Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Transcendental'

Transcendental claims offer necessary, universal, and a priori conditions for the possibility of various phenomena (cognition, perception, language etc.). The current discussion in epistemology takes transcendental arguments, specifically, to serve as refutations of skepticism. However, despite the critical intentions with which they are deployed, transcendental arguments run into problems centering on undeclared metaphysical presuppositions. The aim of this thesis is to challenge these dogmatic presuppositions and to liberate the transcendental from its narrow and problem-ridden focus in epistemology by turning to transcendental themes in the descriptive philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. While anti-skeptical transcendental accounts in epistemology are forced to posit strong and metaphysically charged conditions in order to refute the skeptic decisively, this thesis argues that Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, by transforming the notions operative in transcendental claims – necessity, universality, and apriority – offer a non-metaphysical orientation for transcendental claims. In order to restore the critical impulse Kant once sought in transcendental considerations, this thesis details the basic elements of a pluralist and non-dogmatic transcendental perspective.

Following the general view of faith provided by Paul Tillich as 'the state of being ultimately concerned,' the present work provides a topography of faith that is designed to reveal the intimate connections between faith and the development of personal identity. As the state of Being-for-one's-ultimate-concern, it is a person's faith which molds and shapes her own unique self, providing depth, direction, and unity to her life.
My understanding of faith is that it must be living faith, like living tissue, and this is true in the obvious sense that it is a life lived. Starting from the view that no individual's existence is self-justifying, what is presented is an existential analysis of our actual encounters with faith, brought to show up through the individual's active struggle in responding to the call of her own question-begging existence. This is the process of the making of the identity I have called transcendental faith.

The goal of my thesis is to understand why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism can secure empirical realism, the idea that there really exists an objective world that we can come to know through experience. I maintain that, according to Kant, the possibility of coming to know objective reality depends upon the possibility of referring to objects, which itself, Kant thinks, can be explained by transcendental idealism. The transcendental idealist worldview is supposed by Kant to explain the possibility of referring to objects because it recognizes that objects must conform to cognition and not the other way around. Therefore, I explore what Kant means by objects conforming to cognition. I start with the fact that Kant says that the conditions for the possibility of our experience of objects must be identical with the conditions for the possibility of those objects themselves. I then argue that this means that according to the transcendental idealist worldview, objective reality, if it is to be full-blooded objective reality, must be essentially able to show up for us in experience. In opposition to this worldview stands what Kant calls transcendental realism, the prevailing worldview that supposes that full-blooded objective reality simply cannot be essentially able to show up for us in experience. Kant says that the prevailing transcendental realist worldview, of which he claims all philosophies hitherto are variations, will never be able to explain the possibility of referring to objects, and that only his transcendental idealism can. Because Kant imputes so much importance to the opposition, I elaborate the distinction between transcendental idealism and transcendental realism, and clarify why only the latter can, as the former cannot, explain the possibility of referring to objects and thus the possibility of knowing an objective world, and thereby secure an empirical realism.

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit Kants Projekt der transzendentalen Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe hinsichtlich ihrer Fragen, Annahmen, und Argumente. Anders als viele Interpreten schlage ich vor, dass Kants Fragestellung in der transzendentalen Deduktion im metaphysischen Sinne meta-semantisch ist. Indem er alle möglichen konkurrierenden Theorien ablehnt, zeigt Kant überzeugend die Notwendigkeit seiner kopernikanischen Lösung und die Plausibilität der Auffassung von „keiner notwendigen Verknüpfung ohne notwendige Instanziierung“. Ich werde argumentiert, dass Kant verschiedene Argumentationsansätze in der transzendentalen Deduktion entwickelt: das Argument aus der Erkenntnis, das Argument aus dem Selbstbewusstsein, das Argument aus dem Urteil und das Argument aus der Wahrnehmung, und dass sie alle in erster Linie nicht im Wesen anti-skeptisch, sondern erklärend sind. Diese von mir vorgeschlagene Interpretation von Kants transzendentaler Deduktion zeigt, wie ernst Kant seinen transzendentalen Weg für notwendig hält und warum Kants Ansatz vor allem als problemorientiert, nicht aber als gründungsmotiviert angesehen werden sollte.
This present work addresses Kant’s project of transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding with regard to its question, assumptions, and arguments. Unlike many interpreters, I propose that Kant’s question in transcendental deduction is meta-semantic in the metaphysical sense. By rejecting all the possible rival theories, Kant convincingly shows the necessity of his Copernican solution and the plausibility of the view of “no necessary connection without necessary instantiation”. I argue that Kant develops different lines of arguments in transcendental deduction: the argument from cognition, the argument from self-consciousness, the argument from judgment and the argument from perception, and that all of them are primarily not anti-skeptical, but explanatory in character. This interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction reveals how seriously Kant takes his transcendental path to be necessary and why Kant’s approach should be viewed as problem-oriented, rather than foundation-motivated.

Orientador: Márcio Augusto Damin Custódio
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: A presente dissertação tem por escopo analisar a noção de bem na metafísica de Tomás de Aquino. Para tanto, investigar-se-á como Tomás apresenta essa noção a partir de uma dupla caracterização, qual seja: o bem entendido como uma das noções gerais do ente, isto é, uma propriedade transcendental, e o bem entendido como um dos atributos divinos próprios, isto é, uma propriedade transcendente. Nesse sentido, analisar-se-á, por um lado, as características gerais dos transcendentais e o modo segundo o qual Tomás determina que o bem, sendo convertível ao ente, pode ser entendido como um transcendental. Por outro lado, analisar-se-á como Tomás determina que esta noção pode ser dita transcendente, entendendo, nesse ponto, que o bem é uma das perfeições divinas. Contudo, tal caracterização do bem, aparentemente, gera uma contradição: como essa noção pode ser dita um transcendental e, simultaneamente, ser transcendente? Para investigar essa aparente contradição na caracterização do bem, faz-se necessário explicitar como Tomás salvaguarda este duplo aspecto utilizando-se do modelo de predicação por participação. Assim, a presente dissertação visa explicitar a justificativa encontrada por Tomás para estabelecer a relação entre uma propriedade transcendental e uma propriedade transcendente na utilização de um modelo específico de predicação por participação que, nesse contexto, é mobilizado como fundamento metafísico à dupla caracterização da noção de bem. Nessa medida, para Tomás, as criaturas são ditas boas porque participam da bondade divina. Ao mobilizar, portanto, as noções de predicação e participação, mostrar-se-á como a doutrina dos transcendentais constitui-se como um modelo peculiar de análise de um problema filosófico que recebeu, da parte de Tomás, um tratamento distinto da tradição que o precedera e que não se restringe à mera recepção das fontes que ele tinha acesso
Abstract: This dissertation aims to analyze the notion of good in Thomas Aquinas' metaphysics. In order to do so, it will be inquired how Aquinas introduces this notion through a double characterization: good understood as one of the general notions of the being, i.e., a transcendental property, and good regarded as one of the proper divine attributes, i.e., a transcendent property. In this sense, it shall be analyzed, first, the general characteristics of the transcendentals and the way Aquinas asserts that the good, once it is convertible to the being, may be regarded as a transcendental. Secondly, it will be analyzed how Aquinas states that this notion may be said to be transcendent, provided that the good is one of the divine perfections. However, such a characterization of the good apparently brings out a contradiction: How can this notion be said to be a transcendental and, simultaneously, to be transcendent? In order to inquire this apparent contradiction in the characterization of the good, it is necessary to make explicit the way Aquinas preserves this double aspect by using the model of predication by participation. Thus, this dissertation aims to highlight the justification found by Aquinas to establish the relation between a transcendental property and transcendent one by making use of a specific model of predication by participation which, in this context, is taken as a metaphysical foundation to the double characterization of the notion of good. According to Aquinas, creatures are said to be good because they participate in divine goodness. As this study deals with the notions of predication and participation, it will be presented how the doctrine of transcendentals constitutes a peculiar model of philosophical analysis which has received, from Aquinas, a distinct treatment from the tradition before him and is not only the reception of the sources available to him
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

This thesis seeks to establish a connection between abstract thought and material practice. It does so by focusing on the relation between the transcendental philosophy of time and the socio-technics of time-keeping practices. The thesis begins with a discussion of Kant's philosophy of time as outlined in the Critique of Pure Reason. It argues that Kant's discovery of the transcendental coincides with the development of an entirely new conception of time. This new conception overturns classical thought by making a distinction between the abstract form of time and the empirical phenomena of movement and change. The second chapter maps the transcendental philosophy of time on to the history of capitalist time-keeping. This history includes: the invention and development of the mechanical clock, temporal standardization and the increasing importance of the equation 'time = money. The aim in bringing these two spheres together is to show, both that Kant's philosophy of time owes much to his empirical surroundings, and also that capitalist time can only be understood through the temporal abstraction of transcendental thought. This link between Kant and capitalism is blocked, however, by a dividing line which separates the philosophical nature of time from the empirical changes of history. In order to surpass this problem the thesis turns to the work of Deleuze and Guattari whose 'transcendental materialism' connects the abstract production of time with empirical innovations. This is accomplished by replacing the classical conception of a transcendent eternity with the immanent materiality of an exterior plane. This plane - which they call Aeonis composed of thresholds, or singular events which make no distinction between time and that which occurs in time. The final chapter explores the dawn of the third millennium - or Y2K - as constituting one such Aeonic event.

We study the iteration of a transcendental entire function, f; in particular, the fast escaping set, A(f). This set consists of points that iterate to infinity as fast as possible, and plays a significant role in transcendental dynamics. First we investigate functions for which A(f) has a structure called a spider's web. We construct several new classes of function with this property. We show that some of these classes have a degree of stability under changes in the function, and that new examples of functions with this property can be constructed by composition, by differentiation, and by integration of existing examples. We use a property of spiders' webs to give new results concerning functions with no unbounded Fatou components. When A(f) is a spider's web, it contains a sequence of fundamental loops. We next explore the structure of these fundamental loops for functions with a multiply connected Fatou component, and show that there exist functions for which some fundamental loops are analytic curves and approximately circles, while others are geometrically highly distorted. We do this by introducing a real-valued function which measures the rate of escape of points in A(f), and show that this function has a number of interesting properties. Next we study functions with a simply connected Fatou component in A(f). We give an example of a function with this property, which - in contrast to the only other known functions of this type - has no multiply connected Fatou components. To do this we also prove a new criterion for points to be in A(f). Finally, we investigate the much studied Eremenko-Lyubich class of transcendental entire functions with a bounded set of singular values. We give a new characterisation of this class, and a new result regarding direct singularities which are not logarithmic.

Kant is famous for his use of transcendental arguments in the transcendental deduction. This thesis examines how such a transcendental argument is used within Kant’s methodological framework. Following the work of Henrich and Walker, the paper asks whether transcendental arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason are compatible with Kant’s methodology in general. We find that these arguments and Kant’s methodology are compatible, and that transcendental arguments are indeed very weak arguments by Walker’s standards. However, the entire transcendental deduction should be understood as a deduction writing that uses transcendental arguments particularly effectively according to Kant’s own methodological standards.

In the early section of the thesis I argue for a position which endorses what is usually considered to be an unacceptable paradox: the paradox of the Naturalisation Idealism (hereafter, ‘the paradox’). The paradox occurs most vividly in the work of Arthur Schopenhauer, a philosopher who claimed notoriously that the brain is responsible for the ideality of the whole world even though the brain is itself an object within the world. I argue that there are four key philosophical intuitions whose indubitability leads to the paradox, but I suggest that the paradox may be considered in a more positive light by construing the intuitions in terms of a key analogy. I call the resulting position ‘contraspectivism’. Contraspectivism enables us to countenance what I call a ‘four-fit’ between the key philosophical intuitions, with a ‘fulcral’ role for the brain in connecting them. I claim that this position comprises a ‘Copernican turnaround’: a position which upholds Kant’s Copernicanism but which nonetheless explicates it according to the original reality of the world within which the brain is environed. I allege that three philosophers, in particular, are committed – explicitly or implicitly – to the tenets of contraspectivism, namely, Schopenhauer, Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson. I also suggest that the paradox is embedded within the ‘justified true belief’ construal of knowledge. In the penultimate section I assess Schopenhauer’s claim that there is an ‘originary’ thing-in-itself – knowable as the ‘will’ – within which the terms of the paradox can be reconciled. I reject the notion that any entity could possibly possess the kind of ‘maybeing’ necessary to fulfil this conciliatory role, and I criticise David Cooper’s doctrine of ‘mystery’ in the light of this discussion. I conclude that contraspectivism offers a solution to what Cooper calls the problem of ‘alienation’ in philosophy; but it is a solution which asserts that the terms of the supposed problem are actually perfectly acceptable as they stand.

I aim to provide a satisfying response to radical scepticism, a view according to which our knowledge of the external world is impossible. In the first chapter I investigate into the nature and the source of scepticism. Radical scepticism is motivated both by the closureRK-based and the underdeterminationRK-based sceptical arguments. Because these two sceptical arguments are logically independent, any satisfying anti-sceptical proposal must take both of them into consideration. Also, scepticism is a paradox, albeit a spurious one, so we need to provide a diagnosis as to why we are lead into the paradox and why the alleged paradox misrepresents our epistemic standings. Hence, I advocate an obstacle-dissolving strategy for combating the sceptical problem. In chapter two, I discuss the anti-sceptical import of transcendental arguments. Although ambitious transcendental arguments are vulnerable to Stroud’s dilemma, I argue that modest transcendental arguments are promising. Modest transcendental arguments start from an undoubted psychological fact and then reveal some necessary theoretical commitments that we must make. Regarding these commitments, I submit that we are type II epistemically justified in believing them. Our commitments are type II justified in the sense that making these commitments can promote our epistemic goals, namely, the attainment of true beliefs and the avoidance of false beliefs. After that, in light of Cassam’s objection to transcendental arguments, I contend that a modest transcendental argument should be used as a stepping stone for a diagnostic anti-sceptical proposal. In chapter three, I develop a Davidsonian response to closureRK-based radical scepticism. This form of sceptical argument rests on the idea that there is no limitation on our acquisition of rationally grounded knowledge. I discuss Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation, the principle of charity and triangulation. Crucially, he argues that the content of a knowledge-apt everyday belief is determined by its typical cause and other relevant beliefs. Further, among different propositional attitudes, belief is prior to doubt. What follows is that doubt must be local because it must presume other content-determining beliefs. Also, I explore Davidson’s view on the concept of belief. On his view, in order to have a knowledge-apt belief, we must have the concept of knowledge-apt belief. We can command this concept by having the concept of objective truth. Objective truth requires that we are aware of and are capable of appreciating the possibility of a belief’s being true or false. And this possibility cannot be appreciated unless we have some related contentful beliefs to identify the content of the very belief. However, we are committed to, as opposed to believing, the proposition that the sceptical hypothesis does not obtain. It is impossible to appreciate the possibility of our fundamental commitments being false from our own perspective, because fundamental commitments specify the general cause of our beliefs. A change in this regard would cause a total change of the content of all beliefs, which leaves us no contentful belief at all to make this possibility intelligible. Therefore, the closureRK principle is not applicable to the evaluation of the sceptical hypothesis. Hence, we can retain the closureRK principle while evading the closureRK-based sceptical challenge. Unfortunately, the Davidsonian response cannot deal with the underdeterminationRK-based sceptical challenge, because we are not shown whether our rational support in the good case favours one’s everyday belief over its sceptical counterpart. In chapter four, I examine how epistemological disjunctivism can deal with underdeterminationRK-based radical scepticism. This form of sceptical argument assumes that our rational support provides at best inconclusive support for our beliefs. Therefore, a belief’s being rationally supported, no matter in the good case or in the bad case, is compatible with the belief’s being false. Epistemological disjunctivism claims that in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, our rational support can be both factive and reflectively accessible. The factive rational support at issue is one’s propositional seeing. I discuss both McDowell’s and Pritchard’s proposals for motivating factive seeing, and I argue for epistemological disjunctivism against three prime facie objections, i.e., the distinguishability problem, the basis problem and the access problem. When epistemological disjunctivism is shown to be a plausible view, I argue that underdeterminationRK-based radical scepticism can be dismissed. In particular, in the optimal case, factive rational support favours our everyday belief over the sceptical hypothesis. However, regarding closureRK-based radical scepticism, epistemological disjunctivism seems to licence a robust answer. The ambitious answer is that, in the good case, we can after all know the denial of the sceptical hypothesis in virtue of possessing factive rational support. And it is the immodesty of this answer that renders this response unpalatable. In the last chapter, I propose a combined treatment of the sceptical problem. Although both the Davidsonian response and the epistemological disjunctivist response can only deal with one aspect of the sceptical problem, their views are in fact mutually supportive. On the one hand, the Davidsonian response, together with a Wittgensteinian insight, shows that why rational support can only be provided in a local manner; on the other hand, epistemological disjunctivism reminds us that rational support can be factive in the good case. Putting these two points together allows us to answer the whole sceptical challenge in a uniform way. This combined proposal has three claims. First, our rational support can be both local and factive, so we can dismiss both sceptical arguments in one go. Second, the sceptical problem is a spurious paradox, so the combined treatment involves a diagnosis. This diagnosis starts from a modest transcendental argument which reveals some necessary commitments that we must make, and then proceeds to expose faulty assumptions in the sceptical paradox. Third, once the dubious assumptions are dislodged, we can evade the sceptical problem once and for all. In the end, we are offered with a satisfying response to radical scepticism.

Orientador : Zeljko Loparic
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Esse texto se insere no debate contemporâneo sobre as aproximações entre Kant e Foucault. A relação entre essas duas Filosofias é, ao mesmo tempo, de ruptura e continuidade. Por um lado, o método arqueologia-genealogia levará a resultados que se opõem a muitas teses de Kant sobre o ser humano, o conhecimento e a história. Por outro lado, Foucault não abandona em nenhum momento as fôrmas kantianas de fazer Filosofia e seu método está mergulhado no modelo kantiano e na atitude crítica. Foucault nega o a priori formal, mas afirma um a priori histórico; nega o sujeito transcendental e, consequentemente o idealismo transcendental, mas afirma analogamente um transcendental histórico; inverte categorias kantianas fundamentais e produz algumas de suas principais teses acerca do sujeito moderno. Foucault inverte categorias kantianas, assim como ao longo da história da Filosofia, grandes pensadores subverteram seus mestres criativamente. Foucault assume a atitude crítica, adota o modelo da Filosofia transcendental, usando, portanto, as fôrmas de Kant, contudo, troca o seu conteúdo. Nossa tese caracteriza o que o próprio Michel Foucault indicou como sendo sua filiação kantiana; isto é, se este se inscreve de alguma forma na tradição filosófica, o é na tradição crítica de Kant. Procuramos examinar que tipo de filiação é essa em uma perspectiva de compreensão do como e com o quê essa Filosofia foi produzida. Trabalhamos durante todo o tempo com a hipótese de que o kantismo de Foucault é um exemplo digno de nota de uma relação criativa (e não subserviente) de um filósofo com sua tradição. A elaboração de nossa hipótese e a chegada aos resultados só foi possível podendo considerar toda a obra foucaultiana a partir de uma dada leitura da obra de Kant feita por Z. Loparic. A tese de Loparic é de que a Filosofia de Kant é uma semântica transcendental. À luz dessa interpretação de Kant - especialmente, de uma releitura das teorias do conceito e da verdade, em que aparece o conceito de domínio de interpretação - é que se tornou possível uma leitura adequada da extensão e do tipo de kantismo de Foucault, especialmente no que tange ao conceito de epistémê. A tese percorre o caminho que vai da leitura que Foucault faz de Kant, da maneira como Foucault usa Kant e da indicação do método e alguns de seus operadores conceituais, sempre em relação a Kant. Defendemos que ambas as Filosofias (kantiana e foucaultiana) são filosofias críticas e são semânticas transcendentais, carecendo a segunda, para ser mais bem definida, de um adjetivo: uma semântica transcendental histórica. Como pano de fundo das ideias aqui apresentadas está nosso tema de maior interesse: a produção de Filosofia e as possíveis relações do filósofo com a tradição de pensamento filosófico ocidental. Foucault com Kant é um exemplo elucidativo para se compreender tal produção e uma das maneiras de sua efetivação
Abstract: This text is applicable to the contemporary debate on the similarities between Kant and Foucault. The relationship between these two philosophies is one of both rupture and continuity. On one hand, the archaeological-genealogical approach produces results that contradict many of Kant¿s studies on the human being, knowledge and history. On the other hand, Foucault by no means abandons the Kantian models to produce Philosophy, and his method dives into the Kantian model and the critical attitude. Foucault denies the formal a priori, but affirms the historical a priori; in other words, he denies the transcendental subject and, as a consequence, the transcendental idealism, but analogically affirms a "transcendental-historical". He inverts Kantian ideas and produces some of his principal works on the modern subject. Foucault changes the Kantian categories, just as throughout the history of Philosophy, great thinkers creatively overturned their masters. Foucault is critical in his attitude, adopting the transcendental philosophy model. He does, however, use Kant¿s molds, although with altered content. Our thesis characterizes what Michel Foucault himself indicated as being his Kantian affiliation; namely, if in some way it applies to the philosophical tradition, it will apply to Kant¿s critical tradition. The objective here is to examine what type of affiliation this is, from a perspective of understanding how and with what this philosophy was produced. The hypothesis adopted in this study gives that Foucault¿s Kantianism is a noteworthy example of a creative relationship (and one that is not subservient) between a philosopher and his tradition. It was only possible to elaborate this hypothesis and reach the achieved results by considering the complete work of Foucaultian, by studying Z. Loparic¿s interpretation of Kant¿s work. According to Loparic¿s thesis, Kant¿s philosophy is a transcendental semantic. In light of Kant¿s interpretation ¿ particularly from the re-creation of the theories of concept and truth, in which appears the concept of the domain of interpretation - it was possible to thoroughly study the extension and type of Foucault¿s Kantianism, particularly in terms of the episteme concept. The thesis follows the theory that emerges from Foucault¿s interpretation of Kant, in the way that Foucault uses Kant, the indication of the method and some of its conceptual operators, always in relation to Kant. The present study defends the argument that both Philosophies (Kantian and Foucaultian) are critical and transcendental semantics; the second, in order to be better defined, requires an adjective: a transcendental-historical semantic. The backdrop to the ideas presented in this study is the subject of greatest interest: the production of philosophy and the possible relationships between the philosopher and the tradition of western philosophical thinking. Foucault together with Kant is a clear example that can be used to understand this production and one of the ways that it can be effective
Doutorado
Filosofia
Doutora em Filosofia

This dissertation provides a systematic account of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. According to the proposed theory, appearances are understood as intentional objects, while phenomena are considered as logical constructs that are grounded in noumena, whereby the grounding relation can be modelled by means of a coordinated multiple-domain supervenience relation. This framework is employed to provide a vindication of metaphysics, by giving dual-level explanations that explain how the world can have ontological structure, making intelligible the applicability of metaphysical concepts, such as unity, persistence, causation and mind-body interaction, to the empirical realm. The key claim that is advanced in the dissertation is that in order to be realists we have to be transcendental idealists. In particular, transcendental arguments are provided that establish that if realism about science, metaphysics and ethics is to be possible, then (i) the world must have a transcendental structure that integrates the fragmented perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks into a unified perspective-independent space-time manifold, (ii) space and time must be forms of intuition that give rise to correspondences between appearances and phenomena, making it the case that we can have non-trivial scientific knowledge of the world, and (iii) we must have a priori concepts, namely the mathematical and dynamical categories, that allow us to cognise the empirical as well as ontological structure of the world. The ‘fact of experience’ as well as the ‘fact of reason’ are then brought in to strengthen the case for scientific, metaphysical and moral realism, thereby warding off the threat of nihilism. Moreover, a refutation of the more attractive versions of scepticism and idealism is provided, namely of those versions that claim that a subject’s representations or episodes of awareness can be temporally ordered even though they deny or doubt the existence of a law-governed external world. The conclusion then is that a realist stance is to be adopted and that we should consequently accept transcendental idealism and hold that the world has a transcendental structure.

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This thesis aims to investigate the overcoming of the kantian transcendental idealism held by the hegelian absolute idealism. The arguments in favor of hegelian overcoming the dualism between thing in itself and the phenomenon will be detailed and tested. As Kant points out that metaphysics as a science is impossible, ie the objects that denote the transcendental ideas are beyond space and time, since there are no corresponding object in the sensible world to her and therefore can not be known, because not affect the sensitivity, Hegel presents the reality as subject and denies any form of division between being and thinking.
Esta dissertação tem como objetivo investigar a superação do idealismo transcendental kantiano realizada pelo idealismo absoluto hegeliano. Os argumentos hegelianos em prol da superação do dualismo entre coisa-em-si e fenômeno serão detalhados e postos à prova. Enquanto Kant salienta que a metafísica como ciência é impossível, ou seja, os objetos que as Idéias transcendentais denotam estão além do espaço e do tempo, não existindo nenhum objeto no mundo sensível correspondentes a ela e, portanto, não podem ser conhecidas, pois não afetam a sensibilidade, Hegel apresenta a realidade como sujeito e nega qualquer forma de cisão entre o ser e o pensar.

This thesis examines Kant’s transcendental idealism. It argues that the key to understanding Kant’s idealism lies in appreciating how it is compatible with Kant’s empirical realism. It suggests against the so-called traditional view that transcendental idealism is not a distinction between illusion and reality, where appearances are how things merely seem to be to us in virtue of the nature of our minds, and where things in themselves are understood to be how things really are. Instead, it argues that transcendental idealism, when charitably interpreted, reveals how minds such as ours can have genuine cognitive access to reality, based on exploring the links between the conditions of experience, in terms of a priori forms of intuition and categories that the cognitive subject supplies to its experience, and the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, in terms of the necessary ontological structures that objects of experience must have in order to be representable through human forms of intuition (space and time). The thesis suggests that Kant uses his transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves in at least three ways and that unpacking these three uses helps us to get a better grasp on Kant’s idealism. The three senses of the transcendental distinction are: (1) the traditional phenomenalist conception, according to which appearances are ‘mere representations’ and things in themselves are the putatively ‘real’ things, (2) the notion that things in themselves are ‘objects of a pure understanding’ and (3) that appearances are conditioned phenomena while things in themselves are the unconditioned ground of phenomena. The thesis argues that senses (2) and (3) can be combined to yield transcendental idealism as empirical realism, while the arguments and passages that turn on sense (1) must be rejected.

The paper's purpose is to offer an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason's chapter On the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding. Our hypothesis is that in the doctrine of the schematism the possibility of the ontological constitution of the object as object is decided. Thus we will show that only with the transcendental schemes we find the basic ontological predicates of objectivity. This is demonstrated by establishing that only thanks to the doctrine of schematism the inner dynamism of the cooperation between sensibility and understanding gives place to objective knowledge.
El objetivo de nuestro artículo es ofrecer una interpretación del capítulo sobre El esquematismo de los conceptos puros del entendimiento de la Crítica de la razón pura de Immanuel Kant. Nuestra hipótesis es que en la doctrina del esquematismo se decide la posibilidad de la constitución ontológica del objeto como objeto. Consiguientemente, mostraremos que únicamente con los esquemas trascendentales nos encontramos con los predicados ontológicos fundamentales de la objetividad. Esto se demuestra estableciendo que solo gracias a la doctrina del esquematismo se pone de manifiesto el dinamismo interno de la cooperación entre la sensibilidad y el entendimiento que da lugar al conocimiento objetivo.

The paper’s purpose is to offer an interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason’s chapter On the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding”. Our hypothesis is that in the doctrine of the schematism the possibility of the ontological constitution of the object as object is decided. Thus we will show that only with the transcendental schemes we find the basic ontological predicates of objectivity. This is demonstrated by establishing that only thanks to the doctrine of schematism the inner dynamism of the cooperation between sensibility and understanding gives place to objective knowledge.
El objetivo de nuestro artículo es ofrecer una interpretación del capítulo sobre El esquematismo de los conceptos puros del entendimiento” de la Crítica de la razón pura de Immanuel Kant. Nuestra hipótesis es que en la doctrina del esquematismo se decide la posibilidad de la constitución ontológica del objeto como objeto. Consiguientemente, mostraremos que únicamente con los esquemas trascendentales nos encontramos con los predicados ontológicos fundamentales de la objetividad. Esto se demuestra estableciendo que solo gracias a la doctrina del esquematismo se pone de manifiesto el dinamismo interno de la cooperación entre la sensibilidad y el entendimiento que da lugar al conocimiento objetivo.

Following P.F. Strawson's reading of Kant, the majority of the literature on transcendental arguments seeks to divorce such arguments from their original Kantian context. This thesis is concerned with Mark Sacks's recent defence of transcendental arguments, which takes a different approach. A critique is given of Sacks's work and extensions and modifications of his approach are recommended. It is proposed that certain difficulties encountered by Kant's transcendentally-ideal approach can be overcome with Hegelian solutions.

Master of Philosophy
Following P.F. Strawson's reading of Kant, the majority of the literature on transcendental arguments seeks to divorce such arguments from their original Kantian context. This thesis is concerned with Mark Sacks's recent defence of transcendental arguments, which takes a different approach. A critique is given of Sacks's work and extensions and modifications of his approach are recommended. It is proposed that certain difficulties encountered by Kant's transcendentally-ideal approach can be overcome with Hegelian solutions.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2016.
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A presente pesquisa se propõe a investigar um dos problemas mais debatidos e extensamente criticados da filosofia husserliana: o da intersubjetividade. O volume e o tom majoritariamente censurador das discussões acerca do tema não são nada de surpreendente para uma filosofia que viu no retorno ao ego cogito e na construção de uma verdadeira egologia a pedra de toque para a refundação das ciências e da própria filosofia. Parece que se está diante de um dos limites da filosofia husserliana, um ponto nevrálgico capaz de fazer ruir toda a empreitada do pai da fenomenologia. Entre os textos publicados ainda durante a vida de Husserl, seguramente aquele que se detém de maneira mais profunda nos problemas da intersubjetividade é Meditações cartesianas, de 1931. Trata-se de ponto comum entre os comentadores e os herdeiros da fenomenologia husserliana acusar o fracasso de Husserl em sua tentativa, neste texto, de discutir a dimensão intersubjetiva a partir da perspectiva proporcionada pelos métodos da epoché e da redução fenomenológica. Como seria possível fazer justiça à experiência intersubjetiva após a limitação do campo de investigação à própria consciência? Além disso, outro elemento ajuda a compor e a tornar mais complexo este quadro: o autoproclamado idealismo transcendental que Husserl identifica à própria fenomenologia. Como se poderia, dada a adoção explícita de uma postura idealista, evitar a acusação de solipsismo? E, pior: como seria mesmo pensável superá-la? O que nossa pesquisa pretende abordar é o fato de que, a despeito das inúmeras críticas e vereditos comuns apontando o fracasso e a impossibilidade da empreitada husserliana de justificar a experiência intersubjetiva, os intérpretes tendem a não chegar a um acordo sobre, afinal, qual seria o problema específico, relativo à intersubjetividade, do qual Husserl se ocupa na Quinta Meditação. Nossa investigação buscará, então, como peça-chave de nossas indagações, delimitar algumas das características definidoras destes dois elementos que parecem tornar aporética qualquer tentativa de lidar com a dimensão intersubjetiva a partir de uma perspectiva husserliana: a epoché/redução fenomenológica e o idealismo transcendental-fenomenológico. A partir daí, o que se pretende é chegar a um entendimento que possa se pôr no pórtico das possíveis objeções ao que Husserl está propondo, pois, pensa-se que uma das condições para determinar em que medida ele obtém sucesso ou não é definir minimamente aquilo sobre o qual, enfim, o filósofo está lançando sua atenção e esforços.

Abstract : This research aims to investigate one of the most discussed and widely criticized problems in Husserl?s philosophy: the intersubjectivity. The volume and censorious tone of these discussions is not surprising for a philosophy that saw the return to the ego cogito and the building of a real egology as the touchstone for the re-foundation of science and philosophy itself. It seems that we are facing one of the limits of Husserl's philosophy, a neuralgic point able to collapse the whole enterprise of the father of phenomenology. Among other texts published during Husserl?s life, certainly the one that holds more deeply in the problems of intersubjectivity is Cartesian Meditations, from 1931. Commentators and heirs of Husserl's phenomenology expressly acknowledge the failure of Husserl?s attempt in this text to discuss the intersubjective dimension from the perspective provided by the methods of epoché and phenomenological reduction. How is it possible to do justice to the intersubjective experience after limiting the field of research to one?s own conscience? Besides, another element concurs to compose and to make more complex this picture: the self-proclaimed transcendental idealism that Husserl identifies with phenomenology. How can an explicit adoption of an idealistic posture avoid the charge of solipsism? And worse, how could be even thinkable to overcome it? Our research aims to address the fact that, despite the many criticisms and common verdicts pointing the failure and the impossibility of Husserl's endeavor to justify our intersubjective experience, interpreters do not even reach an agreement, after all, on what would be the specific problem on the intersubjectivity which Husserl is concerned at the Fifth Meditation. Our investigation then seeks, as a key part of our inquiries, to delimit some of the defining characteristics of these two elements that seem to make aporetic any attempt to deal with the intersubjective dimension from a Husserlian perspective: the epoché/phenomenological reduction and the transcendental-phenomenological idealism. From thereon, the aim is to reach an understanding that can be placed on the threshold of possible objections to what Husserl is proposing, insofar as one of the conditions to determine to what extent Husserl succeeds or not is to minimally clarify the matter that the philosopher is devoting its attention and efforts.

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: A expressão ¿Revolução Copernicana¿, usada por Kant para enfatizar a ruptura entre a filosofia crítica e a metafísica tradicional, leva-nos, acima de tudo, a considerar o objeto do conhecimento de uma nova maneira. Agora, o problema da relação entre uma representação e seu objeto tem um conceito do último similar a uma construção matemática como sua condição de solubilidade. Em outras palavras, a forma do objeto é considerada como sendo constituída por operações cognitivas. Explorando a Dedução Transcendental e o Esquematismo Transcendental, nós acreditamos ter descoberto que, mais do que a possibilidade de que um objeto em sentido ¿forte¿ seja constituído por operações cognitivas, Kant teve sucesso mesmo em provar que, em princípio, nós sempre temos que poder executar aquelas operações (desde que nós temos intelecto discursivo e intuição sensível). Isto é o mesmo que dizer que nossa leitura pretende compatibilizar a Semântica Trasncendental, enquanto uma Semântica Construtivista, com uma leitura anti-cética dos fins da Analítica Transcendental
Abstract: The expression ¿Copernican Revolution¿, used by Kant to emphasize the rupturebetween critical philosophy and metaphysical tradition, takes us, above all, to consider the object of knowledge in a new way. Now, the problem of the relation between a representation and its object has a concept of the later which is similar to a mathematical construction as its solvability condition. In other words, the form of the object is taken as constituted by cognitive operations. By exploring the Transcendental Deduction and the Transcendental Schematism, we believe to have discovered that, more than the possibility that an object in the ¿weighty¿ sense be constituted by cognitive operations, Kant has even succeed in proving that, in principle, we always have to be able to execute those operations (since we have discursive intellect and sensible intuition). This amounts to say that our reading intends to make Transcendental Semantic as a Constructive Semantic compatible with an anti-skeptical reading of Transcendental Analytic¿s goals
Doutorado
Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: Neste trabalho identifiquei os elementos mais importantes envolvidos na argumentação de Kant na sua Analítica Transcendental, isto é, por um lado, as representações intuitivas (sensações, intuições empíricas, intuições puras e aparecimentos) tratadas na Estética Transcendental e, por outro, tanto as representações discursivas (conceitos) como as operações (associadas a unidades, regras e julgamentos) tratadas na sua Lógica Transcendental. Em relação a cada um destes elementos, faço um confronto entre trechos de diversas obras de Kant onde eles são explicitados, buscando identificar, nesta multiplicidade de descrições, informações complementares e/ou possíveis incoerências, na intenção de compreender cada um deles de maneira clara e precisa. Finalmente, exponho como Kant opera com tais elementos para resolver seu problema fundamental relacionado à possibilidade dos juízos sintéticos, inicialmente no Esquematismo dos conceitos e, depois, nas Proposições Fundamentais do entendimento puro
Abstract: In this work I have identified the most important elements in Kant' s argumentation in his Transcendental Analytic, that is, on one side, the intuitive representations (sensations, empirical intuitions, pure intuitions and appearances) covered in his Transcendental Aesthetic, and, on the other side, as much the discursive representations (concepts) as the operations (associated to unity, mIes andjudgments) treated in his Transcendental Logic. In relation to each of theses elements, I have made a confrontation between parts of Kant's manifold works where they are explained, searching to identify, in that multiplicity of descriptions, informations and/or possible incoherencies, aimed to comprehend each one of them in a clear and precise way. Finally, I exposed how Kant operates with these elements to solve his fundamental problem relatively to the possibility of synthetic judgments, first in his Schematism of the Conceptions and, afier, in his Principies of pure understanding
Mestrado
Mestre em Filosofia

FundaÃÃo de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do CearÃ
Neste trabalho aborda-se o tema da transformaÃÃo da filosofia realizada por Karl-Otto Apel a partir da radicalizaÃÃo da reviravolta linguÃstico-pragmÃtica atravÃs da demonstraÃÃo do carÃter ineliminÃvel da prÃxis linguÃstica para o saber em geral por meio de uma atitude estritamente autorreflexiva do pensamento unido à linguagem sobre as pressuposiÃÃes irrecusÃveis da argumentaÃÃo enquanto tal. Para tanto, investigam-se os principais delineamentos teÃricos para uma transformaÃÃo semiÃtica da filosofia transcendental clÃssica, especialmente a semiÃtica tridimensional peirceana. Ademais, objetiva-se demonstrar que uma autofundamentaÃÃo reflexiva da filosofia à capaz de justificar inclusive as proposiÃÃes cientÃficas e as normas Ãtico-morais. No final desta pesquisa, aponta-se para a relevÃncia da proposta apeliana ao enfrentar o desafio imposto pela historificaÃÃo do pensar, nÃo por meio de uma postura destranscendentalizante da razÃo, porÃm, pelo caminho de uma fundamentaÃÃo Ãltima nÃo metafÃsica para alÃm das contingÃncias histÃrico-sociais, retomando assim, o especÃfico da reflexÃo filosÃfica enquanto tematizaÃÃo dos princÃpios universalÃssimos de nosso pensar e agir.
This paper is on the theme of the transformation of Philosophy held by Karl-Otto Apel from the radicalization of linguistic and pragmatic twist by showing the ineradicable nature of linguistic praxis for the general knowledge by means of a strict self-reflexive attitude of thought along with the language on the assumptions of the irrefutable argument as such. To this end, we investigate the main theoretical features for a semiotic transformation of the classic transcendental philosophy, especially the three-dimensional Peircean semiotics. Moreover, the objective is to demonstrate that a self-reflexive philosophy is able to justify scientific propositions as well as ethical and moral standards. The end of this research points to the relevance of the proposal of Apel when he faces the challenge imposed by the âhistoricizationâ of the thought, not through an âuntranscendentalizingâ posture towards reason but in the way of an eventual non-metaphysical foundation â beyond the social and historical contingencies, thereby reflecting what is specific of the philosophical reflection as the themes of the universal principles of our thinking and acting.

Neste trabalho investiga-se a questão da fundamentação pragmático-transcendental da ética do discurso, focando a reconstrução apeliana da controvérsia, entre Habermas e o próprio Apel, acerca da relação entre moral e razão prática enquanto concepção procedimental discursiva da filosofia prática. Assim, objetiva-se mostrar a relação - metodologicamente importante - do discurso filosófico no trato específico para a arquitetônica da ética do discurso. Defende-se a hipótese de que o debate e controvérsia entre ambos os programas da ética do discurso decorrem fundamentalmente do modo diferenciado de tematizar a relação metodológica entre enunciados filosóficos e enunciados das ciências sócio-reconstrutivas, empíricas, e que essa diferença de abordagem é relevante na forma distinta de tratarem a moral e conceberem o conceito de razão prática, que culmina na compreensão desta como razão prática moral ou não prescritiva, bem como, o problema da sua unidade e/ou quanto de sua especificação. Para Apel, é importante a determinação dessa relação metodológica, pois a partir dessa reflexão efetivar-se-á, na teoria discursiva, uma cisão entre dois modos fundamentais de pensar a fundamentação e relação entre a moral, o direito e a política. Apel considera fundamental, coisa que Habermas não aceita, defender a tese de que, na perspectiva lingüístico-pragmática, existe um metadiscurso filosófico que é relevante para a diferenciação das dimensões normativas da razão prática.
This work examines the transcendental-pragmatic foundation of discourse ethics. It focuses on the apeliana reconstruction of controversy, between Habermas and Apel himself, about the relationship of morality and practical reason as procedural discursive conception of practical philosophy. Thus, aims to show the relationship - methodologically important of the philosophical discourse in particular for the architectural treatment of the discourse ethics. It supports the hypothesis that the debate and controversy between both discourse ethics programs flow in a fundamentally different way to approach the methodological relation between philosophical and social-reconstructive science propositions, empirical, and that difference in approach is relevant as distinct from addressing the moral and the design concept of practical reason, which culminates in the understanding of practical reason as moral or non-prescription, as well as the problem of its unit and / or how much of its specification. To Apel, it is important determining this methodological relationship, as from the reflection will be effectel, in theory discourse, a fundamental division between two ways of thinking about the foundation and the moral relationship between the law and politics. Apel considers important, and Habermas does not accept, to defend the thesis that, in the linguistic-pragmatic perspective, a philosophical meta-discourse which is relevant to the differentiation of normative dimensions of practical reason.

Este trabajo trata de mostrar si el método talitativo-transcendental zubiriano ¿es fenomenológico? Para responder a esto procedimos en dos pasos, primero, mostramos que el método zubiriano es talitativo-transcendental, y esto porque Zubiri no declara que va a seguir un método talitativo-transcendental, sino que este método es recorrido, en cierta manera, en su pensamiento que comprende toda su tercera etapa intelectual, la que llama metafísica. Este método esta interno en su proceder analítico y mostrativo, pero hay que plantear que al declarar <> lo que queremos decir es que en el desarrollo de su pensamiento trata lo talitativo y transcendental como piezas de su entramado reflexivo, es decir, son partes para explicar su metafísica intramundana. En un segundo momento son las piezas en que se sustenta el análisis y la descripción de la esencia de lo real y del hecho del acto intelectivo. En segundo lugar, al mostrar que este método es talitativo-transcendental, pasamos a responder si es o no una fenomenología. Respecto al primer paso, lo que se ha mostrado de este método es que parte de lo físico y real de la cosa y sin abandonarla por medio de la descripción estructural va mostrando desde las estructura talitativa hasta la estructura transcendental qué sea la realidad de la cosa. Este camino por el cual va desarrollando esta descripción implica una visión o esquema estructural por el cual considera que la cosa física y real es estructura y al momento de ir mostrando su esencia se van mostrando las estructuras de su contenido o talidad y su realidad o transcendentalidad. Este ir describiendo la realidad implica un proyecto filosófico que en Zubiri es metafísico porque va a la mostración de lo transcendental desde y en la cosa física y real. Este marchar descriptivamente es posible porque dentro de este proyecto metafísico la talidad es parte de la misma realidad en cuanto sin aquella no nos podemos instalar en lo transcendental. Esto se lleva a cabo por la función transcendental, aunque también hay una función talitativa, la función transcendental es la que partiendo de la talidad de la realidad me instala en lo transcendental de esta por una consideración que en esta filosofía se llama función de lo tal a lo trans. Ahora bien, esta metafísica envuelve precisamente la visión esquemática estructural, la talidad y las explicaciones científicas que muestran porqué es tal o cual realidad, y la transcendentalidad en cuanto la realidad es tal en cuanto realidad. El despliegue descriptivo de lo que implica la metafísica intramundana y que va del arco de lo físico a lo transcendental es desarrollado por lo que hemos considero los recursos metódicos: cuatro fenomenologías utiliza para llevar a cabo este despliegue. Dos son husserlianas, uno de instalación y otro como momento descriptivo ―ésta con clara influencia de Investigaciones lógicas― que junto al otro momento como ejercicio metafísico es lo que se muestra como descripción de la realidad. Pero al hacer esta descripción utiliza una fenomenología orteguiana, no en cuanto simple descripción, sino va distinguiendo estructura tras estructura de un modo circular hasta llegar a la radical. La otra fenomenología que utiliza es la heideggeriana como modo de desconstrucción de la historia de la filosofía en favor de su propuesta metafísica, no ontológica fundamental. Aunado a estas fenomenologías hemos mostrado otros recursos metódicos como la utilización de la palabra, el influjo científico y lingüístico en la configuración de su pensamiento, así como la utilización de la historia de la filosofía. Para mostrar si este método es fenomenológico procedimos contrastando el método talitativo-transcendental y el método husserliano. Con esto encontramos que si consideramos en un nivel más profundo el método zubiriano se nos da los pasos husserlianos como posibilidades sincréticas en el método zubiriano. Así mostramos que en el método talitativo-transcendental se dan dos epojes: una de instalación, gracias al método husserliano y otra epojé de permanencia que es la zubiriana. Dos reducciones, una, en la realidad y otra, en la inteligencia sentiente. Y la variación estructural dinámica, que aquí ya se justifica el diálogo entre filosofía y ciencia, que consideramos desde los primeros escritos zubirianos, y la descripción circular concéntrica, fruto del influjo orteguiano. Esta variación es el punto en el cual tanto la descripción, la función transcendental como ejercicio metafísico, lo talitativo-transcendental, son parte de esta variación estructural, y así se muestra su justificación y fundamentación. Pero también se llega a mostrar el punto enriquecedor que Zubiri aporta a una fenomenología en donde la variación estructural es un ejercicio metafísico, es decir, este método conlleva en su interior un ejercicio metafísico el cual se muestra como variación estructural dinámica. Con este contraste entre métodos, se nos presenta el método zubiriano no sólo como lo habíamos mostrado en un primer paso, sino que se da como un modo de hacer fenomenología, distinto del husserliano y heideggeriano. El método talitativo-transcendental se desborda y se nos presenta como un modo de hacer fenomenología. Este desborde se debe a que ahora ya podemos justificar las afirmaciones zubirianas, y esto porque tenemos una fenomenología previa, que es husserliana, y que instala al filósofo easonense en lo real y físico, esta es la primera parte de su afirmación: de <>, el siguiente desarrollo conlleva al método zubiriano, que no sólo se nos presenta talitativo-transcendental, sino que se desborda a una fenomenología que parte de los pasos husserlianos y los incorpora como posibilidades sincréticas para ir ―de aquí la segunda parte de la afirmación― a <>. Este camino es un modo <> de considerar los pasos fenomenológicos husserlianos y en los cuales Zubiri antepone un proyecto metafísico. Es decir, el método zubiriano es fenomenológico y le subyace un proyecto metafísico y dentro de este método, en la variación estructural, hay un ejercicio metafísico. En esto consiste el modo nuevo de hacer fenomenología en el método zubiriano. This work is to show whether the method “talitativo-transcendental” zubiriano phenomenological is it? To answer this we proceeded in two steps, first, we show that zubiriano method is “talitativo-transcendental”, and this because Zubiri does not declare that it will follow a “talitativo-transcendental” method, but this method is traversed, in a way, in your thought comprising all intellectual third stage, which called metaphysics. This method is internal in its analytical and demonstrative proceed, but we must raise that by declaring in << a way >> what we mean is that in the development of his thought is what “talitativo” and “transcendental” as pieces of his reflective fabric, is say, they are parties to explain their worldly metaphysics. In a second moment are the pieces that the analysis and description of the essence of the real and the fact the intellectual act is based. Secondly, by showing that this method is “talitativo-transcendental”, we turn to answer whether or not it is a phenomenology. Regarding the first step, what has been shown of this method is that part of the physical and real thing and without leaving through the structural description is showing from the “talitativa” structure to the “transcendental” structure that is the reality of the thing. This way by which develops this description implies a vision or structural scheme by which considers the physical and real thing is structure and time to go showing their essence are showing the structures of their content or “talidad” and reality or “transcendentalidad” . This go describing reality involves a philosophical project that Zubiri is metaphysical, because it goes to the demonstration of the “transcendental” from and physical and real thing. This march is descriptively possible because within this metaphysical the “talidad” project is part of the same reality as without that we cannot install on the “transcendental”. This is accomplished by the transcendental function, although there is a “talitativa” function, the transcendental function is starting from the “talidad” of reality I installed in the transcendental this by a consideration that in this philosophy is called function as “tal” to “trans”. Now this metaphysical involves precise structural schematic view, the “talidad” and scientific explanations that show why it is this or that reality, and “transcendentalidad” as the reality is that as a reality. The descriptive deployment which involves “intramundana” metaphysics and will bow the physical to the transcendental is developed by what we consider the methodic resources: Four phenomenologies used to carry out this deployment. Two are Husserl, one installation and another as descriptive -this time with clear influence of Investigations logics which together with the other time as a metaphysical exercise is shown as a description of reality. But in doing this description uses a “orteguiana” phenomenology, not as simple description, but it is distinguishing structure after structure of a circular to reach the radically. The other is using phenomenology Heidegger as a way of deconstructing the history of philosophy for his metaphysical proposal, not ontological fundamental. In addition to these phenomenologies we have shown other methodic resources and the use of the word, scientific and linguistic influence in shaping his thinking, and the use of the history of philosophy. To show whether this method is phenomenological proceeded contrasting the “talitativo- transcendental” method and the husserlian method. With this we find that if we look at a deeper level zubirian method gives us the husserlian steps as syncretic possibilities zubirian method. Thus we show that two epojes are given in the “talitativo-transcendental” method: installation, thanks to husserlian method and other epojé of permanence that is the zubirian. Two reductions, one, in reality and another in the sentient intelligence. And the dynamic structural variation, here and dialogue between philosophy and science, we believe from the first zubirianos writings, and the description concentric circular, the result of “ortegiano” influence is justified. This variation is the point in which both the description, the transcendental function as a metaphysical exercise, “talitativo-transcendental”, are part of this structural variation, and thus their justification and rationale shown. But reaches also show that Zubiri point enriching brings to a phenomenology where structural variation is a metaphysical exercise, that is, this method carries within it a metaphysical exercise which shows how dynamic structural variation. With this contrast between methods, we are presented zubirian method not only as we had shown in a first step, but is given as a way of doing phenomenology, husserlian and “heideggeriano” other than. The “talitativo-transcendental” method overflows and is presented as a way of doing phenomenology. This overflow is because we can now justify zubirianas claims, and this because we have a prior phenomenology is husserlian, and installing the philosopher “easonense” real and physical, this is the first part of his statement, of << to things >>, the following method development leads to zubirian, we not only presents “talitativo-transcendental”, but overflows to a phenomenology of the husserlian steps and incorporated syncretic possibilities to go ―here the second part of the statement― to << from things>>. This road is a << different>> way of looking husserlian phenomenological steps and in which Zubiri puts a metaphysical project. That is, zubirian method is phenomenological, and underlying a project metaphysical and within this method, structural variation, there is a metaphysical exercise. This is what the new way of doing phenomenology in zubirian method.

In recent years, geography and the wider social sciences have been animated by a conceptually reinvigorated concern for materialist thought. Within cultural geography, this emerging movement - which is often referred to as a 'new' or 'vital' materialism - has sought to understand the materiality of human life in relation to the lively capacities of a more-than-human world. Contrary to entrenched humanist narratives, these new materialist trajectories refute the anthropocentric assumption that humans are metaphysically exceptional beings, defined by their capacity to transcend nonhuman nature. The following thesis contributes to these debates through an experimental engagement with the notion of a 'transcendental empiricism,' as defined in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. My contention is that, whilst current materialist trajectories accept the critique of anthropocentrism at a superficial level, they often do not go far enough in considering the implications of this critique for social science; the most radical of which is that we can no longer approach human life from the Kantian position of a transcendental subject. With Deleuze, I argue that a materialism worthy of the name must begin from the supposition of a transcendental field, that is, a plane of nature that admits of neither subject nor object. My concern, then, is to explore the implications of transcendental empiricism for contemporary materialist thought. Venturing beyond Deleuze, I find resonances of this strange empiricism in the conceptual landscapes of A.N. Whitehead, Gilbert Simondon and Felix Guattari. Taking each in turn, I show how these three renditions of nature's transcendental field generate new kinds of questions regarding the materiality of human life. I achieve this task through a range of empirical lenses, which include singular objects, technical ecologies and aesthetic encounters. I conclude the thesis by affirming the capacity for transcendental empiricism to radicalise materialist thought through its commitment to immanence.

From the very beginning, film announced its duality: the style of the documentary works of the film pioneers - the Lumi?re brothers, stood in opposition to the illusionistic experiments of Georges Méli?s. As film language developed, it became clear that film is a mimetic art in a sense that it possesses the quality of capturing reality itself, which was one of the reasons why so many people were obsessed by the silver screen. At the same time the audience was equally overwhelmed by the modification of the reality previously captured, into a deeper, less profane meaning. These subtile modifications (misrepresentations) of reality in film, are a prerequisite for conveying ideas that enrich the narrative and provoke the audience. Transcendence is immanent to film, and film authors base their personal style, their own credo, on experimenting, exploring, balancing within and appreciating this quality. A bundle of tools had been invented for this purpose, from composition of shapes to combination of colors, from narrative to editing techniques. A complete and precise list would be hard to deliver.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências Jurídicas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito.
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Esta pesquisa busca verificar em que medida a fundamentação pragmático-transcendental da ética do Discurso de Karl-Otto Apel é apta a justificar racionalmente a instituição do Direito, bem como verificar se os princípios morais racionais desse modelo de fundamentação são capazes de funcionar como idéias regulativas para as normas jurídicas positivas. Para atingir tal objetivo, no primeiro capítulo, procuramos destacar as bases epistemológicas da ética do Discurso de Apel a partir das duas principais transformações da filosofia transcendental kantiana promovidas por ele. Na primeira, a transformação histórico-hermenêutica, procurou-se destacar as contribuições da filosofia de Heidegger, especialmente a introdução das categorias de temporalidade e da dimensão histórica do sujeito, e de Gadamer, com as discussões acerca do compreender hermenêutico. Na segunda, a transformação semiótico-pragmática, foi dado destaque, em primeiro lugar, à transição da semântica para a pragmática da linguagem por meio da discussão da obra de Wittgenstein, em seguida, ao debate com o pragmatismo americano de Charles Peirce e à introdução do conceito de comunidade ilimitada de investigadores, e, por fim, ao desenvolvimento, a partir disso, do conceito de comunidade de comunicação e a sua importância como pressuposto transcendental das ciências sociais. Com a construção desse pano de fundo, no segundo capítulo deu-se vez à fundamentação da ética do Discurso propriamente dita. Continuando o debate acerca da racionalidade das ciências, procurou-se responder a pergunta sobre a possibilidade e a necessidade de uma ética hoje por meio da fundamentação pragmático-transcendental de um princípio ético encontrado no a priori da comunidade de comunicação. Tendo demonstrado a possibilidade de fundamentar uma ética racional na era das ciências, deu-se início à construção da arquitetônica de fundamentação da ética do Discurso dividida em uma parte A abstrativo-ideal, relativa à fundamentação de um princípio primordial do discurso que já inclui os conteúdos de um princípio moral primordial, e uma parte B histórico-factual, direcionada à aplicação das normas ideais e à problemática de uma ética da co-responsabilidade historicamente referida. Portanto, no terceiro e último capítulo, procurou-se desenvolver a problemática da ética da responsabilidade com da introdução da idéia de complementaridade do discurso moral ideal por discursos institucionais, como o Direito, que pudessem desonerar os argumentantes da auto-ajuda em situações estratégicas, assim, pôde-se fundamentar moral-normativamente o poder coercitivo do Estado de Direito. Deste modo, foram realizadas as reflexões finais no sentido de que como fundamento da ordem jurídica coercitiva temos os Direitos Humanos que, por sua vez, devem ser fundamentados a partir do princípio primordial do discurso, restando demonstrado, com isso, que o modelo de fundamentação da ética discursiva apeliana pode servir como fundamento do Direito. This research aims to verify in which way the pragmatic-transcendental foundations of Karl-Otto Apel's Discourse ethics is able to rationally justify the institution of Law, as well as verifying if the rational moral principles of this model of justification are of capable to act as regulative ideas for positive rules of law. To reach such objective, in the first chapter, we look to accentuate the epistemological basis of Apel's Discourse ethics from the two main transformations of the kantian transcendental philosophy promoted by him. In the first one, the historical-hermeneutical transformation, we tried to emphasize the contributions of Heidegger's philosophy, especially the categories of temporality and the historical dimension of the subject, as well as Gadamer's philosophy, with the discussion about hermeneutical comprehension. In the second one, the semiotic-pragmatic transformation, we draw attention, in first place, to the transition from the semantics to pragmatics by discussing the Wittgenstein's work, and, after that, to the debate with the Charles Peirce's American pragmatism and to the introduction of the limitless community of investigators, and, finally, to the development of the concept of communication community and its importance as transcendental grounding for the social sciences. With the construction of this scenario, in the second chapter we started the grounding of Discourse ethics. Continuing the discussion about the rationality of sciences, we tried to answer the question about the possibility and the necessity of an ethics today, through the pragmatic-transcendental foundations of an ethical principle found in the communication community's a priori. After we have indicated the possibility of grounding a rational ethics on the age of sciences, we began the construction of the architectonic of Discourse ethics divided in a part A, abstrative-ideal, concerning the justification of a primordial principle of the discourse that includes the contents of a primordial moral principle, and in a part B historically related, directed to the application of ideal norms and to the problems of a co-responsibility ethics historically related. Therefore, in the third and last chapter, we tried to develop the problematic one of a responsibility ethics with the introduction of the idea of complementarity between the ideal moral discourses and the institucional discourses, as the Law, that could take off the charge from the arguers from the self-support in strategical situations. Thus, we could ground moral-normatively the coercitive power of the State of Law. In this way, the final reflections were made to prove that in the grounds of the coercitive juridical order are the Human Rights, that must be grounded form a discourse primordial principle, trying to show, with this, that the foundation model of the apelian Discourse ethics can act as grounding of the Law.

RODRIGUES, Adriano Messias. A transformação semiótica da filosofia transcendental clássica. 2011. 123f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2011.
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This paper is on the theme of the transformation of Philosophy held by Karl-Otto Apel from the radicalization of linguistic and pragmatic twist by showing the ineradicable nature of linguistic praxis for the general knowledge by means of a strict self-reflexive attitude of thought along with the language on the assumptions of the irrefutable argument as such. To this end, we investigate the main theoretical features for a semiotic transformation of the classic transcendental philosophy, especially the three-dimensional Peircean semiotics. Moreover, the objective is to demonstrate that a self-reflexive philosophy is able to justify scientific propositions as well as ethical and moral standards. The end of this research points to the relevance of the proposal of Apel when he faces the challenge imposed by the “historicization” of the thought, not through an “untranscendentalizing” posture towards reason but in the way of an eventual non-metaphysical foundation – beyond the social and historical contingencies, thereby reflecting what is specific of the philosophical reflection as the themes of the universal principles of our thinking and acting.
Neste trabalho aborda-se o tema da transformação da filosofia realizada por Karl-Otto Apel a partir da radicalização da reviravolta linguístico-pragmática através da demonstração do caráter ineliminável da práxis linguística para o saber em geral por meio de uma atitude estritamente autorreflexiva do pensamento unido à linguagem sobre as pressuposições irrecusáveis da argumentação enquanto tal. Para tanto, investigam-se os principais delineamentos teóricos para uma transformação semiótica da filosofia transcendental clássica, especialmente a semiótica tridimensional peirceana. Ademais, objetiva-se demonstrar que uma autofundamentação reflexiva da filosofia é capaz de justificar inclusive as proposições científicas e as normas ético-morais. No final desta pesquisa, aponta-se para a relevância da proposta apeliana ao enfrentar o desafio imposto pela historificação do pensar, não por meio de uma postura destranscendentalizante da razão, porém, pelo caminho de uma fundamentação última não metafísica para além das contingências histórico-sociais, retomando assim, o específico da reflexão filosófica enquanto tematização dos princípios universalíssimos de nosso pensar e agir.

0. L'assumpte de la recerca efectuada es troba formulat en el títol amb què es presenta i al.ludeix a tres temàtiques: la temàtica de l'idealisme, la de la lògica transcendental i, per últim, també la de la problemàtica conjunció de l'idealisme i la lògica transcendental. El camp de problemes delimitat per aquesta conjunció configura l'objecte d'una possible recerca sistemàtica, i el seu resultat hauria de contribuir a l'esclariment històric i filosòfic alhora de l'idealisme i de la lògica transcendental. Però la meva recerca no ha volgut lliurar-se a tal examen sistemàtic sense obrir un "momentum" reflexiu previ referit a les condicions de la seva possibilitat mateixa. D'aquí que la recerca hagi de ser considerada i valorada com a preliminar a la recerca de l'idealisme i la lògica transcendental, és a dir, com a lliure exploració dels problemes que desfermen les preguntes què és l'idealisme i què és la lògica transcendental. Aspecte inherent al "momentum" reflexiu, qualsevol assaig de resposta a les qüestions proposades contindrà ineludiblement - o fins constituirà fonamentalment - una clarificació de les preguntes mateixes com també de la via seguint la qual han de ser recercades (i recercades) les respostes.

I.

1. En la línia indicada d'una clarificació de les condicions de la pregunta i la reposta a la qüestió que demana per l'idealisme avança la primera part del treball - amb el títol "Narratives de l'dealisme".

2. Una recerca preliminar té en l'idealisme, abans que res, una categoria historiogràfica qüestionada: de manera potser inadvertida, l'idealisme alemany ha estat progressivament empès al domini de la mitologia. A partir d'aquí una recerca preliminar de l'idealisme havia de plantejar-se com a tasca primera i indispensable mirar d'explicar com ha arribat a constituir-se el mite - o això que, almenys, se li presenta com a mite.

3. La primera part del meu treball realitza. així doncs, incursions en un nombre determinat de treballs filosòfics i històrico-filosòfics que poden valer com a arquetips d'estructuració de la categoria historiogràfica de l'idealisme alemany. Aquests treballs aspiren, sens dubte, a efectuar la seva estructuració mitjançant un plantejament filosòfic, és a dir, dotant d'un contingut teòric l'idealisme, i qualsevol tasca enfront d'aquests treballs passa, per tant, per una anàlisi del seu contingut, però el meu punt de vista no ha estat (o almenys no ha volgut ser) prioritlriament el d'una valoració teòrica de tals continguts.

4. En relació a aquests reconstruccions de l'idealisme diré que, en general, he partit de l'examen dels seus continguts a fi de fer-ne sorgir el seu model estructurador. El resultat de la meva recerca és mostrar que hi ha un nombre en principi finit determinable de models estructuradors en el marc d'una determinada concepció que anomeno "narrativa" de l'idealisme.

5. ¿En què consisteix la concepció narrativa? L'idealisme alemany es considera UN SISTEMA FlLOSÒFIC i el seu esclariment s'identifica amb una explicació o reconstrucció de la gènesi i el desenvolupament d'un argument teòric.

6. La tesi es proposa mostrar que el terreny fonamental dels debats de la historiografia filosòfica sobre l'idealisme queda definit per aquesta estructura formal i que ella, tant considerada en si mateixa com en l'estructuració del contingut que determina és inapropiada. La recerca actual avança, de fet, sobre la base de la impossibilitat de reescriure narrativament l'idealisme alemany, però aquesta dificultat és de naturalesa doble: pràctica i teòrica.

7. La impossibilitat teòrica de reescriure narrativament l'idealisme no es troba prou clarificada ni justificada en la consciència historiogràfica contemporània. Renunciar a escriure narratives perquè ja no pot abastar-se d'un cop d'ull la totalitat de l'objecte no significa renunciar a la concepció narrativa per principi i per convicció. Això segon no pot fer-se més que per una acte exprès de contestació no d'aquesta o aquella narrativa sinó de la narrativa com a tal.

8. La meva contestació a la narrativa s'expressa en el treball a través d'un capítol on presento conclusions per a començar. La continuïtat adscribible a l'idealisme no ha de ser concebuda com a descabdellament d'una identitat teòrica. com a gènesi i desenvolupament d'un sistema sinó com una continuïtat discreta, aquella continuïtat que configura l'evolució marcada per diversos sistemes filosòfics. Així compresa, la recerca històrica-filosòfica sobre l'idealisme es proposa com a recerca en un horitzó (obert, problemàtic i complex) irreductible al camí que en ell pugui ser resseguit com a traçat per la reflexió d'una sola filosofia idealista.


II.

9. En la segona part del treball, titulada "En l'horitzó històric i filosòfic de la lògica transcendental" he efectuat una consideració igualment preliminar de la problemàtica de la lògica transcendental. Les qüestions principals abordades en aquesta recerca són: (a) la qüestió del significat de la lògica transcendental; (b) una justificació de la lògica transcendental com a possible fil conductor de la reconstrucció de l'idealisme; i hi podriem afegir encara (c) la precisió de l'encaix o relació entre idealisme i lògica transcendental, entre les dues parts del meu treball.

10. També en la qüestió (a) del significat de la lògica transcendental he tingut contramodels - si bé he preferit deixar-los implícits. L'existència mateixa d'aquests models, d'una diversitat de definicions del concepte buscat, posa de relleu la importància d'arribar a esbrinar, d'acord amb les coordenades d'una recerca preliminar, com calgui arribar a guanyar el significat de la lògica transcendental.

11. Per a l'obtenció del significat de la lògica transcendental he mirat de construir el seu preconcepte. Prenent la denominació filosòfica mateixa com a punt de partida he mirat de remuntar fins a la problemàtica històrico-filosòfica a la llum de la qual la nova lògica ha de prendre el seu sentit.

12. El preconcepte de la lògica transcendental queda construït a partir de la comprensió històrica-filosòfica del lògic i del transcendental en la nofió d'una primera ciència que és alhora una ciència primera. En l'entrecreuament dels conceptes "lògic" i "transcendental" s'anuncia una radicalització metafísica de la problemàtica lògica com a via de resolució de la problemàtica que exhibeixen el lògic i el transcendental en el pensament filosofic de la "Aufklärung".

13. El pas següent (b) ha estat el d'assegurar que tal preconcepte té ancoratge històric, que l'anunci d'una lògica ontològica contingut en la denominació precedéis l'assaig efectiu de realització d'aquesta lògica en un concepte de lògica transcendental. La recerca d'aquesta garantia ha portat a examinar la construcció del concepte de lògica transcendental en la "Crítica de la raó pura" de Kant.

14. A partir de la conseqüència metodològica de la Crítica teòrica queda oberta la perspectiva que crec fa accessible la construcció del concepte de lògica transcendental de Kant. Si aquesta teoria parteix de determinats pressupòsits és només a fi d'esclarir-ne el seu caràcter i la seva estructura i a fi de pensar-ne la necessitat mateixa de la seva pressuposició. La lògica transcendental de Kant es proposaria així com una reflexió dirigida cap als seus propis pressupòsits (en un cercle característic) - i empesa per la radicalitat de la seva intenció reflexiva aspiraria a justificar més fins i tot que la possibilitat d'aquest cercle la seva necessitat.

15. Resta, per últim, la dificultat que pot plantejar-se ara com interna al meu plantejament, que amb una sumària exploració de la filosofia teòrica de Kant pugui quedar explicada i justificada la lògica transcendental en quant preconcepte com a fil conductor per a la reconstrucció de l'idealisme. Tofant a aquesta qüestió (c), cal dir que una justificació plena i positiva l'he obtinguda només de la circumstància que caldrà començar en Kant. Però a més ha pogut ser prospectat temptativament el preconcepte de la lògica transcendental com a possible fil conductor també per al postkantisme.

16. En conclusió, la lògica transcendental com a fil conductor d'una reconstrucción històrico-filosòfica de l'idealisme és preconcepte i la seva aplicació consistirà bàsicament en guiar l'examen de la discussió filosòfica que ha suscitat la possibilitat d'efectuar transicions des d'aquest preconcepte a la definició i realització de conceptes històricament verificables. Però una recerca de l'idealisme i la lògica transcendental no inscrita en un esquema narratiu sinó en un horitzó obert, un horitzó que fa de l'idealisme la idea i l'ideal d'una totalitat per configurar, es presentarà amb la prudència de no pretendre exbaurir aquell horitzó i ni tan sols de lofalitzar-ne el seu centre. Ja que dir que aquesta temàtica és essencial a a la definició de l'idealisme queda molt lluny, fins i tot infinitament lluny, de l'afirmació que aquesta temàtica constitueixi l'essència de l'idealisme.
"Idealism and transcendental Logic" constitutes the field of a possible systematic research in modern Philosophy History. Such field presents itself defined by the conjugation of two different concepts -"Idealism", "Transcendental logic" - that are the object of discussion in current historical and philosophical literature. The traditional view of German Idealism as a three-step philosophical profess which would in full consequence be carried out in the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel has long been denounced as basically "Hegelian" and abandoned. The central question remains which philosophical systems should then be taken into account and on which grounds in the study of the period. Similarly, it is far from clear the philosophical meaning of transcendental Logic, as it can be shown when attempting either to answer this question or even specifying its sense from the diverse theoretical starting points established by Kant's theoretical "Kritik", Reinhold's "Elementarphilosophie", Fichte's "Wissenschafisehre" or Hegel's "Wissenschaft der Logik", to summon up only a few of the numerous, in a broad sense logical works of that time. It must be asked whether or not Idealistic thinkers have developed the same kind of logic and what are the conditions under which such an undertaking might be taken as a leading argument for the deconstruction of German Idealism.

Hence the present work aims at clarifying the crucial concepts on which a systematic study of «Idealism and transcendental Logic» necessarily relies and for this reason it proposes to conduct a "preliminary" research of its theme.

The text appears divided in two parts -entitled "Narratives on Idealism" and "On the Historical and Philosophical Horizon of Transcendental Logic"- which set to examine respectively the question of Idealism and the question of transcendental Logic. While the analysis is pursued in both pans in an independent fashion, a final conclusion seeks to connect them again by showing that even though the essence of the phenomenon of Idealism cannot be grasped without taking into consideration the discussion regarding the possibility of constructing a concept of transcendental logic, this argument would never account for the essence of German Idealism as such. This apparent paradox is pondered as the necessary basis for a "liminary" work on the subject.

Newton's method associated to a complex holomorphic function f is defined by the dynamical system Nf(z) = z – f(z) / f'(z). As a root-finding algorithm, a natural question is to understand the dynamics of Nf about its fixed points, as they correspond to the roots of the function f. In other words, we would like to understand the basins of attraction of Nf, i.e., the sets of points that converge to a root of f under the iteration of Nf. Basins of attraction are actually just one type of stable component or component of the Fatou set, defined as the set of points for which the family of iterates is defined and normal locally. The Julia set or set of chaos is its complement (taken on the Riemann sphere). The study of the topology of these two sets is key in Holomorphic Dynamics. In 1990, Mitsuhiro Shishikura proved that, for any non-constant polynomial P, the Julia set of NP is connected. In fact, he obtained this result as a consequence of a much more general theorem for rational functions: If the Julia set of a rational function R is disconnected, then R has at least two weakly repelling fixed points. With the final goal of proving the transcendental version of this theorem, in this Thesis we see that: If a transcendental meromorphic function f has either a multiply-connected attractive basin, or a multiply-connected parabolic basin, or a multiply-connected Fatou component with simply-connected image, then f has at least one weakly repelling fixed point. Our proof for this result is mainly based in two techniques: quasiconformal surgery and the study of the existence of virtually repelling fixed points. We conclude the Thesis with an idea of the strategy for the proof of the case of Herman rings, as well as some ideas for the case of Baker domains, which is left as a subject for a future project.

The notion of the organism has a somewhat ambiguous status in Kant’s philosophy. On the one hand it belongs to natural science, on the other hand it is based on an analogy with the structure of reason. Biology therefore has a peculiar place among the sciences according to Kant: it is a natural science constituted by the use of a regulative maxim. The present study places Kant’s views on biological teleology in the larger context of transcendental idealism. It consists of five essays. The first one treats the notions of things in themselves and appearances, arguing for an interpretation in terms of two aspects or perspectives rather than two worlds. The importance of the discursivity of our cognitive capacity is stressed, as well as the need to separate Kant’s various reflective perspectives. In the second essay this interpretation is applied to the third section of the Groundwork, arguing that this text does not belong to theoretical metaphysics, but rather to the articulation of a specifically practical perspective. The third essay discusses similarities and differences between Kant’s a priori conditions for cognition and conceptions of innate ideas in the rationalist tradition. Kant’s comparison of the system of categories with the biological theory of epigenesis is considered in connection to eighteenth century theories of generation. The comparison is viewed as an analogy rather than as a naturalistic theory of the a priori. In the fourth essay Kant’s account of functional attribution in biology is explicated in the context of the present day debate of the issue. It is claimed that Kant’s neo-Aristotelian approach avoids some of the difficulties in the dominant naturalistic accounts of today. Kant’s view differs from the Aristotelian in that it involves a distinction of levels, making it possible to take functional attributions on the one hand as objective from the standpoint of biology but on the other hand as having a merely regulative status from a philosophical point of view. In the fifth essay an interpretation of the antinomy of teleological judgment in the Critique of Judgment is offered. The antinomy is taken to consist in the dialectical tendency to treat the regulative maxims of teleology and mechanism as constitutive principles. The difference between the discursivity of the human understanding and the idea of a non-discursive understanding, an important theme in Kant’s solution of the antinomy, puts the question of biological teleology in relation to central tenets of transcendental idealism.