Journal articles: 'Transaction costs economics'

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CABALLERO, GONZALO, and DAVID SOTO-OÑATE. "Why transaction costs are so relevant in political governance? a new institutional survey." Revista de Economia Política 36, no. 2 (June 2016): 330–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572016v36n02a05.

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ABSTRACT The New Institutional Economics, led by four Nobel laureates (Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom), has showed that institutions and organizations are a medium for reducing transaction costs and obtaining a higher efficiency in economic performance. This paper goes into the research program of the New Institutional Economics to explain the relevance of transaction costs in political exchange and organization and show that transactions costs are even higher in political markets than in economic markets. The paper reviews the main contributions on institutions, transaction costs and political governance, and provides some lessons on political transacting and governance. The survey includes the most detailed catalogue of political transaction costs that has ever been published.

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Frolov, D. P. "From transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the frictional paradigm." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 8 (August 3, 2020): 51–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-8-51-81.

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The transaction cost economics has accumulated a mass of dogmatic concepts and assertions that have acquired high stability under the influence of path dependence. These include the dogma about transaction costs as frictions, the dogma about the unproductiveness of transactions as a generator of losses, “Stigler—Coase” theorem and the logic of transaction cost minimization, and also the dogma about the priority of institutions providing low-cost transactions. The listed dogmas underlie the prevailing tradition of transactional analysis the frictional paradigm — which, in turn, is the foundation of neo-institutional theory. Therefore, the community of new institutionalists implicitly blocks attempts of a serious revision of this dogmatics. The purpose of the article is to substantiate a post-institutional (alternative to the dominant neo-institutional discourse) value-oriented perspective for the development of transactional studies based on rethinking and combining forgotten theoretical alternatives. Those are Commons’s theory of transactions, Wallis—North’s theory of transaction sector, theory of transaction benefits (T. Sandler, N. Komesar, T. Eggertsson) and Zajac—Olsen’s theory of transaction value. The article provides arguments and examples in favor of broader explanatory possibilities of value-oriented transactional analysis.

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Delmas, Magali, and Alfred Marcus. "Firms' Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach." Business and Politics 6, no. 3 (December 2004): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1073.

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This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.

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Tan, Rong, Volker Beckmann, Futian Qu, and Cifang Wu. "Governing Farmland Conversion for Urban Development from the Perspective of Transaction Cost Economics." Urban Studies 49, no. 10 (November 10, 2011): 2265–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0042098011423564.

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This paper considers farmland conversion for the purpose of urban development as a series of transactions and discusses the determinants of appropriate governance structures for governing farmland conversion in terms of process efficiency. Towards this end, the paper develops a theoretical framework for analysing the process of farmland conversion based on transaction cost economics. The framework covers transactions, transaction attributes, governance structures and performance with the aim of minimising transaction costs. The paper also demonstrates the usability of the framework by creating a corresponding quantitative model for a case study in China. Furthermore, it identifies factors that influence the transaction costs associated with farmland conversion in China and explains why the related governance structures are chosen.

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Hausken, Kjell, and Galina A. Schwartz. "Transaction costs and iceberg costs." Applied Economics Letters 18, no. 1 (December 31, 2010): 101–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504850903427153.

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Yuan, Dinghuan, Yung Yau, Wenyi Lin, and Jianxin Cheng. "An Analysis of Transaction Costs Involved in the Urban Village Redevelopment Process in China." Buildings 12, no. 5 (May 22, 2022): 692. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/buildings12050692.

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A well-designed institutional arrangement for urban village redevelopment projects (UVRPs) must consider transaction costs, but academic papers discussing it from the perspective of transaction cost economics are lacking. This paper applies theory of transaction cost economics to analyse the types and sizes of transaction costs and who bears these costs during redevelopment when implementing UVRPs in China. This paper finds that transactions in UVRPs have high asset specificity, high uncertainty and low frequency, which easily results in high levels of transaction costs. Based on 439 UVRPs collected from seven cities, this paper finds that UVRPs implemented with top–down institutional arrangements remain prevalent in China. Based on semi-structured interviews with participating parties, this paper proves that the sizes and types of transaction costs and the distribution of these costs borne by different participating parties vary with the change of stage under dissimilar institutional arrangements. This implies that a high level of transaction costs at one stage does not necessarily mean the costs stay high at another stage. Transaction costs have essential implications for process efficiency, so policymakers need to consider transaction costs and use hybrid institutional arrangements to enhance the efficiency and sustainability of policies.

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KAN, STEVEN S. "ENTREPRENEURSHIP, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND SUBJECTIVIST ECONOMICS." Journal of Enterprising Culture 01, no. 02 (November 1993): 159–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218495893000099.

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While researches along the lines of Austrian, Buchanan, and Coase’s teachings are thriving recently, they are not united. We show that conceptions of entrepreneurship and transaction costs are generally ambiguous regarding important exchange relationships because they are limited to the consideration of one-sided individual choices only. It is argued in the paper that the completion of an exchange necessarily involves at least two individuals acting in the role of the entrepreneur. In addition, transaction costs are subjective and cannot be treated as production or transportation costs. The paper distinguishes the concept of production cost from that of transaction cost, which is necessarily associated with alternative exchange or organizational opportunities, and therefore expands Buchanan’s subjectivist conception of individual cost to that of interactive transaction cost. A new definition of transaction cost and its implications to a testable theory of the determination of institutions are presented in the paper. Thus, in contrast to the general impression that entrepreneurship cannot be taught and studied, we show how it can be possible under our synthesis of entrepreneurship, transaction costs, and subjectivist economics. An example is also given to demonstrate how entrepreneurship can be taught and learned under our proposed framework.

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Berkowitz, Stephen A., and Dennis E. Logue. "Transaction Costs." Journal of Portfolio Management 27, no. 2 (January 31, 2001): 65–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jpm.2001.319793.

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Langlois, Richard N. "The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs." Organization Studies 27, no. 9 (June 28, 2006): 1389–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0170840606067769.

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Transaction costs, one often hears, are ‘the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems’. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does — let alone should — work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously ‘frictions’. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost — what Baldwin and Clark call mundane transaction costs — actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understand how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.

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Zhang, Y. "Economics of transaction costs saving forestry." Ecological Economics 36, no. 2 (February 2001): 197–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0921-8009(00)00228-7.

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Hoang, Dung Phuong, and Thong Huy Vu. "A transaction cost explanation of the card-or-cash decision among Vietnamese debit card holders." International Journal of Bank Marketing 38, no. 7 (March 6, 2020): 1635–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijbm-05-2019-0191.

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PurposeThis research provides a new perspective in explaining cardholders' willingness to use debit cards instead of cash by applying the transaction costs economic theory. This study also expands the adaptation of transaction cost economics theory in explaining consumer behaviour by investigating the moderating effects of income and education level on the relationship between perceived transaction costs and willingness to use debit cards.Design/methodology/approachThe conceptual framework was developed primarily from the transaction cost economics theory. An in-depth interview method was employed to further support hypothesis development and the development of measurement scales. A structural equation model linking asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, frequency of payment, perceived monitoring costs, perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards was tested using data from a sample of 384 Vietnamese debit card holders.FindingsThis study's results support the transaction cost economics theory that asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of payment all positively contribute to the perceived transaction costs associated with debit card usage. However, only environmental uncertainty and perceived adaptation costs have significant negative impact on willingness to use debit cards, with the relationship between environmental uncertainty and willingness to use debit cards being totally mediated by perceived adaptation costs. Moreover, the relationship between perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards becomes less negative among richer and better-educated cardholders.Practical implicationsThe research provides insights into the hidden obstacles for developing cashless economies, thereby supporting policy makers in designing more effective and comprehensive strategies to make debit cards more widely used as a true substitute for cash.Originality/valueThis study provides a new lens in explaining customer willingness to use debit cards, while expanding the transaction costs economics theory by incorporating demographic factors as moderators in the relationship between transaction costs and the card-or-cash choice.

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See Un, Ryu. "Transaction Behavior in Nonmarket Settings: Revisiting Transaction Cost Economics Theory." Korean Journal of Policy Studies 27, no. 1 (April 30, 2012): 23–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.52372/kjps27102.

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This study focuses on changes in transaction costs over time in nonmarket settings. Traditional Williamsonian transaction cost economics theory shows little concern with time. However, this study reveals that time is a crucial factor in the fluctuation of transaction costs in nonmarket settings: Transaction costs increase in the initial and middle phases of a transaction. But in the long term, they may increase or decrease and are affected considerably by whether the rules, procedures, and protocols governing the transaction are effective ("green tape") or ineffective ("red tape"). In contrast, traditional transaction cost economics assumes a gradual decrease in transaction costs over time. The passage of time and the "red tape" or "green tape" governing the transaction influence stakeholders` transaction behavior in nonmarket settings.

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PLOTNIKOV, Viktor S., and Saule S. KANAPINOVA. "Contractual obligations as an element of transaction costs of the exchange deal." International Accounting 24, no. 3 (March 15, 2021): 252–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.24891/ia.24.3.252.

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Subject. This article discusses the issues relating to the reflection of contractual obligations in the accounting system as an economic category of transaction costs. Objectives. The article aims to describe a market-based approach to defining contractual obligations as transaction costs of the organization and the specifics of their separate reflection in the accounting system. It also aims to define the content of the organization's obligations in terms of the rights of claim for economic resources to reduce the gap between accounting theory and institutional theory. Methods. For the study, we used the theory of institutional economics, the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting that help expand the scope of accounting by incorporating market relations reflecting the obligations to provide exchange transactions. Results. The article defines and proves the importance of the obligations of the exchange transaction parties to reflect them in the accounting system, and that transaction costs expressed by obligations determine the future rights of the market agents. The economic content of the exchange transaction parties' contractual obligations is significantly different from the accounting understanding of receivables and payables. The article proposes to separate the transaction costs determined by the exchange transaction parties' obligations, subsequently capitalizing and reflecting them in financial (integrated) reporting in the structure of client (reputational) capital. Conclusions. It is necessary and possible to develop the accounting theory by incorporating new economic phenomena, such as the contractual obligations of the exchange transaction parties. This approach will help change the retrospective view of understanding accounting information to some extent.

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Lemanowicz, Marzena. "THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN THE LIGHT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS. THE SPECIFICITY OF AGRICULTURAL CONTRACTS." Acta Scientiarum Polonorum. Oeconomia 17, no. 4 (December 30, 2018): 97–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.22630/aspe.2018.17.4.56.

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The article reviews Polish and foreign economic literature regarding new institutional economics (NIE) and various research approaches used in the framework of NIE. Particular attention was paid to the economic theory of contracts and the transaction costs, as the limitation of transaction costs is indeed the main stimulus for contract signing. Special attention was given to agricultural contracts and their specificity. The article discusses different theories applied in the analysis of contracts, characterizes contracts according to different criteria, and draws attention to the importance of transaction costs in the theory of contracts. In addition, factors which contribute to these costs have been identified, indicating the necessity of adapting the principles of transaction cost economics to the needs of the agricultural sector.

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Berck, Peter. "Transaction Costs: Discussion." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81, no. 3 (August 1999): 671–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244032.

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VILLAMAYOR-TOMAS, SERGIO. "Disturbance features, coordination and cooperation: an institutional economics analysis of adaptations in the Spanish irrigation sector." Journal of Institutional Economics 14, no. 3 (July 13, 2017): 501–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137417000285.

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AbstractThis paper explores associations between disturbances and cooperative responses in a selection of irrigation associations from Spain. Transaction costs and collective action theories are used to characterize disturbances and responses. Disturbances are characterized by looking at the uncertainty they generate, their frequency, the distance of the transacting partners they affect, and their impact on asset-specific transactions. Responses are assessed based on the collective action tasks they involve and classified into coordination and cooperation responses. A qualitative comparative analysis confirms two pathways that are sufficient for the emergence of cooperation responses. The first path is congruent with transaction costs theory, and points to disturbances that are frequent and asset specific; the second path supports relational theory, and points to disturbances that emerge progressively from within the system. Other patterns include the tendency of irrigation associations to delegate to external entities when disturbances are external and occur frequently; and the adaptation of existing institutions when the disturbances are internal and progressive.

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Coronado, Jose Jaime Arana, Jos Bijman, Onno Omta, and Alfons Oude Lansink. "Relationship characteristics and performance in fresh produce supply chains: the case of the Mexican avocado industry." Journal on Chain and Network Science 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3920/jcns2010.x101.

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Inter-organisational relations research has shown that relationship characteristics can influence performance in seller-buyer transactions. Using a transaction cost economics approach, this research shows that relational elements such as expectation of continuity reduce the transaction risks related to behavioural uncertainty or asset specificity. However, transaction costs are not only caused by transaction risks but also by the need to coordinate the individual activities of the buyer and the seller. Inter-organisational coordination is important in transactions with perishable products and products with credence attributes, such as in fresh produce supply chains. To study the impact of different relationship characteristics on the efficiency of transactions in a fresh produce supply chain, we collected and analyzed data from 122 avocado producers in Mexico. We found that information exchange and producer expectation of continuity of the relationship positively affect performance in the seller-buyer transaction. While expectation of continuity leads to lower transaction costs associated with behavioural uncertainty, information exchange facilitates the efficient alignment of interdependent activities.

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Yang, Zhi Xue. "Research on Trade Model of Transaction Costs Based on Ecommerce." Applied Mechanics and Materials 26-28 (June 2010): 218–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.26-28.218.

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Transaction cost is one of these costs, but mostly mentioned with trade barriers. The trade barrier, also called tariff barracks or non- tariff barracks, focus on the problems that affect transactions in international trade. Transaction cost in economics can be defined as a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. There are a number of kinds of transaction cost have been researched by economists, “search and information costs” (such as those incurred in determining that the required good is available on the market, who has the lowest price.), “Bargaining costs” (the costs required to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party to the transaction, drawing up an appropriate contract and so on.), “Policing and enforcement costs” (the costs of making sure the other party sticks to the terms of the contract, and taking appropriate action if this turns out not to be the case.). Along with the fast development of e-commerce, a new kind of trade barriers, which is called e-commerce barrier, based on information technology appears quietly, in recent years. Though the emergence of this barracks does not been focused by world, it has profoundly affected international trade already.

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Slater, Gary, and David A. Spencer. "The Uncertain Foundations of Transaction Costs Economics." Journal of Economic Issues 34, no. 1 (March 2000): 61–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2000.11506244.

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Bevan, Alan, and Christos N. Pitelis. "Transaction Costs, Markets and Hierarchies." Economic Journal 104, no. 427 (November 1994): 1481. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2235476.

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Hoelle, Matthew. "Transaction costs and planner intervention." Economic Theory 50, no. 3 (November 10, 2010): 603–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0583-5.

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Famulski, Tomasz. "Selected Legal Aspects of Transaction Costs." Finanse i Prawo Finansowe 1, no. 13 (March 31, 2017): 21–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/2391-6478.1.13.03.

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The aim of this article is to identify the relation between transaction costs and the law, both on theoretical and practical grounds. In literature various approaches on the issue of transaction costs are presented, but it was Ronald H. Coase’s discovery and explanation that turned out to be one of the most crucial determinants of the development of Law & Economics. Thereby, the findings of economics on the issue of transaction costs are interfuses L&E as a jurisprudential movement. Detailed analysis of selected current Polish legal regulations lead to a conclusion that some of those regulations generate transaction costs, while other limit the ability to transact. Concurrently, legal regulations that foster reduction of the level of transaction costs are indentified. In general conclusion it can be asserted that the previous assumption – legal regulations can affect transaction costs in both positive and negative way – is true.

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Nguvava, Heriel Emanuel. "Influence of Transaction Cost Determinants on Credit Customer Category of Commercial Banks in Tanzania." African Journal of Accounting and Social Science Studies 4, no. 1 (August 18, 2022): 244–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajasss.v4i1.13.

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The provision of credit services in rural areas is a challenge as agriculture and other rural economic activities have unique characteristics of dependence on natural resources, long production cycles and vulnerability to multiple risks. This paper aims to analyse transaction cost as the determinants of the choice of credit customer category for commercial bank’s credit business scale-up in Tanzania. Primary data for this study were collected from 37 registered and licensed commercial banks in January 2018 through structured questionnaires. The main sources of secondary data were peer-reviewed journal articles on transaction cost economics and rural financing. Data were analysed quantitatively through the logistic regression method. Key findings revealed that commercial banks have failed to scale up their credit operations to rural-based customers due to high transaction costs. This fact emanated from commercial banks’ preference of transacting credits directly with individual borrowers instead of using intermediaries, thus multiplying transaction costs, especially when dealing with rural-based borrowers. Therefore, commercial banks believe to be better off with few urban-based credit customers. This study recommended that commercial banks should use multiple credit governance structures (CGSs)\ (methods for credits delivery) to mitigate transaction costs when giving credits. Direct channels should be opted for when dealing with urban-based borrowers since low transaction costs are involved. Indirect channels with intermediaries should be opted for when scaling-up credit operations to rural-based borrowers since they allow the spreading of credit transaction costs throughout the credit supply channel.

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Hsieh, Ching-Tang, Hao-Chen Huang, and Wei-Long Lee. "Using transaction cost economics to explain open innovation in start-ups." Management Decision 54, no. 9 (October 17, 2016): 2133–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-01-2016-0012.

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Purpose The basic concept of transaction cost theory is that firms like to conduct transactions in a channel with lower transaction costs. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to use the transaction cost perspective to identify which conditions cause companies to choose between outbound open innovation (hierarchy governance) and inbound open innovation (market governance). Design/methodology/approach Accordingly, transaction cost economics was used to relate the choice and implementation of open innovation using a sample of 250 electronics and information start-ups in China. Structural equation modeling was used to conduct confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate measurement model, while logistic regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses. Findings As expected, the dedicated asset specificity, human asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty, transaction frequency, and small number exchange were positively associated with outbound open innovation. Originality/value The contribution of this paper lies in explaining the role played by transaction cost economics in the process of open innovation for start-ups through empirical analysis.

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Saravia Matus, Jimmy A., and Silvia Saravia-Matus. "Corporate governance and transaction cost economics: A study of the equity governance structure." Corporate Board role duties and composition 12, no. 1 (2016): 33–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv12i1art4.

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This paper extends the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory of the equity governance structure by introducing a (hitherto absent) full analysis of the key TCE issue of bilateral dependency between the firm and its shareholders. In addition, the paper discusses the implications of the analysis for the topic of corporate governance and firm performance. We find that when bilateral dependency holds contractual hazards are mitigated as predicted by TCE, but that when it does not contractual safeguards are altered to the disadvantage of shareholders and managerial discretion costs increase as reflected by lower firm valuation. Importantly, our study documents for the first time a class of transactions where business relationships persist indefinitely even though transaction costs are not minimized.

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Alam, Ahmad Rafay. "Land-locked: An Examination of Some of the Inefficiencies Affecting Transactions Involving Immovable Property." Pakistan Development Review 45, no. 4II (December 1, 2006): 1323–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v45i4iipp.1323-1342.

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In the study of law and economics, the Coase Theorem posits that an efficient allocation of resources will result when transactions costs are zero.1 These “transaction costs” may be viewed as impediments to an efficient allocation of resources and can take many forms. For example, long distances between a prospective vendor and purchaser of property and a lack of communication facilities between them would impede even the best of intentions to enter into a bargain. Similarly, the cost of mobilising labour and materials might impede a property developer from pursuing a tender for civil works. In some cases, a high rate of Stamp Duty on transactions can result in the parties reconsidering their decision to enter into such bargains. To the extent this author can claim knowledge of economics, the Coase Theorem also suggests that transaction costs and inefficiencies hamper the natural flow of bargains, result in inefficient allocation of resources and thus impact the economy. Some transaction costs are small enough to ignore whereas some, imposed, for example, by the law, are unavoidable. In such cases, a mutual understanding between the parties may see the burden of these transaction costs shared or, in others, avoided altogether. For example, the statutory requirements that all leases purporting to grant a term in excess of one year or which reserve an annual rent must be registered and stamped2 often results, in owners of residential property granting indefinitely renewable leases of 11 months and thus avoiding such requirements.

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Mick, Stephen S. Farnsworth, and Patrick D. Shay. "Accountable Care Organizations and Transaction Cost Economics." Medical Care Research and Review 73, no. 6 (August 3, 2016): 649–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077558716640411.

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Using a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach, this paper explores which organizational forms Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) may take. A critical question about form is the amount of vertical integration that an ACO may have, a topic central to TCE. We posit that contextual factors outside and inside an ACO will produce variable transaction costs (the non-production costs of care) such that the decision to integrate vertically will derive from a comparison of these external versus internal costs, assuming reasonably rational management abilities. External costs include those arising from environmental uncertainty and complexity, small numbers bargaining, asset specificity, frequency of exchanges, and information “impactedness.” Internal costs include those arising from human resource activities including hiring and staffing, training, evaluating (i.e., disciplining, appraising, or promoting), and otherwise administering programs. At the extreme, these different costs may produce either total vertical integration or little to no vertical integration with most ACOs falling in between. This essay demonstrates how TCE can be applied to the ACO organization form issue, explains TCE, considers ACO activity from the TCE perspective, and reflects on research directions that may inform TCE and facilitate ACO development.

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Jang, Bong-Gyu, Taeyoon Kim, Seungkyu Lee, and Seyoung Park. "Ambiguity premium and transaction costs." Economics Letters 207 (October 2021): 110007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110007.

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Henning, Christian H. C. A., Géraldine Henningsen, and Arne Henningsen. "Networks and Transaction Costs." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94, no. 2 (October 21, 2011): 377–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aar099.

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Li, Geng. "Transaction costs and consumption." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, no. 6 (June 2009): 1263–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2008.12.003.

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Orekhovsky, P. A. "TRANSACTION COSTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE SIZE OF THE ENTERPRISE AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY." Economics Profession Business, no. 1 (March 10, 2021): 63–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.14258/epb202108.

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The paper presents a discursive analysis of the use of the category of “transaction costs”. The similarity of the concepts of “transaction costs’ and “costs of the marketing” by E. Chamberlin is demonstrated. However, in the original discourse of R. Coase, transaction costs are considered as the costs of using the price mechanism associated with the market allocation of resources. The firm, as a hierarchical economic system, was an alternative allocation mechanism to the market. The factors that influence the value of transaction costs in O. Williamson’s contract theory are almost unrelated to sales and the marketing. In the discourse of J. Buchanan and M. Olson transaction costs are costs arising in the political market. For J. Buchanan, these are the “positive” costs of creating new laws that reduce the social costs associated with the production and distribution of public goods. M. Olson’s discourse addresses not only the “positive” but also the “negative” costs associated with dividing markets through government regulation. In turn, R. Coase himself, investigating the problem of social costs associated with external effects, in fact got rid of transaction costs, equating them to zero. It is this situation of “Coase’s theorem” that began to be used in the framework of the analysis methodology of the discipline “Economics and Law”. The paper proposes an interpretation of transaction costs as costs of overcoming the boundaries between heterogeneous systems, based on the discourse of E. de Soto. In this case, the prices of legality/illegality can be viewed as the transaction costs of using different economic systems.

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Li, Huimin, David Arditi, and Zhuofu Wang. "Transaction costs incurred by construction owners." Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 21, no. 4 (July 15, 2014): 444–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ecam-07-2013-0064.

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Purpose – Transaction costs arise from economic exchange rather than production activities. However, the term “transaction cost” is not consistently defined in the construction industry because the concept of transaction cost is not universally accepted by all stakeholders in construction projects. As a result, empirical studies are few and conflicting because accessing data on transaction costs is problematic, and the interpretation of the data is difficult. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the transaction costs borne by the owner in a construction project from the perspective of transaction cost economics and construction project characteristics. Design/methodology/approach – A questionnaire survey was administered to construction owners. The factors that impact transaction costs were analyzed in the context of human-related issues (the owner's and the contractor's positions in the transaction), and environment-related issues (the transaction environment, and project management efficiency). Statistical analyses were conducted to compare the transaction costs incurred in the pre- vs post-contract phases of a project relative to the private vs public sector, different project delivery systems, different procurement methods, and different types of contracts. Findings – The owners surveyed believe that transaction costs may be reduced if the owner and the contractor follow some basic guidelines (e.g. experience in similar projects, prompt payment, good relationship with project participants, no irregularities in bidding, and only few material substitutions and claims), if the project is well-run (e.g. technical competency, strong leadership, prompt decision-making, effective communication, and fair/speedy conflict management), and if the transaction environment is favorable (e.g. fair risk allocation, early contractor involvement, and complete design documents). The findings of the survey also indicate that post-contract transaction costs are much higher than pre-contract transaction costs expressed as percent of project value and that transaction costs are affected by the owner (public vs private), the procurement method, the project delivery system, and the type of contract. Originality/value – The primary contribution that this research makes to the body of knowledge is a better understanding of transaction costs incurred by construction owners in the USA. The highest transaction costs are to be expected in the post-contract phase of public projects awarded on a unit price basis, but can be reduced, hence reducing overall project cost.

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F. Stepanenko, Raviya, and Murat R. Kamarov. "LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF TRANSACTION COSTS." Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 7, no. 6 (December 12, 2019): 668–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2019.76100.

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Purposes: This paper is devoted to the legal understanding of transaction costs both as a concept and a method developed within the framework of the institutional economics discipline for analyzing the consequences of various kinds arising from the exchange of goods. This work is relevant due to the need to apply new interdisciplinary methodological approaches to solving the problems that classical jurisprudence faces. The authors gave legalized concepts of transaction and transaction costs. Methods: As the main task within the framework of this paper, the authors proposed a classification of transaction costs, with the help of which it is possible to analyze legal activity in various fields. The study was based on the works of foreign and Russian scientists, economists and lawyers. Results: In the paper, the authors found that the classification of transaction costs used in economics was created only for analyzing relationships within substantive law and using them to analyze other legal relationships seems to be quite problematic. As a result of the study, the authors developed a new classification of transaction costs, which can be used both for the analysis of substantive and procedural law. Also, they focus on certain aspects of various transaction costs. Implications/Applications: In this regard, a problem arises in creating a classification that would take into account the advantages of all these approaches, and would also be suitable for describing both substantive and procedural legal relations. Novelty/Originality: The development of domestic and foreign legal science is impossible without the use of interdisciplinary approaches, including not only the interaction of intersectoral relations, and this article has studied this issue.

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Malin, Eric, and David Martimort. "Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory." Revue d’économie industrielle 92, no. 1 (2000): 125–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rei.2000.1043.

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Swidler, Steve, and J. David Diltz. "Implied Volatilities and Transaction Costs." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27, no. 3 (September 1992): 437. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2331329.

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Niehans, Jurg. "Arbitrage Equilibrium with Transaction Costs." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26, no. 2 (May 1994): 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2077908.

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Kowalska, Katarzyna. "Contracts and Transaction Costs in New Institutional Economics." Gospodarka Narodowa 201, no. 7-8 (August 31, 2005): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/gn/101521.

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Burke, Terry. "Risks and reputations: the economics of transaction costs." Corporate Communications: An International Journal 3, no. 1 (January 1998): 5–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb046547.

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Locke, Peter R., and P. C. Venkatesh. "Futures market transaction costs." Journal of Futures Markets 17, no. 2 (April 1997): 229–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1096-9934(199704)17:2<229::aid-fut5>3.0.co;2-l.

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VORONOVA, Ekaterina Yu, and Аnna А. VEKSHINA. "A model of accounting and analytical support of cost optimization in the context of new institutionalism." International Accounting 25, no. 12 (December 15, 2022): 1360–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.24891/ia.25.12.1360.

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Subject. This article deals with the theoretical and methodological features of the formation of accounting and analytical support for transformation and transaction cost optimization. Objectives. The article aims to indicate the need to classify costs according to their belonging to transactions and disclose the theoretical and methodological features in the context of accounting and analytical cost optimization support. Methods. For the study, we used general scientific methods (analysis, comparison and interpretation) and statistical methods in economics. The results of the study are shown in tabular and graphical forms. Results. The article defines the notion of Transaction Cost and the need to decompose cost into transformation and transaction parts to take measures to optimize the level of costs. It systematizes the theoretical and methodological features of accounting and analytical models for transformation and transaction cost optimization. The article also proposes to integrate digital technologies into the management cost accounting system. Conclusions and Relevance. The article justifies the necessity to break costs into transformation and transaction parts for these types of cost have different approaches to the accounting and analytical support formation for optimization. The organization of accounting and analysis of costs by their belonging to transactions can improve the quality of accounting and analytical support and, consequently, the information base for management decisions. At present, the digital technologies that can be used in financial and operational activities contribute to cost reduction.

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Zhang, Lin. "Comparative Corporate Governance and Transaction Costs: Implications for China." Business Law Review 40, Issue 5 (September 1, 2019): 186–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/bula2019025.

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Comparative study is significant for the reform of corporate governance in transitional economies like China. Influenced by the Berle- Means problem, this kind of study is usually under the auspices of the agency theory. However, besides the agency theory, another important theoretical framework to examine corporate governance is transaction cost economics. Based on transaction cost economics, it demonstrates that the governance structure of Japanese vertical keiretsu may promote the enforcement of relational contract other than the function to monitor the performance of managers. This understanding has positive implications for the Venture Capital (VC)-backed strategic alliances in China.

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Medema, Steven G. "Transactions, transaction costs, and vertical integration: a re-examination." Review of Political Economy 4, no. 3 (January 1992): 291–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538259200000021.

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Todorova, Tamara. "Adverse Effects of Transaction Costs in East European Economies." Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies 2, no. 1 (May 31, 2011): 34–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/omee.2011.2.1.14288.

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Abstract. At a given level of technology the gross aggregate production function lies above the net aggregate production function where the difference represents the aggregate transaction costs in the economy. Transitional economies facing serious institutional impediments to creating a smoothly functioning market mechanism are faced with sizable transaction costs. We use a net production function model enhanced by Furubotn and Richter and apply it conceptually to the case of transitional economies. We find that at a particular level of a community isoprofit line much less output will be supplied compared to developed market economies with mature market institutions. The aim of the paper is to trace the falling output and the deep structural problems of East European economies to the effect of transaction costs and institutional building. The more rapidly transaction costs grow, the less the firms would be willing to pay for inputs. Furthermore, we find that certain markets tend to disappear in emerging economies due to the adverse effects of transaction costs. As a safeguard to precontractual opportunism and prevention to ex post transaction costs, ex ante transaction costs would play a more vital role in East European societies.

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Peneva Todorova, Tamara. "The tragedy of the private: transaction cost considerations." International Journal of Social Economics 41, no. 6 (June 3, 2014): 482–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijse-02-2011-0069.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to weigh the benefits and costs of public property, as opposed to private, from the transaction cost perspective. In the absence of transaction costs, private property has clear advantages over public. However, when the true costs of running an economic system are taken into account, the advantages of private property are not so evident and public property may turn out to be the preferred form of ownership. The paper shows that in high-transaction cost sectors and economies such as the newly emerging markets in Eastern Europe, public property is a cheaper way of organizing economic activities, as it can save on transaction costs. The paper demonstrates these virtues of public ownership in relation to market failure, the provision of public goods, natural monopolies and competitive industries with a high degree of market uncertainty, opportunism and asset specificity. Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative paper discussing the advantages of public over private property in the presence of high-transaction costs. Findings – Studying different types of market failure the paper finds that public property is advantageous to private in high-transaction cost systems. Originality/value – Since most of the standard literature emphasizes the advantages of private property, the paper gives an economic explanation to those of public property taking on a new institutional approach and conducting a transaction cost analysis.

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Zhang, Junxi. "Liquidity, Transaction Costs, and Real Activity." Southern Economic Journal 65, no. 2 (October 1998): 308–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00152.x.

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Zhang, Junxi. "Liquidity, Transaction Costs, and Real Activity." Southern Economic Journal 65, no. 2 (October 1998): 308. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1060670.

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Lee, Jihong, and Hamid Sabourian. "Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs." Journal of Economic Theory 135, no. 1 (July 2007): 214–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.014.

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Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe, and Yiannis Vailakis. "Financial markets with endogenous transaction costs." Economic Theory 45, no. 1-2 (September 26, 2009): 65–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0498-1.

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Lleo, Sébastien. "Asymptotic Theory of Transaction Costs." Quantitative Finance 18, no. 8 (July 9, 2018): 1261–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14697688.2018.1475617.

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Nantongo, Mary, and Arild Vatn. "Estimating Transaction Costs of REDD+." Ecological Economics 156 (February 2019): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.08.014.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Transaction costs economics'

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