and the public interest to legal certainty must be taken into consideration and given sufficient protection. Lately, also the Legislator followed, making the annulment and the revocation harder to be put in effect when the first act is favorable to the addressed subject. In such cases, the revocation cannot be ordered for a mere reconsideration of already known circumstances (ius poenitendi) but only if new ones show up. At the same time, ex officio annulment is precluded after 18 months from the issuing of the first act, instead of the previous general limit of a “reasonable time”. On the other hand, the case law has apparently pointed out some hypothesis of mandatory annulment, such as for “anticomunitarian acts” and cost-producing acts. Based on these two orientation, some scholars suggested a global rethinking of the self-protection, its bases and its rules. The study analyzes the case law and the latest legislative reforms, proving that no mandatory annulment exists in the Italian legal system. Therefore, nor the ECJ principle of equivalence nor other principles require that selfredress become generally obliged. The thesis also aims to prove that selfprotection remains a discretionary power, in order to ensure that the contrasting needs (the rule of law on the one hand, and the legal certainty and legitimate expectation on the other hand) can be properly balanced in every decision, according to the Constitutional provision of article 97, which requires that both impartiality and good administration are pursued.

La tesi ha per oggetto l’autotutela amministrativa, specialmente quella c.d. decisoria “spontanea”, ovvero quell’insieme di poteri che consentono all’amministrazione di riesaminare i propri provvedimenti e di rimuoverli a vario titolo.
Di questi poteri si è indagato il fondamento dogmatico e positivo. La questione del fondamento è stata per lunghi anni affrontata dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza in termini totalmente pre-critici e non problematici: l’esistenza di questi poteri era semplicemente scontata e le riflessioni sulla loro base giuridica si esaurivano perlopiù nella constatazione della loro necessità nell’immemore consenso circa la loro ammissibilità. Negli ultimi anni, invece, una parte degli Autori ha disconosciuto la natura implicita e per così dire “originaria” di questi poteri e ne ha perciò patrocinato la stretta riconduzione al principio di legalità: in altre parole, l’annullamento e la revoca non sarebbero affatto conseguenza della c.d. inesauribilità del potere amministrativo – negata da questa dottrina – e sarebbero perciò oggi ammissibili unicamente nei casi e nei modi disciplinati dalle due norme introdotte nella legge sul procedimento nel 2005. Ciò a garanzia della certezza dei rapporti giuridici e del legittimo affidamento dei destinatari dei provvedimenti ampliativi. Secondo un filone ricostruttivo in pare contrastante con il primo, altri Autori hanno inteso valorizzare gli elementi de iure condito a favore della obbligatorietà dell’avvio del procedimento di riesame, auspicandone contemporaneamente la generalizzazione, nell’ottica di una più complessiva trasformazione dell’annullamento d’ufficio in un nuovo istituto ibrido, rispondente alla funzione di alternative dispute risolution system o, se si vuole, di ricorso gerarchico. Per le stesse ragioni, l’istituto dovrebbe perdere il carattere ampiamente discrezionale, in favore di una vincolatezza totale o parziale. Questo secondo “fronte di attacco” alla ricostruzione tradizionale intende offrire soluzione al venir meno del sistema dei controlli di legalità sull’azione amministrativa. Lo studio ha sottoposto a verifica entrambi i filoni evolutivi richiamati, discostandosi dal secondo e, pur accogliendo parte delle argomentazioni ad esso sottostanti, anche dal primo. Quanto alla teoria dell’esauribilità del potere amministrativo, oggetto della prima linea evolutiva, si è ritenuto di condividere le considerazioni circa la tutela dell’affidamento degli interessati e della stabilità dei rapporti giuridici. È parsa tuttavia meglio rispondente alle categorie generali e alle esigenze del sistema (anche sulla base di una visione del diritto amministrativo quale “diritto dei terzi”, per natura volto alla tutela dell’interesse generale e non solo dell’interesse privato particolare coinvolto dall’esercizio del potere) la conservazione della tradizionale inesauribilità del potere, seppur assai mitigata, nella pratica, con riferimento all’esercizio dei poteri di ritiro degli atti favorevoli ai privati il cui affidamento sia concretamente meritevole di tutela. La natura discrezionale dell’annullamento d’ufficio (e della revoca), sottoposta a critica dalla seconda linea evolutiva, viene difesa sia sul piano del diritto positivo e pretorio (attraverso la riconduzione dei principali casi di annullamento c.d. doveroso al modello generale), sia sul piano delle categorie generali, a partire dalla natura dei poteri coinvolti e dall’analisi delle posizioni giuridiche dei soggetti interessati dai procedimenti di secondo grado.<br>The thesis focuses on the Italian system of so called autoprotection or selfprotection. This expression refers to the powers of public administration to revoke its own acts when deemed necessary to repair a vice of legitimacy or a vice of opportunity, without being bind to resort to the courts. Given the aim of this powers – the same of first grade powers plus a semi-judicial one – they are usually meant by judges and scholars as “widely discretionary”. Furthermore, it has always been believed that the choice to activate the correspondent proceeding is totally free for public administration; consequently, a demand of interested parties does not make binding the start of the procedure, opposite to what happens with administrative appeal proceedings. In recent years ECJ, ECHR and national case law has emboldened the limits to selfredress, making clear that legitimate expectations and the public interest to legal certainty must be taken into consideration and given sufficient protection. Lately, also the Legislator followed, making the annulment and the revocation harder to be put in effect when the first act is favorable to the addressed subject. In such cases, the revocation cannot be ordered for a mere reconsideration of already known circumstances (ius poenitendi) but only if new ones show up. At the same time, ex officio annulment is precluded after 18 months from the issuing of the first act, instead of the previous general limit of a “reasonable time”. On the other hand, the case law has apparently pointed out some hypothesis of mandatory annulment, such as for “anticomunitarian acts” and cost-producing acts. Based on these two orientation, some scholars suggested a global rethinking of the self-protection, its bases and its rules. The study analyzes the case law and the latest legislative reforms, proving that no mandatory annulment exists in the Italian legal system. Therefore, nor the ECJ principle of equivalence nor other principles require that selfredress become generally obliged. The thesis also aims to prove that selfprotection remains a discretionary power, in order to ensure that the contrasting needs (the rule of law on the one hand, and the legal certainty and legitimate expectation on the other hand) can be properly balanced in every decision, according to the Constitutional provision of article 97, which requires that both impartiality and good administration are pursued.

Engaging Queensland primary teachers in professional associations can be a challenge, particularly for subject-specific associations. Professional associations are recognised providers of professional learning. By not being involved in professional associations primary teachers are missing potential quality professional learning opportunities that can impact the results of their students. The purpose of the research is twofold: Firstly, to provide a thorough understanding of the current context in order to assist professional associations who wish to change from their current level of primary teacher engagement; and secondly, to contribute to the literature in the area of professional learning for primary teachers within professional associations. Using a three part research design, interviews of primary teachers and focus groups of professional association participants and executives were conducted and themed to examine the current context of engagement. Force field analysis was used to provide the framework to identify the driving and restraining forces for primary teacher engagement in professional learning through professional associations. Communities of practice and professional learning communities were specifically examined as potential models for professional associations to consider. The outcome is a diagrammatic framework outlining the current context of primary teacher engagement, specifically the driving and restraining forces of primary teacher engagement with professional associations. This research also identifies considerations for professional associations wishing to change their level of primary teacher engagement. The results of this research show that there are key themes that provide maximum impact if wishing to increase engagement of primary teachers in professional associations. However the implications of this lies with professional associations and their alignment between intent and practice dedicated to this change.

The purpose of the thesis is to discuss whether public interest considerations play a role in merger review in the EU and Nigeria and to determine the extent to which the concept is considered in merger review in the EU and Nigeria. The research will investigate whether public interest is considered in merger review in the EU and Nigeria and the extent as well as the basis of its consideration. It will also explore how and when public interest is given priority over market effects in the EU and Nigeria as well as carrying out a corporate investigation of cross-influences of merger review in the EU and Nigeria literature. The research will consider the tension in considering public interest factors alongside a competition assessment in a single evaluation with a view to balance the public interest assessment with the competition assessment. The research will also focus on which public interest counts? How are public interest consideration factors addressed in competition cases? And are all public interest consideration factors appraised the same way? It will also consider critically the methodology of the application of the public interest concept by the Competition Commissions by analysing the exclusionary method and how conditional exceptions are used as remedies to achieve a public interest goal. The researcher found that public interest consideration in merger review is an aberration in the EU because of its lack of transparency and consistency, and it would play a significant role in Nigeria if the procedural rules were implemented. The thesis concludes that the concept of public interest is already integrated by the fundamentals of competition law, which have already taken care of consumers’ interests, hence there may be no need for the concept to stand alone during merger review.

LLM<br>Department of Mercantile Law<br>The study critically analyses the concurrent enforceability of restraint of trade and garden leave in South African Labour law. The study seeks to answer the question of whether or not the simultaneous enforceability of restraint of trade agreements and garden leave is reasonable. Designed within a qualitative paradigm primarily based on a critical literature review, the study employs a doctrinal approach to establish the contemporary legal position in respect of the simultaneous enforceability of restraint of trade agreements and garden leave in South African Labour law. The objectives pursued by the study are to mitigate the controversies and clear the confusion relating to the enforceability of restraint of trade agreements; to justify the doctrine of restraint of trade; assess the reasonableness of the simultaneous enforceability of garden leave and restraint of trade; examine the onus of proof in matters dealing with the enforceability of restraint of trade agreements; test the constitutionality of restraint of trade agreements; evaluate the relationship between restraint of trade agreements and garden leave; and propose practical recommendations that can be employed to address identified legal flaws in the context of the topic. Structurally, the study begins with unpacking the background to the research topic, the history, origin and rationality of restraint of trade agreements together with an assessment of their enforceability. It further examines the effect of garden leave on restraint of trade agreements, outlines comparative perspectives on restraint of trade, including aspects relating to garden leave and highlights lessons South Africa may learn from the selected jurisdictions. Finally, the study recommends that South African jurisprudence should be developed to shift the burden of proof to employers to prove reasonableness of garden leave and restraint of trade agreements, to impose an obligation on employers to pay former employees for rendering them jobless and to set a maximum period that an employee can be prevented to compete or be employed by employer’s competitors.<br>NRF

Theoretical bases for the limitation 
 of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Czech Republic 
 In the Czech Republic, the conception of fundamental rights and the conditions for their limitations are the result of a specific interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms by the Constitutional Court, which in turn reflects its own views on constitutional theory. Despite being presented almost dogmatically, the confrontation with foreign literature suggests that the so-called external theory of the Constitutional Court finds strong opponent in the so-called internal theory. Internal theory sheds doubts on such hallmarks of the Court's doctrine like the wide conception of fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality or the very existence of conflicts of constitutional values. In this thesis, it is argued that although the internal theory cannot substitute for the external theory at the moment, it represents an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to reassess its current position in order for it to better depict the aims of the constitution-maker, to respect the policies of the legislator and - above all - to take fundamental rights seriously. In particular, it is claimed that the optimal model of the limitation of fundamental rights dully distinguishes between definition and...

Text in Afrikaans, abstract in English<br>Writer investigates the constitutionality of section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 against the backdrop of the South African common law and the common law of comparative legal systems. In the South Africa law the mother of an illegitimate child has guardianship. The natural father does not have parental power which weakens his legal position. In analysing the judgement of the Constitutional Court, writer criticises the court for stating that in the case of a newborn baby the kind of discrimination which section 18( 4 )( d) authorises against a natural father may be justifiable in the initial period after the child is born. The constitutional position of the natural father in American jurisprudence is discussed at length. Writer concludes that the natural father has to take positive steps to vest a right to be heard in an adoption application. Proposals for legal reform are also made.<br>Private Law<br>LL. M. (Law)

Przedmiotem rozprawy doktorskiej jest zakaz ne bis in idem w prawie administracyj-nym. Autor zakłada, że zakaz ne bis in idem nie dotyczy już wyłącznie norm prawa karnego, ale ma charakter dyrektywy ogólnosystemowej, a więc posiadającej w pewnym sensie znacze-nie także z punktu widzenia norm prawa administracyjnego. Sama rozprawa doktorska składa się z pięciu rozdziałów poprzedzonych uwagami wstępnymi i zakończonych wnioskami. Autor stosuje formalno-dogmatyczną metodę badawczą. W pierwszym rozdziale rozważa poszczególne aspekty obowiązywania zakazu ne bis in idem w prawie karnym. Autor udowadnia również, że za sprawą norm prawa międzynarodo-wego doszło do uwolnienia zakazu ne bis in idem spod reżimu prawa karnego. W drugim rozdziale zwraca uwagę na specyficzną konstrukcję zakazu ne bis in idem jako zasady konstytucyjnej. W tym ujęciu autor stara się określić, czy posiada on charakter wiążący ustawodawcę i organy stosujące prawo. Istotne znaczenie z punktu widzenia autora ma także określenie, czy zakaz ne bis in idem wpisuje się do kręgu publicznych praw podmio-towych, czy w dalszym ciągu jest jedynie uzasadnionym oczekiwaniem obywateli. Autor zwraca uwagę na wyraźny podział materii prawnej w obszarze stosowania zakazu ne bis in idem na poziomie konstytucyjnym na dwie sfery: karania i sankcjonowania. Punktem wyjścia dla rozważań prowadzonych w trzecim rozdziale jest uznanie, iż na zakres obowiązywania zakazu ne bis in idem w prawie administracyjnym wpływa orzecznic-two Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Autor podejmuje się zatem ustalenia za sprawą jakich rodza-jów sankcji administracyjnych obywatele mogą domagać się ochrony prawnej. W czwartym rozdziale zwraca uwagę na to, że w obszarze prawa materialnego walor ochronny zakazu ne bis in idem ogranicza się wyłącznie do niektórych z wielu możliwych wa-riantów zbiegu sankcji prawnych. Autor stoi na straży przekonania, zgodnie z którym zakres obowiązywania zakazu ne bis in idem znajduje swoje uzasadnienie w aksjologii prawa admini-stracyjnego. Wskazuje zatem na granicę wyznaczoną przez ustawodawcę pomiędzy typowymi środkami policji administracyjnej a środkami przymusu administracyjnego i sankcjami praw-nymi polegającymi na pozbawieniu lub ograniczeniu określonych kategorii uprawnień. Rozwa-ża zarazem jej zgodność w świetle klauzuli interesu publicznego oraz konstytucyjnego wymo-gu proporcjonalności reakcji prawnej na naruszenie obowiązku prawnego. Piąty rozdział dotyczy proceduralnego aspektu zakazu ne bis in idem w prawie admini-stracyjnym. Autor zakłada, że w tym ujęciu jest on ściśle powiązany z przesłanką procesową res iudicata. Zmierza zatem do wykazania, że ma on znaczenie nie tylko na etapie postępowa-nia sądowoadministracyjnego, ale urzeczywistnia ideę niesioną za pomocą zakazu ne bis in idem już na drodze ogólnego postępowania administracyjnego. W tym rozdziale autor stara się dodatkowo udzielić odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy instytucja zagadnienia wstępnego i Rozstrzy-gnięcia tymczasowe mają istotne znaczenie z punktu widzenia zakazu ne bis in idem.<br>The subject of the doctoral dissertation is the prohibition of ne bis in idem in adminis-trative law. The author assumes that the prohibition of ne bis in idem no longer concerns only criminal law standards, but that it is a system-wide directive which is, in some sense, also rele-vant from the point of view of the rules of administrative law. The doctoral disservice itself consists of five chapters preceded by preliminary observations and completed proposals. The author applies a formal-dogmatic test method. The first chapter examines the various aspects of the prohibition of ne bis in idem in criminal law. The author also proves that the prohibition of ne bis in idem from the criminal law regime has been liberated by the rules of international law. The second chapter draws attention to the specific design of the prohibition of ne bis in idem as a constitutional principle. In this regard, the author seeks to determine whether it is binding on the legislator and the authorities applying the law. It is also important for the au-thor to determine whether the prohibition of ne bis in idem forms part of the public subjective rights, or remains merely a legitimate expectation of citizens. The author draws attention to the clear breakdown of the legal matter in the area of application of the ne bis in idem prohibition at constitutional level into two spheres: punishment and sanctioning. The starting point for the considerations in the third chapter is that the case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal affects the scope of the ne bis in idem prohibition in administrative law. The author therefore undertakes to determine by which types of administrative sanctions citizens can claim legal protection. In the fourth chapter, it draws attention to the fact that, in the area of substantive law, the prohibition of ne bis in idem is limited to some of the many possible options of overlap-ping of legal sanctions. The author guards the conviction that the scope of the prohibition of ne bis in idem is justified in the axiology of administrative law. It therefore points to the bor-der set by the legislator between the typical measures of the administrative police and the means of administrative coerction and the legal sanctions of depriving or restricting certain categories of allowances. It also considers its compatibility in the light of the public interest clause and the constitutional requirement of proportionality of the legal response to breach of legal obligation. The fifth chapter concerns the procedural aspect of the prohibition of ne bis in idem in administrative law. The author assumes that in this regard it is closely linked to the procedural premise of res iudicata. It seeks, therefore, to demonstrate that it is relevant not only at the stage of the judicial procedure, but that it materialates the idea pursued by the prohibition of ne bis in idem by means of a general administrative procedure. In this chapter, the author seeks to further answer the question of whether the institution of preliminary issues and provi-sional decisions are of significant importance from the point of view of the prohibition of ne bis in idem.