Academic literature on the topic 'Transcendental strategy'

Schubert Ogden is often considered a process theologican because, drawing upon the philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, he holds a “process” view of the nature of reality and of God. But the strategy used in his philosophical theology makes Ogden a sort of “transcendental” theologian as well. I refer to Ogden's argument in The Reality of God that a necessary condition of the possibility of scientific and moral activity is the kind of confidence in the meaning and worth of life that must be seen as an implicit faith in God. This faith might be characterized as innate or a priori because Ogden portrays it not as derived from, but as presupposed by, all our experience; indeed, Ogden claims that such faith is the necessary condition of the possibility of even “secular” scientific and moral experience. Thus one might see this part of his philosophical theology as pursuing a transcendental strategy of argument.

In his A Theory of Legal Argumentation, Robert Alexy lists four modes of justification for his rules of practical discourse. Of these, the only one that to him seems to have a true foundationalist capability is Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic mode of justification. But there is another strategy, which Alexy calls 'definitional', based on the concept of language game, that seems to have been employed by Ronald Dworkin, in his 'Objectivity and truth. You’d better believe it', in order to reject moral scepticism. In this paper I will argue that these two modes of justification can be traced back, from a logical and genealogical perspective, to one form of argument, the transcendental argument. But I will also argue that there is a peculiar circularity in the way this kind of argument develops, a circularity possibly ascribable to certain idealising presuppositions.

In this paper I introduce the transcendental argument for Christian theism in the context of Reformed theologian and philosopher Cornelius Van Til’s thought. I then present the critique proffered by Barry Stroud against ambitious transcendental arguments, and survey various formulations of transcendental arguments in the literature, seeking how the objection bears upon them. I argue that Adrian Bardon’s (2005) interpretation is the most helpful in understanding the Stroudian objection. From this interpretation, two types of possible rebuttals are deduced. Proceeding to survey the responses offered by Van Tillians to this objection in the recent literature, I discern two general strategies pursued in these responses, which map onto the previously deduced types of rebuttals: the Biblical justification strategy and the objection-undermining strategy. I argue that all the specific attempts to answer Stroud which I examine here (those of Butler, Bosserman, and Fluhrer) are inadequate and that these two strategies, in general, face serious problems. I conclude with considering the options before the proponent of the transcendental argument for Christian theism and with offering a new objection to the argument, which focuses on its inconsistency with the implications of Christian theism itself.

According to the orthodox view, it is impossible to know how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and whether they are interpersonally comparable at all. Against the orthodox view, Donald Davidson (1986, 2004) argues that the interpersonal comparability of preferences is a necessary condition for the correct interpretation of other people's behaviour. In this paper I claim that, as originally stated, Davidson's argument does not succeed because it is vulnerable to several objections, including Barry Stroud's (1968) objection against all transcendental arguments of a ‘strong’ kind. However, I argue that Davidson's strategy can still achieve results of anti-sceptical significance. If we reformulate Davidson's argument as a ‘modest’ transcendental argument and if we embrace an ‘internal’ account of epistemic justification, it is in fact possible to have at least justified beliefs about how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and about their interpersonal comparability.

This article explains in ten points the concepts of substance, change and matter that appear in the transcendental Analytics of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as categories and schemes, as well as how they function in the Analogies of Experience. It aims to demonstrate how the category in general, and that of substance in particular, are, in their transcendental ideality, a strategy of the subject to order and objectify the phenomenal world. It establishes that change is also necessary a priori, that both change (accident) and persistence (substance), as well as all appearances, are finite and limited. This would lead to the affirmation that only matter, transcendental matter, is entirely persistent; however, transcendental matter is not a sensible object and therefore those sensible objects that relatively persist in time-space are the only empirical reality of the substance. Finally, matter is made up of forces, and given that there is nothing simple in matter, it can be inferred that empirical substance is nothing other than a field of forces. Recebido / Received: 14.6.2019.Aprovado / Approved: 1.8.2019.

Science—in the forms of Western theoretical science, empirical research, and revised Vedic teachings—has played at least three different roles over the last fifty years in the evolving public and internal teachings of the Transcendental Meditation Organization (TMO) of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. The first phase, starting in 1957, emphasized the power of Indian spiritual teachings to transform the world, and science was downplayed. The second phase, beginning in 1970, was marked by a sudden transformation of the TMO from a small, exotic Indian-based meditation movement to an aggressively modern, science-based, crypto-spiritual business dedicated to bringing optimal physiological and psychological functioning to the world. In the third phase, from the 1980s, a self-selected, relatively small group of dedicated followers entered an enchanted land in which cutting-edge theories from quantum physics were employed creatively to bolster Maharishi's extensively reinterpreted Vedic sciences. It seems likely that this third stage, in which Western science is useful and valid only to the extent that it confirms the ancient Vedic truths, was the destination toward which Maharishi was heading from the inception of his movement. While it is possible that these stages reveal the gradual evolution of Maharishi's thought, it seems more likely that they are the expression of a deliberate strategy of progressive revelation.

The present paper has as objective to explain the phenomenological problem of the relation between the consciousness and the world. Impelled by the slogan of the "return to the things itself", the phenomenology of E. Husserl (1858-1938) adopts, through a methodological point of view, the call "phenomenological reduction", that is, the suspension of the judgement in relation to the natural world, to recover it, in the consciousness, in an indubitable way, in his pure meaning. The paper tries to explain the specificity of the phenomenological attitude and the methodological strategy adopted by the phenomenology to do a "rigorous science" of the philosophy.

This paper critically examines the philosophical foundations of Colin Wilson’s New Existentialism. I will show how Wilson’s writings promoted a phenomenological strategy for understanding states of ecstatic affirmation within so-called ‘peak experiences’. Wilson subsequently attempted to use the life affirming insights bestowed by peak states to establish an ontological ground for values to serve as a foundation for his New Existentialism. Because of its psychological focus however, I argue that Wilson’s New Existentialism contains an ambivalent framework for establishing ontological categories, which leads his thought into theoretical difficulties. More precisely, Wilson’s strategy runs into problems in coherently integrating its explicitly psychological interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality within a broader, and philosophically coherent, phenomenological framework. Wilson’s psychological reading of Husserl’s transcendental reduction, for example, manifests tensions in how it reconciles the empirical basis of acts of transcendence with an essentialist conception of the self as a transcendental ego. The above tensions, I argue, ultimately render the New Existentialism susceptible to criticism from a Husserlian-transcendental perspective. After outlining a Husserlian critique of Wilson’s position, I end the paper by suggesting how some of the central insights of the New Existentialism might help to bridge the gap that persists between pure phenomenological description and metaphysics.

The range of outcomes and published record on the Transcendental Meditation technique across 50 years of research in education, business, and government makes its application unique. Its association with health and relation to an individual’s quality-of-life have also made the technique useful in some developing countries. Data related to application of the technique to higher education in Cambodia have been accruing since the early 1990s. The 26-year research program begun by these authors associated with Transcendental Meditation and non-verbal intelligence, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, learning, memory, and personality in university students, as well as its collective effects on economic and social indicators and reductions in socio-political violence and crime, makes for an uncommonly rich body of knowledge in a country where empirical research has been rare. Indeed, the early studies in this research program represented among the first published research on higher education since the 1960s, after which Cambodia was plunged into civil war, genocide, and ongoing social turmoil and political conflict until 1993. The present study, which is a modified version of a study previously published in ASEAN Journal of Education, extends this research program to include a preliminary investigation of the practice of Transcendental Meditation by faculty and staff in three regional Cambodian universities and examines its impact on health and well-being. Findings generated by a concurrent, quasi-experimental mixed methods design suggest the practice may be of benefit to university personnel as measured by physical mental and social health, perceived health, self-esteem, anxiety, and depression, among other quality-of-life variables, thereby adding to previous results associated with higher education in this increasingly important south-east Asian nation.

This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy)
This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Abstracts in English, Zulu and Xhosa
The central research issue in this study is the third morphing of economies due to the externally available intelligent building blocks of technology. More specifically, it is anticipated that the widespread use of distributed ledger technology will transform the workings of organisations to such a degree that they will cease to exist in their current form. Hence, the use of distributed ledger technology is not merely a tame management problem; it poses a wicked strategic problem. Furthermore, natural explanations add to the confusion in relation to what managers should do with distributed ledger technology. A transcendental phenomenological attitude is required to transcend the multitude of natural explanations. Phenomenology is both the philosophy and method employed in this study, which questions what human engagement in the world is about. More specifically in this study engagement with distributed ledger technology. This study closes this gap in knowledge by giving an accurate description of the essence of the distributed value ecosystem phenomenon. The study makes a contribution to more coherent and fundamental understanding the essences of the distributed value ecosystem phenomenon is the nature of the relationship patterns that participants hold to distributed ledger technology. The central factual finding is the nature and pattern of these relationships is transactional and circular. The pattern preferred by most organisations is the bounded binary transactional pattern. Organisations seek primarily to have power over the socially complex aspects in transacting. However, the bounded binary transactional pattern may become an unbalanced and unfair value-subtract relationship over time. The response to unbalanced binary bounded value relationships is the unbounded transactional pattern, which gives participants greater autonomy and privacy pseudonymity, but not the transparency that is essential to transact seamlessly. The third value relationship pattern and novel idea presented is the folded value relationship pattern in which participants balance conflicts over socially complex aspects in relation to self and others by meeting narrow micro-level near interaction conditions. This is a more folded, novel strategic game that participants can pick. The key implication for society and organisations is that it presents an alternative approach to dealing with conflict in socially complex value relationships. In essence, with the folded transactional pattern, participants seek to trade up value relationships in relation to self and with others, as opposed to making value relationship trade-offs or sacrifices that lead to either compromises in relation to self or dominance over others. However, the practical managerial implication is truly folded value relationship pattern is not easy to create and is rare.
Umbandela ophambili wophando kwesi sifundo kukuzotywa ngokutsha kwesithathu kwezoqoqosho ngenxa yobukho bezakhi zobuchwepheshe ezinobukrelekrele. Eyona nto ingundoqo yeyokuba kucingelwa ukuba ukusetyenziswa kakhulu kobuchwepheshe bokubhala iingxelo mali buya kuyiguqula indlela asebenza ngayo amaqumrhu, ade ayeke ukusebenza ngale ndlela enza ngayo ngoku. Ukusetyenziswa kobuchwepheshe bokusasaza iingxelo zogcino mali (ngesiNgesi kusetyenziswa isishunqulelo esithi DLT) akuyongxakana nje yolawulo; kuyingxaki enkulu nekhohlakeleyo. Ngaphaya koko, iinkcazelo ezikhoyo zongeza ukubhideka malunga neyona nto emele ukwenziwa ngabaphathi ngobu buchwepheshe bokusasaza iingxelo zogcino mali. Into efunekayo kukusebenzisa indlela yophando ngokuphicotha amava nokufuna ukuqonda indlela acinga ngayo umntu, ngakumbi kumba omalunga nobuchwepheshe bokusasaza iingxelo zogcino mali. Esi sifundo sivala isikhewu solwazi esikhoyo ngokunika inkcazelo echanekileyo ngalo mbandela wokusasazwa kokuxabiseka kwentsebenziswano yendalo nomntu. Esi sifundo sinceda ekuqondeni iziseko zombandela wokusasazwa kokuxabiseka kwentsebenziswano yendalo nomntu neepatheni zolwalamano lwabathathi nxaxheba kwicandelo lobuchwepheshe bokusasaza iingxelo zogcino mali. Eyona nto ingundoqo efumanisekayo kukuba ubume nepatheni yolu lwalamano iquka intsebenziswano yorhwebo kwaye ifana nomjikelo. Ipatheni ekhethwa ngamaqumrhu amaninzi yileyo yentsebenziswano ephakathi kwesibini. Amaqumrhu afuna tanci ukuba nolawulo kwimiba enzima yezentlalo xa erhwebelana. Noxa kunjalo, ipatheni yokurhwebelana ngezibini isenokudala ukungalingani nokuqhathana ngokuhamba kwexesha. Usabelo kulwalamano lwezibini olungenalingano yiphatheni yorhwebelwano olungabekelwanga mida, apho abathathi nxaxheba bekwazi ukuzithathela izigqibo ekhusini bengazichazi ukuba bangoobani, nto leyo inqanda ukusebenza ekuhleni nokufunekayo ekusebenzisaneni ngaphandle kwamagingxigingxi. Ipatheni yesithathu kwixabiso lolwalamano kulapho ulwalamano lusongiwe, apho abathathi nxaxheba belungelelanisa iingxabano ezingemiba yezentlalo enzima ngokufezekisa iimeko ezilula nezincinane. Oku kufana nomdlalo osongeneyo nolicebo lobulumko onokukhethwa ngabathathi nxaxheba. Okubalulekileyo kukuba le yindlela eyenye enokukhawulelana neengxwabangxwaba eluntwini nakumaqumrhu. Eneneni, kwipatheni yentsebenziswano esongeneyo, abathathi nxaxheba bazama ukutshintsha ulwalamano oluphakathi komntu nabanye, endaweni yokuncama izinto ezithile ezinokukhokelela kwilahleko okanye ekonganyelweni ngabanye. Noxa kunjalo, ipatheni yolwalamano olusongeneyo kulwalamano lwabalawuli ayinto ilula kwaye inqabile.
Udaba olungumgogodla walolu cwaningo wukuguquka kwesithathu kweminotho ngenxa yamandla namakhono obuchwepheshe besimanjemane atholakala ngaphandle kwenhlangano. Ngokuqondileyo, kubhekeke ukuthi ukusetshenziswa kakhulu kwe-distributed ledger technology kusiguqule kakhulu isimo-sakhiwo sezinhlangano kanye nendlela ezisebenza ngayo, kangangukuthi zigcine sezingabonakali neze ukuthi zike zaba kulesi simo-sakhiwo ezikusona njengamanje. Ngakhoke ukusetshenziswa kwe-distributed ledger technology akuyona neze inkinga elula futhi abangayixazulula kalula abaphathi; kepha kuyinkinga eyinkimbinkimbi futhi eyimpicabadala okungelula nakancane ukuyixazulula. Ngaphezu kwalokho, izincazelo zemvelo ziyengeza phezu kokudideka okuphathelene nalokho okumele kwenziwe ngabaphathi maqondana ne-distributed ledger technology. Ukuze kudlulelwe ngale kwenqwabanqwaba yezincazelo zemvelo ezikhona kudingeka indlela-kucabanga nendlelakubuka evulekile yokuqonda ulwazi oluphathelene nezimo kanye nezigameko okuhlangatshezwane nazo noma okudlulwe kuzona. Ifenomeloji iyikho kokubili ifilosofi kanye nendlela-kusebenza esetshenzisiwe kulolu cwaningo, okuphonsa umbuzo mayelana nokuthi kuphathelene nani ukuxhumana kanye nokubandakanywa kwabantu emhlabeni, ikakhulukazi maqondana nokubandakanywa okuphathelene ne-distributed ledger technology. Lolu cwaningo luvala igebe lokungabi khona kolwazi ngokuthi lunikeze incazelo enembayo yomongo we-distributed value ecosystem. Ucwaningo luyalekelela futhi lufake isandla ekutholakaleni kokuqonda okuhle nokuhleleke kahle futhi okuyisisekelo komongo we-distributed value ecosystem okungukuthi lokhu kuwuhlobo lwamaphethini obudlelwano obuboniswa ngababambiqhaza maqondana ne-distributed ledger technology. Umphumela osemqoka kakhulu futhi oyiqiniso otholakale ocwaningweni wukuthi ubunjalo kanye nephethini yalobu budlelwano ibandakanya izinhloso zokuzizuzela okuthile futhi okungubudlelwano obusasiyingi. Iphethini encanyelwa yiningi lezinhlangano yi-bounded binary transactional pattern. Izinhlangano zihlose ikakhulukazi ukuba namandla phezu kwezinto ezithile ezinobunkimbinkimbi emphakathini lapho zenza umsebenzi wazo. Kodwa-ke ngokuhamba kwesikhathi i-bounded binary transactional pattern kungenzeka ibonise ubudlelwano obungenakho ukulingana futhi obuchemile obungenabugugu. Impendulo yokubhekana nobudlelwano obungama-unbalanced binary bounded value relationships yi-unbounded transactional pattern, enikeza ababambiqhaza ukukhululeka nokuzimela okukhudlwana kanye nobumfihlo bokuthi bangazidaluli noma baziveze ukuthi bangobani, kodwa-ke lokhu akubanikezi ukusebenza ngendlela esobala okuyinto edingekayo ekusebenzeni ngaphandle kwezihibe. I-third value relationship pattern kanye nomqondo ophusile owethulwayo yi-folded value relationship pattern lapho ababambiqhaza beqinisekisa ukuthi kunokulingana phakathi kokungqubuzana noma udweshu oluphathelene nezinto eziyinkimbinkimbi emphakathini maqondana nabo uqobo kanye nabanye abantu, ngokuthi bahlangabezane nama-narrow micro-level near-interaction conditions. Lokhu kuwumdladlwana ofongqekile wesimanjemanje futhi okhethekile nosemqoka ongasetshenziswa ngababambiqhaza. Umthelela osemqoka walokhu emphakathini nasezinhlanganweni wukuthi lokhu kuhlinzeka ngendlela ehlukile yokubhekana nokungqubuzana nodweshu kubudlelwano obuyinkimbinkimbi emphakathini. Empeleni, ku-folded transactional pattern, ababambiqhaza bahlose ukuthola okungcono kubudlelwano phakathi kwabo bona uqobo lwabo kanye nabanye abantu esikhundleni sokwakha ubudlelwano lapho izinhlangothi zonke zithola ukushintshisana okulinganayo noma ukuzidela okuthile maqondana nobudlelwano, okuyinto eholela ekutheni kube nokuvumelana phakathi kwezinhlangothi okuhambisana nokuzidela komuntu uqobo lwakhe noma-ke ukukhonya phezu kwabanye. Kodwa-ke umthelela walokho oqondene nabaphathi wukuthi akulula neze ukwakha i-folded value relationship pattern yoqobo futhi lokhu kuyivela kancane.
Business Management
D. Com. (Business Management)

This chapter presents a straightforward structural description of Immanuel Kant’s conception of what the transcendental deduction is supposed to do, and how it is supposed to do it. The ‘deduction’ Kant thinks is needed for understanding the human mind would establish and explain our ‘right’ or ‘entitlement’ to something we seem to possess and employ in ‘the highly complicated web of human knowledge’. This is: experience, concepts, and principles. The chapter explains the point and strategy of the ‘deduction’ as Kant understands it, as well as the demanding conditions of its success, without entering into complexities of interpretation or critical assessment of the degree of success actually achieved. It also analyses Kant’s arguments regarding a priori concepts as well as a posteriori knowledge of the world around us, along with his claim that our position in the world must be understood as ‘empirical realism’.

This chapter points to the influence of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics on Kant’s transcendental philosophy. By comparing Kant’s refutation of idealism, including modifications to it suggested by notes written after the Critique of Pure Reason, with passages in the Metaphysics, Guyer shows that Kant clearly adopts Baumgarten’s own peculiar definition of idealism and develops the thesis that Baumgarten’s discussion of real interaction suggested to Kant the underlying strategy of his own refutation.

This chapter explores the so-called ‘Duisburg Nachlaß’, a set of sketches in Kant’s hand from the mid-1770s that may be understood as the ancestor of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique. The chapter has two parts. The first explores a central claim in the Duisburg Nachlaß that we know an object a priori only according to its relations by means of an ‘exposition of appearances’. The question is what does this mean? The strategy is to confront the claim with some of Kant’s metaphysical commitments from the 1750s about relations and his engagement with the regimentation of proofs in classical geometry (with a special focus on the ‘ekthesis’). The second part of the chapter uses what is learned from the first part to argue that the exposition of appearances in the Duisburg Nachlaß is meant to yield a cosmology of experience. The author uses the findings of this chapter later in the book to illuminate peculiarities and insights of the Transcendental Deduction.

Introducing or refining moral concepts is an important way of embellishing moral reason. Concepts that pick out distinctive moral issues more clearly are useful ways of furthering ethical debate. Concepts can be defined in a number of ways. In addition to introducing a new concept, arguments can be progressed by considering what must be the case about a concept that is in use in order for it to do the ethical work asked of it. This kind of strategy is what I call drawing ‘transcendental’ distinctions. This chapter describes how distinctions are drawn within slippery-slope arguments, how new concepts can be introduced for a specific moral purpose, and how existing concepts can be refined and theorized. Slippery-slope arguments are quite common in bioethics and, as I will show, can be difficult to sustain and are vulnerable to some common objections.

This chapter examines the thesis and antithesis of the fourth antinomy—along with their supporting arguments. It argues that Kant seeks to resolve this antinomy by a strategy paralleling the one he employs in the third Antinomy: namely, attempting to show that if Transcendental Idealism is true, the thesis and antithesis can be so understood that the truth of neither one excludes the truth of the other. The resolution further mirrors that of the third antinomy insofar as it does not purport to show on theoretical grounds that the concept of a necessary being is internally consistent. The chapter closes by examining the relevance to the fourth antinomy of Kant’s discussion of the example of De Mairan and the moon. This is a case in which one and the same body of evidence strikes each of two rival theorists as exclusively supporting their own position, thus inducing an antinomial dispute.

An essential element in the scientific and technological development has been the institutions of higher education (IHE), their role in economic development has been transcendental. The IHE’s contribute to innovation in the development of applied research aimed at generating useful technologies for society, in incorporating new technologies and in the direct or indirect application of technological innovations. The aspects worked by IHE are research, the generation of knowledge and technology, however, the challenge that currently arises for the IHE’s refers to the approach and management of their structures and actions and the preparation of their resources in the sense to place the technologies generated at the disposal of the market and society. In this context, the objective of this work was the application of a radar framework of critical success factors (RFCSF) for the commercialization of technologies in public universities, to a Technological Institute of Higher Studies in Mexico. The RFCSF allows monitoring four dimensions (Strategy and management, Culture and Structure, Market and Technologies and finally Individual Competencies) and sixteen indicators associated with these dimensions, in order to provide a diagnosis and improvements in the technology commercialization process.

Chapter 3 makes use of the military literature to identify, analyze, and contrast different models of efficacious action in early China. These models intend not to reflect purist and transcendent ways of action. They are a description of the possible solutions to the problem of efficacious action found in our extant military materials. There are certain attitudes that can be better understood under the rubric of a particular model (or meta-model) of agency. Sometimes we need to do the work of assembling these attitudes together and endowing them with a name. At other times, the attitudes are found already conceptualized as a model of action in the texts themselves. Overall, discourses on military agency address situations that can potentially be controlled, even if partially, such as devising strategies to win a battle.

The research's main objective was to assess the levels of development of innovation and research skills of the graduates of graduate programs in administration. The previous literature consulted for the study is made up of the contributions of Hernández, Alvarado, and Luna (2015), Amarista (2014), Valdés, Vera, and Carlos (2012b), and Vila, Dávila, and Ginés (2010). The type of study was a quantitative methodology employed a cross-sectional exploratory - descriptive. The instrument designed to obtain field information was based on a Likert scale questionnaire. The sample consisted of 126 graduates distributed in three graduate management programs. The main results of the study were that graduates globally have inadequate control of their innovation skills and a moderate level of development of their skills in research. The main conclusion of the investigation was that it is transcendental to consider the innovation as a strategic area not only in education but also in the economic and social system of a country.

Evolving discourses within the sphere of Christian experience and social development reveals that social transformation in the society cannot be separated from spiritual transformation. Religion as a social phenomenon has therefore become an acknowledged and strategic dimension in the development thinking and practice in contemporary society. But despite apparent contributions of religion to the development of many societies such as Nigeria, the role of religion, especially Christianity, has not been given due recognition in the history and development of a number of societies such as Ibesikpo Asutan of Akwa Ibom State. This study therefore examines the religious experience of the people towards development between 1912 when Christianity arrived and 2019. The method adopted for this work is the phenomenological and descriptive designs. Findings reveal that besides the consciousness of the transcendent and the question of God's existence, Christian missions in Ibesikpo Asutan have contributed immensely toward the development of the area.

This initial chapter examines the notion of causa sui as the strategic point of the entire first part of Spinoza's Ethics. In the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition (Thomas Aquinas, Suarez - but then, in the end, also Descartes) this notion is accepted only in a metaphorical and approximate sense because, as Aristotle teaches, an entity cannot be, strictly speaking, the efficient cause of itself: the cause is in fact necessarily different and "eminent", temporally prior and ontologically more powerful, than its effect. Spinoza instead uses the notion of causa sui in an unequivocal and direct way. God ("that is, Nature, that is, Substance") is literally the cause of himself in the same sense in which he is the cause of things. Spinoza accepts the paralogism of the "cause of itself" with the aim of completely demolishing the traditional image of a personal God, endowed with intellect and will, and as such transcendent with respect to finite entities. Spinoza's God-Nature-Substance is thus resolved into pure expressive-productive energy, in his being the cause of his "modes". This position opens up a perspective of radical immanence, and the possibility of an ethical and political perfection of man in the dynamic terms of potentia, up to that beatitudo, which represents the culminating point of power.

The spectral data i.e. eigenvalues (natural frequencies) and eigenvectors (mode-shapes), characterizes the dynamics of the system. Non-destructive vibration testing, involving advanced experimental modal analysis techniques, has a potential to obtain the spectral data of the structures. It is well known that the dynamic characteristics of a structure will change due to the change in its physical properties. In this research, such changes in spectral behavior will be exploited towards the detection of minuscule changes in the mass of microstructures such as cantilever micro-beams, micro-resonators and oscillators, by solving certain direct and inverse eigenvalue problems. Some piecewise uniform micro-cantilever beams are considered here and associated transcendental eigenvalue problems are developed. Examples relevant to the design and identification of such beams are demonstrated through systematic mathematical modeling and effective solution strategy. It is shown that spectral behavior of mass loaded piecewise uniform beams can be obtained accurately and efficiently. Moreover, location and severity of the loaded mass can be identified successfully by using finite number of eigenvalues which may be available from experiments. Such formulations can be useful for, design and optimization of microstructures (micro-cantilever beams, resonators etc.), Bio-MEMS sensor design for the detection of single/multiple microbiological cells, and structural health monitoring.

The course of the digital transformation of economy, work and society as well as increasing pressure from hyper individualized demand on the one hand and on the other hand issues that ask for global action, like pandemics or climate change, paves the way for new smart service-oriented forms of value creation, thus, solutions enhanced by new technological possibilities that transcendent corporate or individual routines and restrictions of human coping with complexity. Future Service Business thrives with seamless interaction in the conscious providing and coupling of resources, i. e. products and services, physical and digital elements, manpower and competencies, massively supported by and dependent on data and analytics in business-ecosystems. In order to create this “seamlessness” a new quality of conjoint value creation on strategic as well as operative level is necessary, that helps balancing value co-creation and value co-destruction in coopetitive multi-actor-ecosystems. Research on modelling processes for sustainable and resilient “governance as a smart service” is presented that deep dives on possible ways to combine the relative strenghs of digital evaluation and human decision. The research question if governance design for resource integration in new service business ecosystems can be provided “…as a smart service” itself is approached with two focal assumptions on resource integration in service-oriented ecosystems: firstly, the creation of a common, overarching value proposition for the customer (promise making externally) has to be complemented by value propositions for each contributing actor involved on the provider side (promis making internally). This will enable the governance function to know about and adress the costs of collaboration. Secondly, the design of common operational processes for key activities that meets internal expectations is crucial (promise keeping of the ecosystem). This will enable the governance function as well as mulit facetted actor practices to meet expectations and rely on fullfillment of collaborative quality by each actor in the value creation system. For the formulation of innovative value propositions we refer to the concept of value proposition design (Osterwalder et al 2015, Chesbrough, 2007). We aim to find out, to what extent the elements of the concept in the customer sphere: jobs to be done, pains, gains, can be transferred to the internal perspective of ecosystem partners and what adjustments are necessary in formulating value propositions in internal perspective. In the solution sphere of the Value Proposition Design concept with the elements: products & services, pain relievers, gain creators, we explore to which extent these are suitable to map the perspectives of the actors involved in order to derive reference processes of resource integration regarding the commonly shaped value propositions, internally and externally alike. The view formulated by Grönross (2011, 290), that in service-oriented value creation processes of different actors run simultaneously and a number of dialogic processes lead to an integrated process of coordinated action is modified. Our starting point is the need for a structured and digital augmented multilog and the goal is the design of a number of suitable common processes and standards with a resource-integrating bridging function between the original business models of each contributing partner in the system and the collaborative business model of the ecosystem as system of systems. This includes looking at virtual instances in the (re-) design of governance processes that support collaboration in a balance between independence and dependency (Malone, 2018, Freund / Spohrer, 2013).